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ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT ECONOMIC, MARKETING AND FINANCIAL EVALUATION

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18 - ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL EVALUATION

18.1 - Economic Evaluation

(a) Introduction

This section provides a discussion of the key economic parameters used in the study and develops the net economic benefits stemming from the Susitna hydroelectric project. Section 18.1 (b) deals with those economic principles relevant to the analysis of net economic benefits and develops inflation and discount rates and the Alaskan opportunity values (shadow prices) of oil, natural gas and coal. In particular the analysis is focused on the longer-term prospects for coal markets and prices. This follows from the evaluation that, in the absence of Susitna, the next-best thermal generation plan would rely on substantial and sustained exploitation of Alaska's coal resources. The future coal price is therefore examined in considerable detail to provide rigorous estimates of prices in the most likely alternative markets and hence the market price of coal at the mine-head within the state.

Section 18.1 (c) presents the net economic benefits of the proposed hydroelectric power investments compared with this thermal alternative. These are measured in terms of present-valued differences between Susitna and non-Susitna system costs. Recognizing that even the most careful estimates will be surrounded by a degree of uncertainty, the benefit-cost assessments are also carried out in a probabilistic framework as shown in Section 18.2. The analysis therefore provides both a most likely estimate of net economic benefits accruing to the state and a range of net economic benefits that can be expected with a likelihood (confidence level) of 95 percent or more.

- (b) Economic Principles and Parameters
 - (i) Economic Principles Concept of Net Economic Benefits

A necessary condition for maximizing the increase in state income and economic growth is the selection of public or private investments with the highest present-valued net benefits to the state. In the context of Alaskan electric power investments, the net benefits are defined as the difference between the costs of optimal Susitna-inclusive and Susitna-exclusive (predominantly thermal) generation plans.

The energy costs of power generation are initially measured in terms of opportunity values or shadow prices which may differ from accounting or market prices currently prevailing in the state. The concept and use of opportunity values is fundamental to the optimal allocation of scarce resources. Energy investment decisions should not be made solely on the basis of accounting prices in the state if the international value of traded energy commodities such as coal and gas diverge from local market prices. (This divergence may be due in part to institutional and contractual constraints, or gaps between marginal and average energy costs in Alaska.)

The choice of a time horizon is also crucial. If a short-term planning period is selected, the investment rankings and choices will differ markedly from those obtained through a long-term perspective. In other words, the benefit-cost analysis would point to different generation expansion plans depending on the selected planning period. A short-term optimization of state income would, at best, allow only a moderate growth in fixed capital formation; at worst it would lead to underinvestment in not only the energy sector but also in other infrastructure facilities such as roads, airports, hospitals, schools, and telecommunications.

It therefore follows that the Susitna project, as other Alaskan investments, should be appraised on the basis of long-run optimization, where the long term is defined as the expected economic life of the facility. For hydroelectric projects, this service life is typically 50 years or more. The costs of a Susitna-inclusive generation plan will be compared with the costs of the next-best alternative which is the all-thermal generation expansion plan and assessed over a planning period extending from 1982 to 2051, using internally consistent sets of economic scenarios and appropriate opportunity values of Alaskan energy.

Throughout the analysis, all costs and prices are expressed in real (inflation-adjusted) terms using January 1982 dollars. Hence the results of the economic calculations are not sensitive to modified assumptions concerning the rates of general price inflation. In contrast the financial and market analyses, conducted in nominal (inflation-inclusive) terms, will be influenced by the rate of general price inflation from 1982 to 2051.

(ii) Price Inflation and Discount Rates

- General Price Inflation

Despite the fact that the price level is generally higher in Alaska than in the Lower 48, there is little difference in the comparative rates of price changes; i.e., price inflation. Between 1970 and 1978, for example, the U.S. and Anchorage consumer price indexes rose at annual rates of 6.9 and 7.1 percent respectively. From 1977 to 1978, the differential was even smaller: consumer prices increased by 8.8 percent and 8.7 percent in the U.S. and Anchorage. (1)

Forecasts of Alaskan prices extend only to 1986. (2) These indicate an average rate of increase of 8.7 percent from 1980 to 1986. For the longer period between 1986 and 2010, it is assumed that Alaskan prices will escalate at the overall U.S. rate, or at 5 to 7 percent compounded annually. The average annual rate of price inflation is therefore about 7 percent between 1982 and 2010. As this is consistent with long-term forecasts of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) advanced by leading economic consulting organizations, 7 percent has been adopted as the study value. (3, 4)

- Discount Rates

Discount rates are required to compare and aggregate cash flows occurring in different time periods of the planning horizon. In essence the discount rate is a weighting factor reflecting that a dollar received tomorrow is worth less than a dollar received today. This holds even in an inflation-free economy as long as the productivity of capital is positive. In other words, the value of a dollar received in the future must be deflated to reflect its earning power foregone by not receiving it today. The use of discount rates extends to both real dollar (economic) and escalated dollar (financial) evaluations, with corresponding inflation-adjusted (real) and inflation-inclusive (nominal) values.

. Real Discount and Interest Rates

Several approaches have been suggested for estimating the real discount rate applicable to public projects (or to private projects from the public perspective). Three common alternatives include:

- .. the social opportunity cost (SOC) rate,
- .. the social time preference (STP) rate, and
- .. the government's real borrowing rate or the real cost of debt capital. (5, 6, 7)

The SOC rate measures the real social return (before taxes and subsidies) that capital funds could earn in alternative investments.

If, for example, the marginal capital investment in Alaska has an estimated social yield of X percent, the Susitna hydroelectric project should be appraised using the X percent measure of "foregone returns" or opportunity costs. A shortcoming of this concept is the difficulty inherent in determining the nature and yields of the foregone investments.

The STP rate measures society's preferences for allocating resources between investment and consumption. This approach is also fraught with practical measurement difficulties since a wide range of STP rates may be inferred from market interest rates and socially-desirable rates of investment. A sub-set of STP rates used in project evaluations is the owner's real cost of borrowing; that is, the real cost of debt capital. This industrial or government borrowing rate may be readily measured and provides a starting point for determining project-specific discount rates. For example, long-term industrial bond rates have averaged about 2 to 3 percent in the US in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. (3, 8) Forecasts of real interest rates show average values of about 3 percent and 2 percent in the periods 1985 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000, respectively. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also analyzed the choice of discount rates for investment appraisal in the electric utility industry and has recommended a 3 percent real rate. (24) Therefore, a real rate of 3 percent has been adopted as the base case discount and interest rate for the period 1982 to 2040.

. Nominal Discount and Interest Rates

The nominal discount and interest rates are derived from the real values and the anticipated rate of general price inflation. Given a 3 percent real discount rate and a 7 percent rate of price inflation, the nominal discount rate is determined as 10.2 percent or about 10 percent.¹

(iii) Oil and Gas Prices

- Oil Prices

. Opportunity Value of Fuel Oil

In the base period (January 1982), the Alaskan 1982 dollar price of No. 2 fuel oil is estimated at \$8.65/MMBtu.

Long-term trends in oil prices will be influenced by events that are economic, political and technological in nature, including the following, to name only a few

- .. growth rates in the developed world's economies
- .. rates of energy conservation in the developed world
- .. rates of addition to currently-proven oil reserves
- .. rate of economic development in the Third World and growth in its per capita energy consumption
- rates of substitution from oil to non-oil energy sources, depending on (among others) the cost competitiveness of synthetic and biomass fuels and new energy conversion technologies such as breeder reactors and laser fusion

 $\frac{1}{1}$ (1 + the nominal rate) = (1 + the real rate) x (1 + the inflation rate). = 1.03 x 1.07, or 1.102

- .. political stability in OPEC and especially OAPEC countries
- .. shifts in the balance of power in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, North and West Africa, and South America.

A survey of forecasts has identified the following projections for world oil prices

- .. Data Resources Incorporated, (9): 2 percent (1981-1990)
- ... World Bank, January 1981 (10): 3.2 percent (1981-1990)
- .. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Winter 1980 (11): 1.5 percent (low), 3.4 percent (medium), 5.6 percent (high) (1980-2000)
- .. National Energy Board of Canada, Ottawa, Canada, October 1981 (12): Zero percent to 2 percent (1980-2000).

Clearly, a wide range of oil price futures may be postulated. This uncertainty surrounding energy price projections calls for the development of several scenarios in a probabilistic framework. Recognizing that probabilistic analysis is required, three oil price futures and associated probabilities have been estimated for the period 1982 to 2040, as shown in Table 18.1.1.

The current softness in world oil markets reflects recessionary conditions in the major oil importing nations. In view of forecasts pointing to a mid-1982 recovery, and a sustained growth in the economics of the industrialized world, Acres has developed the following oil price scenario.

In the most likely (medium) scenario, real oil prices are expected to escalate at 2 percent and 1 percent in the intervals 1982 to 2000 and 2000 to 2040 respectively. In the case of low prices, there is zero escalation in the planning period, and in the high price scenario, the real growth rates are 4 percent (1982 to 2000) and 2 percent (2000 to 2040).

. Battelle Analysis and Acres Study Values

The generation planning (OGP) analysis has adopted the Battelle values for forecast oil prices as shown in Table 18.1.2. These values reflect a 2 percent annual real growth in oil prices from 1982 to 2010.

- Gas Prices

Alaskan gas prices have been forecast using both export opportunity values (netting back CIF prices from Japan to Cook Inlet) and domestic market prices as likely to be faced in the future by Alaskan electric utilities.

. Opportunity Value of Natural Gas

In 1980, 5 percent of Japan's imports of LNG were provided by Alaska at prices competitive with Japan's three other suppliers (13). Japan provides a relatively stable future market for LNG, given its "lack of substantial domestic gas supplies and their great distance from any possible pipeline routes". (14) Japan also appears to be willing to agree to higher charges than most importers for the guarantee of uninterrupted supply. (14)

The opportunity cost of Alaskan natural gas is determined by the best alternative use for the gas, and the above factors indicate that the Japanese market provides the best alternative, both today and as a reliable future source of revenues to Alaska. It should be noted however, that the opportunity value may not be realized if current indications of limited Cook Inlet reserves are confirmed.

.. Current Pricing Trends

Table 18.1.3 illustrates the prices paid for Alaskan LNG, CIF Japan over the period 1975 to April 1980. These prices indicate an average annual growth rate of 27 percent. Prices vary widely even from month to month. "In May 1980, for instance, Japan was paying CIF prices of \$5.53 for Alaskan LNG." (15) As of May 1981, LNG deliveries in Japan could command a price of \$6.30/MMBtu (CIF). (16)

The opportunity value of Alaskan gas is based on the potential delivered price minus the costs of liquefying and transporting the gas, that is, the plant-gate price. Based on previous Acres studies of transporting LNG over a similar distance, the Alaskan plant-gate price would be about \$4.65/MMBtu in January 1982 dollars, with liquefaction and transportation representing about \$2.10/MMBtu (1982 dollars).

Natural Gas Price Forecasts

Future international prices of natural gas will depend to a large extent on the development of the supply market. Various factors have been hindering this development, such as:

- .. the high cost and long lead times involved in putting export projects on-stream
- .. the prohibitive cost of transport (as much as five times that of oil)
- specific importers and markets must be identified and depended on
- .. limited flexibility in the network. (For example, some LNG tankers may be incompatible with certain liquefaction projects.) (15)

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In order for the natural gas market to develop to its full potential, prices must be high enough to stimulate the supply market. Considering the long-term potential which is created by higher prices, natural gas price forecasts should not be unduly influenced by short-term slow growth demand patterns.

In fact, even in the short term prices are tending to gravitate towards parity with crude oil. Algeria and Libya have pushed for FOB parity with crude prices, while Abu Dhabi, for example, has called for CIF equivalence. In particular, deliveries of LNG to Japan from Alaska and Brunei have both been officially set at parity with the average landed cost of crude in Japan since April. (15)

Given these current trends, long-term forecasts of natural gas prices tend to assume that future gas prices will grow at approximately the same rate as crude oil prices. (9, 13) Accordingly, the natural gas pricing and probability scenarios developed in this section, follow closely the crude oil prices scenarios.

Based on these considerations, Table 18.1.4 shows the probabilities of low, medium, and high gas prices conditional on the three oil price scenarios developed above. The most likely (medium) price scenario, as well as the low and high price cases and corresponding probabilities, are shown in Table 18.1.5. In the most likely case, with a probability of 46 percent, the Alaskan opportunity values escalate at 2.7 percent (1982 to 2000) and 1.2 percent (2000 to 2040). This results from CIF prices (in Japan) that grow at 2 percent (1982 to 2000) and 1 percent (2000 to 2040) and from shipping costs that are constant in real terms. The Cook Inlet opportunity value rises from \$4.65 (1982) to \$12.26 (2040) measured in 1982 dollars.

The low and high price cases have equal probabilities of 27 percent. In the low case, the CIF prices remain constant in real terms, and in the high case the CIF prices grow at real rates of 4 percent (1982 to 2000) and 2 percent (2000 to 2040).

• Domestic Market Prices (Supplied by Battelle)

In contrast to the shadow prices or opportunity values discussed above, the gas prices estimated by Battelle and used in the base case Optimized Generation Planning (OGP) analysis reflect actual and forecast domestic market prices facing Alaskan electric utilities. These year-by-year prices are shown in Table 18.1.6 based on volume-weighted prices applying to CEA and AMLP. The differences between the opportunity values and domestic market prices are significant; by 1990 and 2000 for example, the export opportunity values are expected to exceed domestic prices by 324 percent and 85 percent respectively. Acceptance of the lower values are apparently based on the conclusion that Cook Inlet reserves would remain insufficient to serve new export markets.

(iv) Coal Prices

- Introduction

The shadow price or opportunity value of Beluga and Healy coal is the delivered price in alternative markets less the cost of transportation to those markets. The most likely alternative demand for thermal coal is the East Asian market, principally Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The development of 60-year forecasts of coal prices in these markets is conditional on the substitution potential of coal and the procurement policies of the importing nations. These factors, in turn, are influenced to a large extent by the price movements of crude oil.

Coal price forecasts which are based solely on production costs overlook these important factors. In fact, there are indications that "economic rents" (that is, a price that exceeds production costs including a normal return on investment) may be earned by the producers, mine labor and/or governments. For example, in the interests of supply security, a coal importer may be willing to pay a price much higher than actual coal production costs. In addition, oil price increases induce increased demand for coal, thus exerting upward pressure on coal prices. Market imperfections may exist which inhibit the long-term supply response effects on consumer coal prices. Therefore, coal price forecasts cannot be based on production costs alone, they must also reflect the influence of both oil price movements and procurement policies. Historical trends support these observations.

- Historical Trends

Historically it has been observed that export prices of coal are highly correlated with oil prices, and that production cost analysis has not predicted accurately the level of coal prices. Even if the production cost forecast itself is accurate, it will establish a minimum coal price, rather than the market clearing price set by both supply and demand conditions.

- In real terms export prices of U.S. coal showed a 94 percent and 92 percent correlation with oil prices 1950 to 1979 and 1972 to 1979.2
- . Supply function (production cost) analysis, has estimated Canadian coal at a price of \$23.70 (1980 US \$/ton) for S.E. British Columbia (B.C.) coking coal, FOB Roberts Bank, B.C.,

 2 Analysis is based on data from the World Bank. (17)

Canada. (18, 23) In fact, Kaiser Resources (now B.C. Coal Ltd.) has signed agreements with Japan at an FOB price of about \$47.50 (1980 US \$/ton). (19) This is 100 percent more than the price estimate based on production costs.

- . The same comparison for Canadian B.C. thermal coal indicates that the expected price of \$55.00 (1981 Can \$) per metric ton (2,200 pounds) or about \$37.00 (1980 US \$) per ton would be 60 percent above estimates founded on production costs. (18, 19, 23).
- . In longer-term coal export contracts, there has been provision for reviewing the base price (regardless of escalation clauses) if significant developments occur in pricing or markets. That is, prices may respond to market conditions even before the expiry of the contract.³
- . Energy-importing nations in Asia, especially Japan, have a stated policy of diversified procurement for their coal supplies. They will not buy only from the lowest-cost supplier (as would be the case in a perfectly competitive model of coal trade) but instead will pay a risk premium to ensure security of supply.

Observation of historical coal price trends reveals that FOB and CIF prices have escalated at annual real rates of 1.5 percent to 6.3 percent as shown below:

- . Coal prices (bituminous, export unit value, FOB U.S. ports) grew at real annual rates of 1.5 percent (1950 to 1979) and 2.8 percent (1972 to 1979). (17)
- . In Alaska, the price of thermal coal sold to the GVEA utility advanced at real rates of 2.2 percent (1965 to 1978) and 2.3 percent (1970 to 1978).
- . In Japan, the average CIF prices of steam coal experienced real escalation rates of 6.3 percent per year in the period 1977 to 1981. (20, 21) This represents an increase in the average price from approximately \$35.22 per metric ton (mt) in 1977 to about \$67.63/mt in 1981.
- Survey of Forecasts

Data Resources Incorporated is projecting an average annual real growth rate of 2.6 percent for U.S. coal prices in the period 1981 to 2000. (19) The World Bank has forecast that the real price of steam coal would advance at approximately the same rate as oil prices (3 percent per year) in the period 1980 to 1990. (10) Canadian Resourcecon Ltd. has recently forecast growth rates of 2 percent

³ This clause forms part of the recently-concluded agreement between Denison Mines and Teck Corporation and Japanese steel makers.

to 4 percent (1980 to 2010) for sub-bituminous and bituminous steam coal. (22)

- Opportunity Value of Alaskan Coal

. Delivered Prices, CIF Japan

Based on these considerations, the shadow price of coal (CIF price in Japan) was forecast using conditional probabilities given low, medium and high oil price scenarios. Table 18.1.7 depicts the estimated coal price growth rates and their associated probabilities, given the three sets of oil prices. Combining these probabilities with those attached to the oil price cases yields the following coal price scenarios, CIF Japan.

| <u>Scenario</u> | Probability | Real Price Growth |
|-------------------------|-------------|--|
| Medium (most likely) | 49 percent | 2 percent (1982-2000) 1 percent (2000-2040) |
| Low | 24 percent | 0 percent (1982-2040) |
| High | 27 percent | 4 percent (1982-2000) 2 percent (2000-2040) |

The 1982 base period price was initially estimated using the data from the Battelle Beluga Market Study. (18) Based on this study, a sample of 1980 spot prices (averaging \$1.66/MMBtu) was escalated to January 1982 to provide a starting value of \$1.95/MMBtu in January 1982 dollars.⁴

As more recent and more complete coal import price statistics became available, this extrapolation of the 1980 sample was found to give a significant underestimate of actual CIF prices. By late 1981, Japan's average import price of steam coal reached \$2.96/MMBtu.⁵ An important sensitivity case was therefore developed reflecting these updated actual CIF prices. The updated base period value of \$2.96 was reduced by 10 percent to \$2.66 to recognize the price discount dictated by quality differentials between Alaska coal and other sources of Japanese

⁴ The escalation factor was 1.03 x 1.14, where 3 percent is the forecast real growth in prices (mid-1980 to January 1982) at an annual rate of 2 percent, and 14 percent is the 18-month increase if the CPI is used to convert from mid-1980 dollars to January 1982 dollars.

⁵ As reported by Coal Week International in October 1981, the average CIF value of steam coal was \$75.50/mt. At an average heat value of 11,500 Btu/lb, this is equivalent to \$2.96/MMBtu.

coal imports, as estimated by Battelle. (18) Tables 18.1.8 and 18.1.9 illustrate the range of recent CIF and FOB prices of steam coal imports to Japan.

- . <u>Opportunity Values in Alaska</u>
 - .. Base Case Battelle-based CIF Prices, No Export Potential for Healy Coal

Transportation costs of \$0.52/MMBtu were subtracted from the initially estimated CIF price of \$1.95 to determine the opportunity value of Beluga coal at Anchorage. In January 1982 dollars, this base period net-back price is therefore \$1.43/MMBtu. In subsequent years, the opportunity value is derived as the difference between the escalated CIF price and the transportation cost (estimated to be constant in real terms). The real growth rate in these FOB prices is determined residually from the forecast opportunity values. In the medium (most likely) case the Beluga opportunity values escalate at annual rates of 2.6 percent and 1.2 percent during the intervals 1982 to 2000 and 2000 to 2040 respectively.

For Healy coal, it was estimated that the base period price of \$1.75/MMBtu (at Healy) would also escalate at 2.6 percent (to 2000) and 1.2 percent (2000 to 2040). Adding the escalated cost of transportation from Healy to Nenana results in a January 1982 price of \$1.75/MMBtu.⁶

In subsequent years, the cost of transportation, of which 30 percent is represented by fuel cost (which escalates at 2 percent), is added to the Healy price resulting in Nenana prices that grow at real rates of 2.3 percent (1982 to 2000) and 1.1 percent (2000 to 2040).

.. Sensitivity Case - Updated CIF Prices, Export Potential for Healy Coal

The updated CIF price of steam coal (\$2.66/MMBtu after adjusting for quality differentials) was reduced by shipping costs from Healy and Beluga to Japan to yield Alaskan opportunity values. In January 1982, prices are \$2.08 and \$1.74/MMBtu at Anchorage and Nenana respectively. The differences between escalated CIF prices and shipping costs result in FOB prices that have real growth rates of 2.5 percent and 1.2 percent for Beluga coal and 2.7 percent and 1.2 percent for Healy coal (at Nenana). Table 18.1.10 shows details of these CIF and FOB prices under the three coal price scenarios. Table 18.1.11 summarizes the coal opportunity values in each of the two cases and three scenarios.

⁶ Transportation costs are based on Battelle. (18, 23)

(v) Generation Planning Analysis - Study Values

Based on the considerations presented in Sections (i) through (iv) above, a consistent set of fuel prices was assembled for the base case probabilistic OGP analysis, as shown in Table 18.1.12. The study values include probabilities for the low, medium and high fuel price scenarios. The probabilities are common for the three fuels (oil, gas and coal) within each scenario in order to keep the number of generation planning runs to manageable size. In the case of the natural gas prices, domestic market prices were selected for the base case analysis with the export opportunity values used in sensitivity runs. The base period value of \$3 was derived by deflating the 1996 Battelle prices to 1982 by 2.5 percent per year. Coal prices were also selected from the base case using Battelle's 1980 sample of prices as the starting point, with the updated CIF prices of coal reserved for sensitivity runs. Oil prices have been escalated by 2 percent (1982-2040).

(c) Analysis of Net Economic Benefits

(i) Modeling Approach

Using the economic parameters discussed in the previous section, and the data relating to the electrical energy generation alternatives available for the Railbelt, an analysis was made comparing the costs of electrical energy production with and without the Susitna project. The primary tool for the net present worth (PW) benefit analysis was a generation planning model (OGP) which simulates production costs over a planning period extending from 1982 to 2010.

The method of comparing the "with" and "without" Susitna scenarios is based on the long-term PW of total system costs. The planning model determines the total production costs of alternative plans on a year-by-year basis. These total costs for the period of modeling include all costs of fuel and operation and maintenance (O&M) for all generating units included as part of the system, and the annualized investment costs of any generating plant and system transmission_added_during the period 1993 to 2010. Factors which contribute to the ultimate consumer cost of power but which are not included in this model are: investment cost for all generating plants in service prior to 1993, investment cost of the transmission and distribution facilities already in service and administrative costs of utilities. These costs are common to all scenarios and therefore have been omitted from the study.

In order to aggregate and compare costs on a sufficiently long-term basis, annual costs have been aggregated for the period 1993 to 2051. Costs have been computed as the sum of two components and converted to a 1982 PW at a 3 percent real discount rate (see Section 18.1 (b)). The first component is the 1982 PW of cost output from the first 18 years of model simulation from 1993 to 2010. The second component is the estimated PW of long-term system costs, from 2011 to 2051.

For an assumed set of economic parameters as a particular generation alternative the first element of the PW value represents the amount of cash (not including those costs noted above) needed in 1982 to meet electrical production needs in the Railbelt for the period 1993-2010. The second element of the aggregated PW value is the long-term (2011-2051) PW estimate of production costs. In considering the value to the system of the addition of a hydroelectric power plant, which has a useful life of approximately 50 years, the shorter study period would be inadequate. A hydroelectric plant which is added in 1993 or 2002 would accrue PW benefits for only 17 or 9 years respectively using an investment horizon that extends to 2010. However, to model the system for an additional 40 years it would be necessary to develop future load forecasts and generation alternatives which are beyond the realm of any prudent projections. For this reason, it has been assumed that the production costs for the final study year (2010) would simply reoccur for an additional 41 years, and the PW of these was added to the 18 year PW (1993-2010), to establish the long-term cost differences between methods of power generation.

(ii) Base Case Analysis

- Pattern of Investments "With" and "Without" Susitna

The base case comparison of the "with" and "without" Susitna plans is based on an assessment of PW of production costs as outlined in 18 (c) (i) for the period 1993-2051, using mid-range values for the energy demand and load forecast, fuel prices, fuel price escalation rates, capital costs and capital cost escalation rates. Load forecasts, fuel prices, and construction costs are analyzed in Chapter 5, 18.1 (b), and 16, respectively⁷. As discussed in Section 18.1 (b), a real interest and discount rate of 3 percent is used.

The Susitna plan calls for 680 MW of generating capacity at Watana to be available to the system in 1993. Although the project may come on-line in stages during the year, for modeling purposes, full load generating capability is assumed to be available for the entire year. In the second stage of Susitna, the Devil Canyon project is scheduled to come on-line in 2002. The optimum timing for the addition of Devil Canyon was tested for earlier and later dates. Addition in the year 2002 was found to result in the lowest long-term cost. Devil Canyon will have 600 MW of installed capacity.

The "without" Susitna plan is discussed in Section 6.7^7 and includes three 200 MW coal-fired plants added in Beluga in 1993,

⁷ References to Feasibility Report

1994, and 2007. A 200 MW unit is added at Nenana in 1996. In addition, nine 70 MW gas-fired combustion turbines (GT's) are added during the 1997-2010 period.

- Base Case Net Economic Benefits

The economic comparison of the base plan alternatives is shown in Table 18.1.13. During the 1993-2010 study period the 1982 PW cost for the Susitna plan is \$3.119 billion. The annual production cost in 2010 is \$0.385 billion. The present worth of this level cost which remains virtually constant, for a period extending to the end of the life of the Devil Canyon plant, say 2051, is \$3.943 billion. The resulting total cost of the "with" Susitna plan is \$7.06 billion (1982 dollars), present valued to 1982.

The non-Susitna plan modeled has a 1982 PW cost of \$3.213 billion for the 1993-2010 period, with a 2010 annual cost of \$0.491 billion. The total long-term cost has a PW of \$8.24 billion. Therefore, the net economic benefit of adopting the Susitna plan is \$1.18 billion. In other words, the present-valued cost difference between the Susitna plan and the expansion plan, based on thermal plant addition, is \$1.8 billion (1982 dollars). This is equivalent to a net economic benefit of \$2,700 per capita for the 1982 population of Alaska. Expressed in 1993 dollars (i.e., at the on-line date of Watana), the net benefits would have a levelized value of \$2.48 billion.⁸

It is noted that the magnitude of net economic benefits (\$1.18 billion) is not particularly sensitive to alternative assumptions concerning the overall rate of price inflation as measured by the CPI. The analysis has been carried out in real (inflationadjusted) terms. Therefore, the present-valued cost savings will remain close to \$1.18 billion regardless of CPI movements, as long as the real (inflation-adjusted) discount and interest rates are maintained at 3 percent.

- Test of Internal Rate of Return

The Susitna project's internal rate of return (IRR) (i.e., the real (inflation-adjusted) discount rate at which the "with" Susitna plan has a zero net economic benefit, or the discount rate at which the costs of the "with" Susitna and the "alternative" plans are equal) has also been determined. The IRR is about 4.1 percent in real terms, and 11.4 percent in nominal (inflation-inclusive) terms.

⁸ \$1.118 billion times 2.105, where 2.105 is the general price inflation index for the period 1982 to 1993. It is emphasized that these net economic benefits and the rate of return stemming from the Susitna project are inherently conservative estimates caused by several assumptions used in the OGP analyses for:

. Zero Growth in Long-term Costs

From 2010 to 2051, the OGP analysis assumed constant annual production costs in both the Susitna and the non-Susitna plans. This has the effect of excluding real escalation in fuel prices and the capital costs of thermal plant replacements, and thereby underestimating the long-term PW costs of thermal generation plans.

Loss of Load Probabilities

The loss of load probability in the non-Susitna plan is calculated at 0.099 in the year 2010. This means that the system in 2010 is on the verge of adding an additional plant, and would do so in 2011. These costs are however not included in the analysis which is cutoff at 2010. On the other hand, the Susitna plan has a loss of load probability of 0.025, and may not require additional capacity for several years beyond 2010.

. Long-term Energy from Susitna

Some of the Susitna energy output (about 350 GWh) is still not used by 2010. This energy output would be available to meet future increases in projected demand in the summer months. No benefit is attributed to this energy in the analysis.

• Equal Environmental Costs

The OGP analysis has implicity assumed equal environmental costs for both the Susitna and the non-Susitna plans. To the extent that the thermal generation expansion plan is expected to carry greater economic cost savings from the Susitna project are understated. It is conceivable that these so-called negative externalities from coal-fired electricity generation will have been mitigated by 1993 and beyond, as a result of the enactment of new environmental legislation. Such government action would simply internalize the externality by forcing up the production and market costs of thermal power.

(iii) Sensitivity Analysis

Rather than rely on a single comparison to assess the net benefit of the Susitna project, a sensitivity analysis has been carried out to identify the impact of modified assumptions on the results. The sensitivity analysis addressed the following variables:

. Load Forecast

. Real Interest and Discount Rate

- Construction Period
- Period of Analysis
- Capital Costs
 - Susitna
 - Thermal Alternatives
- . O&M Costs
- . Base Period Fuel Price
- . Real Escalation in Capital and O&M Costs and Fuel Prices
- . System Reliability
- . Chakachamna included in non-Susitna plan
- . Planned delay in Susitna project timing.

Load Forecast

Throughout the Susitna feasibility study, planning for the project has been based on a medium growth range of capacity and energy forecast. It has been realized that this forecast has been made based on a centerpoint of a range of uncertainty, rather than the actual expected occurrence. For this reason, the authorities responsible for demand forecasting have bracketed the range with high and low forecasts.

As part of the sensitivity analysis, the Susitna project has been analyzed under scenarios that reflect these high and low forecasts. The forecasts used in the analysis are the high, medium and low demand forecasts provided by Battelle based on the ISER studies, as discussed in Section 5⁹ and summarized in Table 18.1.14.

Since the load forecast is the major consideration which influences the timing and size of capacity additions for the system, the nature of the systems varies greatly depending on the forecasts used.

. Low Forecast

In general, the adoption of a lower forecast requires the installation of smaller amounts of capacity to be added at relatively later timings in the period of study. In the non-Susitna plan, only 600 MW of coal-fired units are added, in the form of two 200 MW units in Beluga and one 200 MW unit at Nenana. These units are added in 1995, 1997, and 2007. In addition, 8 GT's with a total capacity of 560 MW are added periodically after 1996. The pattern of capacity additions is close to that in the medium forecast or base case, but it lags by several years.

The optimal timing for the addition of the Susitna units is also changed from that adopted for the medium forecast. As shown in Table 18.1.15, the selected staging for the project is 680 MW at

⁹ Reference to Feasibility Report

Watana in 1995, with the 600 MW Devil Canyon plant coming online in 2004. The addition of Devil Canyon in 2007 was also tested and resulted in a slightly higher long-term PW cost. Watana, as a single project, was also examined, and long-term PW costs found to be higher than those arising from the later addition of Devil Canyon. It should be noted, however, that the staging of the second project is not as critical as in the other demand forecast. There is however a need for additional capacity on the system in 2004 which Devil Canyon can satisfy. If the project is added in that year, there is a sufficient amount of energy (1000 GWh) which cannot be used by the system for several years into the future.

The long-term cost of the non-Susitna plan is \$6.878 billion and that of the Susitna plan is \$6.650 billion. Thus, the net benefit to be released by proceeding with the Susitna project is \$0.228 billion.

. High Forecast

To meet the system demand under the high forecast, capacity is needed long before 1993. Over the 10-year period prior to 1993, it was found that an addition of nearly 500 MW of other capacity would be needed. This could be met by the addition of a 200 MW gas-fired combined cycle unit in 1987 and 1990, and a 70 MW gas turbine unit in 1992. The selection of combined cycle units was essentially the only choice available for system addition in the 1980s since the coal-fired thermal units could not be available until 1990 because of site development and construction lead time.

Note that the addition of these three units would be common to both the "with" and "without" Susitna plans. Therefore, the annual investment costs arising from capital costs expended on these pre-1993 plans have not been included in the long-term PW cost.

In the non-Susitna plan, 1000 MW of coal units would be required, with four 200 MW units at Beluga and one at Nenana. In addition, eleven 70 MW GT units would be added. The long-term cost of the non-Susitna plan is \$10.859 billion.

For the "with" Susitna plan, Watana is added in 1993; the Devil Canyon addition is advanced five years to 1997. In addition, a 70 MW GT unit is added in each of the years between 2006 and 2010. The long-term PW cost of the Susitna plan under the high forecast is \$9.247 billion. The Susitna plan therefore has a net benefit of \$1.612 billion.

- Real Interest and Discount Rate

The base case OGP runs have been made with the interest rates set at 3 percent in real terms. This rate has been selected on the basis of the analysis contained in Section 18.1 (e) above, and is consistent with APA guidelines.

The required real return on investment will be a state policy decision. It is realized that the state may require a rate of return higher or lower than 3 percent. It has been considered reasonable that the desired real rate of return could vary within the range of 2 percent to 5 percent. The economic analysis of the project has been carried out at real rates of 2, 3, 4 and 5 percent. The results of the evaluation are summarized in Table 18.1.15. At 2 percent, the net benefits of the Susitna project are \$2.617 billion. At the high end of the range, a 5 percent real discount rate results in negative net benefits of \$513 million. The "breakeven" discount rate or IRR is about 4.1 percent in real terms.

- Construction Period

Variability on the construction period has the impact of increasing interest during construction charges. Using economic parameters, the interest during construction is small and does not increase significantly as the construction period is extended by one or two years. Should a project be delayed several years, alternative forms of generation may be required in place of the planned unit. However, this change would not significantly impact on the generation planning analysis since the alternative unit would, most likely, be a 70 MW gas turbine which has little impact on the long-term PW cost if only operated for a limited number of years until the larger generating plant comes on-line. The construction schedule for Susitna has been analyzed in detail in the study risk assessment described in Chapter 18.2.

- Period of Analysis

The system planning period over which the OGP model was used extended from 1982 to 2010, the same period covered by the system demand forecasting model. However, the Susitna project is added to the system with Watana on-line in 1993 and Devil Canyon in 2002. Large hydroelectric projects of the size and nature of Susitna have a service life of at least 50 years. Therefore, the analysis of the project has taken into account system costs to a period covering the 50 years from 2002, the service life of the Devil Canyon stage. The conservative nature of this approach has been reviewed in Section 18.1 (d) (ii) above.

The impact of truncated planning horizons may be determined by reviewing the base case results shown in Table 18.1.13. The shortest period for analysis may be considered to extend only to 2010. However, this would account for only 8 years operation for Devil Canyon, well short of its 50-year economic life. In this case, the Susitna project would provide PW net benefits of \$93 million, compared with a value of \$1.180 billion from the more appropriate base case period extending to 2051. If an interim point were selected based on say 30 years of operation for Devil Canyon, the net benefits of the Susitna project would be \$0.718 billion. This is derived as the difference between the costs of the non-Susitna plan (\$6.431 billion) and the Susitna plan (\$5.713 billion). The net benefits in this case are 60 percent of those calculated in the base case.

- Capital Costs

Capital costs have a considerable impact on the present worth costs of the "with" and "without" Susitna scenarios. Capital cost analysis has been approached by varying the costs of the non-Susitna and the Susitna plans.

The capital costs for the alternative to Susitna have been estimated by Ebasco, as part of the Battelle alternatives study. There is some concern that these estimates are based on a less detailed study and are at a lower level of confidence than those pertaining to the Susitna project. Thus, the non-Susitna costs were varied by using "high" and "low" costs of 120 percent and 90 percent of the base estimate.

The second test concerned Susitna capital costs. These were varied using a "low" capital cost equal to the base estimate less 17 percent. For a "high" estimate, a 17 percent increase was allowed.

Table 18.1.17 shows the results of this sensitivity analysis. Note that the Susitna plan remains cost competitive in all cases examined. In the low and high non-Susitna cases, the net benefits of the Susitna project are 73 percent and 168 percent of the base case value. The net benefits are also sensitive to modified assumptions concerning the Susitna project costs. If the "low" capital cost is used, the Susitna plan would provide net benefits of \$2.1 billion. In contrast, the "high" value results in net benefits that drop to \$264 million.

- Operation and Maintenance Costs

The O&M component of production costs is relatively low, representing only 8 percent to 12 percent of the total production costs in any given year. Therefore, if the O&M estimates were varied in a manner similar to capital costs, there would be only a 1 percent to 2 percent impact on present worth costs. For this reason, the sensitivity of the results to O&M costs was not tested by further OGP analysis.

- Base Period Coal Price

As shown in the earlier parts of this Chapter, Section 18.1 (b) (iv), there is evidence that based on recent statistics, the base price (opportunity value) for coal could be as high as

\$2.08/MMBtu, compared to the initial estimate of \$1.43/MMBtu developed by Battelle. This updated starting price was tested in the "with" and "without" cases as shown in Table 18.1.18. This is a significant sensitivity case as the initial estimates of base period (January 1982) prices were established by Battelle on the basis of sample data for 1980. Net economic benefits in this case are \$1.968 billion, or 167 percent of the base case value.

- Real Escalation Rates

. Capital and O&M Cost Escalation

It has been forecast that there could be real escalation in the capital costs of power plants averaging 1.8 percent per year until 1992 and 2 percent per year thereafter. These escalation rates were incorporated into the base case. In order to test the sensitivity of results to this assumption, tests were made with zero real escalation in capital and 0&M costs, double the rate or about 4 percent real escalation, and 1.4 percent real escalation from 1982 to 2010 as estimated by Battelle. Of these three, the lower values appear to be more likely since, unlike finite fuel reserves, construction labor and materials are not a depletable resource and should not experience sustained real cost escalation.

Results of this analysis are shown in Table 18.1.19. The variance in these escalation factors changes the net benefits in a manner similar to the analysis of variance in capital costs. Zero real escalation in capital and O&M costs raises net benefits by one-third. Doubling the rate of escalation causes the net benefits to fall one-third. In the high case, it should be noted that the non-Susitna plan changes from four coal units to two, with the capacity difference made up by GT and combined cycle additions. In the "Battelle" case, net benefits are increased by 10 percent relative to the base case.

. Fuel Price Escalation

As non-renewable resources, the prices of coal, gas, and oil are expected to increase at a rate greater than the general price level, as discussed in Section 18.1 (b). The base case escalation rates were 2.6, 2 and 2.5 percent until 2000 and 1.2, 2 and 2 percent respectively until 2010. Model runs were also carried out with high and low levels of fuel escalation. The low rate was established as zero percent real escalation. The upper limit was set at 5.2 percent for coal, 4 percent for oil, and 5 percent for gas from 1982 to 2000, and 2.2 percent, 2 percent and 2 percent, respectively beyond 2000. The results are summarized in Table 18.1.19. In the low price escalation scenario, the Susitna plan results in negative net benefits of \$1.078 billion. In the case of high energy price escalation, the net benefits rise to \$2.070 billion.

- System Reliability

A generating system loss of load probability of one day in ten years has been used in system modeling. Variation of this factor would cause the system to add more or less capacity, thus potentially changing the staging of alternatives. However, since this is a predetermined criterion rather than an assumption or projection, no sensitivity analysis was carried out.

The Battelle AREEP model has the capability to calculate a target reserve margin based on variable load forecast. It is possible that given the load forecasts projected by Battelle, a reserve margin would be recommended greater than that calculated using the loss of load probability.

- Chakachamna

As discussed earlier, the Chakachamna project has not been included in the base non-Susitna plan. It has been included as a test case however, and found to lower the net benefits of the Susitna plan to \$837 million, as shown in Table 18.1.20.

- Planned Delay in Susitna Project Timing

As shown in Table 18.1.21, the Susitna project's net benefits are essentially insensitive to a planned one- or two-year delay in timing. A one-year postponement of the Watana stage to 1994 would result in net benefits that are 4 percent below those in the base case. A one- or two-year delay in both the Watana and Devil Canyon stages would provide net economic benefits that are 96 percent to 97 percent of the base case values.

(d) <u>Conclusion</u>

The preceding discussion of sensitivity analysis shows that in terms of impacts on net benefits, the most sensitive variables are base period coal prices, fuel escalation rates, discount rates, Susitna capital costs, and load forecasts. As these assumptions are varied through a reasonable range of values, the Susitna plan is shown to retain positive net economic benefits relative to the costs of non-Susitna plans. Table 18.1.22 provides a summary of the various sensitivity analyses.

A multivariate analysis in the form of probability trees has also been undertaken to test the joint effects of several assumptions in combination rather than individually. This probabilistic analysis provides a range of expected net economic benefits and probability distributions that identify the chances of exceeding particular values of net benefits at given levels of confidence. The results of the probabilistic analysis are presented in Section 18.2.

TABLE 18.1.1: REAL (INFLATION-ADJUSTED) ANNUAL GROWTH IN WORLD OIL PRICES

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(Percent)

| | Growth | | |
|---------------------------|------------------|-----------|-------------|
| | <u>1982–2000</u> | 2000-2040 | Probability |
| Low Case | 0 | 0 | 0.3 |
| Medium (most likely case) | 2.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 |
| High Case | 4.0 | 2.0 | 0.2 |

TABLE 18.1.2: STUDY ASSUMPTIONS: OIL PRICES

| | Average Price of No. 2 Fuel Oil |
|-------------|------------------------------------|
| Year | (1982 \$/MMBtu) |
| 1982 - 1985 | 6.70 |
| 1986 - 1990 | 7.33 |
| 1991 - 1995 | 8.08 |
| 1996 - 2000 | 8.93 |
| 2001 - 2005 | 9.86 |
| 2006 - 2010 | 10.88 |

TABLE 18.1.3: JAPANESE IMPORT PRICES (C.I.F.) OF ALASKAN LNG

| Year | <u>US\$/MMBtu</u> |
|---------------|-------------------|
| 1975 | 1.40 |
| 1976 | 1.70 |
| 1977 | 2.01 |
| 1978 | 2.26 |
| 1979 | 2.37 |
| January 1980 | 3.51 |
| February 1980 | 3.44 |
| March 1980 | 3.48 |
| April 1980 | 4.63 |
| | |

Source: Segal & Niering, (15)

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TABLE 18.1.4: GAS PRICE ESCALATION AND ASSOCIATED CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES

| Gas Price Escalation, | Oil Price Escalation | | | |
|--|----------------------|--------|-------------|--|
| | Low | Medium | <u>High</u> | |
| Low (O percent 1982 - 2040) | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.05 | |
| Medium (2 percent 1982 - 2000; 1 percent 2000 - 2040) | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.25 | |
| High (4 percent 1982 - 2000; 2 percent 2000 - 2040) | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.7 | |

| | CIF P (198 | rice ir 2 \$/MME | Transportation Opportuni ice in Japan Costs Gas at Co 2 \$/MMBtu) (1982 \$/MMBtu) (1982 \$ | | | Transportation Opportunity Va in Japan Costs Gas at Cook Ir MBtu) (1982 \$/MMBtu) (1982 \$/MMBt | | | nity Value Cook Inlet \$/MMBtu) | |
|---------------|---------------|---------------------|--|--|------|---|------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| Probability | Medium 46% | Low 27% | <u>High</u> 27% | | N/A | Medium 46% | Low 27% | <u>High</u> 27% | | |
| 1982 | 6.75 | 6.75 | 6.75 | | 2.10 | 4.65 | 4.65 | 4.65 | | |
| 1985 | 7.16 | 6.75 | 7.59 | | 2.10 | 5.06 | 4.65 | 5.49 | | |
| 1990 | 7.91 | 6.75 | 9.24 | | 2.10 | 5.81 | 4.65 | 7.14 | | |
| 2000 | 9.64 | 6.75 | 13.67 | | 2.10 | 7.54 | 4.65 | 11.57 | | |
| 2010 | 10.65 | 6.75 | 16.66 | | 2.10 | 8,55 | 4.65 | 14.56 | | |
| 2020 | 11.77 | 6.75 | 20.31 | | 2.10 | 9.67 | 4.65 | 18.21 | | |
| 2030 | 13.00 | 6.75 | 24.76 | | 2.10 | 10.90 | 4.65 | 22.66 | | |
| 2040 | 14.36 | 6.75 | 30,18 | | 2.10 | 12.26 | 4.65 | 28.08 | | |
| Annual Growth | Rates | | | | | | | | | |
| 1982 - 2000 | 2% | 0 | 4% | | 0 | 2.7% | Ò | 5.2% | | |
| 2000 - 2040 | 1% | 0 | 2% | | 0 | 1.2% | 0 | 2.2% | | |

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TABLE 18.1.5: OPPORTUNITY VALUE OF NATURAL GAS AT COOK INLET, ALASKA, 1982 - 2040

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TABLE 18.1.6: VOLUME WEIGHTED COOK INLET NATURAL GAS PRICE TO AMLP AND CEA

| Period | Average Price <u>(1982 \$/MMBtu)</u> |
|-------------|---|
| 1982 – 1985 | 0.84 |
| 1986 – 1990 | - 1.33 |
| 1991 – 1995 | 3.03 |
| 1996 – 2000 | 4.56 |
| 2001 - 2005 | 5.10 |
| 2006 - 2010 | 5.63 |

| TABLE 18.1.7: | COAL | PRICE | ESCALAT | ION | AND | ASSOCIATED |
|---------------|------|----------------|----------|-----|-------------|------------|
| | COND | ITIONAL | . PROBAB | ILI | FIES | |

| | <u>Oil P</u> | <u>rice Esca</u> | lation |
|--|--------------|------------------|--------|
| Coal Price Escalation | Low | Medium | High |
| Low (O percent 1982 - 2040) | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.05 |
| Medium (2 percent 1982 - 2000; 1 percent | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.25 |
| High (4 percent 1982 - 2000; 2 percent 2000 - 2040) | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.7 |

TABLE 18.1.8: STEAM COAL IMPORTS BY JAPAN, SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1981

| | Volu | Volumes | | CIF Prices \$/mt- (\$/MMBtu)* | |
|----------------|----------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|--|
| O <u>rigin</u> | September (metric | October tons) | September | October | |
| US | 127 037 | 276 467 | 75.10 (2.97) | 81.33 (3.21) | |
| South Africa | 53 70 9 | 92 448 | 65.95 (2.61) | 55.90 (2.21) | |
| Australia | 475 751 | 384 487 | 65.80 (2.60) | 78.59 (3.11) | |
| China | 125 476 | 99 912 | 65.00 (2.57) | 72.25 (2.86) | |
| Soviet Union | 33 805 | 25 826 | 65.47 (2.59) | 73.68 (2.91) | |
| Canada | 28 468 | 130 033 | 67.79 (2.68) | 70.55 (2.79) | |
| TOTAL | 826 246 | 1 009 173 | 67.17 (2.65) | 75.47 (2.98) | |

* Based on an assumed heat value of 11 500 Btu/lb.

Source: Coal Week International

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TABLE 18.1.9: CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SPOT PRICES OF STEAM COAL

| | | | | 1 | | | |
|------------------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| Port of Origin | <u>Btu/1b</u> | Sulphur Percent | Ash <u>Percent</u> | FOB Price US\$/1ong ton Jan. 6, 1982 | CIF Price Japan US\$/1ong ton Jan. 6, 1982 | FOB Price US\$/MMBtu Jan. 1982 | CIF Price Japar US\$/MMBtu Jan. 1982 |
| US | | | | 2 | | | |
| Hampton Roads/ | 11 800 | 1.3 | 14.0 | 55.00 | 73.00 - 74.50 | 2.08 | 2.76 - 2.82 |
| Norfolk | (11 500) | (1.5) | (15.0) | (52.50) | (70.50 - 72.00) | (2.04) | (2.74 - 2.80) |
| Baltimore | 12 000 | 1.0 | 15.0 | 57.00, | 75.00 - 76.50 | 2.12 | 2.79 - 2.85 |
| | (12 000) | (1.0) | (13.5) | (52.00) | (70.00 - 71.50) | (1.93) | (2.60 - 2.66) |
| Mobile | 12 000 | 1.5 | 15.0 | 2 51.00 z | 69.00 - 70.50 | 1.90 | 2.57 - 2.62 |
| | (11 300) | (1.3) | (15.5) | (50.00) | (68.00 - 59.50) | (1.98) | (2.69 - 2.75) |
| South Africa | | | | 2 | | | |
| Richards Bay | 11 900 | 1.0 | 15.0 | 50.25 | 57.25 - 61.25 | 1.89 | 2.15 - 2.30 |
| | (10 800) | (1.0) | (15.0) | (47.75) | (54.75 - 58.75) | (1.97) | (2.26 - 2.43) |
| Australia Newcastle | 12 000 | 1.0 | 14.0 | 56.50 | 66,50 - 67,50 | 2.10 | 2.47 - 2.51 |
| Port Kembla | (12 000) | (1.0) | (14.0) | (53.00) | (63.00 - 64.00) | (1.97) | (2.34 - 2.38) |

¹ Calculated using transportation rates from Coal Week International, December 23, 1981. Bracketed figures refer to November 1981 data.

² Contract quotes. All other prices are spot prices defined by Coal Week International as single shipments to be delivered within one year.

³ Coal Week International and Energy Economist, December 1981.
| | | Medium | (Most Like | ely) Coal | Price | Scenar io | | Lo | w Coal Pric | e Scena | rio |) High Coal Price Scenario | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|---|---|---|--|
| | CIF Price Japan | Shipping Cost | FOB Price Anchorage | Shipping Cost | FOB Price Healy | Shipping Cost Healy to Nenana | Price At Nenana | CIF Price Japan | FOB Price Anchorage | FOB Price Healy | Price At Nenana | CIF Price Japan | FOB Price Anchorage | FOB Price Healy | Price At Nenana | |
| January | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1982 1985 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 Annual (| 2.66 2.82 3.12 3.80 4.20 4.64 5.12 5.66 Growth | 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 | 2.08 2.24 2.54 3.22 3.62 4.06 4.54 5.08 | 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.88 | 1.43 1.58 1.86 2.48 2.85 3.26 3.70 4.20 | 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.41 | 1.74 1.90 2.19 2.83 3.21 3.64 4.09 4.61 | 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 | 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 | 1.43 1.42 1.40 1.34 1.31 1.28 1.24 1.20 | 1.74 1.73 1.69 1.67 1.66 1.63 1.61 | 2.66 2.99 3.64 5.39 6.57 8.01 9.76 11.90 | 2.08 2.41 3.06 4.81 5.99 7.43 9.18 11.32 | 1.43 1.75 2.38 4.07 5.22 6.63 8.34 10.44 | 1.74 2.07 2.71 4.42 5.58 7.01 8.73 10.85 | |
| 1982 to | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2000 | 2% | 0% | 2.5% | 0.7% | 3.1% | 0.7% | 2.7% | 0% | 0% | -0.4% | -0.2% | 4% | 4.8% | 6.0% | 5.3% | |
| 2000 to 2040 | 1% | 0% | 1.2% | 0.4% | 1.3% | 0.4% | 1.2% | 0% | 0% | -0.3% | -0.1% | 2% | 2.2% | 2.4% | 2.3% | |
| 1982 to 2040 | 1.3% | 0% | 1.6% | 0.5% | 1.9% | 0.5% | 1.7% | 0% | 0% | -0.3% | -0.1% | 2.6% | 3.0% | 3.5% | 3.2% | |

TABLE 18.1.10: EXPORT OPPORTUNITY VALUES OF ALASKAN COAL - SENSITIVITY CASE¹

¹ CIF Prices based on updated (late 1981) import prices of coal in Japan. Assumes export potential for Healy coal.

TABLE 18.1.11: SUMMARY OF COAL OPPORTUNITY VALUES

| | Base Period | Annual | Real | Probability | Conditional Probability Given | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Base Case Battelle Base Period CIF Price | (Jan. 1982) Value (\$/MMBtu) | Growth 1980-2000 (%) | n Rate 2000-2040 (%) | of Occurrence (%) | Low Oil Prices (%) | Medium Oil Prices (%) | High Oil Prices (%) | |
| Medium Scenario | | | | | | | | |
| CIF Japan FOB Beluga Nenana | 1.95 1.43 1.75 | 2.0 2.6 2.3 | 1.0 1.2 1.1 | 49 49 49 | 30 30 30 | 70 70 70 | 25 25 25 | |
| Low Scenario | | | | | | | | |
| CIF Japan FOB Beluga Nenana | 1.95 1.43 1.75 | 0.0 0.0 0.1 | 0.0 0.0 0.1 | 24 24 24 | 60 60 60 | 10 10 10 | 5 5 5 | |
| High Scenario | | | | | | | | |
| CIF Japan FOB Beluga Nenana | 1.95 1.43 1.75 | 4.0 5.0 4.5 | 2.0 2.2 1.9 | 27 27 27 | 10 10 10 | 20 20 20 | 70 70 70 | |
| Sensitivity Case | | | | | | | | |
| Updated Base Period CIF Price ¹ | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Medium Scenario</u> | | | | | | | | |
| CIF Japan FOB Beluga FOB Nenana | 2.66 2.08 1.74 | 2.0 2.5 2.7 | 1.0 1.2 1.2 | 49 49 49 | 30 30 30 | 70 70 70 | 25 25 25 | |
| Low Scenario | | | | | | | | |
| CIF Japan FOB Beluga FOB Nenana | 2.66 2.08 1.74 | 0.0 0.0 -0.2 | 0.0 0.0 -0.1 | 24 24 24 | 60 60 60 | 10 10 10 | 5 5 5 | |
| High Scenario | | | | | | | | |
| CIF Japan FOB Beluga FOB Nenana | 2.66 2.08 1.74 | 4.0 4.8 5.3 | 2.0 2.2 2.3 | 27 27 27 | 10 10 10 | 20 20 20 | 70 70 70 | |

¹ Assuming a 10 percent discount for Alaskan coal due to quality differentials

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| | Fuel | Price Scena | rio |
|---|--------------|------------------------|--------------|
| | Low | Medium | High |
| Probability of occurrence | 25% | 50% | 25% |
| Base period January 1982 prices | | (1982\$/MMB | tu) |
| - Fuel Oil - Natural Gas | 6.50 3.00 | 6.50 3.00 | 6.50 3.00 |
| - Coar - Beluga - Nenana | 1.43 1.75 | 1.43 1.75 | 1.43 1.75 |
| Real escalation rates per year | | (percent) ¹ | |
| - Fuel Oil . 1982 - 2000 . 2000 - 2040 | 0.0 | 2.0 2.0 | 4.0 2.0 |
| - Natural Gas . 1982 - 2000 . 2000 - 2040 | 0.0 | 2.5 2.0 | 5.0 2.0 |
| - Beluga Coal . 1982 - 2000 . 2000 - 2040 | 0.0 0.0 | 2.6 1.2 | 5.0 2.2 |
| - Nenana Coal . 1982 - 2000 . 2000 - 2040 | 0.1 0.1 | 2.3 1.1 | 4.5 1.9 |

TABLE 18.1.12: SUMMARY OF FUEL PRICES USED IN THE OGP PROBABILITY TREE ANALYSIS

 $^{1}\,$ Beyond 2010, the OGP analysis used zero real escalation in all cases.

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| | | | \$ x 10 ⁶ 1982 PRESENT-WORTH OF SUSIINA COSTS | | | | | |
|--|----|---|---|------|--------------------------|---------------|--|--|
| PLAN | ID | COMPONENTS | 1993 - 2010 | 2018 | ESTIMATED 2010 - 2051 | 1993 - 2051 | | |
| Non-Susitna | A | 600 MW Coal-Beluga 200 MW Coal-Nenana 630 MW GT | 3213 | 491 | 5025 | 82 <i>3</i> 8 | | |
| Susitna | С | 680 MW Watana 600 MW Devil Canyon 180 MW GT | 3119 | 385 | 3943 | 7062 | | |
| Net Economic Benefit of Susitna Plan | × | | | | | 1176 | | |

TABLE 18.1.13: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS SUSITNA PROJECT - BASE PLAN

TABLE 18.1.14: SUMMARY OF LOAD FORECAST USED FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

| | MED | IUM | L | O W O | HIGH | | |
|------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|--|
| YEAR | MW | GWh | MW | GWh | MW | GWh | |
| 1990 | 892 | 4456 | 802 | 3999 | 1098 | 5703 | |
| 2000 | 1084 | 5469 | 921 | 4641 | 1439 | 7457 | |
| 2010 | 1537 | 7791 | 1245 | 6303 | 2165 | 11435 | |

Source: Battelle, Railbelt Alternative Study, December 1981

TABLE 18.1.15: LOAD FORECAST SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

| | | | 1982 PRES | NET | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------|---|-------------|------|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| PLAN | ID | COMPONENTS | 1993 - 2010 | 2010 | ESTIMATED 2011 - 2051 | 1993 - 2051 | ECONOMIC BENEFIT |
| Non-Susitna Low Forecast | K ₁ | 400 MW Coal-Beluga 200 MW Coal-Nenana 560 MW GT | 2640 | 404 | 4238 | 6878 | |
| Susitna Low Forecast | К ₂ | 680 MW Watana (1995) 600 MW Devil Canyon (2004) | 2882 | 360 | 3768 | 6650 | 228 |
| Non-Susitna High Forecast | J ₁ | 800 MW Coal-Beluga 200 MW Coal-Beluga 770 MW GT 430 MW Pre-1993 | 4176 | 700 | 6683 | 10859 ¹ | |
| Susitna High Forecast | J ₂ | 680 MW Watana (1993) 600 MW Devil Canyon (1997) 350 MW GT 430 MW Pre-1993 | 3867 | 564 | 5380 | 9247 ¹ | 1612 |

1 From 1993 to 2040

| | | | 1982 PRES | | | | |
|-------------|----------------|---------------------------------|-------------|------|--------------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| PLAN | ID | REAL DISCOUNT RATE (percent) | 1993 - 2010 | 2010 | ESTIMATED 2011 - 2051 | 1993 - 2051 | NE I BENEFIT |
| Non-Susitna | Q ₁ | 2 | 3701 | 465 | 7766 | 11167 | |
| Susitna | Q2 | 2 | 3156 | 323 | 5394 | 8550 | 2617 |
| Non-Susitna | A | 3 | 3213 | 491 | 5025 | 82 <i>3</i> 8 | |
| Susitna | С | 3 | 3119 | 385 | 3943 | 7062 | 1176 |
| Non-Susitna | 5 ₁ | 4 | 2791 | 517 | 3444 | 6235 | |
| Susitna | ⁵ 2 | 4 | 3080 | 457 | 3046 | 6126 | 109 |
| Non-Susitna | P ₁ | 5 | 2468 | 550 | 2478 | 4946 | |
| Susitna | P2 | 5 | 3032 | 539 | 2426 | 5459 | (513) |

TABLE 18.1.16: DISCOUNT RATE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

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TABLE 18.1.17: CAPITAL COST SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

| | | | 1982 PRES | \$ x ENT-WOR | 106 TH OF SYSTEM C | OSTS | NET |
|----------------|----------------|---------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------------|---------------|---------------------|
| PLAN | ID | REAL DISCOUNT RATE (percent) | 1993 - 2010 | 2010 | ESTIMATED 2011 - 2051 | 1993 - 2051 | ECONOMIC BENEFIT |
| Alternative Ca | pital | Costs + 20% | | | | | |
| Non-Susitna | G | | 3460 | 528 | 5398 | 8858 | |
| Susitna | c1 | | 3119 | 385 | 3943 | 7062 | 1976 |
| Alternative Ca | pital | Costs - 10% | | | | | |
| Non-Susitna | G ₁ | | 3084 | 472 | 4831 | 7915 | |
| Susitna | с1 | | 3119 | 385 | 3943 | 7062 | 853 |
| Susitna Capita | l Cos | ts Less 17% | | | | | |
| Non-Susitna | Α | | 3213 | 491 | 5025 | 82 38 | |
| Susitna | x ₂ | | 2710 | 336 | 3441 | 6151 | 2087 |
| Susitna Capita | ts Plus 17% | | | | | | |
| Non-Susitna | A | | 3213 | 491 | 5025 | 82 <i>3</i> 8 | |
| Susitna | ^Y 2 | | 3529 | 434 | 4445 | 7974 | 264 |

¹ An adjustment calculation was made regarding the plus or minus capital cost of the 3 GT units added in 2007 - 2010 since the difference was less than \$10 x 10⁶. Beyond 2010, this effect was included.

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TABLE 18.1.18: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - UPDATED BASE PERIOD

(JANUARY 1982) COAL PRICES

| | | \$ x 10 ⁶ 1982 Present Worth of Sustina Costs | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|--|
| Base Case | Base Period Coal Price (1982 \$/MMBtu) | Costs of Non-Susitna Plan | Costs of Susitna Plan | Net Economic Benefits | | | |
| Base Case | 1.43 | 82 <i>3</i> 8 | 7062 | 1176 | | | |
| Sensitivity (Update) Use | 2.08 | 9030 | 7062 | 1968* | | | |

* The value is produced by "forcing" the system to use the same coal fired plants as in the base case. If the system is allowed to optimite, however, combined cycle units are selected in lieu of coal fired plants and the net economic benefit is essentially the same as in the base case.

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TABLE 18.1.19: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - REAL COST ESCALATION

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| | | | 1982 PRES | \$ × ENT-WOR | 10 ⁶ TH OF SYSTEM C | OSTS | · |
|--------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| PLAN | ID | | 1993 - 2010 | 2010 | ESTIMATED 2011 - 2051 | 1993 - 2051 | NET BENEFIT |
| Zero Escalatio | <u>n in</u> | Capital Costs and O&M | . | | | | |
| Non-Susitna | 0 ₁ | | 2838 | 422 | 4319 | 7157 | |
| Susitna | 0 ₂ | | 2525 | 299 | 3060 | 5585 | 1572 |
| Escalation in Costs and O&M | Capit (Batt | al elle) ¹ | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | | |
| Non-Susitna | X ₁ | | 3142 | 477 | 4881 | 8023 | - |
| Susitna | x ₂ | | 2988 | 366 | 37 45 | 67 37 | 1286 |
| Double Escalat | ion i | n Capital Costs and O&M | | | | | |
| Non-Susitna | P ₁ | | 3650 | 602 | 6161 | 9811 | |
| Susitna | ^R 2 | | 3881 | 503 | 5148 | 9029 | 782 |
| Zero Escalatio | n in | Fuel Prices | | | | | |
| Non-Susitna | ۷ ₁ - | | 2233 | 335 | 3427 | 5660 | |
| Susitna | ۷2 | | 3002 | 365 | 37 36 | 67 38 | (1078) |
| High Escalation in Fuel Prices | | • | | | | | |
| Non-Susitna | W ₁ | | 4063 | 643 | 6574 | 10367 | |
| Susitna | W2 | | 3267 | 403 | 4121 | 7388 | 2979 |

 1 Capital and O&M costs assumed to escalate at 1.4 percent 1982 to 2010

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| | | | 1982 PRES | | | | |
|------------------------------------|----|--|--------------------|------|--------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| PLAN | ID | COMPONENTS | 1993 - 2010 | 2010 | ESTIMATED 2011 - 2051 | 1993 - 2051 | NET BENEFIT |
| Non-Susitna with Chakachamna | В | 3 <i>5</i> 0 MW Chakachamna 400 MW Coal-Beluga 200 MW Coal-Nenana 440 MW GT | 3038 | 475 | 4861 | 7899 | |
| Susitna | С | 680 MW Watana 600 MW Devil Canyon 180 MW GT | 31 19 | 385 | 3943 | 7062 | 837 |

TABLE 18.1.20: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - NON-SUSITNA PLAN WITH CHAKACHAMNA

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TABLE 18.1.21: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS -PLANNED DELAY IN SUSITNA PROJECT TIMING

| | ID | \$ x 106 1982 Present Worth of System Costs | \$ x 10 ⁶ Net Economic Benefit |
|---|----|---|---|
| | | | |
| Susitna Base Case | С | 7,062 | 1,176 |
| One-year delay for Watana (1994) | С3 | 7,105 | 1,133 |
| One-year delay for Watana and Devil Canyon (1994, 2003) | C4 | 7,165 | 1,134 |
| Two-year delay for Watana and Devil Canyon (1995, 2004) | С5 | 7,230 | 1,1 <i>3</i> 8 |

| | Index Value |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| | Index Value |
| BASE CASE (\$1,176 MILLION) | 100 |
| Fuel Escalation – – High – Low | 253 ¹ -92 ² |
| Discount Rates - High-High (5%) - High (4%) - Low (2%) | -44 9 223 |
| Susitna Capital Cost - High - Low | 2 <i>3</i> 178 |
| Load Forecast - High - Low | 1 <i>3</i> 7 19 |
| Non-Susitna (Thermal) Capital Costs - High - Low | 168 7 <i>3</i> |
| Capital and O&M Cost Escalation - High - Intermediate (Battelle) - Low | 67 109 1 <i>3</i> 4 |
| Chakachamna (included in Non-Susitna Plan) | 71 |
| Updated Base Coal Price | 167 |
| Planned Delay in Susitna Project | |
| - One-year delay, Watana | 96 |
| - One-year delay, Watana and Devil Canyon | 96 |
| - Two-year delay, Watana and Devil Canyon | 97 |

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TABLE 18.1.22: SUMMARY OF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - INDEXES OF NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS

 1 High fuel escalation case provides net benefits equal to 253 percent of the base value, 2.53 x \$1,176, or \$2,975.

 2 Low fuel escalation case provides minus 92 percent of the base case net benefits, -.92 x \$1,176, or -\$1,082.

18.2 - Probability Assessment and Risk Analysis

(a) Introduction to Multivariate Sensitivity Analysis

The feasibility study of the Susitna Project included an economic analysis based upon a comparison of generation system production costs. The system costs were estimated with and without the proposed project using a computerized model of the Railbelt generation system. In order to carry out this analysis, numerous projections and forecasts of future conditions were made. In order to address these uncertain conditions, a sensitivity analysis on key factors was done. This analysis focused on the variance in each of a number of parameters and determined the impact of this variance on the economic feasibility of the project. Each factor was varied singularly with all other variables held constant.

The purpose of the analysis was served by constructing a probability tree of future conditions for the Alaskan Railbelt electrical system, with and without the Susitna project. Each branching of the tree represents three values for a given variable which were assigned a high, medium and low value as well as a corresponding high, medium and low probability of occurrence. The three values represent the expected range and mid-point for a given variable. In some cases, the mid-point represents the most likely value which would be expected to occur. End limbs of the probability tree represent scenarios of mixed variable conditions and a probability of occurrence for the scenario.

The computer production cost model was then used to determine the PW cost of the electric generation system for each scenario. Using the probabilities assigned to each branch, the PW costs for each "with" and "without" Susitna scenario were plotted against the corresponding cumulative probability. Net benefits of the project have also been calculated and analyzed in a probabilistic manner.

(b) Approach to Probability Assessment

The method followed in the multivariate analysis involved four stages:

- Selection of key variables
- Probability tree development
- Modeling of system costs
- Analysis of results

(i) Selection of Key Variables

The sensitivity tests performed in the economic analysis (see Section 18.1) identified a list of variables which could significantly affect the economic feasibility. This list included:

- . Construction Period
- . Period of Analysis
- . Capital Costs
 - Susitna
 - Thermal Alternatives
- . O&M Costs
- . Base Period Fuel Price
- . Real Escalation in Capital and O&M Costs and Fuel Prices
- . System Reliability
- . Chakachamna included in non-Susitna plan
- . Planned delay in Susitna project timing.

Of this list, several of the inputs are considered to be policy or methodology decisions and are not included in the probabilistic analysis. These include the interest and discount rate, the period of analysis and system reliability criteria. The single variable sensitivity analysis demonstrated that other criteria such as the construction period and O&M costs had little or no impact on the comparison of "with" and "without" Susitna system costs.

Although sensitivity results based on varying the real escalation of capital and O&M costs had a measurable influence on PW costs, it was not included in the probabilistic analysis. The range of capital cost escalation rates tested in the sensitivity analysis extended from 0 percent to 4 percent per year from 1982 to 2010. The mid-range was approximately 2 percent. It is believed that this range accurately covers the minimum and maximum rates anticipated for construction cost escalation. Sensitivity of net benefits to capital and O&M cost excalations was found to be moderate relative to other variables. Therefore, this variable was excluded from the probability assessments.

The three remaining variables were used in the probabilistic analysis. These are the load forecast, capital cost estimates, both for generation alternatives and for the Susitna Project, and real escalation in fuel prices. The variable values and probabilities are discussed in (ii) below.

(ii) Probability Tree

Given the three selected "key" variables for the non-Susitna analysis (four for Susitna), a probability tree was constructed based on the high, medium and low value for each of the variables.

The non-Susitna tree consists of 3 variables and 3 values (high, medium and low) for each, resulting in 27 possible combinations, as shown in Figure 18.2.1. The numbering system selected for this analysis ranges from TO1 to T27 where TO1 refers to the thermal (non-Susitna) case, high load forecast, high alternative capital cost and high fuel cost escalation. At the lower end of the tree, T27 refers to the thermal case, low load forecast, low alternative capital cost and low fuel cost escalation scenario.

The Susitna probability tree (see Figure 18.2.2) could have a maximum of 4 variables and 3 values for each, resulting in 3^4 , or 81 branches. However, a review of the Susitna base plans developed in the economic analysis showed that the medium plan calls for the addition of only three 70 MW gas turbines in the last three years of study. A check on the effect of varying the cost of these units indicated an impact on long-term costs of less than 0.5 percent. Thus, it was assumed that in the medium "branches" there is no variability in thermal alternatives cost.

In the low forecast there is no need for thermal alternative generation in the 1993-2010 period during which the "with" Susitna scenario is being considered. Accordingly, the alternative capital cost variable is removed from that branch. As a result, both the medium and low forecast portions of the probability tree are reduced by a factor of 3. These adjustments reduce the number of ultimate scenarios from 81 to 45 without affecting the accuracy of the multivariate analysis.

A similar numbering system was adopted for the Susitna analysis ranging from SO1 to S45 where SO1 to S27 refer to high load forecast scenarios, S28 to S36 refer to medium load forecast scenarios, and S37 to S45 represent low load forecast scenarios.

(iii) Present Worth of Long-term Cost and Net Benefit Approach

The OGP production cost model was used to determine the PW (in 1982 dollars) of production costs for each scenario, as described in Section 18.1 (c). For each tree, the scenario costs were ranked from lowest to highest and the probability associated with each scenario was used to provide a plot of cumulative probability versus PW cost. Additionally, the scenario costs were weighted with their associated probabilities to provide an expected value of the PW cost.

A second method of cost comparison used in Section (d) below is by comparing net benefits. The net benefit can be estimated by comparing similar "with" and "without" Susitna scenarios, and by examining the difference in PW long-term costs. For example, in a "with" Susitna scenario with PW costs of \$6 billion compared to a similar non-Susitna scenario with \$7 billion PW costs, the PW of the production cost saving over the long-term would be \$1 billion. This difference is the net benefit and again, these net benefits were ranked from low to high and a cumulative probability calculated from the individual probabilities. An expected value of net benefits was also calculated.

(c) Variables and Ranges

(i) Load Forecast

As a single variable, the variance of load forecast remains one of the most important factors. The selection of type and timing of alternative units is dependent on the selected forecast.

In terms of the multivariate sensitivity analysis, the load forecast variation represents the first level of uncertainty in the probability tree. The forecasts used were generated by the Battelle Railbelt Alternative Study group in December 1981 with the use of their Railbelt Electric Demand (RED) model, which relates economic activity, energy prices, and government expenditures to energy demand. The range of variability in the load forcast is presented in Table 18.2.1. Note that these forecasts differ slightly from the final forecasts produced in January 1982 by Battelle.

The probability of the low, medium or high forecast occurring was estimated as a symmetrical pattern of .2, .6 and .2 respectively. These estimates of probability were based upon the estimate by Battelle that the probability of exceedance of their forecasts was approximately 90 percent for the low forecast and 10 percent for the high forecast.

The plans used in the probabilistic analysis are identified as follows:

Low Load Forecast:

Non-Susitna - first 200 MW of thermal capacity added in 1995

Susitna - Watana 600 MW in 1995 - Devil Canyon 600 MW in 2004

Medium Load Forecast:

Non-Susitna - first 200 MW of thermal capacity added in 1993

Susitna - Watana 680 MW in 1993 - Devil Canyon 600 MW in 2002

High Load Forecast:

1982 - 1992 period: (common to both cases)

200 MW of thermal combined cycle capacity added in 1987

200 MW of thermal combined cycle capacity in 1990

70 MW of thermal gas turbine in 1992

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together with:

Non-Susitna - first 200 MW of thermal capacity added in 1993

Susitna - Watana 680 MW in 1993 - Devil Canyon 600 MW in 1997

(ii) Alternative Capital Cost

Consistent with the univariate economic analysis, the base capital cost estimate plus 20 percent was used as the high value and the base capital cost estimate minus 10 percent was used as the low value. These figures were selected based on a review of the Railbelt Alternatives Study Coal Cost Estimate report prepared by Ebasco for Battelle. The discussion contained in the report indicated that there was a greater likelihood of cost increase than decrease.

The base (medium), high and low capital costs for the coal, gas turbine and gas-fired combined cycle plants are shown in Table 18.2.2. These capital costs include allowance for interest during construction based on an S-shaped expenditure curve and the medium economic parameters used throughout the study. In addition, the first unit sited in the Beluga area and the single unit at Nenana district carry the appropriate costs of transmission system strengthening and interconnection. The probability of the occurrence for the high, medium and low capital costs were estimated as a .20, .60, and .20.

(iii) Fuel Cost and Escalation

Considerable effort has been concentrated on defining fuel prices and escalation rates of the various fuels for alternative forms of generation Railbelt, both by Acres and by Battelle for their Railbelt Alternative Study.

The low, medium and high cases are all linked to the forecast escalation rate in the world market price for oil, as shown in Section 18.1 (b).

- Coal

As outlined in Section 18.1 coal reserves available to the Railbelt include coal mined at Healy and a potential coal supply from the as yet undeveloped Beluga field. Furthermore, Healy coal could be transported to Nenana for use as fuel in a potential 200 MW coal-fired plant located there due to air quality restrictions at Healy. Three starting coal prices based on point of use were developed for input into the multivariate sensitivity analysis. For each of these starting coal prices, three escalation rate scenarios were developed, a low, a medium or most likely case, and a high case. Probabilities of occurrence of .25, .50 and .25 respectively were assigned to the three escalation rates. These probabilities are discussed in detail in Section 18.1 (b). Table 18.2.3 summarizes these prices and escalation rates.

- Natural Gas

Cook Inlet natural gas is presently sold to Anchorage utilities at existing contract rates. It is generally agreed that the price is artificially low and will increase significantly as these contracts are renegotiated. Thus, a world market opportunity value was selected as the base starting price for modeling purposes. Based on the Battelle medium price forecast, a 1982 opportunity value of \$3/MMBtu was selected. This value when coupled with Acres medium fuel escalation rates yields values equal to Battelle's assumptions during the 1993-2010 study period. In the low case, prices were assumed constant at \$3/MMBtu throughout the study period. The medium case escalation rate was 2.4 percent (1982-2000) and 2 percent (2001-2010). The high case escalation rate was set at 5 percent (1982-2000) and 2 percent (2001-2010). Table 18.2.3 summarizes these forecasts of gas prices.

- Distillate Oil

Table 18.2.3 summarizes the low, medium and high oil price trends used in this analysis assuming a 1982 rate of \$6.50/MMBtu, based on Battelle estimates.

(iv) Susitna Capital Cost

The potential for variation in the Susitna Project capital cost has been analyzed in the feasibility study. In general, the approach has been to produce an estimated capital cost with a relatively high level of confidence that the ultimate project cost will be less than the "upper limit" cost (in 1982 dollars). As shown in Section 18.2 (f) through (g), the risk analysis has indicated that the estimated capital cost has a 17 percent chance of being equalled or exceeded given the low probability but high impact risks which could occur during construction (i.e., major seismic event or flood).

During earlier sensitivity tests, capital costs were allowed to vary from 83 percent of the project estimate to 117 percent. These capital costs are presented in Table 18.2.4.

Assignment of probabilities to the three levels of estimate was based upon the feasibility study risk assessment. The approach to the "upper limit" value for the Susitna capital cost was an attempt to bound the base estimate with a high level of confidence that the overall project cost will be less than this estimate. Therefore, the assignment of probabilities of occurrence are somewhat different than for the non-Susitna alternatives. Based on the risk analysis, a probability of .6 was assigned to the low case and values of .25 and .15 were assigned to the medium and high values. These values reflect the expectation that ultimate costs of the project will be less than the current estimate (in 1982 dollars).

(d) Results

This section presents the results from the analysis of the two probability trees and of the input data in accordance with the methodology described in Section (b).

(i) Probability Tree: Non-Susitna

The parameters for the twenty-seven scenarios defined by the probability tree in Figure 18.2.1 were entered into the simulation model to determine the 1982 PW of system costs. These results are presented in Table 18.2.5 and Figure 18.2.1.

The PW cost varied by nearly 350 percent from the lowest cost scenario (\$4.41 billion) to the highest cost scenario (\$15 billion). The low cost relates to the case of low load forecast, low capital costs for thermal units and zero real escalation in fuel costs. Conversely, the high case includes the high forecast for each of these variables. The large spread from low to high cost seems most dependent on the fuel cost escalation rate used. The wide range in fuel costs during the study period and the reliance on fossil fuels in the non-Susitna cases led to the wide spread in PW costs.

Table 18.2.5 also shows the calculation of costs versus cumulative probability. This plot is derived as the summation of the probabilistic increments of costs for each scenario. The increment is the product of a scenario's PW cost and its probability. For the non-Susitna case, the expected value of PW costs is \$8.48 billion.

Visual representation of the data from Table 18.2.5 is shown in Figure 18.2.3. This graph is based on a histogram of PW cost versus cumulative probability.

(ii) Probability Tree: Susitna

The 45 scenarios in the "with" Susitna case shown in Figure 18.2.2 were also run using the simulation model to obtain the system production costs. The results are shown in Table 18.2.6. The overall variability of PW costs in the Susitna case is much less than the non-Susitna case. The range from lowest to highest is \$5.54 billion to \$11.59 billion, a range of about 200 percent as compared to 350 percent for the non-Susitna alternatives. The expected value of PW costs is \$7.03 billion.

(iii) Comparison of Present Worth of Long-term Costs

Figure 18.2.3 presents the two histograms of long-term costs for the "with" and "without" Susitna cases. From these it is seen that the non-Susitna plan costs could be expected to be significantly less than the Susitna plan costs about 6 percent of the time, approximately equal to the Susitna costs 16 percent of the time, and significantly greater 78 percent of the time.

A comparison of the expected value of long-term costs for the "with" and "without" cases yields an expected value net benefit of \$1.45 billion. This value represents the difference between the non-Susitna PW cost of \$8.48 billion and the Susitna PW cost of \$7.03 billion.

(iv) Net Benefits

A second method of examining the "with" and "without" Susitna probability trees is to make a direct comparison of similar scenarios and to calculate the net benefit of each comparison. This method is discussed in more detail in section (b). Table 18.2.7 lists the 81 comparisons of similar scenarios between the 27 non-Susitna case and 45 Susitna case scenarios. As was done for the individual tree cases, the net benefits were ranked from low to high and plotted against cumulative probability, as shown in Figure 18.2.4. The net benefits vary from minus \$2.92 billion with an associated probability of .0015 to a high of \$4.80 billion with an associated probability of .018. The single comparison with the highest probability of occurrence of .108 has a net benefit of \$2.09 billion.

The plot of net benefits shows a "breakeven" between the "with" and "without" Susitna cases at about 23 percent, consistent with the previous comparison, i.e., positive net benefits will accrue from the Susitna project with a probability of 77 percent.

(e) Extensions to the Multivariate Analysis

Introduction

The initial probability analysis was carried out under the implicit assumption that energy prices and load forecasts (energy demand) are not correlated. The probabilities attached to high (H), medium (M) and low (L) energy prices were therefore constant across the L, M, and H load forecasts.

Given the importance of energy prices to the Alaskan economy it may be postulated however, that energy demand could be either positively or negatively correlated with prices and that the probabilities of H, M, and L demand should be conditional on the levels of energy prices. These conditional probabilities would reflect the elasticity of demand with respect to energy prices. Two cases were explored, corresponding to positive and negative correlation and elasticity.

(i) Case 1 - Positive Price/Demand Correlation

This case depicts a scenario in which higher (lower) energy prices provide an increase (decrease) in state revenues, incomes and overall economic activity, leading to higher (lower) energy consumption in general, and higher (lower) electricity demand in particular. In essence, it is assumed that the income effect outweighs the price effect stemming from higher or lower energy prices.¹ As shown in Table 18.2.8 the probability tree was modified such that higher (lower) demand is more likely to be associated with higher (lower) energy prices than with lower (higher) prices. Note that the initial tree was altered only with respect to the conditional probabilities of the load forecasts. It is also noted that the revised probabilities correspond to an elasticity of about +0.15 ².

Based on these probabilities, the cumulative probability distributions of present valued costs were constructed for the Susitna (S) and thermal (T) plans. These show that the chances of an S plan being more costly than the T plan are 25 percent. The costs of the S and T plans are approximately equal with a probability of 6 percent, and the S plan is distinctly less costly with a probability of 69 percent. In comparison, the initial probability analysis indicated that the chances of more-costly, equal-cost, and less-costly S plans were about 16 percent, 6 percent and 78 percent respectively.

(ii) Case 2 - Negative Price/Demand Correlation

In this scenario, it is hypothesized that higher (lower) energy prices would on balance result in lower (higher) energy consumption and electricity demand. In contrast to Case 1, Case 2 depicts a

¹ There is a further possibility that larger state revenues from higher energy prices would lead to substantial subsidies to the cost of electrical energy to Alaskan consumers and hence further increase the positive correlation between energy prices generally and demand. Since such subsidies are a political policy decision they cannot be forecast and are therefore not taken into account. This factor could, however, only reinforce the conclusions reached.

² The elasticity is defined as the percent change in the expected value of demand divided by the percent change in real prices. For example, in 2010, the expected values of the load forecast given L and M energy prices are 7 263 GWh and 8 223 GWh respectively, a difference of 13 percent. The percent difference between L and M energy prices in 2010 is 99 percent. Thus the elasticity is 13 percent (13/99) or .13. Similar elasticities were measured for the L-H and M-H pairs of load forecasts and energy prices.

situation in which the price effect outweighs the income effect resulting from a shift in energy prices and corresponding levels of Alaskan economic activity. As shown in Table 18.2.9 the initial probability tree was modified such that higher (lower) energy prices are more (less) likely to lead to lower energy demand and load forecasts. The revised conditional probabilities reflect an elasticity of demand of about minus 13, calculated as in Case 1 above. Cumulative probability distributions of PW system costs were developed for the S and T plans. These indicated an even higher likelihood for positive net benefits from the S plan with a 91 percent chance that the S plan would be the less costly alternative. In this case there is no region of "ambiguity" with equal costs attached to the S and T plans; therefore, it is asserted that there is only a 9 percent probability that the T plan would be cost-competitive. Table 18.2.10 summarizes these results and compares them with those obtained in the initial probability tree analysis.

(f) Approach to Risk Analysis

As the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, the Susitna hydroelectric project is viable in economic terms through a broad range of possible deviations from expected values of key parameters. Even so, net project benefits are sensitive to Susitna capital cost variations; and alternative financing plans are predicated on the assumption that the proposed project schedule will be met. Every reasonable effort was made to prepare conservative cost estimates and to produce an achievable schedule. Yet, uncertainties are involved and their potential importance demands that they be given appropriate consideration at various stages in project development.

A risk analysis was undertaken as the basis for determining the extent to which perceived risks are likely to influence capital costs and schedule. In addition, because a mature Susitna project would represent a major portion of the total generation system, a further risk analysis was accomplished to assess the probability and consequences of a long-term outage of the proposed transmission system. This section summarizes the risk analyses. A more detailed report is included in the project documentation for Subtask 11.03, Risk Analysis.

Any major construction effort is inevitably exposed to a large number of risks. Floods may occur at crucial times. Accidents should not happen, but they sometimes do. Sub-surface investigations, no matter how thorough, do not always tell the whole story about what will be found when major excavation work goes on. The normal estimation process implicitly accounts for a set of reasonably "normal" expectations as direct costs are developed, adding a contingency to the directly-computed total on the grounds that problems usually do occur even though their specific nature may not be accurately foreseen at the outset.

The Susitna Risk Analysis took explicit account of 21 different risks, applying them as appropriate to each major construction activity. The effort involved combining reasonably precise data (e.g., the probability that a particular flood crest will occur in any given year can be determined from analysis of hydrologic records) with numerous subjective judgments (e.g., until a particular flood crest does occur, we cannot know with any degree of certainty what havoc it will wreak). The over-all methodology is illustrated in Figure 18.2.5 and is briefly described below:

- (i) The base cost and schedule estimation effort was reviewed to determine important underlying assumptions, areas of uncertainty, proposed construction methods and sequence.
- (ii) A risk list was developed, providing an initial statement of major areas of uncertainty to be considered in the analysis. It was important at this stage to begin to make initial gross assessments of how each risk might affect the project at various stages of completion, as well as to estimate the extent to which dependency existed between one risk and another. (In this regard, for example, the risk of a major flood is independent of the risk that geologic conditions will differ from those expected. On the other hand, it can be reasonably asserted that the risk that any given contractor will experience a construction accident is at least partially dependent on the risk that the same contractor will have poor construction guality control.)
- (iii) Upon completion of the estimate review and concurrent with development of an initial risk list, a review was made of proprietary risk analysis software as the basis for specifying particular modifications which would permit proper treatment of all data elements.
- (iv) A data collection effort was accomplished for each identified risk and a determination was made of the probability that each of a selected range of risk magnitudes would be realized in any given year. Where data gaps existed, a decision analysis process was used to produce required information.
- (v) Transformation criteria were developed so that individual risk analysts could more easily view the consequences of realizing any single risk in terms of "natural" criteria. For example, it is easier to think in terms of the volume of earth involved in a slope failure than to think directly of its cost impact. Transformation criteria can then be used to convert to cost and schedule implications.
- (vi) Software revisions were made in accordance with specifications noted at sub-paragraph (iii) above concurrent with the analysis of risks.

- (vii) For each major construction activity at each dam site, the consequences of realizing each possible risk magnitude were assessed and estimated. Responses (actions which will be taken if a particular consequence is realized) were developed.
- (viii) As the work proceeded, reviews and revisions were made to introduce collective judgments from diverse disciplines into the process.
 - (ix) The initial data set was run and interpreted. Anomalies were identified and risks emerging as most significant were further reviewed to ensure that their consequences had been adequately accounted for.
 - (x) Whereas the primary risk analysis effort focused upon the construction phase, a separate analysis of the transmission system was also made to assess the likelihood and the consequences of a major transmission outage. A similar methodology was followed in this sub-analysis.
 - (xi) All input data was updated based on the results of step (ix) above.
 - (xii) A final run was made to compute expected values of costs and completion schedules as well as to create probability distributions for these items. This final output provided the basis for interpretation.

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(g) Elements of the Analysis

Figure 18.2.6 graphically depicts important questions which were addressed at the start and relates them to elements of the analysis. Each element is further subdivided as follows:

(i) Configurations

Three primary configurations were considered:

- the Watana hydroelectric project (with transmission)
- the Devil Canyon hydroelectric project (with transmission)
- the Susitna transmission system alone.

Separate risk studies of these configurations permitted the production of data which can be aggregated in various ways to accommodate alternative "power-on-line" dates which differ according to the various demand forecasts.

(ii) Configuration States

Two configuration states were considered:

- Construction Period applicable to Watana and Devil Canyon;
- Operation Period applied only to the transmission system configuration.

(iii) Risks

Twenty-one risks were identified for consideration in the analysis and were grouped as follows:

- Natural Risks
 - . flood
 - . ice
 - . wind
 - . seismic
 - permafrost deterioration
 - . geologic conditions
 - . low streamflow.

- Design Controlled Risks

- seepage/piping erosion
- . groundwater.

- Construction Risks

- equipment availability
- . labor strikes/disputes
- . material availability
- equipment breakdown
- material deliveries
- . weather.

- Human Risks

- contractor capability
- construction quality control
- accidents
- sabotage/vandalism.
- Special Risks
 - regulatory delay
 - . estimating variance.

(iv) Activities

For each configuration state involving construction, up to 22 activities were considered. For Watana, for example, these included:

- main access
- site facilities
- diversion tunnels

- cofferdams
- main dam excavation
- main dam fill initial portion
- main dam fill final portion
- relict channel protection
- chute spillway
- emergency spillway
- service spillway tunnels
- intake
- penstock
- powerhouse
- transformer gallery
- tailrace and surge chambers
- turbine-generators
- mechanical/electrical equipment
- switchyard
- transmission
- impoundment
- test and commission.

(v) Damage Scenarios

Up to ten different damage scenarios were associated with each logical risk-activity combination. While these varied significantly from one risk-activity combination to another, they generally described a range of possibilities which accounted for discrete increments extending from "no damage" to "catastrophic loss".

(vi) Criteria

The consequences of realizing particular risk magnitudes for each activity were measured in terms of the following criteria:

- cost implications
- schedule implications
- manpower requirements.

(vii) Boundary Conditions

The following assumptions and limitations were established to permit a reasonable and consistent analysis of the problem:

- All cost estimates were made in terms of January 1982 dollars. Thus, results are presented in this report in terms only of real potential cost variations, exclusive of inflation.
- The analysis was limited only to the construction periods for Watana and Devil Canyon since the greatest potential cost and schedule variance would be possible during these periods. The risk analysis for the operating period was associated solely with

the transmission system since that configuration represents the most likely source of a major system outage during project operation.

- The risk analysis was accomplished concurrently with finalization of the total project cost estimate and was necessarily associated with the feasibility level design. There is clearly some potential for design change as the project proceeds and a future risk analysis should be undertaken coincident with completion of final detailed design and prior to commitment to major construction activities. Even so, the "estimating variance" risk takes into account the fact that some design changes are likely to appear as detailed design effort proceeds.
- A great deal of subjective judgment was necessarily involved in assessing certain probabilities and in predicting possible damage scenarios. This effort was accomplished initially by individual qualified professionals in the various disciplines and was subjected to iterative group review and feedback efforts. To the extent that individual biases entered the analysis, their effects were probably mutually offsetting. Even so, sensitivity tests were made for risks which were important contributors to the final results.
- The risk list does not include the important possibility of funding delays or of financing problems. These issues were dealt with in a separate financial risk analysis as discussed in paragraph 18.5 below.

(h) Risk Assessments

For each of the risks identified in paragraph 18.2 (g) (iii) above, the assessment commenced with detailed definition of credible events. Whereas flood was identified as a risk, for example, a definition was sought of the magnitudes of floods which could occur and, with each magnitude, the probability that it would occur. Depending upon the particular risk under consideration, data sources included reasonably accurate scientific data (particularly applicable to the natural risk category), historical experience on water resources projects, and, where data gaps existed, subjective group judgments.

In each case, the effort was to identify some maximum credible event (what is the most extreme event, albeit highly unlikely, that could occur?). This choice set an upper limit on a scale of possible events which always began with a minimum magnitude corresponding to a "no damage" situation. Continuing with flood as an example, the maximum credible event was considered to be the probable maximum flood which had been computed in the hydrologic studies (corresponding to a return period of more than 10,000 years and an annual probability of occurrence of less than .0001). The minimum magnitude "no damage" event at the lower end of the scale varied from activity to activity. (In this regard for example, a cofferdam built early in the construction period and designed to withstand a 50-year flood event can be expected to suffer damage if a 100-year event actually occurs. Late in the project a 100-year event would not only cause no damage to structures in place, but also it might be regarded as fortuitous because it could improve the reservoir impoundment schedule.)

Once risks were defined and logical risk-activity combinations were reviewed, a concept of the consequences of realizing each selected risk magnitude was postulated (e.g., if this risk magnitude is realized, will a partially completed structure be damaged? Will it fail? If it fails, is some other work in progress disrupted?). Clearly, it cannot be determined with certainty what precise damage scenario should be associated with a given risk magnitude for a particular activity. Thus, a range of damage scenarios was defined and associated with each of them a probability of occurring if a particular risk magnitude is realized.

Even if a particular risk level is realized and a particular damage scenario is suffered, there is no certainty as to the cost of restoring the activity, nor can we be sure how long it will take to do so. Things do go exceedingly well every once in a while. Occasionally they go very badly, indeed. Each of the risk analysts was asked to provide three values for each criterion:

- A minimum corresponding, for instance, to the one time in twenty that the weather is particularly good, materials are readily available, no accidents occur, and the like.
- A modal value associated with the most likely expectation of the analyst.
- A maximum value corresponding to the one time in twenty that everything is more difficult than expected.

In the computerized calculation process, the three criterion values supplied by the risk analysts were fitted to a triangular distribution, which approximated the Beta distribution illustrated at the bottom of Figure 18.2.7. In effect, then, designation of the three conceptual criterion values led to generation of a histogram with relatively narrow intervals and a nearly-continuous range of possible values over a relatively-wide spectrum.

Figure 18.2.7 illustrates the structural relationship for handling risk-activity combinations, damage scenarios, and criterion values.

While the procedure described above is generally applicable, some commentary on particular aspects of its application and on certain unique risks is appropriate:

- (i) The terminology "damage scenario" has been used for convenience since most identified risks will normally be thought of as reasons that the cost will be higher than had been estimated or that the schedule will be exceeded. In fact, however, the process does permit consideration of what might be regarded as a "negative" damage scenario. The geologic conditions risk is an excellent example. The cost estimate was produced on the basis of estimates of requirements for some concrete lining in the penstocks, extensive grouting, a certain level of rock bolting, and the like. If geologic conditions are found to be better than currently assumed, the costs could be less and the schedule might be accelerated.
- (ii) The estimating variance risk was treated in a special way because it cannot easily be conceptualized in physical terms. It accounts for inevitable differences which do occur between estimates and actual bids, and between bids and actual activity costs - even in the absence of any other identified risks. Its probability of occurrence and associated range (fractions or multiples of the basic estimate) were determined from historical data on water resources projects. It includes, but is not necessarily limited to, such considerations as:
 - the influence of competition and market pressures;

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- estimating discrepancies or errors in unit quantities on the parts of both owner's estimator and bidder;
- particular contract forms and the owner's acceptance/ non-acceptance of certain risks;
- labor market conditions and the nature of project labor agreements;
- productivity and efficiency changes over time;
- the cost implications of variances between activity schedules and actual activity durations;
- the potential for scope changes over time;
- extraordinary escalation of construction costs above the underlying inflation rate.
- (iii) In addition to estimating variance, a second special risk is associated with regulatory matters. Various legislated controls will most certainly be applied to the Susitna project and it is a relatively simple matter to compute the minimum time in which regulatory requirements could be satisfied. It is a far more difficult task indeed to estimate the precise nature and duration of possible future regulatory delays. It would also clearly be inappropriate to attempt to apply regulatory risks at the activity level.

This risk was handled by developing a separate distribution for a range of periods necessary for satisfaction of important licensing and permitting requirements.

Data used in arriving at a distribution was based on recent experiences on other water resources projects, as well as on discussions with staff members of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The effect of applying the regulatory risk is primarily one of shifting the starting time for commencement of construction activities, leading to corresponding change in the projected completion time. A lesser effect of the regulatory risk was to introduce delays during construction.

Regulatory requirements have been an important influence during the past decade on major construction costs and schedules, though it is difficult to isolate their effects. In order to separately consider estimating variance risks and regulatory risks, "estimating variance" probability determination relied heavily upon water resources construction data developed for projects essentially completed prior to the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). As noted above, regulatory risk probability distributions were derived from more recent projects.

- (iv) Each of the various risk magnitude probabilities was originally calculated as an annual value. On a risk-activity by risk-activity basis, these annual values were then converted by standard computational procedures to provide a probability of occurrence during the duration of the activity.
- (v) The concept of "response" is particularly important in the formal risk analysis process. As the terminology suggests, a "response" represents the action to be taken if a particular event occurs.

There are two kinds of "response". The first - and most often used - is an expected reaction to the occurrence of a particular damage level (i.e., if this damage level is incurred, then what actions must be taken to restore the activity to its pre-damage status? And what costs, schedule, and manpower implications (consequences) will result?). A second kind of response can also be considered and it provides an important link between the design team and the risk analysis team. This latter is the "preventive response" (i.e., what changes might reasonably be made in the design and/or construction procedures_which_would_permit_us_to_avoid_or_reduce_a_particular damage level? Is the cost and schedule change which might ensue worthwhile when compared to the probability and magnitude of the consequences which would otherwise be incurred?). A number of preventive responses were identified by risk analysts during the risk study and several of these were incorporated into the project design and design criteria. There may be further opportunities for preventive response. Since none would be chosen unless it offered a net benefit to cost and/or schedule, it may reasonably be concluded that as detailed design proceeds and as subsequent risk analysis updates are accomplished, a gradual reduction in the spread of possible values can be expected.

(i) Interpretation of Results

(i) Presentation of Data

A variety of formats is available for presentation of risk analysis results. Figure 18.2.8 illustrates three common methods. The choice of a particular graphic display and of "expected value" calculations is explained as follows:

- The density form ((2) on Figure 18.2.8) plots the probability that a particular value will occur against its value. This kind of distribution was used in the preparation of histograms for risks and damage levels, as may be seen on Figure 18.2.7. Insofar as presentation and interpretation of final outputs are concerned, however, the density form is not as meaningful. The decision makers tend to be more concerned about the confidence they can have that a particular value will not be exceeded than that the same value will actually be achieved. (In other words, it is more meaningful to know that there is a 90 percent chance that a certain cost will be \$100 million or less than it is to know that there is a 5 percent chance that the cost will be between \$95 million and \$100 million.)
- The reverse cumulative form ((3) on Figure 18.2.8) provides a measure of the probability that a particular criterion value will be exceeded (e.g., such a distribution might indicate that there is a 10 percent chance that a particular activity will cost <u>more</u> than \$100 million).
- The cumulative form ((1) on Figure 18.2.8) provides a measure of the probability that a particular value will not be exceeded. This latter form was selected for presentation of results since it relates directly to the decision maker's need to know how confident he can be that total costs will be within certain limits and it also allows him to understand that further exposure may exist.
- The "expected value" is the value which would appear on the average if a large number of projects of this type were constructed independently under the same conditions.

Minor variations in activity costs were generated by the estimating team concurrent with development of the risk analysis. In addition, account was taken of the expectation that construction costs will escalate at a faster rate than normal inflation - both in the economic analyses and the risk analyses. To avoid confusion regarding absolute cost values, the results of the risk analysis are presented in this section as percentages of the estimated project cost or as ratios between actual costs and estimated costs.

(ii) Watana Cost-Probability Distribution

Figure 18.2.9 provides the cumulative distribution of total direct costs and their related non-exceedance probabilities as determined in the risk analysis. Certain important points noted on the figure are interpreted as follows:

- The project cost estimate was presented in Chapter 16 of the Feasibility Report. Point "A" on Figure 18.2.9 corresponds to this project estimate. As may be read directly from the display, the analysis suggests that the probability of completing Watana for less than the project estimate is about 73 percent. Said another way, the chance of underrun (in January 1982 dollars) is 73 percent.
- When the low cost estimate (as tested in the sensitivity analysis) is considered, Point "B" results. The probability that Watana will be completed for less than the low cost estimate is about 46 percent.

The fact that this probability is lower than that cited above is, of course, to be expected. It will be noted that the percentage value on the horizontal scale at Point "B" is 83 percent, arrived at from the ratio between low cost estimate and project estimate.

- In spite of the relatively comfortable chance of underrun (or said another way, the degree of confidence we may have in the project cost estimate), it is nonetheless true that the project remains exposed to some potential for costs well above the total estimated costs. Point "C" on Figure 18.2.9 corresponds to the high cost estimate. It will be recalled that a sensitivity analysis was undertaken to determine the effect of such a cost on total project economics. The risk analysis suggests that there is a 90 percent probability that the high cost estimate will not be exceeded.
- As will be noted from Figure 18.2.9, there remains a small but measurable possibility that the project costs will exceed even the high value at Point "C". It can be argued that the degree of conservatism which was used in the analysis has overstated the possibility of extreme upper limits on total cost. The paragraph on comparison with available data below addresses this conservatism issue, comparing our results with historical data.

- The expected value of the actual cost is 90.25 percent of the project estimate.

(iii) Devil Canyon - Probability Distributions

Figure 18.2.10 provides the cumulative probability distribution for Devil Canyon costs. Points "A", "B", and "C" on the curve correspond to those discussed above for Watana and are associated

with probabilities of 74 percent, 47 percent, and 90 percent respectively, for actual percentages of the project estimate being less than indicated values. Once again, a not insignificant long "tail" in the extreme upper right-hand portion of the distribution provides a measure of the potential exposure to large overruns. The expected value of the actual cost is 91.5 percent of the project estimate.

(iv) Total Project Distribution

Figure 18.2.11 combines the separate Watana and Devil Canyon projects, providing a cumulative distribution for the Susitna hydroelectric project as a whole. Points "A", "B", and "C" now have associated probabilities of non-exceedance of 73 percent, 47 percent, and 90 percents, respectively. Taken as a whole, the figure suggests a very broad range of total project cost ratios is possible. Even between the 10 percent and 90 percent probability interval, the cost range spans nearly \$3 billion. If the project follows historical patterns, it may be expected that this range will narrow over time as detailed design and construction proceeds. A word of caution is important enough to deserve repetition at this point: the cost distributions are in every case based upon January 1982 dollars and they do not account for the effects of inflation. Nor do they include interest during construction or finance charges. Only the potential for extraordinary construction cost escalation (over and above inflation) has been taken into account. It follows that if the project is completed in the next several decades, the final "actual" cost will have to be adjusted to equivalent 1982 dollars if it is to be compared with risk analysis results as presented herein.

(v) Comparison with Available Data

During the assessment of the important "estimating variance" risk (see paragraph 18.2 (h) (ii) above), historical data for 48 federal water resources projects completed prior to passage of NEPA were considered. While certain important limitations apply to the use of this data, it is nonetheless worthwhile to compare it with our Susitna Risk Analysis results. Recognizing that each of the historical projects differed from another in terms of cost, schedule, and complexity, we have once again chosen to normalize the data by displaying a cost ratio scale rather than an actual absolute cost value. Figure 18.2.12 offers a cumulative probability histogram for various cost ratios. In each case, the cost ratio reflects the actual project cost (after adjustment for inflation) divided by the "initial" estimated cost. As may be seen from the display, relatively large overruns have occurred in the past and they were almost inevitably the basis for widely publicized "finger pointing". Less well known, but particularly important, is the evidence that a substantial number of water resources projects have been accomplished for less than the originally estimated costs.

In order to compare this information with the Susitna Risk Analysis results, it is necessary to determine the meaning of "initial" estimate in terms of the historical data. In each case, the "initial" estimate is the estimate presented to the Congress at the time a request was made for project authorization. Thus, it would be inappropriate to regard the current Susitna estimate (as discussed in Chapter 16) as an "initial" estimate in the federal sense. Fortunately, however, the Susitna project does have a long history of federal involvement. Indeed, the Corps of Engineers provided a detailed "initial" estimate in 1975 as the basis for seeking authorization for important design activities. This "initial" estimate was further updated by a second "initial" estimate in 1979 after some additional exploratory work and further analysis were requested by the Office of Management and Budget. Inclusive of contingencies and excluding lands, the direct cost "initial" Corps of Engineers' estimate (from the 1979 report) in January 1982 dollars for the Watana/Devil Canyon (thin arch dam) project was used as the denominator for display of possible Susitna cost ratios.

Figure 18.2.13 overlays the results of the Susitna Risk Analysis on the historical data. Note that the cost ratios differ on this display from those on Figure 18.2.11 because of the necessity to use the "initial" estimate for comparison purposes.

As may be seen from Figure 18.2.13, the Susitna Risk Analysis results reflect a more pessimistic expectation at low cost levels than the historical data would appear to indicate is reasonable. The degree of pessimism appears appropriate, however, for the following reasons:

- The pre-NEPA data base largely excludes cost implications of regulatory requirements. Our own assessment indicates that regulatory matters do impose some additional important cost burdens on post-NEPA projects. These have largely been accounted for in the project estimate, but some uncertainty must remain.
- The data base includes a variety of time intervals between the "initial" estimate and the actual realized cost. By disaggregating the data to include only those water resources projects reflecting ten years or more between "initial" estimate and actual costs, a new histogram can be generated as shown on Figure 18.2.14. The Susitna results continue to appear pessimistic at the lower end in light of historical data, but the difference is seen to have diminished on this display. Some optimism is reflected for higher cost possibilities, but the Susitna estimate is well above the mean of the values in the data set. The distribution also reflects a longer tail at the extreme upper end than the data set displays.

- The data base included water resources projects which are not directly comparable to Susitna. Removing such projects as canals, harbors, and locks permits generation of a third histogram for dams and reservoirs as shown on Figure 18.2.15. As may be seen from this display, the Susitna Risk Analysis appears to offer an even more conservative expectation than the total data base had reflected.

In short, it appears reasonable to assert that the results of the risk analysis are consistent with historical data and, if any bias is evident, it is on the side of conservatism.

(vi) Schedule Risks

At the same time that minimum, modal, and maximum cost values were estimated for each damage scenario in each risk-activity set, estimates were also made of similar values for potential schedule changes. As a result, schedule probability distributions were generated for each major activity. These individual distributions could not be combined in the same way as was accomplished on the cost side, however. Delays in certain activities can be tolerated with no expectation of change in total project schedule. Delays in other areas may bear a one-to-one relationship with total project delay.

A critical path network was prepared for the entire set of activities for each configuration. Individual probability distributions for critical activities were then combined to yield a distribution for the total project schedule.

Several critical paths were identified in the process since a long delay on a non-critical activity can, of course, place that activity on a new critical path. The raw schedule delay distribution was then considered in the context of a one-year schedule contingency which had been built into the original estimate³ and in light of regulatory delay risks. The resulting distributions are discussed and interpreted as follows:

- Figure 18.2.16 provides a cumulative probability distribution for months from the scheduled completion date for the Watana project. It reflects all risk contributions except those posed by regulatory requirements. It is based upon a critical path through the

³ It is important to note that with the exception of the "regulatory" and "estimate variance" risks, all criterion values were estimated as increments or decrements to the direct cost or schedule estimate. The assertion by the estimating team that a one-year contingency was included in the schedule distribution was accounted for by shifting the raw probability distribution one year to a new centerpoint.

main dam and it takes into account the one-year schedule contingency. As may be read directly from the figure, the probability of completing the project ahead of schedule or on time is about 65 percent. There is only a 17 percent chance of completing the project a year early (i.e., in 1992).

- Figure 18.2.17 provides a similar distribution after regulatory risks are accounted for. Two components are included: (1) prior to the start of construction a license must be issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. There is a small chance (25 percent) that the license will be issued a year earlier than the current 30-month licensing schedule anticipates. The probability of meeting or bettering the 30-month estimate is about 72 percent and there is a 90 percent probability that not more than 39 months will be required; (2) during the construction period, regulatory delays may be imposed as a result of various permitting requirements, injunctions, and the like. These delays yield only increases in schedule and range from a 50 percent probability of delays of a month or less to a 95 percent probability that regulatory delays during construction will not exceed 12 months. As may be seen from Figure 18.2.17, the net effect of the regulatory risks is to broaden the range of possible values. At the lower end of the distribution, it will be noted that the chances of completing at least a year early have increased to nearly 40 percent -- primarily because of the chance of getting a license early and therefore starting early. No significant change appears for the probability of meeting or bettering the schedule. A substantial effect is evident in the upper portion of the curve where the chances of long regulatory delays have pushed out the 95 percent confidence level to an expectation of no more than three years' delay -- a significant change from the 12 to 13 months attributable to risks other than regulatory, as may be seen on Figure 18.2.16.

While similar distributions can be plotted for Devil Canyon, they are less meaningful since there is flexibility associated with its starting date.

(vii) Transmission_Line_Risks-

The separate risk analysis of the Susitna transmission system was conducted to determine the probability of significant power supply interruptions at the two major load centers in Anchorage and Fairbanks. The methodology was generally similar to that described in preceding paragraphs. Recognizing that the system is assumed to be in an operating mode, those risks which had applied only for construction in the preceding analysis (e.g., contractor capability) were eliminated from the risk list. Additions to the list were made to account for the potential effects of lightning, aircraft collisions, and anchor-dragging in Knik Arm (applicable to the submarine cable segment). Account was taken of redundancies designed into the system (e.g., a loss of one line in the three-line system extending south toward Anchorage can be tolerated with no loss of energy delivery capability).

In addition, special attention was given to dependencies (e.g., an earthquake which causes the loss of two lines will very likely knock out the third. On the other hand, vandalism which causes an outage on one line is only infrequently expected to extend to all lines). Important assumptions included the availability of well-trained repair crews and equipment, and a reasonable supply of spare components.

The results of the analysis provide the cumulative probability of not exceeding a given number of days of reduced energy delivery capability. Figures 18.2.18 and 18.2.19 display this information for Anchorage and Fairbanks, respectively. Interpretations are as follows:

- In the particular case of Anchorage (Figure 18.2.18), it will first be noted that the probability scale includes only the extreme upper range of non-exceedance probabilities. The intersection of the distribution curves on the probability axis indicates that the probability of no lost energy delivery capability in a given year is .958 and of not having 50 percent reduction is .955. Beyond these points the curves rise sharply, indicating that outages beyond 5 days are extremely unlikely. The "expected" annual value of .0696 days for a total delivery loss may be compared with the "loss of load probability" of .1 (one day in 10 years) which had been used in the generation planning efforts in the economic studies. In short, the risk analysis confirms that the reliability of the transmission system for energy delivery to Anchorage is consistent with the requirements of the overall Railbelt generation system. The "expected" annual value of .09171 days for a 50 percnet reduction in energy delivery appears to be similarly acceptable when compared to assumed loss of load probability.
- The cumulative probability distribution for Fairbanks (Figure 18.2.19) has a slightly different intercept on the probability axis and its shape is also slightly different from those for Anchorage. These differences stem from the fact that delivery to Fairbanks requires no submerged crossing and certain other risks (e.g., flood, temperature extremes) would be expected to have different probabilities for northern and southern segments of the system. In spite of the absolute differences, it may be seen from the display that the "expected" annual value of .08116 does not exceed the loss of load probability criterion of .1 day per year. No 50 percent loss for Fairbanks is shown since the loss of one of two lines causes no reduction in delivery capability. Two lines lost is, of course, a 100 percent loss.
(viii) Emergency Response

In spite of the apparent reliability of the transmission system, it is nonetheless true that a small but finite chance of relatively long-term outages does exist. It is also unfortunately true that certain extreme risk magnitudes (e.g., combination of extreme low temperature, wind, and ice) which could lead to an outage also tend to coincide with high demands by users on the generating system. The "response" in this case is extremely important. The final report for Subtask 11.03, Risk Analysis, provides such a response in the form of a preliminary emergency plan which includes such measures as shedding non-essential loads, putting reserve capacity on line, and energy transfers from military generation systems. Prior to the time that the Susitna hydroelectric project begins operation, this plan should be updated and occasional tests should be made of its practicality.

(j) Conclusions

Based upon the risk analysis, it is concluded that:

- The probabilities that actual costs will not exceed values subjected to sensitivity tests in the economic analysis are as follows:

ValueProbability that
value will not
be exceeded. Project estimate73 percent. Low capital cost tested in
the economic analysis47 percent. High capital cost tested in
the economic analysis90 percent

- Exposure to potential costs above the project estimate does exist and there is about a 1 percent chance that an overrun of 40 percent or more (in 1982 dollars) will occur.
- The annual probability that no interruption in energy delivery to major load centers will occur as a result of transmission line failures is in excess of 95 percent.

Expected values of energy delivery interruptions are less than one day in ten years and are consistent with loss of load probabilities assumed in the generation planning efforts.

- There is a 65 percent probability that the Watana project will be completed prior to the scheduled time in 1993. Exposure to schedule delays is heavily influenced by regulatory requirements and there is a 10 percent probability that the Watana project will not be completed until 1995 or later.

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PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT LOAD FORECASTS1

| | Low | | Medi | ium | High | 1 |
|--------------------------|---------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Year | MW | GWh | MW | GWh | MW | GWh |
| 1990 | 802 | 3999 | 892 | 4456 | 1098 | 5703 |
| 1995 | 849 | 4240 | 983 | 4922 | 1248 | 6464 |
| 2000 | 921 | 4641 | 1084 | 5469 | 1439 | 7457 |
| 2005 | 1066 | 5358 | 1270 | 6428 | 1769 | 9148 |
| 2010 | 1245 | 6303 | 1537 | 7791 | 2165 | 11435 |
| Probabilit of Occurre | cy 0.20 | | 0.6 | 50 | 0.2 | 20 |

 1 Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, December 1981.

PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT ALTERNATIVES-CAPITAL COST ANALYSIS1

Type/Size Low Medium High \$/kW2 MW \$/kW2 \$/KW2 Coa1/200MW/ @ Beluga 2018 2242 2690 Coa1/200 MW 0 Nenana 2073 2764 2303 Gas Turbine/ 70 MW 572 636 763 Combined Cycle/ 200 MW 996 1107 1328 Probability of Occurrence 0.20 0.20 0.60

1 Developed by Ebasco for the Railbelt Alternatives Study by Battelle

² Includes AFDC

PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT FUEL COST AND ESCALATION1

| Probability of Occurrence | f 0.25 | . 0.50 | 0.25 |
|---|--|--|---|
| | Healy Coal (| @ Healy (cents/MMBtu) | |
| <u>Year</u> 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 | Low 146 146 146 146 146 | <u>Medium</u> 179 204 232 246 261 | High 216 275 351 391 436 |
| | Healy Coal (| @ Nenana (cents/MMBtu) | |
| 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 | 175 175 175 175 175 | 210 235 264 279 295 | 249 310 387 425 467 |
| | Beluga (| Coal (cents/MMBtu) | |
| 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 | 143 143 143 143 143 | 176 200 227 241 256 | 211 269 343 382 426 |
| | Natural | Gas (cents/MMBtu) | |
| 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 | 300 300 300 300 300 | 300 327 480 530 585 | 443 565 722 797 880 |
| | <u>0i1</u> | (cents/MMBtu) | |
| 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 | 650 650 650 650 650 | 762 841 928 1025 1132 | 890 1083 1317 1954 1605 |

 1 Base prices and escalation patterns derived from Battelle and Acres meetings and research

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PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT SUSITNA CAPITAL COST ANALYSIS1

| | | January 1982 | 2\$ |
|------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------|------------------------|
| Dam/Size MW | Low \$/kW2 | Medium \$/kW ² | High <u>\$/kW</u> 2 |
| Watana 680 MW | 5018/kW | 6021/kW | 7025/kW |
| Devil Canyon 600 MW | 2265 | 2718 | 3171 |
| Probability of Occurrence | 0.60 | 0.25 | 0.15 |

 1 Based on the 1280 MW Susitna Project estimate of \$5,117 million 2 Includes AFDC and transmission line costs.

Note: Low capital cost is computed as medium divided by 1.20 and is equal to a zero percent contingency. High capital cost is computed as the low times 1.4 and represents a double (40 percent) contingency.

| Rank (Low to High) | <u>ID1</u> | (1982 \$) \$ x 106 Long-Term Cost | Proba- bility | Cumula- tive Proba- bility | Expected LTC ² |
|--------------------------|-------------------|--|-------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 2 3 | T27 T24 T21 | 4412 4590 4856 | .01 .03 .01 | .01 .04 .05 | 44.12 137.70 48.56 |
| 4 5 | T18 T15 | 5489 5661 | .03 .09 | .08 .17 | 164.67 509.49 |
| 6 | T12 | 5991 | .03 | .20 | 179.73 |
| 7 | T26 | 6101 | .02 | .22 | 122.02 |
| 8 | 123 | 68/8 71 04 | .06 | .28 | 412.68 |
| 10 | T09 | 7313 | .01 | .29 | 219 39 |
| 11 | T20 | 7460 | .02 | .34 | 149.20 |
| 12 | T03 | 7624 | .01 | .35 | 76.24 |
| 13 | T17 | 7915 | .06 | .41 | 474.90 |
| 14 | T14 | 8238 | .18 | .59 | 1482.84 |
| 15 | 125 T22 | 8492 | .01 | .60 | 84.92 262 39 |
| 17 | T11 | 8858 | .05 | .03 | 531.48 |
| 18 | T19 | 9253 | .01 | .70 | 92.53 |
| 19 | T16 | 10321 | .03 | .73 | 309.63 |
| 20 | T08 | 10503 | .02 | .75 | 210.06 |
| 21 | T13 | 10637 | .09 | .84 | 957.33 |
| 22 | 105 T10 | 10859 | .06 | .90 | 051.54 |
| 23 | T02 | 11272 | .03 | •95 95 | 231 38 |
| 25 | T07 | 13742 | .01 | .96 | 137.42 |
| 26 | T04 | 14194 | .03 | .99 | 425.82 |
| 27 | T01 | 15058 | .01 | 1.00 | 150.58 |
| | | | 1.00 | | |

LONG-TERM COSTS AND PROBABILITY NON-SUSITNA TREE

¹ Relates to Figure 18.2.1

2 LTC - Long-term Costs.

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LONG-TERM COSTS AND PROBABILITY SUSITNA TREE

| Ranl (Lov Higl | k w to h) ID1 | (1982 \$ \$ x 100 Long-Te <u>Cost</u> | erm Proba- <u>bility</u> | Cumula- tive Proba- <u>bility</u> | Expected LTC 2 |
|---|---|--|--|---|--|
| $\begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 2 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1$ | 17 10 S45 S42 S36 S39 S33 S44 S30 S41 S35 S38 S32 S27 S18 S09 S43 S29 S40 S31 S26 S17 S08 S24 S15 S28 S06 S21 S12 S03 S21 S13 S04 | $\begin{array}{r} 5543\\ 5757\\ 5827\\ 6097\\ 6151\\ 6437\\ 6477\\ 6650\\ 6738\\ 6991\\ 7062\\ 7087\\ 7108\\ 7151\\ 7331\\ 7388\\ 7543\\ 7543\\ 7650\\ 7884\\ 7974\\ 7986\\ 8008\\ 8050\\ 8326\\ 8347\\ 8371\\ 8390\\ 8886\\ 8098\\ 8050\\ 8326\\ 8347\\ 8371\\ 8390\\ 8886\\ 8908\\ 8951\\ 9225\\ 9247\\ 9290\\ 9614\\ 9758\\ 9784\\ 10126\\ 10147\\ 10190\\ \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c} 0.3\\ .06\\ .09\\ .03\\ .18\\ .0125\\ .09\\ .025\\ .0375\\ .0125\\ .075\\ .0125\\ .075\\ .0125\\ .075\\ .006\\ .018\\ .006\\ .0075\\ .0375\\ .015\\ .0225\\ .015\\ .0255\\ .015\\ .0025\\ .012\\ .0075\\ .045\\ .0025\\ .015\\ .0025\\ .012\\ .0015\\ .0025\\ .012\\ .0015\\ .005\\ .015\\ .005\\ .015\\ .005\\ .015\\ .005\\ .015\\ .005\\ .015\\ .005\\ .015\\ .005\\ .015\\ .005\\ .015\\ .005\\ .018\\ .006\\ .018\\ .006\\ .018\\ .006\\ .003\\ .009\\ .003\\ .000\\ .000\\ .$ | .0300 .0900 .1800 .2100 .3900 .4025 .4925 .5175 .5555 .5675 .6425 .6425 .6485 .6665 .6725 .6800 .7175 .7325 .7550 .7625 .8075 .8100 .8175 .8200 .8320 .8680 .8905 .9025 .9040 .9085 .9025 .9040 .9085 .9100 .9150 .9350 .9410 .9590 .9590 .9650 .9680 .9770 .9800 | $\begin{array}{c} 166.29\\ 345.42\\ 524.43\\ 182.91\\ 1107.18\\ 80.46\\ 582.93\\ 166.25\\ 252.67\\ 87.38\\ 529.65\\ 42.52\\ 127.94\\ 42.91\\ 54.98\\ 277.05\\ 113.15\\ 172.12\\ 59.13\\ 358.83\\ 19.96\\ 60.06\\ 20.12\\ 99.91\\ 300.49\\ 188.35\\ 100.68\\ 13.33\\ 40.09\\ 13.43\\ 46.12\\ 138.70\\ 46.45\\ 57.68\\ 175.64\\ 58.70\\ 30.38\\ 91.32\\ 30.57\\ \end{array}$ |
| 40 | S20 | 10514 | .0025 | .9825 | 26.29 |

TABLE 18.2.6 (Continued)

| | LONG | G-TERM COSTS AN SUSITNA T | D PROBABI | LITY | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| Rank (Low to High) | <u>ID</u> 1 | (1982 \$) \$ x 106 Long-Term Cost | Proba- bility | Cumula- tive Proba- bility | Expected LTC 2 |
| 41 42 43 44 45 | S11 S02 S19 S10 S01 | 10658 10683 11414 11558 11584 | .0075 .0025 .0015 .0045 .0015 1.000 | .9900 .9925 .9940 .9985 1.0000 | 79.94 26.70 17.12 52.01 17.38 |

¹ Relates to Figure 18.2.2

2 Long-term Costs

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| | NET | BENEFIT | CALCULATED |) VALUES |
|--|-----|---------|--------------------------------|----------|
|--|-----|---------|--------------------------------|----------|

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| Comparison | T-ID | S-ID | P | <u>T-LTC</u> | S-LTC | Net <u>Benefit</u> |
|--|---|--|--|--|---|---|
| Comparison 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 | T-ID T01 T01 T02 T02 T02 T02 T03 T03 T03 T03 T04 T04 T04 T04 T05 T05 T05 T06 T06 T06 T06 T07 T07 T07 T07 T08 T08 T08 T09 T09 T09 T09 T10 | S-ID S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 | <u>P</u> .0015 .0025 .006 .003 .005 .012 .0015 .0025 .006 .0045 .0075 .018 .0075 .018 .0075 .018 .0075 .018 .0045 .0075 .018 .0025 .006 .003 .005 .012 .0015 .0025 .006 .003 .005 .012 | <u>T-LTC</u> 15058 15058 15058 15058 1569 11569 1569 7624 7624 7624 14194 14194 14194 14194 10859 10503 10505 1050 | <u>S-LTC</u> 11584 10683 9784 10190 9290 8390 895? 8051 7151 11558 10658 9758 10147 9247 8347 8908 8008 7108 11414 10514 9614 10126 9225 8326 8886 7986 7087 8371 | Net Benefit 3474 4375 5274 1379 2279 3179 (1327) (427) 473 2636 3536 4436 712 1612 2512 (1595) (695) 205 2328 3228 4128 377 1278 2177 (1702) (802) 97 2901 |
| 27 28 29 | T09 T10 T13 | S27 S28 S28 | .006 .0045 .0135 | 7184 11272 10637 | 7087 8371 8371 | 97 2901 2266 |
| 30 31 32 33 34 | T10 T13 T16 T10 | S28 S29 S29 S29 S30 | .0045 .0075 .0225 .0075 .018 | 10321 11272 10637 10321 11272 | 8371 7388 7388 7388 6477 | 1950 3884 3249 2933 4795 |
| 35 36 37 38 39 | T13 T16 T11 T14 T17 | S30 S30 S31 S31 S31 S31 | .054 .018 .009 .017 .009 | 10637 10321 8858 8238 7915 | 6477 6477 7974 7974 7974 | 4160 3844 844 264 (59) |
| 40 41 42 | T11 T14 T17 | S32 S32 S32 | .015 .045 .015 | 8858 8238 7915 | 7062 7062 7062 | 1796 1176 853 |

TABLE 18.2.7 (Continued)

NET BENEFIT - CALCULATED VALUES

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| Comparison | <u>T-ID</u> | <u>S-ID</u> | <u>P</u> | <u>T-LTC</u> | S-LTC | Net <u>Benefit</u> |
|------------|-------------|-------------|----------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| 43 | T11 | S33 | .036 | 8858 | 6151 | 2707 |
| 44 | T14 | S33 | .108 | 8238 | 6151 | 2087 |
| 45 | T17 | S33 | .036 | 7915 | 6151 | 1764 |
| 46 | T12 | S34 | .0045 | 5991 | 7650 | (1659) |
| 4/ | 115 | \$34 | .0135 | 5561 | 7650 | (1989) |
| 48 | 118 | 534 | .0045 | 5489 | /650 | (2101) |
| 49 50 | 11Z T15 | 222 | .00/5 | 5991 5661 | 0/38 6739 | (1077) |
| 50 | T19 | 535 | .0225 | 5001 | 6738 | (1077) |
| 52 | T12 | 536 | .018 | 5991 | 5827 | 164 |
| 53 | T15 | S36 | .054 | 5661 | 5827 | (166) |
| 54 | T18 | S36 | .018 | 5489 | 5827 | (338) |
| 55 | T19 | S37 | .0015 | 9253 | 7884 | 1369 |
| 56 | T22 | S37 | .0045 | 8746 | 7884 | 862 |
| 57 | T25 | S37 | .0015 | 8492 | 7884 | 608 |
| 58 | T19 | S38 | .0025 | 9253 | 6991 | 2262 |
| 59 | T22 | S38 | .00/5 | 8/46 | 6991 | 1/55 |
| 6U 61 | 125 | 538 | .0025 | 8492 | 6991 | 1501 |
| 62 | 119 | 222 | .000 | 9253 | 6097 | 3130 |
| 63 | T25 | 223 | .010 | 8492 | 6097 | 2395 |
| 64 | T20 | 540 | .003 | 7460 | 7543 | (83) |
| 65 | T23 | S40 | .009 | 6878 | 7543 | (655) |
| 66 | T26 | S40 | .003 | 6101 | 7543 | (1442) |
| 67 | T20 | S41 | .005 | 7460 | 6650 | 810 |
| 68 | T23 | S41 | .015 | 6878 | 6650 | 228 |
| 69 | T26 | S41 | .005 | 6101 | 6650 | (549) |
| 70 | T20 | S42 | .012 | 7460 | 5757 | 1703 |
| /1 | T23 | S42 | .036 | 6878 | 5757 | 1121 |
| 72 | 126 | S42 | .012 | 6101 | 5/5/ | 344 |
| 73 71 | 121 | 543 643 | .0015 | 4850 | /33L 7331 | (24/5) |
| 74 | T24 | 545 CAR | .0045 | 4390 | 7331 | (2010) |
| 76 | T21 | 545 | .0015 | 4856 | 6437 | (1581) |
| 77 | T24 | S44 | .0075 | 4590 | 6437 | (1847) |
| 78 | T27 | S44 | .0025 | 4412 | 6437 | (2025) |
| 79 | T21 | S45 | .006 | 4856 | 5543 | (687) |
| 80 | T24 | S45 | .018 | 4590 | 5543 | (953) |
| 81 | T27 | S45 | .006 | 4412 | 5543 | (1131) |

CASE 1 - POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN ENERGY DEMAND AND PRICES

Conditional Probabilities of Energy DemandHigh
Load ForecastMedium
Load ForecastLow
Load ForecastHigh Energy Prices0.60.30.1Medium Energy Prices0.20.60.2Low Energy Prices0.10.30.6

TABLE 18.2.9

CASE 2 - NEGATIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN ENERGY DEMAND AND PRICES

| | <u>Conditional Pr</u> | obabilities of | Energy Demand |
|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| | High Load Forecast | Medium Load Forecast | Low Load Forecast |
| High Energy Prices | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| Medium Energy Prices | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.2 |
| Low Energy Prices | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.1 |

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SUMMARY OF PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT

| | | Case 1 | Case 2 | Initial Case |
|------|---|---|---|---|
| | | Positive Correlation Between Energy Prices and Demand | Negative Correlation Between Energy Prices and Demand | Zero Correlation Between Energy Prices and Demand |
| Prob | ability that | | | |
| (a) | Thermal plan is more costly than the Susitna plan | 69 percent | 91 percent | 78 percent |
| (Ь) | Thermal plan is less costly than the Susitna plan | 25 percent | 9 percent | 16 percent |
| (c) | Thermal and Susitna plans are equal cost | 6 percent | 0 percent | 6 percent |
| | | | | |

| | LOAD FORECAST | | ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL COST | FUEL COST ESCALATION | RESULT | PROBABILITY | LONG-TERM COST PRESENT WORTH |
|----|------------------|------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| 00 | HIGH MEDIUM | .20 .60 | CAPITAL COST HIGH .04 20 MEDIUM 60 MEDIUM 12 .04 10 .04 11 .04 12 .04 13 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 12 .04 .04 .04 | ESCALATION HIGH LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW | $\begin{array}{c} ID \\ \hline TOI \\ \hline TO2 \\ \hline TO3 \\ \hline TO4 \\ \hline TO5 \\ \hline TO6 \\ \hline TO7 \\ \hline TO8 \\ \hline TO9 \\ \hline TO9 \\ \hline TI0 \\ \hline TI0 \\ \hline TI2 \\ \hline TI2 \\ \hline TI3 \\ \hline TI4 \\ \hline TI5 \\ \hline TI6 \\ \hline TI7 \\ \hline TI8 \\ \hline TI6 \\ \hline TI7 \\ \hline TI8 \\ \hline TI9 \\ \hline T20 \\ \hline T21 \\ \hline T22 \\ \hline T21 \\ \hline T22 \\ \hline T23 \\ \hline T24 \\ \hline T25 \\ \hline T26 \\ \hline T27 \\ \end{array}$ | PROBABILITY .01 .02 .01 .03 .06 .03 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .03 .06 .03 .09 .18 .09 .03 .09 .18 .09 .03 .06 .03 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .03 .06 .03 .01 .03 .06 .03 .01 .03 .01 .02 .01 .03 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 | PRESENT WORTH \$15,058 11,569 7,624 14,194 10,859 7,313 13,742 10,503 7,184 11,272 8,858 5,991 10,637 8,238 5,661 10,321 7,915 5,489 9,253 7,460 4,856 8,746 6,878 4,590 8,492 6,101 4,412 |
| | | | | | | Σ = 1.00 | |

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FIGURE 18.2.1 – PROBABILITY TREE – SYSTEM WITH ALTERNATIVES TO SUSITNA

ALTERNATIVE SUSITNA LOAD CAPITAL FUEL COST RESULT LONG-TERM COST CAPITAL FORECAST COST ESCALATION COST ID PROBABILITY PRESENT WORTH HIGH \$11,584 SOI .0015 HIGH 01 MEDIUM 25 .0025 10,683 **S02** \$ LOW **Š**03 .0060 9,784 25 10,190 .0030 **S04** HIGH .04 50 MEDIUM .02 \$05 \$06 .0050 9,290 .0120 8,390 *₹*5 .0015 8.951 **S07** LOW .01 508 509 .0025 8.050 .0060 7,151 <u>SIO</u> SII .0045 11,558 HIGH .03 10,658 .0075 9,758 .0180 S12 23 <u>S13</u> .0090 10,147 HIGH 20 / 60 MEDIUM 12 50 MEDIUM .06 9,247 **SI4** .0150 25 S15 .0360 8,347 .0045 8,908 lib <u>516</u> 517 LOW .03 8,008 .0075 7,108 S18 .0180 .0015 11,414 **SI9** HIGH .01 \$20 \$21 10,514 .0025 .0060 9,614 25 .0030 10,126 <u>\$22</u> LOW MEDIUM .02 .04 .50 .0050 9,221 S23 **S24** .0120 8,326 રેડ S25 S26 S27 8,886 .0015 LOW 0 .0025 7,986 .0060 7,081 20 .0225 8,371 S28 S29 S30 HIGH 15 .0375 7,388 .0900 6,477 23 .0450 7,974 S3I MEDIUM .60 MEDIUM .60 60 1.0 .50 MEDIUM .30 .0750 7,062 S32 .1800 6,151 <u>S33</u> ÷₹5 67/ .0225 7,650 S34 S35 S36 LOW .15 .0375 6,738 5,827 .0900 7.884 .0075 \$37 HIGH .05 <u>\$38</u> \$39 .0125 6,991 .0300 6,097 25 .0150 7,543 **S40** LOW 20 1.0 MEDIUM 20 50 MEDIUM IO 6,650 .0250 <u>\$41</u> .0600 5,757 ંટેક S42 HIGH .0075 7,331 S43 LOW 1/25 MEDIUM .05 6,437 .0125 **S44** 5 LOW 5,543 \$45 .0300

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 Σ = 1.000

FIGURE 18.2.2 – PROBABILITY TREE – SYSTEM WITH SUSITNA







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FIGURE 18.2.4 – SUSITNA MULTIVARIATE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS – CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY VS NET BENEFITS





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FIGURE 18.2.9



FIGURE 18.2.10











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CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR DAYS PER YEAR WITH NO SUSITNA ENERGY DELIVERY TO FAIRBANKS

FIGURE 18.2.19

18.3 - Marketing

Introduction

This section presents an assessment of the market in the Railbelt region for the energy and capacity of the Susitna hydroelectric development. A range of rates at which this could be priced in the year of first power and the price in succeeding years is also considered as well as a basis for contracting for supply of Susitna energy.

(a) The Railbelt Power System

It is necessary to consider first the basic characteristics of the Railbelt region electric power demand and supply, load resource analysis for the period during which Watana and Devil Canyon come into operation in 1993 and 2002 respectively.

The power system to which Susitna capacity and energy would be delivered is defined as the Railbelt Region interconnected system which will result from the linking of the Anchorage and Fairbanks systems through a transmission intertie to be completed in the mid-1980s.

(i) Delineation of Region

The Railbelt Region covers the Anchorage-Cook Inlet area, the Fairbanks-Tanana Valley area and the Glennallen-Valdez area as shown in Figure 18.3.1. The utilities, military installations and university for which electric generating facilities are included in this report are listed in Table 18.3.1. The approximate location of service areas of these utilities are shown in Figure 18.3.2 and the generating plants servicing the region are listed in Table 18.3.3.

- Anchorage-Cook Inlet Area

There are five electric utility companies in the Anchorage-Cook Inlet area. The two largest are Anchorage Municipal Light and Power (AMLP) which serves the Anchorage municipal area and Chugach Electric Association (CEA), serving the Anchorage suburban and surrounding rural areas. Homer Electric Association (HEA) serves the western portion of the Kenai Peninsula, including Seldovia, across the bay from Homer. Matanuska Electric Association (MEA) serves the town of Palmer and the surrounding rural area in the Matanuska and Susitna Valleys. Seward Electric System (SES) serves the city of Seward. Alaska Power Administration operates the Eklutna hydroelectric plant and markets wholesale power to CEA, AMLP and MEA. Chugach Electric Association also provides power at wholesale rates to HEA, SES and MEA. There are also two major national defense installations in the Anchorage area: Elmendorf Air Force Base and Fort Richardson.

- Fairbanks-Tanana Valley Area

There are two electric utility companies in the Fairbanks-Tanana Valley area. Fairbanks Municipal Utilities System (FMUS) serves the Fairbanks municipal area, and Golden Valley Electric Association (GVEA) serves the rural areas. The University of Alaska at Fairbanks owns and operates an electric generating plant and its capacity is included in this report. The other generating facilities in the area are those at three major national defense installations: Eilson Air Force, Fort Greeley and Fort Wainwright. Clear Air Force Base, which is not interconnected with any local utility, is not included.

- Glenallen-Valdez Area

There is only one electric utility company in the Glenallen-Valdez area, the Copper Valley Electric Association (CVEA).

(ii) <u>Ownership</u>

The Railbelt Region is presently served by nine major utility systems. Five are rural electric cooperatives, three are municipally owned and operated, and one is a federal wholesaler. In 1980 the rural electric cooperatives supplied 70 percent of total net energy generated by the Railbelt utilities, the municipal systems 23 percent and the Alaska Power Administration 7 percent (see Figure 18.3.4a). Wholesale energy supply represented 28 percent of total net generation.

The total nameplate generating capacity for each of the utilities, military installations and the university in the Railbelt Region is given in Table 18.3.1. The rural electric cooperatives own 58 percent of total generating capacity, the municipal systems 27 percent, national defense organizations 10 percent, the Alaska Power Administration 3 percent and the University of Alaska at Fairbanks 2 percent (see Figure 18.3.4b). The 1980 net energy generation from each of the utilities is provided in Table 18.3.1.

Although national defense installations have represented a major portion of the total installed capacity in the past, they now constitute only 10 percent of the total in the Railbelt Region. It is expected that the national defense installation will become a less significant part of the total generating capacity, with the projected stability of military sites and the relative growth of the utilities.¹

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, "South-Central Railbelt Area, Alaska, Upper Susitna River Basin, Supplemental Feasibility Report", Appendix - Part II, Section G Marketability Analysis, February 1979.

There are three industrial plants in the Kenai Peninsula that operate their own power plants: Union 76 Chemical Division Plant, Kenai Liquified Natural Gas Plant and Tesoro Refinery Plant. These plants are connected to the HEA system and are buying either energy or standby capacity from HEA to supplement their own generation in meeting their needs. There are other self-supplied industrial generators including oil platform and pipeline terminal facilities in the Cook Inlet area.

In general, industries own and operate generating facilities only for their own use. They were not included in this analysis.

(iii) Types of Fuel

The net energy generated by the Railbelt utilities by types of fuel is shown in Figure 18.3.4c. As shown in this figure, 76 percent of the total net energy generated in 1980 was based on natural gas, 12 percent on coal, 2 percent on oil and 10 percent from hydroelectric plants.

The relative mix of the generating capacity of the Railbelt utilities by type of generating capacity is shown in Figure 18.3.4d. Most of the generating capacity (55 percent) is powered by simple cycle gas or oil-fired combustion turbines.

(iv) Existing Power Sales

In the Anchorage-Cook Inlet area the two major wholesalers of electricity are Alaska Power Administration, operating the Eklutna hydroelectric project, and CEA. In 1980 the Alaska Power Administration sold a total of 180,376 MWh made up of deliveries to CEA, 57,717 MWh; AMLP, 90,854 MWh and MEA, 31,805 MWh. CEA sold a total of 550,548 MWh made up of deliveries to HEA, 287,966 MWh; MEA, 236,209 MWh and SES, 26,373 MWh, in 1980. In the same year AMLP sold 10 MWh to Elmendorf Air Force Base.

The 1980 energy sales by each of the Railbelt utilities are stated by category of customer (Table 18.3.1). The Anchorage-Cook Inlet area had an 81 percent share of the total electricity sales in the Railbelt Region, the Fairbanks-Tanana Valley area 17 percent and the Glenallen-Valdez Valley area 2 percent.

(v) Transmission System

The existing transmission systems in the Railbelt Region are indicated on Figure 18.3.2. In the Anchorage-Cook Inlet area the utilities are at present loosely interconnected through facilities of Alaska Power Administration and the CEA. CEA has interconnections with MEA, HEA, SES and Eklutna. AMLP has an emergency 20 MW connection to Elmendorf Air Force Base.

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In the Fairbanks-Tanana Valley area, CVEA has interconnections with FMUS, Fort Wainwright, Eilson Air Force Base and the University of Alaska. The CVEA serves both Glenallen and Valdez.

(vi) Power Exchanges and Interchange Contracts

The 1980 energy transfers between utilities in the Railbelt Region are summarized in Table 18.3.3. As discussed earlier, the main deliveries of electricity were made within the Anchorage-Cook Inlet area. At present, the Anchorage-Cook Inlet and the Fairbanks-Tanana Valley areas operate independently. The existing transmission system between Anchorage and Willow consists of a network of 115 kV and 138 kV lines with interconnection at Palmer.

Fairbanks is primarily served by a 138 kV line from the 28 MW coalfired plant at Healy. Communities between Willow and Healy are served by local distribution.

In 1980, 28 percent of the total supply was purchased under wholesale interutility arrangements. At present there are power sales agreements between the following utilities:

- (1) Alaska Power Administration and CEA, AMLP, MEA, and
- (2) CEA and HEA, Matanuska Electric Association, and
- (3) GVEA and the University of Alaska.

SES and HEA have long-term purchase contracts with CEA for non-emergency power supplies. The coordination of area power exchange between systems is, at present, not formalized and takes the form of mutual assistance and unstructured interchange agreements.¹

The power sales contracts between the Alaska Power Administration and the utilities are in pursuance of the Act of Congress approved July 13, 1950 (48. U.S.C. Section 312-312d) and all amendments and supplements.

(vii) Anchorage and Fairbanks Interconnection

It is considered likely that an electrical interconnection between Anchorage and Fairbanks will be established before the Susitna project comes into operation. The intertie has been found to be

¹ The 1976 Alaska Power Survey, Volume I, FERC.
feasible¹ and its operation will result in significant economic benefits to both areas. The recommended construction plan will involve the following steps:

- (1) Construct approximately 160 miles of new transmission line designed for future operation at 345 kV.
- (2) Add 138 kV circuit breakers at Healy, Willow and Teeland sub-stations.
- (3) Add a new 138/24 kV transformer at Willow sub-station along with a 138 kV connection.
- (4) Possibly add a 138 kV voltage regulating transformer at Point Mackenzie sub-station if studies in preparation for design show a need for it.
- (5) Install approximately 70 MVAR of switched capacitors to control voltage across the interconnection.

The interconnection will allow a transfer of power between Anchorage and Fairbanks in capacity up to approximately 70 MW in either direction. It will provide opportunity for the economy interchange of energy from Anchorage to the Fairbanks area. An average of 260,000 MWh per year from 1984 to 1993 can be exchanged. The intertie will result in an estimated reserve sharing starting from 18 MW as early as 1985 to a maximum of 135 MW in 1994.

The proposed plan of interconnection includes provisions for a future operating voltage of 345 kV that allows for integrating the new line into the future transmission facilities for Susitna or other regional generation source. Transmission facilities with respect to Susitna project are discussed in further detail in Chapter 12 of the Feasibility Report.

(viii) Impacts of the Interconnection

In the feasibility study of the Anchorage-Fairbanks electrical interconnection, it has been indicated that with the tie-line no additional generating capacity will be required in the Fairbanks area before 1993, but the Anchorage area may require approximately 120 MW of additional capacity by that time. The Anchorage and Fairbanks systems however will require additional thermal generating capacity, even with the tie-line in service, if Susitna is not built.

It was also found in the interconnection study that, if the Susitna project and its associated transmission facilities are placed in service in 1994, the Susitna transmission will interconnect the Anchorage and Fairbanks areas and greatly increase the transfer capability between the areas.

¹ Engineering Report R-2274, May 1981 Gilbert/Commonwealth

(b) Regional Electric Power Demand and Supply

(i) Socioeconomic Conditions

The Railbelt Region, as shown in Figure 18.3.1, includes Anchorage, Fairbanks, the Kenai Peninsula, and the Valdez-Glennallen area. The 1980 Railbelt population was 284,822 comprising 72 percent of the state's population of 400,142 (U.S. Bureau of Census). Anchorage is the Railbelt's major urban center with 61 percent of the total regional population. Fairbanks, with 19 percent of the total, represents the next major population center. Major industries in the Railbelt include fisheries, petroleum, timber, agriculture, construction, tourism, and transportation. Development of Alaska's natural resources represents current and potential economic activity (Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development, 1978). The Federal Government provides employment in both the military and civilian sectors, although these sectors are presently declining. A review of the socioeconomic scenarios upon which forecasts of electric power demand were based is presented in Chapter 5 of the Feasibility Report.

(ii) Electric Power Demand

Demand in terms of electric energy and peak load in the Railbelt Region for the period 1980-2010 has been presented in detail in Section 5 of the Feasibility Report. The forecasts adopted in this report are the mid-range levels presented by Battelle Northwest in December 1981. Subsequent forecasts which introduce price/demand elasticity considerations have not been used at this stage. The relatively wide range of demand scenarios associated with pricedependent sales of electrical energy in the Railbelt deserve particular consideration later.

The results of studies reported in Section 5 of the Feasibility Report call for Watana to come into operation in 1993 and deliver a full year's energy generation in 1994. Devil Canyon would come into operation in 2002 and deliver a full year's energy in 2003. Figure 18.3.4 shows the mid-range forecast of energy demand corresponding to moderate growth and the energy outputs planned from the Susitna hydroelectric development.

(c) Market and Price for Watana Output in 1994

In this assessment of the market for energy output from Susitna energy in 1994 it will be assumed initially that this energy will be supplied at a single wholesale rate on a free market basis, that is on the basis that no utility has any obligation to purchase but will choose to do so on grounds of the single wholesale price set for Susitna energy compared with other alternatives. It should be noted that these marketing conditions, and in particular the single wholesale rate, constitute a very exacting market, for they preclude the possibility of securing markets by discriminatory pricing or of long-term contracts based on concessionary prices. In effect these marketing conditions require that all Susitna energy is based on a wholesale price which is attractive even to the utility with the lowest cost alternative source of energy.

(i) Organizational and Contractual Preconditions for Susitna Energy Sales

Optimum economic operation of Watana and Devil Canyon hydroelectric plants require that they are operated as close as possible to full capacity. This is because of the inherent characteristics of hydro power developments which result in effectively zero incremental cost of additional energy when the facilities are operating at less than full capacity. If it is determined, therefore, that Susitna is to proceed it will be most important, in terms of obtaining the leastcost energy system in the Railbelt, to plan for the introduction of Watana as an operating plant in a systematic and orderly manner. Specifically, the APA and the Railbelt utilities should consult on any significant additions to the system capacity which the utilities might consider in the years prior to Watana coming on-stream in 1993 and Devil Canyon in 2002 to avoid costly duplication of facilities and consequent "over building" of capacity.

The APA should also commence power contract negotiations with the four major electric utilities (CEA, AMPL, FMUS and GVEA) for the output of Susitna as soon as any decision in principle is reached to proceed with Susitna. Given that the utilities are wholly independent, it must be expected that they will bargain for costs no higher than the cost of energy from the best thermal option available to them. It is on this assumption that the marketing plan given below is developed. It is essential, however, that appropriate contracts are established between the APA and the major utilities as a precondition for the actual commencement of Susitna. The reasons for this are firstly, that such contracts will be required (see Section 18.4) to support bond issues required to fund the construction of the project and are, therefore, a precondition of Susitna financing. Secondly such precontract would be necessary and desirable if equitable terms were to be arrived at. If the contractual negotiations were left until construction was substantially underway, the contractual bargaining would be on a most unequal basis, given that Susitna would then be virtually a "trapped" resource with no alternative markets other than that provided by the Railbelt utilities.

Subject to tax considerations noted in Section 18.4, power supply contracts, entered into as a precondition of proceeding with Susitna, should also be on the basis of utilities taking whole blocks of energy long term at a price which is the lesser of either the cost of energy from the best thermal option (as developed below) or the APA wholesale rate, as laid down by Senate Bill 25. The ceiling set by the best thermal option cost should also be considered over a period of years so that, for example, the maximum price charged for Susitna energy over ten years might be the average price of the energy from the best thermal option rather than the year-toyear estimates of this cost. (In the following analysis, however, it is assumed that the ceiling set by the best thermal option cost is a year-to-year limitation as presently required by Senate Bill 25.) It should be noted that these general principles would enable any benefits arising from the subsidization of Susitna (Section 18.4 below) to be passed on to the utilities and to Alaskan consumers. They would also ensure that, under no circumstances, would Alaskan consumers be disadvantaged by Susitna energy pricing.

(ii) Maximum Price for Watana Output

The first issue to be considered is the maximum price which could be charged for the output of Watana (3387 GWh) in 1994 (the second year of output and the first year of normal costs) and leave the Railbelt consumers with no higher cost electricity than would have been the case under the best thermal option had this been implemented in the early 1990s. Identification of this price is important since it is assumed that as a matter of policy the State of Alaska would wish this limit to be retained to avoid imposing any additional burden on the Railbelt consumers. Moreover, under the present system of decentralized independent utilities, it must be expected that the maximum price which they would be prepared to pay is the cost of this, the next best option to Susitna.

The marketing position for Watana Stage I in 1994 is set out in Figure 18.3.5. The basis of the figure is first the incremental costs (i.e., cost over and above those already incurred by way of <u>capital investment on the system by the early 1980's</u>) that would result if the best thermal option to Susitna were chosen. The major incremental cost would arise from the 400 MW Beluga coal fired thermal power station producing 2554 GWh in 1994. Since this would be new capacity its whole cost (capital investment, fuel and 0&M) would be added to that for the overall system. The rest of the generating plant required to meet the 1994 demand, primarily combined cycle and gas turbines and all already installed, would involve incremental costs equal only to fuel and 0&M cost of this equipment.

Figure 18.3.5 shows, on the far right of the figure, the area in which costs of the best thermal and the Susitna options are common and arise from plant required in both system configurations to meet the full generating requirements of 1994. Watana, coming on-stream at that time would effectively "avoid" all costs represented by the shaded area. These costs divided by the Watana output of 3387 GWh gives a wholesale energy rate of approximately 145 mills/kWh (in 1994 dollars) which is the maximum which could be charged if consumers were to be neither better nor worse off in 1994 by the decision to proceed with Susitna, rather than the best thermal option. This confirms the estimate of 148 mills/kWh which is produced by the more detailed OGP.5 analysis, the results of which are given in Figure 18.3.6.

(iii) The Entry Price Problem

The entry price problem for Watana in 1993 (as for Devil Canyon later) arises because its wholesale energy rate must be competitive not only with the cost of the best thermal option (i.e., the 145 mills/kWh above) but also with the avoided operating costs of all supplied by existing equipment and this situation would continue until such time as the equipment is retired and becomes due for replacement or until the system needs additional capacity.

Unless appropriate measures are taken therefore, the entry price of Watana might be constrained by the need to make it competitive with the lowest significant block of avoided cost arising from existing capacity. This could give rise to a situation in which the pricing policy, which maximized revenue from Watana, was not to reduce its wholesale price to a point at which all of its output was sold, but maintain a higher price and "spill" the unsold energy. Such a policy, while it might be effective in terms of increasing the operating revenues of Watana, evidently would not be efficient for the system as a whole. The system would incur operating costs of around 70-80 mills/kWh for even the least-cost thermal energy while Watana is "spilling" energy which would cost virtually nothing to supply. It would therefore be far cheaper for the system to use the Watana energy rather than operate any of the thermal sources still available.

This entry price problem could be resolved in a number of ways to achieve the lowest possible cost for the system as a whole. It should in large measure be avoided by the pre-contract arrangements described in (c) (i) above. Under such contracts the major utilities would agree to take the Watana output in contracted-for blocks of energy at an average price of 145 mills/kWh in 1994 rather than to take whatever amount minimized their costs on a year-to-year basis, regardless of the cost to the system as a whole. It would be realistic for the major utilities to accept pre-contract arrangements on this basis as the system will clearly require substantial additions to generating capacity involving heavy investment in the early nineties and this, as shown above, will bring the cost up to 145 mills/kWh. Under such block purchase pre-contract arrangements, utilities would effectively be in a "take-or-pay" position under which it would be more economic for them to avoid using existing capacity on an operating cost-only basis.

The second solution to the entry price problem, (which would be supplementary to the block pre-contract arrangements and not a substitute), would directly address the underlying cause of the problem. This is that the single wholesale rate obliges the Susitna output to be sold on the basis of an average price which takes no recognition of the basic fact that, as long as there is any of the hydroelectric capacity unused, its incremental cost is virtually zero. This situation could be remedied by a two-part tariff system with a demand charge and incrementally-priced energy supplied at less than the operating cost of the existing equipment. This would encourage utilities to absorb the maximum amount of the Watana output, thus minimizing the cost to the system as a whole.

It is recognized that there may be grounds for opposing multi-part tariff systems as possibly discriminating unfairly against particular categories of consumer. It should nevertheless be possible in the context of the Railbelt system, as it will exist in 1994, to devise a tariff which could be fairly and generally applied even if only on an interim basis.

(d) Market and Price for Watana Output 1995 - 2001

> After its initial entry into the market in 1994 the price and market for the 3387 MWh of Watana output is consistently upheld over the years up to 2001 by the 20 percent increase in total demand over this period, and the 70 percent increase in cost savings which this output is providing compared with the cost of the best thermal option. These savings per unit of output are shown in Figure 18.3.6 and are, as noted above, derived from the OGP5 analysis. The very substantial increase in the cost savings per unit of Watana output which occurs in the latter half of the 1990s reflects the fact that, but for this hydroelectric plant, it would have been necessary to bring on a further 200 MW coal station at Nenana in 1996. Another major influence on the cost savings arising from Watana over this period is the rapidly escalating cost of natural gas as existing contracts are renegotiated. This rising curve of cost savings attributable to the Watana output therefore again represents the maximum price at which the output could be marketed if, within the constraint of the single wholesale energy rate system, it was possible for Watana to recapture the whole of the savings which it confers on the system compared with the best thermal option.

(e) Market and Price for Watana and Devil Canyon Output in 2003

Devil Canyon comes on-stream in the year 2002, but its first full year of normal_costing_is_2003_and_it_is_with_reference_to_this_year_that_we <u>consider_the_pricing_and_marketing_problems_involved_in_selling_the</u> additional 2450 GWh made available and usable on the Railbelt system.

A diagramatic analysis of the total cost savings which the combined Watana and Devil Canyon output will confer on the system in the year 2003 compared with the best thermal option is shown in Figure 18.3.7. By this year, under the thermal option, the costs of the system would have been dominated by the three 200 MW coal plants completed in the years 1994 and 1996. The diagram shows the total savings brought about by the usable output from Susitna in this year. Again, dividing these total savings by the energy contributed by Susitna we arrive at the 250 mills/kWh price which represents the maximum price which can be charged for Susitna output on a basis that enabled the project to recapture the whole of the savings which it confers on the system compared with the best thermal option.

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Again, the practical marketing problem which would need to be resolved in the year 2003 is that of making the entry price of Susitna energy competitive, not merely with the best thermal option, but also immediately competitive with the actual combined cycle, gas turbines, plants, etc., which the additional output from Devil Canyon will displace. It is this capacity (combined with the output of Watana and other hydroelectric plants) that will have been supplying the whole Railbelt energy demand in the years immediately preceding the start-up of Devil Canyon. It could therefore still be available as an alternative power generating mode open to the utilities wherever this is more economical than paying the single wholesale rate charged for Susitna.

If the wholesale rate charged for Susitna would be at the 250 mills/kWh level (designed to recapture wholly the savings conferred by the project in that year) it will be seen from Figure 18.3.7 that it would be more economical for some utilities to keep in operation part of the combined cycle and gas turbine generating capacity since their operating costs would be considerably less than the 250 mills. This is expected however to be only a relatively short term problem, one reason being that some of these remaining facilities will be approaching retirement.¹ At that time new capital costs would need to be incurred for generation expansion and this would clearly render much of this plant uneconomic given the option of a supply from Susitna at a cost of 250 mills/kWh (in 2003). As in the case of Watana in 1993-94 a block sale arrangement or a multi-part tariff might be used as a temporary measure to guide the system to the least overall cost generating plan.

It is also probable that by 2003 the Railbelt electrical supply system (which will be about one-third larger than in 1994) will have developed an appropriate institutional structure to ensure that overall costs are minimized. It might reasonably be assumed that rationalization of the power supply function in the Railbelt area would lead to a demand for all available and usable energy from Susitna since its incremental cost is virtually zero.

Only about 90 percent of the total energy output of Susitna will be absorbed by the system in 2002; the remaining output would be progressively picked up over the following decade or so. This will provide increasing total savings to the system from Susitna for no increase in operating costs and thus progressively reduce the cost per unit of the Susitna output. This, combined with the continuing escalation in the cost of thermal fuel, will again progressively consolidate the market position of the project and make Susitna the central element in the system.

¹ It is also probable that, at this stage, some combined-cycle generating capacity will be required for standby purposes given that hydroelectric plants in these early years of the century, will account for almost all the system needs. How such standby capacity is factored into the system will depend upon the institutional arrangements at that time for the ownership of generating capacity, and the distribution network.

(f) Potential Impact of State Appropriations Reducing The Cost of Susitna Energy Below The Best Thermal Option

In the preceding analysis we have identified the maximum prices at which the Susitna energy could be sold. Whether or not the energy is sold at these prices will depend upon the magnitude of any possible appropriation designed to reduce the cost of Susitna energy in the earlier years when, without such appropriations, it would be more expensive than energy from the best thermal option. The demand forecasts used to analyze the market for Susitna energy in the preceding sections have been based on the assumption that the policy of "full cost" pricing obtains for electrical energy. At significantly lower prices and on the basis of the unit elasticity of demand estimated by Battelle, the total system demand could be substantially higher than assumed. It is nevertheless possible that the state appropriation of funds for the project might be of a magnitude (see Section 18.4) that the Susitna energy would be supplied at a price materially below that of the best thermal option. If this were the case then it would evidently make it correspondingly easier to market the output from Watana and Devil Canyon. As the preceding analysis shows, however, a viable and strengthening market exists for the energy from these two facilities even where they are priced up to the full cost that it would be possible to charge for the best thermal option.

(g) Conclusions

Based on the assessment of the market for power and energy output from the Susitna hydroelectric project it has been concluded that, with the appropriate level of state appropriation and with pricing as defined in Senate Bill 25, an attractive basis exists, particularly in the long term, for the Railbelt utilities to derive benefit from the project. It should be recognized that contractual arrangements covering purchase of Susitna ouput will be an essential pre-condition for the actual commencement of project construction.

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| UTILITY | Generating Capacity 1981 MW at 0°F Rating | Predominant Type of Generation | Tax Status Re: IRS Section 103 | Purchases Wholesale Electrical Energy | Provides Wholesale Supply | Utility Annual Energy Demand 1980 GWh |
|---|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|--|
| | | | | | | |
| IN ANCHORAGE-COOK INLET AREA | | | | | | |
| Anchorage Municipal Light and Power | 221.6 | SCCT | Exempt | * | | 585.8 |
| Chugach Electric Association | 395.1 | SCCT | Non-Exempt | * | * | 941.3 |
| Matanuska Electric Association | 0.9 | Diesel | Non-Exempt | * | <u> </u> | 268.0 |
| Homer Electric Association | 2.6 | Diesel | Non-Exempt | * | _ | 284.8 |
| Seward Electric System | 5.5 | Diesel | Non-Exempt | * | - | 26.4 |
| Alaska Power Administration | 30.0 | Hydro | Non-Exempt | | * | _ |
| National Defense | 58.8 | ST | Non-Exempt | - | - | - |
| Industrial — Kenai | 25.0 | SCCT | Non-Exempt | — | | - |
| IN FAIRBANKS – TANANA VALLEY | | | | | | |
| Fairbanks Municipal Utility System ¹ | 68.5 | ST/Diesel | Exempt | | | 116.7 |
| Golden Valley Electric Association ¹ | 221.6 | SCCT/Diesel | Non-Exempt | - | | 316.7 |
| University of Alaska | 18.6 | ST | Non-Exempt | | | _ |
| National Defense ¹ | 46.5 | ST | Non-Exempt | - | - | - |
| IN GLENALLEN/VALDEZ AREA | | | | | | |
| Copper Valley Electric Association | 19.6 | SCCT | Non-Exempt | - | - | 37.4 |
| TOTAL | 1114.3 | | | | | 2577.1 |

1Pooling Arrangements in Force

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 TABLE 18.3.1 – RAILBELT UTILITIES PROVIDING MARKET POTENTIAL

| | NET GENERATION (1980 – MWh) | | | | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| | Rural Electric Cooperatives | Municipal Systems | Alaska Power Administration | Total | Generation for Wholesale | |
| ANCHORAGE-COOK INLET AREA Alaska Power Administration Anchorage Municipal Light & Power Chugach Electric Association Homer Electric Association | 1,444,104 1) | 493,531 | 184,285 | 184,285 493,531 1,444,104 — | 184,285 550,548 | |
| Matanuska Electric Association Seward Electric System | 2) | 3) | | | | |
| FAIRBANKS-TANANA VALLEY AREA Fairbanks Municipal Utilities System Golden Valley Electric Association | 316,705 | 116,685 | | 116,685 316,705 | 2,453 | |
| GLENNALLEN-VALDEZ AREA Copper Valley Electric Association | | | | 43,982 | | |
| TOTAL MWh Percent | 1,794,791 70 | 610,216 23 | 184,285 7 | 2,589,292 100 | 737,286 28 | |

1) Homer Electric Association purchased its energy from Chugach Electric Association, 284,810 MWh in 1980.

2) Matanuska Electric Association purchased its energy from Alaska Power Administration and Chugach Electric Association, 31,805 MWh and 236,208.7 MWh respectively in 1980.

3) Seward Electric System received most of its energy from Chugach Electric Association 26,373.6 MWh in 1980.

Sources: Based on data from US Department of Energy, FPC Form No. 12, 1980.



TABLE 18.3.2 – ENERGY SUPPLY FROM RAILBELT UTILITIES

PLANT LIST

| PLANT | |
|-------|-----------------------|
| No. | NAME OF PLANT |
| 2 | Anchorage No. 1 |
| 3 | Anchorage |
| 6 | Eklutna |
| 7 | Chena |
| 10 | Knik Arm |
| 22 | Elmendorf-West |
| 23 | Fairbanks |
| 32 | Cooper Lake |
| 34 | Elmendorf-East |
| 35 | Ft. Richardson |
| 36 | Ft. Wainright |
| 37 | Eilson |
| 38 | Ft. Greeley |
| 47 | Bernice Lake |
| 55 | International Station |
| 58 | Healy |
| 59 | Beluga |
| 75 | Clear AFB |
| 80 | Collier-Kenai |
| 81 | Eyak |
| 82 | North Pole |
| 83 | Valdez |
| 84 | Glennallen |
| | |

UTILITY

Anchorage Municipal Light and Power Anchorage Municipal Light and Power Alaska Power Administration Fairbanks Municipal Utilities System **Chugach Electric Association, Inc. United States Air Force** Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc. Chugach Electric Association, Inc. **United States Air Force United States Army United States Air Force United States Air Force United States Army Chugach Electric Association, Inc.** Chugach Electric Association, Inc. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc. Chugach Electric Association, Inc. **United States Air Force** Collier-Kenai **Cordova Public Utilities** Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.

TYPE OF OWNERSHIP

Municipal Municipal Federal Municipal Cooperative Federal Cooperative Cooperative Federal Federal Federal Federal Federal Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative Federal Municipal Municipal Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative

TABLE 18.3.3 – LIST OF GENERATING PLANTS SUPPLYING RAILBELT REGION





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18.4 - Financial Evaluation

Introduction

This section considers the basic financial characteristics of Susitna and a range of financial plans under which the project might proceed. It also considers the relationship between the economic and financing characteristics of Susitna and the impact of inflation. This demonstrates the manner in which inflation, without it changing the real economic worth of the project, creates the major financing problem for the project if it is largely debt financed, in the form of an "inflationary financing deficit" in the early years.

The basic financing options which would effectively meet this inflationary financing deficit while maintaining the Susitna output at a price competitive with alternative energy options are then developed. The main issues involved in these options are then considered in some detail with particular reference to levels of possible state appropriation and securing tax-exempt bond financing.

The actual financial outcome for the project will depend not only on the real i.e., constant dollar - characteristics of the project such as the constant dollar capital cost but also on a range of financial characteristics including the rate of inflation, the rate of interest at which debt financing is secured, magnitudes of funding through possible State appropriation, etc. The actual range of possible financial outcomes depends upon the interaction of this range of real and financial factors.

In this section the analysis is confined to the financing outcomes for the central forecasts of the real economic factors as developed in Section 18.1, and the particular rate of interest and inflation given in the text. For convenience of reference the real and financial estimates used are detailed in Table 18.4.1. Forecasts of the main financial factors, i.e., rates of interest and inflation, are discussed in sub-section 18.4 (a) below.

The content of this section also concentrates on the problems of financial planning as represented by the analyses of the basic financing options. The problems of financial risk - i.e., the problems arising from the range of possible financial outcomes as both the real economic factors and the financial factors are allowed to vary - are considered in the following Section 18.5.

- (a) Forecast Financial Parameters
 - (i) Interest Rates on Possible Susitna G.O. and Revenue Bond Financing

Unless Susitna is 100 percent state financed residual bond financing will be required. A key factor here will be the level of interest rates. Interest rates are determined by many complex political and economic forces acting nationally and internationally. It is therefore evidently difficult to forecast with any degree of certainty what the prevailing level of interest rates will be in the period 1985 to 2002 when the Susitna bond financing is likely to take place. The authoritative Data Resources Incorporated long-term projections are, however, given in the following Table 18.4.4.

| | Annual rencentages haves | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--|
| | Historical | | Forecast | | | | |
| | 1970 to 1975 | 1975 to 1980 | 1980 to 1985 | 1985 to <u>1990</u> | 1990 to 1995 | 1995 to 2000 | |
| CPI | 6.8 | 8.9 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 7.3 | 6.8 | |
| Interest Rate for High Grade Industrial Bonds | 8.0 | 9.4 | 11.3 | 10.7 | 9.8 | 8.8 | |

The long-term rate of interest on high grade bonds over the period from 1985 to the year 2000 is forecast to drop progressively from 10.7 percent through 9.8 to 8.8 percent as the rate of inflation falls from 8.1 to 6.8 percent.

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The tax-exempt bond rate implied by these figures will depend in part upon the supply of these bonds relative to the markets which have traditionally supported such issues. These have tended to be high tax bracket investors, insurance companies and banks. The reduction in U.S. tax rates and cyclical factors have reduced the demand for tax-exempt bonds by insurance companies and banks. These factors, as well as an increased supply of tax-exempt bonds, has tended to push their yields closer into line with comparable nontax-exempt bonds, reducing their favorable differential from around 25 to 35 percent of the comparable rate down to only 9 percent in December 1981.

The differential which will apply in the future again cannot be estimated with any certainty since it depends substantially on the future pattern of Federal tax rates and supply of tax-exempt bonds. Subject to these qualifications, it can be argued that the present very low differential between tax-exempt and non-tax-exempt bonds will widen again in the future. With tax-exempt bonds trading at an interest rate 80 percent of that of high grade industrials (with which we might expect Susitna bonds to be comparable), the taxexempt bond financing over the successive 5-year period from 1985 might be of the order of 8.6, 7.8 and 7 percent.

As already stated, these estimates must be regarded as having a very wide range of uncertainty. Given this and the very much higher level of tax-exempt bond interest rates (13.3 percent in January 1982) the financing plan as developed above has been based on interest rates of 10 and 12 percent for Susitna financing in order to arrive at relatively conservative estimates of project financing characteristics. A wider range of possible interest rates and rates of inflation is developed in Section 18.5 dealing with the financing risk.

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(ii) <u>Rates of Inflation</u>

The reference inflation index is taken as that of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The rate of inflation used in the projections given in the preceding section was taken for simplicity at 7 percent throughout the period 1982 to 2010. On the basis of the DRI estimates this rate is approximately one percentage point too low for the 1985 to 1990 period although approximately correct for the following decade. The impact of this on the basic financing analysis in terms of bond financing requirements in 1982 dollars is, however, negligible. The impact of a wide range of inflation and interest rates is considered in the following Section 18.5.

(b) The Inflationary Financing Deficit

Under inflationary conditions long life capital-intensive projects will automatically tend to produce "inflationary financing deficits" in their early years of operation. Figure 18.4.1 demonstrates schematically the relationship between this deficit and the long-term gain on a hypothetical project which might well be a highly economic and attractive undertaking in the long term.

The Susitna hydroelectric development with its long life and high capital investment would, if financed in a conventional manner with debt funds, have similar inflationary financing deficit of the actual magnitude illustrated on Figure 18.4.2. This figure shows the energy cost to the Railbelt system which would arise from supply from the next-best (predominantly coal) thermal power generation plan (see Section 18.1). This energy would be expected to cost 148 mills/kWh in 1994 (the first normal year of operation of Watana, the first phase of the Susitna development). With a general inflation rate of 7 percent and an approximate additional inflation of 2 percent per annum in the price of coal, on which the new thermal power generation would be based, the cost of electricity generated by this means would increase from 148 mills/kWh to 287 mills/kWh within a decade.

The economic justification for Susitna described in Section 18.1 is based on the present worth of the total savings to the system with Susitna compared with the thermal option and shows that, despite being more costly in the early years, the net present worth of the savings over the life of the project is \$1,176 million in 1982 dollars.

If Susitna were 100 percent debt financed at a 10 percent rate of interest, the price it would have to charge for its output is as shown by the higher line in the Figure 18.4.2. Almost the whole of this cost would be made up by interest and debt repayments since the operating costs of the hydroelectric system would be only about 5 percent of the total cost in the year 1994. On this financing basis it would be some 14 years before the cost of thermal-generated electricity overtakes that of the generation output from Susitna.

Thereafter, however, there would be an ever-increasing, favorable gap stretching out into the almost indefinite future, recognizing the very long life of the hydroelectric generating facilities. In this inflationary world, therefore, the costs of supporting a major hydroelectric development such as Susitna on a 100 percent debt-financed basis are out of time phase with its benefits, giving rise to a deficit (i.e., a difference between cost and potential revenues). Being a direct result of inflation this may appropriately be termed "the inflationary financing deficit". However, if inflation were to cease completely in the year 1993 (i.e., after the completion of the Watana segment of Susitna), the cost of electricity developed by the best thermal option would no longer grow at approximately 9 percent, but drop back to an annual rate of around 2 percent, (i.e., the rate by which the rate of inflation in thermal energy costs is expected to exceed that of general inflation).

The effect on Susitna energy production costs would be even more marked. This is because in a world of zero inflation, interest rates would no longer be 10 percent but, on historical experience, would be about 3 percent. This means that the cost of electricity generated by Susitna would very rapidly be lower than the cost of the best thermal option as shown in Figure 18.4.2. It is in this sense that the inflationary financing deficit can be viewed as a direct result of inflation. Without inflation it would not exist.

Inflation, however, does not change the real economics of Susitna. In terms of present worth and 1982 money the net benefits are exactly the same as they would be in the absence of general inflation. This is principally because inflation does not make debt financing more expensive over the 35-year term of the bond financing that is expected for Susitna. It merely makes the bond financing more costly in the earlier years (in terms of 1982 money) and correspondingly less expensive in the later years. For example, in terms of dollars of equal purchasing power, inflation at 7 percent will nearly halve the burden of the interest and debt repayments for Susitna every 10 years. This means that within 20 years of the project coming into operation, interest and debt repayment in terms of 1982 purchasing power will be only 26 percent of the level existing in 1994. In contrast the cost of electricity generated by the best thermal option is forecast to have increased by 24 percent in constant money terms over the 20 years from 1994.

In summary, inflation, without necessarily changing the economics of the project, will automatically create a large inflationary financing deficit for projects which are capital intensive and largely or wholly debt financed. This inflationary financing deficit must be met either by consumers or by the state if such projects are to be undertaken and their substantial advantages in terms of economic benefit and long-term stabilization of energy prices are to be realized. The following analysis of the financing options available for Susitna therefore considers the various means by which the State of Alaska might meet Susitna's inflationary financing deficit and ensure the ensuing benefits.

As shown from the cost benefit analysis in 18.1 (c) (ii), the project has a rate of return of 11.4 percent, taking into account all the capital invested. This shows that it would be possible, in the long term, for the

state to recover the whole of its investment with this rate of return. Since this is in excess of the forecast cost of capital at that time, state appropriation of funds to meet Susitna's inflationary financing deficit can be justified on economic grounds.

(c) Basic Financing Options

A wide range of options exist for possible state participation in meeting the inflationary financing deficit for Susitna. Three basic financing options have been reviewed. To illustrate these, central estimates of capital cost, thermal prices, etc., are used throughout. As noted above the inflation rate is assumed to be 7 percent and the interest rate 10 percent. Detailed printouts of the financial projections for the cases considered are provided in Tables 18.4.5 to 18.4.8. The cases cover:

(i) 100 Percent State Appropriation of Total Capital Cost (\$5.1 billion 1982 dollars)

Under this case 100 percent of Susitna capital cost is financed by the state. This conforms with a possible outcome of Senate Bill 25 and represents the simplest financing option.¹

The year-by-year appropriation required in then current dollars to meet the \$5.1 billion capital cost (in 1982 dollars) is given in Table 18.4.5 (line 461).

The Alaska Power Authority, under the present wholesale energy rate-setting requirements incorporated in Senate Bill 25, would not be able to charge more for the output of Susitna than a wholesale energy rate necessary to provide:

- operation, maintenance and equipment replacement costs
- debt service on bonds issued for the power project, if any, and
- safety inspections and investigations of the project by the Authority.

These costs would enter into a wholesale rate which would be determined by aggregating costs from all projects provided for by the Power Development Fund established in AS44-83-382¹.

In this 100 percent state-financed case only the relatively small year-to-year operating costs could therefore be charged as the cost of output. For all practical purposes therefore, the energy developed by Susitna would be supplied to the consuming utilities at a price representing only a small fraction of the cost of power from

¹ Reference: State of Alaska Senate Bill 25. "An Act relating to energy projects and programs of the Alaska Power Authority."

alternative sources.² Evidently, in this case there would be no financing or marketing problems. The major problem might well be that of devising appropriate means of equitably sharing out this major low cost energy supply between the different utilities taking the output since demand would exceed supply.

(ii) \$3 billion (1982 dollars) State Appropriation with Residual Bond Financing

> The financing scenario which would arise if the state appropriated only \$3 billion (in 1982 dollars) and the residual financing requirements were met by bond issues is summarized in Figure 18.4.6. This again shows the cost of electricity on vertical axis over the first years of operation of Susitna. The plot representing the "best thermal option" is again the central estimate of the year-toyear costs of providing the same energy as Susitna by the least cost thermal power generation system based on the costs as detailed in Section 18.1 of the report and assuming an interest rate of 10 percent - the same rate assumed in determining the Susitna costs applies to the cost of thermal units.

> As already noted, the wholesale price of the electricity supply from Susitna (and other projects provided for from the Power Development Fund) would be limited to the actual costs incurred including the cost of debt service. On the central estimates this would lead to an almost constant wholesale price for Susitna's output over the period up to the completion of Devil Canyon. This is because virtually the whole of the costs would be accounted for by debt service which would not change until Devil Canyon came on-stream.

> Interest incurred on the bonds issued to finance Devil Canyon would be capitalized and, therefore, have no effect upon price until Devil Canyon was completed in the year 2002. At this time the cost of Susitna energy would increase as it became necessary for the project to recover the costs of Devil Canyon. This "step-up" results from the fact that the \$3 billion state appropriation would in effect have been wholly expended in meeting the capital costs of Watana (thus producing low-cost energy from Watana). Devil Canyon, on the other hand, will have been wholly financed by interest-bearing bonds so that its per-unit cost of energy output will be correspondingly higher than that from Watana.

It should also be noted that after the completion of Devil Canyon the most meaningful basis of comparison is the Susitna cost excluding excess debt service cover. This is because this excess debt service charge is then available to finance other power generation projects and could, under certain conditions, be "refunded" to consumers (up until this date the excess charge is used to help finance Devil Canyon).

² This conclusion would be modified if, as proposed by Senate Bill 646, the APA is required to repay the state appropriation from the revenues generated by the project.

However, after the step-up as Devil Canyon comes on-stream in 2002, the future unit price of Susitna energy would be falling for some years before becoming virtually constant, despite an assumed annual rate of inflation of 7 percent and an additional escalation of about 2 percent in operating and maintenance costs. (This fall is due to the effect of increased sales of Susitna energy after 2002.) In terms of constant 1982 dollars, therefore, the cost of energy supplied from Susitna will be falling markedly.

Under this scenario Susitna will again provide ever-increasing savings to Alaskan consumers in terms of the difference between its falling and then nearly-constant price energy and the ever-escalating cost of the thermal alternative as shown in Figure 18.4.3.

(iii) "Minimum" State Appropriation \$2.3 billion (1982 dollars)
with Residual Bond Financing

The "minimum" state appropriation is taken as the minimum amount required to meet debt service cover of 1.25 on the residual debt financing by revenue bonds and to make Susitna's wholesale energy price competitive with the best thermal option in its first normal cost year of operation (i.e., 1994). The basic characteristics of this scenario are shown in Figure 18.4.7. Again the results shown are based upon central estimates for interest rates, inflation, capital cost, etc. If these estimates were achieved, the \$2.3 billion (1982 dollars) state appropriation would be just sufficient to result in Susitna meeting its debt service cover and operating costs in the first year.

As is seen from Figure 18.4.7, however, with an appropriation of \$2.3 billion (in 1982 dollars) Susitna will again, after the completion of Devil Canyon, provide a falling and then virtually stable cost of electricity indefinitely and ever-increasing cost savings compared with the thermal option.

Slightly lower appropriations would still be consistent with financial viability of the project based on the central estimates. These would however result in Susitna being unable, in its first normal year of operation (1994), to meet fully debt service cover, i.e., it would be unable to earn the 1.25 times debt service requirement which must be expected as the minimum if the project were residually financed by revenue bonds. Under such "less-thanminimum" scenario, therefore, it must be assumed that this residual bond financing in the earlier years is on the basis of a state guarantee or general obligation (G.O.) bonds as detailed below. At any substantially lower state appropriation than \$2.3 billion (in 1982 dollars), Susitna would have a correspondingly large, early year inflationary financing deficit unless it was possible to wholesale its energy output at a higher price than that which would apply under the best thermal option. If it was not possible to secure such higher price contracts there might also be significant financing difficulties as discussed in (d) (vi) below.

(d) Issues Arising From the Base Financing Options

(i) Need for Financial Restructuring

If substantial revenue bond financing is to be secured for Susitna, it will have to be based on firm power contracts from the major Railbelt utilities. These contracts will, however, need to be supported by adequate financial strength on the part of the utilities themselves if they are to constitute acceptable security to bondholders. Whether Susitna or any other alternative element of generating capacity is chosen to meet the Railbelt energy requirements over the next decade, the same issue of the financial strength of the Railbelt utilities will arise if revenue bond financing is to be secured. On these grounds it is assumed that independently of Susitna, financial restructuring will take place to ensure that all the major Railbelt utilities will be able to offer adequate financial security relative to their power contract commitments.

(ii) Tax-exempt Bond Financing

Tax exemption for its bond financing is important to the economics of Susitna insofar as it is, in substantial measure, to be financed by G.O. or revenue bonds. Tax-exempt bonds have tended to trade at interest rates some 25 to 30 percent less than the rate of interest on comparable securities. Since interest charges account for some 90 percent of the total price for Susitna's output (in 1994 under the \$2.3 billion state appropriation scenario), loss of tax exemption would have a serious adverse affect on the economics of the project.

The conditions under which bonds will secure tax-exempt status are covered in the Internal Revenue Code Section 103. These are designed to prevent the benefits of tax-exempt bond financing passing to non-exempt entities. The only significant tax-exempt entities in the Railbelt area likely to purchase Susitna energy are AMLP and FMUS. All other potential customers for Susitna energy (representing_approximately_two-thirds_of_the_potential_market) are private utilities or co-ops_which_are_not_tax=exempt.

This issue has been considered in detail by the consultants and reviewed by tax advisers. It has been concluded, that with an appropriate degree of financial restructuring referred to above, it will prove possible to meet the conditions required for any bond financing for Susitna to obtain tax exempt status.

(iii) Options for Residual Financing

Tables 18.4.2 and 18.4.3 set out the estimated requirements for bond financing and state appropriations of \$2.3 billion and \$3 billion respectively.

- Several options are available to meet these financing needs and these are summarized below.
 - . Revenue Bonds with a Completion Guarantee

A completion guarantee must be assumed to be a precondition of bond financing at the Watana stage (up to 1993). A State of Alaska guarantee of project completion would probably enable all residual financing to be met by revenue bonds.

. Guaranteed Revenue Bonds with Post-completion Refinancing

If the revenue bonds were guaranteed by the State of Alaska, this could be expected to limit the requirement for a completion guarantee.

. G.O. Bonds with Post-completion Refinancing

G.O. bonds which have the "full faith and credit" of the State of Alaska share a common security feature with guaranteed revenue bonds and would limit the support required from a completion guarantee. Furthermore, G.O. bond financing would have a beneficial effect on energy pricing arising from reduced debt service cover requirements.

In this case, as with that of guaranteed revenue bonds, the burden on the credit of the state could be minimized by making the bonds subject to "call" after a few years (when project viability was established) and refinancing into non-guaranteed revenue bonds.

- Revenue Bonds with Completion Guarantee

The first option is that of revenue bond financing for the whole of the residual capital requirements. It is probable that such financing will only be obtainable on the basis of bond holders being protected from pre-completion risk including (a) the risk of overruns and (b) the risk of actual non-completion. Neither the Railbelt utilities nor the APA could provide a wholly satisfactory guarantee covering both (a) and (b). The guarantee would have to be provided by the State of Alaska.

The precise form of this completion guarantee cannot be determined at this stage. It will depend on the extent to which the power sales contracts accept any escalation in wholesale energy price based on capital costs and on the magnitude of the state appropriation since it is primarily these factors which will determine the residual financing risk. With appropriate power contracts and a sufficiently large state appropriation, the state completion guarantee might be limited to guaranteeing bond holders against non-completion due to natural hazards or national emergencies. In other cases it might also be necessary to provide a contingent authorization permitting a given maximum amount of subordinated G.O. bonds to be issued to ensure completion.

- Guaranteed Revenue Bonds with Post-completion Refinancing

If revenue bonds were guaranteed by the State of Alaska they could be issued without any requirement for a completion guarantee. This is because the strength of the state guarantee would make any other security unnecessary. It is assumed, however, that in the interest of avoiding unnecessary burdens on its 'credit', the State of Alaska would wish to see the guarantee terminated at the earliest possible date. This could be achieved by making the bonds subject to "call" (repayment at the option of the issuer) 15 years after issue in the case of bonds financing Watana and 10 years after issue of bonds to finance Devil Canyon. The state guarantee would, of course, ensure repayment at the call dates. Coverage level conditions at these call dates (2005 at the earliest) are seen from Figures 18.4.3 and 18.4.4 to be such as to offer adequate security without state guarantees and therefore, subject to market conditions at the time, permit refinancing into non-guaranteed revenue bonds.

- G.O. Bonds with Post-completion Refinancing

As an alternative to guaranteed revenue bonds, G.O. bonds on the "full faith and credit" of the State of Alaska could be issued. These are effectively identical to bonds carrying a comparable state guarantee. Again they could be subject to "call" and as such be converted to revenue bonds without state guarantee when the project was fully established.

(iv) Borrowing Requirements for the Residual Financing Options

On the assumption that the residual source of finance for Watana is revenue bonds, the estimate of year-by-year requirements up to the completion of Watana are shown in Table 18.4.2 and 18.4.3 for the minimum state appropriation of \$2.3 billion and the \$3 billion scenarios respectively (1982 dollars). These again take the central capital cost estimate as the starting point and estimate the bond financing requirements year-by-year for a 7 percent rate of inflation up to the date of completion of Watana.

The requirements are given in the form of then-actual money and in terms of dollars at 1982 purchasing power. It is the latter on which the assessment should focus since, even with 7 percent inflation, the value of the bonds issued for the completion of Watana in 1993 will be worth only 48 cents of a dollar in 1982. It is these "today's purchasing power dollars" which most accurately reflect the financing burden of Susitna. Even in this, the "minimum" \$2.3 billion state appropriation scenario, the issuance of \$1.7 billion of bonds (in 1982 purchasing power) over the 4 years from 1990 appears to be well within the financing capability of the State of Alaska. The possible impact of such an issue on the credit rating of the state is however considered below.

(v) Refinancing Watana and the Financing of Devil Canyon

> As already noted it is assumed that it would be the policy of the State of Alaska to ensure that any guaranteed revenue bonds were refinanced into non-guaranteed revenue bonds at as early a date as possible. When this would in fact be possible would depend both on the revenues actually obtainable from Susitna at the Watana stage of development and on the conditions of the bond market at that time.

> A dominant consideration, as regards the date at which refinancing into non-guaranteed revenue bonds will be possible, will be the magnitude of the initial state appropriation. In the \$3 billion (1982 dollars) scenario such refinancing should be possible for a very wide range of outcomes. This is apparent in Figure 18.4.3 which shows that on the central estimates Susitna could be financed with revenue bonds on a 1.25 cover basis and be charging a wholesale energy price of approximately 236 mills/kWh (i.e., 20 mills/kWh less than the cost of the best thermal option) in 2003. This price would thereafter show rapid and ever-increasing divergence from the cost of the best thermal option. In this case only a relatively extreme combination of adverse eventualities in terms of interest rates, capital cost overruns, etc., could result in it not being possible to undertake refinancing into non-guaranteed revenue bonds within a few years of completion.

Capital expenditures for Devil Canyon for completion in the year 2002 will begin almost immediately after the completion of Watana. On the basis of the central forecasts, the outcome, as depicted in summary form in Figures 18.4.3 and 18.4.4, is that it would be possible to finance this stage wholly by non-guaranteed revenue bonds and without a completion guarantee where the initial state appropriation is at the \$2.3 billion or \$3 billion level for the total project (in 1982 dollars).

The grounds for this conclusion are that (a) Devil Canyon is a considerably smaller capital project than Watana (\$1.48 billion as compared with \$3.65 billion in 1982 dollars) and (b) the major construction risks would have been fully explored during the Watana stage. Also seen from Figures 18.4.3 and 18.4.4 on the central forecast, the cost of energy from the best thermal option would be 23 percent or more costly than that from Susitna in 2005. This comparative cheapness (and therefore the scope for substantially-increased revenues if necessary) is the basic security which the project would offer to bond holders.

The magnitude of the revenue bond financing required for the Devil Canyon stage in the \$2.3 billion state appropriation scenario is shown in Table 18.4.2. The financing requirements are given for a 7 percent inflation rate and in then-actual money terms as well as in the purchasing power of 1982 dollars. The amount of \$2.1 billion (in 1982 dollars) as a bond financing burden on the State of Alaska does not appear excessively large. The financing requirements in the \$3 billion appropriation case are given in Table 18.4.3.

(vi) Importance of Adequate Appropriation to Subsequent Financing

In the "minimum" scenario (i.e., a state appropriation of \$2.3 billion) refinancing into non-guaranteed revenue bonds would still be possible on the central estimates with the completion of Watana in 1993. On any less favorable outcome than that resulting from the central estimates, however, G.O. bond refinancing could be delayed until the ceiling on the Susitna energy price, set by the best thermal option, was high enough for Susitna energy prices to be increased to a level at which it could offer the 1.25 times debt service cover which would probably be required by revenue bond holders in the absence of guarantees.

This scenario is illustrated in Figure 18.4.8 for a state appropriation of only \$1.8 billion. (See also Table 18.4.8.) In this case it would be necessary to increase the price of Susitna's energy each year (within the limit set by the cost of energy from the best thermal option) and use the additional revenue to refinance with non-guaranteed_revenue_bonds. In this scenario complete refinancing into revenue bonds would not take place until 1995.

Timely and adequate funding for Susitna is of great importance in minimizing dependance on state guarantees. There is the likelihood that inadequate initial funding would result in insufficient potential earnings cover in the early years of Devil Canyon. This might necessitate state guarantees for the financing of Devil Canyon as well as Watana. This possibility is also illustrated in Figure 18.4.8, where the Susitna price is forced to "track" the cost of the best thermal option over the years 2002-2004. These considerations point to the importance of adequate initial funding to the establishment of Susitna at the Watana stage as a project fully capable of securing both tax-exempt low interest revenue bond financing for the Devil Canyon stage and subsequent refinancing into non-guaranteed bonds of the issues made to finance Watana.

A further consideration of basic importance is the influence of adequate and timely state appropriation in minimizing construction bid prices. It must be expected that any perceived inadequacy in funding, creating possible delay in payment or uncertainties in the construction schedule, would be fully reflected in the level of bid prices.

(vii) Impact on State Credit Rating of Susitna G.O. Bond Financing

Where the financing plan actually undertaken is near the "minimum" (\$2.3 billion) state appropriation, the guaranteed revenue bond or G.O. bond financing at the Watana stage may be of a magnitude that warrants consideration of its effect upon the overall credit rating of the State of Alaska.

As at November 1981 the State of Alaska had approximately \$681.7 million of G.O. bonds outstanding. In late 1981 these were rated "AA" by Moody's and "Aa-" by Standard & Poors.

The impact on the state's credit rating of Susitna guaranteed or G.O. bond financing of \$1.7 billion (in 1982 dollars) for the \$2.3 billion state appropriation case will depend upon a wide range of factors. The most important will obviously be the strength of the credit standing of the State of Alaska at that time, taking into account the total amount of bonds which it has issued and outstanding. The second factor will be the economic prospects for Susitna itself - that is the extent to which it is perceived by the bond market as likely to be able to meet the interest burden on the bonds issued to finance its construction. The impact has been assessed by the Alaskan Power Authority's investment banking and financial advisers First Boston Corporation and First Southwest Company. They have concurred in the following statement.

"We are only able to render a conditional estimate of the possible impact on the credit of the State of Alaska as a result of the contemplated general obligation bond financing of \$1.7 billion for the Watana stage of the Susitna Hydroelectric Project. Alaska's presently favorable ratings are greatly influenced by its low debt to assessed value ratio which helps to overcome the unusually high per capita debt statistics. Given the dramatic growth of assessed valuation and in the fact that interest expense through start-up of Watana is to be capitalized from bond proceeds the envisaged financing should not significantly impair the credit of the state. Even if the State of Alaska's general obligation bond rating were reduced one full letter grade, the cost in terms of interest rates on future bond issues would likely be in the approximate range of 1/4 percent to 1/2 percent per annum."

(e) Financing Options Under Senate Bill 646 and House Bill 655

Senate Bill 646 and House Bill 655 have been proposed and if enacted would offer alternative financing options to those considered above. These options are briefly reviewed in this sub-section.

In summary, Senate Bill 646 and House Bill 655 propose funding for approved energy projects from the Power Development Fund on the basis of such funding being recovered at a rate of 3 percent per annum together with an uplift to reflect past inflation. The latter is determined at 10 yearly intervals and increases the 3 percent recovery by the average rate of inflation in the CPI over the preceding 33 years.

(i) 100 Percent State Appropriation

First to be considered is the total appropriation required to finance Susitna wholly under this proposed legislation. In terms of total state appropriation this is the same as the outright appropriation case considered in 18.4 (c) (i). As seen from Figure 18.4.6 and Table 18.4.9, however, the resulting cost of power is very different. For the 'outright' appropriation case the cost of power would be only 19 mills/kWh in 1994. For the Senate Bill 646 case it would be 81 mills/kWh.

(ii) "Minimum" State Appropriation of \$3 Billion (in 1982 dollars) with Residual Bond Financing

To identify the impact of Senate Bill 646 and House Bill 655, where residual bond financing is required, some details of the proposed bills need to be clarified. Specifically:

- . Whether the state recovery is subordinate to interest and debt repayments on the revenue or G.O. bonds.
- . Whether, in the event of any failure to meet the state recovery, the APA would be deemed in default and the payment made be a debt of the APA and attract interest.

Both questions are important to residual financing by revenue bonds. In the following analysis it is assumed that, to facilitate bond financing, the state recovery will be wholly subordinate and failure to meet payment would not be deemed a default. This assumption has the important effect in terms of the pricing of Susitna energy that the state recovery of funding could be largely made out of the .25 excess debt service cover and not need to be additional to it.

It is again assumed that the ceiling price of the Susitna output is set by the cost of the best thermal option, and that 1.25 times cover would be required for the revenue bonds.

The results are shown in Figure 18.4.7 and Table 18.4.10. This shows that an appropriation of \$3 billion (in 1982 dollars) would be enough to provide sufficient earnings cover for the \$0.9 billion (in 1982 dollars) of bond financing required to complete Watana. In 1994 a further \$2.3 billion of revenue bonds would be required to achieve the completion of Devil Canyon.

The \$3 billion appropriation would, however, be the "minimum" in the sense that the Susitna output would need to be priced up to the full cost of the best thermal option in the first year of operation of Devil Canyon. As will be seen from Figure 18.4.7 this Senate Bill 646 scenario would result in a selling price for Susitna energy of 120 mills/kWh in 1994 compared with 80 mills/kWh in the \$3 billion outright appropriation case ((c) (ii) above). This scenario would nevertheless be effective in terms of the twin objectives of meeting the inflationary financing deficit and reducing the cost of power to Alaskan consumers and might be regarded as similar in these characteristics and in state appropriation to the \$3 billion outright appropriation already noted.

(f) Future Development and Resolution of Uncertainties

Prior to the decision to proceed with actual construction of Susitna, several significant uncertainties affecting the project will have been reduced. Demand forecasts will be more certain and the impact of the electrical intertie between Anchorage and Fairbanks will be known. Fuel cost trends and energy prices from alternative generation sources will be more precisely known. More advanced engineering work and definition of the basis for construction contracts will have firmed up requirements for capital funds. In addition, the passage of time will have allowed better definition of the level of state appropriation required and of the ability of the state to provide the necessary financial support.

The development of the institutional structure of the Railbelt utilities by this date should also permit power contracts and legislative proposals to be drawn up which would equitably share these then more clearly delineated risks between the utilities, the APA and the State of Alaska. The key requirements for state guarantees and financing could then be more precisely defined in an appropriately limited form which would be acceptable to the state and adequate for project financing.

(g) <u>Conclusion</u>

Early year inflationary financing deficits have been seen to be inevitable in the case of capital-intensive debt-financed projects being built under inflationary conditions. Such inflationary financing deficits have no bearing on the economic viability of the project but instead directly result from inflation. As a highly capital-intensive, long-life project, Susitna has a substantial inflationary financing deficit despite its strong economic viability. If the project is to go forward and its advantages in terms of indirect economic benefit and stablization of Alaskan electrical energy prices realized, major state appropriation of funds will be required.

In terms of the magnitude of appropriation an amount of not less than \$2.3 billion (in 1982 dollars) would represent an assured and effective means of meeting the inflationary financing deficit. This would ensure that Susitna energy could be made available in the first year of operation at a price

competitive with the cost from the appreciable increase in the Railbelt system energy cost which would be otherwise occurring at that time as a result of the rising cost of fuel and other factors. Substantially lesser levels of appropriation might create appreciable difficulties or costs as regards the residual debt financing. In particular such inadequacies might create the need for a more prolonged period of guaranteed revenue bond or G.O. bond financing, or involve higher electricity costs.

Finally, it is important to distinguish between appropriations to meet the inflationary deficit and appropriations designed to reduce the cost of electricity to Alaskan consumers. The economics of Susitna are such that it could, long term, repay with an adequate rate of return, all of the state appropriations used to finance Susitna's inflationary financing deficit. State financing of the magnitude indicated is therefore economically justifiable in terms of meeting the inflationary financing deficit in an efficient and adequate manner to enable an economically viable and important project to proceed. The decision to allow all or part of this appropriation to be retained in the project, long term, or to provide even larger appropriations to subsidize the cost of electrical energy to Alaskan consumers, is a separate issue to be decided as a matter of public policy and is beyond the terms of reference of this study.

18-77

TABLE 18.4.1: FORECAST FINANCIAL PARAMETERS

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| • | Watana | | Devil Canyon | Total |
|--|-------------------|----------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| Project Completion - Year | 1993 | | 2002 | |
| Energy Level - 1993 - 2002 - 2010 | | | | 3 387 GWh 5 223 " 6 616 " |
| Costs in January 1982 Dollars | | | | |
| Capital Costs | \$ 3.64 billio | 7 1 | \$1.470 billion | \$ 5.117 billion |
| Operating Costs - per annum | \$10.0 million | ı | \$5.42 million | \$15.42 million |
| Provision for Capital Renewals — per annum (0.3 percent of Capital Costs) | \$10.94 | | \$4.41 | \$15.35 |
| Operating Working Capital | | 15 pe 10 pe | rcent of Opera rcent of Reven | ting Costs ue |
| Reserve and Contingency Fund | | 100 p 100 p Ren | ercent of Oper ercent of Prov ewals | ating Costs ision for Capital |
| Interest Rate | | 10 pe: | rcent per annu | m |
| Debt Repayment Period | | 35 ye | ars | |
| Inflation Rate | | 7 perc | cent per annum | |
| Real Rate of Increase in Operating - 1982 to 1987 - 1988 on | Costs | 1.7 pr 2.0 pr | ercent per ann ercent per ann | បក បក |
| Real Rate of Increase in Capital Co - 1982 to 1985 - 1986 to 1992 - 1993 on | osts | 1.1 pr 1.0 pr 2.0 pr | ercent per ann ercent per ann ercent per ann | |

TABLE 18.4.2 FINANCING REQUIREMENTS - \$ BILLION

For \$2.3 billion State Appropriation Scenario

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| | Intere: Inflat: | st Rate 10% ion Rate 7% |
|---|---|---|
| | Actual | 1982 Purchasing Power |
| 1985 State Appropriation 86 " 87 " 88 " 89 " 90 " | 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.7 | 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 |
| Total State Appropriation | 3.5 | 2.3 |
| 1990 Guaranteed or G.O Bonds 1 " " 2 " " 3 " " Total Watana Bonds | 0.8 1.3 0.9 0.3 3.3 | 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.1 1.7 |
| 1994 Revenue Bonds 5 " " 6 " " 7 " " 8 " " 9 " " 2000 " " 1 " " 2 " " | 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.4 0.2 | 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 |
| Total Devil Canyon Bonds | 6.8 | 2.1 |
| Total Susitna Bonds | 10.1 | 3.8 |
TABLE 18.4.3: FINANCING REQUIREMENTS - \$ BILLION

For \$3 billion State Appropriation Scenario

Interest Rate 10% Inflation Rate 7% 1982 Actual Purchasing Power \$ billion 1985 State Appropriation 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 86 11 87 11 88 0.5 0.3 11 89 0.9 0.6 11 90 1.5 0.9 91 Ħ 0.2 0.5 Total State Appropriation 4.8 3.0 -----____ 1990 Guaranteed or G.O Bonds ---------0.4 н 0.8 1 ... 23 .. 0.7 0.4 11 11 0.1 0.3 T 'al Watana Bonds 1.8 0.9 1994 Revenue Bonds 0.2 0.1 0.1 11 5 11 0.4 H 6 18 0.4 11 11 7 0.1 0.4 ... 11 8 1.2 0.4 9 11 11 0.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 0.5 0.4 2000 11 11 11 1 11 11 2 0.1 0.1 Total Devil Canyon Bonds 7.2 2.3 _____

Total Susitna Bonds

9.0 3.2

| DATA10K.WATANA-DC.(DN.LINE.1993-2002): | یل دی ملہ بری ہی می مل مل ہی ہی ہی ، چہ جن بری میں میں ہی جن میں میں میں میں | مدر بدر به مدری وی وی وی وی مدر بن بن وی بر بن وی وی وی وی | یان ملد بیان ماد بای ماد ماد ماد بای باد روی برای بیان ماد روی ماد روی ماد وری | | ********* N.7%-INTE | ******** REST_10%- | CAP.COST | ******** \$5•117_BN | ******** 23 - F | ******* EB_82 |
|--|--|---|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| ***** | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1983 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
| | | | CA | SH FLOW S | | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 465 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 0 0.00 126.72 0.00 | 0.00 135.59 0.00 | 0.00 145.08 0.00 | 0.00 155.24 0.00 | 0.00 166.10 0.00 | 0.00 177.73 0.00 | 0.00 190.17 0.00 | 0 0.00 203.48 0.00 | 3387 3•65 217•73 7•94 | 3387 7.98 232.97 18.59 |
| 515 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 | | | | 0.0 | 26.9 26.9 | 63•0 29•3 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 33.6 5.6 9.8 0.0 |
| 548 VET EARNINGS FROM DPERS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 29.5 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USE 543 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 445 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAHDOWNS 243 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 0.0 403.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 472.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 499.5 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 938.3 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 1550.4 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 1247.1 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 676.4 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 333.1 0.0 98.0 | 29.5 229.7 0.0 17.7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 403.7 | 472.7 | 479.7 | 499.5 | 938.3 | 1550.4 | 1247.1 | 676.4 | 431.1 | 276.9 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 403.7 0.0 0.0 | 472.7 0.0 0.0 | 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 499.5 0.0 0.0 | 938.3 0.0 0.0 | 1550.4 0.0 0.0 | 1247.1 0.0 0.0 | 676.4 0.0 0.0 | 333.1 98.0 0.0 | 259.2 17.7 0.0 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 SHORT TERM DEBT 444 CASH RECOVERED | | | | | | | | | | |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 0.0 0.0 0.0 403.7 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 876.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1356.1 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1855.6 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 2794.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 4344.3 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 5591.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 6267.8 | 56.5 41.5 0.0 6600.9 | 61.6 54.1 0.0 6860.1 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 403.7 | 876.4 | 1356.1 | 1955.6 | 2794.0 | 4344.3 | 5591.4 | 6267.8 | 6698.9 | 6975.8 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHURT TERM 554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 403.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 876.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1356.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1355.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 2794.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 4344.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 5591.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 6267.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 6600.9 0.0 98.0 0.0 | 6830.6 29.5 115.7 0.0 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDDWN \$1962 543 CUM∙ DEBT DRAWWDDWN \$1982 519 DEBT SERVICE COVER | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 00.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | | | | | 0•0 0•0 0•00 |

100% STATE APPROPRIATION OF TOTAL CAPITAL COST (\$5.1 BILLION IN 1982 DOLLARS)

Sheet 1 of 3

| | | یک علو ہوں ہوں جان جان ہوں ہوں ماہ ماد | ل مان مان ماد رای مان رای مان بان . | ********** | *********** | | ****** | **** | ************************************** | *** |
|--|---------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|--|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| | - *~~~~~~~~ | ************************************** | ********* | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| | • • • • | •••• | C A | SH FLOW | SUMMARY | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 523 PRICE-MILLS | 3387 8•24 249•28 20•55 | 3387 8.38 266.73 22.36 | == 3387 8•74 285•40 24•93 | ==(\$MILLIC 3387 8•38 305•38 27•13 | DN)==== 3387 9.04 326.75 29.53 | 3387 9.17 349.62 32.06 | 3387 9•30 374•10 34•79 | 5223 7•66 400•29 30•64 | 5414 8.84 428.31 37.86 | 5605 8•68 458•29 39•80 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 69.6 32.0 | 75.7 35.0 | 84.4 38.1 | 91.9 41.6 | 100.0 | 108.5 | 117.8 54.1 | 160.0 91.1 | 204.9 99.4 | 223•1 108•5 |
| 517 DPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 37.6 6.2 11.6 0.0 | 40.8 6.7 12.4 0.0 | 46.3 7.3 15.3 0.0 | 50.2 8.0 16.4 0.0 | 54.6 8.7 17.7 0.0 | 59.0 9.5 18.7 0.0 | 63.7 10.4 19.8 0.0 | 69.0 11.4 21.0 0.0 | 105.5 19.1 33.8 0.0 | 114.6 20.9 36.3 0.0 |
| 548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 32.2 | 35.1 | 38.3 | 41.8 | 45.6 | 49.8 | 54.4 | 59.3 | 90.9 | 99+2 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USE 54: CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 32.2 363.1 0.0 8.1 | 35.1 382.1 0.0 29.3 | 38.3 303.8 0.0 11.2 | 41.8 1022.3 0.0 12.2 | 45.6 1177.5 0.0 10.6 | 49.8 1204.8 0.0 10.4 | 54.4 913.1 0.0 12.3 | 59.3 303.0 0.0 128.0 | 90•9 0•0 0•0 24•7 | 99•2 0•0 0•0 42•8 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 403.4 | 446.5 | 353.3 | 1082.4 | 1233.7 | 1265.1 | 979.8 | 490.3 | 115.6 | 142.0 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 395.3 8.1 0.0 | 417.2 29.3 0.0 | 342.1 11.2 0.0 | 1070.1 12.2 0.0 | 1223.2 10.6 0.0 | 1254•6 10•4 0•0 | 967.5 12.3 0.0 | 362•3 128•0 0•0 | 90•9 24•7 0•0 | 99•2 42•8 0•0 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 SHORT TERM DEBT 444 CASH RECOVERED | | | | | | | | | | |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 67.2 56.6 0.0 7255.4 | 73.4 79.7 0.0 7672.6 | 80.1 84.2 0.0 8014.7 | 87.4 89.1 0.0 9084.8 | 95.4 91.7 0.0 10308.0 | 104.1 93.4 0.0 11562.6 | 113.7 96.2 0.0 12530.1 | 191.3 146.6 0.0 12892.5 | 208.8 153.8 0.0 12983.3 | 227.8 177.6 0.0 13082.5 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 7379.2 | 7325.7 | 8179.0 | 9261.4 | 10495.1 | 11760.2 | 12740.0 | 13230.3 | 13345.9 | 13487.9 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT DUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT DUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 7193.7 61.6 123.9 0.0 | 7575.8 96.8 153.1 0.0 | 7879.6 135.1 164.3 0.0 | 9907.9 176.9 176.6 0.0 | 10085.4 222.6 187.1 0.0 | 11290.3 272.4 197.6 0.0 | 12203.4 326.7 209.9 0.0 | 12506•4 386•1 337•8 0•0 | 12506.4 477.0 362.6 0.0 | 12506.4 576.1 405.4 0.0 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982 543 Cum. Debt Drawwdown \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 | | | | | 0•0 0•0 0•00 | | | | |

100% STATE APPROPRIATION OF TOTAL CAPITAL COST (\$5.1 BILLION IN 1982 DOLLARS)

TABLE 18.4.5

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| DATA 10K WATANA-OC (ON LINE 1993-2002) | ***** | ****** | ***** | ·INFLATIC |]N 72-1NTE | REST 10%- | CAP COST | \$5.117 BN | 23-F + ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ | ********* ********* |
|--|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | TOTAL |
| | | | C # | SH FLOW S | | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 6092 8•18 490•37 40•12 | 6147 8•27 524•69 43•39 | 6250 8•33 561•42 46•75 | 6472 9•24 600•72 49•49 | 6544 8•30 642•77 53•35 | 6616 8•35 687•77 57•45 | 6638 8•48 735•91 62•39 | 6660 8•57 787•42 67•48 | 6682 8•67 842•54 73•02 | 104826 0.00 0.00 0.00 |
| 515 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 244.4 118.4 | 266.7 129.2 | 292.1 141.0 | 320.3 153.9 | 349•1 168•0 | 380.1 183.4 | 414.1 200.1 | 449.4 218.4 | 487.9 238.4 | 4530•0 2202•0 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 126.0 22.8 40.5 0.0 | 137.4 24.9 44.2 0.0 | 151.1 27.1 49.3 0.0 | 166.3 29.6 55.2 0.0 | 181.1 32.3 59.8 0.0 | 196.7 35.3 64.4 0.0 | 214.0 38.5 69.6 0.0 | 231.0 42.0 73.4 0.0 | 249.5 45.9 77.5 0.0 | 2328.0 412.4 746.6 0.0 |
| 540 NET EARNINGS FROM JPERS | 108.2 | 118.1 | 128.9 | 140.7 | 153.6 | 167.6 | 182.9 | 199.7 | 217.9 | 1993.8 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USE 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 440 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 243 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 108 • 2 0• 0 0• 0 36• 4 | 118.1 0.0 0.0 51.3 | 128.9 0.0 0.0 59.3 | 140.7 0.C 0.C 45.8 | 153.6 0.0 0.0 45.9 | 167.6 0.0 0.0 52.0 | 182.9 0.0 0.0 37.7 | 199.7 0.0 0.0 41.2 | 217.9 0.0 0.0 44.9 | 1993.8 12506.4 0.0 819.7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 144.7 | 169.4 | 188.2 | 186.5 | 199.4 | 219.6 | 220.6 | 240.8 | 262.8 | 15319.9 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 443 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 108.2 36.4 0.0 | 118.1 51.3 0.0 | 128.9 59.3 0.0 | 140.7 45.8 0.0 | 153.6 45.9 0.0 | 167.6 52.0 0.0 | 182.9 37.7 0.0 | 199.7 41.2 0.0 | 217.9 44.9 0.0 | 14500•2 819•7 0•0 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Term Debt 444 Cash Recovered | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | | | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 DTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 248.7 193.2 0.0 13190.7 | 271.4 221.7 0.0 13308.9 | 296.2 256.2 0.0 13437.8 | 323.3 274.9 0.0 13578.5 | 352.8 291.2 0.0 13732.1 | 385.1 310.9 0.0 13899.7 | 420.3 313.4 0.0 14082.6 | 458.7 316.2 0.0 14282.3 | 500.6 319.2 0.0 14500.2 | 500.6 319.2 0.0 14500.2 |
| 405 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 13032.0 | 13801.9 | 13990.2 | 14176.7 | 14376.1 | 14595.7 | 14816.3 | 15057.1 | 15319.9 | 15319.9 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT DUTSTANDING-SHURT TERM 554 DEBT DUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 12506.4 684.4 441.8 0.0 | 12506.4 802.5 493.1 0.0 | 12506.4 931.4 552.4 0.0 | 12506.4 1072.1 598.2 0.0 | 12506.4 1225.7 644.0 0.0 | 12506.4 1393.3 696.0 0.0 | 12506.4 1576.3 733.7 0.0 | 12506.4 1775.9 774.8 0.0 | 12506.4 1993.8 819.7 0.0 | 12506.4 1993.8 819.7 0.0 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWKDOWN \$1982 543 Cum. Debt Drawwddwn \$1982 519 DFBT Service Cover | | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 | | | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 |

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100% STATE APPROPRIATION OF TOTAL CAPITAL COST (\$5.1 BILLION IN 1982 DOLLARS)

Sheet 3 of 3

| | | | • | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| DATA10K WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)- | ********** \$3.0 BN(\$) ******* | ******** 1982) STA ******* | ********* TE FUNDS- ******* | ******** I NF LATION ******* | ********* 78-INTER ******* | ********* EST 10%-0 ******* | ********* APCOST \$5 ******* | ********* .117 BN ******** | ******** 23-F ****** | ******* EB-82 ***** |
| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
| | | | CA == | SH FLOW S =(\$MILLIO | UMMARY N)==== | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 Inflation Index 520 Price-Mills | 9.00 126.72 0.00 | 0.00 135.59 0.00 | 0.00 145.08 0.00 | 0.00 155.24 0.00 | 0.00 166.10 0.00 | 0.00 177.73 0.00 | 0.00 190.17 0.00 | 0 0.00 203.48 0.00 | 3387 29.74 217.73 64.76 | 3387 34•38 232•97 80•08 |
| INCOME 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 219.3 | 271.2 29.3 |
| 517 DPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LUNG TERM DEBT | | | | | | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 | | | 192.4 0.0 0.0 154.0 | 241.9 5.6 9.8 183.4 |
| 548 NET EARNINGS FROM DPERS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 38.5 | 54.3 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USC 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 403.7 0.0 0.0 | 472.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 499.5 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 938.3 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 1550.4 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 462.4 784.7 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 754.9 0.0 | 38.5 0.0 294.6 98.0 | 54.3 0.0 211.6 17.7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 403.7 | 472.7 | 479.7 | 499.5 | 938.3 | 1550.4 | 1247.1 | 754.9 | 431.1 | 283.7 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 403.7 0.0 0.0 | 472.7 0.0 0.0 | 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 499.5 0.0 0.0 | 938.3 0.0 0.0 | 1550.4 0.0 0.0 | 1247.1 0.0 0.0 | 754.9 0.0 0.0 | 333.1 98.0 0.0 | 259•2 17•7 6•8 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Term Debt 444 Cash Recovered | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 Other Working Capital 454 Cash Surplus Retained 370 Cum. Capital Expenditure | 0.0 0.0 403.7 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 876.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1356.1 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1855.6 | 0.0 0.0 2794.0 | 0.0 0.0 4344.3 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 5591.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 6346.3 | 56.5 41.5 0.0 6679.4 | 61.6 54.1 0.0 6938.6 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 403.7 | 876.4 | 1356.1 | 1855.6 | 2794.0 | 4344.3 | 5591.4 | 6346.3 | 6777.4 | 7054.3 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT DUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT DUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 403•7 0•0 0•0 0•0 | 876.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1356.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1855.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 2794.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 4344.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 4806•7 0•0 0•0 784•7 | 4806•7 0•0 0•0 1539•5 | 4806.7 38.5 98.0 1834.2 | 4806.7 92.8 115.7 2039.0 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982 543 Cum. Debt drawwdown \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 412.6 412.6 0.00 | 371.0 783.6 0.00 | 135.3 918.9 1.25 | 90.8 1009.7 1.25 |

\$3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO **7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST**



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| DATA10K WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002) | -\$3.0 3N(\$ ****** | ******** 1982) STA ******* | ********* TE FUNDS- ******* | ********* Inflation ******** | ********** 1 7%-1NTER ******** | EST 10%-0 | APCOST \$5 | ********** •117 BN | ********** 23-F ****** | ******** EB-82 ******** |
|--|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| | | | C A | SH FLOW S | | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 3387 32.59 249.28 31.25 | 3387 30.81 266.73 82.18 | 3387 29•37 285•40 83•81 | 3387 27.83 305.38 84.97 | 3387 26.39 326.75 86.24 | 3387 25.04 349.62 87.54 | 3387 23.79 374.10 89.00 | 5223 58.55 400.29 234.36 | 5414 55.54 428.31 237.89 | 5605 50.49 458.29 231.37 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 275.2 32.0 | 278.3 35.0 | 283.8 38.1 | 287.8 | 292.1 45.4 | 296•5 49•6 | 301.4 54.1 | 1224.0 91.1 | 1287.8 99.4 | 1296.7 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 559 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 243.1 6.2 11.6 182.7 | 243.4 6.7 12.4 182.0 | 245.7 7.3 15.3 181.2 | 246•2 8•0 16•4 130•3 | 246.6 8.7 17.7 179.3 | 246.9 9.5 18.7 178.2 | 247.3 10.4 20.0 177.0 | 1132.9 11.4 21.9 883.4 | 1188.4 19.1 34.7 895.7 | 1188.2 20.9 36.3 891.5 |
| 548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 55.0 | 55.7 | 56.6 | 57.5 | 58.4 | 59.5 | 60.7 | 239.0 | 277.2 | 281.4 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USE 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 243 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 55.0 0.0 368.9 8.1 | 55.7 0.0 427.7 29.3 | 56.6 0.0 395.4 11.2 | 57.5 0.0 1163.0 12.2 | 58•4 0•0 1432•3 10•6 | 59.5 0.0 1604.7 10.4 | 60.7 0.0 1473.5 12.3 | 239.0 0.0 137.8 128.0 | 277.2 0.0 0.0 24.7 | 281•4 0•0 0•0 42•8 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 432.0 | 512.8 | 463.1 | 1232.7 | 1501.3 | 1674.7 | 1546.5 | 504.8 | 301.9 | 324.3 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 416.4 8.1 7.4 | 475.3 29.3 8.2 | 442.9 11.2 9.0 | 1210.5 12.2 9.9 | 1479.8 10.6 10.9 | 1654.5 10.4 12.0 | 1527.9 12.3 13.2 | 362.3 128.0 14.5 | 90.9 24.7 42.6 | 99•2 42•8 46•8 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 SHORT TERM DEBT 444 CASH RECOVERED | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | | | -2.3 2.3 0.0 | -6.8 6.8 0.0 | | 143.7 -9.1 134.6 | 135.4 0.0 135.4 |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 67.2 56.6 0.0 7355.0 | 73.4 79.7 0.0 7830.3 | 80.1 84.2 0.0 8273.2 | 87.4 89.1 0.0 9483.7 | 95.4 91.7 0.0 10963.5 | 104•1 93•4 0•0 12618•0 | 113.7 96.2 0.0 14145.9 | 191.3 146.6 0.0 14508.2 | 208.8 153.8 0.0 14599.1 | 227.8 177.6 0.0 14698.3 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 7478.8 | 7983.4 | 8437.5 | 9660.3 | 11150.6 | 12815.6 | 14355.8 | 14846.1 | 14961.7 | 15103.7 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 4806.7 147.8 123.9 2400.5 | 4806.7 203.5 153.1 2820.0 | 4806.7 260.1 164.3 3206.4 | 4806.7 317.5 176.6 4359.4 | 4806.7 376.0 187.1 5780.8 | 4806.7 435.5 199.8 7373.5 | 4806.7 496.2 219.0 8833.8 | 4806.7 735.2 346.9 8957.1 | 4806.7 877.8 362.6 8914.6 | 4806.7 1023.8 405.4 8867.7 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982 543 Cum• Debt Drawwdown \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 148.0 1157.7 1.25 | 160.4 1318.0 1.25 | 138.5 1456.6 1.25 | 380.8 1837.4 1.25 | 438.3 2275.7 1.25 | 459.0 2734.7 1.25 | 393.9 3128.6 1.25 | 34.4 3163.0 1.25 | 0.0 3163.0 1.25 | 0.0 3163.0 1.25 |

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\$3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST



Sheet 2 of 3

| | **** | ***** | **** | ***** | ***** | ***** | ***** | **** | **** | **** |
|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| PATA106 WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002) | -\$3.0 8N() | 1982) STA | TE FUNDS | -INFLATIO | N 72-1NTE | REST 10%-0 | CAPCOST \$ | .117 BN | 23-f ******** | EB-82 |
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | TOTAL |
| | | | C / | ASH FLOW S | SUMMARY | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH | 6092 | 6147 | 6250 | 6472 | 6544 | 6616 | 6638 | 6660 | 6682 | 104826 |
| 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS | 43.82 | 40.97 | 38.08 | 34•79 | 32•53 | 30•45 | 28•74 | 27•13 | 25•63 | 0.00 |
| 466 INFLATION INDEX | 490.37 | 524.69 | 561.42 | 600•72 | 642•77 | 687•77 | 735•91 | 787•42 | 842•54 | 0.00 |
| 520 PRICE-MILLS | 214.89 | 214.98 | 213.79 | 208•98 | 209•12 | 209•41 | 211•54 | 213•62 | 215•95 | 0.00 |
| 516 REVENUE | 1309.0 | 1321.4 | 1336.1 | 1352.4 | 1368.4 | 1385.3 | 1404.1 | 1422.6 | 1442.9 | 18656.4 |
| 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 118.4 | 129.2 | 141.0 | 153.9 | 168.0 | | 200.1 | 218.4 | 238.4 | 2202.0 |
| 517 DPERATING INCOME | 1190.6 | 1192.2 | 1195.0 | 1198.5 | 1200.4 | 1202.0 | 1204.0 | 1204.2 | 1204.5 | 16454.4 |
| 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS | 22.8 | 24.9 | 27.1 | 29.6 | 32.3 | 35.3 | 38.5 | 42.0 | 45.9 | 412.4 |
| 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT | 40.5 | 44.2 | 49.3 | 55.2 | 59.8 | 64.4 | 69.6 | 73.4 | 77.5 | 748.6 |
| 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 886.8 | 881.6 | 876.0 | 869.7 | 862.9 | 855.3 | 847.0 | 837.9 | 827.9 | 12013.6 |
| 548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 286.1 | 291.2 | 296.9 | 303.1 | 310.0 | 317.5 | 325.8 | 335.0 | 345.0 | 4104.6 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USE 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 243 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 286•1 0•0 0•0 36•4 | 291.2 0.0 0.0 51.3 | 296.9 0.0 0.0 59.3 | 303.1 0.0 0.0 45.8 | 310.0 0.0 0.0 45.9 | 317.5 0.0 0.0 52.0 | 325.8 0.0 0.0 37.7 | 335.0 0.0 0.0 41.2 | 345.0 0.0 0.0 44.9 | 4104.6 4806.7 9049.0 819.7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 322.5 | 342.5 | 356.2 | 349.0 | 355.9 | 369.5 | 363.6 | 376.1 | 389.9 | 18780.1 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 108.2 | 118.1 | 128.9 | 140.7 | 153.6 | 167.6 | 182.9 | 199•7 | 217.9 | 16115.9 |
| 443 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS | 36.4 | 51.3 | 59.3 | 45.8 | 45.9 | 52.0 | 37.7 | 41•2 | 44.9 | 819.7 |
| 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 51.5 | 56.7 | 62.3 | 68.6 | 75.4 | 83.0 | 91.3 | 100•4 | 110.4 | 880.9 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) | 126.3 | 116.4 | 105.6 | 93.9 | 81.0 | 67.0 | 51.6 | 34•9 | 16.7 | 963.5 |
| 249 Short Term Debt | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0•0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 444 CASH Recovered | 126.3 | 116.4 | 105.6 | 93.9 | 81.0 | 67.0 | 51.6 | 34•9 | 16.7 | 963.5 |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND | 249.7 | 271.4 | 296.2 | 323.3 | 352.8 | 385.1 | 420.3 | 458.7 | 500.6 | 500.6 |
| 371 JTHER WORKING CAPITAL | 193.2 | 221.7 | 256.2 | 274.9 | 291.2 | 310.9 | 313.4 | 316.2 | 319.2 | 319.2 |
| 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 14306.5 | 14924.6 | 15053.6 | 15194.3 | 15347.9 | 15515.5 | 15698.4 | 15898.1 | 16116.0 | 16116.0 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 15248.3 | 15417.7 | 15605.9 | 15792.4 | 15991.9 | 16211.4 | 16432.1 | 16672.9 | 16935.7 | 16935.7 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION | 4806.7 | 4806.7 | 4806.7 | 4806.7 | 4806.7 | 4806.7 | 4806.7 | 4806.7 | 4806.7 | 4806.7 |
| 462 RETAINED EARNINGS | 1183.5 | 1358.3 | 1549.6 | 1758.9 | 1987.9 | 2238.5 | 2512.7 | 2812.8 | 3141.1 | 3141.1 |
| 555 DEBT DUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM | 441.3 | 493.1 | 552.4 | 598.2 | 644.0 | 696.0 | 733.7 | 774.8 | 819.7 | 819.7 |
| 554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LUNG TERM | 8816.2 | 8759.5 | 8697.2 | 8628.6 | 8553.2 | 8470.2 | 8378.9 | 8278.6 | 8168.1 | 8168.1 |
| 542 ANNLAL DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982 | 9.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3163.0 |
| 543 Cum. Debt Drawwdown \$1982 | 3163.0 | 3163.0 | 3163.0 | 3163.0 | 3163.0 | 3163.0 | 3163.0 | 3163.0 | 3163.0 | 3163.0 |
| 519 Debt Service Cover | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 0.00 |

\$3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST

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Sheet 3 of 3

TABLE 18.4.6

| **** | **** | **** | **** | **** | **** | **** | ********* | ***** | ***** | **** |
|---|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| DATA10K WATANA-DC (UN LINE 1993-2002)- | -\$2.3 BN () ********* | ********* ******** | A1E FUNUS ******** | -1NFLA11U ******* | N /%-INIE ******** | REST 107-0 ******** | CAP COST ******** | \$5.117 BN ******* | 23-F ******* | EB-82 \$\$\$\$\$ |
| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
| | | | C A | SH FLOW S =(\$HILLIO | UMMARY N}==== | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 0 0.00 126.72 0.00 | 0.00 135.59 0.00 | 0 0.00 145.08 0.00 | 0.00 155.24 0.00 | 0 0.00 166.10 0.00 | 0.00 177.73 0.00 | 0.00 190.17 0.00 | 0 0.00 203.48 0.00 | 3387 50•85 217•73 110•73 | 3387 58•76 232•97 136•90 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0•0 0•0 | 375.0 26.9 | 463.6 29.3 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | | | | | | | | | 348.1 0.0 0.0 303.1 | 434.3 5.6 9.8 331.9 |
| 548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 45.0 | 98.3 |
| 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 0.0 403.7 0.0 0.0 | 472.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 499.5 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 938.3 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 738.4 812.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 1328.3 0.0 | 0•0 0•0 890•4 0•0 | 45.0 0.0 288.1 98.0 | 98.3 0.0 173.2 17.7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 403.7 | 472.7 | 479.7 | 499.5 | 938.3 | 1550.4 | 1328.3 | 890.4 | 431.1 | 289.2 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 403.7 0.0 0.0 | 472.7 0.0 0.0 | 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 499.5 0.0 0.0 | 938.3 0.0 0.0 | 1550.4 0.0 0.0 | 1328.3 0.0 0.0 | 890.4 0.0 0.0 | 333.1 98.0 0.0 | 259.2 17.7 12.2 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Term Debt 444 Cash Recovered | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | | |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 JTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 0.0 0.0 0.0 403.7 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 876.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1356.1 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1855.6 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 2794.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 4344.3 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 5672.6 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 6563.0 | 56.5 41.5 0.0 6896.1 | 61.6 54.1 0.0 7155.3 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 403.7 | 876.4 | 1356.1 | 1855.6 | 2794.0 | 4344.3 | 5672.6 | 6563.0 | 6994.1 | 7271.0 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 403.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 876.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1356.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1855.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 2794.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 3532.4 0.0 0.0 812.0 | 3532.4 0.0 0.0 2140.2 | 3532.4 0.0 0.0 3030.7 | 3532.4 45.0 98.0 3318.7 | 3532.4 143.3 115.7 3479.6 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982 543 Cum• Debt Drawwdown \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | | | | | 456.8 456.8 0.00 | 698•4 1155•3 0•00 | 437.6 1592.9 0.00 | 132.3 1725.2 1.15 | 74.3 1799.5 1.25 |

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Sheet 1 of 3

TABLE 18.4.7

ACRES

| DATA13K WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)- | \$2.3 BN (| \$1982) ST \$4***** | ATE FUNDS | -1NFLATI(| DN 78-INTE | REST 10% | -CAP COST | \$5.117 B | 1 23-6 1******** | *EB-82 ******* |
|--|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| | | | C A == | SH FLOW S | UMMARY | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 3387 55•38 249•28 138•06 | 3387 52.11 266.73 139.00 | 3387 49•27 285•40 140•63 | 3387 46•43 305•38 141•79 | 3387 43•78 326•75 143•06 | 3387 41.29 349.62 144.36 | 3387 38•96 374•10 145•75 | 5223 63•57 400•29 254•47 | 5414 59•90 428•31 256•58 | 5605 55•83 458•29 255•86 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 467•6 32•0 | 470 • 8 35 • 0 | 476.3 38.1 | 480.2 41.6 | 484•5 45•4 | 488•9 49•6 | 493.6 54.1 | 1329.0 91.1 | 1389.0 99.4 | 1434.0 108.5 |
| 517 DPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 435.6 6.2 11.6 330.6 | 435.8 6.7 12.4 329.3 | 438.1 7.3 15.3 327.8 | 438.6 8.0 16.4 326.2 | 439.1 8.7 17.7 324.4 | 439.3 9.5 18.7 322.4 | 439.5 10.4 19.8 320.3 | 1237.9 11.4 21.0 982.5 | 1289.6 19.1 33.8 994.1 | 1325.5 20.9 36.3 988.8 |
| 546 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 99.5 | 100.8 | 102.3 | 104.0 | 105.8 | 107.7 | 109.9 | 245.8 | 280.8 | 321.3 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USE 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT ORAWDOWNS 243 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 99.5 0.0 326.5 8.1 | 100.8 0.0 381.2 29.3 | 102.3 0.0 344.2 11.2 | 104.0 0.0 1106.6 12.2 | 105.8 0.0 1370.3 10.6 | 107.7 0.0 1538.8 10.4 | 109.9 0.0 1405.6 12.3 | 245.8 0.0 142.8 128.0 | 280.8 0.0 0.0 24.7 | 321.3 0.0 0.0 42.8 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 434.2 | 511.3 | 457.7 | 1222.8 | 1486.6 | 1657.0 | 1527.8 | 516.5 | 305.5 | 364.2 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 412.6 8.1 13.5 | 467.2 29.3 14.8 | 430.2 11.2 16.3 | 1192.7 12.2 17.9 | 1456.3 10.6 19.7 | 1624.8 10.4 21.7 | 1491.6 12.3 23.9 | 362•3 128•0 26•2 | 90.9 24.7 53.9 | 99•2 42•8 59•3 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Term Debt 444 Cash Recovered | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | 0.0 0.Ú 0.0 | | | 136.0 0.0 136.0 | 162.8 0.0 162.8 |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 JTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 67.2 56.6 0.0 7567.9 | 73.4 79.7 0.0 8035.1 | 80.1 84.2 0.0 8465.3 | 87.4 89.1 0.0 9657.9 | 95.4 91.7 0.0 11114.2 | 104.1 93.4 0.0 12739.1 | 113.7 96.2 0.0 14230.7 | 191.3 146.6 0.0 14593.0 | 208.8 153.8 0.0 14683.8 | 227.8 177.6 0.0 14783.0 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 7691.7 | 9188.2 | 8629.6 | 9834.5 | 11301.4 | 12936.6 | 14440.5 | 14930.8 | 15046.4 | 15188.4 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 3532•4 242•8 123•9 3792•7 | 3532.4 343.7 153.1 4159.0 | 3532.4 446.0 164.3 4486.9 | 3532.4 550.0 176.6 5575.6 | 3532.4 655.7 187.1 6926.2 | 3532.4 763.4 197.6 8443.3 | 3532.4 873.3 209.9 9825.0 | 3532.4 1119.1 337.8 9941.5 | 3532.4 1263.9 362.6 9887.6 | 3532.4 1422.4 405.4 9828.2 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDDWN \$1982 543 Cum. Debt Drawwddwn \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 131.0 1930.5 1.25 | 142.9 2073.4 1.25 | 120.6 2194.0 1.25 | 352.4 2556.3 1.25 | 419.4 2975.7 1.25 | 440.1 3415.8 1.25 | 375.7 3791.5 1.25 | 35•7 3827•2 1•22 | 0.0 3827.2 1.22 | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 |

\$2.3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) MINIMUM STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO **7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST** .





| DATA10K WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)- | ******** \$2.3 BN (******* | ********** \$1982) ST ******** | ********** ATE FUNDS ******* | -INFLATI ******* | *********** JN 7%-INT[******** | ********* REST 10%- | ********* CAP COST ******* | \$5.117 B | ********** 23-F ******** | ******** EB-82 ***** |
|---|---|---|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2003 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | TOTAL |
| | | | C A = = | SH FLOW | SUMMARY | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 6092 48•42 490•37 237•42 | 6147 45.23 524.69 237.31 | 6250 41•99 561•42 235•75 | 6472 38•32 600•72 230•18 | 6544 35•80 642•77 230•09 | 6616 33.46 687.77 230.15 | 6638 31.55 735.91 232.21 | 6660 29•75 787•42 234•23 | 6682 28.07 842.54 236.49 | 104826 0.00 0.00 0.00 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 1446.3 118.4 | 1458.6 | 1473.3 141.0 | 1489.6 | 1505.6 168.0 | 1522.6 183.4 | 1541.3 200.1 | 1559.8 218.4 | 1580.1 238.4 | 21929.6 2202.0 |
| 517 DPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 1327.8 22.8 40.5 982.8 | 1329.4 24.9 44.2 976.3 | 1332.3 27.1 49.3 969.1 | 1335.7 29.6 55.2 961.2 | 1337.6 32.3 59.8 952.5 | 1339.2 35.3 64.4 943.0 | 1341.2 38.5 69.6 932.5 | 1341.4 42.0. 73.4 920.9 | 1341.7 45.9 77.5 908.2 | 19727.6 412.4 746.6 14428.0 |
| 543 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 327.3 | 333.8 | 341.0 | 348.9 | 357.5 | 367.1 | 377.6 | 389.2 | 401.9 | 4965.4 |
| 543 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 543 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEST DRAWDOWNS 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 327.3 0.0 0.0 36.4 | 333.8 0.0 0.0 51.3 | 341.0 0.0 0.0 59.3 | 348.9 0.0 0.0 45.8 | 357.5 0.0 0.0 45.9 | 367.1 0.0 0.0 52.0 | 377.6 0.0 0.0 37.7 | 389•2 0•0 0•0 41•2 | 401.9 0.0 0.0 44.9 | 4965.4 3532.4 10107.8 819.7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 363.7 | 385.0 | 400.2 | 394.7 | 403.4 | 419.0 | 415.3 | 430.3 | 446.8 | 19425.3 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 108.2 36.4 65.2 | 118.1 51.3 71.8 | 128.9 59.3 78.9 | 140.7 45.8 86.8 | 153.6 45.9 95.5 | 167.6 52.0 105.1 | 182.9 37.7 115.6 | 199.7 41.2 127.1 | 217.9 44.9 139.9 | 16200.7 819.7 1165.5 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Tërm debt 444 CASH Recovered | 153.8 0.0 153.8 | 143.9 0.0 143.9 | 133.1 0.0 133.1 | 121.3 0.0 121.3 | 108.4 0.0 108.4 | 94•4 0•0 94•4 | 79.1 0.0 79.1 | 62•4 0•0 62•4 | 44.1 0.0 44.1 | 1239.3 0.0 1239.3 |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 271 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 248.7 193.2 0.0 14891.3 15333.1 | 271.4 221.7 0.0 15009.4 15502.5 | 296.2 256.2 0.0 15138.3 ===== 15690.7 | 323.3 274.9 0.0 15279.0 15877.2 | 352.8 291.2 0.0 15432.6 16076.6 | 385.1 310.9 0.0 15600.2 16296.2 | 420.3 313.4 0.0 15783.2 ======== 16516.8 | 458.7 316.2 0.0 15982.8 16757.6 | 500.6 319.2 0.0 16200.7 17020.5 | 500.6 319.2 0.0 16200.7 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT DUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT DUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 3532.4 1595.9 441.8 9763.0 | 3532•4 1785•8 493•1 9691•2 | 3532.4 1993.7 552.4 9612.3 | 3532.4 2221.2 598.2 9525.4 | 3532.4 2470.3 644.0 9429.9 | 3532.4 2743.0 696.0 9324.8 | 3532.4 3041.5 733.7 9209.2 | 3532.4 3368.3 774.8 9082.1 | 3532.4 3726.1 819.7 8942.2 | 3532.4 3726.1 819.7 8942.2 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDDWN \$1982 543 CUM. DEBT DRAWWDDWN \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 | 0.0 3827.2 1.25 | 3827.2 3827.2 0.00 |

\$2.3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) MINIMUM STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST



Sheet 3 of 3

\$1.8 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS TABLE 18.4.8



| CATAIOK WATANA-DC | «************************************* | ********* \$1.3 BN (* ******* | ********* 61982) ST ******* | ******** ATE FUNDS ******* | ********* - 1 NF LAT 10 ******* | ******** N 7%-INTE ****** | ******** REST 10%- ******* | ******** CAP COST ******* | ******** \$5.117 BN ******* | ******** 23-F ***** | ****** EB-82 ***** | |
|--|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| | | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | |
| | | | | CA | SH FLOW S | UMMARY | | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MI 466 INFLATION IND 520 PRICE-MILLS | LLS EX | 0.00 125.72 0.00 | 0.00 135.59 0.00 | 0 0.00 145.08 0.00 | 0.00 155.24 0.00 | 0.00 166.10 0.00 | 0 0.00 177.73 0.00 | 0.00 190.17 0.00 | 0.00 203.48 0.00 | 3387 50.85 217.73 110.73 | 3387 62•99 232•97 146•75 | |
| 510 REVENUE 173 LESS OPERATIN | G COSTS | | | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 | 375.0 | 497.0 29.3 | |
| 517 DPERATING INC 214 ADD INTEREST 550 LESS INTEREST 391 LESS INTEREST | DME EARNED DN FUNDS ON SHORT TERM DEBT ON LONG TERM DEBT | | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | | 348.1 0.0 0.0 411.1 | 467.7 5.6 16.1 444.4 | |
| 548 NET EARNINGS | FROM OPERS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -63.0 | 12.8 | |
| CASH SOU 543 CASH INCOME F 446 STATE CONTRIB 143 LONG TERM DEB 248 WORCAP DEBT D | RCE AND USE ROM OPERS UTION T DRAWDOWNS RAWDOWNS | 0.0 403.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 472.7 0.0 0.0 | 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 499.5 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 797.9 140.4 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 1564.4 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 1417.6 0.0 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 988 • 6 0 • 0 | -63.0 0.0 396.1 98.0 | 12.8 0.0 229.7 17.7 | |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCE | S OF FUNDS | 403.7 | 472.7 | 479.7 | 499.5 | 938.3 | 1564.4 | 1417.6 | 988.6 | 431.1 | 260.2 | |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL 448 LESS WURCAP A 260 LESS DEBT REP | EXPENDITURE ND FUNDS AYMENTS | 403.7 0.0 0.0 | 472.7 0.0 0.0 | 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 499.5 0.0 0.0 | 938.3 0.0 0.0 | 1564•4 0•0 0•0 | 1417.6 0.0 0.0 | 988•6 0•0 0•0 | 333.1 98.0 0.0 | 259•2 17•7 16•4 | |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(249 SHDRT TERM DE 444 CASH RECOVERE | DEFICIT) BT D | | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | -33•1 33•1 0•0 | |
| BALANCE 225 RESERVE AND C 371 DTHER WORKING 454 CASH SURPLUS 370 CUM. CAPITAL | SHEET ONT. FUND CAPITAL RETAINED EXPENDITURE | 0.0 0.0 0.0 403.7 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 876.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1356.1 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1855.6 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 2794.0 | 0.0 0.0 4358.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 5775.9 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 6764.6 | 56.5 41.5 0.0 7097.7 | 61.6 54.1 0.0 7356.9 | |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLO | YED | 403.7 | 876.4 | 1356.1 | 1855.6 | 2794.0 | 4358.4 | 5775.9 | 6764.6 | 7195.7 | 7472.6 | |
| 461 STATE CONTRIB 462 Retained Earn 555 Debt Dutstand 554 Debt Dutstand | UTION Ings Ing-Short Term Ing-Long Term | 403.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 876.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1356.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1855.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 2653.5 0.0 0.0 140.4 | 2653.5 0.0 0.0 1704.8 | 2653.5 0.0 0.0 3122.4 | 2653.5 0.0 0.0 4111.0 | 2653.5 -63.0 161.0 4444.1 | 2653.5 -50.2 211.8 4657.4 | |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT D 543 CUM. DEBT D 519 DEBT SERVICE | RAWWDOWN \$1982 Rawwdown \$1982 Cover | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 | 84.5 84.5 0.00 | 880.2 964.7 0.00 | 745.4 1710.1 0.00 | 485•8 2196•0 0•00 | 181.9 2377.9 0.85 | 98.6 2476.5 0.99 | |

\$1.8 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST



Sheet 1 of 3

| ATA10K WATANA-0C (ON LINE 1993-20 | ************** 02)-\$1.d BN (****** | ********* \$1982) ST ******* | ******** ATE FUNDS | -INFLATIC | N 78-INTE | REST 10%- | -CAP COST | \$5.117 BM | xxxxxxxxxx 1 23-F xxxxxxxxxxx | ******** E8-82 ***** |
|---|--|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| | | | C A = = | SH FLOW S | | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 460 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 3387 61.36 249.28 152.95 | 3387 69.57 265.73 185.56 | 3387 65•59 285•40 187•18 | 3387 61.68 305.38 188.34 | 3387 58.03 326.75 189.61 | 3387 54.61 349.62 190.92 | 3387 51.40 374.10 192.30 | 5223 63•57 400•29 254•47 | 5414 59•90 428•31 256•58 | 5605 62•52 458•29 286•53 |
| 515 REVENUE 179 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 518.0 32.0 | 628•4 35•0 | 633.9 38.1 | 637.9 41.0 | 642•2 45•4 | 646•6 49•6 | 651.3 54.1 | 1329.0 91.1 | 1389.0 | 1605.9 108.5 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM D 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DE | 486.0 6.2 EBT 21.2 BT 442.8 | 593.5 6.7 24.2 441.0 | 595.8 7.3 27.1 439.0 | 596.2 8.0 28.2 436.8 | 596.7 8.7 29.5 434.4 | 597.0 9.5 30.5 431.8 | 597.2 10.4 31.6 428.9 | 1237•9 11•4 32•8 1088•3 | 1289.6 19.1 45.6 1111.8 | 1497.4 20.9 48.4 1105.3 |
| 549 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 23.2 | 135.0 | 137.0 | 139.2 | 141.6 | 144.3 | 147.2 | 128.1 | 151.4 | 364.5 |
| 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 28.2 0.0 386.1 8.1 | 135.0 0.0 363.6 29.3 | 137.0 0.0 324.8 11.2 | 139.2 0.0 1085.4 12.2 | 141.6 0.0 1346.9 10.6 | 144.3 0.0 1513.1 10.4 | 147.2 0.0 1377.3 12.3 | 128.1 0.0 269.3 128.0 | 151.4 0.0 0.0 24.7 | 364.5 0.0 0.0 42.8 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 422.4 | 527.9 | 473.0 | 1235.8 | 1499.1 | 1667.8 | 1536.7 | 525.4 | 176.1 | 407.3 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 443 LESS WURCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 418•2 8•1 18•0 | 478.8 29.3 19.8 | 440.0 11.2 21.8 | 1200.6 12.2 24.0 | 1462.1 10.6 26.4 | 1628.3 10.4 29.0 | 1492.5 12.3 32.0 | 362.3 128.0 35.1 | 90.9 24.7 64.1 | 99•2 42•8 70•5 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 SHORT TERM DEBT 444 CASH RECOVERED | -22.0 22.0 0.0 | | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | | -3.6 3.6 0.0 | 194.8 -58.7 136.1 |
| 225 3ESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 67.2 56.6 0.0 7775.1 | 73.4 79.7 0.0 8253.9 | 80.1 34.2 0.0 8693.9 | 87.4 89.1 0.0 9894.5 | 95.4 91.7 0.0 11356.6 | 104.1 93.4 0.0 12984.9 | 113.7 96.2 0.0 14477.4 | 191.3 146.6 0.0 14839.7 | 208.8 153.8 0.0 14930.5 | 227.8 177.6 0.0 15029.7 |
| . 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 7893•9 | 8407.0 | 8858.3 | 10071.1 | 11543.7 | 13182.5 | 14637.2 | 15177.5 | 15293.1 | 15435.1 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 2653.5 -22.0 241.9 5025.5 | 2653.5 113.0 271.2 5369.2 | 2653.5 250.1 232.4 5672.2 | 2653.5 389.3 294.7 6733.6 | 2653.5 530.9 305.2 8054.1 | 2653•5 675•1 315•7 9538•1 | 2653.5 822.3 328.0 10883.4 | 2653.5 950.4 455.9 11117.6 | 2653.5 1101.8 484.3 11053.5 | 2653.5 1330.2 468.4 10983.0 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982 543 Cum• Debt Drawwdown \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 154.9 2631.3 1.02 | 136.3 2767.7 1.25 | 113.8 2881.5 1.25 | 355.4 3236.9 1.25 | 412.2 3649.1 1.25 | 432.8 4081.8 1.25 | 368 • 1 4450 • 0 1 • 25 | 67.3 4517.3 1.08 | 0.0 4517.3 1.07 | 0.0 4517.3 1.25 |

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\$1.8 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST



Sheet 2 of 3

| 047410K WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002) 247410K WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002) | ********** -\$1.8 BN (******* | \$1982) ST | ********* ATE FUNDS ***** | ********* 5 - 1 NFLATI ******* | ********** DN 72-INTE ******* | ********* REST 10* ****** | ********** -CAP COST ******** | \$4******** \$5.117 BN ******** | *************************************** | ********* *EB-82 ******* |
|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | TOTAL |
| | | | C / | ASH FLOW S | SUMMARY | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PEICE-MILLS 465 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 6092 53•98 490•37 264•68 | 6147 50•38 524•69 264•32 | 6250 46•72 561•42 262•31 | 6472 42•59 600•72 255•84 | 6544 39•74 642•77 255•46 | 6616 37•11 687•77 255•25 | 6638 34.95 735.91 257.23 | 6660 32.91 787.42 259.16 | 6682 31.02 842.54 261.34 | 104826 0.00 0.00 0.00 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 1512.3 118.4 | 1624.7 129.2 | 1639.3 141.0 | 1655.7 | 1671.6 | 1688.6 | 1707.3 200.1 | 1725.9 218.4 | 1746.1 238.4 | 24625.8 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 1493.9 22.8 46.8 1098.3 | 1495.5 24.9 50.5 1090.5 | 1498.3 27.1 55.6 1082.0 | 1501.8 29.6 61.5 1072.6 | 1503.6 32.3 66.1 1062.3 | 1505.3 35.3 70.7 1050.9 | 1507.2 38.5 75.9 1038.4 | 1507.5 42.0 79.7 1024.7 | 1507.8 45.9 83.8 1009.6 | 22423.8 412.4 925.8 16744.9 |
| 543 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 371.5 | 379.3 | 387.8 | 397.2 | 407.5 | 418.9 | 431.4 | 445.1 | 460.3 | 5165.4 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USE 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 245 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 371.5 0.0 0.0 36.4 | 379.3 0.0 0.0 51.3 | 337.8 0.0 0.0 59.3 | 397.2 0.0 0.0 45.8 | 407.5 0.0 0.0 45.9 | 418.9 0.0 0.0 52.0 | 431.4 0.0 0.0 37.7 | 445.1 0.0 0.0 41.2 | 460.3 0.0 0.0 44.9 | 5165•4 2653•5 11403•2 819•7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 408.0 | 430.5 | 447.1 | 443.0 | 453.4 | 470.8 | 469.1 | 486.3 | 505.2 | 20041.9 |
| 329 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS | 108.2 36.4 77.6 | 118.1 51.3 85.3 | 128.9 59.3 93.9 | 140.7 45.8 103.2 | 153.6 45.9 113.6 | 167.6 52.0 124.9 | 182.9 37.7 137.4 | 199.7 41.2 151.2 | 217.9 44.9 166.3 | 16447•4 819•7 1410•7 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Term Debt 444 Cash Recovered | 185.7 0.0 185.7 | 175.8 0.0 175.8 | 165.0 0.0 165.0 | 153.3 0.0 153.3 | 140.4 0.0 140.4 | 126.4 0.0 126.4 | 111.0 0.0 111.0 | 94.3 0.0 94.3 | 76.1 0.0 76.1 | 1364•1 0•0 1364•1 |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 248.7 193.2 0.0 15138.0 | 271.4 221.7 0.0 15256.1 | 296.2 256.2 0.0 15385.0 | 323.3 274.9 0.0 15525.7 | 352.8 291.2 0.0 15679.3 | 385.1 310.9 0.0 15846.9 | 420.3 313.4 0.0 16029.9 | 458.7 316.2 0.0 16229.5 | 500.6 319.2 0.0 16447.4 | 500.6 319.2 0.0 16447.4 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 15579.8 | 15749.2 | 15937.4 | 16123.9 | 16323.3 | 16542.9 | 16763.5 | 17004.3 | 17267.2 | 17267.2 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT DUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT DUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 2653.5 1516.0 504.8 10905.4 | 2653.5 1719.5 556.1 10820.1 | 2653.5 1942.3 615.3 10726.2 | 2653.5 2186.3 661.1 10622.9 | 2653.5 2453.4 707.0 10509.4 | 2653.5 2745.9 759.0 10384.4 | 2653.5 3066.3 796.7 10247.0 | 2653.5 3417.1 837.8 10095.8 | 2653.5 3801.3 882.7 9929.6 | 2653.5 3801.3 882.7 9929.6 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982 543 Cum• Debt Drawwdown \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 0.0 4517.3 1.25 | 0.0 4517.3 1.25 | 4517.3 4517.3 0.00 |

\$1.8 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST



Sheet 3 of 3

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| ************************************** | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
| | | | C/ | SH FLOW S | UMMARY | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GHH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 0.00 126.72 0.00 | 0.00 135.59 0.00 | 0 0.00 145.08 0.00 | 0.00 155.24 0.00 | 0 0.00 166.10 0.00 | 0.00 177.73 0.00 | 0.00 190.17 0.00 | 0.00 203.48 0.00 | 3387 30.49 217.73 66.39 | 3387 34.60 232.97 80.61 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 224.9 26.9 | 273.0 29.3 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 198.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 243.7 5.6 9.8 0.0 |
| 548 NET EARNINGS FROM DPERS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 198.0 | 239.5 |
| 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAHDOWNS 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 0 • 0 403 • 7 0 • 0 0 • 0 | 0•0 472•7 0•0 0•0 | 0.0 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 499.5 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 938.3 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 1550.4 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 1247.1 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 676.4 0.0 0.0 | 198.0 333.1 0.0 98.0 | 239.5 229.7 0.0 17.7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 403.7 | 472.7 | 479.7 | 499.5 | 938.3 | 1550.4 | 1247.1 | 676.4 | 629.1 | 487.0 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS 395 LESS PAYMENT TO STATE | 403°7 0°0 0°0 0°0 | 472.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 479-7 0-0 0-0 0-0 | 499.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 938.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1550.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1247.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 676.4 0.0 0.0 | 333.1 98.0 0.0 198.0 | 259.2 17.7 0.0 210.0 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Tern Debt 444 Cash Recovered | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 Other Working Capital 454 Cash Surplus Retained 370 Cum. Capital Expenditure | 0.0 0.0 0.0 403.7 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 876.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1356.1 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1855.6 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 2794.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 4344.3 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 5591.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 6267.8 | 56.5 41.5 0.0 6600.9 | 61.6 54.1 0.0 6860.1 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 403.7 | 876.4 | 1356.1 | 1855.6 | 2794.0 | 4344.3 | 5591.4 | 6267.8 | 6698.9 | 6975.8 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT DUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT DUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 403 • 7 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 | 876.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1356•1 0•0 0•0 0•0 | 1855.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 2794.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 4344.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 5591.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 6267.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 6600.9 0.0 98.0 0.0 | 6830.6 29.5 115.7 0.0 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWNDOWN \$1982 543 Cum. Debt Drawndown \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 | | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0•0 0•0 0•00 | | 0.0 0.0 0.00 |

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SENATE BILL 646 100% STATE WITH 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST

| \$ | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| | | | C | ASH FLOW | SUMMARY | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 3387 34.64 249.28 86.35 | 3387 34•56 266•73 92•17 | 3387 34.69 285.40 99.01 | 3387 34.62 305.38 105.72 | 3387 34•56 326•75 112•91 | 3387 34•48 349•62 120•53 | 3387 34.39 374.10 128.66 | 5223 32.27 400.29 129.17 | 5414 32.73 428.31 140.17 | 5605 31.90 458.29 146.19 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS DPERATING COSTS | 292.5 32.0 | 312.2 35.0 | 335.3 30.1 | 358.1 41.6 | 382.4 | 408.2 | 435.8 54.1 | 674.6 91.1 | 758.8 99.4 | 819.3 108.5 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 260.4 6.2 11.6 0.0 | 277.2 6.7 12.4 0.0 | 297.2 7.3 15.3 0.0 | 316.4 8.0 16.4 0.0 | 337.0 8.7 17.7 0.0 | 358.6 9.5 18.7 0.0 | 381.6 10.4 19.8 0.0 | 583.5 11.4 21.0 0.0 | 659.4 19.1 33.8 0.0 | 710.8 20.9 36.3 0.0 |
| 548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 255.0 | 271.6 | 289.2 | 308.0 | 328.1 | 349.5 | 372.3 | 573.9 | 644.8 | 695.5 |
| 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAHDOWNS 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAHDOWNS | 255.0 363.1 0.0 8.1 | 271.6 382.1 0.0 29.3 | 289.2 303.8 0.0 11.2 | 308.0 1028.3 0.0 12.2 | 328.1 1177.5 0.0 10.6 | 349.5 1204.8 0.0 10.4 | 372.3 913.1 0.0 12.3 | 573.9 303.0 0.0 128.0 | 644•8 0•0 0•0 24•7 | 695+5 0+0 0+0 42+8 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 626.2 | 683.0 | 604.2 | 1348.6 | 1516.1 | 1564.7 | 1297.7 | 1004.8 | 669.5 | 738.3 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS 395 LESS PAYMENT TO STATE | 395.3 8.1 0.0 222.9 | 417.2 29.3 0.0 236.5 | 34 2.1 11.2 0.0 250.9 | 1070.1 12.2 0.0 266.2 | 1223.2 10.6 0.0 282.4 | 1254.6 10.4 0.0 299.6 | 967.5 12.3 0.0 317.9 | 362.3 128.0 0.0 514.5 | 90°9 24°7 0°0 553°9 | 99•2 42•8 0•0 596•3 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Term Debt 444 CASH Recovered | | | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 67•2 56•6 0•0 7255•4 | 73.4 79.7 0.0 7672.6 | 80.1 84.2 0.0 8014.7 | 87.4 89.1 0.0 9084.8 | 95.4 91.7 0.0 10308.0 | 104.1 93.4 0.0 11562.6 | 113.7 96.2 0.0 12530.1 | 191.3 146.6 0.0 12892.5 | 208.8 153.8 0.0 12983.3 | 227.8 177.6 0.0 13082.5 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 7379.2 | 7825.7 | 8179.0 | 9261.4 | 10495.1 | 11760.2 | 12740.0 | 13230.3 | 13345.9 | 13487.9 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT DUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 7193.7 61.6 123.9 0.0 | 7575.8 96.8 153.1 0.0 | 7879.6 135.1 164.3 0.0 | 8907.9 176.9 176.6 0.0 | 10085.4 222.6 187.1 0.0 | 11290.3 272.4 197.6 0.0 | 12203.4 326.7 209.9 0.0 | 12506.4 386.1 337.8 0.0 | 12506.4 477.0 362.6 0.0 | 12506•4 576•1 405•4 0•0 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDDWN \$1982 543 Cum. Debt Drawwddwn \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0•0 0•0 0•00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0•0 0•0 0•00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0•0 0•0 0•00 |

SENATE BILL 646 100% STATE WITH 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST

Sheet 2 of 3

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|--|-----------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | TOTAL |
| | | | C . | ASH FLOW | | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 6092 29.67 490.37 145.50 | 6147 29•70 524•69 155•81 | 6250 29.53 561.42 165.77 | 6472 28.84 600.72 173.22 | 6544 28.79 642.77 185.08 | 6616 28.75 687.77 197.73 | 6638 28.93 735.91 212.90 | 6660 29•08 787•42 228•96 | 6682 29•23 842•54 246•28 | 104826 0.00 0.00 0.00 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 886.3 118.4 | 957.7 129.2 | 1036.0 141.0 | 1121.0 | 1211.1 168.0 | 1308.1 | 1413.1 200.1 | 1524.8 218.4 | 1645.5 238.4 | 16378.6 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | 767.9 22.8 40.5 0.0 | 828.4 24.9 44.2 0.0 | 895.0 27.1 49.3 0.0 | 967.1 29.6 55.2 0.0 | 1043.1 32.3 59.8 0.0 | 1124.7 35.3 64.4 0.0 | 1213.0 38.5 69.6 0.0 | 1306.4 42.0 73.4 0.0 | 1407.2 45.9 77.5 0.0 | 14176.6 412.4 746.6 0.0 |
| 548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 750.1 | 809.1 | 872.8 | 941.5 | 1015.6 | 1095.6 | 1181.9 | 1275.0 | 1375.5 | 13842.4 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USE 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERH DEBT DRAWDOWNS 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 750+1 0+0 0+0 36+4 | 809•1 0•0 0•0 51•3 | 872+8 0+0 0+0 59+3 | 941.5 0.0 0.0 45.8 | 1015.6 0.0 0.0 45.9 | 1095.6 0.0 0.0 52.0 | 1181.9 0.0 0.0 37.7 | 1275.0 0.0 0.0 41.2 | 1375.5 0.0 0.0 44.9 | 13842.4 12506.4 0.0 819.7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 786.5 | 860.4 | 932.1 | 987.3 | 1061.5 | 1147.5 | 1219.6 | 1316.2 | 1420.5 | 27168.5 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS 395 LESS PAYMENT TO STATE | 108.2 36.4 0.0 641.9 | 118.1 51.3 0.0 691.0 | 128.9 59.3 0.0 743.9 | 140.7 45.8 0.0 800.8 | 153.6 45.9 0.0 862.0 | 167.6 52.0 0.0 928.0 | 182.9 37.7 0.0 999.0 | 199°7 41°2 0°0 1075°4 | 217.9 44.9 0.0 1157.6 | 14500-2 819-7 0-0 11848-5 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Term Debt 444 Cash Recovered | | | | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. EUND 371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 248.7 193.2 0.0 13190.7 | 271 • 4 221 • 7 0 • 0 13308 • 9 | 296.2 256.2 0.0 13437.8 | 323.3 274.9 0.0 13578.5 | 352.8 291.2 0.0 13732.1 | 385.1 310.9 0.0 13899.7 | 420.3 313.4 0.0 14082.6 | 458.7 316.2 0.0 14282.3 | 500.6 319.2 0.0 14500.2 | 500 •6 319 •2 0 • 0 1 4 5 0 0 • 2 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 13632.6 | 13801.9 | 13990.2 | 14176.7 | 14376.1 | 14595.7 | 14816.3 | 15057.1 | 15319.9 | 15319.9 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT DUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT DUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 12506.4 684.4 441.8 0.0 | 12506.4 802.5 493.1 0.0 | 12506.4 931.4 552.4 0.0 | 12506.4 1072.1 598.2 0.0 | 12506.4 1225.7 644.0 0.0 | 12506•4 1393•3 696•0 0•0 | 12506.4 1576.3 733.7 0.0 | 12506.4 1775.9 774.8 0.0 | 12506.4 1993.8 819.7 0.0 | 12506•4 1993•8 819•7 0•0 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982 543 Cum. Debt Drawwdown \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 | | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 |

SENATE BILL 646 100% STATE WITH 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST

| NARARAANAANAANAANAANAANAANAANAANAANAANAA | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
| | | | C. | ASH FLOW | | | | | | |
| 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 520 PRICE-MILLS | 0 0.00 126.72 0.00 | 0 0.00 135.59 0.00 | 0 0.00 145.08 0.00 | 0.00 155.24 0.00 | 0.00 166.10 0.00 | 0.00 177.73 0.00 | 0 0.00 190.17 0.00 | 0 0.00 203.48 0.00 | 3387 44.08 217.73 95.97 | 3387 51.98 232.97 121.10 |
| 516 REVENUE 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 325.0 | 410.1 29.3 |
| 517 OPERATING INCOME 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT | | | | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | | | 298.2 0.0 0.0 154.0 | 380 • 8 5 • 6 9 • 8 187 • 3 |
| 548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 144.2 | 189.4 |
| CASH SOURCE AND USE 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 446 STATE CONTRIBUTION 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS | 0.0 403.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 472.7 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 479.7 0.0 0.0 | 0 • 0 4 99 • 5 0 • 0 0 • 0 | 0.0 938.3 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 1550.4 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 462.4 784.7 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 754.9 0.0 | 144.2 0.0 333.1 98.0 | 189.4 0.0 229.7 17.7 |
| 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS | 403.7 | 472.7 | 479.7 | 499.5 | 938.3 | 1550.4 | 1247.1 | 754.9 | 575.3 | 436.8 |
| 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS NORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS 395 LESS PAYMENT TO STATE | 403.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 472.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 479.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 499.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 938.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1550.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1247.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 754.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 333.1 98.0 0.0 144.2 | 259.2 17.7 6.9 153.0 |
| 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 249 Short Term Debt 444 Cash Recovered | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 |
| 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE | 0.0 0.0 0.0 403.7 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 876.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1356.1 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 1855.6 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 2794.0 | 0.0 0.0 4344.3 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 5591.4 | 0.0 0.0 0.0 6346.3 | 56.5 41.5 0.0 6679.4 | 61.6 54.1 0.0 6938.6 |
| 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED | 403.7 | 876.4 | 1356.1 | 1855.6 | 2794.0 | 4344.3 ======== | 5591.4 | 6346.3 | 6777.4 | 7054.3 |
| 461 STATE CONTRIBUTION 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 555 DEBT DUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM | 403.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 876-4 0-0 0-0 0-0 | 1356.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 1855.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 2794.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 | 4344°3 0°0 0°0 0°0 | 4806.7 0.0 0.0 784.7 | 4806.7 0.0 0.0 1539.5 | 4806.7 0.0 98.0 1872.6 | 4806.7 36.4 115.7 2095.4 |
| 542 ANNUAL DEBT ORAHWDOWN \$1982 543 Cum. Debt Drawwdown \$1982 519 Debt Service Cover | | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0.0 0.0 0.00 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 | 0•0 0•0 0•00 | 0 • 0 0 • 0 0 • 00 | 412.6 412.6 0.00 | 371.0 783.6 0.00 | 153.0 936.5 1.94 | 98.6 1035.1 1.94 |

SENATE BILL 646 "MINIMUM" APPROPRIATION OF \$3.0 BILLION WITH 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST



Sheet 1 of 3

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DATA10K2 WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)-\$3.0 BN(\$1982) BILL646 FUNDS-INFLATION 7%-INTEREST 10%-CAPCOST \$5.117 BN 2-MAR-82 1997 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 CASH FLOW SUMMARY ===(\$H1LL10N)==== 3387 3387 3387 3387 3387 3387 5223 5414 5605 59•73 ENERGY GWH 3387 73 42.90 374.10 45.17 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 466 INFLATION INDEX 50.47 48.94 266.73 130.55 47.73 46.41 44.00 63.06 249.28 285.40 326.75 349.62 400.29 428.31 458.29 273.72 125.82 136.22 141.71 147.60 160.51 252.41 256.58 520 PRICE-MILLS 153.84 --INCOME--------442.1 479.9 499.9 521.0 1389.0 1534.1 516 REVENUE 426.1 461.4 543.6 1318.2 35.0 54.1 99.4 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS 32.0 38.1 41.6 45.4 49.6 91.1 108.5 489.5 517 OPERATING INCOME 394.1 407.2 423.2 438.3 454.5 471.4 1227.1 1289.6 1425.6 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT 6.2 6.7 7.3 8.0 8.7 9.5 10.4 11.4 19.1 20.9 11.6 15.3 17.7 10.7 19.8 16.4 41.3 897.7 186.6 185.8 183.0 180.7 922.1 184.1 926.5 185.0 181.9 ____ 215.7 202.1 230.3 262.5 280.3 299.4 319.9 348.5 483.0 548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS 245.8 548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 202.1 215.7 230.3 245.8 280.3 299.4 319.9 348.5 483.0 262.5 STATE CONTRIBUTION 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 446 1175.2 1613.5 0.0 143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS 386.1 443.7 409.7 1442.0 1483.1 303.0 0.0 29.3 10.4 24.7 248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS 8.1 11.2 12.2 10.6 12.3 128.0 42.8 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS 596.3 688.7 1433.3 1715.0 1904.2 1794.8 750.8 525.9 549 651.2 373.2 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS 395 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS 395 LESS PAYMENT TO STATE 418.2 90.924.7 99.2 478.8 448.0 1217.1 1663.3 1537.5 362.3 1487.6 10.6 42.8 8.4 9.2 48.3 7.6 10.1 11.1 12.2 13.5 14.8 43.9 162.3 172.2 193.9 218.3 231.6 245.7 264.5 ____ _ _ _ _ - - - <u>-</u> ----____ ----141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 0.0 0.0 -50.8 50.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0' 249 SHORT TERM DEBT 0.0 50.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -50.8 444 CASH RECOVERED 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ----BALANCE SHEET-----225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL 80.1 87.4 104.1 191.3 67.2 73.4 95.4 113.7 208.8 227.8 84.2 93.4 177.6 56.6 89.1 146.6 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.Ō 0.0 0.0 0.0 454 8283.6 14551.4 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 7356.8 7835.6 9500.7 10988.3 12651.6 14189.1 14642.3 14741.4 ******** 3333333 ****** -----******* ---------****** ******* *** 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED 14398.9 14889.2 15004.8 7480.7 7988.7 8448.0 9677.3 11175.4 12849.1 15146.8 ******* ***** -----....... ******* ***** ***** **461 STATE CONTRIBUTION** 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 119.6 479.9 405.8 762.2 **462 RETAINED EARNINGS** 167.1 219.1 275.9 337.9 563.9 76.2

> SENATE BILL 646 "MINIMUM" APPROPRIATION OF \$3.0 BILLION WITH 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST

164.3

143.6

2.14

1499.9

3309.7

176.6

384.8

2.21

1884-8

4474.9

187.1

441.3

2.29

2326.0

5905.7

197.6

461.5

2.38

2787.5

8976.6

396.4

3184.0

2.47

9264.7

3259.6

75.7

1.33

7506-9

153.1

2909.2

166.3

2.07

1356.4

123.9

2473.9

154.9

2.00

1190.0



405.4

0.0

1.45

9172.5

3259.6

413.4

0.0

1.31

9220.8

3259.6

Sheet 2 of 3

543 CUM.

555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM

542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982

519 DEBT SERVICE COVER

DEBT DRAWWDOWN \$1982

554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERH

DATA 10K2 WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)-\$3.0 BN(\$1982) BILL646 FUNDS-INFLATION 7%-INTEREST 10%-CAPCOST \$5.117 BN 2-HAR-82 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL CASH FLOW SUMMARY ===(\$MILLION)===== 0 6472 65 73 ENERGY GWH 521 REAL PRICE-MILLS 6092 6147 48.59 6250 6616 39.42 687.77 6638 6544 6660 35.72 104826 50.93 46.11 43.04 41.16 36.87 0.00 600.72 466 INFLATION INDEX 490.37 524.69 561.42 642.77 735.91 842.54 0.00 520 PRICE-MILLS 249.74 254.95 258.86 258.52 264.55 271.12 280.46 290.31 300-99 0.00 -----INCOHE------REVENUE 1673.0 1521.3 1567.0 1617.7 1731.1 1793.6 1933.3 2011.1 516 1861.6 24060.4 183.4 170 LESS OPERATING COSTS 118.4 218.4 129.2 141.0 153.9 168.0 200.1 238.4 2202.0 **517 OPERATING INCOME** 1402.9 1437.8 1476.7 1519.1 1563.1 1610.3 1661.4 1714.9 1772.7 21858.4 214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS 550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT 391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT 22.8 24.9 27.1 29.6 32.3 35.3 38.5 42.0 45.9 412.4 49.3 55.2 44.2 64.4 69.6 899.7 917.3 911.9 906-1 892.6 876.3 12386.5 884.8 866.8 856.5 ____ ----467.9 548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS 506.6 548.4 593.8 643.0 696.3 754.1 816.7 884.6 9132.6 -----CASH SOURCE AND USE----548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS 546 STATE_CONTRIBUTION 467.9 548.4 593.8 696.3 0.0 754.1 884.6 9132.6 506.6 643.0 816.7 0.0 0.0 ŏ.ŏ 0.0 ō.ŏ 0.0 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS 143 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9358.6 51.3 59.3 45.9 248 36.4 45.8 52.0 37.7 41.2 44.9 819.7 504.3 549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS 557.8 607.7 639.6 688.9 791.8 929.5 24117.6 748.3 857.9 320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS 260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS 217.9 44.9 113.9 153.6 108.2 118.1 128.9 140.7 167.6 182.9 199.7 16159.1 45.9 52.0 41.2 103.5 513.5 36.4 53.1 37.7 45.8 58.4 64.3 70.7 77.8 85.6 94.1 907-6 LESS PAYMENT TO STATE 306.5 330.0 355.2 477.0 552.0 6231.2 395 411.6 382.4 443.1 0.0 141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 249 SHORT TERM DEBT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 444 CASH RECOVERED 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND 371 OTHER HORKING CAPITAL 500.6 296.2 352.8 500.6 248.7 193.2 271.4 385.1 310.9 420.3 458.7 323.3 274.9 313.4 316.2 319.2 454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED 370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 16159.1 14849.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15558.6 15741.6 15941.2 16159.1 15096.7 15237.4 15391.0 14967.8 ******* ******* 出去不定点之意 ****** ****** ****** ******* ***** ****** ******* 16475.2 16978.9 465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED 15291.5 15460.9 15649.1 15835.6 16035.0 16254.6 16716.0 16978.9 ******* ******* ****** ******* **** **** 黑象黑金金金属 **461 STATE CONTRIBUTION** 4806.7 923.5 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 4806.7 1100.1 1293.4 2266.4 2569.6 462 RETAINED EARNINGS 1504.8 1736.2 1989.3 2901.4 2901.4 774.8 555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM 554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM 441.8 493.1 644.0 696.0 733.7 819.7 819.7 552.4 598.2 8996.6 8925.9 8668.4 8564.9 8451.0 3259.6 542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWNDOWN \$1982 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 543 CUM DEBT DRAWHDOWN \$1982 519 DEBT SERVICE COVER 3259.6 3259.6 3259.6 3259.6 3259.6 3259.6 3259.6 3259.6 3259.6 3259.6

> SENATE BILL 646 "MINIMUM" APPROPRIATION OF \$3.0 BILLION WITH 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST

















18.5 - Financial Risk

This section of the report considers the financial risks arising to the entities potentially financing Susitna. These entities are the State of Alaska, Alaskan consumers and bond holders. Under the financing schemes described in Section 18.4, the only risks to bond holders would arise in the later stages of the project's life when either the G.O. bonds had been converted into revenue bonds or the revenue bonds were no longer guaranteed. These financing plans would therefore protect bond holders from all risks from Susitna until the project was fully established and fully met the normal standards of security for bond holders. It can be taken therefore that the proposed financing schemes would, in effect, hold the bond holders free from all abnormal risk. On these grounds only, the risk arising to the State of Alaska and Alaskan consumers will be considered.

The analysis is also confined to Watana completion and operation up to the year 2001. This is firstly because Watana accounts for more than two-thirds of the total capital cost of the Susitna Project. Secondly, as can be seen from Figure 18.4.3 to 18.4.5, the long-term viability of Susitna (i.e., its costs compared with the best thermal option) is such that, long term, there is very little risk that the project would be unable to meet all financing costs when charging a price which is more favorable to consumers than the best thermal option. This means that there is little likelihood of any additional burden falling on Alaskan consumers (compared with that imposed by the best thermal option) after Devil Canyon comes on-stream. Risk to the State of Alaska in terms of being called upon to permit Devil Canyon to be financed by guaranteed revenue bonds or G.O. Bonds is correspondingly small. These considerations, and the extreme uncertainty attaching to any detailed financing scenarios some two decades hence, support the approach followed here of concentrating on the risk at the Watana stage of project development.

The analysis considers risk in terms of pre-completion and post-completion risk. It concludes that there is very little pre-completion risk as measured by likelihood of non-completion. The major specific risks at the pre-completion phase (i.e., risk of capital overruns, higher-than-forecast interest rates, etc.) have their effect in the post-completion phase by giving rise to additional financing requirements, inadequacy of debt service and delay in conversion to non-guaranteed revenue bonds. Each of these specific risks is considered and their probability of occurrence estimated. Also considered is the critically important aggregative risk relating to project earnings expressed in terms of the cumulative net operating deficit or surplus.

The general conclusion is that, in terms of failure to achieve estimated forecasts in 1982 dollars, both specific and aggregative risks have well defined probability limits which should be acceptable having regard to the long-term net benefits and the energy price stabilization advantages of the project.

(a) Pre-completion Risk

The first major risk, considered in the pre-completion phase, is the risk that the project will not be completed. The scenarios which might lead to

this conclusion are possibly that major and unforeseen natural hazards are identified in the construction phase or alternatively that an actual natural calamity prevents completion. The possibilities of seismic and other natural hazards are dealt with in Sections 9 and 10 of the Feasibility Report for the Susitna Hydroelectric Project. The analysis given there supports the conclusion that the chance of unforeseen natural hazards of a magnitude sufficient to prevent completion, occurring during the construction phase, is negligible. The probability of construction being permanently halted by occurrence of a major natural hazard is also identified in that section and is assessed as very small. It may be concluded therefore, that the risks arising from non-completion owing to natural hazards are negligible.

In considering the risk of non-completion owing to capital overruns it is necessary to differentiate between capital overruns which are the result merely of general inflation and capital overruns which represent constant (1982) dollar increases in the capital cost of the project should its costs rise faster than the general rate of inflation. It was noted in the Section 18.4 (c) which deals with the basic financing plan that the general rate of inflation is inherently unpredictable in the long term, since it is the result of complex worldwide political and economic forces which also cannot be predicted. Providing, however, that such inflation has a uniform effect on prices and leaves the real rate of interest unchanged, it will have zero impact on the net benefits of the project. The capital required to complete the project will certainly increase in line with inflation but, given that the net benefits are not adversely affected, this should not lead to any significant risk that the project will not be completed. Additional inflation, far from challenging the viability of long term price stabilizing investments such as Susitna, should generally make them more desirable and urgent in the preference scale of the majority of consumers.

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In contrast to such inflationary capital overruns which should not adversely affect the economic viability of the project, capital overruns in excess of inflation could, if sufficiently large, result in the project being abandoned. In this context, however, we must note that:

- (i) The project involves only well established and proven technology and hence is not exposed to technological risk;
- (ii) Construction will be undertaken on a well-defined and carefully surveyed site so that the project should be free from the extensive and unsurveyed terrain problems which led to environmental and geotechnical factors giving rise to major real capital overruns in the case of the Aleyska pipeline; and
- (iii) The risk of any constant (1982) dollar overrun has been extensively examined by Acres on the basis of standard engineering approaches and formal probability analysis and estimated to have only a 20 to 27 percent probability of occurrence.

Taking these factors into account and considering the economic logic which would require that already-incurred costs be disregarded in any completion decision, it may be concluded that the risk of non-completion due to capital cost overruns is negligible.

(b) Post-completion Risks

(i) The Generation of Post-completion Risks

Any major project, dependent for its outcome on a range of different factors, can be regarded as a risk-generating mechanism. The risks, in terms of their actual outcome, can be either favorable or unfavorable. To make any general assessment of such risks, however, the risk-generating mechanism in terms of its major variables must be defined. These are summarized in Table 18.5.1 and define the variables to which the project financial outcome is sensitive and provide an estimate of the range of such variables together with their corresponding probabilities.

A major variable in the risk-generating mechanism is the range of capital costs in 1982 dollar terms. For purposes of this analysis the probability distribution of the range of capital costs as given in Section 18.2 has been reduced to the cumulative probability distribution shown in Table 18.5.1.

Another variable to which the risk-generating mechanism is highly sensitive is that of the rate of inflation and the related rate of interest on the revenue bonds and G.O. bonds financing the investment. Historically, inflation and interest rates have tended to be closely, although not precisely, related, as can be determined from Table 18.4.4. As was stressed in connection with that table, rates of inflation and interest are subject to a wide range of uncertainty. Furthermore, there exists no objective manner by which the probabilities of different inflation and interest rates occurring can be determined. As these are variables of fundamental importance in the risk-generating mechanism, however, probabilities have been estimated on a judgmental basis for a range of interest and inflation rates. These center on the Data Resources Incorporated, forecasts in Table 18.4.4 and result in the estimates given in Table 18.5.1.

The fourth variable to which the risk-generating mechanism is sensitive is that of the rate of escalation of thermal fuels, particularly coal. It is this which will primarily determine the cost savings Susitna energy will produce, and hence the wholesale rate which Susitna may charge. This determines the revenue earned by Susitna. The probabilities and range in this case are as given in Section 18.1.

While other variables also have an impact on the risk generating mechanism, it is the above four variables which are its primary determinants. In the analysis each combination of these four variables defines a particular financial outcome for the project. - Specific Risk II: Inadequate Debt Service Cover (Figure 18.5.2)

An adverse impact on the state credit rating might occur if the project failed to earn adequate debt service and cover, and consequently, conversion into non-guaranteed revenue bonds was delayed. The analysis showed that in the \$2.3 billion state appropriation case:

. The probability of forecast coverage being less than adequate (i.e., cover of less than 1.25) in 1994 (first normal year of Watana) is .22.

The probability of a shortfall in coverage also diminishes with time (due to increasing cost of alternative fuels). Reference to the 1997 line in Figure 18.5.2 shows that the probability of inadequate cover by that year is only .05.

- Specific Risk III: Early Year Non-viability (Figure 18.5.3)

The third specific risk that may be considered to be of importance is the risk that, although the project is fully completed and operational, it is not completely financially viable in its early years. A wide range of the factors detailed in Table 18.5.1 could lead to this result. For example, at the completion of Watana in 1993 the project might be unable to meet interest charges because capital costs had been higher than expected (due, for instance, to inflation or constant dollar overruns), or because interest rates had been higher than expected, or revenues lower.

The probabilities of this occurring are analyzed in Figure 18.5.3. This shows probability on the vertical axis, and on the horizontal, the Watana costs in 1996 as a percentage of the cost of the best thermal option.

Again, the reference financing scenario is that of the \$2.3 billion state appropriation and the analysis is based on the central estimates of capital cost, interest rates, revenues, etc. This, as can be seen from Figure 18.4.4, should enable the Watana output in 1996 to be produced at a cost (excluding excess debt service cover) 51 percent of the cost of the best thermal option in that year. The 51 percent value is the reference point of the results summarized in Figure 18.5.2.

The result which may be of particular concern relates to the probability of the Watana costs exceeding the costs of the best thermal option so that the project either shows losses (i.e., is unable to meet its interest charges) or alternatively, insofar as it is able, it is forced to charge a higher energy price than the best thermal option. The probability of this occurrence is only .05. There is also a .71 probability that Watana costs will be less than the forecast level of 51 percent of the best thermal option (see previous paragraph).

(iii) Aggregate Risk (Figure 18.5.4)

While specific risks of the type considered above are of importance in evaluating particular aspects of the project, the basic concern in the financial risk analysis must relate to aggregate risk. It is inherent in the large number of independent variables and the very long time period involved in the Susitna project that, while many of these factors at any given point of time will be deviating from their forecast values, the deviations will, in total effect and over time, tend to cancel out so that the aggregate outcome will be close to forecast. There are, however, certain conditions under which this "averaging out" would not occur. This is where the outcome of the project depends critically upon relatively few major factors which are themselves very variable.

An essential purpose of the probability analysis is to evaluate this variability in a systematic manner so that we can ascertain the extent to which, long term, the averaging process will bring the aggregate outcome for the project close to forecast despite the inevitable variations from forecast of many of its component forecasts.

A number of measurements can be made to test the aggregate outcome for the project. The most obvious is that of the rate of return which it earns. This was considered in some detail in Section 18.1. The measure of aggregate outcome most appropriate for the financial analysis in this case is probably the cumulative net operating earnings at the end of the first nine years of operation of Watana (i.e., the year 2001, immediately before Devil Canyon comes into operation). These net operating earnings are after interest and include accumulated interest on any deficits which may arise over the period.

This statistic could not, however, reflect the impact of favorable outcomes which reduced the cost of the Watana output below its This is because the requirements of Senate Bill forecast level. 25 governing the wholesale electricity rate would oblige the APA to reduce the price of Watana energy in line with the lower cost so that no additional gains would show up in the net operating earnings. In order to make the statistic reflect the "upside" as well as "downside" possibilities, it has been reestimated for the present analysis on the assumption that the APA would have the freedom to set the wholesale price of the Watana energy at higher levels up to the full cost of output from the best thermal option. On this basis the resulting net operating earnings at the year 2001 fully reflect all favorable as well as unfavorable possibilities, picking up both the cost savings to consumers in the favorable outcomes and the excess costs arising from the adverse ones.

The results of this analysis for the \$2.3 billion state appropriation scenario are shown in Figure 18.5.4. Again, probability is shown on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis is shown the cumulative net operating deficit or surplus at the year 2001 (reexpressed in terms of 1982 dollars). The reference point of the figure is the forecast of \$0.8 billion net operating surplus which would have occurred if the central estimates used in the financial analysis were realized. The \$0.8 billion therefore represents the "forecast" against which the other outcomes can be assessed.

On the basis of this analysis, the probability of the net operating surplus being less than the forecast level is only .27. The probability of the surplus being less than \$0.6 billion is only .2. Moreover, counter-balancing these adverse possibilities are the probabilities shown of very much larger surpluses arising. This would lead to very much larger cost savings being conferred upon Alaskan consumers than the forecast \$0.8 billion. There is, for example, a .35 probability of the surplus exceeding \$1.4 billion.

(c) Conclusions

The main conclusion of this analysis is that the project at the Watana stage has only limited exposure to adverse outcomes in terms of specific risks, particularly those of financing overruns, delayed revenue bond conversion or failure to realize early year cost savings once it is in operation. An important qualification attaching to the risk of financing overruns is that a point of reference is the forecast capital requirements in terms of 1982 dollars. It is inherent in the extreme unpredictability of the rate of inflation over the long term that forecasts of financing requirements in terms of then-current money (e.g., money of the purchasing power of the years 1985 to 1992 when the financing takes place) would prove to be substantially in error. It is, however, the risk of financial overrun in terms of today's purchasing power which represents the only meaningful assessment of this particular category of risk.

As regards the aggregate risk as measured by the net operating surplus or deficit over the first nine years of Watana's life, there is only a relatively low probability of this variable failing to achieve its forecast level. This low probability also extends to the chance that the project would not realize cost savings as large or even larger than those forecast in the central estimate.

The qualification attaching to all the foregoing analyses is that the estimates and probabilities used are free from any systematic biases which might render them unrealistically favorable. The approach to the study for Susitna and the analysis of its alternatives has been specifically designed to guard against this possibility. The Acres capital cost estimates have been subjected to independent verification by EBASCO and the economic estimates independently assessed by BATTELLE. Every practical precaution has been taken to exclude the possibility of any such systmatic bias, and to base the analysis on consistently objective estimation.

BASIC PARAMETERS OF RISK GENERATION MODEL

| | COAL PRICE ESCALATION (% REAL) | | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | 0 | 2.6 to 2000 1.2 thereafter | 5.0 to 2000 . 2.2 thereafter | | | | | |
| PROBABILITY | .25 | .50 | .25 | | | | | |

| | , | \sim | | |
|-------------|-------|--------|--------|---------|
| | 5 – 7 | 7 — 9 | 9 – 11 | 11 – 13 |
| PROBABILITY | .10 | .32 | .43 | .15 |

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| | li DIFFEREN | NFLATION RATI CE FROM INTER | E REST RATE |
|-------------|----------------|--------------------------------|----------------|
| | 2% | -3% | 4% |
| PROBABILITY | .33 | .34 | .33 |

| | CAPITAL COSTS (REAL 1982 \$ billion) | | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--|--|--|--|
| | Below 3.1 | Below 3.6 | Below 4.3 | Below 5.1 | | | | |
| PROBABILITY | .46 | .73 | .90 | 1.00 | | | | |




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