



SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

FEASIBILITY REPORT

VOLUME 1

**ENGINEERING AND
ECONOMIC ASPECTS**

SECTIONS 9-19

FINAL DRAFT

Prepared by:



ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

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LIST OF REFERENCE REPORTS

The following reports and documents were prepared during the course of the study program. Specific references in the text of the report are cited and listed separately by section; they should not be confused with the following list.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Report</u>	<u>Prepared By</u>
R1	Plan of Study	Acres
R2	Plan of Study, Revision 1	Acres
R3	Plan of Study, Revision 2	Acres
R4	Plan of Study, Revision 3	Acres
R5	Forecasting Peak Electrical Demands for Alaska's Railbelt	WCC
R6	Closeout Report, Review of ISER Work	Acres
R7	Task 1 Termination Report, September 1980	Acres
R8	Field Reconnaissance of Reservoir Area - Timber Report	R&M
R9	Marketability and Disposal Study for Reservoir Area	R&M
R10	Aerial Photography and Photogrammetric Mapping	R&M
R11	Control Network Survey Report	R&M
R12	Hydrographic Surveys	R&M
R13	Field Data Collection and Processing	R&M
R14	Glacier Studies	R&M/U. of Alaska
R15	Regional Flood Studies	R&M
R16	Hydraulic and Ice Studies	R&M/Acres
R17	Reservoir Sedimentation	R&M
R18	River Morphology	R&M
R19	Review of Available Materials	Acres
R20	Field Data Index	R&M
R21	Water Quality - Annual Report - 1980	R&M
R22	Water Quality - Annual Report - 1981	R&M
R23	Water Quality - Interpretation - 1981	R&M
R24	Ice Observations - 1980	R&M
R25	Processed Climatic Data for Six Weather Stations (6 volumes)	R&M
R26	Interim Report on Seismic Studies	WCC
R27	Final Report on Seismic Studies	WCC
R28	1980 Geotechnical Report (Superceded by R29)	Acres
R29	1980-81 Geotechnical Report	Acres
R30	OGP Data	Acres
R31	Development Selection Report	Acres
R32	Review of Previous Studies and Reports Closeout Report February 1981	Acres
R33	Tunnel Alternative Report July 1981	Acres
R34	Evaluation of Arch Dam at Devil Canyon Site	Acres
R35	1981 Upper Limit Capital Cost Estimate, July 1981	Acres
R36	Scour Hole Development Downstream of High Head Dams	Acres
R37	1980 Summary Environmental Report	TES

LIST OF REFERENCE REPORTS (Cont'd)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Report</u>	<u>Prepared By</u>
R38	Environmental Report - Fish Ecology - 1980	TES
R39	Environmental Report - Plant Ecology - 1980	TES
R40	Environmental Report - Big Game - 1980	TES
R41	Environmental Report - Birds and Non Game Mammals - 1980	TES
R42	Environmental Report - Furbearers - 1980	TES
R43	Environmental Report - Land Use Analysis - 1980	TES
R44	Environmental Report - Socioeconomics - 1980	TES
R45	Environmental Report - Cultural Resources - 1980	TES
R46	Fish and Wildlife Mitigation Policy - Revised	TES/Acres
R47	Instream Flow Study Plan	Acres
R48	Draft Fishery Mitigation Plan	TES
R49	Draft Wildlife Mitigation Plan	TES
R50	Phase 1 Report - Fish Ecology	ADF&G
R51	Phase 1 Report - Big Game	ADF&G
R52	Phase 1 Report - Plant Ecology	TES
R53	Phase 1 Report - Bird and Non-Game Mammals	TES
R54	Phase 1 Report - Furbearers	TES
R55	Phase 1 Report - Land Use	TES
R56	Phase 1 Report - Socioeconomics	TES
R57	Phase 1 Report - Cultural Resources	TES
R58	Phase 1 Report - Recreation	TES
R59	Sociocultural Report	Acres
R60	Environmental Analysis of Alternative Access Plan	TES
R61	Access Planning Study	R&M
R62	Access Route Selection Report	Acres
R63	Electric System Studies	Acres
R64	Transmission Line Corridor Screening Report	Acres
R65	Transmission Line Selected Route	Acres/TES
R66	Switching Stations and Substations - Single Line Diagrams	Acres
R67	Agency Consultation Report	Acres
R68	Initial Version Preliminary Licensing Documentation, April 1980	Acres
R69	Preliminary Licensing Documentation - 2nd Version November 1981	Acres
R70	Status of Susitna Basin Water Rights	Acres
R71	Project Overview Report, 2nd Draft	Acres
R72	Economic Marketing and Financial Evaluation	Acres
R73	Susitna Risk Analysis	Acres

9 - SELECTION OF WATANA GENERAL ARRANGEMENT

This section describes the evolution of the general arrangement of the Watana project, which, together with the Devil Canyon project, comprises the development plan selected as part of Section 8. This section also describes the site topography, geology, and seismicity of the Watana site relative to the design and arrangement of the various site facilities. The process by which reservoir operating levels and the installed generating capacity of the power facilities were established is presented, together with the means of handling floods expected during construction and subsequent project operation.

The main components of the Watana development are as follows:

- Main dam;
- Diversion facilities;
- Spillway facilities;
- Outlet facilities;
- Emergency release facilities; and
- Power facilities.

A number of alternatives are available for each of these components and they can obviously be combined in a number of ways. The following paragraphs describe the various components and methodology for the preliminary, intermediate, and final screening and review of alternative general arrangement of the components, together with a brief description of the selected scheme. A detailed description of the various project components is given in Section 12.

9.1 - Site Topography

The project site is located in a broad U-shaped valley at river mile 184, approximately 2.5 miles upstream of the confluence of Tsusena Creek with the Susitna River. The river at the site is relatively wide, although turbulent. On the right bank, the valley rises at an approximate slope of 2H:1V from river level at Elevation 1450 for approximately 600 feet, then gradually flattens to a maximum elevation of 2350 between the Susitna River and Tsusena Creek. The left bank rises more steeply from the river for about 450 feet at a slope of 1.4H:1V, then flattens to 3H:1V or less to approximate Elevation 2600.

9.2 - Site Geology

A detailed description of the geology and site investigations at the Watana site is given in the 1980-1981 Geotechnical Report (1). The following is a brief summary of the findings presented in the Geotechnical Report.

(a) Geologic Conditions

A summary of site overburden and bedrock conditions is presented in the following paragraphs. A geologic map of the damsite area is shown in Figure 9.1.

(i) Overburden

Overburden thickness in the damsite area ranges from 0 up to 80 feet in localized areas. On the lower slopes, the overburden consists primarily of talus. The upper areas of the abutments near the top of the slope are deposits of glacial tills, alluvium, and talus. Subsurface investigations show the contact between the overburden and bedrock to be relatively unweathered.

The depth of the river alluvium beneath the proposed dam averages about 80 feet and consists of sand, silt, coarse gravels, and boulders.

(ii) Bedrock Lithology

The damsite is primarily underlain by an intrusive dioritic body which varies in composition from granodiorite to quartz diorite to diorite. The texture is massive and the rock is hard, competent, and fresh except within sheared and altered zones. These rocks have been intruded by mafic and felsic dikes which are generally only a few feet thick. The contacts are healed and competent. The rock immediately downstream from the damsite is an andesite porphyry. This rock is medium to dark gray to green and contains quartz diorite inclusions. The contact zone of the andesite with the diorite is generally weathered and fractured up to 10 to 15 feet above the contact.

(iii) Bedrock Structures

- Joints

There are two major and two minor joint sets at the site. Set I, which is the most prominent set, strikes 320° and dips to 80° NE to vertical. This set is found throughout the damsite and parallels the general structural trend in the region. Set I has a subset, which strikes 290° to 300° with a dip of 75° NE. This subset is localized in the downstream area near where the diversion tunnel portals are proposed. This subset also parallels the shear zones in the downstream area of the site. Set II trends northeast to east and dips vertically. This set is best developed in the upstream portion of the damsite area, but is locally prominent in the downstream areas. Sets III and IV are minor sets but can be locally well

developed. Set III trends N-S with variable dips ranging from 40° east to 65° west, while Set IV trends 090° with subhorizontal dips. Set III forms numerous open joints on the cliff faces near the "Fingerbuster," and several shear zones parallel this orientation. Set IV appears to have developed from stress relief from glacial unloading and/or valley erosion.

The average spacing of Joint Sets I and II is 1 to 2 feet and 6 to 12 inches, respectively. The spacing of Joint Sets III and IV is quite variable and can range from a few inches to several feet.

- Shears and Fracture Zones

Several shears, fracture zones, and alteration zones are present at the site (Figure 9.1). For the most part, they are small and discontinuous. All zones greater than 10 feet in width have been delineated on the geologic map (Figure 9.1).

Shears are defined as having breccia, gouge, and/or slickenslides indicating relative movement. Two forms of shearing are found at the site. The first type is found only in the diorite and is characterized by breccia of sheared rock that has been rehealed into a matrix of very fine grained andesite/diorite. These shear zones have high RQDs and the rock is fresh and hard. The second type is common to all rock types and consists of unhealed breccia and/or gouge. These shear zones are soft, friable, and often have secondary mineralization of carbonate and chlorite showing slickenslides. These zones are generally less than 1 foot wide.

Fracture zones are also common to all rock types and range from 6 inches to 30 feet wide (generally less than 10 feet). These zones are closely spaced joints that are often iron oxide stained or carbonate coated. Where exposed, the zones trend to form topographic lows.

Alteration zones are areas where hydrothermal solution have caused the chemical breakdown of the feldspars and mafic minerals. The degree of alteration encountered is highly variable across the site. These zones are rarely seen in outcrop as they are easily eroded into gullies, but were encountered in all the boreholes. The transition between fresh and altered rock is gradational. The zones may range to 20 feet thick although are usually less than 5 feet.

(b) Structural Features

The Watana site has several significant geologic features consisting of shears, fractures and alteration zones described previously (Figure 9.1).

The two most prominent areas have been named the "Fins" and the "Fingerbuster." The "Fins" is located on the north bank of the river upstream from the diversion tunnel intake. It is an area approximately 400-feet wide, characterized by three major northwest trending zones of shearing and alteration that have eroded into steep gullies. These alteration zones are separated by intact rock bands (ribs) 5 to 50 feet wide. The 20-foot-wide upstream zone of the series coincides with the diorite/andesite porphyry contact. The other two zones, approximately 55 and 30 feet wide, are filled with severely altered rock. This zone trends 310° with a near vertical dip. The extension of the zone has been extrapolated to extend northwestward outcropping in Tsusena Creek.

The "Fingerbuster" is located downstream from the damsite and is exposed in a 40-foot-wide deep talus-filled gully along the andesite porphyry/diorite contact (Figure 9.1). The rock is severely weathered with closely spaced joints trending parallel to Set I (330°) and Set III (0°). Slickensides indicate vertical displacement. The extension of this zone to the south is based on a strong north-south topographic lineament. Because of the lack of exposure, its location and extent have been approximated.

A prominent alteration zone was encountered on the south bank where a drill hole encountered approximately 200 feet of hydrothermally altered rock. Although core recovery in this boring was good, the quality of rock was relatively poor (Figure 9.1).

(c) Ground Water Conditions

The ground water regime in the bedrock is confined to movement along fractures and joints. The water table is a subdued replica of the surface topography. Water levels on the right abutment were deep, ranging from about 110 to 280 feet. Ground water conditions on the south abutment are complicated because of the apparent continuous thick permafrost resulting in a perched water table near surface and a deep table below the frost.

(d) Permafrost Conditions

Permafrost conditions exist on the north-facing slopes (left bank) of the damsite area. Measurements indicate that permafrost exists to a depth of 200 to 300 feet. Temperature measurements show the permafrost to be "warm" (within 1°C of freezing). No permafrost was found on the north abutment but sporadic areas of frost can be expected.

(e) Permeability

The rock permeability does not vary significantly within the site area; generally ranging between 1×10^{-4} cm/sec to 1×10^{-6} cm/sec. The permeability is controlled by a degree of fractures within the rock, with the higher permeability occurring in the more sheared and fractured zone. Permeabilities tend to decrease with depth.

(f) Reservoir Geology

The topography of the Watana Reservoir and adjacent slopes is characterized by a narrow V-shaped stream-cut valley superimposed on a broad U-shaped glacial valley. Overburden masks much of the bedrock especially in the lower and uppermost reaches of the reservoir.

The lower portions of the Watana reservoir are predominantly covered by a veneer of glacial till with scattered outwash deposits. On the south side of the Susitna River, the Fog Lakes area is characterized by a fluted ground moraine surface. Upstream in the Watana Creek area, a broad flat plain is mantled with glacial till and semi-consolidated Tertiary sediments. These are predominantly stratified, poorly graded, fine sands, and silts with some clays. The river valleys contain significant amounts of alluvial deposits and reworked outwash. Ice disintegration features such as kames and eskers have been observed in the river valley.

A non-conformable contact between argillite and the diorite pluton at the damsite area was mapped approximately three miles upstream from the damsite. Semi-consolidated, Tertiary age sedimentary rocks and volcanics are present just downstream from the confluence of metabasalt flows with thin interbeds of metachert, argillite, marble, and metavolcaniclastic rocks. The rocks between Jay Creek and Oshetna Creek are metamorphic amphibolite and minor amounts of greenschist and foliated diorite.

The main structural feature of the Watana Reservoir is the Talkeetna Thrust Fault which trends northeast-southwest. The Talkeetna Thrust Fault crosses the Susitna River approximately eight miles upstream from the damsite. This fault has been studied in detail as part of the seismic studies, and has been determined to be inactive (2).

(g) Construction Material Investigations

Extensive investigations have been conducted both prior to and during the current studies to identify quantities of suitable materials for the construction of an embankment dam and for concrete aggregates. Detailed discussion of these borrow and quarry sites is presented in the 1980-81 Geotechnical Report (1).

(i) Rock Fill Material

The source for rockfill material is Quarry A, which comprises the rock knob immediately adjacent to the left abutment. The rock in Quarry A is diorite and andesite. The rock is generally hard, durable and fresh, and is suitable for use as rockfill in the dam.

(ii) Core Material

Two sources have been identified for the site core material and are designated as Borrow Site D and Borrow Site H. Borrow Site D is located immediately northwest of the damsite on the north bank. The upper few feet of material comprise tundra, topsoil, and boulders, which is underlain by thick glacial tills composed of gravelly silty sands with some clay. An alternative source of core material, designated Site H, is located approximately 7 miles downstream from the damsite on the south bank of the river.

(iii) Filter Material

Borrow Site E has been identified as a primary source of material for filter and transition zones of the embankment. This area is located at the confluence of the Tsusena Creek and the Susitna River approximately 2.5 miles downstream from the damsite. The area is covered by about 2 feet of organics and silt underlain by a few feet thick layer of silty sand to clean sand and a thick layer of sandy and gravelly material exists. Sufficient quantities are available in this borrow site to meet the project requirements for filter materials and will also be a major source of gravel materials for the shells of the dam.

(iv) Gravels and Cobbles for Shells

To identify additional sources of gravel for the shells, seismic refraction survey investigations were performed both upstream and downstream from the damsite in the Susitna River valley. These investigations confirmed that sufficient quantities of granular material are available for use in the supporting shell zones of the dam to supplement Borrow Site E. Available data indicates that the grain size distribution of these materials will be similar to that from Borrow Site E, with probably a higher percentage of coarser material.

(v) Concrete Aggregate

The material available from Borrow Sites E, C, F, and the riverbed alluvium is suitable for use as coarse and fine aggregate for concrete. Processing will be required to

produce desired gradations. The coarser particles are rounded and petrographic analyses have indicated the material to be of good quality. Sufficient quantities are available within the identified sources.

9.3 - Geotechnical Design Considerations

This section deals with the geotechnical aspects of design of the dam and other major structures at the Watana site.

(a) Main Dam Excavation and Foundation Treatment

As discussed previously, the riverbed alluvium ranges up to approximately 80 to 100 feet in depth. The character of this material has not yet been well defined and its stability during a strong earthquake event is questionable. The overburden material on the abutments is relatively thin, except for gullies and pockets. Most of this material is frozen and will become unstable when thawed and is therefore unsuitable for the dam foundation.

Localized sheared and altered zones beneath the proposed dam will not adversely affect the dam foundation. Potential seepage through these zones will be eliminated by a grout curtain cutoff combined with a downstream drainage system.

Although the two major geologic structures at the site, the "Fins" on the upstream side and the "Fingerbuster" on the downstream side, have had an influence on the overall project layout, they do not directly affect the dam at its proposed location.

Extensive permafrost is present on the south bank and sporadic permafrost may be encountered on the north bank. This permafrost is within 1°C of freezing. Thawing of the permafrost and grouting of the foundation will be required.

(b) Cofferdams and Dewatering

Because of the pervious nature of the thick riverbed deposits, some form of cutoff will probably be required beneath both the upstream and downstream cofferdams to control seepage. A slurry trench cement bentonite cutoff constructed from an initial rock-fill/gravel closure dike is currently proposed. Such a cutoff is unlikely to be fully effective and continuous dewatering will be required to handle seepage through the cutoff until the dam construction is above the diversion stage pool level.

Further exploration is necessary in the riverbed to better define the alluvial materials at the cofferdam sites and provide data for the final design.

(c) Underground Structures

The rock conditions at the Watana site are suitable for the construction of tunnels and underground caverns. The location and the orientation of these structures is influenced by the orientation and location of rock discontinuities. Permafrost conditions will not have any major adverse impact except where thawing may be required for grouting.

The RQD values indicate that 85 percent of the rock is of a good to excellent category. The remaining 15 percent represents poor quality rock associated with rock discontinuities. The major joint sets at the Watana site are oriented at N40W (Set I) and N45E (Set II). Other four joint sets are minor. The major shear and fracture zones also parallel these general trends. The most favorable orientations for the tunnels and the large underground caverns are with their long axis perpendicular to the major joint sets. These factors have been a major consideration in selection of the alignments of the tunnels and major caverns to achieve maximum stability and minimum support requirement.

Although little is known at this time about the insitu stress regime at the site, the general tectonic stress regime within the region is in a compression mode. Conventional rock bolt support is generally considered adequate in most areas with spans less than 40 feet. For larger spans and in areas of poor quality rock, the support requirements have been determined on a case-by-case basis. In the case of large span openings, intersection of nearby vertical and subhorizontal joints can create unstable blocks in the crown. Allowances have been made for the use of support measures such as shotcrete, welded wire fabric, and concrete lining in areas of potentially poor rock quality and in water carrying tunnels under high head (such as penstocks).

Although the rock mass is fairly impervious, intersection of rock discontinuities may cause ground water seepage and high pore pressures during operation.

Tunnel excavation can be performed using either conventional drill and blast techniques or high production mechanical excavating equipment. Sufficient information is not available at this time to make this decision, and for feasibility assessment purposes, conventional drill and blast methods have been assumed.

The spacing between long tunnels has been set at 2.5 times the diameter of the largest tunnel. The spacing between the major caverns has been set such that a pillar thickness of 1.5 times the span of the larger cavern is maintained.

(d) Stability of Soil and Rock Slopes

In most areas the excavation slopes will be in rock. The slopes in the overburden have been determined based on soil properties, ground water table, and the height of the slope. In general, slopes in overburden will not be steeper than 2H:1V below the water table and 1.5H:1V above the water table. A bench of adequate width will be provided at the overburden-rock contact to accommodate any local slumping or slope failure and to intercept and dispose of ground/seepage water. Flatter slopes may be required where frozen ground may become unstable during thawing.

The cut slopes in rock will be controlled by the local joint dips and orientations. Major joint set dips are near vertical and where such joints control slopes, they will be cut at 1H:10V, with flatter slopes where necessary to ensure stability. In general, slopes will be cut back to the dip of the controlling joint set or flatter. Locally, rock bolting or similar support techniques and drainage systems will be provided to stabilize individual blocks, ensure overall stability of rock slopes and maintain safe working conditions.

(e) Use of Excavated Rock in Dam Construction

Since most of the rock excavation will be within the diorite and andesite, the quality of rock will be acceptable for use as rock-fill. Poor quality or weathered rock will not be acceptable fill. The use of rockfill in the dam will be limited to the downstream shell, and in zones or rip-rap material.

(f) Relict Channel

A deep bedrock depression exists on the north bank of the river extending from about 2,500 feet west of Deadman Creek northwest toward Tsusena Creek. The depth to bedrock is as much as 400 feet below the surface and the reservoir level. The overburden consists of several sequences of glacial deposits, lake sediments, and alluvium varying in thickness and character both laterally and with depth. Some of these granular deposits exhibit high permeability, and temperatures below 0°C were noted at a depth of several hundred feet suggesting the possibility of permafrost. The ground water surface has not been well defined. Perched water tables are evidenced by the presence of several surface lakes. Artesian conditions have been encountered in at least one boring. With the proposed range of reservoir levels, these overburden deposits will become saturated. A bedrock contour map of the Relict Channel area is presented in Figure 9.2.

Additional investigation will be necessary to properly characterize the subsurface conditions in the area prior to construction. Details of the potential design problems to be dealt with in the Relict Channel and the possible methods of treatment are discussed further in Section 12.

9.4 - Seismic Considerations

For earthquake engineering and design considerations, the project structures have been classified as either critical structures or non-critical structures. Critical structures include the dam and similar major structures whose failure may result in sudden and uncontrolled release of large volumes of water which may endanger property and lives downstream. The non-critical structures are those structures whose failure can be assessed as an economic or financial loss to the project in terms of lost revenue, repair, and/or replacement cost. Critical structures will be designed to safely withstand the effect of the "Safety Evaluation Earthquake" (SEE) for the site. No significant damage to these structures will be accepted under these conditions. The design of noncritical structures for earthquake conditions is undertaken on the basis of conventional Uniform Building Code recommendations.

Two sources will be used for determination of the most severe SEE condition as a basis for design of structures at Watana, a Benjoff Zone maximum earthquake of magnitude 8.5 at a distance of 40 miles from the site, and a Terrain maximum earthquake of magnitude 6.25 at a distance of less than 6 miles from the site.

Design of critical concrete structures is generally based on a conservative analysis using an 80th percentile response spectrum for The Terrain SEE, with a 10 percent damping ratio (Figure 9.3), scaled down by a factor of 80 percent.

Although the Terrain earthquake would result in more severe ground motions, the duration of these motions is relatively short and the likelihood of occurrence of such an event is extremely small. A more likely source of strong ground shaking at the Watana site is the Benjoff Zone.

The design of the Watana dam has therefore been based on the projected time history for this event as discussed in Section 12.

9.5 - Selection of Reservoir Levels

The selected elevation of the Watana dam crest is based on considerations of the value of the hydroelectric energy produced from the associated reservoir, geotechnical constraints on reservoir levels, and freeboard requirements. Firm energy, average annual energy, construction costs and operation and maintenance costs were determined for the Watana development with dam crest elevations of 2240, 2190, and 2140 feet. The relative value of energy produced in terms of the present worth of the long-term production costs (LTPW) for each of these three dam elevations was determined by means of the OGP generation planning model described in Section 6. The physical constraints imposed on dam height and reservoir elevation by geotechnical considerations were reviewed and incorporated into the crest elevation selection process.

Finally, freeboard requirements for the PMF and settlement of the dam after construction or as a result of seismic activity were taken into account.

(a) Methodology

Firm and average annual energy produced by the Susitna development are based on 32 years of hydrological records. The energy produced was determined by using a multi-reservoir simulation of the operation of the Watana and Devil Canyon reservoirs. A variety of reservoir drawdowns were examined, and drawdowns producing the maximum firm energy consistent with engineering feasibility and cost of the intake structure were selected (see Section 9.11). Minimum flow requirements were established at both project sites based on downstream fisheries considerations.

As discussed in Section 9.6, to meet system demand the required maximum generating capability at Watana in the period 1993 and 2010 ranges from 665 MW to 908 MW. For the reservoir level determinations, energy estimates were made on the basis of assumed average annual capacity requirements of 680 MW at Watana in 1993, increasing to 1020 MW at Watana in 2007, with an additional 600 MW at Devil Canyon coming online in the year 2002. The long term present worth costs of the generation system required to meet the Railbelt energy demand were then determined for each of the three crest elevations of the Watana dam using the OGP5 model.

The construction cost estimates used in the OGP5 modeling process for the Watana and Devil Canyon projects were based on preliminary conceptual layouts and construction schedules. Further refinement of these layouts has taken place during the optimization process. These refinements have no significant impact on the reservoir level selection.

(b) Economic Optimization

Economic optimization of the Watana reservoir level was based on an evaluation of three dam crest elevations of 2240, 2190, and 2140 feet. These crest elevations apply to the central portion of the embankment with appropriate allowances for freeboard and seismic settlement, and correspond to maximum operating levels of the reservoir of 2215, 2165, and 2115 feet, respectively. Average annual energy calculated for each case using the reservoir simulation model are given in Table 9.1, together with corresponding project construction costs.

In the determination of LTPW, the Susitna capital costs were adjusted to include an allowance for interest during construction and then used as input to the OGP5 model. Simulated annual energy yields were distributed on a monthly basis by the reservoir operation model to match as closely as possible the projected monthly

energy demand of the Railbelt and then input to the OGP5 model. The LTPW of meeting the Railbelt energy demand using the Susitna development as the primary source of energy, were then determined for each of the three reservoir levels.

The results of these evaluations are shown in Table 9.2, and plots showing the variation of the LTPW with dam crest elevation are shown in Figure 9.4. This figure indicates that on the basis of the assumptions used, the minimum LTPW occurs at a Watana crest elevation ranging from approximately 2160 to 2200 feet (reservoir levels 2140 to 2180). A higher dam crest will still result in a development which has an overall net economic benefit relative to thermal energy sources. However, it is also clear that as the height of the Watana dam is increased, the unit costs of additional energy produced at Watana is somewhat greater than for the displaced thermal energy source. Hence, the LTPW of the overall system would increase. Conversely, as the height of the dam is lowered, and thus Watana produces less energy, the unit cost of the energy produced by a thermal generation source to replace the lost Susitna energy, is more expensive than Susitna energy. In this case also, the LTPW increases.

(c) Geotechnical Considerations

On the right side of the reservoir created by the Watana dam a relict channel of considerable depth connects the reservoir to Tsusena Creek. As the water surface elevation of the reservoir is increased up to and beyond 2200 feet, a low area in the relict channel would require costly water retaining structures to be built and other measures to be taken. In addition to the cost the technical feasibility of these measures is not as certain as desired on a project of this magnitude. Because of the considerations relating to seismic stability, seepage problems and permafrost conditions in the relict channel area, it was concluded that the relict channel area should not be constantly under water. By comparing normal reservoir levels plus flood surcharge to ground surface contours, it was determined that with normal reservoir levels of 2185 and a small freeboard dike the following conditions would exist:

- For flood magnitudes up to the 1:10,000-year event, there will be no danger of overtopping the lowest point in the relict channel.
- For the PMF a freeboard dike in the low area of up to 10 feet in height would provide adequate protection. This dike would be wetted only a few days during a PMF event.
- If seismic settlement or settlement due to permafrost melting did occur, the combination of the 10 feet freeboard dike constructed on a suitable foundation plus a normal reservoir level of 2185 would ensure that breakthrough in the relict channel area would not occur.

With this approach, the Watana project will develop the maximum energy reasonably available without incurring the need for costly water retaining structures in the relict channel area.

(d) Conclusions

It is important to establish clearly the overall objective slightly of setting the Watana reservoir level. An objective which is to minimize the LTPW energy cost will lead to selection of a slightly lower reservoir level than an objective which is to maximize the amount of energy which can be obtained from the available resource, while doing so with a technically sound project.

The three values of LTPW developed by the OGP5 computer runs defined a relationship between LTPW and Watana dam height which is relatively insensitive to dam height. This is highlighted by the curve of LTPW versus dam height in Figure 9.4. This figure shows there is only a slight variation in the LTPW for the range of dam heights included in the analysis. Thus, from an economic standpoint, the optimum crest elevation could be considered as varying over a range of elevations from 2140 to 2220 feet with little effect on project economics. The governing factors in establishing the upper limit of dam height were consequently the geotechnical considerations discussed in (c) above.

The normal maximum operating level of the reservoir was therefore set at Elevation 2185, allowing the objective of maximizing the economic use of the Susitna resource still to be satisfied.

9.6 - Selection of Installed Capacity

The generating capacity to be installed at both Watana and Devil Canyon was determined on the basis of generation planning studies described in Sections 6 and 8, together with appropriate consideration of the following:

- Available firm and average energy from Watana and Devil Canyon;
- The forecast energy demand and peak load demand of the system;
- Available firm and average energy from other existing and committed plant;
- Capital cost and annual operating costs for Watana and Devil Canyon,
- Capital cost and annual operating costs for alternative sources of energy and capacity;
- Environmental constraints on reservoir operation; and
- Turbine and generator operating characteristics.

(a) Methodology

The following procedure was used to select the installed capacity Watana:

- The firm and average energy available at both Watana and Devil Canyon was determined using the reservoir simulation program described in Section 9.5 (see Plate 8.6).
- A determination was then made of the generating capacity required to utilize the available energy from the Susitna Project in the hydrological years of record, based on the following assumptions:
 - . In a wet year, energy developed at either Watana or Devil Canyon, displaces excess thermal energy (from coal, gas turbine, combined cycle, or diesel plants).
 - . In an average year, where thermal energy is required to meet system energy demand, hydro energy is used either to satisfy peak demand with thermal energy supplying base load (Option 1); or hydro energy is used to supply base load requirements with thermal energy at peak demand (Option 2). The actual choice is based on dispatching the most economic energy first.
 - . Devil Canyon energy is used predominantly as base load energy because of environmental constraints on downstream flow variations.
 - . The maximum installed capacity was determined on the basis of the established peak generating capacity required plus any hydro standby or spinning reserve equipment.

(b) Watana Installed Capacity

The required total capacity at Watana in a wet year, excluding standby and spinning reserve capacity, is summarized below. The capacities are based on the Battelle medium load forecast.

Demand Year	Capacity (MW)					
	Option 1			Option 2		
	Watana Peak	Thermal Base	Devil Canyon Base	Watana Base	Thermal Peak	Devil Canyon Base
1993	801	0	0	801	0	0
1995	839	0	0	839	0	0
2000	874	66	0	742	198	0
2002 (Including Devil Canyon)	660	0	354	660	0	354
2005 (Including Devil Canyon)	750	0	376	750	0	376
2010 (Including Devil Canyon)	900	0	493	900	0	493

On the basis of this evaluation, the ultimate power generation capability at Watana was selected as 1020 MW for design purposes, to allow a margin for hydro spinning reserve and standby for forced outage. This installation also provides a small margin in the event that the load growth exceeds the Battelle medium load forecast.

(c) Unit Capacity

Selection of the unit size for a given total capacity is a compromise between the initial least cost solution, generally involving a scheme with a smaller number of large capacity units, and the improved plant efficiency and security of operation provided by a larger number of smaller capacity units. Other factors include the size of each unit as a proportion of the total system load and the minimum anticipated load on the station. Any requirement for a minimum downstream flow would also affect the selection. Growth of the actual load demand is also a significant factor, since the installation of units may be phased to match the actual load growth. The number of units and their individual ratings were determined by the need to deliver the required peak capacity in the peak demand month of December, at the minimum December reservoir level, with the turbine wicket gates fully open.

An examination was made of the economic impact on power plant production costs of various combinations of a number of units and rated capacity, which would provide the selected total capacity of 1020 MW. For any given installed capacity, plant efficiency increases as the number of units increases. The assumed capitalized value used in this evaluation was \$1.00 per kWh, based on the economic analysis completed for the thermal generation system. Variations in the number of units and capacity will affect the cost of the power intakes, penstocks, powerhouse, and tailrace. The differences in these capital costs were estimated and included in the evaluation. The results of this analysis are presented below.

<u>Number of Units</u>	<u>Rated Capacity of Unit (MW)</u>	<u>Capitalized Value of Additional Energy (\$ Millions)</u>	<u>Additional Capital Cost (\$ Millions)</u>	<u>Net Benefit (\$ Millions)</u>
4	250	0	0	0
6	170	40	31	9
8	125	50	58	-8

It is apparent from this analysis that a six-unit scheme with a net benefit of approximately \$9 million is the most economic alternative. This scheme also offers a higher degree of flexibility and security of operation compared to the four-unit alternative,



as well as advantages if unit installation is phased to match actual load growth. The net economic benefit of the six unit scheme is \$17 million greater than that of the eight-unit scheme, while at the same time, no significant operational or scheduling advantages are associated with the eight-unit scheme.

A scheme incorporating six units each with a rated capacity of 170 MW, for a total of 1020 MW, has been adopted for all Watana alternatives.

9.7 - Selection of the Spillway Design Flood

Normal design practice for projects of this magnitude, together with applicable design regulations, require that the project be capable of passing the PMF routed through the reservoir without endangering the dam.

In addition to this requirement, the project should have sufficient spillway capacity to safely pass a major flood of lesser magnitude than the PMF without damaging the main dam or ancillary structures. The frequency of occurrence of this flood, known as the spillway design flood or Standard Project Flood (SPF), is generally selected on the basis of an evaluation of the risks to the project if the spillway design flood is exceeded, compared to the costs of the structures required to safely discharge the flood. For this study, a spillway design flood with a return frequency of 1:10,000 years was selected for Watana. A list of spillway design flood frequencies and magnitudes for several major projects is presented below.

Project	Spillway Design Flood		Basin PMF (cfs)	Spillway Capacity After Routing (cfs)*
	Frequency	Peak Inflow (cfs)		
Mica, Canada	PMF	250,000	250,000	150,000
Churchill Falls, Canada	1:10,000	600,000	1,000,000	230,000
New Bullards, USA	PMF	226,000	226,000	170,000
Oroville, USA	1:10,000	440,500	711,400	440,500
Guri, Venezuela (final stage)	PMF	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
Itaipu, Brazil	PMF	2,195,000	2,195,000	2,105,000
Sayano, USSR	1:10,000	480,000	N/A	680,000

All spillways except Sayano have capacity to pass PMF with surcharge.



The flood frequency analysis (see Section 7.2) produced the following values:

<u>Flood</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Inflow Peak</u>
Probable Maximum	--	326,000 cfs
Spillway Design	1:10,000 years	156,000 cfs

Additional capacity required to pass the PMF will be provided by an emergency spillway consisting of a fuse plug and rock channel on the right bank.

9.8 - Main Dam Alternatives

This section describes the alternative types of dam considered at the Watana site and the basis for the selected alternative.

(a) Comparison of Embankment and Concrete Type Dams

The selection between an embankment type or a concrete type dam is usually based on the configuration of the valley, the condition of the foundation rock, depth of the overburden, and the relative availability of construction materials. Previous studies by the COE envisaged an embankment dam at Watana. Initial studies completed this as part of this current evaluation included comparison of an earthfill dam with a concrete arch dam at the Watana site. An arrangement for a concrete arch dam alternative at Watana is presented in Plate 9.1. The results of this analysis indicated that the cost of the embankment dam was somewhat lower than the arch dam, even though the concrete costs used significantly lower than comparable costs used for Devil Canyon. This preliminary evaluation did not indicate any significant advantages to be gained by constructing the concrete arch relative to the arrangement of other structures, or the construction schedule.

Based on the overall cost differences described above, and the likelihood that the cost of the arch dam would increase relative to that of the embankment dam, the arch dam alternative was eliminated from further consideration.

(b) Selection of Dam Type

The development of the design of the main dam, together with a description of the various features of the dam, is given in Section 12. The dam is, of course, the central and most costly component of the project, and a brief discussion of the development of the finally selected design, together with some of the factors which influenced development of the general arrangement is presented in this section.

Selection of the configuration of the embankment dam cross-section was undertaken within the context of the following basic considerations:

- The availability of suitable construction materials within economic haul distance, particularly core material;
- The requirement that the dam be capable of withstanding the effects of a significant earthquake shock as well as the static loads imposed by the reservoir and its own weight;
- The relatively limited construction season available for placement of compacted fill materials.

The main dam will consist of a compacted core protected by fine and coarse filter zones on both the upstream and downstream slopes of the core. The upstream and downstream outer supporting fill zones will contain relatively free draining compacted gravel or rockfill, providing stability to the overall embankment structure. The location and inclination of the core is fundamental to the design of the embankment. Two basic alternatives exist in this regard:

- A vertical core located centrally within the dam; and
- An inclined core with both faces sloping upstream.

The advantages and disadvantages of these two alternatives are discussed in Section 12. A central vertical core was chosen for the embankment based on a review of precedent design and the nature of the available impervious material.

The exploration program undertaken during 1980-81 indicated that adequate quantities of materials suitable for dam construction were located within reasonable haul distance from the site. The potential borrow materials for the dam are discussed in Section 9.2. The well graded silty sand material from Borrow Site D is considered the most promising source of impervious fill. Compaction tests indicate a natural moisture content slightly on the wet side of optimum moisture content, so that control of moisture content will be critical in achieving a dense core with high shear strength.

Potential sources for the upstream and downstream shells include either river gravel from borrow areas along the Susitna River, or compacted rockfill from quarries or excavations for spillways.

During the intermediate review process, the upstream slope of the dam was flattened from 2.5H:1V used during the initial review to 2.75H:1V. This slope was based on a conservative estimate of the effective shear strength parameters of the available construction materials, as well as a conservative allowance in the design for the effects of earthquake loadings on the dam.

During the final review stage, the exterior upstream slope of the dam was steepened from 2.75H:1V to 2.4H:1V, reflecting the results of the preliminary static and dynamic design analyses being undertaken at the same time as the general arrangement studies. As

part of the final review, the volume of the dam with an upstream slope of 2.4H:1V was computed for four alternative dam axes. The location of these alternative axes are shown on Plate 9.2. The dam volume associated with each of the four alternative axes is listed below:

<u>Alternative Axis Number</u>	<u>Total Volume (million yd³)</u>
1	69.2
2	71.7
3	69.3
4	71.9

A section with a 2.4H:1V upstream slope and a 2.H:1V downstream slope located on alternative axis number 3, was used for the final review of alternative schemes. Further refinements to the design were subsequently incorporated in the final design presented in Section 12.

9.9 - Diversion Scheme Alternatives

The topography of the site generally dictates that diversion of the river during construction be accomplished using diversion tunnels with upstream and downstream cofferdams protecting the main construction area.

The configuration of the river in the vicinity of the site favors location of the diversion tunnels on the right bank, since the tunnel length for a tunnel on the left bank would be approximately 2,000 feet greater. In addition, rock conditions on the right bank are more favorable for tunneling and excavation of intake and outlet portals.

(a) Design Flood for Diversion

The recurrence interval of the design flood for diversion is generally established based on the characteristics of the flow regime of the river, the length of the construction period for which diversion is required and the probable consequences of overtopping of the cofferdams. For this feasibility analysis, design criteria and experience from other projects similar in scope and nature have been used in selecting the diversion design flood.

At Watana, damage to the partially completed dam could be significant, or more importantly, would probably result in at least one-year delay in the completion schedule. A preliminary evaluation of the construction schedule indicates that the diversion scheme would be required for 4 or 5 years until the dam is of sufficient height to permit initial filling of the reservoir. A design flood with a return frequency of 1:50 years was selected based on experience and practice with other major hydroelectric projects. This approximates a 90 percent probability that the cofferdam will not

be overtopped during the 5-year construction period. The diversion design flood together with average flow characteristics of the river significant to diversion are presented below:

Average annual flow	7,940 cfs
Maximum average monthly flow	23,100 cfs (June)
Minimum average monthly flow	890 cfs (March)
Design flood inflow (1:50 years)	81,100 cfs

(b) Cofferdams

For the purposes of establishing the overall general arrangement of the project and for subsequent diversion optimization studies, the upstream cofferdam section adopted comprises an initial closure dam structure approximately 30 feet high placed in the wet.

(c) Diversion Tunnels

A basic consideration in evaluation of any diversion tunnel scheme is an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of concrete-lined tunnels compared to unlined tunnels. Preliminary hydraulic studies indicated that the design flood routed through the diversion scheme would result in a design discharge of approximately 80,500 cfs. For concrete-lined tunnels, design velocities of the order of 50 feet per second have been used in several projects. For unlined tunnels, maximum design velocities rang from 10 ft/s in good quality rock to 4 ft/s in less competent material are typical. Thus, the volume of material to be excavated using an unlined tunnel would be at least 5 times that for lined tunnel. The reliability of an unlined tunnel is more dependent on rock conditions than is a lined tunnel, particularly given the extended period during which the diversion scheme is required to operate. These considerations, together with the considerable higher cost and the somewhat questionable feasibility of four unlined tunnels with diameters approaching 50 feet in this type of rock, are considered sufficient to eliminate consideration of unlined tunnels for the diversion scheme.

The following alternative lined tunnel schemes were examined as part of this analysis:

- Pressure tunnel with a free outlet;
- Pressure tunnel with a submerged outlet; and
- Free flow tunnel.

(d) Emergency Release Facilities

The emergency release facilities influenced the number, type, and arrangement of the diversion tunnels selected for the final scheme.

At an early stage of the study, it was established that some form of low level release facility was required to permit lowering of the reservoir in the event of an extreme emergency, and to meet instream flow requirements during filling of the reservoir. The most economical alternative available would involve converting one of the diversion tunnels to permanent use as a low level outlet facility. Since it would be necessary to maintain the diversion scheme in service during construction of the low level outlet works, two or more diversion tunnels would be required. The use of two diversion tunnels also provides an additional measure of security to the diversion scheme in case of the loss of service of one tunnel.

The low level release facilities will be operated approximately three years during filling of the reservoir. Discharge at high heads usually requires some form of energy dissipation prior to returning the flow to the river. Given the space restrictions imposed by the size of the diversion tunnel, it was decided to utilize a double expansion system constructed within the upper tunnel.

(e) Optimization of Diversion Scheme

Given the considerations described above relative to design flows, cofferdam configuration and alternative types of tunnels, an economic study was undertaken to determine the optimum combination of upstream cofferdam height and tunnel diameter.

Capital costs were developed for three heights of upstream cofferdam embankment with a 30-foot-wide crest and exterior slopes of 2H:1V. A freeboard allowance of 5 feet for settlement and wave runup and 10 feet for the effects of downstream ice jamming on tailwater elevations was adopted.

Capital costs for the 4,700 foot long tunnel alternatives included allowances for excavation, concrete liner, rock bolts, and steel supports. Costs were also developed for the upstream and downstream portals, including excavation and support. The cost of intake gate structures and associated gates was determined not to vary significantly with tunnel diameter and was excluded from the analysis.

Curves of headwater elevation versus tunnel diameter for the various tunnel alternatives with submerged and free outlets are presented in Figure 9.5. The relationship between capital cost and crest elevation for the upstream cofferdam is shown in Figure 9.6. The capital cost for various tunnel diameters with free and submerged outlets is given in Figure 9.7.

The results of the optimization study are presented in Figure 9.8, and indicate the following optimum solutions for each alternative.

<u>Type of Tunnel</u>	<u>Diameter (feet)</u>	<u>Cofferdam Crest Elevation (ft)</u>	<u>Total Cost (\$)</u>
Two pressure tunnels	30	1595	66,000,000
Two free flow tunnels	32.5	1580	68,000,000
Two free flow tunnels	35	1555	69,000,000

The cost studies indicate that a relatively small cost differential (4 to 5 percent) separates the various alternatives for tunnel diameter from 30 to 35 feet.

(f) Selected Diversion Scheme

An important consideration at this point is ease of cofferdam closure. For the pressure tunnel scheme, the invert of the tunnel entrance is below riverbed elevation, and once the tunnel is complete diversion can be accomplished with a closure dam section approximately 10 feet high. The free flow tunnel scheme however requires a tunnel invert approximately 30 feet above the riverbed level, and diversion will involve an end-dumped closure section 50 feet high. Two basic problems are associated with closure embankments of 50 feet high - velocities during final closure would be quite high, thus requiring large size stone, and subsequent sealing of the closure embankment in the wet must be done at significant depth, with relatively no control compared to the lower essentially dry embankment.

Based on the preceding considerations, a combination of one pressure tunnel and one free flow tunnel (or pressure tunnel with free outlet) was adopted. This will permit initial diversion to be made using the lower pressure tunnel, thereby simplifying the critical closure operation and avoiding potentially serious delays in the schedule. Two alternatives were re-evaluated as follows:

<u>Tunnel Diameter (feet)</u>	<u>Upstream Cofferdam</u>	
	<u>Crest Elevation (feet)</u>	<u>Approximate Height (feet)</u>
30	1595	150
35	1555	110

More detailed layout studies indicated that the higher cofferdam associated with the 30 foot diameter tunnel alternative would require locating the inlet portal further upstream into "The Fins" shear zone. Since good rock conditions for portal construction are essential, and the 35 foot diameter tunnel alternative would permit a portal location downstream of "The Fins", this latter alternative was adopted. As noted in (e), the overall cost difference was not significant in the range of tunnel diameters considered, and the scheme incorporating two 35 foot diameter tunnels with an upstream cofferdam crest Elevation 1555 was incorporated as part of the selected general arrangement.

The various components of the selected diversion scheme are described in Section 12.

9.10 - Spillway Facilities Alternatives

As discussed in Section 9.7, the project has been designed to safely pass floods with the following return frequencies:

<u>Flood</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Total Spillway Discharge (cfs)</u>
Spillway Design	1:10,000 years	145,000
Probable Maximum	--	310,000

Discharge of the spillway design flood will require a gated service spillway on either the left or right bank. Three basic alternative spillway types were examined:

- Chute spillway with flip bucket;
- Chute spillway with stilling basin; and
- Cascade spillway.

Consideration was also given to combinations of these alternatives with or without supplemental facilities such as valved tunnels and an emergency spillway fuse plug for handling the PMF discharge.

Clearly, the selected spillway alternatives will greatly influence and be influenced by the project general arrangement.

(a) Energy Dissipation

The two chute spillway alternatives considered achieved effective energy dissipation either by means of a flip bucket which directs the spillway discharge in the form of a free-fall jet into a plunge pool well downstream from the dam or a stilling basin at the end of the chute which dissipates energy in a hydraulic jump. The cascade type spillway limits the free fall height of the discharge by utilizing a series of 20 to 50 feet steps down to river level, with energy dissipation at each step.

All spillway alternatives were assumed to incorporate a concrete ogee type control section controlled by fixed roller vertical lift gates. Chute spillway sections were assumed to be concrete lined, with ample provision for air entrainment in the chute to prevent cavitation, and with pressure relief drains, and rock anchors in the foundation. A detailed description of the selected spillway alternative is given in Section 12.

(b) Environmental Mitigation

During development of the general arrangements for both the Watana and Devil Canyon dams, a restriction was imposed on the amount of excess dissolved nitrogen permitted in the spillway discharges.

Supersaturation occurs when aerated flows are subjected to pressures greater than 30 to 40 feet of head which forces excess nitrogen into solution. This occurs when water is subjected to the high pressures that occur in deep plunge pools or at large hydraulic jumps. The excess nitrogen would not be dissipated within the downstream Devil Canyon reservoir and a buildup of nitrogen concentration could occur throughout the body of water. It would eventually be discharged downstream from Devil Canyon with harmful effects on the fish population. On the basis of an evaluation of the related impacts, and discussions with interested federal and state agencies, spillway facilities were designed to limit discharges of water from either Watana or Devil Canyon that may become supersaturated with nitrogen to a recurrence period of not less than 1:50 years.

9.11 - Power Facilities Alternative

Selection of the optimum power plant development involved consideration of the following:

- Location, type and size of the power plant;
- Geotechnical considerations;
- Number, type, size and setting of generating units;
- Arrangement of intake and water passages; and
- Environmental constraints.

The selection of the installed capacity of 1020 MW at Watana is described in Section 9.6. The detailed comparison of power facilities alternatives is described in Appendix B. A summary of the general conclusions is described below.

(a) Comparison of Surface and Underground Powerhouse

Studies were carried out to compare the construction costs of a surface powerhouse and of an underground powerhouse at Watana. These studies were undertaken on the basis of preliminary conceptual layouts assuming six units and a total installed capacity of 840 MW. The comparative cost estimates for powerhouse civil works and electrical and mechanical equipment (excluding common items) indicated an advantage in favor of the underground powerhouse of \$16,300,000. The additional cost for the surface powerhouse arrangement is primarily associated with the longer penstocks and the steel linings required. Although construction cost estimates for a 1020 MW plant would be somewhat higher, the overall conclusion favoring the underground location would not change.

The underground powerhouse arrangement is also better suited to the severe winter conditions in Alaska, is less affected by river flood flows in summer, and is aesthetically less obtrusive. This arrangement has therefore been adopted for further development.

(b) Comparison of Alternative Locations

Preliminary studies were undertaken during the development of conceptual project layouts at Watana to investigate both right and left bank locations for power facilities. The configuration of the site is such that left bank locations generally required longer penstock and/or tailrace tunnels and were therefore more expensive.

The location of the left bank was further rejected because of indications that the underground facilities would be located in relatively poor quality rock. The underground powerhouse was therefore located on the right bank such that the major openings lay between the two major shear features ("The Fins" and the "Fingerbuster").

(c) Underground Openings

Because no construction adits or extensive drilling in the powerhouse and tunnel locations have been completed it has been assumed that full concrete-lining of the penstocks and tailrace tunnels will be required. This assumption is conservative and is for preliminary design only; in practice, a large proportion of the tailrace tunnels will probably be unlined, depending on the actual rock quality encountered.

The minimum center-to-center spacing of rock tunnels and caverns has been assumed for layout studies to be 2.5 times the width or diameter of the larger excavation.

(d) Selection of Turbines

The selection of turbine type is governed by the available head and flow. For the design head and specific speed, Francis type turbines have been selected. Francis turbines have a reasonably flat load-efficiency curve over a range from about 50 percent to 115 percent of rated output with peak efficiency of about 92 percent.

The number and rating of individual units is discussed in detail in Section 9.6. The final selected arrangement comprised six units producing 170 MW each, rated at minimum reservoir level (from reservoir simulation studies) in the peak demand month (December) at full gate. The unit output at best efficiency and a rated head of 680 feet is 181 MW.

(e) Transformers

The selection of transformer type, size, location and step-up rating is described in Section 12.18 and summarized below:

- Single phase transformers are required because of transport limitations on Alaskan roads and railways;

- Direct transformation from 15 kV to 345 kV is preferred for overall system transient stability;
- An underground transformer gallery has been selected for minimum total cost of transformers, cables, bus, and transformer losses, and
- A grouped arrangement of three sets of three single-phase transformers for each set of two units has been selected (a total of nine transformers) to reduce the physical size of the transformer gallery and to provide a transformer spacing comparable with the unit spacing.

(f) Power Intake and Water Passages

The power intake and approach channel are significant items in the cost of the overall power facilities arrangement. The size of the intake is controlled by the number and minimum spacing between the penstocks, which in turn is dictated by geotechnical considerations (Sections 9.2 and 9.3).

The preferred penstock arrangement comprises six individual penstocks, one for each turbine. With this arrangement, no inlet valve is required in the powerhouse since penstock dewatering can be performed by using the control gate at the intake. An alternative arrangement with three penstocks was considered in detail to assess any possible advantages. This scheme would require a bifurcation and two inlet valves on each penstock and extra space in the powerhouse to accommodate the inlet valves. Estimates of relative cost differences are summarized below:

Item	Cost Difference (\$ x 10 ⁶)	
	<u>6 Penstocks</u>	<u>3 Penstocks</u>
Intake	Base Case	-20.0
Penstocks	0	- 3.0
Bifurcations	0	+ 3.0
Valves	0	+ 4.0
Powerhouse	0	+ 8.0
Capitalized Value of Extra Head Loss	<u>0</u>	<u>+ 6.0</u>
Total	0	- 2.0

Despite a marginal saving of \$2 million (or less than 2 percent in a total estimated cost of \$120 million) in favor of three penstocks, the arrangement of six individual penstocks has been retained. This arrangement provides improved flexibility and security of operation.

The preliminary design of the power facilities involves two tailrace tunnels leading from a common surge chamber. An alternative arrangement with a single tailrace tunnel was also considered, but no significant cost saving was apparent.

Optimization studies on all water passages were carried out to determine the minimum total cost of initial construction plus the capitalized value of anticipated energy losses caused by conduit friction, bends and changes of section. For the penstock optimization, the construction costs of the intake and approach channel were included, as a function of the penstock diameter and spacing. Similarly, in the optimization studies for the tailrace tunnels, the costs of the surge chamber were included, as a function of tailrace tunnel diameter.

(g) Environmental Constraints

Apart from the potential nitrogen supersaturation problem discussed in Section 9.10, the major environmental constraints on the design of the power facilities are:

- Control of downstream river temperatures; and
- Control of downstream flows.

The intake design has been modified to enable power plant flows to be drawn from the reservoir at four different levels throughout the anticipated range of reservoir drawdown for energy production in order to control the downstream river temperatures within acceptable limits.

Minimum flows at Gold Creek during the critical summer months have been studied to mitigate the project impacts on salmon spawning downstream of Devil Canyon. These minimum flows represent a constraint on the reservoir operation, and influence the computation of average and firm energy produced by the Susitna development. These studies are discussed in detail in Section 15.

The Watana development will be operated as a daily peaking plant for load following. The actual extent of daily peaking will be dictated by unit availability, unit size, system demand, system stability, generating costs, etc., (as described in Section 15).

9.12 - Selection of Watana General Arrangement

Preliminary alternative arrangements of the Watana Project were developed and subjected to a series of review and screening processes. The layouts selected from each screening process were developed in greater detail prior to the next review, and where necessary, additional layouts were prepared combining the features of two or more of the alternatives. Assumptions and criteria were evaluated at each stage and additional data incorporated as necessary. The selection process followed the general selection methodology established for the Susitna project, and is outlined below.

(a) Selection Methodology

The determination of the project general arrangement at Watana was undertaken in three distinct review stages: preliminary, intermediate, and final.

(i) Preliminary Review (completed early in 1981)

This comprised four steps:

- Step 1: Assemble available data; Determine design criteria; and Establish evaluation criteria.
- Step 2: Develop preliminary layouts and design criteria based on the above data including all plausible alternatives for the constituent facilities and structures.
- Step 3: Review all layouts on the basis of technical feasibility, readily apparent cost differences, safety, and environmental impact.
- Step 4: Select those layouts that can be identified as most favorable, based on the evaluation criteria established in Step 1, taking into account the preliminary nature of the work at this stage.

(ii) Intermediate Review (completed by mid-1981)

This involved a series of 5 steps:

- Step 1: Review all data, incorporating additional data from other work tasks.

Review and expand design criteria to a greater level of detail.

Review evaluation criteria and modify, if necessary.
- Step 2: Revise selected layouts on basis of the revised criteria and additional data. Prepare plans and principal sections of layouts.
- Step 3: Prepare quantity estimates for major structures based on drawings prepared under Step 2.

Develop a preliminary construction schedule to evaluate whether or not the selected layout will allow completion of the project within the required time frame.

Prepare a preliminary contractor's type estimate to determine the overall cost of each scheme.

- Step 4: Review all layouts on the basis of technical feasibility, cost impact of possible unknown conditions and uncertainty of assumptions, safety, and environmental impact.
- Step 5: Select the two most favorable layouts based on the evaluation criteria determined under Step 1.

(iii) Final Review (completed early in 1982)

- Step 1: Assemble and review any additional data from other work tasks.

Revise design criteria in accordance with additional available data.

Finalize overall evaluation criteria.

- Step 2: Revise or further develop the two layouts on the basis of input from Step 1 and determine overall dimensions of structures, water passages, gates, and other key items.
- Step 3: Prepare quantity take-offs for all major structures.

Review cost components within a preliminary contractor's type estimate using the most recent data and criteria, and develop a construction schedule.

Determine overall direct cost of schemes.

- Step 4: Review all layouts on the basis of practicability, technical feasibility, cost, impact of possible unknown conditions, safety, and environmental impact.
- Step 5: Select the final layout on the basis of the evaluation criteria developed under Step 1.

(b) Design Data and Criteria

As discussed above, the review process included assembling relevant design data, establishing preliminary design criteria, and expanding and refining these data during the intermediate and final reviews of the project arrangement. The design data and design criteria which evolved through the final review is presented in Table 9.3. Data and criteria developed during the preliminary and intermediate review stages are given in Appendix B for reference.

(c) Evaluation Criteria

The various layouts were evaluated at each stage of the review process on the basis of the criteria summarized in Table 9.4. The criteria listed in Table 9.4 illustrate the progressively more detailed evaluation process leading to the final selected arrangement.

9.13 - Preliminary Review

The development selection studies described in Section 8 involved comparisons of hydroelectric schemes at a number of sites on the Susitna River. As part of these comparisons a preliminary conceptual design was developed for Watana incorporating a double stilling basin type spillway (Plate 8.2).

Eight further layouts were subsequently prepared and examined for the Watana project during this preliminary review process, in addition to the scheme shown on Plate 8.2. These eight layouts are shown in schematic form on Plate 9.3. Alternative 1 of these layouts was the scheme recommended for further study in the Development Selection Report (3).

This section describes the preliminary review undertaken of alternative Watana layouts.

(a) Basis of Comparison of Alternatives

Although it was recognized that provision would have to be made for downstream releases of water during filling of the reservoir and for emergency reservoir drawdown, these features were not incorporated in these preliminary layouts. These facilities would either be inter-connected with the diversion tunnels or be provided for separately. Since the system selected would be similar for all layouts with minimal cost differences and little impact on other structures, it was decided to exclude these facilities from overall assessment at this early stage.

Ongoing geotechnical explorations had identified the two major shear zones crossing the Susitna River and running roughly parallel in the northwest direction. These zones enclose a stretch of watercourse approximately 4500 feet in length (see Section 9.2). Preliminary evaluation of the existing geological data indicated highly fractured and altered materials within the actual shear zones, which would pose serious problems for conventional tunneling methods and would be unsuitable for founding of massive concrete structures. The originally proposed dam axis was located between these shear zones, and as no apparent major advantage appeared to be gained from large changes in the dam location, layouts generally were kept within the confines of these bounding zones.

An earth and rockfill dam as described in Section 9.8 was used as the basis for all layouts. The downstream slope of the dam was assumed as 2H:1V in all alternatives, upstream slopes varying between 2.5H:1V and 2.25H:1V were examined in order to determine the influence of variance in the dam slope on the congestion of the layout. In all these preliminary arrangements, except that shown on Plate 8.2, cofferdams were incorporated within the body of the main dam.

Floods greater than the routed 1:10,000 year spillway design flood and up to the probable maximum flood were assumed to be passed by surcharging the spillways except in cases where an unlined cascade or stilling basin type spillway served as the sole discharge facility. In such instances, under large surcharges, these spillways would not act as efficient energy dissipators but would be drowned out, acting as steep open channels with the possibility of their total destruction. In order to avoid such an occurrence the design flood for these latter spillways was considered as the routed probable maximum flood.

On the basis of information existing at the time of the preliminary review, it appeared that an underground powerhouse could be located on either side of the river. A surface powerhouse on the right bank appeared feasible but was precluded from the left bank by the close proximity of the downstream toe of the dam and the adjacent broad shear zone. Locating the powerhouse further downstream would require tunneling across the shear zone, which would be expensive, and excavating a talus slope. Furthermore, it was found that a left bank surface powerhouse would either interfere with a left bank spillway or would be directly impacted by discharges from a right bank spillway.

(b) Description of Alternative

(i) Double Stilling Basin Scheme

The Scheme as shown on Plate 8.2 has a dam axis location similar to that originally proposed by the COE, and a right bank double stilling basin spillway. The spillway follows the shortest line to the river avoiding interference with the dam and discharging downstream, almost parallel to the flow, into the center of the river. A substantial amount of excavation is required for the chute and stilling basins, although most of this material could probably be used in the dam. A large volume of concrete is also required for this type of spillway, resulting in a spillway system that would be very costly. The maximum head dissipated within each stilling basin is approximately 450 feet. Within world experience, cavitation and erosion of the chute and basins should not be a problem if the structures are properly designed. Extensive erosion downstream would not be expected.

The diversion follows the shortest route, cutting the bend of the river on the right bank, and has inlet portals as far upstream as possible without having to tunnel through "The Fins". It is possible that the underground powerhouse is in the area of "The Fingerbuster", but the powerhouse could be located upstream almost as far as the system of drain holes and galleries just downstream of the main dam grout curtain.

(ii) Alternative 1

This alternative is that recommended for further study in the Development Selection Report (3) and is similar to the layout described in (i) above, except that the right side of the dam has been rotated clockwise, the axis relocated upstream and the spillway changed to a chute and flip bucket. The revised dam alignment resulted in a slight reduction in total dam volume compared to the above alternative. A localized downstream curve was introduced in the dam close to the right abutment in order to reduce the length of the spillway. The alignment of the spillway is almost parallel to the downstream section of the river and it discharges into a pre-excavated plunge pool in the river approximately 800 feet downstream from the flip bucket. This type of spillway should be considerably less costly than one incorporating a stilling basin, provided that excessive pre-excavation of bedrock within the plunge pool area is not required. Careful design of the bucket will be required however, to prevent excessive erosion downstream causing undermining of the valley sides and/or build up of material downstream which could cause elevation of the tailwater levels.

(iii) Alternatives 2 through 2D

Alternative 2 consists of a left bank cascade spillway with the main dam axis curving downstream at the abutments. The cascade spillway would require an extremely large volume of rock excavation but it is probable that most of this material, with careful scheduling, could be used in the dam. The excavation would cross "The Fingerbuster" and extensive dental concrete would be required in that area. In the upstream portion of the spillway, velocities would be relatively high because of the narrow configuration of the channel and erosion could take place in this area in proximity to the dam. The discharge from the spillway enters the river perpendicular to the general flow but velocities would be relatively low and should not cause substantial erosion problems. The powerhouse is in the most suitable location for a surface alternative where the bedrock is close to the surface and the overall rock slope is approximately 2H:1V.

Alternative 2A is similar to Alternative 2 except that the upper end of the channel is divided and separate control structures are provided. This division would allow the use of one structure or upstream channel while maintenance or remedial work is being performed on the other.

Alternative 2B is similar to Alternative 2 except that the cascade spillway is replaced by a double stilling basin type structure. This spillway is somewhat longer than the similar type of structure on the right bank in the alternative described in (i) above. However, the slope of the ground is less than the rather steep right bank and thus, it may be easier to construct, a factor which may partly mitigate the cost of the longer structure. The discharge is at a sharp angle to the river and being more concentrated than the cascade could cause erosion of the opposite bank.

Alternative 2C is a derivative of 2B with a similar arrangement, except that the double stilling basin spillway is reduced in size and augmented by an additional emergency spillway in the form of an inclined, unlined rock channel. Under this arrangement the concrete spillway acts as the main spillway, passing the 1:10,000 year design flood with greater flows passed down the unlined channel which is closed at its upstream end by an erodable fuse plug. The problems of erosion of the opposite bank still remain, although these could be overcome by excavation and/or slope protection. Erosion of the chute would be extreme for significant flows, although it is highly unlikely that this emergency spillway would ever be used.

Alternative 2D replaces the cascade of Alternative 2 with a lined chute and flip bucket. The comments relative to the flip bucket are the same as for Alternative 1 except that the left bank location in this instance requires a longer chute, partly offset by lower construction costs because of the flatter slope. The flip bucket discharges into the river at an angle which may cause erosion of the opposite bank. The underground powerhouse is located on the right bank, an arrangement which provides an overall reduction of the length of the water passages.

(iv) Alternative 3

This arrangement has a dam axis location slightly upstream from Alternative 2, but retains the downstream curve at the abutments. The main spillway is an unlined rock cascade on the left bank which passes the design flood. Discharges beyond the 1:10,000 year flood would be discharged through the auxiliary concrete-lined chute and flip bucket spillway on the right bank. A gated control structure is provided for this auxiliary spillway which gives it the flexibility

to be used as a backup if maintenance should be required on the main spillway. Erosion of the cascade may be a problem, as mentioned previously, but erosion downstream should be a less important consideration because of the low unit discharge and the infrequent operation of the spillway. The diversion tunnels are situated in the right abutment, as with previous arrangements, and are of similar cost for all these alternatives.

(v) Alternative 4

This alternative involves rotating the axis of the main dam so that the left abutment is relocated approximately 1000 feet downstream from its Alternative 2 location. The relocation results in a reduction in the overall dam quantities but would require siting the impervious core of the dam directly over the "Fingerbuster" shear zone at maximum dam height. The left bank spillway, consisting of chute and flip bucket, is reduced in length compared to other left bank locations, as are the power facility water passages. The diversion tunnels are situated on the left bank; there is no advantage to a right bank location, since the tunnels are of similar length owing to the overall downstream relocation of the dam. Spillways and power facilities would also be lengthened by a right bank location with this dam configuration.

(c) Selection of Schemes for Further Study

A basic consideration during design development was that the main dam core should not cross the major shear zones because of the obvious problems with treatment of the foundation. Accordingly, there is very little scope for realigning the main dam apart from a slight rotation to place it more at right angles to the river.

Location of the spillway on the right bank results in a shorter distance to the river and allows discharges almost parallel to the general direction of river flow. The double stilling basin arrangement would be extremely expensive, particularly if it must be designed to pass the probable maximum flood. An alternative such as 2C would reduce the magnitude of design flood to be passed by the spillway but would only be acceptable if an emergency spillway with a high degree of operational predictability could be constructed. A flip bucket spillway on the right bank, discharging directly down the river, would appear to be an economic arrangement, although some scour might occur in the plunge pool area. A cascade spillway on the left bank could be an acceptable solution providing most of the excavated material could be used in the dam, and adequate rock conditions exist.

The length of diversion tunnels can be decreased if they are located on the right bank. In addition, the tunnels would be accessible by a preliminary access road from the north, which is the most likely route. This location would also avoid the area of "The Fingerbuster" and the steep cliffs which would be encountered on the left side close to the downstream dam toe.

The underground configuration assumed for the powerhouse in these preliminary studies allows for location on either side of the river with a minimum of interference with the surface structures.

Four of the preceding layouts, or variations of them, were selected for further study:

- (i) A variation of the double stilling basin scheme, but with a single stilling basin main spillway on the right bank, a rock channel and fuse plug emergency spillway, a left bank underground powerhouse and a right bank diversion scheme;
- (ii) Alternative 1 with a right bank flip bucket spillway, an underground powerhouse on the left bank, and right bank diversion;
- (iii) A variation of Alternative 2 with a reduced capacity main spillway and a right bank rock channel with a fuse plug serving as an emergency spillway; and
- (iv) Alternative 4 with a left bank rock cascade spillway, a right bank underground powerhouse, and a right bank diversion.

9.14 - Intermediate Review

For the intermediate review process, the four schemes selected as a result of the preliminary review were examined in more detail and modified. A description of each of the schemes is given below and shown on Plates 9.4 through 9.9. The general locations of the upstream and downstream shear zones shown on these plates are approximate, and have been refined on the basis of subsequent field investigations for the design studies described in Section 12.

(a) Description of Alternative Schemes

The four schemes are shown on Plates 9.4 through 9.9:

(i) Scheme WP1 (Plate 9.4)

This scheme is a refinement of Alternative 1. The upstream slope of the dam is flattened from 2.5:1 to 2.75:1. This conservative approach was adopted to provide an assessment of the possible impacts on project layout of conceivable measures which prove necessary in dealing with severe earthquake design conditions. Uncertainty with regard to

the nature of river alluvium also led to the location of the cofferdams outside the limits of the main dam embankment. As a result of these conditions, the intake portals of the diversion tunnels on the right bank are also moved upstream from "The Fins". A chute spillway with a flip bucket is located on the right bank. The underground powerhouse is located on the left bank.

(ii) Scheme WP2 (Plates 9.6 and 9.7)

This scheme is derived from the double stilling basin layout. The main dam and diversion facilities are similar to Scheme WP1 except that the downstream cofferdam is relocated further downstream from the spillway outlet, and the diversion tunnels are correspondingly extended. The main spillway is located on the right bank, but the two stilling basins of the preliminary DSR scheme are combined into a single stilling basin at the river level. An emergency spillway is also located on the right bank, and consists of a channel excavated in rock, discharging downstream from the area of the relict channel. The channel is closed at its upstream end by a compacted earthfill fuse plug and is capable of discharging the flow differential between the probable maximum flood and the 1:10,000-year design flood of the main spillway. The underground powerhouse is located on the left bank.

(iii) Scheme WP3 (Plates 9.5 and 9.6)

This scheme is similar to Scheme WP1 in all respects, except that an emergency spillway is added, consisting of right bank rock channel and fuse plug.

(iv) Scheme WP4 (Plates 9.8 and 9.9)

The dam location and geometry for Scheme WP4 are similar to that for the other schemes. The diversion is on the right bank and discharges downstream from the powerhouse tailrace outlet. A rock cascade spillway is located on the left bank and is served by two separate control structures with downstream stilling basins. The underground powerhouse is located on the right bank.

(b) Comparison of Schemes

The main dam is in the same location and has the same configuration for each of the four layouts considered. The cofferdams have been located outside the limits of the main dam in order to allow more extensive excavation of the alluvial material and to ensure a sound rock foundation beneath the complete area of the dam. The overall design of the dam is conservative, and it was recognized during the evaluation that savings in both fill and excavation costs can probably be made after more detailed study.

The diversion tunnels are located on the right bank. The upstream flattening of the dam slope necessitates the location of the diversion inlets upstream from "The Fins" shear zone which will require extensive excavation and support where the tunnels pass through this extremely poor rock zone and could cause delays in the construction schedule.

A low-lying area exists on the right bank in the area of the relict channel and requires an approximately 50-foot high saddle dam for closure, given the reservoir operating level assumed for the comparison study. As discussed in Section 9.5, however, the finally selected reservoir operating level will require only a nominal freeboard structure at this location.

A summary of capital cost estimates for the four alternative schemes is given in Table 9.5.

The results of this intermediate analysis indicate that the chute spillway with flip bucket (Scheme WP1) is the least costly spillway alternative.

The scheme has the additional advantage of relatively simple operating characteristics. The control structure has provision for surcharging to pass the design flood. The probable maximum flood can be passed by additional surcharging up to the crest level of the dam. In Scheme WP3 a similar spillway is provided, except that the control structure is reduced in size and discharges above the routed design flood are passed through the rock channel emergency spillway. The arrangement in Scheme WP1 does not provide a backup facility to the main spillway, so that if repairs caused by excessive plunge pool erosion or damage to the structure itself require removal of the spillway from service for any length of time, no alternative discharge facility would be available. The additional spillway of Scheme WP3 would permit emergency discharge if it were required under extreme circumstances.

The stilling basin spillway (Scheme WP2) would reduce the potential for extensive erosion downstream, but high velocities in the lower part of the chute could cause cavitation even with the provision for aeration of the discharge. This type of spillway would be very costly, as can be seen from Table 9.5.

The feasibility of the rock cascade spillway is entirely dependent on the quality of the rock, which dictates the amount of treatment required for the rock surface and also the proportion of the excavated material which can be used in the dam. For determining the capital cost of Scheme WP4, conservative assumptions were made regarding surface treatment and the portion of material that would have to be wasted.

The diversion tunnels are located on the right bank for all alternatives examined in the intermediate review. For Scheme WP2, the downstream portals must be located downstream from the stilling basin, resulting in an increase of approximately 800 feet in the length of the tunnels. The left bank location of the powerhouse requires its placement close to a suspected shear zone, with the tailrace tunnels passing through this shear zone to reach the river. A longer access tunnel is also required, together with an additional 1,000 feet in the length of the tailrace. The left-side location is remote from the main access road, which will probably be on the north side of the river, as will the transmission corridor.

(c) Selection of Schemes for Further Study

Examination of the technical and economic aspects of Scheme WP1 through WP4 indicates there is little scope for adjustment of the dam axis owing to the confinement imposed by the upstream and downstream shear zones. In addition, passage of the diversion tunnels through the upstream shear zone could result in significant delays in construction and additional cost.

From a comparison of costs in Table 9.5, it can be seen that the flip bucket type spillway is the most economical, but because of the potential for erosion under extensive operation it is undesirable to use it as the only discharge facility. A mid-level release will be required for emergency drawdown of the reservoir, and use of this release as the first-stage service spillway with the flip bucket as a backup facility would combine flexibility and safety of operation with reasonable cost. The emergency rock channel spillway would be retained for discharge of flows above the routed 1:10,000-year flood.

The stilling basin spillway is very costly and the operating head of 800 feet is beyond precedent experience. Erosion downstream should not be a problem but cavitation of the chute could occur. Scheme WP2 was therefore eliminated from further consideration.

The cascade spillway was also not favored for technical and economic reasons. However, this arrangement does have an advantage in that it provides a means of preventing nitrogen supersaturation in the downstream discharges from the project which could be harmful to the fish population, as discussed in Section 9.10. A cascade configuration would reduce the dissolved nitrogen content, and hence, this alternative was retained for further evaluation. The capacity of the cascade was reduced and the emergency rock channel spillway was included to take the extreme floods.

The results of the intermediate review indicated that the following components should be incorporated into any scheme carried forward for final review:

- Two diversion tunnels located on the right bank of the river;
- An underground powerhouse also located on the right bank;
- An emergency spillway, comprising a rock channel excavated on the right bank and discharging well downstream from the right abutment. The channel is sealed by an erodible fuse plug of impervious material designed to fail if overtopped by the reservoir; and
- A compacted earthfill and rockfill dam situated between the two major shear zones which traverse the project site.

As discussed above, two specific alternative methods exist with respect to routing of the spillway design flood and minimizing the adverse effects of nitrogen supersaturation on the downstream fish population. These alternatives are:

- A chute spillway with flip bucket on the right bank to pass the spillway design flood, with a mid-level release system designed to operate for floods with a frequency of up to about 1:50 years; or
- A cascade spillway on the left bank.

Accordingly, two schemes were developed for further evaluation as part of the final review process. These schemes are described separately in the paragraphs below.

9.15 - Final Review

The two schemes considered in the final review process were essentially deviations of Schemes WP3 and WP4.

(a) Scheme WP3A (Plate 9.10)

This scheme is a modified version of Scheme WP3 described in Section 9.14. Because of scheduling and cost considerations, it is extremely important to maintain the diversion tunnels downstream from "The Fins." It is also important to keep the dam axis as far upstream as possible to avoid congestion of the downstream structures. For these reasons, the inlet portals to the diversion tunnels were located in the sound bedrock forming the downstream boundary of "The Fins." The upstream cofferdam and main dam are maintained in the upstream locations as shown on Plate 9.10. As mentioned previously, additional criteria have necessitated modifications in the spillway configuration, and low-level and emergency drawdown outlets have been introduced.

The main modifications to the scheme are as follows:

(i) Main Dam

Continuing preliminary design studies and review of world practice suggest that an upstream slope of 2.4H:1V would be acceptable for the rock shell. Adoption of this slope results not only in a reduction in dam fill volume but also in a reduction in the base width of the dam which permits the main project components to be located between the major shear zones.

The downstream slope of the dam is retained as 2H:1V. The cofferdams remain outside the limits of the dam in order to allow complete excavation of the riverbed alluvium.

(ii) Diversion

In the intermediate review arrangements, diversion tunnels passed through the broad structure of "The Fins," an intensely sheared area of breccia, gouge, and infills. Tunneling of this material would be difficult, and might even require excavation in open cut from the surface. High cost would be involved, but more importantly would be the time taken for construction in this area and the possibility of unexpected delays. For this reason, the inlet portals have been relocated downstream from this zone with the tunnels located closer to the river and crossing the main system of jointing at approximately 45°. This arrangement allows for shorter tunnels with a more favorable orientation of the inlet and outlet portals with respect to the river flow directions.

A separate low-level inlet and concrete-lined tunnel is provided, leading from the reservoir at approximate Elevation 1550 feet to downstream of the diversion plug where it merges with the diversion tunnel closest to the river. This low-level tunnel is designed to pass flows up to 6000 cfs during reservoir filling. It will also pass up to 30,000 cfs under 500-foot head to allow emergency draining of the reservoir as discussed in Section 9.9.

Initial closure is made by lowering the gates to the tunnel located closest to the river and constructing a concrete closure plug in the tunnel at the location of the grout curtain underlying the core of the main dam. On completion of the plug, the low-level release is opened and controlled discharges are passed downstream. The closure gates within the second diversion tunnel portal are then closed and a concrete closure plug constructed in line with the grout curtain. After closure of the gates, filling of the reservoir would commence.

(iii) Outlet Facilities

As a provision for drawing down the reservoir in case of emergency, a mid-level release is provided. The intake to these facilities is located at depth adjacent to the power facilities intake structures. Flows will then be passed downstream through a concrete-lined tunnel, discharging beneath the downstream end of the main spillway flip bucket. In order to overcome potential nitrogen supersaturation problems, Scheme WP3A also incorporates a system of fixed cone valves at the downstream end of the outlet facilities. The valves were sized to discharge in conjunction with the powerhouse operating at 7000 cfs capacity, flows up to the equivalent routed 50-year flood. Six cone valves are required, located on branches off a steel manifold and protected by individual upstream closure gates. The valves are partly incorporated into the mass concrete block forming the flip bucket of the main spillway. The rock downstream is protected from erosion by a concrete facing slab anchored back to the sound bedrock.

(iv) Spillways

As discussed in Section 9.10 above, the designed operation of the main spillway facilities was arranged to limit discharges of potentially nitrogen-supersaturated water from Watana to flows having an equivalent return period greater than 1:50 years.

The main chute spillway and flip bucket discharge into an excavated plunge pool in the downstream river bed. Releases are controlled by a three-gated ogee structure located adjacent to the outlet facilities and power intake structure just upstream from the dam centerline. The design discharge is approximately 114,000 cfs corresponding to the routed 1:10,000-year flood (145,000 cfs) reduced by the 31,000 cfs flows attributable to outlet and power facilities discharges. The plunge pool is formed by excavating the alluvial river deposits to bedrock. Since the excavated plunge pool approaches the limits of the calculated maximum scour hole, it is not anticipated that, given the infrequent discharges, significant downstream erosion will occur.

The emergency spillway is provided by means of a channel excavated in rock on the right bank, discharging well downstream from the right abutment in the direction of Tsusena Creek. The channel is sealed by an erodible fuse plug of impervious material designed to fail if overtopped by the reservoir, although some preliminary excavation may be necessary. The crest level of the plug will be set at Elevation 2230, well below that of the main dam. The channel will be capable of passing the excess discharge of floods

greater than the 1:10,000-year flood up to the probable maximum flood of 310,000 cfs.

(v) Power Facilities

The power intake is set slightly upstream from the dam axis deep within sound bedrock at the downstream end of the approach channel. The intake consists of six units with provision in each unit for drawing flows from a variety of depths covering the complete drawdown range of the reservoir. This facility also provides for drawing water from the different temperature strata within the upper part of the reservoir and thus regulating the temperature of the downstream discharges close to the natural temperatures of the river. For this preliminary conceptual arrangement, flow withdrawals from different levels are achieved by a series of upstream vertical shutters moving in a single set of guides and operated to form openings at the required level. Downstream from these shutters each unit has a pair of wheel-mounted closure gates which will isolate the individual penstocks.

The six penstocks are 18-foot-diameter, concrete-lined tunnels inclined at 55° immediately downstream from the intake to a nearly horizontal portion leading to the powerhouse. This horizontal portion is steel-lined for 150 feet upstream from the turbine units to extend the seepage path to the powerhouse and reduce the flow within the fractured rock area caused by blasting in the adjacent powerhouse cavern.

The six 170 MW turbine/generator units are housed within the major powerhouse cavern and are serviced by an overhead crane which runs the length of the powerhouse and into the service area adjacent to the units. Switchgear, maintenance room and offices are located within the main cavern, with the transformers situated downstream in a separate gallery excavated above the tailrace tunnels. Six inclined tunnels carry the connecting bus ducts from the main power hall to the transformer gallery. A vertical elevator and vent shaft run from the power cavern to the main office building and control room located at the surface. Vertical cable shafts, one for each pair of transformers, connect the transformer gallery to the switchyard directly overhead. Downstream from the transformer gallery, the underlying draft tube tunnels merge into two surge chambers, one chamber for three draft tubes, which also house the draft tube gates for isolating the units from the tailrace. The gates are operated by an overhead traveling gantry located in the upper part of each of the surge chambers. Emerging from the ends of the chambers, two concrete-lined, low-pressure tailrace tunnels carry the discharges to the river. Because of space restrictions at the river, one of

these tunnels has been merged with the downstream end of the diversion tunnel. The other tunnel emerges in a separate portal with provision for the installation of bulkhead gates.

The orientation of water passages and underground caverns is such as to avoid, as far as possible, alignment of the main excavations with the major joint sets as described in Section 9.3.

(vi) Access

Access is assumed to be from the north (right) side of the river. Permanent access to structures close to the river is by a road along the right downstream river bank and then via a tunnel passing through the concrete forming the flip bucket. A tunnel from this point to the power cavern provides for vehicular access. A secondary access road across the crest of the dam passes down the left bank of the valley and across the lower part of the dam.

(b) Scheme WP4A (Plate 9.11)

This scheme is similar in most respects to Scheme WP3A previously discussed, except for the spillway arrangements.

(i) Main Dam

The main dam axis is similar to that of Scheme WP3A, except for a slight downstream rotation at the left abutment at the spillway control structures.

(ii) Diversion

The diversion and low level releases are the same for the two schemes.

(iii) Outlet Facilities

The outlet facilities used for emergency drawdown are separate from the main spillway for this scheme. The outlet facilities consists of a low-level gated inlet structure discharging up to 30,000 cfs into the river through a concrete-lined, free-flow tunnel with a ski jump flip bucket. This facility may also be operated as an auxiliary outlet to augment the main left bank spillway.

(iv) Spillways

The main left bank spillway is capable of passing a design flow equivalent to the 1:10,000-year flood through a series of 50-foot drops into shallow pre-excavated plunge pools. The emergency spillway is designed to operate during floods of greater magnitude up to and including the PMF.

Main spillway discharges are controlled by a broad multi-gated control structure discharging into a shallow stilling basin. The feasibility of this arrangement is governed by the quality of the rock in the area, requiring both durability to withstand erosion caused by spillway flows, and a high percentage of sound rockfill material that can be used from the excavation directly in the main dam.

On the basis of the site information developed concurrently with the general arrangement studies, it became apparent that the major shear zone known to exist in the left bank area extended further downstream than initial studies have indicated. The cascade spillway channel was therefore lengthened to avoid the shear area at the lower end of the cascade. The arrangement shown on Plate 9.11 for Scheme WP4A does not reflect this relocation, which would increase the overall cost of the scheme.

The emergency spillway consisting of rock channel and fuse plug is similar to that of the right bank spillway scheme.

(v) Power Facilities

The power facilities are similar to those in Scheme WP3A.

(c) Evaluation of Final Alternative Schemes

An evaluation of the dissimilar features for each arrangement (the main spillways and the discharge arrangements at the downstream end of the outlets) indicates a saving in capital cost of \$197,000,000, excluding contingencies and indirect cost, in favor of Scheme WP3A. If this difference is adjusted for the savings associated with using an appropriate proportion of excavated material from the cascade spillway as rockfill in the main dam, this represents a net overall cost difference of approximately \$110,000,000 including contingencies, engineering, and administration costs.

As discussed above, although limited information exists regarding the quality of the rock in the downstream area on the left bank, it is known that a major shear zone runs through and is adjacent to the area presently allocated to the spillway in Scheme WP4. This would require relocating the left bank cascade spillway several hundred feet farther downstream into an area where the rock quality is unknown and the topography less suited to the gentle overall slope of the cascade. The cost of the excavation would substantially increase compared to previous assumptions, irrespective of the rock quality. In addition, the resistance of the rock to erosion and the suitability for use as excavated material in the main dam would become less certain. The economic feasibility of this scheme is largely predicated on this last factor, since the ability to use the material as a source of rock-fill for the main dam represents a major cost saving.

In conjunction with the main chute spillway, the problem of the occurrence of nitrogen supersaturation can be overcome by the use of a regularly operated dispersion type valve outlet facility in conjunction with the main chute spillway. As this scheme presents a more economic solution with fewer potential problems concerning the geotechnical aspects of its design, the right bank chute arrangement (Scheme WP3A) has been adopted as the final selected scheme.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Acres American Incorporated, Susitna Hydroelectric Project, 1980-81 Geotechnical Report, prepared for the Alaska Power Authority, February 1982.
2. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, Final Report on Seismic Studies for Susitna Hydroelectric Project, prepared for Acres American Incorporated, February 1982.
3. Acres American Incorporated, Susitna Hydroelectric Project, Development Selection Report, prepared for the Alaska Power Authority, December 1981.

TABLE 9.1: COMBINED WATANA AND DEVIL CANYON OPERATION

<u>Watana Dam Crest Elevation (ft MSL)</u>	<u>Watana* Cost (\$ x 10⁶)</u>	<u>Devil Canyon* Cost (\$ x 10⁶)</u>	<u>Total Cost (\$ x 10⁶)</u>	<u>Average Annual Energy (GWh)</u>
2240 (2215 reservoir elevation)	4,076	1,711	5,787	6,809
2190 (2165 reservoir elevation)	3,785	1,711	5,496	6,586
2140 (2115 reservoir elevation)	3,516	1,711	5,227	6,264

Watana Project alone (prior to year 2002)

<u>Crest Elevation (ft MSL)</u>	<u>Average Annual Energy (GWh)</u>
2240	3,542
2190	3,322
2140	3,071

* Estimated costs in January 1982 dollars, based on preliminary conceptual designs, including relict channel drainage blanket and 20 percent contingencies.

TABLE 9.2: PRESENT WORTH OF PRODUCTION COSTS

<u>Watana Dam Crest Elevation (ft MSL)</u>	<u>Present Worth of Production Costs (\$ x 10⁶)</u>
2240 (reservoir elevation 2215)	7,123
2190 (reservoir elevation 2165)	7,052
2140 (reservoir elevation 2115)	7,084

* LTPW in January 1982 dollars.

TABLE 9.3: DESIGN DATA AND DESIGN CRITERIA FOR FINAL REVIEW OF LAYOUTS

River Flows

Average flow (over 30 years of record):	7,860 cfs
Probable maximum flood (routed):	326,000 cfs
Maximum inflow with return period of 1:10,000 years:	156,000 cfs
Maximum 1:10,000-year routed discharge:	115,000 cfs
Maximum flood with return period of 1:500 years:	116,000 cfs
Maximum flood with return period of 1:50 years:	87,000 cfs
Reservoir normal maximum operating level:	2215 ft
Reservoir minimum operating level:	2030 ft

Dam

Type:	Rockfill
Crest elevation at point of maximum super elevation:	2240 ft
Height:	890 ft above foundation
Cutoff and foundation treatment:	Core founded on rock; grout curtain and downstream drains
Upstream slope:	2.4H:1V
Downstream slope:	2H:1V
Crest width:	50 ft

Diversion

Cofferdam type:	Rockfill
Cutoff and foundation:	Slurry trench to bedrock
Upstream cofferdam crest elevation:	1585 ft
Downstream cofferdam crest elevation:	1475 ft
Maximum pool level during construction:	1580 ft
Tunnels	Concrete lined,
Final closure:	Mass concrete plugs
Releases during impounding:	6,000 cfs maximum via bypass to outlet structure

Spillway

Design floods:	Passes PMF, preserving integrity of dam with no loss of life
	Passes routed 1:10,000-year flood with no damage to structures
Main spillway - Capacity:	Routed 1:10,000-year flood with 5 ft surcharge
- Control structure:	Gated ogee crests
Emergency spillway - Capacity:	PMF minus 1:10,000 year flood
- Type:	Fuse plug

Power Intake

Type:	Reinforced concrete
Number of intakes:	6
Draw-off requirements:	Multi-level corresponding to temperature strata
Drawdown:	185 feet

TABLE 9.3: (Cont'd)

Penstocks

Type: Concrete-lined tunnels with downstream steel liners
 Number of penstocks: 6

Powerhouse

Type: Underground
 Transformer area: Separate gallery
 Control room and administration: Surface
 Access - Vehicle: Rock tunnel
 - Personnel: Elevator from surface

Power Plant

Type of turbines: Francis
 Number and rating: 6 x 170 MW
 Rated net head: 690 ft
 Design flow: 3,500 cfs per unit
 Normal maximum gross head: 745 ft
 Type of generator: Vertical synchronous
 Rated output: 190 MVA
 Power factor: 0.9
 Frequency: 60 HZ
 Transformers: 13.8-345 kV, 3-phase

Tailrace

Water passages: 2 concrete-lined tunnels
 Surge: Separate surge chambers
 Average tailwater elevation (full generation): 1458 ft


TABLE 9.4: EVALUATION CRITERIA

<u>PRELIMINARY REVIEW</u>	<u>INTERMEDIATE REVIEW</u>	<u>FINAL REVIEW</u>
Technical feasibility	Technical feasibility	Technical feasibility
Compatibility of layout with known geological and topographical site features	Compatibility of layout with known geological and topographical site features	Compatibility of layout with known geological and topographical site features
Ease of construction	Ease of construction	Ease of construction
Physical dimensions of component structures in certain locations	--	--
Obvious cost differences of comparable structures	Overall cost	Overall cost
Environmental acceptability	Environmental acceptability	Environmental impact
Operating characteristics	Operating characteristics	Mode of operation of spillways
--	Impact on construction schedule	Impact on construction schedule
--	--	Design and operating limitations for key structures

TABLE 9.5: SUMMARY OF COMPARATIVE COST ESTIMATES

INTERMEDIATE REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
(January 1982 \$ x 10⁶)

	<u>WP1</u>	<u>WP2</u>	<u>WP3</u>	<u>WP4</u>
Diversions	101.4	112.6	101.4	103.1
Service Spillway	128.2	208.3	122.4	267.2
Emergency Spillway	-	46.9	46.9	-
Tailrace Tunnel	13.1	13.1	13.1	8.0
Credit for Use of Rock in Dam	<u>(11.7)</u>	<u>(31.2)</u>	<u>(18.8)</u>	<u>(72.4)</u>
Total Non-Common Items	231.0	349.7	265.0	305.9
Common Items	<u>1643.0</u>	<u>1643.0</u>	<u>1643.0</u>	<u>1643.0</u>
Subtotal	1874.0	1992.7	1908.0	1948.9
Camp & Support Costs (16%)	<u>299.8</u>	<u>318.8</u>	<u>305.3</u>	<u>311.8</u>
Subtotal	2173.8	2311.5	2213.3	2260.7
Contingency (20%)	<u>434.8</u>	<u>462.3</u>	<u>442.7</u>	<u>452.1</u>
Subtotal	2608.6	1773.8	2656.0	2712.8
Engineering and Administration (12.5%)	<u>326.1</u>	<u>346.7</u>	<u>332.0</u>	<u>339.1</u>
TOTAL	2934.7	3120.5	2988.0	3051.9



NOTES

1. ADDITIONAL GEOLOGIC DATA FROM COE, 1978, GEOLOGIC FIELD BOOKS 1 THRU 28.
2. TOPOGRAPHY FROM COE, 1978, 1" = 200'.
3. EXTENT OF SHEARS, FRACTURE ZONES, AND ALTERATION ZONES ARE INFERRED BASED ON GEOLOGIC MAPPING AND SUBSURFACE EXPLORATIONS, AND ARE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION THROUGH FUTURE DETAILED INVESTIGATIONS.
4. DETAILS OF GEOLOGIC FEATURES PRESENTED IN 1980-81 GEOTECHNICAL REPORT.

LEGEND

- LITHOLOGY:**
- DIORITE TO QUARTZ DIORITE, INCLUDES MINOR GRANODIORITE
 - ANDESITE PORPHYRY, INCLUDES MINOR DACITE AND LATITE
 - DIORITE PORPHYRY
- CONTACTS:**
- LITHOLOGIC, DASHED WHERE INFERRED, DIP WHERE KNOWN
- STRUCTURE:**
- SHEAR, WIDTH GREATER THAN 10 FEET, VERTICAL UNLESS DIP SHOWN
 - SHEAR, WIDTH LESS THAN 10 FEET, INCLINED, VERTICAL, EXTENT WHERE KNOWN
 - FRACTURE ZONE, WIDTH GREATER THAN 10 FEET, VERTICAL UNLESS DIP SHOWN
 - FRACTURE ZONE, WIDTH LESS THAN 10 FEET, INCLINED, VERTICAL EXTENT WHERE KNOWN
 - JOINTS: INCLINED, OPEN INCLINED, VERTICAL (SETS I AND II ONLY, EXCEPT FOR OPEN JOINTS)
 - ALTERATION ZONE, WIDTH AS SHOWN
- OTHER:**
- W-1 GEOLOGIC SECTION LOCATION
 - WJ-1 JOINT STATION
 - GF1 GEOLOGIC FEATURE


REFERENCE: BASE MAP FROM COE, 1978 - 1" = 200' WATANA TOPOGRAPHY, SHEET 8 & 13 OF 26, COORDINATES IN FEET, ALASKA STATE PLANE (ZONE 4)

**WATANA
GEOLOGIC MAP**

SCALE 0 200 400 FEET


FIGURE 9.1





LOCATION MAP

SCALE 0 4 8 MILES



LEGEND

- TOP OF BEDROCK, CONTOUR INTERVAL 50 FEET, 50 FOOT CONTOURS DASHED.
- TOPOGRAPHY, CONTOUR INTERVAL 100 FEET.
- POTENTIAL CHANNEL THALWEGS
- PROFILE OR CROSS-SECTION LOCATION

NOTES


- I. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE RELICT CHANNEL PRESENTED IN THE 1980-81 GEOTECHNICAL REPORT.

SCALE 0 1000 2000 FEET

WATANA
RELICT CHANNEL - TOP OF BEDROCK

FIGURE 9.2






MEAN RESPONSE SPECTRA AT DEVIL CANYON AND WATANA
SITES FOR TERRAIN SAFETY EVALUATION EARTHQUAKE

FIGURE 9.3






WATANA RESERVOIR
DAM CREST ELEVATION/PRESENT WORTH OF PRODUCTION COSTS

FIGURE 9.4






NOTE
FOR 80,000 CFS

**WATANA DIVERSION
HEADWATER ELEVATION / TUNNEL DIAMETER**

FIGURE 9.5






WATANA DIVERSION
UPSTREAM COFFERDAM COSTS

FIGURE 9.6






WATANA DIVERSION
TUNNEL COST / TUNNEL DIAMETER

FIGURE 9.7






WATANA DIVERSION
 TOTAL COST / TUNNEL DIAMETER


FIGURE 9.8






NOTE
 THIS DRAWING ILLUSTRATES A
 PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL PROJECT LAYOUT
 PREPARED FOR COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE
 SITE DEVELOPMENTS ONLY.

ACRES	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY	
	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
WATANA ARCH DAM ALTERNATIVE		
<i>ACRES</i>	MARCH 1982	PLATE 9.1
ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED		




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
	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY
	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT
WATANA ALTERNATIVE DAM AXES	
	MARCH 1982
ACRS AMERICAN INCORPORATED	PLATE 9.2




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
ALTERNATIVE 2




ALTERNATIVE 2A




ALTERNATIVE 2B




ALTERNATIVE 2C



ALTERNATIVE 2D




ALTERNATIVE 3



ALTERNATIVE 4


WATANA
PRELIMINARY SCHEMES

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WATANA PRELIMINARY SCHEMES		
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 9.3
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
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	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
WATANA SCHEME WPI PLAN		
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 9.4
ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED		



NOTES


1. THIS DRAWING ILLUSTRATES A PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL PROJECT LAYOUT PREPARED FOR COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE SITE DEVELOPMENTS ONLY
2. SECTIONS FOR SCHEME WPI ARE SIMILAR EXCEPT THAT GATE STRUCTURE IS 150' WIDE WITH CHEST EL. 2150 AND 3 - 40' WIDE x 53' HIGH GATES

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	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
WATANA SCHEME WP3 SECTIONS		
<i>Acres American</i>		MARCH 1982
ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED		PLATE 9.5




GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
SCALE: A

SECTION A-A
SCALE: B




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ALTERNATIVE SITE DEVELOPMENTS ONLY

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	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
WATANA SCHEME WP 2 & WP 3 PLAN & SECTIONS		
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 9.6
ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED		




SPILLWAY PROFILE



SECTION A-A


SECTION B-B



NOTE


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	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
WATANA SCHEME WP 2 SECTIONS		
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
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	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
WATANA SCHEME WP4 PLAN		
<i>Lawson</i> ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED	MARCH 1982	PLATE 9.8




SPILLWAY PROFILE

SCALE: A



SECTION B-B

SCALE: B



SECTION A-A

SCALE: B

SECTION C-C

SCALE: B


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SCALE B 0 50 100 FEET

NOTE


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	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY	
	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
WATANA SCHEME WP4 SECTIONS		
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 9.9
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 ALTERNATIVE SITE DEVELOPMENTS ONLY

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	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
WATANA SCHEME WP3A		
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 9.10
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SCALE 0 200 400 FEET

APAC ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY
SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

**WATANA
SCHEME WP4A**

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ALTERNATIVE SITE DEVELOPMENTS ONLY

Acres
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MARCH 1982

PLATE
9.11

10 - SELECTION OF DEVIL CANYON GENERAL ARRANGEMENT

This section describes the development of the general arrangement of the Devil Canyon project. The site topography, geology, and seismicity of the Devil Canyon site are described relative to the design and arrangement of the various site facilities, in a manner similar to that presented in Section 9 for the Watana site. The method of handling floods during construction and subsequent project operation is also outlined in this section.

The reservoir level fluctuations and inflow for Devil Canyon will essentially be controlled by operation of the upstream Watana project. This aspect is also briefly discussed in this section. A detailed description of the various project components is given in Section 13.

10.1 - Site Topography

The Devil Canyon site is located at river mile 152 of the Susitna River, approximately 32 miles downstream from the Watana site, near the entrance to a 2-mile long, steep-walled canyon. The valley wall on the left side of the river rises very steeply from Elevations 900 to 1300 on the left bank at a slope of approximately 0.4H:1V to a relatively gently sloping plateau area which reaches Elevation 1600 within the general project area. On the right side, the valley is less pronounced, rising at about 1.1H:1V to Elevation 1500, then much more gradually to approximate Elevation 1900. The steep left bank contains overhanging cliffs and detached blocks of rock.

10.2 - Site Geology

A detailed description of the site investigations and the geologic and geotechnical conclusions at the Devil Canyon site is provided in the 1980-81 Geotechnical Report (1). The following is a brief summary and interpretation of the findings presented in the Geotechnical Report.

(a) Geologic Conditions

The overburden and bedrock conditions at the Devil Canyon site are summarized in the following paragraph. A geologic map of the dam-site area is shown in Figure 10.1 in this section.

(i) Overburden

The valley walls at the Devil Canyon site are very steep and are generally covered by a thin veneer of overburden consisting primarily of talus at the base. The flatter upland areas are covered by 5 to 35 feet of overburden of glacial origin. A topographic depression along the elongated lakes on the south bank has an overburden cover in

excess of 85 feet of glacial materials. The overburden on the alluvial fan or point bar deposit at the Cheechako Creek confluence thickens from 100 feet to more than 300 feet over a distance of less than 400 feet.

The river channel alluvium appears to be composed of cobbles, boulders, and detached blocks of rock and is inferred to be up to 30 feet thick.

(ii) Bedrock Lithology

The bedrock at the Devil Canyon site is a low-grade metamorphosed sedimentary rock consisting predominantly of argillite with interbeds of graywacke. A geologic map of the site is shown in Figure 10.1. The argillite is a fresh, medium-to-dark gray, thinly bedded, fine grained argillaceous rock with moderately well-developed foliation parallel to the bedding. The graywacke is a fresh, light gray, mainly fine grained sandstone within an argillaceous matrix. The graywacke is well indurated and exhibits poorly developed to non-existent foliation. The graywacke is interbedded with the argillite in beds generally less than 6 inches thick. Contacts between beds are tight and both rock types are fresh and hard. Minor quartz veins and stringers are commonly found in the argillite. These are generally less than 1 foot wide and unfractured with tight contacts. Sulphide mineralization is common with pyrite occurring in as much as 5 percent of the rock.

The area has also been intruded by numerous felsic and mafic dikes ranging from 1 inch to 60 feet wide (averaging 20 feet). The dikes have northwest to north orientation (Figure 10.1) with steep dips. When closely fractured they are easily eroded and tend to form steep talus-filled gullies, some of which exhibit shearing with the host rock. The felsic dikes are light gray and include aplite and rhyolite. The mafic dikes are fine grained and appear to be of diorite to diabase composition.

(iii) Bedrock Structures

- Bedding

The argillite/graywacke has been completely deformed as evidenced by refolded folds and the development of multiple foliations. The primary foliation parallels the bedding at 035° to 090°, subparallel to the river, and dips 45° to 80°SE (Figure 10.1). Where exposed, the foliation planes appear slaty and phyllitic. The north canyon wall at the dam site appears to be controlled by the bedding planes.

and dips 45° to 80° SE. Where exposed, the foliation planes appear slaty and phyllitic. The north canyon wall at the damsite appears to be controlled by the bedding planes.

- Joints

Four joint sets have been delineated at Devil Canyon. Set I (strike 320° to 355° and dips 60° to 70° NE) and Set II (strike 040° to 065° and dips 40° to 60° S) are the most significant. Set I joints are the most prominent with spacing of 15 feet to 2 feet, and on the upper canyon walls of the south bank these joints are open as much as 6 inches. Set III is subparallel to the bedding/foliation and, when it intersects with Set I, can cause the formation of loose blocks. Set III joints (strikes 005° to 030° and dip 85° NW to 85° SE) are also often open on the south bank and where they dip towards the river they may create potential slip planes. This set has variable spacing and sporadic distribution. The fourth set is a minor set with low dip angles and variable strike orientation.

Joint spacings measured from the borehole cores range from less than 1 foot to more than 10 feet. The spacing and tightness of the joints increase with depth.

- Shears and Fracture Zones

Shears and fracture zones were encountered in localized areas of the site in both outcrops and boreholes (Figure 10.1). Shears are defined as areas containing breccia, gouge, and/or slickenslides indicating relative movement. These zones are soft and friable and are characterized by high permeability and core loss during drilling. Fracture zones, often encountered in conjunction with the shears, are zones of very closely spaced joints. With depth, these zones become tighter and more widely spaced. Where exposed, they are eroded into deep gullies.

The most common trend of these features is northwest, parallel to Joint Set I. These zones have vertical to steep northeast dips and are generally less than 1 foot wide. Northwest trending shears are also associated with the contacts between the argillite and mafic dikes and are up to 1 foot wide.

A second series of shears trend northeasterly, subparallel to the bedding/foliation and Joint Set II, with high

angle southeasterly dips. These average less than 6 inches in width.

(b) Structural Features

Several structural features at the Devil Canyon site were investigated during the 1980-81 program.

In summary, these included the east-west trending sheared and fractured zone beneath the proposed saddle dam area; a bedrock drop-off beneath Borrow Site G; and bedrock conditions beneath the Susitna River.

Seismic refraction and drilling data confirm the existence of a highly sheared and fractured zone on the left bank beneath the proposed saddle dam that generally trends parallel to the river. The dip on this feature is inferred to be parallel or subparallel to the bedding/foliation at approximately 65° to the south. The linear extent of the feature has not been determined but may be up to 2,500 feet. No evidence was found during the 1980-81 program to suggest movement along this feature. This conclusion was confirmed during the seismic investigations (3). Further investigation of this feature will be required to define its extent and to determine the type of foundation treatment that will be required beneath the saddle dam.

Upstream from the damsite, a several-hundred-foot drop-off in the bedrock surface under the alluvial fan was detected by seismic refraction surveys. Land access restrictions imposed during the study prohibited any further investigation of this area. Possible explanation for this apparent anomalous drop-off could be attributed to misinterpretation of the seismic data or else the lower velocity material could be either a highly fractured rock in lieu of soil or an offset of the rock surface caused by faulting. The latter interpretation is unlikely in that work performed (3) in this area concluded that there was no compelling evidence for a fault. Future work remains to be done in this area to more clearly define this feature.

Detailed examination of rock core and mapping in the river valley bottom showed no evidence for through going faulting in the river-bed.

(c) Ground Water Conditions

Ground water migration within the rock is restricted to joints and fractures. It is inferred that the ground water level is a subdued replica of the surface topography with the flow towards the river and lakes. Measured water levels in the boreholes varied from ground surface to 120 feet.

(d) Permafrost

No permafrost was found in either the bedrock or surficial material at or around the damsite.

(e) Permeability

Rock permeability ranges from approximately 1×10^{-4} cm/sec to 1×10^{-6} cm/sec with lower permeabilities generally at depth. Higher permeability occur in the more weathered fractured rock zones.

(f) Devil Canyon Reservoir Geology

The Devil Canyon reservoir will be confined to a narrow canyon where the topography is controlled by bedrock. The overburden is thin to nonexistent, except in the upper reaches of the reservoir where alluvial deposits cover the valley floor. A large intrusive plutonic body composed predominantly of biotite granodiorite with local areas of quartz diorite and diorite, underlies most of the reservoir and adjacent slopes. This rock is light gray to pink, medium grained, hard, massive, and competent. The other rock types in the reservoir is the argillite and graywacke which are exposed at the damsite. The rock has been isoclinically folded into steeply dipping structures striking generally northeast-southwest. The argillite has been intruded by massive granodiorite, and as a result, large isolated roof pendants of the argillite and graywacke are found locally throughout the entire reservoir and surrounding areas. The joint measurements at selected areas indicate structural trends similar to those at the damsites.

(g) Construction Material Investigations

A major source of construction materials for the Devil Canyon Project is the alluvial fan deposit, Borrow Site G, which lies near the Cheechako Creek confluence approximately 1,000 feet upstream from the damsite. The area contains large quantities of sands and gravels with inclusions of boulders and cobbles above the river level.

(i) Shell Materials for the Saddle Dam

Clean gravel and cobble fill will be obtained from the alluvial fan Site G. This material will be supplemented by rockfill obtained from the excavations of other structures where suitable and economic. Potential sources of rockfill are likely to be the emergency spillway located adjacent to the saddle dam and Quarry Site K (1).

(ii) Core Material for the Saddle Dam

No suitable source for the core material for the saddle dam has been identified at this time near the site. It is, therefore, proposed that the core material be transported from Borrow Site D near the Watana site, where sufficient quantities of suitable material have been identified. Additional investigations should be performed in an attempt to locate a suitable source nearer the Devil Canyon site prior to final design.

(iii) Filter Material for the Saddle Dam

Filter materials will be obtained by processing deposits in the alluvial fan Borrow Site G, discussed above.

(iv) Concrete Aggregate

The coarse and fine aggregate for the concrete structures will also be obtained from the Borrow Site G. The results of the laboratory testing indicate that the material from this source is of adequate quality. The gravel particles are generally rounded with accompanying subangular sands. Petrographic analyses indicate that the material includes quartz diorites, granites, andesites, diorites, dacites, metavolcanics, rocks, aplites, breccias, schists, phillites, argillites, and amphibolites. Generally, the material has less than 2 percent deleterious constituents such as chert, muscovite, and argillite.

10.3 - Geotechnical Considerations

The geotechnical investigations to date have been primarily directed toward the important geological features which may have significant impact on the feasibility of the project. More detailed investigations, including exploratory adits, will be required prior to the detailed design.

(a) Arch Dam Foundation and Abutments

The geologic and topographic conditions are favorable for an arch dam at the Devil Canyon site. The rock is principally hard, competent, and fresh with weathering limited to joints and shear zones. Intrusive mafic and felsic dikes, where present, are hard, and the contact with the parent rock is tight. The orientation of the dikes is generally northwest to north. They will have no important adverse effect on the stability of the abutments. The unconfined compressive strength of the intact rock ranges between 16,000 psi and 32,000 psi. The stresses imposed by the arch dam are about 1,000 psi or less under normal conditions. Even under

extreme loading conditions, the stresses will be well within the acceptable limits for bearing considerations. On the right abutment, the arch dam thrust block will be seated in good sound rock. On the left side, the bedrock surface is below the crest elevation and a concrete thrust block will be required to transfer the loads to competent rock. This thrust block will form an abutment to the saddle dam.

No large-scale, continuous oriented rock discontinuities, which might affect abutment stability, have been found. Open fractures and joints have been noted to extend up to 80-100 feet back from the valley walls on the south abutment. This area will, therefore, require extensive dental work and foundation treatment. The stability of the right abutment (north bank) is controlled by the bedding planes and foliations that strike roughly parallel to subparallel to the canyon walls and dip steeply into the canyon. The bedding planes generally are tight with undulating surfaces. Preliminary analyses indicate no stability problems in this area. Additional rock investigations and in situ testing will be required to provide data for final design.

The dam foundation and the thrust blocks will be founded on sound rock, requiring removal of all the overburden and weathered rock. Extensive dental excavation will be required in some areas to form an acceptable foundation. The entire dam foundation area will be consolidation grouted to fill all the openings and cavities in rock at shallow depth.

A double row grout curtain will be provided under the entire dam including the abutments and an appropriate distance beyond the dam into the abutments. A system of drain holes and drainage galleries will be included to control uplift pressures and to safely release seepage water.

(b) Underground Structures

The rock conditions at the site are suitable for the construction of tunnels and underground caverns. For the most part, the underground structures have been sited to avoid adverse geologic conditions (i.e., jointing and shear zones).

Although the magnitude and the orientation of the in situ stresses were not performed for this study, the tectonic setting suggests that the entire site region is in a compressional stress regime. The stresses near valley walls are expected to have been relieved and low horizontal stresses may exist. Considering the unconfined strength of the intact rock, overstressing problems such as rock spalling and slabbing are not anticipated. The rock support requirements will depend on the size and orientation of the openings and the presence and character of the rock discontinuities

intersected. For the most part, conventional rock bolt support using 3/4-inch to 1-inch-diameter bolts has been assumed to be adequate for openings less than 40 feet in span. For larger spans, in areas of poor quality rock and where rock discontinuities are known to be adversely oriented, support requirements have been determined on a case-by-case basis. The use of shotcrete, welded wire fabric, and concrete lining will be required in poor rock quality areas. For power tunnels, provisions have also been made for concrete lining and contact/consolidation grouting.

Although rock permeabilities are generally low to moderate, intersection of rock discontinuities may lead to ground water inflow problems during construction. High-pore water pressures may develop within discontinuities after the reservoir is flooded. Therefore, provisions have been made for grouting around tunnels and caverns, and installation of suitably placed drain holes and drainage galleries has also been provided upstream from the powerhouse and surge chamber.

The spacing between long tunnels will be 2.5 times the diameter of the largest tunnel and caverns will be kept spaced to maintain a minimum pillar thickness of 1.5 times the span of the larger cavern.

(c) Stability of Soil and Rock Slopes

In most areas, the permanent excavation slopes will be within rock, except on the left bank, where a deep buried channel exists. The slopes within overburden will depend on the nature of soil, ground water table, and the height of the slope. In general, slopes within the overburden have been assumed as 2H:1V or less below the water table and 1.5H:1V or less above the water table. A bench of appropriate width will be provided at the overburden-rock contact to accommodate any local slumping and to intercept and dispose of ground/seepage water.

The slopes of excavations in rock have been selected in accordance with the joint dips and orientations and the shear strength of rock along discontinuities. Slopes in intact rock or where discontinuities dip into the excavated face will usually stand steeply without any structural support. Slopes paralleling the discontinuity have, wherever possible, been laid back to the same angle as the dip of the rock discontinuity or adequate rock support provided. Wherever possible, permanent cuts have been set at stable slopes without the need for rock bolts. In areas where pore pressures could develop behind the rock cuts, allowances have been made for drain holes to relieve the pore pressures. In general, a 4V:1H overall slope is considered stable. Excavation of tunnel portals includes pattern rock bolting and appropriate provision for concrete/shotcrete to reduce the risk of unstable slopes. Special details are required in areas where slopes will intersect or cross larger shear zones or otherwise unstable rock.

(d) Saddle Dam Foundation

The saddle dam on the south bank will be constructed across the buried channel. The thickness of overburden in this area reaches up to 80 feet. The underlying bedrock is competent argillite and graywacke. The core, filters, and outer shells for the saddle dam will be founded on sound rock. The prominent shear zone or fault which was found in the saddle dam foundation, together with various other shear and fracture zones, will require treatment by consolidation and curtain grouting under the core.

10.4 - Seismic Considerations

As discussed in Section 9.4 for Watana, the Devil Canyon project structures have been classified as either critical structures or noncritical structures for earthquake engineering and design considerations. Critical structures include the dam and similar major structures whose failure may result in sudden and uncontrolled release of large volumes of water which may endanger property and lives downstream. The noncritical structures are those structures whose failure can be assessed as an economic or financial loss to the project in terms of lost revenue, repair, and/or replacement cost. Critical structures will be designed to safely withstand the effect of the "Safety Evaluation Earthquake" (SEE) for the site. No significant damage to these structures will be accepted under these conditions.

The design of noncritical structures for earthquake conditions will be undertaken on the basis of conventional Uniform Building Code recommendations.

The design of the saddle dam at Devil Canyon, as for Watana dam, is based on the projected time history for the Benioff Zone SEE, magnitude 8.5. The distance from Devil Canyon in this case is 57 miles.

The design of the arch dam and other critical concrete structures is based on the Terrain SEE as discussed for Watana. The appropriate response spectra for ground motions for the magnitude 6.25 Terrain earthquake are shown in Figure 9.3.

10.5 - Selection of Reservoir Level

The selected normal maximum operating level at Devil Canyon dam is Elevation 1455. Studies by the USBR and COE on the Devil Canyon Project were essentially based on a similar reservoir level, which corresponds to the tailwater level selected at the Watana site. Although the narrow configuration of the Devil Canyon site and the relatively low costs involved in increasing the dam height suggest that it might be economic to do so, it is clear that the upper economic limit of reservoir level at Devil Canyon is the Watana tailrace level.

The detailed studies of reservoir level at Watana (Section 9) indicated little change in benefit-cost ratio over a 100-foot range of reservoir

level at the upper limit. Maximization of hydroelectric energy production at the site was found to be an important objective which weighed heavily in the selection of reservoir level at Watana. Although a detailed determination has not been undertaken, the same is likely to be true at Devil Canyon.

Although significantly lower reservoir levels at Devil Canyon would lead to lower dam costs, it is clearly evident that the location of adequate spillway facilities in the narrow gorge would become extremely difficult and lead to offsetting increases in cost. In the extreme case, a spillway discharging over the dam would raise concerns regarding safety from scouring at the toe of the dam, which have already led to rejection of such schemes.

10.6 - Selection of Installed Capacity

The methodology used for the preliminary selection of installed capacity at Watana and Devil Canyon is described in Section 9.6.

The decision to operate Devil Canyon primarily as a based loaded plant was governed by the following main considerations:

- Daily peaking is more effectively performed at Watana than at Devil Canyon; and
- Excessive fluctuations in discharge from the Devil Canyon dam may have an undesirable impact on mitigation measures incorporated in the final design to protect the downstream fisheries.

Given this mode of operation, the required installed capacity at Devil Canyon has been determined as the maximum capacity needed to utilize the available energy from the hydrological flows of record, as modified by the reservoir operation rule curves. In years where the energy from Watana and Devil Canyon exceeds the system demand, the usable energy has been reduced at both stations in proportion to the average net head available, assuming that flows used to generate energy at Watana will also be used to generate energy at Devil Canyon.

The total capacity required at Devil Canyon in a wet year, excluding standby and spinning reserve capacity, is summarized below. As discussed in Section 9.6, the capacity shown is based on the December 1981 Battelle medium load growth forecast.

<u>Demand Year</u>	<u>Capacity MW</u>
2002	370
2005	410
2010	507

The selected total installed capacity at Devil Canyon has been established as 600 MW for design purposes. This will provide some margin for standby during forced outage and possible accelerated growth in demand.



The major factors governing the selection of the unit size at Devil Canyon are the rate of growth of system demand, the minimum station output, and the requirement of standby capacity under forced outage conditions. The above tabulation indicates that station maximum load in December will increase by about 50 percent from 2002 to 2010 (from 370 MW to 507 MW). Station minimum output in July during the same period will vary from about 150 MW to 202 MW.

The power facilities at Devil Canyon have been developed using 4 units at 150 MW each. This arrangement will provide for efficient station operation during low load periods as well as during peak December loads. During final design, consideration of phasing of installed capacity to match the system demand may be desirable. However, the uncertainty of load forecasts and the additional contractual costs of mobilization for equipment installation are such that for this study it has been assumed that all units will be commissioned by 2002.

The Devil Canyon reservoir will usually be full in December; hence, any forced outage could result in spilling and a loss of available energy. The units have been rated to deliver 150 MW at maximum December draw-down occurring during an extremely dry year; this means that in an average year, with higher reservoir levels, the full station output can be maintained even with one unit on forced outage.

10.7 - Selection of Spillway Capacity

A flood frequency of 1:10,000 years was selected for the spillway design on the same basis as described for Watana. An emergency spillway with an erodible fuse plug will also be provided to safely discharge the probable maximum flood. The development plan envisages completion of the Watana project prior to construction at Devil Canyon. Accordingly, the inflow flood peaks at Devil Canyon will be less than pre-project flood peaks because of routing through the Watana reservoir. Spillway design floods are:

<u>Flood</u>	<u>Inflow Peak (cfs)</u>
1:10,000 years	165,000
Probable Maximum	346,000

The avoidance of nitrogen supersaturation in the downstream flow discussed in Section 9 for Watana also will apply to Devil Canyon. Thus, the discharge of water possibly supersaturated with nitrogen from Devil Canyon will be limited to a recurrence period of not less than 1:50 years by the use of solid cone valves similar to Watana.

10.8 - Main Dam Alternatives

The location of the Devil Canyon damsite was examined during previous studies by the USBR and COE. These studies focused on the narrow entrance to the canyon and led to the recommendation of a concrete arch



dam. Notwithstanding this initial appraisal, a comparative analysis was undertaken as part of this feasibility study to evaluate the relative merits of the following types of structures at the same location:

- Concrete gravity dam;
- Thick concrete arch;
- Thin concrete arch; and
- Fill embankment.

(a) Comparison of Embankment and Concrete Type Dams

This analysis was based on the thin concrete arch and thick concrete arch schemes developed by the COE in 1975 and 1978, together with a rockfill dam alternative developed as part of this study. The results of the analysis indicated a trend in favor of the concrete arch dam alternatives when compared to the concrete gravity dam or rockfill dam alternatives. The assessment showed that a concrete gravity dam in the narrow gorge would tend to behave similarly to an arch dam but would not have the flexibility of such a structure. The technical feasibility of a concrete gravity dam was therefore questionable particularly under severe seismic shaking conditions. This type of dam also tended to be more expensive than either concrete arch and was, therefore, not considered further.

Consideration of a central core rockfill dam at Devil Canyon indicated relatively small cost differences from a conservative arch dam cost estimate, based on a dam cross-section significantly thicker than the finally selected design. Furthermore, no information was available to indicate that impervious core material in the necessary quantities could be found within a reasonable distance of the damsite. The rockfill dam was accordingly dropped from further consideration. Details of this evaluation are presented in Appendix B.

Neither of the concrete arch dam layouts were intended as the final site arrangement, but were sufficiently representative of the most suitable arrangement associated with each dam type to provide an adequate basis for comparison. Each type of dam was located just downstream from where the river enters Devil Canyon and close to the canyon's narrowest point, which is the optimum location for all types of dams. A brief description of each dam type and configuration is given below.

(i) Thick Arch Dam

The main concrete dam would be a single center arch structure, acting partly as a gravity dam, with a vertical cylindrical upstream face and a sloping downstream face inclined at 1V:0.4H. The maximum height of the dam would be 635 feet with a uniform crest width of 30 feet, a crest

length of approximately 1,400 feet, and a maximum foundation width of 225 feet. The crest elevation would be 1460. The center portion of the dam would be founded on a massive mass concrete pad constructed in the excavated river bed. This central section would incorporate the main spillway with sidewalls anchored into solid bedrock and gated orifice spillways discharging down the steeply inclined downstream face of the dam into a single large stilling basin set below river level and spanning the valley.

The main dam would terminate in thrust blocks high on the abutments. The left abutment thrust block would incorporate an emergency gated control spillway structure which would discharge into a rock channel running well downstream and terminating at a level high above the river valley.

Beyond the control structure and thrust block, a low-lying saddle on the left abutment would be closed by means of a rockfill dike founded on bedrock. The powerhouse would house four 150 MW units and will be located underground within the right abutment. The intake would be constructed integrally with the dam and connected to the powerhouse by vertical steel-lined penstocks.

The main spillway would be designed to pass the 1:10,000-year routed flood with larger floods discharged downstream via the emergency spillway.

(ii) Thin Arch Dam

The main dam would be a two-center, double-curved arch structure of similar height to the thick arch dam, but with a 20-foot uniform crest and a maximum base width of 90 feet. The crest elevation would be 1460. The center section would be founded on a concrete pad, and the extreme upper portion of the dam would terminate in concrete thrust blocks located on the abutments.

The main spillway would be located on the right abutment and would consist of a conventional gated control structure discharging down a concrete-lined chute terminating in a flip bucket. The bucket would discharge into an unlined plunge pool excavated in the riverbed alluvium and located sufficiently downstream to prevent undermining of the dam and associated structures.

The main spillway would be supplemented by orifice type spillways located high in the center portion of the dam which would discharge into a concrete-lined plunge pool immediately downstream from the dam. An emergency spillway, consisting of a fuse plug discharging into an unlined rock

channel, terminating well downstream, would be located beyond the saddle dam on the left abutment.

The concrete dam would terminate in a massive thrust block on each abutment which, on the left abutment, would adjoin a rockfill saddle dam.

The main and auxiliary spillways would be designed to discharge the 1:10,000-year flood. Larger floods for storms up to the probable maximum flood would be discharged through the emergency left abutment spillway.

(iii) Comparison of Arch Dam Types

Sand and gravel for concrete aggregates are believed to be available in sufficient quantities within economic distance from the damsite. The gravel and sands are formed from the granitic and metamorphic rocks of the area; at this time it is anticipated that they will be suitable for the production of aggregates after screening and washing.

The bedrock geology of the site is discussed in Sections 10.2 and 10.3. At this time it appears that there are no geological or geotechnical concerns that would preclude either of the dam types from consideration.

Under hydrostatic and temperature loadings, stresses within the thick arch dam will be generally lower than for the thin arch alternative. However, finite element analysis has shown that the additional mass of the dam under seismic loading will produce stresses of a greater magnitude in the thick arch dam than in the thin arch dam. If the surface stresses approach the maximum allowable at a particular section, the remaining understressed area of concrete will be greater for the thick arch, and the factor of safety for the dam will be correspondingly higher. The thin arch is, however, a more efficient design and better utilizes the inherent properties of the concrete. It is designed around acceptable predetermined factors of safety and requires a much smaller volume of concrete for the actual dam structure.

The thick arch arrangement did not appear to have a distinct technical advantage compared to a thin arch dam and would be more expensive because of the larger volume of concrete needed. Studies, therefore, continued on refining the feasibility of the thin arch alternative.

10.9 - Diversion Scheme Alternatives

In this section the selection of general arrangement and the basis for sizing of the diversion scheme are presented.

(a) General Arrangements

The steep walled valley at the site essentially dictated that diversion of the river during construction be accomplished using one or two diversion tunnels, with upstream and downstream cofferdams protecting the main construction area.

The selection process for establishing the final general arrangement included examination of tunnel locations on both banks of the river. Rock conditions for tunneling did not favor one bank over the other. Access and ease of construction strongly favored the left bank or abutment, the obvious approach being via the alluvial fan. The total length of tunnel required for the left bank is approximately 300 feet greater; however, access to the right bank could not be achieved without great difficulty.

(b) Design Flood for Diversion

The recurrence interval of the design flood for diversion was established in the same manner as for Watana dam. Accordingly, at Devil Canyon a risk of exceedence of 10 percent per annum has been adopted, equivalent to a design flood with a 1:10-year return period for each year of critical construction exposure. The critical construction time is estimated at 2.5 years. The main dam could be subjected to overtopping during construction without causing serious damage, and the existence of the Watana facility upstream will offer considerable assistance in flow regulation in case of an emergency. These considerations led to the selection of the design flood with a return frequency of 1:25 years.

The equivalent inflow, together with average flow characteristics of the river significant to diversion, are presented below:

Average annual flow:	9,040 cfs
Design flood inflow (1:25 years routed through Watana reservoir):	37,800 cfs

(c) Cofferdams

As at Watana, the considerable depth of riverbed alluvium at both cofferdam sites indicates that embankment-type cofferdam structures would be the only technically and economically feasible alternative at Devil Canyon. For the purposes of establishing the overall general arrangement of the project and for subsequent diversion optimization studies, the upstream cofferdam section adopted will comprise an initial closure section approximately 20 feet high constructed in the wet, with a zoned embankment constructed in the dry. The downstream cofferdam will comprise a closure dam structure approximately 30 feet high placed in the wet. Control of underseepage through the alluvium material may be required and could be achieved by means of a grouted zone. The coarse nature of the alluvium at Devil Canyon led to the selection of a grouted zone rather than a slurry wall.

(d) Diversion Tunnels

Although studies for the Watana project indicated that concrete-lined tunnels were the most economically and technically feasible solution, this aspect was reexamined at Devil Canyon. Preliminary hydraulic studies indicated that the design flood routed through the diversion scheme would result in a design discharge of approximately 37,800 cfs. For concrete-lined tunnels, a design velocities of approximately 50 ft/s would permit the use of one concrete-lined tunnel with an equivalent diameter of 30 feet. Alternatively, for unlined tunnels, a maximum design velocity of 10 ft/s in good quality rock would require four unlined tunnels, each with an equivalent diameter of 35 feet, to pass the design flow. As was the case for the Watana diversion scheme, considerations of reliability and cost were considered sufficient to eliminate consideration of unlined tunnels for the diversion scheme.

For the purposes of optimization studies, only a pressure tunnel was considered, since previous studies indicated that cofferdam closure problems associated with free-flow tunnels would more than offset their other advantages.

(e) Optimization of Diversion Scheme

Given the considerations described above relative to design flows, cofferdam configuration, and alternative types of tunnels, an economic study was undertaken to determine the optimum combination of upstream cofferdam elevation (height) and tunnel diameter.

Capital costs were developed for a range of pressure tunnel diameters and corresponding upstream cofferdam embankment crest elevations with a 30-foot wide crest and exterior slopes of 2H:1V. A freeboard allowance of 5 feet was included for settlement and wave runup.

Capital costs for the tunnel alternatives included allowances for excavation, concrete liner, rock bolts, and steel supports. Costs were also developed for the upstream and downstream portals, including excavation and support. The cost of an intake gate structure and associated gates was determined not to vary significantly with tunnel diameter and was excluded from the analysis.

The centerline tunnel length in all cases was estimated to be 2,000 feet.

Rating curves for the single-pressure tunnel alternatives are presented in Figure 10.2. The relationship between capital costs for the upstream cofferdam and various tunnel diameters is given in Figure 10.3.

The results of the optimization study indicated that a single, 30-foot-diameter pressure tunnel results in the overall least

cost (Figure 10.3). An upstream cofferdam 60 feet high, with a crest elevation of 945, was carried forward as part of the selected general arrangement.

10.10 - Spillway Alternatives

The project spillways have been designed to safely pass floods with the following return frequencies:

<u>Flood</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Inflow Peak (cfs)</u>	<u>Discharge (cfs)</u>
Spillway Design	1:10,000 years	165,000	165,000
Probable Maximum	--	346,000	365,000

A number of alternatives were considered singly and in combination for Devil Canyon spillway facilities. These included gated orifices in the main dam discharging into a plunge pool, chute or tunnel spillways with either a flip bucket or stilling basin for energy dissipation, and open channel spillways. As described for Watana, the selection of the type of spillway was influenced by the general arrangement of the major structures. The main spillway facilities will discharge the spillway design flood through a gated spillway control structure with energy dissipation by a flip bucket which directs the spillway discharge in a free fall jet into a plunge pool in the river. As noted in Section 10.7, restrictions with respect to limiting nitrogen supersaturation in selecting acceptable spillway discharge structures have been applied. The various spillway arrangements developed in accordance with these considerations are discussed in Sections 10.13 and 10.14.

10.11 - Power Facilities Alternatives

The selection of the optimum arrangements for the power facilities involved consideration of the same factors as described in Section 9.11 for Watana. The selection of the installed capacity of 600 MW at Devil Canyon is described in Section 10.6.

(a) Comparison of Surface and Underground Powerhouses

A surface powerhouse at Devil Canyon would be located either at the downstream toe of the dam or along the side of the canyon wall. As determined for Watana, costs favored an underground arrangement. In addition to cost, the underground powerhouse layout has been selected based on the following:

- Insufficient space is available in the steep-sided canyon for a surface powerhouse at the base of the dam;
- The provision of an extensive intake at the crest of the arch dam would be detrimental to stress conditions in the arch dam

particularly under earthquake loading, and would require significant changes in the arch dam geometry; and

- The outlet facilities located in the arch dam are designed to discharge directly into the river valley; these would cause significant winter icing and spray problems to any surface structure below the dam.

(b) Comparison of Alternative Locations

The underground powerhouse and related facilities have been located on the right bank for the following reasons:

- Generally superior rock quality at depth;
- The left bank area behind the main dam thrust block is unsuitable for the construction of the power intake; and
- The river turns north downstream from the dam, and hence, the right bank power development is more suitable for extending the tailrace tunnel to develop extra head.

(c) Selection of Units

The turbine type selected for the Devil Canyon development is governed by the design head and specific speed and by economic considerations. Francis turbines have been adopted for reasons similar to those discussed for Watana in Section 9.11.

The selection of the number and rating of individual units is discussed in detail in Section 10.6. The four units will be rated to deliver 150 MW each at full gate opening and minimum reservoir level in December (the peak demand month).

(d) Transformers

Transformer selection is similar to Watana and discussed in Section 9.11.

(e) Power Intake and Water Passages

For flexibility of operation, individual penstocks are provided to each of the four units. Detailed cost studies showed that there is no significant cost advantage in using two larger diameter penstocks with bifurcation at the powerhouse compared to four separate penstocks.

A single tailrace tunnel with a length of 6,800 feet to develop 30 feet of additional head downstream from the dam has been incorporated in the design. Detailed design may indicate that two smaller tailrace tunnels for improved reliability may be superior to one

large tunnel since the extra cost involved is relatively small. The surge chamber design would be essentially the same with one or two tunnels.

The overall dimensions of the intake structure are governed by the selected diameter and number of the penstocks and the minimum penstock spacing. Detailed studies comparing construction cost to the value of energy lost or gained were carried out to determine the optimum diameter of the penstocks and the tailrace tunnel.

(f) Environmental Constraints

In addition to potential nitrogen-saturation problems caused by spillway operation, the major impacts of the Devil Canyon power facilities development are:

- Changes in the temperature regime of the river; and
- Fluctuations in downstream river flows and levels.

Temperature modeling has indicated that a multiple level varying the intake design at Devil Canyon would not significantly affect downstream water temperatures, since these are effectively controlled by the water released from Watana. Consequently, the intake design at Devil Canyon incorporates a single level draw-off about 75 feet below maximum reservoir operating level (E1 1455).

The Devil Canyon station will normally be operated as a base-loaded plant throughout the year, to satisfy the requirement of no significant daily variation in power flow.

10.12 - General Arrangement Selection

The approach to selection of a general arrangement for Devil Canyon was a similar but simplified version of that used for Watana described in Section 9.

(a) Selection Methodology

Preliminary alternative arrangements of the Devil Canyon project were developed and selected using two rather than three review stages. Topographic conditions at this site limited the development of reasonably feasible layouts, and initially, four schemes were developed and evaluated. During the final review, the selected layout was refined based on technical, operational and environmental considerations identified during the preliminary review.

(b) Design Data and Criteria

The design data and design criteria on which the alternative layouts were based is presented in Table 10.1. Subsequent to selection of the preferred Devil Canyon scheme, the information was

refined and updated as part of the on-going study program. The description of the Devil Canyon project presented in Section 13 reflects the most recent design data for the project.

10.13 - Preliminary Review

Consideration of the options available for types and locations of various structures led to the development of four primary layouts for examination at Devil Canyon in the preliminary review phase. Previous studies had led to the selection of a thin concrete arch structure for the main dam, and indicated that the most acceptable technical and economic location was at the upstream entrance to the canyon. The dam axis has been fixed in this location for all alternatives.

(a) Description of Alternative Schemes

The schemes evaluated during the preliminary review are described below. In each of the alternatives evaluated, the dam is founded on the sound bedrock underlying the riverbed. The structure is 635 feet high, has a crest width of 20 feet, and a maximum base width of 90 feet. Mass concrete thrust blocks are founded high on the abutments, the left block extending approximately 100 feet above the existing bedrock surface and supporting the upper arches of the dam. The thrust block on the right abutment makes the cross-river profile of the dam more symmetrical and contributes to a more uniform stress distribution.

(i) Scheme DC1 (See Plate 10.1)

In this scheme, diversion facilities comprise upstream and downstream earthfill and rockfill cofferdams and two 24-foot-diameter tunnels beneath the left abutment.

A rockfill saddle dam occupies the lower lying area beyond the left abutment running from the thrust block to the higher ground beyond. The impervious fill cut-off for the saddle dam is founded on bedrock approximately 80 feet beneath the existing ground surface. The maximum height of this dam above the foundation is approximately 200 feet.

The routed 1:10,000-year design flood of 135,000 cfs is passed by two spillways. The main spillway is located on the right abutment. It has a design discharge of 90,000 cfs, and flows are controlled by a three-gated ogee control structure. This discharges down a concrete-lined chute and over flip bucket which ejects the water in a diverging jet into a pre-excavated plunge pool in the riverbed. The flip bucket is set at Elevation 925, approximately 35 feet above the river level. An auxiliary spillway, discharging a total of 35,000 cfs, is located in the center of the dam, 100 feet below the dam crest and is controlled by three wheel-mounted gates. The orifices are designed to direct the

flow into a concrete-lined plunge pool just downstream from the dam.

An emergency spillway is located in the sound rock south of the saddle dam. This is designed to pass discharges in excess of the 1:10,000-year flood up to a probable maximum flood of 270,000 cfs, if such an event should ever occur. The spillway is an unlined rock channel which discharges into a valley downstream from the dam leading into the Susitna River.

The upstream end of the channel is closed by an earthfill fuse plug. The plug is designed to be eroded if overtopped by the reservoir. Thus, as the crest is lower than either the main or saddle dams, the plug would be washed out prior to overtopping of either of these structures.

The underground power facilities are located on the right bank of the river, within the bedrock forming the dam abutment. The rock within this abutment is of better quality with fewer shear zones and a lesser degree of jointing than the rock on the left side of the canyon (see Section 10.3), and hence more suitable for underground excavation.

The power intake is located just upstream from the bend in the valley before it turns sharply to the right into Devil Canyon. The intake structure is set deep into the rock at the downstream end of the approach channel. Separate penstocks for each unit lead to the powerhouse.

The powerhouse contains four 150 MW turbine/generator units. The turbines are Francis type units coupled to overhead umbrella type generators. The units are serviced by an overhead crane running the length of the powerhouse and into the end service bay. Offices, the control room, switchgear room, maintenance room, etc., are located beyond the service bay. The transformers are housed in a separate, upstream gallery located above the lower horizontal section of the penstocks. Two vertical cable shafts connect the gallery to the surface. The draft tube gates are housed above the draft tubes in separate annexes off the main powerhall. The draft tubes converge in two bifurcations at the tailrace tunnels which discharge, under free-flow conditions, to the river. Access to the powerhouse is by means of an unlined tunnel leading from an access portal on the right side of the canyon.

The switchyard is located on the left bank of the river just downstream from the saddle dam, and the power cables from the transformers are carried to it across the top of the dam.

(ii) Scheme DC2 (See Plate 10.2)

The layout is generally similar to Scheme DC1 except that the chute spillway is located on the left side of the canyon. The concrete-lined chute terminates in a flip bucket high on the left side of the canyon which drops the discharges into the river below. The design flow is 90,000 cfs, and discharges are controlled by a 3-gated, ogee-crested-control structure, similar to that for Scheme DC1, which abuts the left side thrust block.

The saddle dam axis is straight, following the shortest route between the control structure at one end and the rising ground beyond the low-lying area at the other.

(iii) Scheme DC3 (See Plate 10.3)

The layout is similar to Scheme DC1 except that the right side main spillway takes the form of a single tunnel rather than an open chute. A 2-gated, ogee-control structure is located at the head of the tunnel and discharges into an inclined shaft 45 feet diameter at its upper end. The structure will discharge up to a maximum of 90,000 cfs.

The concrete-lined tunnel narrows to 35 feet diameter and discharges into a flip bucket which directs the flows in a jet into the river below as in Scheme DC1.

An auxiliary spillway is located in the center of the dam and an emergency spillway is excavated on the left abutment.

The layout of dams and power facilities are the same as for Scheme DC1.

(iv) Scheme DC4 (See Plate 10.4)

The dam, power facilities, and saddle dam for this scheme are the same as those for Scheme DC1. The major difference is the substitution of a stilling-basin type spillway on the right bank for the chute and flip bucket. A 3-gated, ogee-control structure is located at the end of the dam thrust block and controls the discharges, up to a maximum of 90,000 cfs.

The concrete-lined chute is built into the face of the canyon and discharges into a 500-foot-long by 115-foot-wide by 100-foot-high concrete stilling basin formed below river level and deep within the right side of the canyon. Central orifices in the dam and the left bank rock channel and fuse plug form the auxiliary and emergency spillways, respectively, as in the other alternative schemes.

The downstream cofferdam is located beyond the stilling basin, and the diversion tunnel outlets are located farther downstream to enable construction of the stilling basin.

(b) Comparison of Alternatives

The arch dam, saddle dam, power facilities, and diversion vary only in a minor degree among the four alternatives. Thus, the comparison of the schemes rests solely on a comparison of the spillway facilities.

As can be seen from a comparison of the costs in Table 10.2, the flip bucket spillways are substantially less costly to construct than the stilling-basin type of Scheme DC4. The left side spillway of Scheme DC2 runs at a sharp angle to the river and ejects the discharge jet from high on the canyon face toward the opposite side of the canyon. Over a longer period of operation, scour of the heavily jointed rock could cause undermining of the canyon sides and their subsequent instability. The possibility of deposition of material in the downstream riverbed with a corresponding elevation of the tailrace. Construction of a spillway on the steep left side of the river could be more difficult than on the right side because of the presence of deep fissures and large unstable blocks of rock which are present on the left side close to the top of the canyon.

The two-right side flip bucket spillways schemes, based on either an open chute or a tunnel, take advantage of a downstream bend in the river to discharge parallel to the course of the river. This will reduce the effects of erosion but could still present a problem if the estimated maximum possible scour hole would occur.

The tunnel type spillway could prove difficult to construct because of the large diameter inclined shaft and tunnel paralleling the bedding planes. The high velocities encountered in the tunnel spillway could cause problems with the possibility of spiraling flows and severe cavitation both occurring.

The stilling basin type spillway of Scheme DC4 reduces downstream erosion problems within the canyon. However, cavitation could be a problem under the high-flow velocities experienced at the base of the chute. This would be somewhat alleviated by aeration of the flows. There is, however, little precedent for stilling basin operation at heads of over 500 feet; and even where floods of much less than the design capacity have been discharged, severe damage has occurred.

(c) Selection of Final Scheme

The chute and flip bucket spillway of Scheme DC2 could generate downstream erosion problems which could require considerable maintenance costs and cause reduced efficiency in operation of the project at a future date. Hydraulic design problems exist with Scheme DC3 which may also have severe cavitation problems. Also, there is no cost advantage in Scheme DC3 over the open chute Scheme DC1. In Scheme DC4, the operating characteristics of a high head stilling basin are little known, and there are few examples of successful operation. Scheme DC4 also costs considerably more than any other scheme (Table 10.2).

All spillways operating at the required heads and discharges will eventually cause some erosion. For all schemes, the use of solid cone valve outlet facilities in the lower portion of the dam to handle floods up to 1:50-year frequency is considered a more reasonable approach to reduce erosion and eliminate nitrogen supersaturation problems than the gated high level orifice outlets in the dam. Since the cost of the flip bucket type spillway in the scheme is considerably less than that of the stilling basin in Scheme DC4, and since the latter offers no relative operational advantage, Scheme DC1 has been selected for further study as the selected scheme.

10.14 - Final Review

The layout selected in Section 10.13 was further developed in accordance with updated engineering studies and criteria. The major change compared to Scheme DC1 is the elimination of the high level gated orifices and introduction of low level solid cone valves, but other modifications that were introduced are described below.

The revised layout is shown on Plate 10.5. A description of the structures is as follows.

(a) Main Dam

The maximum operating level of the reservoir was raised to Elevation 1455 in accordance with updated information relative to the Watana tailwater level. This requires raising the dam crest to Elevation 1463 with the concrete parapet wall crest at Elevation 1466. The saddle dam was raised to Elevation 1472.

(b) Spillways and Outlet Facilities

To eliminate the potential for nitrogen supersaturation problems, the outlet facilities were designed to restrict supersaturated flow to an average recurrence interval of greater than 50 years. This led to the replacement of high level gated orifice spillway by outlet facilities incorporating 7 fixed-cone valves, 3 with a diameter of 90 inches and 4 with a diameter of 102 inches, capable of passing a design flow of 38,500 cfs.

The chute spillway and flip bucket are located on the right bank, as in Scheme DC1; however, the chute length was decreased and the elevation of the flip bucket raised compared to Scheme DC1.

More recent site surveys indicated that the ground surface in the vicinity of the saddle dam was lower than originally estimated. The emergency spillway channel was relocated slightly to the south to accommodate the larger dam.

(c) Diversion

The previous twin diversion tunnels were replaced by a single-tunnel scheme. This was determined to provide all necessary security and will cost approximately one-half as much as the two-tunnel alternative (see Section 10.9).

(d) Power Facilities

The drawdown range of the reservoir was reduced, allowing a reduction in height of the power intake. In order to locate the intake within solid rock, it has been moved into the side of the valley, requiring a slight rotation of the water passages, powerhouse, and caverns comprising the power facilities.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- (1) Acres American Incorporated, Report on 1980-81 Geotechnical Investigations, Prepared for the Alaska Power Authority, February 1982.
- (2) Woodward-Clyde Consultants, Interim Report of Seismic Studies for the Susitna Hydroelectric Project, Prepared for Acres American Incorporated, December 1980.
- (3) Woodward-Clyde Consultants, Final Report of Seismic Studies for the Susitna Hydroelectric Project, Prepared for Acres American Incorporated, February 1982.

TABLE 10.1: DESIGN DATA AND DESIGN CRITERIA FOR
REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE LAYOUTS

River Flows

Average flow (over 30 years of record):	8,960 cfs
Probable maximum flood:	270,000 cfs
Max. flood with return period of 1:10,000 years:	135,000 cfs (after routing through Watana)
Maximum flood with return period of 1:500 years:	-
Maximum flood with return period of 1:50 years:	42,000 cfs (after routing through Watana)

Reservoir

Normal maximum operating level:	1455 feet
Reservoir minimum operating level:	1430 feet
Area of reservoir at maximum operating level:	21,000 acres
Reservoir live storage:	180,000 acre feet
Reservoir full storage:	1,100,000 acre feet

Dam

Type:	Concrete arch
Crest elevation:	1455 feet
Crest length:	-
Maximum height above foundation:	635 feet
Crest width:	20 feet

Diversion

Cofferdam types:	Rockfill
Upstream cofferdam crest elevation:	960 feet
Downstream cofferdam crest elevation:	900 feet
Maximum pool level during construction:	955 feet
Tunnels:	Concrete lined
Outlet structures:	Low-level structure with slide closure gate
Final closure:	Mass concrete plugs in line with dam grout curtain
Releases during impounding:	2,000 cfs min. via fixed-cone valves


Spillway

Design floods:	Passes PMF, preserving integrity of dam with no loss of life
	Passes routed 1:10,000-year flood with no damage to structures
Service spillway - capacity:	45,000 cfs
- control structure:	Fixed-cone valves
- energy dissipation:	Five 108-inch diameter fixed-cone valves
Secondary spillway - capacity:	90,000 cfs
- control structure:	Gated, ogee crests
- energy dissipation:	Stilling basin
Emergency spillway - capacity:	pmf minus routed 1:10,000-year flood
- type:	Fuse plug

TABLE 10.2: SUMMARY OF COMPARATIVE COST ESTIMATES

PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
(January 1982 \$ X 10⁶)

<u>Item</u>	<u>DC1</u>	<u>DC2</u>	<u>DC3</u>	<u>DC4</u>
Land Acquisition	22.1	22.1	22.1	22.1
Reservoir	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5
Main Dam	468.7	468.7	468.7	468.7
Emergency Spillway	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2
Power Facilities	211.7	211.7	211.7	211.7
Switchyard	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.1
Miscellaneous Structures	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5
Access Roads & Site Facilities	28.4	28.4	28.4	28.4
Common Items - Subtotal	<u>783.2</u>	<u>783.2</u>	<u>783.2</u>	<u>783.2</u>
Diversion	32.1	32.1	32.1	34.9
Service Spillway	46.8	53.3	50.1	85.2
Saddle Dam	19.9	18.6	18.6	19.9
Non-Common/Items Subtotal	<u>98.8</u>	<u>104.0</u>	<u>100.8</u>	<u>140.0</u>
Total	882.0	887.2	884.0	923.2
Camp & Support Costs (16%)	141.1	141.9	141.4	147.7
Subtotal	<u>1023.1</u>	<u>1029.1</u>	<u>1025.4</u>	<u>1070.9</u>
Contingency (20%)	204.6	205.8	205.1	214.2
Subtotal	<u>1227.7</u>	<u>1234.9</u>	<u>1230.5</u>	<u>1285.1</u>
Engineering & Administration (12.5%)	153.5	154.3	153.8	160.6
Total	<u>1381.2</u>	<u>1389.2</u>	<u>1384.3</u>	<u>1445.7</u>



LEGEND

LITHOLOGY:

- OVERBURDEN, UNDIFFERENTIATED
- ARGILLITE AND GRAYWACKE OUTCROP
- FELSIC DIKE, WIDTH SHOWN WHERE GREATER THAN 10 FEET
- MAFIC DIKE, WIDTH SHOWN WHERE GREATER THAN 10 FEET

CONTACTS:

- LIMIT OF OUTCROP

STRUCTURE:

- SHEAR, WIDTH SHOWN WHERE GREATER THAN 10 FEET, VERTICAL UNLESS DIP SHOWN
- SHEAR, WIDTH LESS THAN 10 FEET, INCLINED, VERTICAL, EXTENT WHERE KNOWN
- FRACTURE ZONE, WIDTH SHOWN WHERE GREATER THAN 10 FEET, VERTICAL UNLESS DIP SHOWN
- JOINTS, INCLINED, OPEN INCLINED, VERTICAL (SETS I AND II ONLY)
- BEDDING/FOLIATION, INCLINED, VERTICAL

OTHER:

- DC-1**
 GEOLOGIC SECTION LOCATION
- ΔDCJ-1** JOINT STATION
- GF1** GEOLOGIC FEATURE
- M1** MAFIC DIKE
- F1** FELSIC DIKE

NOTES

1. CONTOUR INTERVAL 50 FEET.
2. EXTENT OF SHEARS, FRACTURE ZONES AND ALTERATION ZONES ARE INFERRED BASED ON GEOLOGIC MAPPING AND SURFACE EXPLORATIONS, AND ARE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION THROUGH FUTURE DETAILED INVESTIGATIONS.
3. DETAILS OF GEOLOGIC FEATURES PRESENTED IN 1980-81 GEOTECHNICAL REPORT.


REFERENCE: BASE MAP FROM R & M, 1981 - 1"=200'
DEVIL CANYON TOPOGRAPHY.
COORDINATES IN FEET, ALASKA STATE PLANE (ZONE 4)

**DEVIL CANYON
GEOLOGIC MAP**

SCALE 0 200 400 FEET

FIGURE 10.1






DEVIL CANYON DIVERSION
 HEADWATER ELEVATION / TUNNEL DIAMETER

FIGURE 10.2







DEVIL CANYON DIVERSION
TOTAL COST / TUNNEL DIAMETER

FIGURE 10.3





	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY	
	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
DEVIL CANYON SCHEME DC1		
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 10.1
	ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED	




GENERAL ARRANGEMENT

NOTE

THIS DRAWING ILLUSTRATES A PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL PROJECT LAYOUT PREPARED FOR COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE SITE DEVELOPMENTS ONLY


NOTE
POWERHOUSE LOCATION SUBJECT TO OPTIMIZATION STUDIES OF DOWNSTREAM LOCATIONS.

	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY	
	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
DEVIL CANYON SCHEME DC2		
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 10.2
ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED		




GENERAL ARRANGEMENT

SCALE: A




SECTION E-E

SCALE: B




SECTION A-A

SCALE: A




SECTION F-F

SCALE: B




SECTION G-G

SCALE: B




SECTION B-B

SCALE: B




SECTION C-C

SCALE: B



SECTION D-D

SCALE: B





NOTE


THIS DRAWING ILLUSTRATES A PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL PROJECT LAYOUT PREPARED FOR COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE SITE DEVELOPMENTS ONLY

	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
	DEVIL CANYON SCHEME DC3	
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 10.3

4




SECTION A-A
(THRU SPILLWAY)



SECTION B-B


SECTION C-C

SECTION D-D



SECTION E-E


SECTION F-F



NOTE

THIS DRAWING ILLUSTRATES A PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL PROJECT LAYOUT PREPARED FOR COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE SITE DEVELOPMENTS ONLY

APAC	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY	
	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
DEVIL CANYON SCHEME DC4		
<i>Lawson</i>	MARCH 1962	PLATE 10.4
ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED		



	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY	
	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
DEVIL CANYON SELECTED SCHEME		
	MARCH 1992	PLATE 10.5
	ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED	

11 - SELECTION OF ACCESS PLAN

This section describes the process of formulation and selection of an access plan for the Susitna Hydroelectric Project. The methodology for comparison of alternative plans is outlined, and an evaluation of each basic plan is presented, considering schedule, costs, and biological and social impacts. The selected plan is described in detail, and recommendations for measures to reduce impacts are presented.

Engineering studies conducted on the alternative routes consisted of development of design criteria, layout of the alternative routes, preliminary field investigations, estimated cost of constructing the alternative routes and costs in transporting supplies and materials to the damsites. Environmental studies included identification, field investigations, and evaluation of biological impacts for each of the alternative routes. Social, cultural, socioeconomic, and a public participation program were included among the studies completed as part of the Access Plan evaluation. Public concerns and preferences, particularly those of the area that would be impacted the most directly, were solicited and fully considered in the evaluation.

The evaluation of the alternative plans included evaluation criteria, comparisons of the alternative plans, identification of conflicts among the alternative plans relative to the evaluation criteria, resolution of the conflicts in the evaluation criteria, and the tradeoffs made in the evaluation process.

11.1 - Background

(a) Existing Access Facilities

The proposed Devil Canyon and Watana sites are located approximately 115 miles northeast of Anchorage and 140 miles south of Fairbanks. The Alaska Railroad, which links Anchorage and Fairbanks, passes within 12 miles of the Devil Canyon site at Gold Creek. The George Parks Highway (Route 3) parallels the Alaska Railroad for much of its route, although between the communities of Sunshine and Hurricane, the highway is routed to the west of the railroad, so that Gold Creek is situated approximately 16 miles south of the intersection of the railroad and highway. A portion of the highway between Lane and Hurricane passes through Denali State Park. At Cantwell, 51 miles north of Gold Creek, the Denali Highway (Route 8) leads easterly approximately 116 miles to Paxson, intersecting the Richardson Highway at this point.

To the south, the Glenn Highway (Route 1) provides the main access to Glennallen and intersects the Richardson Highway which leads south to Valdez.

(b) Modifications to Plan of Study

The original POS proposed that a single route would be selected by May 1981 to be followed by detailed environmental investigations of this route.

Early in the study, three main access corridors were developed. Consideration of these plans on the basis of available information, comments, and concerns from various state agencies and a recommendation from the Susitna Steering Committee, led to a decision to assess all three alternative routes in more detail throughout 1981 and recommend a selected route later in the year. Accordingly, this assessment included environmental studies, engineering studies, aerial photography, and geologic mapping of all three alternatives rather than the single route initially envisaged.

11.2 - Objectives

The finally selected access plan must allow for the efficient and timely undertaking of construction and maintenance activities in order that the Susitna Hydroelectric Project can be completed and electric power be reliably and continuously provided to the Railbelt area of Alaska.

In meeting this basic objective, several specific objectives were developed as a basis for evaluation of the alternative access routes. These objectives are:

- To allow the construction of the Susitna project to proceed on a schedule that would supply the necessary power to the Railbelt Area of Alaska where needed in 1993;
- To minimize total cost including construction costs of the access facilities, logistics costs for supporting the construction of the Susitna development as well as the logistics costs of subsequent operation of the completed project;
- To allow for ease of operation and maintenance to insure reliability in the power supply;
- To minimize adverse biological impacts;
- To accommodate the preferences of local communities;-and
- To accommodate the preferences of native landowners.

11.3 - Approach

The approach utilized to arrive at an access plan recommendation was an adaptation of the generic plan formulation and selection methodology described elsewhere in the report. The methodology as specifically applied to selection of the access plan is presented graphically in Figure 11.1.

To aid in understanding the selection process and the various studies conducted, the following definitions are provided:

(a) Corridor

A strip of land generally 2 miles or greater in width leading between two points or areas.

(b) Route

A strip of land generally 1/2 mile or less in width, leading between two points.

(c) Segment

Portions of a route which when combined constitute one alternative route between two points.

(d) Alternative Route

One of several routes which will be evaluated between two points.

(e) Plan

An access plan includes a single or a combination of existing and new alternative routes. The plan will also define the logistics involved in the transportation of supplies and materials.

11.4 - Corridor Selection and Evaluation

The first step in the selection process involved identification of the three general corridors described below (see Plate 11.1):

<u>Corridor</u>	<u>Description</u>
1	From the Parks Highway to the Watana site via the north side of the Susitna River.
2	From the Parks Highway to the Watana site via the south side of the Susitna River.
3	From the Denali Highway to the Watana site.

These corridors were selected based upon the use of existing transportation facilities within reasonable proximity to the Watana and Devil Canyon sites.

A general environmental analysis was undertaken for each corridor, and discussions, evaluations, and results are presented elsewhere (2). The major environmental constraints identified within each corridor are potential impacts on the following:

(a) Corridor 1

- Fishery resources in the Susitna and Indian Rivers;
- Cliff-nesting raptors near Portage Creek and Devil Canyon;
- Furbearer habitat near Portage Creek and High Lake;
- Moose habitat on the Susitna River; and
- Caribou habitat between Devil Creek and Deadman Creek.

(b) Corridor 2

- Fishery resources in the Susitna and Indian Rivers;
- Cliff-nesting raptors near south side of the Susitna River;
- Waterfowl habitat in the Stephan Lake-Fog Lake areas; and
- Furbearer habitat in the Stephan Lake-Fog Lake areas.

(c) Corridor 3

- Caribou calving area near Butte Lake;
- Furbearer habitat; and
- Some waterfowl habitat.

In addition, increased access will cause various impacts which are common to all corridors. Archaeological resources could pose a constraint; at this time, the locations of such resources that may exist are unknown.

Finally, socioeconomic impacts will vary both in magnitude and areas of concentration, depending upon which access route or combination of access routes is selected, and whether a road or railroad is used. With the socioeconomic assessment of access schemes, there is more concern with the origin and type of access because these will affect the communities more than the actual route.

With a road from the Parks Highway to the damsites (Corridors 1 and 2), effects generally would be concentrated on the western side of the project area along the Parks Highway. An easily accessible road corridor would provide for transportation of construction materials, equipment, and labor as well as post-construction uses of the upper Susitna basin (such as recreation). The impact of a railroad from the same side would likewise be concentrated on the western side. However, in every socioeconomic category, impacts would be the same or less with a railroad than with the road. The single exception would be in rail industry activities, which would experience major changes.

With a road constructed from the Denali Highway to the damsites (Corridor 3), impacts along the Parks Highway-Alaska Railroad corridor would depend upon whether materials were to be shipped by road or rail to Cantwell before being transported along the Denali Highway to the access road. If Corridor 3 is used, impacts would occur in the Cantwell area regardless of the transportation mode.

11.5 - Route Selection and Evaluation

Following identification of three major corridors, a number of access routes were selected and evaluated based on engineering and economic criteria. The selected routes were then modified on the basis of an environmental analysis.

(a) Design Criteria

Construction of the Susitna project will require a dependable, safe, and efficient access route suitable for transporting personnel, consumable supplies and large pieces of equipment for an extended period, in adverse weather conditions.

The preliminary design criteria adopted for the access road and rail alternatives were selected on the basis of similar facilities provided for other remote projects of this nature. Basic parameters were as follows:

	<u>Access Road</u>	<u>Railroad</u>
Maximum Grade	6 percent	2.5 percent
Maximum Curvature	5 degrees	10 degrees
Design Loading		
- During Construction	80k per axle and 200 k total	not applicable
- After Construction	HS-20	E-50

Following corridor definition, various segments that met the engineering criteria were mapped. These segments were then jointed to form alternative routes which were compared on the basis of:

- overall length;
- average grade per mile; and
- average deflection per mile.

(b) Economic Criteria

For the early stages of corridor and route selection, the alternatives were compared on the basis of total centerline length of route, with minor adjustments for average grade and curvature. Preliminary capital costs for construction were estimated at \$1,250,000 per mile.

(c) Results

A total of 16 segments, combined into 30 routes, were identified within the three corridors. The alternatives identified as being most favorable in terms of overall length, grade and alignment are as follows (the routes are described and presented in greater detail elsewhere [3]):

	<u>Corridor 1</u>	<u>Corridor 2</u>	<u>Corridor 3</u>	<u>Corridor 2</u>
	Parks Highway to Watana north side	Parks Highway to Watana south side	Denali Highway to Watana	Gold Creek to Watana south side
Type	Road	Road	Road	Rail
Overall length	64.9 miles	66.5 miles	39.1 miles	58.0 miles
Average Grade	2.4 percent	2.2 percent	1.3 percent	0.5 percent
Deflection per Mile	7° 06' <u>+</u>	4° 50° <u>+</u>	1° 30' <u>+</u>	5° 11' <u>+</u>

(d) Environmental Influences on Alternative Routes

After the engineering and economic assessment identified the 3 roads and 1 rail route described above, an initial screening was made which resulted in several refinements to the alternative routes under consideration. A major refinement involved the deletion of a large portion of the road access corridor from the Parks Highway on the north side of the river (Corridor 1). The segment connecting the highway and the Devil Canyon site routed around Portage Creek was deleted mainly on the basis of potentially severe environmental impacts on anadromous fish, furbearers, and raptors. The topography in the Portage Creek area is furthermore such that the overall length of road necessary to meet the established criteria was excessive. In addition, the construction of the segment would be extremely difficult due to the predominance of steep sidehill cuts of considerable height.

Another major refinement to the corridors was the routing to the west of the northern portion of the Denali route (Corridor 3). This routing was advocated on environmental grounds in an attempt to reduce potential impacts on the caribou subherd calving area near Butte Lake. A final refinement consisted of realignment of the portion of the Corridor on the south side of the river (Corridor 2) in the Stephan Lake-Fog Lakes area to reduce potential environmental impacts to furbearers and waterfowl.

The main routes within the corridors remaining after the initial screening are described below (see Plate 11.2):

(i) Parks Highway to Devil Canyon

This route follows the existing portion of the Alaska Railroad between Gold Creek and the intersection of the railroad with the Parks Highway just south of Hurricane. Traveling southeast from Hurricane, this route passes through Chulitna Pass and then parallels the Indian River to Gold Creek. The existing river valley is sufficiently wide to accommodate a road. From Gold Creek to Devil Canyon, the route lies south of the Susitna River, paralleling the river on a high ridge.

(ii) Devil Canyon to Watana - South Side of Susitna River

This route generally parallels the Susitna River and traverses west to east from Devil Canyon to Watana. The initial topography is mountainous and the route involves the most difficult construction of the three routes, requiring a number of sidehill cuts in rock and soil. This route also includes the environmentally sensitive Stephan Lake and Fog Lake areas.

(iii) Devil Canyon to Watana - North Side of Susitna River

This route generally parallels the Susitna River and traverses west to east from Devil Canyon to Watana. This route is mountainous and includes terrain at the highest elevations of all routes; however, construction of the road would not be as difficult as the route between the damsites on the south side of the Susitna River.

(iv) Denali Highway to Watana

This route connects the Denali Highway with the Watana site and runs in a north-south direction. This route is the easiest to construct of the alternative routes. The terrain is relatively flat with a few wetlands involved. This route would not require any major bridges.

11.6 - Description of Basic Plans

From the three routes remaining after the initial screening, eight plans were developed. These plans were evaluated in more detail than originally planned, as a result of information and assessments conducted during the study program, the concerns of state agencies, and recommendations of the Susitna Steering Committee. The additional investigation and evaluations consisted of environmental field work, geologic and topographic mapping, and subsurface borings.

The plans are presented below and are also shown schematically in Figures 11.2 through 11.5.

(a) Plan 1

This plan utilizes a roadway from the Parks Highway to Watana along the south side of the river. This access plan is based on materials such as cement and steel being brought into the state through the port of Whittier. Food and other camp supplies would be imported through Anchorage via containers, and fuel directly from Kenai to Anchorage via existing pipeline. These materials and supplies would then be carried by rail to a railhead and storage area at Gold Creek. At Gold Creek, materials would be transferred to trucks for transport by road to the site. Other materials and supplies would be transported by truck from Anchorage along the Parks Highway to the access road. An alternative for fuel supply would be rail haul from the refinery at North Pole, Alaska.

(b) Plan 2

This plan would serve both dam sites by a rail line. This alternative would essentially preclude public access. Construction planning for this mode of access would be based on trains being broken down and cars dropped on the siding at Gold Creek. An engine and train crew would be stationed at Gold Creek which would allow shuttle cars from Gold Creek to the project site on a daily basis. Passenger rail service would be required daily. If public access is desired after construction, the rails could be removed and the road bed graded into a single lane road with turnouts.

(c) Plan 3

This plan envisages the use of a combination of rail and road transportation. Construction activities at Watana would be served from a railhead and storage area at Cantwell by truck across the Denali Highway and along a newly constructed road from the Denali Highway. Construction at Devil Canyon would be served by road from a railhead at Gold Creek and road access from Gold Creek to the Parks Highway. This plan does not include a connection between the two dams.

(d) Plan 4

This plan serves Watana by truck from a railhead at Cantwell and Devil Canyon by rail from Gold Creek. In the plan, there is no connection between dams.

(e) Plan 5

This plan serves both dams by road from a railhead at Gold Creek. The route is located on the south side of the river to Devil Canyon with a major bridge downstream from the damsite, then follows the north side of the river to Watana. There is a road connection to the Parks Highway from Gold Creek.

(f) Plan 6

This plan is identical to Plan 4 except that a service road for maintenance purposes is included on the north side of the river between the two dams.

(g) Plan 7

This plan is the same as Plan 3 except that a service road would be provided along the north side of the river as in Plan 6.

(h) Plan 8

This plan is the same as Plan 5 except there is no road connection to the Parks Highway. A newly constructed road would service Devil Canyon from Gold Creek on the south side of the river. A major bridge would be required downstream from Devil Canyon and a new road on the north side of the river would connect the two dams. This alternative plan precludes public access.

11.7 - Additional Plans

Following selection and evaluation of the eight plans described above, presentations were made to the Power Authority and the Susitna Hydroelectric Project Steering Committee. These presentations and subsequent discussions resulted in the addition of the three plans described below and shown schematically in Figures 11.6 and 11.7.

(a) Plan 9

This plan is the same as Plan 8 except access between Gold Creek and Devil Canyon is by rail along a similar route, and the railhead is located at Devil Canyon instead of Gold Creek.

(b) Plan 10

This plan is identical to Plan 9 except that the road connecting Devil Canyon and Watana is on the south side of the Susitna River.

(c) Plan 11

This plan utilizes a railhead at Cantwell, road access via the existing Denali Highway, a road from the Denali Highway to Watana and a road from Watana to Devil Canyon on the north side of the river.

Plans 9 and 10 were suggested by the Steering Committee as a means to reduce accessibility to the area, thus avoiding the introduction of adverse environmental impacts into the Susitna Basin.

Plan 11 was added as a possible way to provide access from only one area while also alleviating the socioeconomic impacts the communities near Hurricane would feel as a result of an access road from the west.

11.8 - Evaluation Criteria

The specific objectives of the selected access plan are described in Section 11.2. The criteria used to assess the degree that any given plan satisfies these objectives are described in the following paragraphs.

(a) Construction Schedule

It is essential that the selected access plan be adequate to meet the overall project scheduling requirements. The load forecasts described in Section 5 together with the examination of the existing system and future generating options indicated a requirement for first power from Watana in 1993. A delay in the on-line date by one year would mean that another source of fossil fuel generation would have to be constructed, or the loss of load probability must be violated. In terms of present worth costs, a delay of one year would increase the present worth of the long-term costs of the project by approximately \$43 million.

Analysis of the construction schedule requirements for Watana demonstrates that an all-weather access route to the site is required by mid-1986 if the on-line date of 1993 is to be maintained. For the purposes of these studies, it has been assumed that a FERC license to construct the project will be received at the beginning of 1985, and the start of permanent work on the project will coincide with this date. In order to meet all the mid-1986 requirements, it is obvious that an access route to the site would have to be constructed within approximately 18 months.

A preliminary evaluation of the construction period for completion of the access plans is presented below.

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Origin for Watana Access</u>	<u>Approximate Construction Period (years)</u>
1	Parks Highway	3-4
2	Gold Creek	3-4
3	Denali Highway	1
4	Denali Highway	1
5	Parks Highway	3-4
6	Denali Highway, Gold Creek	1
7	Denali Highway, Parks Highway	1
8	Gold Creek	3
9	Gold Creek	3
10	Gold Creek	3
11	Denali Highway	1

It is apparent from the above that only Plans 3, 4, 6, 7 and 11 could be constructed within the 18-month period required to maintain the overall project schedule. Since this would severely limit the selection process, a scheme was developed to provide initial access to the Watana site within the framework of regulatory and scheduling restraints. This scheme, described in more detail elsewhere (1), involves construction of a pioneer road to Watana from either Gold Creek or the Parks Highway. The pioneer road would consist of a gravel based road with periodic passing turn-outs and would be constructed on existing ground insofar as possible to avoid significant cuts or fills. Temporary floating Bailey bridges would be used at river crossings, replaced by ice crossings in the winter. The analysis indicates that the pioneer road scheme will be sufficient to provide continuous access to the site within 18 months, and will be sufficient to support construction activities until the permanent access route is completed. Certain additional licensing and permitting requirements are associated with this scheme; these are discussed in Section 11.12.

The pioneer road scheme can be implemented with Plans 1, 2, 5, 8, 9 and 10. Therefore, all 11 plans can be considered equivalent in terms of their ability to meet initial project requirements provided a pioneer road can be constructed.

(b) Construction and Logistics Costs

For the purposes of this evaluation, construction costs include the cost of constructing the access facilities, adjusted for any differences in cost of constructing the Susitna project itself which relate to the particular access plan under construction. Logistic costs are the costs associated with transporting, labor, fuel, equipment, materials and supplies to construct the two power developments.

(c) Ease of Operation and Maintenance

This criterion relates to the relative ease of operation and maintenance of the two developments after construction is complete. Initial planning envisages operation of both developments from Watana for several years after Devil Canyon is brought on-line, after which time both projects will be operated remotely from a central location. Maintenance of two projects of this size and complexity will obviously be an important consideration. Duplication of maintenance facilities and staff at both sites would result in a substantial increase in the annual costs of the overall development. The most economic scheme, given the sequence of development, would be to establish an operation and maintenance facility at Watana, with a reliable means of access to Devil Canyon 32 miles downstream. In this regard, access plans with a road connection between the two sites have been evaluated as being superior in terms of ease of operation and maintenance than plans without a road connection.

(d) Flexibility in Construction Logistics and Transportation

This criterion is used to evaluate the extent to which an access plan contributes to the maintenance of a reliable and flexible logistic support system during construction of Watana and Devil Canyon.

For the Susitna project, a fundamental consideration is whether or not to provide a road connection to a major highway. For this evaluation, the following alternatives have been considered:

- a road connection either to the Parks Highway or Denali Highway; and
- rail access only from Gold Creek.

Plans 1 through 10 described in Section 11.5 all include a rail-head and storage area at Gold Creek. Accordingly, plans incorporating a road connection with the Parks or Denali Highways obviously provide greater flexibility and reliability in case of a transportation disruption involving the Alaska Railroad, compared to plans with "rail only" access. Specific considerations are as follows:

- Any breakdown in the rail system would result in a loss of all ground transportation, in the absence of an alternative road system. The increased risk of delays has an associated cost penalty. An analysis has been undertaken to quantify the risks associated with rail access only. Methodology for this risk analysis is presented elsewhere (1).

- The availability of two possible modes of transportation will undoubtedly be reflected in lower and more competitive bids for construction, supply and service contracts, since contractors would otherwise include some contingency to cover transportation disruptions. Although significant, this aspect is difficult to quantify.

(e) Environmental Considerations

Exclusive of socioeconomic considerations, the objective is to develop an access plan which minimizes adverse changes to the natural environment. The criteria used to assess the degree to which any plan meets this objectives are described below.

(i) Effects on Big Game

A primary concern associated with the selection of an access plan is the potential effect on the Nelchina caribou herd, specifically the subpopulation of approximately 1,000 animals that inhabit the northwestern section of the Upper Susitna Basin. The impacts of hunters on moose and bear are also considered but as secondary concerns. These impacts can be greatly lessened by selecting a route other than the access from the Denali Highway.

(ii) Effects on Fisheries

In the case of resident fisheries, there are relatively isolated lakes (Butte Lake, Big Lake) and streams in the northwestern section of the Upper Susitna Basin, and the Fog Lakes area that would receive additional angling pressure if road access was provided. These impacts can be lessened by avoiding access from the Denali Highway and along the south side of the Susitna River between the dam-sites.

Since Devil Canyon acts as a natural barrier to anadromous fish migration, there is no concern regarding the effect of improved access on this resource upstream of Devil Canyon. However, Indian River and the Susitna River below Portage Creek, are important for salmon. Any access plans that follow or cross these rivers could affect salmon directly through habitat disruption (i.e., sedimentation) or indirectly through increased fishing pressure. These impacts could be lessened by avoiding road access paralleling the Indian River.

(iii) Effects on Furbearers

Wetlands, important to furbearers, have been identified between the Parks Highway and Gold Creek, near Deadman Mountain, near Deadman and Big Lakes and the Upper Deadman Creek. In addition, the Fog Lake - Stephan Lakes wetlands complex is a valuable furbearer habitat. A red fox denning complex has also been identified south of Deadman Mountain. Any access road crossing through these areas has the potential for negative impacts on furbearers. Impacts on furbearers would be least by selecting access from Gold Creek to Devil Canyon on the south side of the Susitna River and on the north side of the River between the damsites.

(iv) Effects on Birds

Heavily forested areas between the Parks Highway and Devil Canyon along riverbanks are productive avian habitat. Construction through these areas would disturb this habitat.

(v) Effects on Wilderness Setting

The Upper Susitna Basin is presently in a state of wilderness to semi-wilderness. Although continued intrusion with ATVs from Denali Highway, potential development of native lands and the establishment of the Indian River disposal sites have the potential of changing the character of sections of the basin. The improved public access associated with construction of the Susitna Hydroelectric Project will produce a major alteration in the remoteness of the area. Natural resource agencies and the local public have expressed a desire to maintain the status quo to the maximum extent possible. People from the urban centers of Anchorage and Fairbanks have expressed a desire to provide road access and open the area for recreation development. The factor used to assess the potential effect of a proposed route on the wilderness setting was the ease by which the public would have access to the area.

(vi) Effects on Archaeological Resources

Archaeological resources are likely present along all access routes. The segment with the least potential for affecting archaeological sites is between Gold Creek and Devil Canyon. All other segments have a moderate to high potential of disturbing cultural resource sites. The segments from the Denali Highway to Watana and from the Devil Canyon site to Watana north of the Susitna River have a higher potential for archaeological disturbance because of the treeless topography and thin soils.

(f) Social Considerations

(i) Preferences Expressed by Native Landowners

- CIRI

The CIRI organization has selected lands surrounding the impoundment areas and south of the Susitna River between the damsites. CIRI has officially expressed a preference for a plan providing road access from Parks Highway to both damsites along the south side of the Susitna River (Plan 1). Unofficially, they have indicated that only Plan 1 is fully acceptable to them.

- Ahtna

The Ahtna native corporation presently owns land bordering the Denali Highway. At a public meeting in Cantwell in October 1981, a number of Ahtna members expressed a preference for a route involving the Denali Highway; however, no official position from the Ahtna Corporation has been documented.

In evaluating the compatibility of a proposed route with native landowner preference, it was considered that only Plan 1 met the preference expressed by CIRI and that Plans 3, 4, 6, 7, or 11 would meet the preference of Ahtna. Since CIRI is the largest native landowner in the area and since they have officially expressed their preference, greater importance was given to their preference.

(ii) Effects on Native Landowners

For the purposes of plan evaluation, distinction has been made between the native preferences as expressed and Acres evaluation as to how the various access plans would affect the opportunity for the natives to develop their lands on the south side of the river.

The aspects used to assess the effect of a proposed route on the opportunity for CIRI to develop their lands were:

- The degree of access provided from a major transportation corridor to native lands;
- The degree of access provided on native lands; and
- The type of access provided.

(iii) Preferences Expressed by Local Communities

The local communities have expressed opinions relating to:

- The access plan they prefer;
- The general community lifestyle patterns they prefer; and
- The general setting in the surrounding area they prefer.

These preferences are discussed by community. This summary refers mainly to the opinion expressed by the majority of residents within each community. Complete documentation of community preferences is presented in the report submitted by S. Braund (1).

- Cantwell

The majority of residents in Cantwell preferred the Denali access route, provided stringent hunter control was enforced.

The community desired economic stimulus and were in favor of the economic changes that could result from having a major construction project in the area.

They preferred the semi-wilderness setting of the Upper Susitna Basin and expressed concern over the potential effects of a Denali access on the fish and wildlife resources of the area.

- Railroad Communities North of Talkeetna

The residents of these communities were unanimous in their preference for no increase in access or development of the area. If access was required, they preferred the all-rail alternative. These communities also expressed a strong preference for maintenance of the status quo within their communities and the surrounding area.

- Talkeetna

Attitudes were somewhat divided within this community (see S. Braund report [1]). However, the majority of residents:

- . Preferred to maintain their general lifestyle patterns;
- . Preferred the all-rail access plan; and

- . Preferred to maintain the semi-wilderness-wilderness setting in the Upper Susitna Basin area.

- Trapper Creek

Although alternative access plans considered could affect Trapper Creek differently from Talkeetna, the preferences expressed by this community were similar to those outlined for Talkeetna.

- Willow/Wasila Area

These communities were not contacted through Susitna community workshops or the sociocultural study. Data from a study conducted in the Mat-Su Borough by the Overall Economic Development Program, Inc. indicates that people in Willow, Houston, Wasila, and Palmer tend to favor a higher rate of development than the communities north of Willow.

- Indian River Land Disposal Sites

In 1981, a total of 75 remote state land parcels were awarded by lottery in the Indian River area. Of these, 35 were staked in the summer of 1981. The 35 land holders were contacted by letter through the Power Authority's Public Participation Office. Of the 12 responses received to date, 11 favored retention of the remote status of the area and one favored road access to the area. This area would be most affected by road access from the Parks Highway and least affected by access from the Denali Highway.

- Effect on Local Communities

For the purposes of plan evaluation, distinction has been made between the local community preferences as expressed and Acres evaluation as to how the various access plans would affect the local communities.

Preferences in regard to general lifestyle patterns were used to assess whether or not the communities would view projected socioeconomic changes as being positive or negative.

Preferences in regard to the general setting in the surrounding area were used to assess whether or not project changes to this setting would be considered positive or negative.

It is Acres evaluation that the Denali route with stringent hunting regulations implemented and enforced would

best meet the preferences expressed by the majority of the residents in Cantwell.

It is Acres evaluation that for the communities north of Talkeetna, Talkeetna, and Trapper Creek, the all-rail access, and the road access would be equal in meeting their preferences for "the general community lifestyle patterns." The communities expressed preference for the all-rail access assuming it would better maintain the status quo. Acres assessment indicates that if rail access only is provided, the practicality of a self-contained family-status community at either of the sites would be greatly diminished and a single-status only facility would likely be established. If this were to be the case, workers would tend to locate their families in the nearest communities, thus increasing the impacts on these communities.

(g) Agency Concerns

Correspondence, meetings and interaction with the various agencies involved with the Susitna Hydroelectric Project Steering Committee occurred throughout the study. Agency comments have been considered in the evaluation. The concerns of the agencies have generally related to environmental issues, with the emphasis on biological and land use impacts. Therefore, evaluation in terms of the environmental criteria discussed previously is considered to generally include agency concerns.

The Susitna Hydro Steering Committee has expressed the following:

- Access corridors which serve a dual or triple purpose would be highly desirable;
- If feasible, it generally prefers a rail mode of access to and within the project site;
- Three environmentally sensitive areas that should be avoided are:
 - . Routes from the Denali Highway;
 - . The route crossing the Indian River and through wetlands to the Parks Highway; and
 - . The route on the south side of the Susitna River from Devil Canyon to the proposed Watana damsite.
- A pioneer road should not be built before FERC licensing.

(h) Transmission

Access plan selection has been coordinated with the transmission line studies. The transmission line studies to date have identified two corridors, one north of the Susitna River and one south of the Susitna River from Watana to Gold Creek. Although corridors run along the river, there is flexibility to expand the corridor to include the access road when the decision is made as to which access route will be constructed. Due to more stringent engineering criteria of lines and grades for road alignments, it was decided that the selection of a transmission line route would occur subsequent to the access road selection.

The results of the transmission studies have also established that if the northern Denali access route is selected, the transmission line would not follow that route due to excessive cost and adverse visual impacts.

(i) Recreation

In discussing and evaluating the recreation plans, it has become apparent that the various recreation plans are sufficiently flexible to accommodate any access route selected. No single route was identified which had superior recreational potential associated with it. Therefore, compatibility with recreational aspects was essentially eliminated as an evaluation criteria.

11.9 - Evaluation of Access Plans

The 11 access plans evaluated on the basis of the criteria described in Section 11.8 have been grouped in accordance with the following categories in order to clarify the presentation.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Plan Numbers</u>
Plans providing access from both Parks and Denali Highways	3 and 7
Plans providing access from Parks Highway only	1 and 5
Plans providing access from Denali Highway only	4, 6 and 11
Access from Gold Creek only	2, 8, 9 and 10

In addition to the specific considerations outlined in the following paragraphs, a major concern with all of the access plans is the creation of access to areas previously inaccessible or relatively inaccessible. Such access would lead to impacts to furbearers through increased trapping pressure and to big game through hunting pressure. In

addition, detrimental effects could occur to all wildlife through disturbance and destruction of habitat by ATVs. Cultural resources would also be vulnerable to amateur collectors and ATV traffic.

(a) Access to Both Parks and Denali Highways (Plans 3 and 7)

(i) Cost

The costs of the 11 alternative access plans are summarized in Table 11.1. Given the preliminary nature of the field data used to develop construction costs, construction cost differences of less than \$10,000,000 (approximately 5 to 10 percent of the cost of the alternatives examined) should not be considered significant.

Maintenance costs are a small portion of construction costs, and large variations in maintenance costs will have negligible influence on overall costs. The logistic costs are based on current freight rates and vary by less than 10 percent for all plans. The personnel shuttle costs and contingency risk costs are necessarily approximate but are adequate for comparison purposes. When comparing the total costs, the plans were considered equal if the total costs were within \$20 million, and a definite cost advantage was considered if there was a \$50 million difference.

On the basis of the foregoing, Plan 3 is comparable in cost to the minimum cost alternative plan. Plan 7 has approximately a \$60 million cost disadvantage compared to Plan 3.

(ii) Ease of Operation, Maintenance and Construction Flexibility

Access Plan 3 does not meet the ease of operation and maintenance criterion because it does not have a connecting road between Watana and Devil Canyon. Access Plan 7 does meet the ease of operation criteria by having a connection service road between the two sites.

Plans 3 and 7 both satisfy the criteria for flexibility for construction logistics and transportation by having a road access connecting to a major highway.

(iii) Biological

The primary biological concerns for these two plans relate to the effects the road would have on furbearers, big game, and cultural resources.

A roadway from the Parks Highway would cross productive furbearer wetlands habitat between the highway and Gold Creek. The Denali segment of both these plans also crosses

aquatic furbearer habitat near Deadman Mountain, Deadman and Big Lakes, and Upper Deadman Creek. In addition, a red fox denning complex south of Deadman Mountain within one mile of the proposed road is likely to be affected.

The primary concern relative to big game for both these plans is the Denali segment, which would pass through an area that has frequently been used by either major portions or all of the Nelchina herd and includes the calving and summer ranges of the northwestern subgroups of the Nelchina caribou herd. The route also lies across the late summer migration route of caribou moving toward Butte Lake and Gold Creek and parallels a traditional spring migration route southward to the Susitna River.

The direct effects upon this group of caribou, should Plan 3 be implemented, include disturbance to cows and calves during the road construction period, a disturbance and possible impediment to caribou migration as a result of increased traffic in the area, and the possibility of direct mortality from road kills. However, the presence of the road should not interfere with migration, since caribou are known to cross roads. Moreover, interference with the calving areas could cause a major adverse impact on the females who show an affinity to traditional calving grounds.

Of greater importance than these factors, however, are the indirect consequences to this group of caribou of increased access to its range. An access road across this alpine tundra would provide the opportunity for all terrain vehicles to push a network of unplanned trails throughout the range of this subherd. This new access would cause disturbance and increased mortality to these caribou from their contact with hunters. Thus, there is a chance that this route could lead to partial abandonment of important caribou habitat. Since the caribou hunt is controlled through permitting, increased hunting mortality caused by improved access should be minimal, although additional controls may be required.

The actual magnitude of impact is difficult to assess since it depends on the somewhat unpredictable behavior of both caribou and man. With an increased emphasis on management of the area and stringent hunter control, it is technically possible to lessen the potential extent of impact. It is noted, however, that resource agencies are apprehensive about the success of any mitigation plans and would resist any road access from the Denali Highway.

(iv) Social Considerations

Without mitigating measures, access plans with a roadway originating from the Parks Highway could significantly

impact the westside communities in terms of demand for increased services, changes in population, housing availability, government expenditures and revenues, labor demand, and unemployment. There will also be significant effects on construction, retail trade, and tourism.

Many of these changes will occur as construction workers attempt to relocate to the communities near the construction site. Depending upon commuting modes to the camp, there could be a large increase in vehicular traffic in the area.

These access plans also include a road from the Denali Highway. As such, many of the impacts which would be felt in the west side communities of Talkeetna, Trapper Creek, and railroad communities north of Talkeetna would also occur in Cantwell. With a road from the north, it is expected an increased number of workers would settle in Fairbanks, thereby reducing some of the impacts which the west side communities would experience.

These plans would create economic stimulus in Cantwell but will not meet the preferences expressed by those in the west side communities who desire no change.

However, road access connecting the Denali and Parks Highways would create extensive public access following construction thus creating the maximum change in the status quo of the area.

As discussed under Section 11.13, it is considered that mitigation measures can be implemented to lessen the effects on the west side communities of Talkeetna and Trapper Creek. With road access from the Parks Highway, change in the remoteness of Gold Creek and the Indian River Land Disposal sites will occur regardless of mitigation.

(b) Access from Parks Highway Only (Plans 1 and 5)

(i) Costs

Access Plan 1 is comparable to the minimum cost alternative Plan 5 (Table 11.1).

(ii) Ease of Operation and Construction Flexibility

Both Access Plans 1 and 5 satisfy the ease of operation criteria by having a road directly connecting both sites. Both Access Plans 1 and 5 satisfy the flexibility criteria by having a road connection with a major highway.

Access Plans 1 and 5 involve a shorter haul distance compared to any alternative having access via Denali Highway.

Anchorage has been identified as the most viable port of entry for the majority of the materials and supplies. When comparing Access Plans 1 and 5, with plans having access only from the Denali Highway, Plans 1 and 5 have a logistics cost advantage over any access from the Denali Highway. With the majority of materials and supplies coming from Anchorage, the access route from the Denali Highway would involve an additional haul of approximately 52 miles to Watana when compared to an access from the Parks Highway. The additional 52 miles would be a disadvantage in long-term operation and maintenance.

(iii) Biological Considerations

The primary concerns with access from only the Parks Highway were discussed in (a) above. Briefly, the concerns are the potential impact to furbearer habitat between the highway and Gold Creek and potential degradation of fisheries habitat in the Indian and Susitna Rivers. Of lesser concern is the disturbance of moose and bear populations and removal of their habitat caused by the northside connecting road in Plan 5.

In addition to these, Plan 1 includes a connection on the south side of the Susitna River between the two damsites. This road would pass near and through extensive wetland areas in the Stephan Lake-Fog Lake area. These wetlands provide habitat for furbearers and waterfowl and support a large, year-round concentration of moose. Because this area is currently relatively inaccessible, potential impacts include removal of habitat and increased mortality through hunting and trapping.

(iv) Social Considerations

Evaluation of these plans from a socioeconomic aspect reveals that Plans 1 and 5 will result in the greatest impact to the west side communities. Because access is provided from the west only, the majority of the impacts would be felt in the west side communities. There would be a greater tendency for people to relocate in the communities and perhaps in Anchorage and a lesser tendency to live in the Fairbanks area. There would be some impacts to the Cantwell area, but fewer than with a road from Denali.

In terms of public preference, these plans least meet the desires of people living in the project area. The plans would cause the greatest change in the Talkeetna-Trapper Creek area (where residents have expressed negative attitudes toward social change) and would minimize impacts to the Cantwell area (where residents have expressed a desire for change). The Indian River land disposal site and Gold

Creek would experience the greatest change with the selection of one of these plans.

(c) Access from Denali Highway (Plans 4, 6 and 11)

(i) Costs

Table 11.1 indicates that Plan 4 is comparable to the least cost alternative (Plan 5). The costs of Plans 6 and 11 are approximately \$50 million greater than that of Plan 5.

(ii) Ease of Operation and Construction Flexibility

Plan 4 does not satisfy the ease of operation criterion due to the absence of a road directly connecting the two dam-sites. Plans 6 and 11 both have a road directly connecting the dam-sites, therefore both plans satisfy the ease of operation criterion.

Plan 4 only partially meets the construction flexibility criterion. Plan 4 includes a road connection to a major highway for the Watana development but not for the Devil Canyon development. Access Plans 6 and 11 both satisfy the flexibility criteria by having a connection to a major highway.

(iii) Biological Considerations

These three plans all involve road access from Denali Highway to Watana dam-site. The potential biological and cultural impacts associated with this route were discussed under (a) above. Basically, impacts could occur to portions of the Nelchina caribou herd through increased hunting mortality and potential interference with migration and calving. Increased access and trapping pressure could also impact furbearers. In addition, because of treeless topography and shallow soil, disturbance and removal of any cultural resources could result.

Plans 4 and 6 involve construction of a rail connecting from Gold Creek to Devil Canyon. No major environmental problems were identified along this portion of the route. The connection road on the north side of the Susitna River between the two dams was discussed under (b) above, the only environmental concern being the crossing of moose and bear habitat.

(iv) Social Considerations

Plans 4, 6 and 11 involve access from the Denali Highway, rather than the Railbelt Corridor. Workers' families would tend to locate to more communities, including Cantwell and

Fairbanks. Due to the rail access from Gold Creek, there would still be some impact on the west side communities, but less than with a road originating from the Parks Highway. Plan 11, involving access from Denali Highway only, would cause the greatest number of changes in the Cantwell and Fairbanks area and essentially no impacts on west side communities.

(d) Access from Gold Creek Only (Plans 2, 8, 9 and 10)

(i) Costs

Table 11.1 indicates that the total costs of Plan 8 and 9 are respectively \$15 and \$30 million greater than the least cost alternative, Plan 5. The substantial savings in construction costs are offset by increased personnel shuttle costs and an allowance for contingency risk. The cost comparison also shows that the total costs of Plans 2 and 10 are \$55 million and \$40 million more than that of the least cost alternative.

(ii) Ease of Operation and Construction Flexibility

Access Plans 2, 8, 9 and 10 all only partially satisfy the ease of operation and maintenance criteria. These plans have either a road or a railroad directly connecting the two damsites, however, none of them have a connection to a major highway. This reduces the flexibility in operation and maintenance of the sites as discussed in Section 11.8.

Access Plans 2, 8, 9 and 10 do not satisfy the flexibility criteria for construction as they do not have a road connection to a major highway.

(iii) Biological Considerations

These plans all preclude access from the Parks Highway or Denali Highway; therefore, the impacts associated with increased access are substantially reduced.

Plans 2 and 10, which involve connections between Watana and Devil Canyon on the south side of the Susitna River, have as the major potential environmental impacts, the disturbance of wetland areas near Stephan and Fog Lakes, as discussed under (b) above.

The overall reduction in access and the fact there is no access connecting with the Denali Highway to the north indicates these plans would result in the least number of impacts to biological and cultural resources.

(iv) Social Considerations

These plans all involve access from the west by rail only to Gold Creek, then from Gold Creek the only difference being road or rail, and if rail, the distance into the basin the railroad extends. As such, impacts would be concentrated in the Gold Creek area as well as Talkeetna and Hurricane because of their location at rail-highway intersections. The Cantwell and Fairbanks areas would be less affected as there would be no northerly access.

The public has expressed a preference for a rail access and a maintenance of the status quo. Although rail access would best maintain the status quo of the Upper Susitna Basin in general with the rail access, significant changes could occur in the Talkeetna/Trapper Creek area as discussed in Section 11.8(f).

These plans would not meet the public preferences expressed by Cantwell residents.

11.10 - Identification of Conflicts

From the evaluation presented in Section 11.9, it is apparent no single plan meets all the objectives or satisfies all the criteria established as part of the study. The basic conflicts identified were:

(a) Social and Biological Considerations vs Construction and Operation Logistics

Rail or road access from a railhead at Gold Creek without road access from a major highway would limit social and biological changes in the immediate project area and retain the status quo to the greatest extent possible. This option is in direct conflict with the requirement to provide flexibility in construction logistics and transportation and to provide ease of operation and maintenance. The selection of such an option would increase the risk of high costs, schedule delays, and safety problems and decrease project reliability.

(b) Social vs Biological Considerations

Social and biological objectives are not in basic conflict since limited access to the project area is most desirable in both cases. If, however, the assumption is made that road access to a major highway will be provided, then a conflict arises. From the social/local public preference perspective, access from the Denali Highway is preferred. This plan would create the economic stimulus desired in Cantwell, reduce the potential for change in the Trapper Creek/Talkeetna area, while retaining the remoteness of the Indian River land disposal site and the railroad communities north of Talkeetna. The Denali access, however, is in conflict

with biological objectives since it would allow access by hunters and ATVs to a large portion of the Upper Susitna Basin and create potential impacts on the Nelchina Caribou, other big game species including moose and bear, the fisheries in isolated lakes and streams and furbearer habitat. In addition, the potential for disturbance of archaeological sites in this area is greatest. Although mitigation measures can be employed to reduce these potential biological impacts, it is noted that government resource agencies are apprehensive about the success of any control programs and would thus be opposed to access from the Denali Highway.

The selection of a Denali access plan could result in unacceptable delays in license approval or a subsequent rejection of this plan requiring a reassessment of access plans from the west.

Table 11.2 broadly summarizes the conflicts in the evaluation.

11.11 - Comparison of Access Plans

- (a) Access from Railhead at Gold Creek (Plans 2, 8, 9 and 10) vs Access from Major Highway (Plans 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11)

Considerable cost, schedule, safety and reliability risks are associated with construction of a major project without road access to a major highway. On the other hand, road access to a major highway will create additional change in the status quo of the Upper Susitna Basin. If the decision is made to develop a large scale hydroelectric facility in the Upper Susitna Basin, it is considered essential that the orderly development and maintenance of the facility should be afforded a higher priority than maintenance of the status quo. Thus, access plans originating at a railhead at Gold Creek only are not recommended.

These considerations led to the rejection of plans not providing road access to a major highway.

Plans eliminated in this comparison: 2, 8, 9, 10

Plans remaining: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11

- (b) Access from Both Parks Highway and Denali Highway (Plans 3, 7) vs Access from Only One Highway (Plans 1, 4, 5, 6, 11)

The plans which optimize transportation flexibility and ease of operation, Plans 3 and 7, involve the initial construction of a road from Denali Highway to Watana damsite. To allow for improved logistics during the peak construction at Watana and throughout the construction of Devil Canyon, road access would also be created to the Parks Highway. The disadvantages of these plans are that they would create the maximum change in the status quo producing both the biological impacts associated with the Denali link and the social impacts associated with the Parks Highway link. These impacts are further intensified with both roads since

connection of the Parks and the Denali Highway would encourage hunters and tourists to drive the complete loop.

These plans are also more costly than the minimum cost alternatives. It is considered that the social and biological impacts that would result from these plans cannot be justified by the added transportation flexibility and ease of operation benefits associated with road access to both the Parks and Denali Highways.

These conclusions resulted in the rejection of the plans providing road access to both the Parks and Denali Highway.

Plans eliminated in this comparison: 3, 7
Plans remaining: 1, 4, 5, 6, 11

(c) Roadway Connecting the Damsites Directly (Plans 1, 5, 6, 11) vs
No Roadway Connecting the Damsites Directly (4)

Plans incorporating a road connecting the damsites directly are clearly superior in terms of ease of operation and maintenance to plans which do not directly connect the damsites. The access plans which do not connect the damsites directly do not have advantages in any of the other, or combined criteria to warrant not eliminating these alternatives from further consideration.

These conclusions resulted in the rejection of plans not connecting the damsites directly.

Plans eliminated in this comparison: 4
Plans remaining: 1, 5, 6, 11

(d) Access to Denali Highway (Plans 6, 11) vs
Access to Parks Highway (Plans 1, 5)

The main concerns associated with the Denali access are the potential effects on the Nelchina caribou herd, increased access to a large area of alpine tundra with the associated effects of disturbance by ATVs and disturbance of potential cultural resources.

Although there are some fisheries and furbearer concerns in the Indian River area associated with a Parks Highway access, from the biological perspective, Parks Highway access is preferred to a Denali Highway access.

In terms of construction logistics and long-term operation, the access from the Parks Highway is preferred. Any access plan which utilizes the Denali has an additional haul distance of 52 miles for the majority of construction equipment and supplies and long-term maintenance and resupply. With a Denali road access, it is still preferable to transport equipment and supplies to Devil Canyon from Gold Creek, thus creating access to the area from both



the north via Denali and the west from Gold Creek. In terms of initial project scheduling, the Denali route or the Parks Highway route with the pioneer road are considered similar.

From a perspective of social change, the Denali route is considered to have the advantage compared to the Parks Highway route. The Denali route would promote the economic stimulus desired in Cantwell while reducing the influence on the communities of Trapper Creek, Talkeetna, and north of Talkeetna, which have expressed a desire to maintain their general lifestyle patterns. It is considered, however, that even with a Parks Highway access, mitigation in the form of self-contained construction camp facilities, regulation of commuter schedules, and control of transportation modes can reduce or avoid many of the potential changes in Talkeetna and Trapper Creek. It is also considered that, with the Parks Highway access, changes to these communities would be greater than changes that would occur with a Denali access. These changes, however, are not considered significantly greater, and therefore, for comparison purposes, the Denali route is considered to have a slight advantage.

A Parks Highway route also allows the transmission line and access road to be constructed in a common corridor.

Considering native landowner preferences, the Parks Highway route is considered to have the advantage over the Denali route.

With any access plan from the west, a major railhead would be located at Gold Creek creating local changes. With road access from the Parks Highway to Gold Creek, changes will also occur at the Indian River disposal sites.

Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the Parks Highway access is preferable to the Denali access plan. This conclusion is based on the assumption that if a Denali route were selected:

- It would be Plan 6, which would still result in significant social changes in the Gold Creek area;
- Mitigation planning, preparation of environmental impact statements, and the permitting process itself could cause delays of 1 to 2 years, since there are a number of significant environmental concerns with the Denali route expressed by resource agencies;
- Changes in local communities can, to a large degree, be mitigated through controls imposed on contractor and construction workers; and

- Controls would be very difficult to impose upon hunters and ATV operators who would utilize the Denali route after construction.

The foregoing considerations resulted in the elimination of plans involving access from the Denali Highway.

Plans eliminated in this comparison: 6, 11
Plans remaining: 1, 5

(e) Comparison of Plan 1 vs Plan 5

Plans 1 and 5 both commence on the Parks Highway near Hurricane and proceed through Chulitna Pass and along the Indian River to Gold Creek. From Gold Creek, both plans proceed east on the south side of the Susitna River to the Devil Canyon site. At Devil Canyon, Plan 1 proceeds east on the south side of the Susitna River to the Watana site. Plan 5 crosses the Susitna River at Devil Canyon and proceeds east on the north side of the Susitna River to the Watana site. Access Plan 1 has potential for greater environmental impacts than Access Plan 5. This is because of extensive wetland areas in the Stephan Lake - Fog Lake area. The wetlands provide habitat for furbearers and waterfowl and support a large, year-round concentration of moose. Providing road access into this area increases the potential for adverse impacts by removal of habitat and increased mortality through hunting and trapping.

Access Plan 1 is more difficult to construct than Access Plan 5 because of the more difficult terrain in the segment between Devil Canyon and Watana, south of the Susitna River. The difficult terrain would require considerable steep sidehill construction and a large bridge over Cheechacko Creek, just east of the Devil Canyon damsite.

Access Plan 1 has an advantage over Access Plan 5 in native landowner (CIRI) preference. Although Plan 5 does not totally meet the preference expressed by CIRI, it does create road access to native lands, thus providing a major transportation link which would allow the native landowners to develop their lands more easily than is presently possible.

Based on the above considerations, it is concluded that Access Plan 5 would better meet the overall project objectives than Access Plan 1.

Plans eliminated in this comparison: 1
Plans remaining: 5

11.12 - Recommended Access Plan

Based on the above discussion, it is recommended that:

- The selected access plan for the construction and operation of the Susitna Hydroelectric Project should comprise a road commencing near



MP 156 on the Parks Highway, proceeding southeast crossing the Susitna River at Gold Creek, turning northeast to Devil Canyon dam-site along the southern side of the Susitna River, crossing the Susitna River at Devil Canyon, and proceeding along the north side of the Susitna River to Watana damsite (see Plate 35).

- To allow for continued access for project construction by mid-1986, a limited access pioneer road between Gold Creek and Watana damsite be constructed commencing in mid-1983. The application for permits to construct this pioneer road be submitted to the State of Alaska and the Bureau of Land Management by September 1982, independent of the FERC license application.
- To mitigate against the possibility of unrestricted public access to the area in the event that the project is not built, road access between the Parks Highway and Gold Creek not commence until after FERC license approval. If the project does not proceed after the pioneer road is constructed, the road as such should be rendered impassable to future vehicular traffic.
- To minimize potential impacts to furbearers and fisheries resources in the Indian River and Susitna River areas, special construction techniques be utilized (including adequate bank stabilization, revegetation and restoration) when crossing wetland areas or when constructing in proximity to any important stream, river or water body.
- To minimize the effects of public access during the operation phase of the project consideration be given to controlling public access across Devil Canyon Dam. If access is provided east of Devil Canyon damsite, restrictions should be placed on the use of ATVs and hunting.
- To assist in minimizing changes in the local communities of Talkeetna, Trapper Creek, Sherman and Curry, it is strongly recommended that subsequent decision on construction camp facilities, commuter modes, work incentives, and general policies incorporate a special effort to minimize the effects of construction on these local communities. Specific mitigation recommendations are included in Section 11.13.

The foregoing is based on the following assumptions:

- The pioneer road concept will be approved by government regulatory agencies since the pioneer road would not connect to any existing road before the issuing of a FERC license, thus not making the prior commitment to allowing public access to the Upper Susitna Basin.
- Although the native landowners (CIRI) have expressed a strong preference for road access from Parks Highway to both damsites along the south side of the Susitna River, they would receive significant benefits from the recommended road access to their existing land holdings.

- Public access will be prohibited during the construction phase of the project. Also, the selection of Plan 5 offers some flexibility in regard to the degree and type of public access subsequent to 1993.
- Most biological and social impacts will be mitigated through adoption of the recommendations presented in Section 11.13.

If the pioneer road concept receives institutional opposition from agencies from which permits must be received, than a Denali route alternative (preferably Plan 6) is the only means by which the overall project schedule can be retained. If the required permits are not obtained by mid-1983, it will be necessary to reevaluate the options and possibly amend the FERC License Application to include an access plan that retains the overall project schedule.

11.13 - Mitigation Recommendations

The plan recommended by Acres does not satisfy all the evaluation criteria outlined in Section 11.2. In order to reduce potential impacts to biological and cultural resources and to alleviate socioeconomic impacts to the communities of Talkeetna, Trapper Creek, Sherman and Curry, the following mitigation measures are recommended:

- Permit only on-duty construction workers to have access to both the pioneer road and access road.
- After construction of the power development is complete, maintain a controlled access route beyond the Devil Canyon Dam. It is anticipated a cooperative agreement could be reached with BLM and ADF&G concerning the number of people permitted access to the areas and control measures could be implemented by maintenance and security personnel.
- The construction camp should be as self-contained as possible, thus limiting the number of workers who might otherwise bring their families to a nearby community and commute daily.
- Provide incentives to encourage workers to work the longest time possible between leaves to minimize commuter traffic. Although the final schedule will not be known until labor agreements are established and construction commences, longer work periods between breaks can be advocated.
- Provide planning assistance if requested to the communities of Talkeetna and Trapper Creek and railroad communities north of Talkeetna to aid them in preparing for the effects of potential increased populations.
- Evaluate various commuter management policies and select the one which reduces impacts to the local communities. Socioeconomic impact assessment studies currently under way for the Susitna Project will provide important input data for evaluating possible commuter management policies.



- Utilize excavated cuts and other construction techniques to prohibit utilization of the pioneer road after construction of the access road. Areas used for the pioneer road which do not follow final road alignment should be reclaimed.

The total costs for the mitigation measures are estimated to be about \$3.5 million (1982 dollars). These capital costs are not considered to influence the evaluation and comparison of alternatives.

11.14 - Tradeoffs Made in the Selection Process

(a) Basis of Selection Process

From the natural resource and local public preference perspective, maintenance of their general lifestyle patterns is probably most favored. However, it is unrealistic to consider that a project the size of Susitna can be implemented without changing the existing character of sections of the Upper Susitna Basin.

Access to the damsites is a complex and controversial issue. As such, it has received considerable attention from the study team, APA, resource agencies and the public. Although the studies have determined that there is no single access plan that satisfies all the project objectives and evaluation criteria, it has been possible to develop an access plan which provides a reasonable trade-off of preference. These tradeoffs are essentially based on the following compromises:

- All entities must present a degree of flexibility, otherwise a satisfactory compromise is impossible.
- Whenever a specific objective is partially compromised, considerable effort is made during subsequent decisions to compensate.
- Any compromises made are clearly outlined such that decision makers reviewing the final recommendation are aware of negotiations to date.

(b) Tradeoffs Made in the Selection Process

(i) Engineering

Concessions made include:

- No road access from Denali Highway which would include a complete loop connecting Parks Highway with Denali Highway;

- No pioneer road to Parks Highway prior to the issuance of a FERC license;
- Commitment to be prepared to make the pioneer road impassible if FERC license not granted; and
- Restrictions to be placed on worker commuting schedules and mode; worker incentives to be provided to minimize effects on local communities.

Objectives retained include:

- Road access to both damsites to allow for ease of construction, operation and maintenance of the project;
- Maintenance of schedule through retention of the pioneer road concept.

(ii) Biological

Concessions made include:

- Road access from Parks Highway affecting Indian River area and providing partial public access to the upper basin.

Objectives retained include:

- No access from Denali Highway which was considered to have the greatest potential for environmental impact;
- No route on the south side of the Susitna River between the damsites, thus avoiding the sensitive Stephan Lake and Fog Lakes area;
- Emphasis on construction mitigation when developing road link between Parks Highway and Gold Creek; and
- Retention of a degree of control on future public access by accepting the Parks Highway plan where, due to the terrain, private vehicles are basically restricted to the access corridor between Parks Highway and the Devil Canyon damsite. The degree and type of access east of Devil Canyon can be somewhat controlled by regulation of access across the Devil Canyon dam.

The alternative of not connecting to a major highway was considered to have the least net adverse biological impact. The ease of operation and maintenance and the construction flexibility criteria, as explained previously, was considered to outweigh this advantage. The mitigation measures

and road management will reduce the adverse biological impacts associated with an access connection to a major highway, to a minimum.

(iii) Social

Concessions made include:

- Road access to the Upper Susitna Basin;
- Road access from Parks Highway which creates greatest potential for change in the Indian River land disposal site.

Objectives retained include:

- Through the implementation of a relatively self-contained construction camp, restriction of private vehicles from the construction site, implementation of mass transit modes for commuting workers, incentives to encourage workers to remain on site and controlled public access east of Devil Canyon following construction, it is considered that changes in the local communities of Trapper Creek/Talkeetna area will be minimized;
- Although the western communities favored a rail access, they also favored maintaining their general lifestyle patterns. The recommended plan with its associated mitigation should produce less change in the Talkeetna/Trapper Creek area than an all-rail access plan.

Overall consensus of the local community preference favored access from the Denali Highway. The advantages of the Parks Highway access over the Denali access in reducing the biological impacts is considered to outweigh the local community preference. In addition to the lessened biological impacts, the recommended plan better meets the preferences of Native landowners.

The recommended plan does not fully meet the preferences of the Native landowners. They would prefer the access road between Devil Canyon and Watana be located on the south side of the Susitna River. The advantages of the road being located on the north side of the Susitna River, include, reduced biological impacts, the actual construction of the road is easier than if located on the south side. The recommended plan would, however, provide a major transportation link which would allow the native landowners to develop their land more easily than is presently possible. These advantages are considered to outweigh the native landowner preference to have the road located on the south side of the Susitna River.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Acres American Incorporated, Task 2 - Access Route Selection Report, March 1982.
2. Terrestrial Environmental Specialists, Environmental, Socioeconomic, and Land Use Analysis of Alternative Access Plans, October 1981.
3. R&M Consultants, Subtask 2.10 - Access Planning Study, March 1982.


TABLE 11.1: SUSITNA ACCESS PLANS

PLAN	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
DESCRIPTION:	ROADWAY: PARKS HIGHWAY TO DEVIL CANYON & WATANA ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA	RAIL: GOLD CREEK TO DEVIL CANYON & WATANA ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA	ROADWAY: DENALI HIGHWAY TO WATANA, PARKS HIGHWAY TO DEVIL CANYON ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA. NO CONNECTING ROAD	ROADWAY: DENALI HIGHWAY TO WATANA, RAIL, GOLD CREEK TO DEVIL CANYON ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA. NO CONNECTING ROAD	ROADWAY: PARKS HIGHWAY TO DEVIL CANYON ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA, DEVIL CANYON TO WATANA ON NORTH SIDE OF SUSITNA.	ROADWAY: DENALI HIGHWAY TO WATANA, RAIL, GOLD CREEK TO DEVIL CANYON ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA. CONNECTING ROAD ON NORTH SIDE OF SUSITNA.	ROADWAY: DENALI HIGHWAY TO WATANA, PARKS HIGHWAY TO DEVIL CANYON ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA. CONNECTING ROAD ON NORTH SIDE OF SUSITNA.	ROADWAY: GOLD CREEK TO DEVIL CANYON ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA, DEVIL CANYON TO WATANA ON NORTH SIDE OF SUSITNA.	RAIL: GOLD CREEK TO DEVIL CANYON ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA, ROADWAY DEVIL CANYON TO WATANA ON NORTH SIDE OF SUSITNA.	RAIL: GOLD CREEK TO DEVIL CANYON ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA. ROADWAY DEVIL CANYON TO WATANA ON SOUTH SIDE OF SUSITNA.	ROADWAY: DENALI HIGHWAY TO WATANA CONNECTING ROAD BETWEEN WATANA AND DEVIL CANYON ON NORTH SIDE OF SUSITNA.
MILEAGE OF NEW ROAD	62	58	70	60	68	102	111	54	58	53	86
CONSTRUCTION COST (\$ x 1,000,000)	158	140	151	119	143	179	209	93	108	123	145
MAINTENANCE COST (\$ x 1,000,000)	5	4	6	5	8	8	9	7	5	5	11
LOGISTICS COST (\$ x 1,000,000)	215	210	231	230	214	230	231	214	216	214	258
SUBTOTAL (\$ x 1,000,000)	378	354	388	354	365	417	449	314	329	342	414
PERSONNEL SHUTTLE COST (\$ x 1,000,000)	0	25	0	10	0	0	0	25	25	25	0
CONTINGENCY RISK (\$ x 1,000,000)	0	40	0	15	0	0	0	40	40	40	0
TOTAL COSTS (\$ x 1,000,000)	378	419	388	379	365	417	449	379	394	407	414
CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE	3-4	3-4	1	1	3-4	1	1	3	3	3	1
MAJOR BRIDGES	2	2	0/1	0	2	0	0/1	1	1	1	0

TABLE 11.2: IDENTIFICATION OF CONFLICTS

<u>Criteria</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
<u>Costs</u>											
Minimize Costs	3	1	3	3	3	1	1	3	2	2	1
<u>Ease of Operation and Construction Flexibility</u>											
Ease of Operation and Maintenance	3	2	1	1	3	3	3	2	2	2	3
Construction Flexibility	3	1	3	2	3	2	3	1	1	1	3
<u>Biological</u>											
Minimize Biological Impacts	2	3	1	1	2	1	1	3	3	3	1
<u>Social</u>											
Accommodate Preference of Native Landowners	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Accommodate Local Community Preference	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2

- 1 - Does not satisfy criteria
 2 - Intermediate
 3 - Satisfies criteria



ACCESS PLAN SELECTION METHODOLOGY





FIGURE 11.2









FIGURE 11.3





PLAN 5



PLAN 6







FIGURE 11.5









FIGURE 11.6





PLAN II







	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY	
	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
ALTERNATIVE ACCESS CORRIDORS		
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 11.1
	ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED	

REFERENCE: BASE MAP FROM USGS, 1:250,000
HEALY, ALASKA
TALKEETHA MOUNTAINS, ALASKA





LEGEND

-  ACCESS ALTERNATE 1
-  ACCESS ALTERNATE 2
-  ACCESS ALTERNATE 3



SCALE  0 4 8 MILES

REFERENCE: BASE MAP FROM USGS, 1:250,000
HEALY, ALASKA
TALKEETNA MOUNTAINS, ALASKA

	ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY	
	SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT	
ALTERNATIVE ACCESS ROUTES		
	MARCH 1982	PLATE 11.2
ACRES AMERICAN INCORPORATED		

12 - WATANA DEVELOPMENT

This section describes the various components of the Watana Development, including diversion facilities, emergency release facilities, the main dam, outlet facilities, reservoir, main and emergency spillways, the power intake, penstocks and powerhouse complex including turbines, generators, mechanical and electrical equipment, switchyard structures and project lands. A description of the permanent and temporary access and support facilities is also included.

12.1 - General Arrangement

The evolution of the Watana general arrangement is described in Section 9. The Watana reservoir and surrounding area is shown in Plate 2. The site layout in relation to main access facilities, borrow areas and camp facilities is shown in Plate 3. A more detailed arrangement of the various site structures is presented in Plate 4.

The Watana dam will form a reservoir approximately 48 miles long, with a surface area of 37,800 acres, and a total volume of 9,520,000 acre-feet at a normal maximum operating elevation of 2185. During operation, the reservoir will be capable of being drawn down to a minimum elevation of 2045.

The dam will be an embankment structure with a central core. The crest elevation of the dam will be 2210, with a maximum height of 885 feet and a crest length of 4,100 feet. The total volume of the structure will be approximately 62,000,000 cubic yards. During construction, the river will be diverted around the main construction area by means of two concrete-lined diversion tunnels, each 38 feet in diameter, on the right bank of the river.

A power intake located on the right bank will comprise an approach channel cut into the rock leading to a concrete intake structure with multi-level gates capable of operation over the full 140 feet drawdown range. From the intake structure, six concrete-lined penstocks, each 17 feet in diameter, will lead to an underground powerhouse complex housing six Francis turbines with a rated capacity of 170 MW and six semi-umbrella type generators each rated at 180 MVA. Access to the powerhouse complex will be by means of an unlined access tunnel. Turbine discharge will flow through six draft tube tunnels to two surge chambers downstream of the powerhouse. Each surge chamber will discharge to the river through a 34-foot diameter concrete-lined tailrace tunnel. A separate transformer gallery just upstream from the powerhouse cavern will house nine single-phase 15/345 kv transformers. The transformers will be connected by 345 kV single-phase, oil-filled cable through two cable shafts to the switchyard at the surface.

A tunnel spillway located on the right bank will be designed to discharge all flows resulting from floods having a return frequency of

once in 50 years or less. This structure will be equipped with six fixed-cone valves at the downstream end to eliminate undesirable nitrogen supersaturation in the river downstream from the dam during spillway operations. Flows resulting from floods with a frequency greater than once in 50 years but less than once in 10,000 years will be discharged by a chute spillway also located on the right bank. The flow down the chute spillway will be controlled at the upstream end by three fixed wheel gates leading to a reinforced concrete-lined chute section and then to a flip bucket at the downstream end. An emergency spillway on the right bank will provide sufficient additional capacity to permit discharge of the PMF without overtopping the dam. An emergency release facility will allow lowering of the reservoir over a period of time to permit emergency inspection or repair.

12.2 - Site Access

(a) Roads

At Watana the main access road will enter the site from the north. In addition to the main access, several additional roads will be required to the camp, village, airstrip, and tank farm. Haul roads to the borrow areas and construction roads to the dam and all major structures will also be required. These roads with the exception of the haul roads are shown on Plate 36.

The construction roads will be 40-foot wide gravel surfaced roads with small radius curves and grades limited to 10 percent. Major cut and fill work will be avoided. A gravel pad approximately 5 feet thick will be required for the roads. This gravel pad will provide a drivable surface and also will protect against the sporadic permafrost areas.

(b) Bridges

No major temporary bridges at the Watana site will be required for the construction of the Watana development. The crests widths of the upstream and downstream cofferdams will be planned to provide suitable access to the south bank of the Susitna River during construction.

The completed main dam crest will provide permanent access across the Susitna River.

One area which may require a small temporary bridge is Tsusena Creek near its confluence with the Susitna River. Currently it is envisioned that this crossing can be accomplished using culverts.

(c) Airstrip

A permanent airstrip will be constructed approximately 2.5 miles north of the main construction camp. The runway will be 6,000 feet in length and will be capable of accommodating the C-130



Hercules aircraft, as well as small jet passenger aircraft. Roads will connect the airstrip to the camp, village, and damsite. A small building will be constructed to serve as a terminal and tower and a fuel truck/maintenance facility will be constructed.

A temporary airstrip will also be constructed to support the early phases of mobilization and construction. This temporary runway will be 2,500 feet in length and will be located in the vicinity of the main construction camp. The airstrip will be capable of supporting smaller type aircraft.

The temporary airstrip will eventually be incorporated into one of the main haul roads for Borrow Site D. This will occur after the permanent airstrip is in service.

(d) Access Tunnel

An access tunnel will be provided to the underground powerhouse and associated works. The main access tunnel will be approximately 35 feet wide and 28 feet high. The tunnel will allow permanent access to the operating development and will also be utilized during construction as the main construction tunnel. Construction adits will branch off to the various components of the development during construction.

12.3 - Site Facilities

(a) General

The construction of the Watana development will require various facilities to support the construction activities throughout the entire construction period. Following construction, the operation of the Watana hydroelectric development will require certain permanent staff and facilities to support the permanent operation and maintenance program.

The most significant item among the site facilities will be a combination camp and village that will be constructed and maintained at the project site. The camp/village will be largely a self-sufficient community housing 4,000 people during construction of the project. After construction is complete, it is planned to dismantle and demobilize most of the facility and to reclaim the area. The dismantled buildings and other items from the camp will be used as much as possible during construction of the Devil Canyon development. Other site facilities include contractors' work areas, site power, services, and communications. Items such as power and communications will be required for construction operations independent of camp operations. The same will be true regarding a hospital or first aid room.

Permanent facilities required will include a permanent town or small community for approximately 130 staff members and their families. Other permanent facilities will include a maintenance building for use during subsequent operation of the power plant.

A conceptual plan for the permanent town has been developed, however, it is recommended that the final design be deferred until near the end of construction when more information as to the design parameters is available.

(b) Temporary Camp and Village

The proposed location of the camp and village will be on the north bank of the Susitna River between Deadman and Tsusena Creek, approximately 2.5 miles northeast of the Watana Dam. The north side of the Susitna River was chosen because the main access will be from the north and south-facing slopes can be used for siting the structures. The location is shown in Plate 36.

The camp will consist of portable woodframe dormitories for bachelors with modular mess halls, recreational buildings, bank, post office, fire station, warehouses, hospital, offices, etc. The camp will be a single status camp for approximately 3,600 workers.

The village, accommodating approximately 350 families, will be grouped around a service core containing a school, gymnasium, stores, and recreation area.

The village and camp areas will be separated by approximately 1.5 miles to provide a buffer zone between areas. The hospital will serve both the main camp and village.

The camp location will separate living areas from the work areas by a mile or more and keep travel time to work to less than 15 minutes for most personnel.

The camp/village will be constructed in stages to accommodate the peak work force as presented in Table 12.1. The facilities have been designed for the peak work force plus 10 percent for turnover. The turnover will include allowances for overlap of workers and vacations. The conceptual layouts for the camp and village are presented on Plate 37 and 38.

(i) Site Preparation

Both the camp and the village areas will be cleared in select areas, filter fabric will be installed, and the granular material will be placed over it. At the village site, selected areas will be left with trees and natural vegetation intact. Topsoil stripped from the adjacent Borrow Site D will be utilized to reclaim camp and village sites.



Both the main camp and the village site have been selected to provide well-drained land with natural slopes of 2 to 3 percent.

A granular pad varying in thickness up to 4 feet will be placed at the main camp, covering most of the areas inside the perimeter fence. This will provide a uniform working surface for erection of the high density housing and service buildings and will serve in certain areas to protect the permafrost where it underlies the camp. In the village area, a granular pad will be installed only as necessary to support the housing units and to provide a suitable base for construction of the temporary village center buildings.

All roadways within the camp/village areas will be flanked by roadside ditches, with culverts carrying water across the intersections. In general, drainage will be through construction of a surface network of ditches.

(ii) Facilities

Construction camp buildings will consist largely of trailer-type factory-built modules assembled at site to provide the various facilities required. The modules will be fabricated complete with heating, lighting and plumbing services, interior finishes, furnishings, and equipment. Larger structures such as the central utilities building, warehouses and hospital will be pre-engineered, steel-framed structures with metal cladding.

The larger structures will be erected on concrete-slab foundations. The slab will be cast on a non-frost susceptible layer at least the thickness of the annual freeze/thaw layer.

Permawalks will connect the majority of the buildings and dormitories. The various buildings in the camp are identified on Plate 37. A detailed description of the nature and function of the buildings is presented in Appendix B7.

(c) Permanent Town

The permanent town will be located at the north end of the temporary village (see Plate 36) and be arranged around a small lake for aesthetic purposes.

The permanent town will consist of permanently constructed buildings. The various buildings in the permanent town are listed below:

- Single family dwellings;
- Multifamily dwellings;
- Hospital;
- School;
- Fire station;
- A town center will be constructed and will contain the following:
 - . a recreation center
 - . a gymnasium and swimming pool
 - . a shopping center

The concept of building the permanent town at the beginning of the construction period and using it as part of the temporary village was considered. This concept was not adopted, since its intended occupancy and use is a minimum of 10 years away, and the requirements and preferences of the potential long-term occupants cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy.

(d) Site Power and Utilities

(i) Power

Electrical power will be required to maintain the camp/village and construction activities. A 345 kV transmission line will be constructed and will service the site from 1987 onward. The 345 kV transmission line will be operated at 138 kV during the construction phase. After the Watana development is complete and in operation, the transmission line will supply power to the Intertie from Watana and will operate at 345 kV.

During the first two years of construction (1985 and 1986), the power supply will come from diesel generators. These generators will remain on site after 1987 as standby power supply. The peak demand during the peak camp population year is estimated at 13 MW for the camp/village and 7 MW for construction requirements totaling 20 MW of peak demand. The distribution system in the camp/village and construction area will be 4.16 kV.

Power for the permanent town will be supplied from the station service system after the power plant is in operation.

(ii) Water

The water supply system will provide for potable water and fire protection for the camp/village and selected contractors' work areas. The estimated peak population to be served will be 4,720 (3,600 in the camp and 1,120 in the village).

The principal source of water will be Tsusena Creek, with a back up system of wells drawing on ground water. The water will be treated in accordance with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) primary and secondary requirements.

A system of pumps and storage reservoirs will provide the necessary system capacity. The distribution system will be contained within utilidors constructed using plywood box sections integral with the permawalks. The distribution and location of major components of the water supply system are presented in Plate 36. Details of the utilidors are presented in Plate 39.

(iii) Waste Water

A waste water collection and treatment system will serve the camp/village. One treatment plant will serve the camp/village using gravity flow lines with lift stations will be used to collect the waste water from all of the camp and village facilities. The "in-camp" and "in-village" collection systems will be run through the utilidors so that the collection system will be protected from freezing.

The chemical toilets located around the construction site will be serviced by sewage trucks, which will discharge directly into the sewage treatment plant. The sewage treatment system will be a biological system with lagoons designed to meet Alaskan and EPA standards. The sewage plant will discharge its treated effluent through a force main to Deadman Creek. All treated sludge will be disposed in a solid waste sanitary landfill.

The location of the treatment plant is shown in Plate 37. The location was selected to avoid unnecessary odors in the camp as the winds are from the SE only 4 percent of the time, which is considered minimal.

(e) Contractor's Area

The onsite contractors will require office, shop, and general work areas. Partial space required by the contractors for fabrication shops, maintenance shops, storage or warehouses, and work areas, will be located between the main camp and the main access road.

12.4 - Diversion

(a) General

Diversion of the river flow during construction will be accomplished with two 38 foot diameter circular diversion tunnels. The

tunnels will be concrete-lined and located on the right bank of the river. The tunnels are 4,050 feet and 4,140 feet in length. The diversion tunnels are shown in plan and profile on Plate 11.

The tunnels are designed to pass a flood with a return frequency of 1:50 years, equivalent to peak inflow of 81,100 cfs. Routing effects are small and thus, at peak flow the tunnels will discharge 80,500 cfs. The maximum water surface elevation upstream of the cofferdam is EL 1536. A rating curve is presented in Figure 12.1.

The upper tunnel or Tunnel No. 2 will be converted the permanent low level outlet after construction. The local enlarging of the tunnel diameter to 45 feet is to accommodate the low level outlet gates and expansion chamber.

(b) Cofferdams

The upstream cofferdam will be a zoned embankment founded on the closure dam (see Plate 12). The closure dam will be constructed to Elevation 1475 based on a low water elevation of 1470, and will consist of coarse material on the upstream side grading to finer material on the downstream side. For purposes of feasibility design, it has been assumed that a cut-off through the river bed alluvium to bedrock will be required. A cement/bentonite slurry wall supplemented by downstream pumping has been shown on Plate 12. Further investigations at the cofferdam site may indicate that the insitu materials are such that seepage flows can be controlled solely by pumping without the need for a cutoff.

Above Elevation 1475 the cofferdam will be a zoned embankment consisting of a central core, fine and coarse upstream and downstream filters, and rock and/or gravel supporting shell zones with riprap on the upstream face to resist ice action. This cofferdam is shown with a 9 foot freeboard for wave runup and ice protection.

The downstream cofferdam will consist of only a closure dam constructed from approximate Elevation 1440 to 1472, and consisting of coarse material on the downstream side grading to finer material on the upstream side. Control of underseepage similar to that for the upstream cofferdam will be required.

(c) Tunnel Portals and Gate Structures

A reinforced concrete gate structure will be located at the upstream end of each tunnel, housing two closure gates (see Plate 13).

Each gate will be 38 foot high by 15 foot wide separated by a center concrete pier. The gates will be of the fixed roller vertical lift type operated by a wire rope hoist. The gate hoist will be located in an enclosed, heated housing. Provision will be

made for heating the gates and gate guides. The gate in Tunnel No. 1 will be designed to operate with the reservoir at Elevation 1540, a 50 foot operating head. The gate in Tunnel No. 2 will be designed to operate with the reservoir at Elevation 1540, a 120 foot operating head. The gate structures for Tunnels No. 1 and 2 will be designated to withstand external (static) heads of 130 and 520 feet, respectively. The downstream portals will be reinforced concrete structures with guides for stoplogs.

(d) Final Closure and Reservoir Filling

As discussed in Section 9 one of the diversion tunnels will be converted to a low level outlet or emergency release facility during construction.

It is estimated one year will be required to construct and install the permanent low level outlet in the existing diversion Tunnel No. 1. This will require that the lower Tunnel No. 2 pass all flows during this period. The main dam will be at an elevation sufficient to allow a 100 year recurrence interval flood (90,000 cfs) to pass through Tunnel No. 2. This flow will result in a reservoir elevation of 1625. During the construction of the low level outlet, the intake operating gate in the upper Tunnel No. 1 will be closed. Prior to commencing operation of the low level outlet, coarse trashracks will be installed in the Tunnel No. 1 intake structure in the slots provided.

Upon commencing operation of the low level outlet, the lower Tunnel No. 2 will be closed with the intake gates and construction of the permanent plug and filling of the reservoir will commence.

When the lower Tunnel No. 2 is closed the main dam crest will have reached an elevation sufficient to start filling the reservoir and still have adequate storage available to store a 250 year recurrence period flood.

During the filling operation, the low level outlet will be passing the summer flow of 6,000 cfs and a winter flow of 800 cfs. In case of a large flood occurring during the filling operation, the low level outlet would be opened to its maximum capacity of 30,000 cfs until the reservoir pool was lowered to a safe level.

The filling of the reservoir will take 4 years to complete to full reservoir operating elevation of 2185. After 3 years of filling the reservoir will be at Elevation 2150 and will allow operation of the powerplant to commence.

The filling sequence is based on the main dam elevation at any time during construction and the capability of the reservoir storage to absorb the inflow volume from a 250 year recurrence period flood without overtopping the main dam.

This information is presented graphically in Figure 12.2.

12.5 - Emergency Release Facilities

The upper diversion Tunnel No. 1 will be converted to a permanent low level outlet, or emergency release facility. These facilities will be used to pass the required minimum discharge during the reservoir filling period and will also be used for draining the reservoir in an emergency.

The facility will have a capacity of 30,000 cfs at full reservoir pool and will be capable of drawing the reservoir dam in 14 months. The reservoir drawdown time incorporating the low level outlet is presented graphically in Figure 12.3 for various "start" times during the year.

During operation, energy will be dissipated by means of two gated concrete plugs separated by a 340 foot length of tunnel (see Plate 21).

Bonnetted type high pressure slide gates will be installed in the tunnel plugs. The gate arrangement will consist of one upstream emergency gate and one operating gate in the upstream plug and one operating gate in the downstream plug. A 340 foot length of tunnel between plugs will act as an energy dissipating expansion chamber.

The 7.5 feet by 11.5 feet gates will be designed to withstand a total static head of about 740 feet, however, they will only be operated with a maximum head of about 600 feet or less.

During operation, the operating gate opening in the upstream plug will be equal to the opening of the corresponding gate in the downstream plug. This should effectively balance the head across the gates. The maximum operating head across a gate should not exceed 340 feet.

Each gate will have a hydraulic cylinder operator designed to raise or lower gate against a maximum head of 560 feet. Three hydraulic units will be installed, one for the emergency gates, one for the upstream operating gates and one for the downstream operating gates. Each gate will have an opening/closing time of about 30 minutes. A grease injection system will be installed in each gate to reduce frictional forces when the gates are operated.

The design of the gate will be such that the hydraulic cylinder as well as the cylinder packing may be inspected and repaired without dewatering the area around the gate. All gates may be locally or remotely operated.

To prevent concrete erosion, the conduits in each of the tunnel plugs will be steel lined. An air vent will be installed at the downstream side of the operating gate in the downstream plug.

12.6 - Main Dam

(a) Comparison with Precedent Structures

The main dam at Watana, as currently proposed with a height of 885 feet will be among the highest in the world. The highest embank-

ment dams completed in North America are Mica Creek in British Columbia (794 feet) and Oroville in California (771 feet). Two dams under construction in the USSR will exceed 1,000 feet, but the only dam completed to a height in excess of 800 feet is Sulak in the USSR. A list of embankment (earth and rockfill) dams in excess of 500 feet completed, under construction or proposed is given in Table 12.2.

The Watana site is located in a seismically active area and the major design features of 24 embankment dams between 350 and 795 feet in height constructed in seismic areas are summarized in Table 12.3. The characteristics of the Watana design, which will be developed in this section, are included in this table for comparison. Special site conditions, purpose of development, depth to bedrock, availability of materials, size of reservoir, site location, for example, all have an impact on the design and such factors account for some of the extremes quoted in the table.

A further comparison is given in Table 12.4 which includes the principal geometrical parameters of the core and outer slopes for high dams in seismically active areas. Considering these various parameters:

- The freeboard ranges between 13 and 62 feet, with seven of the eleven cases quoted being less than the 25 feet proposed for Watana.
- The crest width ranges between 33 and 111 feet. Wide crests are usually the result of non-structural requirements, i.e., a roadway across the dam. Neglecting extreme widths, seven of the ten cases quoted are between 30 and 40 feet compared with the 35-foot width proposed for Watana.
- The core width to water depth ratio ranges between 0.29 and 0.56, with only one example higher than the 0.50 ratio proposed for Watana.
- The upstream slopes range between 2.0:1 and 2.7:1. The Japanese dams tend to have flatter slopes (within the range 2.5 to 2.7), while the North American dams are in the range of 2.0 to 2.6. The Watana slope of 2.4:1 is among the steepest, but is flatter than the next two highest dams, Mica at 2.25:1 and Chicoasen at 2.2:1. However, special features are included in the Watana design, primarily the use of free-draining processed alluvial gravel in the upstream shell, to minimize the effects of earthquakes on the stability of the upstream face of the dam.
- The downstream slopes range between 1.8:1 and 2.7:1. Ten of the 15 cases quoted are equal to or steeper than the 2:1 slope proposed for Watana, while only one case is flatter than 2.2:1.

Complete details of the core materials used in all the dams listed in the accompanying tables are not available in the literature. However a number of large dams have been constructed in Canada using similar glacial deposits as core material. The mean grading curves for these materials including that used for the core of the Mica Creek dam, the existing dam generally comparable to Watana in size, materials, and location, are compared with the mean grading curve for the core material proposed for the Watana dam in Figure 12.4. It is apparent from this figure that the Watana core material is well within the range of materials used successfully for other large dams in North America.

In summary, the proposed Watana design is generally conservative with respect to precedent design. However, special features which are discussed in more detail later in this section are incorporated in the Watana section to provide additional safeguards against seismic loading.

(b) Excavation and Foundation Preparation - General

The geology of the Watana site is described in Section 9. In summary, the existing conditions at the damsite comprise alluvial deposits in the riverbed up to 100 feet deep overlying bedrock, while the lower slopes of the valley are covered with talus and there is overburden on the upper slopes. The bedrock is jointed and weathered at the surface with weathering along joints extending to considerable depths. Locally in shear zones and drainage gullies the rock is weathered throughout to depths in excess of 40 feet. The frequency of joints and fractures generally decreases with depth but fractured and weathered zones have been identified locally at depths up to 200 feet. Zones of permafrost occur, particularly in the south abutment.

The dam foundation must satisfy the following basic requirements:

- The foundation under the core must be stable and capable of supporting the weight of the core under all loading conditions, must not erode under the seepage gradients which will develop under the core, and must not allow excessive seepage losses under the core.
- The foundation under the upstream and downstream shells must be stable and capable of supporting the weight of the dam without excessive movement under all loading conditions.
- The core material must be prevented from moving down into the foundation (e.g. into cracks or joints) and then through the foundation under the transition zone into the downstream shell or beyond.
- There must be positive contact between the core and its foundation despite the distortions that will occur in the dam because of its own weight and the thrust of the reservoir.

- Any seepage through the foundation must be controlled and discharged so that excessive seepage pressures do not develop in the downstream portion of the core, in the materials beneath the shell, or downstream of the dam.

The excavation and foundation preparation necessary to meet these objectives are outlined in the following paragraphs.

(c) Excavation

(i) River Excavation

The properties of the river alluvium are not well defined but it is expected to include sands, gravels, cobbles, and boulders up to 3 feet or more. Such materials are not suitable as a foundation for the core, primarily because of their relatively high permeability. Similar deposits have been left in place under both the upstream and downstream shells of many of the world's largest dams (see Table 12.4). However, at Watana these granular materials could undergo liquefaction under seismic loading with potentially catastrophic results. Insufficient data is available to demonstrate that there is no possible risk of liquefaction of the alluvium, but further investigations may provide data to support the concept of removing the alluvium only under the central portion of the shells and of incorporating the cofferdams within the shells. However, in view of the high seismicity of the area it is proposed at this time that the river alluvium be removed over the whole foundation area.

(ii) Under Core and Filters

The core and filters must be founded on sound rock to ensure that no material can wash through open joints. This will require excavation of overburden and talus on the slopes and weathered rock in the valley bottom and on the abutments. The talus thickness on the abutments perpendicular to the slope varies from zero to an estimated 20 feet and weathered rock to 40 feet or more in some areas. Weathered rock is here defined as closely jointed or fractured rock with weathering and infilling of the joints. The final foundation will be sound hard rock with only minor weathering, which can be treated by slush grouting and/or consolidation grouting to ensure that core material cannot be washed through joints in the rock.

The maximum rock slope along the abutments is determined to some extent by the valley shape. In general, 1H:1V slope or flatter is ideally preferred although steeper slopes have been used. At Watana damsite, the natural slopes at

lower elevations are steeper but still generally less than 1H:2V. It is therefore proposed that the overall core foundation slopes will be no steeper than 1H:2V below elevation 1800 and 1H:1V above elevation 1800. The cross cut slopes will be 1H:10V.

Local shaping of the rock foundation will be necessary to eliminate irregularities which might otherwise induce local cracking of the core due to differential settlements or strains in the core or would impede proper compaction of the core at the foundation contact.

The depth of excavation required to remove unsuitable rock will vary considerably over the core contact area. In some areas very little or no excavation may be needed, while in shear or altered zones excavation may extend to 50 or 60 feet.

(iii) Under Upstream and Downstream Shells

The shells will be founded on competent rock. Loose or detached rock or rock ribs and highly weathered rock will be removed to expose sound rock. The actual thickness of loose rock to be excavated will vary across the site, but it is estimated that the average will not exceed 10 feet.

(iv) Dental Excavation

Dental excavation over and above normal excavation will be required in zones of intense shearing or highly irregular surfaces. Such excavations will normally be backfilled with concrete.

(v) Excavation Methods

It is expected that the excavation of the overburden material within the dam foundation will be performed as a multi-level operation using wheeled loaders working with dozers. Boulders that cannot be removed by excavation equipment will be blasted. On the steep slopes working areas will be formed with material excavated from the slopes above. These working areas will be progressively lowered removing overburden and weathered rock in one operation.

To ensure a safe operation, the excavation of the foundation will need to be complete from about Elevation 1800 down to the riverbed before placing of fill is commenced. Trimming of the rock surface to acceptable slopes may require blasting and the excavation on the upper slopes will require to be kept sufficiently in advance of grouting and fill placement to avoid interference with these activities by any blasting.

Dental excavation will be done by small backhoes and final cleanup of the area under the core and filters will be carried out to a high standard by hand with high pressure air and water jetting prior to grouting. The rock surface under the core and filters should be clean enough for detailed geological mapping. Final surface preparation will include slush grouting were necessary to seal exposed open joints.

Selected alluvial material from the riverbed and sound rock may be used in the downstream shell of the dam but the remaining material, generally a mixture of weathered rock and overburden, will be wasted or used for road, cofferdam or temporary facility construction. Spoil areas will generally be below final water level in the reservoir area.

(d) Grouting and Pressure Relief

A combination of consolidation grouting and cutoff curtain grouting under the core and a downstream pressure relief (drainage) system are proposed for the Watana site. Those systems will result in:

- Improved stability of the foundation;
- Reduction in rock mass permeability and hence seepage through the foundation;
- Reduction in the risk of movement of soil particles through joints in the rock; and
- Control and safe discharge of any seepage flows through the grout curtain.

It is proposed that the curtain grouting and drilling for the pressure relief system are carried out from galleries in the rock foundation in the abutments and beneath the dam. Details of the grouting, pressure relief and galleries are shown on Plate 10.

The purpose of grouting is to improve foundation and abutment rock conditions with respect to load bearing and seepage considerations. The need, extent, and detail of grouting is dependent on site geological conditions, type and character of rock, reservoir head, and location of specific structures. The diorite bedrock at Watana is competent as far as load carrying capacity is concerned. However, numerous shear zones from a few inches to several feet in width, have been identified in a general NW-SE direction. Occasionally, the width of shear zones may be several tens of feet locally. Most of these zones, which are found both in the river channel and in abutments, contain gouge material and under appropriate conditions, may be susceptible to piping. These features are discussed in more detail in Section 9.

The permeability tests in boreholes indicate the rock mass permeability at the Watana site to be generally in the range from 1×10^{-6} cm/sec to 1×10^{-4} cm/sec, indicating a maximum seepage rate through the foundation of the order of 4 cubic feet per second. However, these permeability values may not properly account for shear zones. For example, in Borehole BH-2 on the north abutment, circulation was lost during drilling when the boring encountered a shear zone. Also, because of heavy vegetation, talus cover, and limited access, it is possible that there may be other shear zones not yet identified. A primary grouting program of an exploratory nature will be required under the dam and in the abutments, and the results of this program will form the basis for final grout curtain design.

(i) Consolidation Grouting

The rock under the core, upstream filter, and downstream filter will be consolidation grouted to provide a zone of relatively impermeable rock under the entire contact. Locally, the rock may be sound and free of any discontinuities resulting in virtually no grout take; nevertheless, the joints and shear zones are generally steeply dipping and any particular vertical plane is likely to intersect these zones which are estimated to be 15 to 20 feet apart. Consolidation grouting is estimated to require 30 foot deep holes on a 10 foot by 10 foot grid.

(ii) Curtain Grouting

The design of grout curtains under dams is largely empirical, though based on data from boreholes. At the Watana site, only Borehole DH-21 extends to a significant depth below the river to Elevation 876, approximately 500 feet below dam foundation level. Sheared and highly fractured zones are indicated at an average of 50 feet intervals to the bottom of the hole and the upper zones should be grouted to reduce seepage losses. The average rock permeability decreases significantly around 200 feet depth.

For the purposes of this study, a double row grout curtain to a depth of $0.7H$, where H is the head of water behind the dam at a particular location, with a maximum depth of grout curtain of 350 feet has been assumed. Grouting will be carried out from a series of underground galleries which will also serve the drainage system pressure relief.

It is likely that in some areas the grout take at depth will be very low. Primary holes will be considered as exploratory holes and will be core drilled. On the basis of the core and water pressure tests in the exploratory holes, the depth of secondary holes can be decided. The exploratory holes may also identify areas that need additional grouting.

All holes will be water pressure tested in stages and the grouting program will be determined using these results. Grouting will be carried out using split spacing with the primary holes at 40 feet spacing. The secondary, tertiary and quaternary holes would bring the final hole spacing to 5 feet if required.

Any permafrost in the area to be grouted will have to be thawed before water pressure testing and grouting can be done. The greatest depth of permafrost so far recorded was in BH-8 where the hole froze to a depth of 175 feet. Permafrost will be thawed by circulating clean river water through drill holes.

The effectiveness of the initial thawing and grouting may be difficult to assess but the permanent galleries under the dam will enable additional grouting to be carried out at any time during and following reservoir filling and subsequent thawing of the foundation and abutments.

It is desirable for the grout holes to intersect as many discontinuities as possible. The dip of the main joint sets and shear zones range from 80° to 60° and it is therefore considered most efficient to drill the boreholes vertically or at an angle of 45° .

A major shear zone approximately 600 feet wide trending in a NW direction intersects the left edge of the dam and reservoir area and the curtain should extend into the abutment to provide a positive cutoff of this zone. The ground surface rises to the south of the dam and the surface expression of any shears to the south of the major zone will be outside the reservoir area and are unlikely to cause appreciable seepage. The extent of the grout curtain through the shear zone will be determined by exploration from the grout gallery.

No major shears have been found on the right abutment where the rock is of good quality. The grout curtain will extend from the spillway intake structure 400 feet into the abutment with the depth of the curtain set at a maximum of 200 feet.

The spillway control structure is located on the dam centerline and the grout curtain will extend beneath the structure with drilling and grouting carried out from the gallery formed within the concrete rollway.

Drainage will be provided behind the grout curtain with holes drilled from the gallery.

(iii) Drainage and Pressure Relief

Drainage features are included beneath the dam foundation and the abutments to intercept seepage through the grout curtain and to relieve pressure. Common drainage and grouting will be constructed with grouting from the upstream side and drainage from the downstream side of the galleries. The use of galleries is recommended for the following reasons:

- Curtain grouting from the gallery can be carried out independently of the construction of the dam.
- The grouting can continue longer into the winter than would be possible with surface grouting.
- Permanent access is available under the dam for inspection and maintenance. Additional grouting or drainage holes can be drilled after construction of the dam when, for example, the thawing effect of the reservoir may lead to increased seepage requiring remedial grouting.
- Higher grout pressures may be used because of the weight of the overlying embankment.
- Drainage holes drilled downstream of the grout curtain will be discharged into the gallery enabling flow from individual holes to be monitored. This system will prevent the outlets of the drainage holes from freezing.
- The galleries may be used for the installation of instrumentation and provide access for the repair and replacement of instrumentation.

The drainage/pressure relief holes will be drilled after all grouting is complete. They will be approximately 3 inches in diameter spaced at about 10 foot centers. Generally the holes will be open but any penetrating fractured or sheared rock may require perforated casing to prevent caving.

(iv) Construction Methods - Grouting and Pressure Relief

The schedule of work is of particular importance in this phase of the work. The excavation for the galleries must be carried out before consolidation grouting because the grouted rock may be disturbed by tunnel blasting. It will also be preferable to complete excavation of the dam foundation in a particular section before excavation of the gallery so that the surface rock profile may be confirmed before tunnelling.

Rock temperatures will be measured in any areas of permafrost thawed prior to grouting. Grout holes will generally be approximately 1-1/2 inch in diameter. Large hole sizes will be drilled where exploratory cored holes are required or downthe-hole hammer equipment is used.

All holes will be washed and pressure tested before grouting. Grouting will be done with Type II Portland cement with 2 percent addition of bentonite (by weight of cement). The water/cement ratio and grouting pressures will be varied according to the conditions encountered. Grouting will be carried out in stages using packers. Some redrilling between stages will be required. To allow greatest flexibility of the schedule, most curtain grouting, which will include up-hole grouting, will be done from the galleries. In the inclined galleries special platforms will be required for drilling and grouting equipment.

Primary grout holes will be treated as exploratory holes and core drilled, with further core-drilled holes as required to test the effectiveness of the grouting. The grouting program will be modified according to the rock conditions encountered as the work proceeds.

(v) Gallery Construction

The layout of the galleries are shown on Plate 10. It is expected that the majority of the gallery length will not require any support but from available geologic data it is estimated that about 25 percent will require rock bolt and shotcrete support. Steel arches may be required at the portals and at tunnel junctions or in highly fractured or sheared zones. A concrete slab will be cast in the tunnel invert to provide an even working surface and to form the drainage channel.

Measuring weirs will be constructed in the drainage channels in order that the volume of seepage water may be monitored. The seepage water will be discharged from the gallery just above tailwater level into drainage tunnels extending to the downstream toe of the dam and discharging below tailwater level to prevent icing up of the outlet. Inspection access will be provided at the downstream toe of the dam but from a separate portal above water level.

Lighting for inspection of the galleries and ventilation will be required when personnel are in the tunnels. The fresh air intake during the winter must be heated to prevent freezing of seepage water within the tunnels. Elevators and emergency stairs will be installed in the vertical shafts and cable hoists will be installed in the inclined tunnels for movement of equipment.

(e) Main Dam Embankment

The main dam will consist of a central compacted core protected by fine and coarse filters on the upstream and downstream slopes. The downstream outer shell will consist of rock fill and alluvium gravel; and the upstream outer shell of clean alluvium gravel. A typical cross section is shown on Plate 9.

(i) Comparison of Vertical and Inclined Cores

The design of the embankment is dependent on the type of core chosen, either a vertical core or an inclined core, and its location, upstream or central in the embankment.

The advantages to each type of core are as follows:

- Vertical Core

Provides better contact with the foundation;

Provides slightly more thickness of core for the same quantity of the core material; and

Settlement of the core will be independent of the post-construction or seismic displacement settlement of the downstream shell.

- Inclined Core

Can place large proportion of downstream shell before placing core material; and

Can carry out foundation treatment during placement of shell material.

The major disadvantages for each type of core are as follows:

- Vertical Core

Placement of core material controls placement of filters and shell materials; and

- Inclined Core

Excessive post-construction settlement or seismic displacement of downstream shell may cause rupture of core; and

Location of core may affect the upstream slope by requiring a flatter slope for stability reasons.

The proposed core material is a combination of glacial outwash and alluvial/fluviol deposits with a wide grain size distribution. This material might tend to crack rather than deform under tensile stress and hence could be susceptible to erosion. For a sloping core there is a risk of cracks developing in core constructed of nonplastic material because of lateral settlement or displacement during a seismic event.

A central vertical core was therefore selected for the embankment based on a review of precedent structures discussed above and the nature of the proposed impervious material.

(ii) Earthquake Resistance Design Features

Because of the apparent low plasticity of the material to be used in the core and the requirement for an earthquake resistant design, the following design features will be incorporated into the main dam cross section:

- The core-foundation contact will be widened near the ends of the embankment to ensure seepage control during normal operating conditions and any seismic event.
- Thick filter zones will be placed upstream and downstream from the core to prevent breaching of the core from either post-construction settlement and cracking or from any cracking resulting from a seismic event.
- The filters will be designed to flow into and seal any transverse cracks which might develop in the core, as a result of either post-construction settlement or a seismic event, thus preventing the formation of an open seepage path through the core.
- The downstream filters will be designed to be capable of handling any abnormal flows which could result from transverse cracking of the core from post-construction settlement or a seismic event.
- The proposed width of the core will prevent arching of the core caused by transfer of load to the shell or filter materials.
- Compacted processed clean river alluvium gravel of high permeability will be used to construct the upstream outershell to minimize settlement displacement and the build up of pore pressures during a seismic event, and to ensure rapid dissipation of any pressures which may develop.

(iii) Freeboard and Static Settlement

The minimum required crest elevation of the Watana dam, not including static and seismic settlement, was determined for each of the following conditions:

	<u>1:50 Year Storm</u>	<u>1:10,000 Year Storm</u>	<u>Probable Maximum Flood</u>
Normal maximum reservoir elevation	2185	2185	2185
Storm surcharge	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>17</u>
Water elevation	2191	2193	2202
Wave runup allowance	6	6	-
Dry freeboard allowance	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>-</u>
Elevation top of core	2200	2202	2202
Roadway thickness	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
Minimum crest elevation	2203	2205	2205

These elevations refer to the maximum section of the dam and are based on a normal operating reservoir level of 2185 feet. The governing minimum crest elevation excluding static and seismic settlement is seen to be 2205 feet at the maximum section and at the abutments.

This is the lowest elevation acceptable for the dam crest and allowances must be made for static settlement of the dam following its completion, settlement on saturation of the upstream shell, and possible settlement because of seismic loading. It has not been possible to perform detailed calculations at this time to determine the likely settlements since little test data is available.

For purposes of this feasibility study, it has been assumed that settlement due to seismic loading could be up to 0.5 percent of the height of the dam and the design crest elevation at the center of the dam is, therefore, shown at 2210. An allowance of 2 feet has been made at both abutments and hence the design crest elevation rises from 2207 at the abutments to 2210 at the center. Under normal operating conditions the minimum freeboard relative to the maximum operating pool elevation of 2185 will be 22 feet at the abutments and 25 feet at the center of the dam.

If for any reason the crest settles below 2210 feet, more material should be added to maintain the safety margin of 5 feet to allow for seismic settlement.



An additional allowance must also be made for post-construction settlement of the dam under its own weight and for the effects of saturation on the upstream gravel fill when the reservoir is first filled. This allowance is not shown on the drawings since it is not a permanent requirement. However, for initial estimating purposes, 1 percent of the height of the dam has been allowed. Hence, at the end of construction the dam crest elevation at the center of the dam would be at 2210 feet plus 9, or 2219 feet. The additional height constructed into the dam would be achieved by steepening both slopes above approximately elevation 1850. This 1 percent allowance is conservative when compared with observed settlements of similar structures, and may be revised when more data is available.

Further margin against overtopping of the main dam is provided by the emergency spillway. Under normal operation this spillway is sealed by a fuse plug or dam across the entrance channel. This plug is simply a gravel dam with special design of the core and strict control of the shell materials to ensure that it will erode rapidly when overtopped, allowing flood flows to be discharged freely down the emergency spillway. The location and typical cross section through the fuse plug are shown on Plate 53.

(iv) Typical Cross Section

The typical cross section of the main dam is shown in Plate 45. The central core slopes are 1H:4V with a top width of 35 feet. The thickness of the core at any section will be slightly more than 0.5 times the head of water at that section. Minimum core-foundation contact will be 50 feet requiring flaring of the cross section at each end of the embankment.

The upstream and downstream filter zones increase in thickness from 15 or 30 feet near the crest of the dam to a maximum in excess of 60 feet. They are sized to provide protection against possible piping through transverse cracks in the core that could occur because of settlement or resulting from displacement during a seismic event.

The shells of the dam will consist of compacted alluvial gravels. To minimize pore pressure generation and ensure rapid dissipation during a seismic event, the saturated upstream shell will consist of compacted clean alluvial gravels processed to remove fines so that not more than 10 percent of the materials is less than 3/8-inch in size. The downstream shell will consist of compacted unprocessed alluvial gravels and rockfill from the excavations for underground work, since it will not be effected by pore pressure generation during a seismic event.

Protection against wave and ice action on the upstream slope will consist of a 10 foot layer of riprap comprising quarried rock between 18 and 36 inches in size.

The typical crest detail is shown in Plate 9. Because of the narrowing of the crest dam, the filter zones are reduced in width and the upstream and downstream coarse filters are eliminated. A layer of filter fabric is incorporated to protect the core material from damage from frost penetration and dessication, and to act as a coarse filter where required.

(v) Core Material Properties

The core material will be obtained from Borrow Site D, located on the right bank of the river, upstream from the dam. The area consists of a series of glacial deposits separated by alluvial and lacustrine deposits. A generalized surficial stratigraphic column in Area D, based on all investigations to date including seismic lines and deep drilling, is given in Table 12.5.

Complete details of these deposits together with results of laboratory test results are given in the 1980-81 Geotechnical Report.

It is proposed that materials from the upper outwash, alluvial and fluvial deposits, designated C, D, E, and F in Table 12.5, are blended to produce core material within the gradation band indicated on Figure 12.5. The actual grading curve for a composite sample used in the testing program is shown in Figure 12.6 and the laboratory test results are summarized as follows:

- Atterberg Limits: Liquid Limit - 7 to 18
Plasticity Index - Non-plastic to 4.2
- Permeability:
10⁻⁶ cm/sec (test on <3/4 inch material, 2 percent wet of Standard Proctor optimum).
- Compaction:

	<u>Modified Proctor</u>	<u>Standard Proctor</u>
Material	< 3/4 inch	< No. 4
Maximum Dry Density	135.5 pcf	127.6 pcf
Optimum W/C	7.5 percent	10.4 percent

- Shear Strength:

$\phi = 37^\circ$; $c = 0$ (in terms of effective stresses, on material 2 percent wet of Modified Proctor optimum).

- Pinhole dispersion test: non-dispersive

The natural water contents of samples tested ranged from 7 to 21 percent with an average in the range of 10 to 12 percent. Unit G (Table 12.5) includes clay layers with relatively high plasticity and water contents in excess of 40 percent. Such materials cannot be blended with coarser materials to form a homogeneous material, and Unit G is not, therefore, considered suitable for inclusion in the core materials.

(vi) Excavation, Placement, and Compaction of Core Material

The borrow area will be excavated to a depth of approximately 30 feet working vertical faces. Processing and blending of the material will be done during excavation. Oversize material (greater than 6 inches) will be removed by grizzlies or raked out of the fill during spreading. Frozen material will, where possible, be allowed to progressively thaw insitu, with a system of surface ditches to accelerate drainage of the thawed material. Where this is not practical for scheduling reasons or other considerations, the frozen material will be loosened by ripping or blasting and hauled to a disposal area.

It is presently contemplated that the core material will be placed in lifts of 8 to 12 inches compacted thickness with the water content wet of optimum to a maximum of plus 3 percent. The final requirements for compaction will be based on field tests of the actual materials and compaction equipment.

(vii) Fine and Coarse Filter Materials

Fine and coarse filter material will be obtained from Borrow Site E. The required gradations of the fine and coarse filter material to satisfy the following criteria are shown in Figure 12.6:

Criterion 1: The 15 percent (D15) of a filter material must be not more than five times the 85 percent size (D85) of a protected soil.

Criterion 2: The 15 percent size (D15) of a filter material should be at least five times the 15 percent size (D15) of a protected soil.

Criterion 3: The 50 percent size (D50) of a filter material must be not more than 25 times the 50 percent size (D50) of a protected soil.

Permeability of the fine filter and coarse filter is estimated to be greater than 1 cm/sec and 10 cm/sec, respectively. Permeability will be verified by large scale field or laboratory tests.

The fine and coarse filter materials have been assumed to have an angle of shearing resistance in terms of effective stresses (ϕ) of 35° for the purposes of these studies. Actual properties will be determined from large scale triaxial tests and/or modeling the gradation for standard triaxial tests for final design.

(viii) Excavation, Placement, and Compaction of Filter Material

The borrow areas will be developed utilizing scrapers and draglines. Material will be processed by screening and blending using wet screening methods. Any oversized material will be either used as an aggregate source or in the outershell of the dam.

The method of placement and compaction will depend on the results of field tests to be done prior to construction using the proposed equipment and materials. It has been assumed that 12-inch lifts with four passes of a large vibratory roller will provide the required compaction.

(ix) Alluvial Fill Material

The alluvial fill will be obtained from Borrow Sites E and I. The upstream shell of the dam will be constructed using processed alluvial gravel and the downstream shell of unprocessed alluvial fill material mixed with rock from the various excavations, when available. Any oversized material will be either used in the riprap zones or crushed for concrete aggregate.

The required grading limits for the upstream shell are shown in Figure 12.5. The downstream shell material will not require processing.

On the basis of the proposed operation, the permeability of the processed alluvial fill in the upstream shell is estimated to be greater than 100 cm/sec.

An angle of shearing resistance in terms of effective stresses of 35° has been assumed for the alluvial fill material.

Actual properties will be determined from large scale triaxial tests and/or modeling the gradation for standard triaxial tests for final design.

(x) Excavation, Placement, and Compaction of Alluvial Fill Materials

The alluvial fill material will be obtained from the main dam foundation excavation and from downstream from the dam. Excavation will likely be by scraper operations above the water table and dragline operation below the water table to a maximum depth of 50 feet. The material will have to be processed to remove the undersized and oversize material for the upstream shell.

All material in the shells must be well compacted to minimize post-construction settlement and seismic slumping. The method of placement and compaction will be based on the results of test fills but it has been assumed that 24-inch lifts for alluvium fill material with four passes of a large vibratory roller will provide the required compaction.

(xi) Rip-Rap Material

The rip-rap material (slope protection) comprising excavated rock 18 to 36 inches in size, will be obtained from the oversize material from the various borrow areas, Quarry A and any other rock excavations. The rip-rap material will be placed on the upstream slopes and in certain areas on the downstream slopes of the dam exposed to wave and ice action.

(f) Stability Analysis

(i) Methodology

Static and dynamic stability analyses were performed to confirm the stability of the upstream and downstream slopes of the Watana dam. The analyses indicated stable slopes under all conditions for a 2.4 horizontal to 1.0 vertical upstream slope and a 2.0 horizontal to 1.0 vertical downstream slope.

The static analyses were done using the STABL computer program developed to handle general slope stability problems by adaptation of the Modified Bishop method, and a finite element program for static analysis of earth and rockfill dams (FEADAM) to determine the initial stresses in the dam during normal operating conditions. The detailed results and conclusions from both the static and dynamic analyses are given in Appendix B.

The dynamic analyses were done using the QUAD 4 finite element program which incorporates strain dependent shear modulus and damping parameters. The design earthquake for the dynamic analyses was developed for a Benioff zone event.

The assessment of the static and seismic response of the Watana dam for the static and postulated seismic loading involved the following:

- Finite Element Model

The finite element model consisted of 20 layers of elements with 546 nodes and 520 elements. Different soil parameters as described in the following sections were chosen for the core, transition material, and the shell material. The transition material comprised the fine and coarse filter zones.

- Static Analysis

The slope stability analyses were done using the STABL computer program for the general solution of slope stability problems by a two-dimensional limiting equilibrium method. The calculation of the factor of safety against instability of a slope was performed by an adaptation of the Modified Bishop method of slices which allows the analysis of trial failure surfaces other than those of a circular slope. Soil properties used in the analysis are given in Table 12.6.

The calculated factors of safety are in the range of 1.7 to 2.2 indicating no general slope stability problems under static loading.

Further analysis, using the finite element program for static analyses of earth and rockfill dams (FEADAM), determined the initial stresses in the dam during normal operating conditions. The program calculates the stresses, strains, and displacements in the dam simulating the actual sequence of construction operations. Two analyses were performed to show the effects of relatively soft versus stiff core material.

- Dynamic Analysis

The dynamic analysis was done using the QUAD 4 computer program. The initial values of shear modulus and damping ratio used in the analyses were derived from typical values available in Banerjee et al (1979) and are as follows:

<u>ZONE</u>	<u>K₂</u>	<u>Damping Shear Type Curve</u>
Core Material		
- Soft	90	sand
- Stiff	120	sand



Transition Material	150	sand
Shell Material	180	sand

The design earthquake time history was developed by Woodward-Clyde Consultants and is shown in Figure 12.8. The significant features are as follows:

- Magnitude 8.5 Richter;
- Location 25 miles (40 km) from the site (Benioff Zone);
- Maximum acceleration of 0.55g;
- Duration of strong motion - 45 seconds; and
- Significant number of cycles - 25.

(g) Instrumentation

Instrumentation will be installed to provide monitoring during construction as well as during operation. Instruments for measuring internal vertical and horizontal displacements, stresses and strains, and total and fluid pressures, as well as surface monuments and markers will be installed. The quantity and location will be decided during final design. Typical instrumentation is as follows:

- Piezometers

Piezometers are used to measure static pressure of fluid in the pore spaces of soil, rockfill and in the rock foundation.

- Internal Vertical Movement Devices

- . Cross-arm settlement devices as developed by the USBR.
- . Various versions of the taut-wire devices which have been developed to measure internal settlement.
- . Hydraulic-settlement devices of various kinds.

- Internal Horizontal Movement Devices

- . Taut-wire arrangements.
- . Cross-arm devices.
- . Inclinometers.
- . Strain meters.

- Other Measuring Devices

- . Stress meters.
- . Surface monuments and alignment markers.
- . Seismographic records and seismoscopes.
- . Flow meters to record discharge from drainage and pressure relief system.

(h) Conclusions

The static stability of the embankment was assessed by comparing the induced stresses at any location with the shear strength available within the material. The results of the analyses for both the soft and stiff core cases indicate no failure zones and a more than adequate static factor of safety for all cases considered. Vertical and confining stresses from the analyses show the expected results considering the reservoir load and the variation in materials within the dam.

The seismic stability of the embankment was assessed by comparing the induced dynamic stresses at any location with the available static stresses. The results of the analyses indicate limited zones of shear stress exceedance adjacent to the toe of the upstream shell, near the upstream crest, and on the surface of the downstream shell. However, these are localized zones not extending into the embankment, and overall stability will not be jeopardized. The results of the analyses are presented in Appendix B.

12.7 - Relict Channel Treatment

(a) Site Conditions

Earlier studies identified a buried channel running from the Susitna River gorge immediately upstream from the proposed damsite to Tsusena Creek, a distance of about 1.5 miles. A boring by the Corps of Engineers penetrated 454 feet of glacial deposits overlying bedrock which was encountered at Elevation 1775, while the surface elevation of the lowest saddle is approximately 2205. Additional investigations during the current study further delineated the channel, and full details are given in the 1980-81 Geotechnical Report. The channel represents a potential source of leakage from the Watana reservoir. Along the buried channel thalweg, the highest bedrock surface is some 450 feet below reservoir level, while along the shortest leakage path between the reservoir and Tsusena Creek the highest rock surface is some 250 feet below reservoir level. The maximum hydraulic gradient along the buried channel from the edge of pool to Tsusena Creek is approximately 9 percent, while between existing riverbed levels it is about 6 percent. There are surface lakes within the channel area, and while some drill holes encountered artesian water, others penetrated highly permeable zones resulting in complete loss of drilling fluid. Zones of permafrost have also been identified throughout the channel area.

Although the glacial history of the area is not clearly understood, a sequence of events has been postulated in the 1980-81 Geotechnical Report, based primarily on the investigation of the Borrow Site D adjacent to the buried channel. The generalized surficial stratigraphic column is given in Table 12.5.

Of particular relevance to the buried channel problems are the alluvium at the base of the channel, encountered in one deep borehole between 292 feet and bedrock at 454 feet below ground, and the unconsolidated outwash, alluvial and fluvial deposits. The deep alluvium offers a potential leakage path, its high permeability being indicated by loss of drilling fluid, while the unconsolidated, primarily sandy deposits may be subject to liquefaction following saturation.

(b) Potential Problems

The major potential problems associated with the buried channel are leakage, both surface and subsurface flows; piping at downstream outlets to Tsusena Creek; the impact of permafrost and the long-term effects as heat from the reservoir thaws the ground through the channel area; and instability of soil slopes on saturation, thawing, or seismic loading leading to a breach of the rim of the reservoir.

(i) Surface Flows

During the study of alternative layouts for Watana, the maximum operating reservoir level was higher than the critical ground elevation of 2205 in the buried channel area. These layouts, therefore, incorporated a saddle dam about 40 feet high and 2,500 feet long across the critical section of the channel. The foundation conditions for such a saddle dam are not well defined at this time but because of the variable nature of the glacial deposits, the effects of permafrost and potential for liquifaction within the foundation were addressed. It was concluded, however, that in any event there was a strong possibility that settlement of such a dam could not be adequately controlled and there would be a real risk of transverse cracking occurring through the dam. With the reservoir level above ground surface, any such cracking could lead to surface flows and subsequent channeling through the unconsolidated deposits.

(ii) Subsurface Leakage

No field permeability tests have been conducted, but it is anticipated that the total subsurface leakage will be relatively small and economically insignificant. For example, if the average permeability of all material in the channel were 10^{-2} cm/sec, the total leakage flow would be less than 100 cubic feet per second. By inspection of the grading curves, the actual permeability is certainly less than 10^{-2} cm/sec, except possibly in the channel bed alluvium, Unit K, Table 12.5, and a more realistic leakage flow would be about 10 cubic feet per second. The capital value of this leakage, in terms of lost energy, is about \$4

million. However, any leakage may be concentrated in the discharge zone in Tsusena Creek, and there is potential for piping which could lead to large-scale erosion cutting back to the high ground forming the rim of the reservoir.

(iii) Permafrost

Thawing of permafrost will result in higher seepage rates and possibly settlement of the surface as excess water drains from the thawed soils.

(iv) Liquefaction

Filling the reservoir will lead to the saturation of some of the glacial deposits within the buried channel area, including the upper slopes of the Susitna River valley, and produce the potential for liquefaction of these deposits under seismic loading. Under extreme circumstances, liquefaction could lead to mass movements of soils into the reservoir and breach of the reservoir rim in the area of the freeboard dike.

For this situation to occur, it would require a large, continuous deposit of loose, saturated, granular material with sufficient ground surface slope so that the soil above the liquefied zone would move under its own weight. Although such a scenario is considered most unlikely, the investigations to date are not sufficiently detailed to preclude the possibility. In view of the potentially catastrophic failure that would result from a breach of the reservoir rim, further investigations must be carried out prior to construction to confirm the stratigraphy and provide adequate data to properly assess the need for and design of remedial treatment.

(c) Remedial Measures

Since the stability of the section of the buried channel forming the rim of the Watana reservoir is essential for the feasibility of the Watana development as outlined in this report, practical solutions to all possible scenarios, including extreme combinations of the problems outlined above, must be identified.

(i) Surface Flows

To eliminate the potential problems associated with settlement and breach of a saddle dam allowing surface flows through the buried channel area, the maximum operating level of the reservoir has been lowered to 2185 feet leaving a width of at least 1,500 feet of "dry" ground at the saddle above this elevation. A freeboard dike with a crest elevation of 2210 is required to provide protection

against extreme reservoir levels under probable maximum flood conditions. The shortest distance between the toe of the dike and the edge of the Elevation 2185 reservoir pool is at least 450 feet, and under PMF flood, the water level will just reach the toe of the dike.

(ii) Subsurface Flows

Progressive piping and erosion in the area of discharge into the Tsusena Creek will be controlled by the placement of properly graded granular materials to form a filter blanket over the zones of emergence. Field investigation will be carried out to define critical areas, and only such areas will be treated. Continuous monitoring of the outlet area will be necessary, since it may take many years for equilibrium with respect to permafrost to become established in the buried channel area.

If the permeability of the base alluvium is found to be excessive, grouting of the upstream inlet zone could be carried out to reduce the total leakage.

(iii) Permafrost

Thawing of permafrost will occur that may have an impact on subsurface flows and ground settlement. No specific remedial work is necessary, but flows, ground water elevation, and ground surface elevation in the buried channel area must be monitored and any necessary maintenance work carried out to maintain freeboard and control seepage discharge.

(iv) Liquefaction

To guarantee the integrity of the reservoir rim through the channel area requires that either:

- There is no potential for a liquefaction slide into the reservoir which could cut back and breach the rim, or
- If there is such potential, there is a sufficient volume of stable material at the critical section that even if the upstream materials were to slide into the reservoir, the failure zone could not cut back to the reservoir rim.

Any remedial treatment required will depend on the location and extent of critical zones and could range from stabilization by compaction (vibroflotation) or grouting techniques, either cement or chemical grouting, or in the limit, removal of material.

The stratigraphic column indicates that the two lower till deposits I and J have been overconsolidated by glaciation, and it is unlikely that these deposits could liquefy under any circumstances. The overlying Unit H is a medium fine sand with silt and is probably the most susceptible to liquefaction of all the materials sampled. This unit has been identified up to 40 feet thick in places, with the top of the layer estimated to be about 100 feet below ground surface at the deepest point, as shown in the 1980-81 Geotechnical Report. All materials above this unit are normally consolidated water-lain till, outwash, alluvium, and fluvial deposits which could include zones of critical materials.

There are insufficient data available to identify the full extent of such critical materials; hence, it is not possible to precisely define the remedial work necessary at this time. Available alternative methods include:

- Densification

Layers within about 100 feet of the surface could be compacted by vibroflotation techniques to eliminate the risk of liquefaction and provide a stable zone.

- Stabilization

Critical layers at any depth could be grouted, either with cement for fine gravels and coarse sands or by chemical grouting for fine sands and silts.

- Removal

This could range from the replacement of critical material near the valley slopes with high-quality, processed material, which would stabilize the toe of a potential slide and so prevent the initiation of failure that might otherwise cut back and cause major failures, to the excavation, blending, and replacement of large volumes of material to provide a stable zone.

The ultimate treatment will be based on an engineering and cost analysis study of the appropriate alternatives during the design phase of the project when the site conditions have been more closely defined. However, to confirm the technical and overall financial feasibility of the project at this time, it is necessary to consider a solution to the worst conditions deemed possible.

On the basis of available data, such conditions are:

- That the alluvium Unit H encountered between elevations 2100 and 2140 in drill hole DR22 is a homogeneous loose, silty, fine sand.
- That it is of large areal extent and continuous from beyond the saddle out to the Susitna valley slopes.
- That is of such thickness that a failure plane could be contained fully within its boundaries.

With these conditions, liquefaction of the unit under seismic loading following saturation from the reservoir could result in the overlying material sliding on the liquefied zone into the reservoir.

Catastrophic failure would develop if the back scarp of the failure surface through the overlying materials broke ground surface on the downstream side of the saddle below reservoir water level.

The most positive solution to such a situation would be the replacement of the critical zone with material that would not liquefy. This would involve, in effect, the rearrangement of the in-place materials to create an underground dam section constructed of selected materials founded on the dense till layer beneath the critical alluvium. Such an operation would require the excavation of a trench up to 135 feet deep with a surface width up to 1,000 feet. Selected materials would be compacted to form a central stable zone while surplus and unsuitable materials would be placed on both sides of this central "dam" to complete backfilling to ground surface. The central zone would be designed to remain stable in the event that all material upstream did slide into the reservoir. Preliminary estimates indicate that such a structure would need to be about 5,000 feet long, with a total cut volume of about 13 million cubic yards, of which 4-1/2 million cubic yards could be used in the compacted center zone. The cost of such work is estimated to be about \$100 million. The need of such expenditure is considered to be most unlikely and is deemed to be covered by the overall project contingency cost.

(d) Further Investigations

Additional site investigations are necessary in the relict channel area to more closely define the following:

- Confirm and/or refine the stratigraphy throughout the area.
- Thickness, extent, density, continuity, and permeability of the alluvium identified in DR22 immediately above bedrock. The

investigations should include pumping tests and possibly dye injection tests to check the continuity of this unit along the buried channel, since this is deemed to have the greatest potential for leakage.

- Density of the lowest till layers I and J which have been subjected to overconsolidation by glaciation, to confirm that they would not liquefy under earthquake loading.
- Density, gradation, extent, and continuity of the sandy silt alluvium, Unit H.
- Extent of any other units which may be subject to liquefaction.
- Conditions in the outlet area of the relict channel into Tsusena Creek.
- Ground water regime throughout the channel area with particular reference to the source of artesian or confined aquifers and the drainage outlets from such aquifers.

12.8 - Outlet Facilities

The primary function of the outlet facilities will be to discharge floods with recurrence frequencies of up to once in 50 years after they have been routed through the Watana reservoir. Downstream erosion will be minimal and the dissolved nitrogen content in the discharges will be restricted as much as possible to avoid harmful effects on the downstream fish population. A secondary function of outlet facilities will be to provide the capability to rapidly draw down the reservoir during an extreme emergency situation.

The facilities will be located on the right abutment, as shown on Plate 18, and will consist of an intake structure, pressure tunnel, and an energy dissipation and control structure housing six fixed-cone valves which will discharge into the river 100 feet below.

(a) Approach Channel and Intake

The approach channel to the outlet facilities will be shared with the power intake. The channel will be 400 feet wide and excavated to a depth of approximately 150 feet in the bedrock with an invert elevation of 2010. The intake structure will be founded deep in the rock at the end of the channel. The single intake passage will have an invert elevation of 2012. It will be divided upstream by a central concrete pier which will support steel trashracks located on the face of the structure, spanning the openings to the water passage. The racks will be mounted in vertical guides and can be raised and lowered for cleaning and maintenance by a mobile gantry crane monitored at deck level.

Downstream of the racks, located between the pier and each of the sidewalls, will be two fixed wheel gates operated by a mechanical hoist mounted above the deck of the structure. The purpose of the fixed wheel gates will not be to control flows through the outlet, but to isolate the downstream tunnel to allow dewatering for maintenance of the tunnel or ring gates located in the discharge structure. Stoplog guides will be provided just upstream of the two fixed wheel gates to permit dewatering of the structure and access to the gate guides for maintenance.

(b) Intake Gates and Trashracks

The gates will be of the fixed wheel vertical lift type with downstream skinplate and seals. The nominal gate size will be 18 feet wide by 30 feet high. Each gate will be operated by a single drum wire rope hoist mounted in an enclosed tower structure at the top of the intake. The height of the tower structure will permit raising the gates clear of the intake concrete for inspection and maintenance.

The gates will be capable of being lowered either from a remote control room or locally from the hoist area. Gate raising will be from the hoist area only.

The trashracks will have a bar spacing of about 7 inches, and will be designed for a maximum differential head of 40 feet. The maximum net velocity through the racks will be about 6 ft/s. Provision will be made for monitoring the head loss across the trashracks.

(c) Shaft and Tunnel

Discharges will be conveyed from the upstream gate structure by a concrete-lined tunnel terminating in a steel liner and manifold. The manifold will branch into six steel-lined tunnels which will run through the main spillway flip bucket structure to the fixed cone valves mounted on the downstream face.

The water passages will be 28 feet in diameter up to the steel manifold. The upstream concrete-lined portion will run a short distance horizontally from the back of the intake structure before dipping at an angle of 55° to a lower level tunnel of similar cross section. This angle of 55° is considered the flattest slope at which the tunnel can be "self-mucking" during construction. The lower tunnel will run at a gradient of 1:10 to the point where the overlying rock is insufficient to withstand the large hydrostatic pressure which will occur within the tunnel. Downstream of this point the tunnel will be steel lined. The steel liner will be 26 feet in diameter and surrounded by mass concrete filling the space between the liner and the surrounding rock. The area between the outside face of the liner and the concrete will be grouted to fill all voids and reduce external ground water pressure build up.

The majority of the tunnel length is on bearing 065°. This alignment is intersected by Joint set II at acute angle of about 10°. This may cause some greater than normal overbreak but conventional support measures will be sufficient for stability.

At the upstream end, the tunnel parallels the trend of the main shear and fracture zones and is intersected by a minor fracture and shear zone some 80 feet wide. The tunnelling over this length is expected to be difficult. Extensive rock bolting and shotcrete or steel sets will be required.

For hydraulic consideration the tunnel is required to be concrete lined.

A rock pillar width of 1.0 times excavated diameter is required. With this spacing requirement considerable control and care will have to be exercised in this section of the tunnel. Steel set support will be required through this section and the manifold tunnel.

The portal is located in a shear and fracture zone. Extensive rock support will be required both on the portal face and within the tunnel.

Steel arch support will probably be required in the first 50-100 feet of tunnel, depending on the extent of the shear and fracture zone.

The excavation will probably be carried out by driving a pilot tunnel first and enlarging to full size.

Upstream from the discharge structure the liner will terminate in a steel manifold with six parallel 8 foot diameter steel-lined branches. These will continue through the back face of the discharge structure, and terminate in fixed cone discharge valves mounted at the downstream end of the structure.

(d) Discharge Structure

The concrete discharge structure is shown on Plate 17. It will form the flip bucket for the main spillway and will house the fixed cone valves and individual upstream ring follower gates. The valves will be set with a centerline elevation of 1560 and will discharge into the river approximately 105 feet below. Openings for the valves will be formed in the concrete and the valves will be recessed within these openings sufficiently to allow enclosure for ease of maintenance and heating of the moveable valve sleeves. An access gallery upstream from the valves will run the length of the discharge structure, and will terminate in the access tunnel and access road on either side of the structure. Housing for the ring follower gates will be located up-

stream from the fixed cone gate chambers. The ring follower gates will operate in the steel liners and will serve to isolate the discharge valves. A common monorail hoist will be located above each valve and gate assembly to provide for their removal and transportation to the access gallery.

(e) Fixed Cone Discharge Valves

Eight 78-inch diameter fixed-cone discharge valves will be installed at the downstream end of the outlet manifold, generally as shown on Plate 17. The valves were selected to be within current experience, considering the valve size and operating head (see Figure 12.20). The fixed-cone valves are a further development of Howell Bunger valves with the cone support vanes of the fixed-cone valve extending further upstream and are more streamlined. The valves have a slightly higher discharge coefficient than Howell Bunger valves and are less prone to vibration. During final design, careful consideration must be given to prevent vibration. Considerable research will be carried out concerning experience and design of existing installations, and model tests will be necessary to help ensure satisfactory valve operation.

The valves will be operated either by two hydraulic cylinder operators or by a screw stem hoist. For preliminary design purposes, hydraulic operators have been assumed. The valves may be operated either locally or remotely.

In sizing the valves it has been assumed that the valve gate opening will be restricted to 80 percent full stroke to reduce vibration.

(f) Ring Follower Gates

A ring follower gate will be installed upstream of each valve and will be used:

- To permit inspection and maintenance of the fixed-cone valves;
- To relieve the hydrostatic pressure from the fixed-cone valves when they are in the closed position; and
- To close against flowing water in the event of malfunction or failure of the valves.

The ring follower gates will have a nominal diameter of 90 inches and will be designed to withstand a total static head of about 630 feet. Existing large diameter high head ring follower gates are summarized in Table 12.6.

The ring follower gates will be designed to be lowered under flowing water conditions and raised under balanced head conditions. A grease injection system will be installed in each gate to reduce frictional forces when the gates are operated. The gates will be operated by hydraulic cylinders from either a local or remote location.

(g) Discharge Area

Immediately downstream of the discharge structure, the rock will be cut at a slope of 2H:3V to a lower elevation of 1510. This face will be heavily reinforced by rock bolts and protected by a concrete slab anchored to the face. The lower level will consist of unlined rock extending to the river. Because of the high degree of dispersion of the discharges and the infrequency of operation of the valves, it is anticipated that erosion will not be a problem.

12.9 - Main Spillway

(a) General

The main spillway will provide discharge capability for floods exceeding the capacity of the outlet facilities. The combined total capacity of the main spillway and outlet facilities will be sufficient to pass routed floods with recurrence frequencies up to once in 10,000 years.

The main spillway, shown on Plate 14, is located on the right abutment and consists of an approach channel, a gated ogee control structure, a concrete-lined chute, and a flip bucket.

The spillway is designed to discharge flows of up to 115,000 cfs with a corresponding reservoir elevation of 2192. The total head dissipated by the spillway is approximately 730 feet making it among the world's highest. A major concern with large spillways is the total energy to be dissipated during discharge. It is to be noted that there are a number of spillways with energies of discharge several times higher than that at Watana.

A comparable spillway in North America is that at the Mica Project on the Columbia River in British Columbia. This spillway was constructed in 1974 and has operated successfully at flows approaching its design flow with only minor damage occurring in the upper part of the chute. A comparison of data for the two schemes is given below.

	<u>Discharge (cfs)</u>	<u>Total Head Reservoir to to Tailwater (ft)</u>	<u>Energy Dissipated (MW)</u>
Watana	115,000	730	6,700
Mica	150,000	600	7,300

(b) Approach Channel and Control Structure

The approach channel is excavated to a depth of approximately 100 feet into rock. It is adjacent to the power facilities approach channel, and in order to minimize its length, it is integrated with the power channel.



The control structure is a massive concrete structure set at the end of the approach channel. Flows are controlled by three 47 feet high by 36 feet wide vertical lift gates. As shown on Plate 15, each gate is contained within a separate unit consisting of an ogee overflow weir, pier, and a partially precast integral roadway deck. The units are of individual monolithic structures separated by construction joints.

Model tests will be necessary during the final design stage to determine final geometry and dimensions of the control structure.

The structure will be located adjacent to the right dam abutment in line with the dam crest. The main access route will pass across the spillway deck and along the crest.

The approach channel is located to the south side of the intake structure and intersects the intake channel upstream of the intake structure. The rock cuts up to 100 feet in height should be excavated to 1H:4V slopes. Only localized rock bolting and shotcrete support will be required.

The structure is to be founded on sound rock. Since the excavation is likely to extend well into sound rock, consolidation grouting is not anticipated to be required. However shear or fracture zones passing through the foundation may require dental excavation, concrete backfill and/or consolidation grouting. The slope of the contact surface between the dam core and the spillway control structure is required to be 1H:3V to ensure sufficient contact stress and therefore prevent leakage.

The main dam grout curtain and drainage system will pass beneath the structure. Access to the grouting tunnels will be via a shaft within the structure and a gallery running through the ogee weir.

(c) Spillway Gates and Stoplogs

The three spillway gates will be of the fixed wheel vertical lift type operated by double drum wire rope hoists located in an enclosed bridge structure. The gate size has been selected as 36 feet wide by 47 feet high, including freeboard allowance. The gates will have upstream skinplates. The seals will be totally enclosed to permit gate heating in the event that winter operation is necessary. Provision will also be made for heating the gate guides.

The height of the tower and bridge structure will permit raising of the gates above the top of the spillway pier for gate inspection and maintenance.

An emergency gasoline engine will be provided to enable the gates to be raised in the event of loss of power to the spillway gate hoist motors.

Stoplog guides will be installed upstream of each of the three spillway gates. One set of stoplogs will be provided to permit servicing of the gate guides.

(d) Spillway Chute

The control structure will discharge down an inclined chute that tapers slightly until a width of 80 feet is reached. A constant width of 80 feet is maintained over the remainder of its length. Convergence of the chute walls will be gradual to minimize any shock wave development.

The maximum depth of overburden in the area of the spillway is generally 20 feet. The depth of overburden in boreholes BH-1, 3, 4 and DH 10 and 11 average 12 feet. Seismic line 80-2 indicates an overburden thickness of 15 to 20 feet.

Weathering of the rock surface is generally only slight to moderate and poor rock qualities and RQD values less than 50 percent exist up to 15 feet below top of rock. However towards the lower end of the spillway chute, surface features indicate minor shears and fracture zone and the depth to sound rock is expected to be up to 50 feet or more in places.

The spillway foundation is intersected by several shear and fracture zones up to 60 feet wide. Joint sets I, II and III mapped in the spillway area are all vertical or near vertical.

The structure will require to be founded on sound rock. Areas where shear and fracture zones extend for considerable depths may require dental excavation and backfilling with concrete.

The major joint sets in the area of the spillway are generally vertical or steeply dipping. Stability of the rock slopes on the south side of the excavation are not generally a problem. However, towards the downstream end of the chute the rock condition on the north side deteriorates towards the "Fingerbuster". An overall excavation slope for this area of 1H:4V has been adopted. The excavated faces to be subsequently covered with concrete can be excavated vertical or near vertical. Joint set II parallels the excavation and joints sets I and III could give rise to some wedge instability. An allowance has accordingly been made for rockbolt support over 24 percent of the face area.

The chute section will be rectangular in cross section, excavated in rock, and lined with concrete anchored to the rock. Adequate underdrainage of the spillway chute is essential for stability of the structure. Uplift pressure will develop from reservoir seepage under the control structure, from ground water and seepage from the high velocity flows within the spillway itself. Seepage from the spillway flow will generate high pressure within the rock through cracks in the concrete and with sudden closing of the spillway gates, residual unbalanced water pressures under the slab will result.

An extensive drainage system is therefore proposed. The dam grout curtain and drainage system is continued under the spillway control structure utilizing a gallery through the mass concrete rollway. A system of box drains on the rock surface under the concrete slab in a herringbone pattern at 20 feet spacing is proposed for the entire length of the spillway. To avoid blockage of the system by freezing of the surface drains a drainage gallery is proposed at 30 feet depth into rock over the entire length of the spillway. Drain holes from the surface drains will intersect the gallery.

Since complete drainage of the underside of the slab cannot be assumed, some freezing or blockage of the drains could occur at some time. Additional resistance to uplift pressure must therefore be provided by rock anchors. To ensure adequate foundation quality for anchorage, consolidation grouting is proposed to a depth of 20 feet. This grouted zone will also restrict seepage below the spillway and improve the quality of the flip bucket rock foundation.

Drainage holes drilled into the base of the high rock cuts will ensure increased stability of excavations.

Provision will be made at four locations along the chute to aerate the flows and prevent cavitation of the concrete floor. Aeration will be attained by means of a small inclined step with air being drawn from a transverse lower gallery.

(e) Flip Bucket

The function of the flip bucket will be to direct the spillway flow clear of the spillway and well downstream into the river below. The jet issuing from the flip bucket will be partly dispersed during its passage through the air with a corresponding loss of energy. The remainder of the energy will be dissipated on impact in the plunge pool.

A mass concrete block will form the flip bucket for the main spillway. Final geometry of the bucket, as well as dynamic pressures on the floor and walls of the structure, will be determined by model studies. Although the structure shown on Plate 17 shows a simple, cylindrical type of bucket, it is foreseen that a more effective, dispersive type bucket will be developed during model tests.

12.10 - Emergency Spillway

The emergency spillway will be located on the right side of the river beyond the main spillway and power intake structure (see Plate 20). The emergency spillway will consist of a long straight chute cut in the rock and leading in the direction of Tsusena Creek. An erodible fuse

plug, consisting of fine gravel materials, will be constructed at the upstream end. The plug will be designed to wash away when overtopped, releasing flows of up to 160,000 cfs in excess of the combined main spillway and outlet facility capacities, thus preventing overtopping of the main dam.

(a) Fuse Plug and Approach Channel

The approach channel to the fuse plug will be excavated in rock and will have a width of 310 feet and invert elevation of 2170. The main access road to the dam and powerhouse will cross the channel by means of a bridge. The fuse plug will close the approach channel, and will have a maximum height of 31.5 feet with a crest elevation of 2201.5 feet. The plug will have a core up to 10 feet wide, steeply inclined in the downstream direction, with fine filter zones upstream and downstream. It will be supported on a downstream erodible shell of crushed stone or gravel up to 1.5 inches in diameter. The crest of the plug will be 10 feet wide and will be traversed by a 1.5 foot deep pilot channel. The principle of the plug is based on erosion progressing rapidly downward and laterally from the pilot channel as soon as it is overtopped.

The channel section at the fuse plug is considered as a broad crested weir. A gated control structure was considered as an alternative to the fuse plug, but this would give higher construction and maintenance costs and would not provide an discharge response like plug.

Water velocities in the approach channel are expected to be in the order of 30 ft/s but will occur very infrequently, if ever, during the life of the project.

Localized rock bolting only will be required and rock slopes of 1H:4V will be used.

(b) Discharge Channel

The rock channel downstream of the fuse plug will narrow to 200 feet and continue in a straight line over a distance of 5,000 feet at gradients of 1.5 percent to 5 percent in the direction of Tsusena Creek. The flow will discharge into a small valley on the south side of and separated from relict channel. It is estimated that flows down the channel will continue for a period of 20 days under probable maximum flood conditions. Some erosion in the channel will occur, but the integrity of the main dam will be maintained. The reservoir will be drawn down to Elevation 2170. Reconstruction of the fuse plug will be required prior to refilling of the reservoir.

The spillway channel is straight, bearing 115°. The channel will be generally unlined and the base of the channel will be excavated into rock to provide a minimum side wall height of 50 feet in rock. At the downstream end of the channel the height of this rock wall decreases to zero.

The depth of overburden has been determined mainly by seismic investigation and surface expressions and is expected to be 30 - 40 feet deep. The depth increases towards the downstream end of the channel.

The trend of major shear and fracture zones intersects the emergency spillway channel at angle of 10°. The side wall excavations parallel joint set I and some wedge instability is expected. The sides of the excavation are designed for 1H:4V slopes. No provision for rockbolting within the channel excavation has been made. Since the channel will be used only infrequently, if ever, during the life of the project and small rock falls will not endanger personnel or the spillway operation, a low factor of safety for wall stability in some locations is considered.

A zone of consolidation grouting 20 feet deep under the fuse plug is required to ensure there is no seepage through the foundation that could cause piping of the fuse plug material into the foundation.

12.11 - Intake

(a) General

The intake structure at Watana will satisfy the following design conditions:

- To provide independent power flow of 3,870 cfs to each of the six Francis turbines, for any reservoir level from elevation 2200 (maximum flood level) to the maximum drawdown level of elevation 2045;
- To provide an upstream closure gate on each penstock to permit dewatering of the penstock and turbine water passages for routine inspection and maintenance; and
- To control the temperature of the water discharged from the reservoir within acceptable limits to mitigate the environmental impacts of the Susitna development on downstream fisheries.

(b) Environmental Constraints

The operation of the Watana reservoir will effect the temperature of the downstream flows:

- In summer, the temperature of downstream releases will be cooler than the normal river regime; and

- In winter, the temperatures will be warmer than the normal river regime.

If the temperature of the summer flow is below the acceptable range for salmon spawning, the cooler water in the summer months would have an impact on downstream fisheries, particularly in July and August when salmon are moving into the sloughs downstream from Devil Canyon to spawn. Warmer water in winter will affect the formation of ice, resulting in extensive open water downstream from the reservoirs.

Temperature simulation was undertaken using a Corps of Engineers Hydraulic Engineering Center (HEC) program to model the downstream effects of reservoir operation. A variety of different power intake designs at Watana and Devil Canyon were tested in the model. These studies indicated that the temperature of the discharge in the winter is sensitive to the intake design and would be approximately 39°F. However, the downstream river temperatures in the summer months can be significantly effected by the power intake design at Watana. The flow to the turbine should be drawn from the reservoir surface at all times.

The selected power intake design at Watana will permit water to be drawn from the reservoir at four distinct levels through the anticipated range of drawdown to mitigate the environmental impacts on downstream river temperatures (see Volume 2).

Details of the reservoir temperature modeling are presented in Appendix A.

(c) Drawdown

The allowable drawdown of the reservoir level controls the live storage volume usable for river regulation. With no drawdown, the development becomes a run-of-the-river plant and the dependable energy from Watana would be determined by the unregulated river flow. As the maximum allowable drawdown is increased, the flow from the development during a dry year will be increased relative to the natural flow by water drawn from storage. Drawdowns ranging from 100 to 220 feet were analyzed to determine the relationship between firm energy, average annual energy and cost. The following results were obtained:

- For drawdowns less than 140 feet, the average annual energy (sum of energy produced during each of the 32 years divided by 32) is essentially constant.
- For drawdowns greater than 140 feet, the average annual energy decreases approximately 1 GWH per foot of increased drawdown.
- For drawdowns of the order of 100 feet the energy generated in the driest and second driest years are significantly different.

As the drawdown is increased from 100 feet to 140 feet during these two years, the difference in firm energy decreases.

- The technical feasibility of a multi-level intake structure designed to accommodate 220 feet of drawdown is marginal and the costs are considerable (compared to a 140 foot drawdown).

Based on the above results a 140 feet drawdown was selected as the maximum allowable for the Watana reservoir.

(d) Design

The power intake will be a concrete structure located deep in the rock at the upstream end of the approach channel. Access to the structure will be the same as access to the intake for the outlet facilities.

In order to draw from the reservoir surface over a drawdown range of 140 feet, four openings will be provided in the upstream concrete wall of the structure for each of the six independent power intakes. The upper opening will always be open, but the lower three openings can be closed off by sliding steel shutters operated in a common guide. All openings will be protected by upstream trashracks. A heated bulkhead will operate in guides upstream of the racks following the water surface, keeping the racks ice free.

A lower control gate will be provided in each intake unit. A single upstream bulkhead gate will be provided for routine maintenance of the six intake control gates. In an emergency, stoplogs can be installed on the upstream wall of the power intake for work on the trashracks or shutter guides.

The width of the intake will be controlled by the minimum spacing of penstock tunnel excavations, taken as 2.5 times the excavated diameter.

The upper level of the concrete structure will be set at elevation 2202, corresponding to the maximum anticipated flood level. The level of the lowest intake will be governed by the vortex criterion for flow into the penstock from the minimum reservoir level EL 2045. The foundation of the structure will be about 200 feet below existing ground level and will be expected to be generally in sound rock.

Mechanical equipment will be housed in a steel-frame building on the upper level of the concrete structure. The general arrangement of the power intake is shown on Plate 26.

(e) Approach Channel

The width of the approach channel will be governed by the combined width of the power intake and the intake to the outlet facilities. The overall width of the channel will be about 350 feet.

The intake channel is bounded by two shear zones: to the north the extension of "The Fins", and to the south a fracture zone with shearing approximately 80 feet wide. "The Fins" feature strikes at 120° parallel to the intake excavation and the feature to the south strikes at 130° , intersecting the excavated face of the intake channel at an acute angle.

The major joint set I strikes approximately parallel to the shear zones and joint set II strikes at right angles to joint set I. Both joint sets dip vertically.

Because of the proximity of both shear zones to the excavations, the excavated slopes of the channel should be 1H:4V, with local rockbolting and shotcrete where required. Water velocity in this channel will be in the order of 5 ft/s and will not cause erosion problems.

In the adjacent main spillway approach channel, however, higher flows in the order of 30 ft/s are expected, and at the portal of the service spillway tunnel a water velocity of 50 ft/s will occur. Since the junction of the main spillway approach channel and the intake channel is in a zone of sheared and fractured rock, the excavated slopes will require to be 1H:4V with 10 foot benches at 40 foot intervals. Extensive rock support will be required in this area of poor rock to prevent erosion.

The maximum flow in the intake approach channel will occur when six machines are operating and the outlet facilities are discharging at maximum design capacity. With the reservoir drawdown to elevation 2045, the velocity in the approach channel will be 3.5 ft/s, which will not cause any erosion problems. Velocities of 10 cfs may occur where the intake approach channel intersects the approach channel to the main spillway.

Excavations in overburden are expected to be up to 75 feet in depth and will generally be trimmed at 2H:1V; riprap protection will be required in the areas where high-flow velocities are anticipated.

(f) Geotechnical Considerations

The excavation for the intake structure will be over 200 feet deep in rock in the northwest corner, with a total excavation depth of 240 feet. The southern end of the structure will be located in a shear and fracture zone with an approximate excavation depth of 80 feet in rock. The excavation depth at the north end of the structure will be 120 feet.



With sufficient rock support, mainly from rock bolting, the rock slopes can be cut nearly vertical, with the possible exception of the southern end, where the excavation will intersect the fracture and shear zone. If it proves impracticable to support this face nearly vertically, it will have to be trimmed back to a stable slope. The intake structure would then be partially free-standing. The spillway tunnel portal will also be located in this zone of fractured rock and will require substantial rock support installed in the portal face. Since the intake structure will, when complete, support this rock face, the required support will be temporary.

The foundation will be in sound rock, but the shear and fracture zones at the southern end may require consolidation grouting. Minor shears and fractures exposed in the remainder of the foundation area may require local grouting and/or dental concrete.

(g) Mechanical Arrangement

(i) Ice Bulkhead

A heated bulkhead will be installed in guides immediately upstream of the trashracks for each of the six power intakes. The bulkhead will be operated by a movable hoist and will automatically follow the reservoir level. The bulkhead will serve to minimize ice accumulation in the trashrack and intake shutter area, and prevent thermal ice-loading on the trashracks.

(ii) Trashracks

Each of the six power intakes will have four sets of trashracks, one set in front each intake openings. Each set of trashracks will be in two sections to facilitate handling by the intake service crane. Each set of trashracks will cover an opening 30 feet wide by 24 feet high. The trashracks will have a bar spacing of about 6 inches and will be designed for a maximum differential head of 20 feet.

(iii) Intake Shutters

Each of the six power intakes will have three intake shutters which will serve to prevent flow through the intake openings behind which the shutters will be installed. As the reservoir level drops, the sliding shutters will be removed as necessary using the intake service crane.

Each of the shutters will be designed for a differential head of 25 feet. The lowest shutter at each power intake will incorporate a flap gate which, with 25 feet differential head across the shutter, will allow maximum turbine

flow through the gate. This will prevent failure of the shutters in the event of accidental blocking of all intake openings.

The shutter guides will be heated to facilitate removal in sub-freezing weather. In addition, a bubbler system will be provided in the intake behind the shutters to keep the intake structure water surface free of ice.

(iv) Intake Service Crane

A single, overhead, traveling-bridge type intake service crane will be provided in the intake service buildings. The crane will be used for:

- Servicing the ice bulkhead and ice bulkhead hoist;
- Handling and cleaning the trashracks;
- Handling the intake shutters;
- Handling the intake bulkhead gates; and
- Servicing the intake gate and hoist.

The overhead crane will have a double point lift and followers for handling the trashrack shutters and bulkhead gates. The crane will be radio-controlled with a pendant or cab control for backup.

(v) Intake Bulkhead Gates

One set of intake bulkheads will be provided for closing any one of the six intake openings upstream from the intake gates. The bulkheads will be used to permit inspection and maintenance of the intake shutters and intake guides. The gate will be designed to withstand full differential pressure.

(vi) Intake Gates

The intake gates will close a clear opening approximately 17 square feet. They will be of the vertical fixed wheel lift with an upstream seals and skinplate.

Each gate will be operated by a hydraulic cylinder type hoist. The length of a cylinder will allow withdrawal of the gate from the water flow. The intake service crane will be used to raise the gate. The gates will normally be closed under balanced flow conditions to permit dewatering of the penstock and turbine water passages for inspection and maintenance of the turbines. The gates will also be designed to close in an emergency with full turbine flow conditions in the event of loss of control of the turbine.

12.12 - Penstocks

The general arrangement of the penstocks is shown on Plates 23 and 25.

The design static head on each penstock is 763 feet at distributor level (elevation 1422). An allowance of 35 percent has been made for pressure rise in the penstock caused by hydraulic transients.

(a) Steel Liner

The rock adjacent to the powerhouse cavern will be incapable of restraining the internal hydraulic forces within the penstocks. Consequently, the first 50 feet of a steel liner will be required to resist the maximum design head, without support from the surround rock. Beyond this section the steel liner will be extended a further 150 feet. For preliminary design purposes it is assumed that not more than 50 percent of the maximum design head will be taken by the surrounding rock over this length.

The steel liner will be surrounded by a concrete infill, with a minimum thickness of 24 inches. The internal diameter of the steel lining will be 15 feet based on the minimum total cost of construction and the capitalized value of annual energy losses. A steel transition will be provided between the liner and the 17 feet diameter concrete-lined penstock.

(b) Concrete Lining

The penstocks will be fully lined with concrete from the intake to the steel lined section, the thickness of lining varying with the external hydrostatic head. The internal diameter of the concrete lined penstock will be 17 feet, based on the minimum total cost of construction and the capitalized value of annual energy losses. The minimum lining thickness will be 12 inches.

(c) Geotechnical Considerations

The orientation of the penstock tunnels is generally at right angles to the powerhouse i.e., 70° but at the upstream end near the intake, the orientation is 115°.

Generally, good rock quality is expected in this area and the tunnels over the majority of this length in the lower section will require only light support. Joint set II intersects the tunnel at an acute angle of 20° and this may cause some wedge instability.

However, in the upper part of the penstocks with an orientation of 115°, the tunnels parallel joint set I and this will probably make tunneling more difficult in this section. An 80 feet wide shear and fracture zone intersects the penstocks 200 feet to 600 feet from the intake structure. The tunnels intersect the zone at an angle of 60° in plan but at this point, the penstocks are inclined

at 55° therefore the length of tunnel affected by this zone may be up to 150 feet in length. Fairly extensive support may be required in this section. However, the shear and fracture zone is expected to narrow with depth and would lessen the length of the tunnel affected.

There is a minimum of 200 feet of rock cover to the penstock. The rock has a high modulus and therefore deformation of the rock around the penstock will be negligible. Highly fractured zones may require consolidation grouting, but this will be in localized areas only.

(d) Grouting and Pressure Relief

A comprehensive pressure relief system will be required to protect the underground caverns against seepage from the high pressure penstock. The system will comprise small diameter boreholes set out to intercept the jointing in the rock.

Grouting around the penstocks will be provided to:

- Seal and fill any voids between the concrete lining and the steel liner, which may be left after the concrete placing and curing; and
- Fill joints or fractures in the rock surrounding the penstocks to reduce flow into the pressure relief system and to consolidate the rock.

A grouting drainage gallery will be located upstream of the transformer gallery, from which curtain grouting may be performed to intersect the grouting from the penstock tunnels and from which drainage holes may be drilled.

12.13 - Powerhouse

(a) General

The underground powerhouse complex will be constructed beneath the right abutment. This will require the excavation in rock of three major caverns, the powerhouse, transformer gallery, and surge chambers with interconnecting rock tunnels for the draft tubes and isolated phase bus ducts.

Unlined rock tunnels will be required for vehicular access to the three main rock caverns and the penstock construction adit. Vertical shafts will be required for personnel access to the underground powerhouse, for cable ducts from the transformer gallery, for surge chamber venting and for the heating and ventilation system.

The general layout of the powerhouse complex is shown in plan and section in Plates 54 and 55, and in isometric projection in Plate 56. The transformer gallery will be located on the upstream side of the powerhouse cavern; the surge chamber will be located on the downstream side. Clear dimensions between major rock excavations have been set at 1.5 times the main span of the larger excavation. This criterion controls not only the minimum distance between caverns, but also the spacing between transformer gallery and penstock, between bus shaft and penstock, and the minimum spacing of penstock and tailrace tunnels.

The draft tube gate gallery and crane will be located in the surge chamber cavern, above the maximum anticipated surge level. Provision will also be made in the surge chamber for tailrace tunnel intake stoplogs, which will be handled by the draft tube crane.

(b) Layout Considerations

The location of the powerhouse was selected from consideration of the following data:

- Plots of the known major faults and shear zones on the right abutment;
- Estimated cost of approach channel excavation, intake structure, penstocks, and tailrace; and
- An assumed angle of 55° to the horizontal for the inclined section of penstock.

Preliminary cost estimates indicate that the intake structure and approach channel excavation are the most significant items in the overall arrangement of the power facilities; the underground powerhouse costs are dependent only on installed capacity. The optimum arrangement has therefore been determined by adjusting the position of the intake to give the least cost for intake, penstocks, and tailrace. Since the costs of tunneling are small compared to the intake costs, the intake will be sited as far upstream as possible, consistent with the required minimum drawdown level, and a reasonable length of access tunnels.

The underground transformer gallery will be located on the upstream side of the powerhouse. This arrangement gives the minimum possible distance between the turbines and the surge chamber, for maximum protection of the draft tubes under transient load conditions. The transformer gallery and the powerhouse cavern will be protected against high pressure seepage from the penstocks by a 200 foot long steel-lined section and an extensive pressure relief system (see Section 12.12).

(c) Access Tunnels and Shafts

Vehicular access to the underground facilities at Watana will be provided by a single unlined rock tunnel from the right bank area adjacent to the diversion tunnel portal. The access tunnel will cross over the diversion tunnels and then descend at a uniform gradient to the south end of the powerhouse cavern at generator floor level, at EL 1463. Separate branch tunnels from the main tunnel will give access to the transformer gallery at EL 1507, the penstock construction adit at EL 1420, and the draft tube gate gallery at EL 1500. The maximum gradients will be 6.1 percent on the construction access tunnel, and 6.9 percent on the permanent access tunnels.

The common access tunnel will be sized to provide passing clearance for the construction plant used during penstock construction. The size of an articulated trailer required to deliver heavy items of machinery such as the turbine runner, turbine spiral case, and generator rotor, will be less critical with respect to tunnel size, but will dictate the minimum radius of vertical and horizontal curves. For preliminary design, the cross section of the access tunnel has a modified horseshoe shape, 35 feet wide by 28 feet high. The access tunnel branch to the surge chamber and draft tube gallery will have a reduced section, consistent with the anticipated size of vehicle and loading required.

The alignment of the access tunnel intersects the trend of major shears and fracture zones at angle of about 80°. The tunnel will therefore be driven through these zones for only a minimum distance. The features as mapped on the surface, are up to 60 feet wide but are expected to be less extensive at depth.

Joint sets II and III intersect the tunnel alignment at angles of 27° and 25°. Some unstable rock wedges may occur due to this pattern of jointing but can be supported by normal support techniques. The tunnel parallels joint set II at the powerhouse end. Since joint set II is vertical or near vertical, this will not be a major problem. Some additional overbreak due to this parallel joint set may occur.

With rock permeabilities at depth of 1×10^{-5} to 1×10^{-6} , little if any water inflow into the tunnel is expected. At major shear and fracture zones, some minor seepage may occur which can be controlled by simple drainage techniques. Grouting is not expected to be required. Borings have shown high RQD values for over 60 percent of the tunnel length for which only spot bolting rock support is required.

It is estimated from the borings and from the mapped shear and fracture zones that 9 percent of the tunnel length will be in very poor rock with RQDs less than 25 percent. In this zone, it is anticipated that extensive shotcrete and rockbolt support or steel sets and insitu concrete lining will be required.

Additional supports will be required for all junctions, the amount required will depend on the local rock conditions.

At the portal, as a general rule, 1.5 multiplied by the tunnel span is required for rock cover to the tunnel. The side slopes to the portal cut are expected to be 1H:4V with localized support only. The portal face may be excavated steeply at 1H:10V but will require more extensive rockbolting.

For safety, chainlink mesh will be installed over the length of the tunnel crown that is not shotcreted or concreted. With good scaling of the rock, the amount of rock caught by this mesh is expected to be minimal.

The main access shaft will be at the north end of the powerhouse cavern, providing personnel access from the surface control building by elevator. Access tunnels will be provided from this shaft for pedestrian access to the transformer gallery and the draft tube gate gallery. Elevator access will also be provided to the fire protection head tank, located about 250 feet above powerhouse level.

The shaft 20 feet in internal diameter will probably be raised bored or excavated by a pilot raise bore and enlarged to full diameter by drill and blast. Depending on the method of excavation, a concrete lining 9 to 18 inches in thickness will be installed. As in the cable shafts, little rockbolt support is expected to be required for stability, the concrete lining is required mainly for smoothing the profile and providing protection against small pieces of rock falling from the rock walls. The concrete is not required for structural stability of the shaft.

(d) Powerhouse Cavern

The main powerhouse cavern is designed to accommodate six vertical shaft Francis turbines, in line, with direct coupling to coverhung generators. Each unit is designed to generate 170 MW at a rated head of 680 feet.

The vertical dimension of the powerhouse cavern is determined by the physical size of turbine and generator, the crane height required for routine maintenance, and the design dimensions of the turbine draft tube. The length of the cavern will allow for a unit spacing of 60 feet, with a 110-foot long service bay at the south end for routine maintenance and for construction erection. The width of the cavern allows for the physical size of the generator plus galleries for piping and air-conditioning, electrical cables, isolated phase bus ducts, and generator circuit breakers. Continuous drainage galleries will be provided to a low level sump.

Vehicular access will be by tunnel to the generator floor at the south end of the cavern; pedestrian access will be by elevator from the surface control building to the north end of the cavern. Multiple stairway access points will be available from the main floor to each gallery level. Access to the transformer gallery from the powerhouse will be by tunnel from the main access shaft, or by stairway through each of the isolated phase bus shafts. A service elevator will be provided from the maintenance area on the main floor level to the machine shop and stores area on the turbine floor level.

Hatches will be provided through all main floors for installation and maintenance of heavy equipment using the overhead traveling cranes.

(e) Transformer Gallery

The transformers will be located underground in a separate gallery, 120 feet upstream from the main powerhouse cavern, with three connecting tunnels for the isolated phase bus. There will be nine single-phase transformers rated at 15/345 kV, 122 MVA, installed in groups of three one group for each pair of turbines. Generator circuit breakers will be required, and will be installed in the powerhouse on the lower generator floor level.

High voltage cables will be taken to the surface by two cable shafts, each with an internal diameter of 7.5 feet. Provision has been made for installation of an inspection hoist in each shaft. A spare transformer will be located in the transformer gallery, and a spare HV circuit will also be provided for improved reliability. The station service auxiliary transformers (2 MVA) and the camp services auxiliary transformer (7.5/10 MVA) will be located in the bus tunnels. Generator excitation transformers will be located in the powerhouse on the main floor.

Vehicle access to the transformer gallery will be the main powerhouse access tunnel at the south end. Pedestrian access will be from the main access shaft or through each of the three isolated phase bus tunnels.

(f) Surge Chamber

A surge chamber will be provided 120 feet downstream from the powerhouse cavern to control pressure fluctuations in the turbine draft tubes and tailrace tunnels under transient load conditions, and to provide storage of water for the machine start-up sequence. The chamber will be common to all six draft tubes, and under normal operation will discharge equally to the two tailrace tunnels.

The draft tube gates gallery and crane will be located in the same cavern, above the maximum anticipated surge level. The draft tube

gate crane has also been designed to allow installation of tailrace tunnel intake stoplogs for emergency closure of either tailrace tunnel.

The chamber will generally be an unlined rock excavation, with localized rock support as necessary for stability of the roof arch and walls. The gate guides for the draft tube gates and tailrace stoplogs will be of reinforced concrete, anchored to the rock by rockbolts.

Access to the draft tube gate gallery will be by an adit from the main access tunnel; the tunnel will be widened locally for storage of draft tube bulkhead gates and stoplogs.

(g) Geotechnical Consideration for Caverns

The orientation of the powerhouse cavern was selected to avoid paralleling major joint sets I and II and the trend of shear and fracture zones. Problems of block release into the excavation will be minimal if the major cavern axis is made normal to the strike of the predominant joint sets of the caverns but this arrangement is not practical for power generation considerations. A compromise orientation with powerhouse cavern 165° was therefore adopted to avoid paralleling the trend of major shears.

BH-4 intersected a fracture zone at elevation 1567 just above the cavern crown of about 20 feet along the hole where RQDs were around 30 percent. In BH-3, a 56 feet length of borehole intersected a shear/alteration zone with RQDs of zero at an elevation about 200 feet above the powerhouse.

Further investigations will be carried out to locate similar zones if they exist and in final design, the caverns, where possible, would be arranged to avoid the altered and fractured zones. However, this may not be possible and an allowance has been made in the cavern support to deal with these difficult conditions.

The rock quality at depth is generally good to excellent. Water pressure tests show permeabilities in the range of 1×10^{-5} to 1×10^{-6} . Little seepage into the excavation from the surrounding rock is expected.

Preliminary design of the support of the cavern roof has been done using the empirical rule: $p_i = n B \gamma$

Where p_i = support pressure
n = constant, generally between 0.1 and 0.3
B = span of cavern
 γ = density of rock

Using an average value for $n = 0.2$, which is considered reasonable value for the quality of rock at Watana, this correlates well with other design methods (2).

Similar preliminary design for wall support was carried out with modified factors in each case.

The lengths of rockbolts have been designed considering:

- Average block size;
- Span dimension; and
- Anchor spacings.

The design of large underground excavations in jointed rock requires an appreciation of the effects of stresses both on the rock and its discontinuities. Rock is, in general, a non-homogeneous discontinuous medium with complex behavior under load. No generalized design method has been evolved which is applicable to all potential situations. Final design studies will be based on the following methods:

- Precedent practice, observational methods and empirical rules;
- Stability studies using the results of stress analyses based on the principles of continuum mechanics; and
- Analyses using limit equilibrium techniques applied to specific failure mechanisms.

Each of the three methods of design have substantial limitations. Design of reinforcement requires input from all three methods and a considerable amount of engineering judgement.

Final design of the underground caverns will require further investigation of:

- Rock jointing;
- Joint shear strength;
- Rock mass deformation properties;
- Insitu stress field; and
- Distribution of rock types.

This information can most likely be obtained from an exploration adit driven in the powerhouse location. Construction of this adit at an early stage will be a design requirement.

Although in final design, every effort will be made to locate the powerhouse away from altered zones, such as described earlier encountered in BH-3; an allowance has been made in the cost estimates for very substantial support for a portion of the cavern length.

Allowances have been made in cost estimates for additional rock-bolting at the junctions of the penstock tunnels, draft tube tunnels, bus galleries and access tunnels with the main cavern.

A cavern spacing (i.e., rock pillar width) criteria at 1.5 times the larger of the adjacent cavern spans has been adopted. In good rock, this may be somewhat conservative but considering the shear and fracture zones known to exist in the area, this spacing requirement was considered necessary. The spacing of the caverns will be considered in the stress analyses program in final design.

The excavation will be carried out by conventional drill and blast techniques. Particular attention will be paid to obtaining an even excavation profile. This contributes to the stability of the cavern while reduced overbreak decreases the amount of concrete required in the powerhouse structure. It is expected that the excavation will be done in several stages starting with a top heading which would be subsequently enlarged to the full width of the cavern. The rock support to the cavern roof will be installed progressively as the excavation is carried out. During this stage, multiple point borehole extensometers and rockbolt load cells will be installed to monitor the support performance. The support design will be modified if necessary in light of the performance measurements. The excavation will then be lowered in benches with wall supports being installed as the excavation is lowered. In the initial stages, access will be by ramps within the powerhouse from the main access tunnel level. As the excavation is lowered, muck removal will be through the draft tube and tailrace tunnels. Chain link mesh will be installed on all exposed overhead rock surfaces for protection against small rock falls.

The geotechnical considerations for the transformer gallery and surge chamber are similar to those of the powerhouse cavern. Seepage into the transformer gallery may be greater because this gallery is the most upstream cavern and is close to the section of penstock tunnel which is not steel lined. The grout and drainage gallery located upstream of the transformer gallery will control this seepage. Seepage will be channeled into a drainage system through the bus galleries and conducted into the powerhouse drainage system.

(h) Grouting and Pressure Relief

During construction, the seepage into the excavation is expected to be very low. However, with the reservoir full and the penstock tunnels operating under full head of water, there may be significant leakage into the powerhouse areas. Seepage into the underground structures affects the overall stability of the cavern and also would create difficult operating conditions.

Control of this seepage will be achieved by a grout curtain upstream of the transformer gallery and an arrangement of drainage holes downstream of this curtain. In addition, drain holes will be drilled from the caverns extending to a depth greater than the rock anchors.

Seepage water will be collected by surface drainage channels and directed into the powerhouse drainage system.

It is not anticipated that rock grouting from the caverns to control water inflows will be required.

(i) Cable Shafts

Cable shafts are 8.5 feet in excavated diameter. Although not required for rock stability, a 6-inch thick concrete lining has been specified for convenience of installing hoist, stairway and cable supports. It is expected that these shafts will be raise bored, and the resulting smooth profile will require little rock support. Allowance has been made for rock bolting at the upper and lower sections.

(j) Draft Tube Tunnels

The orientation of the draft tube tunnels is determined from the powerhouse alignment. The draft tube tunnels bear 075°. Joint set II intersects these tunnels at an acute angle of 20°. This is not expected to be a problem except that on the south side of the junction with the surface chamber and the northside of the junction with the powerhouse where the rock corner may spall off. The tunnel, with excavated diameter of 23 feet, will require only light rock support. When the joint set II tends to parallel the tunnel greater than normal overbreak may occur.

The draft tube tunnel will be lined with concrete, 2 feet in thickness to embed the steel draft tube liner. The initial rock support will therefore be temporary and concentrated at the junctions with the powerhouse and single chamber where the two free faces give greatest potential for block instability.

The contact between tunnel crown and concrete tunnel lining will be grouted. Consolidation rock grouting will only be required if a highly fractured zone is encountered.

12.14 - Reservoir

The Watana reservoir, at normal operating level of 2185 feet, will be approximately 48 miles long with a maximum width in the order of 5 miles. The total water surface area at normal operating level is 37,800 acres. Just upstream from the dam, the maximum water depth will

be approximately 680 feet. The minimum reservoir level will be 2045 feet during normal operation, resulting in a maximum drawdown of 140 feet. The reservoir will have a total capacity of 9,470,000 acre-feet of which 4,400,000 acre-feet will be live storage.

Prior to reservoir filling, the area below Elevation 2190 will be cleared of all trees and brush. A field reconnaissance of the proposed reservoir area included examination of aerial photographs and maps, an aerial overflight of the reservoir and collection of recent (1980 field season) forest inventory data from the U.S. Forest Service. Most of the vegetatal material within the reservoir consists of trees, with very little undergrowth. The trees are quite small, and the stands are not very dense. In the Watana reservoir area, an estimated 18,000,000 cubic feet of wood exists. Approximately 87 percent of the available timber are soft woods. The combination of steep terrain, moderate-light tree stocking levels, small trees, erosive potential of the reservoir slopes, remoteness, and very restricted access to the reservoirs are major factors affecting the choice of harvesting systems to be utilized for this project.

Present market demand for the timber at Susitna is low, however the worldwide demand wood fluctuates considerably. It is anticipated that use of the harvested material would be limited to either sale as wood - waste products and as fuel.

Slash material including brush and small trees, which will be unsuitable for either of the above uses, will be either burned in a carefully controlled manner consistent with applicable laws and regulations, or hauled to a disposal site. Material placed in disposal areas will be covered with a earthfill cover sufficient to prevent erosion and subsequent exposure.

12.15 - Tailrace

Two tailrace pressure tunnels will be provided at Watana to carry water from the surge chamber to the river. The tunnels will have a modified horseshoe cross-section with a major internal dimension of 34 feet. For preliminary design the tunnels are assumed to be fully concrete-lined throughout, with a minimum concrete thickness of 12 inches and a length of 1,800 feet.

The tailrace tunnels will be arranged to discharge into the river between the main dam and the main spillway. In view of the severe limitations on space in this area, one tailrace tunnel will be designed to discharge through one of the diversion tunnel portals. The cross section of the tailrace tunnel will be modified over the common length of 300 feet to the shape of the diversion tunnel in order not to impair the hydraulic performance of the tailrace tunnel. After diversion closure, the diversion tunnel upstream section will be plugged with concrete.

The size of the two tailrace tunnels was selected after an economic study of the cost of construction and the capitalized value of average

annual energy losses caused by friction, bends, and changes of section. In an emergency, however, the station can be operated using one tailrace tunnel, with increased head losses. For such an emergency condition, tailrace intake stoplog guides will be provided in the surge chamber. The surge chamber will be designed for full plant load rejection with either one or two tailrace tunnels in operation.

The upstream section of the tailrace is on bearing 018° and parallels the main access tunnel.

The northern tunnel joins the lower diversion tunnel and utilizes the diversion portal for the tailrace outlet.

The northern tunnel changes direction on downstream end to bear 60° and the portal is situated between the diversion tunnel portals and the spillway flip bucket.

Alternative alignments for the diversion tunnels were examined downstream of the flip bucket but this would require tunnelling through the "Fingerbuster" area in which very poor rock quality has been found.

The tunnels are favorably oriented with respect to major joint sets and shears. The rock at depth is of good quality and little support will be required except for a number of shear, fracture and alteration zones. An allowance has been made for rockbolt and shotcrete support for 17 percent of the tunnel length and steel set supports for 8 percent.

The tunnels are concrete-lined for hydraulic considerations.

The downstream portal of the northern tunnel is located between the spillway flip bucket and diversion tunnel portal. A rock berm is required to be left to the south of the portal to allow construction of a cofferdam to permit access to the tailrace tunnel which the diversion tunnels are operating.

It was necessary to locate the tailrace portal as far downstream as possible to avoid undercutting the southside of the spillway flip bucket.

Major joint set I and the trend of the major shears intersect the portal face and an acute angle about 10°. Therefore it may be desirable to excavate the portal face bank to a natural discontinuity within the rock.

The rock berm left between the tailrace portal and diversion portal has been made as wide as possible for stability and to ensure a good connection for the tailrace tunnel cofferdam, but the arrangement is restricted by the downstream cofferdam and the spillway flip bucket.

It is realized that this berm may be unstable because of the jointing and considerable rock support and mass concrete will be required to maintain it.

The rock slope between the tailrace portal and the flip bucket will also require extensive rock support to ensure stability of the flip bucket foundation.

The tailrace portals will be reinforced concrete structures designed to reduce the outlet flow velocity, and hence the velocity head loss at the exit to the river. The minimum rock cover required above the tunnels will be 1.5 times the major excavated dimension (about 54 feet).

12.16 - Turbines and Generators

(a) Unit Capacity

The Watana powerhouse will have six generating units with a nominal capacity of 170 MW corresponding to the minimum December reservoir level (elevation 2117) and a corresponding gross head of 662 feet on the station.

The head on the plant will vary from 590 feet to approximately 735 feet. The maximum unit output will change with head, as shown on Figure 12.8.

The rated head for the turbine has been established at 680 feet, which is the weighted average operating head on the station. Allowing for generator losses, the rated turbine output is 250,000 hp (186.5 MW) at full gate.

The generator rating has been selected as 190 MVA with a 90 percent power factor. The generators will be capable of a continuous 15 percent overload allowing a unit output of 196 MW. At maximum reservoir water level, the turbines will be operated below maximum output to avoid overloading of the generators.

(b) Turbines

The turbines will be of the vertical shaft Francis type with steel spiral casing and a concrete elbow-type draft tube. The draft tube will comprise a single water passage without a center pier.

The rated output of the turbines will be 250,000 hp at 680 feet rated net head. Maximum and minimum heads on the units will be 728 feet and 576 feet respectively. The full gate output of the turbines will be about 275,000 hp at 728 feet net head and 195,000 hp at 576 feet net head. Overgating of the turbines may be possible, providing approximately 5 percent additional power; however, at high heads the turbine output will be restricted to avoid over-

loading the generators. The best efficiency point of the turbines will be established at the time of preparation of bid documents for the generating equipment and will be based on a detailed analysis of the anticipated operating range of the turbines. For preliminary design purposes, the best efficiency (best gate) output of the units has been assumed as 85 percent of the full gate turbine output. This percentage may vary from about 80 percent to 90 percent; in general, a lower percentage reduces turbine cost.

The full gate and best gate efficiencies of the turbines will be about 91 percent and 94 percent respectively at rated head. The efficiency will be about 0.5 percent lower at maximum head and 1 percent lower at minimum head. The preliminary performance curve for the turbine is shown on Figure 12.9.

A speed of 225 rpm has been selected for the unit for preliminary design purposes. The resulting turbine specific speed (N_s) is 32.4. As shown on Figure 12.10, this is within present day practice for turbines operating under a head of 680 feet. The turbine data are summarized in Table 12.7.

On the basis of information from turbine manufacturers and the studies on the power plant layout, the centerline of the turbine distributor has been set at 30 feet below minimum tailwater level. The final setting of the unit will be established in conjunction with the turbine manufacturer when the contract for the supply of the turbine equipment has been awarded.

Bulkhead domes will be provided with two of the turbines (Units 3 and 4) to be installed at the bottom of the draft tube liner at the time of turbine installation. The domes permit work to continue on turbine installation after the tailrace, surge chamber, and draft tubes are flooded (prior to startup of Unit 1), without installing draft tube gates.

Because of the relatively short length of the intake penstock and a surge tank location immediately downstream of the powerhouse, the hydraulic transient characteristics of the turbines are favorable. The regulating ratio is above the minimum recommended by the USBR for good regulating capacity. Also, unit speed rise and penstock pressure rise are all well within normal accepted values. Because of the deep unit setting and the relatively short distance between the turbine and the tailrace surge tank, there will be no problems with draft tube water column separation.

The potential problems associated with partial loads must be given serious consideration in the final design.

(c) Generators

(i) Type and Rating

The six generators in the Watana powerhouse will be of the vertical shaft, overhung type directly connected to the vertical Francis turbines. The arrangement of the units is shown in Plates 27 and 28 and the single line diagram is shown in Plate 32.

The optimum arrangement at Watana will consist of two generators per transformer bank, with each transformer bank comprising three single-phase transformers. (Development of this scheme is described in Section 12.18). The generators will be connected to the transformers by isolated phase bus through generator circuit breakers directly connected to the isolated phase bus ducts.

Each generator will be provided with a high initial response static excitation system. The units will be controlled from the Watana surface control room, with local control facility also provided at the powerhouse floor. The units will be designed for black start operation.

The generators are rated as follows:

Rated Capacity:	190 MVA, 0.9 power factor
Rated Power:	170 MW
Rated Voltage:	15 kV, 3 phase, 60 Hertz
Synchronous Speed:	225 rpm
Inertia Constant:	3.5 MW-sec/MVA
Transient Reactance:	28 percent (maximum)
Short Circuit Ratio:	1.1 (minimum)
Efficiency at Full Load:	98 percent (minimum)

The generators will be of the air-cooled type, with water-to-air heat exchangers located on the stator periphery. The ratings given above are for a temperature rise of the stator and rotor windings not exceeding 60°C with cooling air at 40°C.

The generators will be capable of delivery 115 percent of rated MVA continuously (195.5 MW) at a voltage of +5 percent without exceeding 80°C temperature rise in accordance with ANSI Standard C50.10.

The generators will be capable of continuous operation as synchronous condensers when the turbine is unwatered, with an underexcited reactive power rating of 140 MVAR and an overexcited rating of 110 MVAR. Each generator will be capable of energizing the transmission system without risk of self-excitation.

The design data of the generators stated above should be reviewed during the detailed design stage for overall economic and technical design and performance requirements of the power plant and the power system.

(ii) Generator Construction

The generator will be of a modified umbrella type overhung construction, with a combined thrust and guide bearing below the rotor and a guide bearing above the rotor. The lower bearing bracket will support the rotor and turbine runner weights and the unbalanced hydraulic thrust of the runner. All removable parts, including turbine parts, will be designed for removal through the generator stator.

The rotating parts of the generator and turbine will be designed so that the critical speed exceeds the runaway speed of the unit by at least 20 percent.

Approximate dimensions and weights of the principal parts of the generator are given below:

Stator pit diameter:	36 feet
Rotor diameter:	22 feet
Rotor length (without shaft):	7 feet
Rotor weight:	385 tons
Total weight:	740 tons

It should be noted that these are approximate figures and they will vary between manufacturers, sometimes considerably. However, at this stage of design feasibility and planning, the dimensions and weights are considered appropriate and representative.

(iii) Generator Excitation System

The generator will be provided with a high initial response type static excitation system supplied with rectified excitation power from transformers connected directly to the generator terminals. The excitation system will be capable of supplying 200 percent of rated excitation field (ceiling voltage) with a generator terminal voltage of 70 percent. The power rectifiers will have a one-third spare capacity to maintain generation even during failure of a complete rectifier module.

The excitation system will be equipped with a fully static voltage regulating system maintaining output from 30 percent to 115 percent, within ± 0.5 percent accuracy of the voltage setting. Manual control will be possible at the excitation board located on the powerhouse floor, although



the unit will normally be under remote control, as described in Section 12.18 covering the control systems of the plant.

(iv) Erection and Tests

As is normal for large hydroelectric generators, the machines will not be assembled completely and tested in the factory. The erection and tests of the generators at the powerhouse, therefore, will assume greater importance in the successful commissioning of the station and should be carefully coordinated with that of the turbines and civil works.

The assembly of the stator sections will be done in the pit. The rotor will be assembled in the erection bay. The powerhouse cranes will be capable of lifting the completed rotor assembly and lowering it into the stator, and onto the thrust bearing and shaft assembly on the bracket supports. Alignment and tests of the rotor, turbine runner, and shaft will be done to tolerances specified in NEMA/ANSI Standards.

The generators will be fully tested after assembly and mechanical run tests, including dielectric tests, saturation tests, heat run, efficiency, and full-load rejection tests. Ceiling voltage and response of the excitation system will be tested. Operation of the unit within specified vibration limits will be checked.

(d) Governor System

The governor system which control the generating unit will include a governor actuator and a governor pumping unit. A single system will be provided for each unit. The governor actuator will be the electric hydraulic type and will be connected to the computerized station control system.

12.17 - Miscellaneous Mechanical Equipment

(a) Powerhouse Cranes

Two overhead traveling bridge type powerhouse cranes will be installed in the powerhouse. The cranes will be used for:

- Installation of turbines, generators, and other powerhouse equipment; and
- Subsequent dismantling and reassembly of equipment during maintenance overhauls.

Each crane will have a main and auxiliary hoist. The combined capacity of the main hoist for both cranes will be sufficient for the heaviest equipment lift, which will be the generator rotor, plus an equalizing beam. A tentative crane capacity of 205 tons has been established. The auxiliary hoist capacity will be about 25 tons.

(b) Draft Tube Gates

Draft tube gates will be provided to permit dewatering of the turbine water passages for inspection and maintenance of the turbines. The draft tube gate openings (one opening per unit) will be located in the surge chamber. The gates will be of the bulkhead type, installed under balanced head conditions using the surge chamber crane. Four sets of gates have been assumed for the six units, with each gate 20 feet wide by 10 feet high.

When Unit 1 is ready for startup, the gates will be installed in Units 2, 5, and 6, with one gate available for Unit 1. Turbine bulkhead domes will be installed in Units 3 and 4.

(c) Surge Chamber Gate Crane

A crane will be installed in the surge chamber for installation and removal of the draft tube gates as well as the tailrace tunnel intake stoplogs. The crane will either be a monorail (or twin monorail) crane, a top running crane, or a gantry crane. For the preliminary design, a twin monorail crane has been assumed. The crane will be about 30 tons in capacity, and will have a two point lift.

(d) Miscellaneous Cranes and Hoists

In addition to the powerhouse cranes and surge chamber gate crane, the following cranes and hoists will be provided in the power plant:

- A 5-ton monorail hoist in the transformer gallery for transformer maintenance;
- A 4-ton monorail hoist in the circuit breaker gallery for handling the main circuit breakers;
- Small overhead jib or A-frame type hoists in the machine shop for handling material; and
- A-frame or monorail hoists for handling miscellaneous small equipment in the powerhouse.

(e) Elevators

Access and service elevators will be provided for the power plant as follows:



- An access elevator from control buildings to powerhouse;
- A service elevator in the powerhouse service bay; and
- Inspection hoists in the cable shafts.

(f) Power Plant Mechanical Service Systems

The mechanical service systems for the power plant can be grouped into six major categories:

- Station water systems;
- Fire protection;
- Compressed air;
- Oil storage and handling;
- Drainage and dewatering; and
- Heating, ventilation and cooling.

(i) Station Water Systems

The station water systems will include the water intake, cooling water systems, turbine seal water systems, and domestic water systems. The water intakes will supply water for the various station water systems in addition to fire protection water. The water can be taken from the penstock; however, pressure-reducing valves will be necessary because of the high pressure of the water (about 330 psig maximum). Alternatively, water can be supplied from the draft tube using pumps to provide suitable pressure.

On a unit basis, cooling water will be required for generator air coolers, turbine and generator bearing coolers, transformers, and powerhouse unit air coolers. The total cooling water requirements for each unit will be about 4,000 gpm. In addition, the compressed air systems in the service bay will require approximately 100 gpm of cooling water. One cooling water pump will be provided per unit which will take water from downstream from the water intake strainer. To ensure suitable reliability, the cooling water pumps for two units will be interconnected, with each pump capable of handling the flow for both units. Two cooling water pumps in the service bay will handle compressor cooling water requirements. The cooling water for each unit will discharge into the turbine draft tube, while the compressor cooling water will flow into the station drainage system.

Turbine seal water will be supplied to the seal on the main shaft and to the runner seals when the unit is spinning in air (i.e., in spinning reserve mode). Filtered water may or may not be required, depending on the type of shaft seal. If no filtration is needed, the seal water will be

taken directly from the high-pressure side of the cooling water pumps. If filtration is necessary, a single system will be provided for the powerhouse. The system will have two filters and two pumps which will take water from downstream from the water intake strainer and distribute the water to each unit via a looped header.

Domestic water will be required for the washrooms, lunch rooms, drinking fountains, and a service sink and emergency eyewash in the battery room. Peak domestic water requirements are expected to be about 30 gpm. The system will have two pumps and a hydropneumatic tank. Water will be taken from the water intake system and will be treated by chlorination or other means as necessary.

(ii) Fire Protection System

The power plant fire protection system will consist of a fire protection water system with fire hose stations located throughout the powerhouse and transformer gallery; sprinkler systems for the generators, transformers, and the oil rooms; and portable fire extinguishers located in strategic areas of the powerhouse and transformer gallery. Fire hose stations will be provided on all floors of the powerhouse, in the transformer gallery, and in the bus tunnels.

Fire protection water will be taken from the station water intakes. Pressurized water will be provided by a pumped system with two main fire pumps as well as a jockey pump, or alternatively by a head tank with two supply pumps which keep the head tank full. For preliminary design purposes, a system with a head tank has been selected because of the increased reliability of the system. With an underground powerhouse, a head tank can be provided quite easily at a suitable elevation as an adit to the access shaft.

The capacity of the head tank will be about 100,000 gallons; the tanks will have two compartments to permit draining of half the water for inspection and maintenance. For reliability, the water supply pumps will have two electrical power sources.

Service water outlets will be installed at the various fire hose stations to supply water for washing down floors or equipment. The sprinkler systems for generators, transformers, and oil rooms will be the dry deluge type, operated by a solenoid valve which in turn will be activated by detectors in the respective area.

The portable fire extinguishers will generally be carbon dioxide or a dry chemical type.

(iii) Compressed Air Systems

Compressed air will be required in the powerhouse for the following:

- Service air;
- Instrument air;
- Generator brakes;
- Draft tube water level depression;
- Air blast circuit breakers; and
- Governor accumulator tanks.

For the preliminary design, two compressed air systems have been assumed: a 100-psig air system for service air, brake air, and air for draft tube water level depression; and a 1,000-psig high-pressure air system for governor air and circuit breaker air. For detailed plant design, a separate governor air system and circuit-breaker air system may be provided.

The service air systems will have three air compressors of the rotary screw or reciprocating type, each with a capacity of about 200 cfm. The system will have four air receivers, two with approximately 800 ft³ capacity used for the draft tube water level depression system, and two with approximately 150 ft³ used for service and brake air. The system will be designed to give priority to the brake air system. Service air piping with air hose stations will be located on all floors of the powerhouse and in the transformer gallery.

The high-pressure governor/circuit-breaker air system will have three reciprocating air compressors with approximately 30-cfm capacity each, and three small air receivers. The governor air system will supply air for initial filling of the governor system accumulator tanks and for makeup air to replace air lost through leakage and air dissolved in the governor system oil.

The circuit breaker air system will provide compressed air for operation of the main breakers. To insure dry air for the breakers, the air will be stored at 1,000 psig and then reduced to about 350 psig for operation of the breakers.

Instrument air will also be taken from the high-pressure air system.

(iv) Oil Storage and Handling

Facilities will be provided for replacing oil in the transformers and for topping-up or replacing oil in the turbine and generator bearings and the governor pumping system.

For preliminary design purposes, two oil rooms have been assumed, one in the transformer gallery and one in the powerhouse service bay.

The transformer gallery will have two oil storage tanks, one for filtered oil and the other for unfiltered oil. Each tank will have a capacity at least equal to the volume of oil in one transformer (about 8,000 gallons). A header with valve stations at each transformer will be used for transferring oil to and from the transformers. Oil will be transferred by a portable pump and filter unit.

A similar system will be provided in the powerhouse with a filtered and unfiltered oil tank and distribution header with valve stations at each unit. The oil tank capacity will be equal to the total oil volume for one unit (about 3,000 gallons).

During the detailed design stages, consideration should be given to the use of mobile oil tanks located in a parking area near the powerhouse and transformer gallery, near the access tunnel.

(v) Drainage and Dewatering Systems

The drainage and dewatering systems will consist of:

- A unit dewatering and filling system;
- A clear water discharge system; and
- A sanitary drainage system.

The unit dewatering and filling systems will consist of two sumps each with two dewatering pumps and associated piping and valves from each of the units. To prevent station flooding, the sump will be designed to withstand maximum tailwater pressure. For preliminary design purposes, submersible dewatering pumps have been assumed. Vertical turbine type pumps can also be considered; however, since the dewatering system acts as an emergency drainage system, the pump columns would have to be extended so that the motors are above maximum tailwater level. Another option is turbine-driven pumps, but these are generally very costly. A valved draft tube drain line will connect to a dewatering header running along the dewatering gallery. The spiral case will be drained by a valved line connecting the spiral case to the draft tube. Suitable provisions will be necessary to insure that the spiral case drain valve is not open when the spiral case is pressurized to headwater level. The dewatering pump discharge line will discharge water into the surge chamber. The general procedure for dewatering a unit will be to close the intake gate, drain the penstock to tailwater level through the

unit, then open the draft tube and spiral case drains to dewater the unit. Unless the drainage gallery is below the bottom of the draft tube elbow, it will not be possible to completely dewater the draft tube through the dewatering header. If necessary, the remainder of the draft tube can be unwatered using a submersible pump lowered through the draft tube access door. Unit filling to tailwater level will be accomplished from the surge chamber through the dewatering pump discharge line (with a bypass around the pumps) and then through the draft tube and spiral case drain lines. Alternatively, the unit can be filled to tailwater level through the draft tube drain line from an adjacent unit. Filling the unit to headwater pressure will be accomplished by "cracking" the intake gate and raising it about 2 to 4 inches.

The clearwater drainage system will handle normal drainage into the power plant. Drainage will be collected by a network of floor drains, trench drains, pressure relief drains, and equipment drains which discharge into gravity drainage sumps from which the water will be pumped to the surge chamber.

The sumps in the powerhouse will have submersible pumps for the same reasons as discussed above for the dewatering system. The transformer gallery will have vertical turbine type pumps. The drainage sumps in the powerhouse will have an overflow line which will discharge water into the adjacent dewatering sump should inflow into the drainage sumps exceed the capacity of the drainage pumps. The overflow line will have a flap valve to prevent reverse flow from the dewatering sump.

Particular care will be taken to prevent accidental oil spills from being discharged into the powerhouse. The following provisions will be made:

- All three main sumps will have oil contamination detectors to obtain the pressure of oil in the sumps;
- Drainage into the sumps will first pass through an oil separator;
- Controls for the drainage pumps into the transformer gallery will be interlocked with the transformer fire protection sprinkler system. Activation of the sprinklers, which signifies a transformer fire and the possibility of a major oil spill, will prevent the drainage pumps from starting until the drainage sump is almost full. It will be possible to retain about 40,000 gallons of oil/water in the sump before the pump start

(each transformer holds about 8,000 gallons of oil). In this manner, it will be possible to retain a large amount of oil in the sump where it may be skimmed off; and

- Suitable oil retention curbs will be provided in the oil rooms.

Sanitary drainage from the washrooms, lunch room, and drinking fountains will drain to a packaged sewage treatment plant and then will be discharged into the surge chamber via sewage lift pumps.

(vi) Heating, Ventilation and Cooling

The heating, ventilation and cooling system for the underground power plant will be designed primarily to maintain suitable temperatures for equipment operation and to provide a safe and comfortable atmosphere for operating and maintenance personnel. Air will be drawn into the power facilities through one or more shafts, circulated throughout the power plant, and discharged from the power plant through other shafts. For preliminary design purposes it has been assumed that air will be drawn down the access and the cable shafts, and discharged out through the access tunnel; however, the actual arrangement will depend upon the final design.

The power plant will be located in mass rock which has a constant year around temperature of about 40°F. Considering heat given off from the generators and other equipment, the primary requirement will be for air cooling. Initially, some heating will be required to offset the heat loss to the rock, but after the first few years of operation an equilibrium will be reached with a powerhouse rock surface temperature of about 60 to 70°F.

Air cooling will be accomplished by providing suitable air changes incorporating cooling coils in the air circulation system. Cooling water from the station service water supply will be circulated through the cooling coils. In winter, some heating may be required to moderate the temperature of the incoming air into the power plant. Allowance must be made in the design for the possibility that large quantities of air (up to about 5,000 cfm per unit) may be required for turbine aeration.

Other factors which must be considered or incorporated in the design are:

- To prevent or minimize the circulation of combustion products in the event of a fire, powerhouse ventilation

should be separate from transformer gallery ventilation and provision should be made for isolating the two areas; and

- Suitable air locks will be necessary to preclude adverse chimney effects in the shafts.

(g) Surface Facilities Mechanical Service Systems

The mechanical services at the control building on the surface will include:

- A heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system for the control room;
- Domestic water and washroom facilities; and
- A halon type fire protection system for the control room.

Domestic water will be supplied from the powerhouse domestic water system, with pumps located in the powerhouse and piping up through the access shaft. Sanitary drainage from the control building will drain to the sewage treatment plant in the powerhouse through piping in the access tunnel.

The standby generator building will have the following services:

- A heating and ventilation system;
- A fuel oil system with buried fuel oil storage tanks outside the building, and transfer pumps and a day tank within the building; and
- A fire protection system of the carbon dioxide or halon type.

(h) Machine Shop Facilities

A machine shop and tool room will be located in the powerhouse service bay area with sufficient equipment to take care of all normal maintenance work at the plant, as well as machine shop work for the larger components at Devil Canyon. For preliminary design purposes, an area of about 1,500 ft² has been allocated for the machine shop and tool room. The actual equipment to be installed in the machine shop will be decided during the design stages of the project; however, it will generally include drill presses, lathes, arbor press, power hacksaw, shaper, and grinders.

12.18 - Accessory Electrical Equipment

The accessory electrical equipment described in this section includes the following:

- . Main generator step-up 15/345 kV transformers;
- . Isolated phase bus connecting the generator and transformers;
- . Generator circuit breakers;
- . 345 kV oil-filled cables from the transformer terminals to the switchyard;
- . Control systems of the entire hydro plant complex; and
- . Station service auxiliary AC and DC systems.

Other equipment and systems described include grounding, lighting system, and communications.

The main equipment and connections in the power plant are shown in the single line diagram, Plate 32. The arrangement of equipment in the powerhouse, transformer gallery, and cable shafts is shown on Plates 27 through 29.

(a) Selection of Transformers and H.V. Connections

(i) General

Nine single-phase transformers and one spare transformer will be located in the transformer gallery. Each bank of three single-phase transformers will be connected to two generators through generator circuit breakers by isolated phase bus located in individual bus tunnels. The HV terminals of the transformer will be connected to the 345 kV switchyard by 345 kV single-phase oil-filled cable installed in 700-foot-long vertical shafts. There will be two sets of three single-phase 345 kV oil-filled cables installed in each cable shaft. One set will be maintained as a spare three phase cable circuit in the second cable shaft. These cable shafts will also contain the control and power cables between the powerhouse and the surface control room, as well as emergency power cables from the diesel generators at the surface to the underground facilities.

A number of considerations led to the choice of the above system of transformation and connections. Different alternative methods and equipment designs were also considered. In summary, these are:

- One transformer per generator vs one transformer for two generators;
- Underground transformers vs surface transformers;
- Direct transformation from generator voltage to 345 kV vs intermediate step transformation to 230 kV or 161 kV, and then to 345 kV;
- Single-phase vs three-phase transformers for each alternative method considered; and

- Oil-filled cable vs solid dielectric cable for SF6 gas-insulated bus.

(ii) Reliability Considerations

Reliability considerations will be based on the general reliability requirements for generation and transmission described in Section 15 regarding the forced outage of a single generator, transformer, bus or cable in addition to planned or scheduled outages in a single contingency situation, or a subsequent outage of equipment in the double contingency situation. The system should be capable of readjustment after the outage for loading within normal ratings and for loading within emergency ratings.

The generators will be rated with a 115 percent continuous overload capability. All main connections and equipment including the transformers, circuit breakers, isolated phase bus, and 345 kV cables will be rated for continuous operation at the 115 percent overload rating of the generators.

Emergency ratings are different for different items of equipment and emergency periods. It generally varies between 110 to 130 percent in summer to 120 to 140 percent in winter for a 4 to 12 hour period, with somewhat higher values for very short (1 hour) emergency periods.

(iii) Technical and Economic Considerations

The use of surface transformers connected directly to the underground generators by isolated phase buses was ruled out at the outset due to significantly higher costs and higher losses associated with generator isolated phase bus. The incremental cost could be decreased if three units were connected to one transformer, but such a compromise is not acceptable due to reliability considerations.

In general, 3-phase transformers are preferred to single-phase transformers because of their lower overall costs, smaller overall dimensions and smaller underground gallery dimensions. However, transport limitations within the Railbelt seriously affect the use of the larger size 3-phase transformers, both in dimensions and weight. The following are the road and rail data available:

- Parks and Denali Highways

Maximum load - 150,000 lb
Overweights require special permits.

- Railway

Maximum Weight - 263,000 lb
Dimension Limits - 16 feet high, 10 feet wide

A further check of these design limitations for the selected sizes of transformers is recommended during the detailed design stage. A careful route reconnaissance study is also required.

Single-phase transformers are therefore recommended for the 6-unit power plant. One advantage of single-phase transformers is that a spare transformer can be provided at a fairly low incremental cost.

The grouped unit arrangement with two generators per transformer will allow a smaller gallery length, with center-to-center spacing comparable to the generator spacing. The grouped unit arrangement is the recommended arrangement. The alternative with one transformer per generator will require a gallery about 300 feet longer.

The double-step transformation scheme (15/161 KV generator-transformer, 161 KV cable and 161/345 KV auto-transformer at the switchyard) is economically competitive with the direct transformation scheme (15/345 KV), resulting from a number of tradeoffs: cost/MVA per transformer is lower; also dimensions, weights and cavern dimensions are lower; but the intermediate-voltage transformer costs are additional.

Direct transformation (15/345 KV) is best from system transient stability viewpoint since the overall impedance of the generator unit to the 345 KV bus is lower. Furthermore, it has a better overall reliability since there is one less voltage level and, therefore, less equipment in the generating "chain" of equipment. This scheme costs about \$2 million less in overall costs compared to the double-step transformation scheme.

The comparison between 345 KV oil-filled cables and other 345 KV cable and bus system is made in Section 12.18. The SF6 bus is about 5 to 6 times the cost of the oil-filled cables. It also requires a larger diameter cable shaft. The oil-filled cable is well proven at a number of underground power installations and was therefore selected for both technical and economic considerations.

(c) Main Transformer

(i) Rating and Characteristics

The nine single-phase transformers (three transformers per group of two generators) and one spare transformer, will be of the two winding, oil-immersed, forced-oil water-cooled (FOW) type, with rating and electric characteristics as follows:

Rated capacity:	145 MVA
High voltage winding:	345 / $\sqrt{3}$ kV, Grounded Y
Basic insulation level (BIL) of H.V. winding:	1300 kV
Low voltage winding:	15 kV, Delta
Transformer impedance:	15 percent

The temperature rise above air ambient temperature of 40°C is 55°C for the windings for continuous operation at the rated kVA.

(ii) Construction

The transformers will be of the FOW type with water-cooled heat exchangers which will remove the heat from the oil circulating through the windings. A one-third spare cooler capacity will be provided. The transformer will be of the forced oil directed type with a design aimed to achieve minimum dimensions and weight for shipping purposes. The low voltage terminals will be connected to the isolated phase bus, and the high voltage terminals to the 345 kV oil-filled cable box termination at the transformer.

Lightning arresters will be connected directly to the high voltage terminals. The transformer installation in the gallery will be designed to provide the necessary ground and safety clearances from the live 345 kV terminals to all nearby equipment and structures.

The tank underbase will be provided with flanged wheels for transport on rails. The spare single-phase transformer will be exactly identical to the remaining nine single-phase transformers. It will be maintained in a state of maximum readiness, for connection in the shortest practical time to replace any of the main transformers.

The transformers will be fully tested and inspected in the factory according to ANSI/NEMA Standards. They will be shipped without oil and filled with inert gas for protection. At the site, erection would be mainly for external fittings such as bushings, lightning arresters, heat exchangers, piping, and electrical connections.

(iii) Fire Protection

Fire walls will separate each single-phase transformer. Each transformer will be provided with fog-spray water fire protection equipment, automatically operated from heat detectors located on the transformer.

(d) Generator Isolated Phase Bus

(i) Ratings and Characteristics

The isolated phase bus main connections will be located between the generator, generator circuit breaker, and the transformer.

Tap-off connections will be made to the surge protection and potential transformer cubicle, excitation transformers, and station service transformers. Bus duct ratings are as follows:

	<u>Generator Connection</u>	<u>Transformer Connection</u>
Rated current, amps	9,000	18,000
Short circuit current momentary, amps	240,000	240,000
Short circuit current, symmetrical, amps	150,000	150,000
Basic insulation level, kV (BIL)	150	150

The bus conductors will be designed for a temperature rise of 65°C above 40°C ambient temperature.

(ii) Construction

The bus will be of standard self-cooled design with conductor and tubular enclosure of aluminum. The current rating is such that either a self-cooled or forced cooled design will be possible. With a forced cooled design, the size and costs will be lower; however, if the forced-cooling plant fails, the bus would be severely derated to a rating less than 50 percent of the forced cooling rating. The self-cooled designs are used up to 30,000 amps rated current and are therefore recommended for this installation where the ratings will not exceed 18,000 amps.

The enclosure will be of welded construction and each bus will be grounded. The construction is highly reliable; will eliminate phase-to-phase faults, neutralize the magnetic field outside the enclosure, and provide protection against contamination and moisture, with consequent minimum maintenance requirements.



(e) Generator Circuit Breakers

The generator circuit breakers will be of the enclosed air circuit breaker design suitable for mounting in line with the generator isolated phase bus ducts. They are rated as follows:

Rated Current:	9,000 Amps
Voltage:	23 kV class, 3-phase, 60 Hertz
Breaking capacity, symmetrical, amps	150,000

The short circuit rating is tentative and will depend on detailed analysis in the design stage.

The breakers will be designed and constructed with a high degree of reliability. The phase spacing of the breakers will be generally the same as the isolated phase bus duct. The breakers will be mounted on strong foundations on the generator floor designed to absorb the reaction forces when the breaker operates.

(f) 345 kV Oil-Filled Cable

(i) General

The recommended 345 kV connection is a 345 kV oil-filled cable system between the high voltage terminals of the transformer and the surface switchyard. The cable will be installed in a vertical cable shaft. Cables from two transformers will be installed in a single cable shaft.

This system of 345 kV connection was chosen after a technical and economic analysis of alternative methods of connection, including:

- SF₆ isolated bus system;
- High pressure oil pipe cable system; and
- Solid dielectric cable system.

The SF₆ bus system is considered to be the best alternative to the oil-filled cable system. Its advantages are a generally better overall reliability, including a low fire hazard. However, it costs approximately 5 to 6 times that of the oil-filled cable installation, and requires almost twice the diameter cable shaft of the cable installation. The overall cost difference is approximately \$7,000,000 in direct costs.

The oil pipe cable will consist of three conductors contained within an oil-filled steel pipe. This system has the highest potential fire hazard of all the cable systems and is not recommended for high head vertical cable in-

stallations. The solid dielectric (polymeric) cables are still under development at the 345 kV to 500 kV voltage class.

It is recommended that further detailed study of the oil-filled cable in comparison with the SF₆ bus and other more recent SF₆ cable designs under development be undertaken at the design stage.

By far the greatest number of high voltage, high capacity installations utilize oil-filled cables. A formidable experience record is evident for the oil-filled cable installations associated with large power plants all over the world. Typical installations include the 525 kV/650 MVA units at Grand Coulee III, the 345 kV/550 MVA units at Churchill Falls in Canada, the 400 kV/2640 MVA cables at Severn River crossing in Great Britain, and the 400 kV/2340 MVA cables at Dinorwic pumped storage plant in Great Britain.

(ii) Rating and Characteristics

The cable will be rated for a continuous maximum current of 800 amps at 345 kV +5 percent. The maximum conductor temperature at the maximum rating will be 70°C over a maximum ambient of 35°C. This rating will correspond to 115 percent of the generator overload rating. The normal operating rating of the cable will be 87 percent, with a corresponding lower conductor temperature which will improve the overall performance and lower cable aging over its project operating life. Depending on the ambient air temperature, a further overload emergency rating of about 10 to 20 percent will be available during winter conditions.

The cables will be of single-core construction with oil flow through a central oil duct within the copper conductor. Cables will have an aluminum sheath and PVC over-sheath. No cable jointing will be required for the 700 to 800 feet length cable installation.

(g) Control Systems

(i) General

A Susitna Area Control Center will be located at Watana to control both the Watana and the Devil Canyon power plants as shown in Plate 34. The control center will be linked through the supervisory system to the Central Dispatch Control Center at Willow as described in Section 14.



The supervisory control of the entire Alaska Railbelt system will be done at the Central Dispatch Center at Willow. A high level of control automation with the aid of digital computers will be sought but not a complete computerized direct digital control of the Watana and Devil Canyon power plants. Independent operator controlled local-manual and local-auto operations will still be possible at Watana and Devil Canyon power plants for testing/commissioning or during emergencies. The control system will be designed to perform the following functions at both power plants:

- Start/stop and loading of units by operator;
- Load-frequency control of units;
- Reservoir/water flow control;
- Continuous monitoring and data logging;
- Alarm annunciation; and
- Man-machine communication through visual display units (VDU) and console.

In addition, the computer system will be capable of retrieval of technical data, design criteria, equipment characteristics and operating limitations, schematic diagrams, and operating/maintenance records of the unit.

The Susitna Area Control Center will be capable of completely independent control of the Central Dispatch Center in case of system emergencies. Similarly it will be possible to operate the Susitna units in an emergency situation from the Central Dispatch Center, although this should be an unlikely operation considering the size, complexity, and impact of the Susitna generating plants on the system.

The Watana and Devil Canyon plants will be capable of "black start" operation in the event of a complete black out or collapse of the power system. The control systems of the two plants and the Susitna Area Control Center complex will be supplied by a non-interruptible power supply.

(ii) Unit Control System

The unit control system will permit the operator to initiate an entire sequence of actions by pushing one button at the control console, provided all preliminary plant conditions have been first checked by the operator, and system security and unit commitment have been cleared through the central dispatch control supervisor. Unit control will be designed to:

- Start a unit and synchronize it with the system;
- Load the unit;
- Stop a unit;

- Operate a unit as spinning reserve (runner in air with water blown down in turbine and draft tube); and
- Operate as a synchronous condenser (runner in air as above).

Unit control will be essentially possible at four different levels in a hierarchical organization of the control system:

- Local control at the machine floor at individual turbine-generator control boards (primarily designed for commissioning and recommissioning of units). It will be the responsibility of the operator for performing individual control operations in the correct sequence, and monitoring instrumentation during local control operations.
- Automatic or semi-automatic system for start-up and shut-down of generating unit at the local board at the machine floor.
- Fully automatic system at Susitna Area Control (at Watana) for Watana and Devil Canyon power plants. (This will be the normal Susitna operation.)
- Fully automatic system through supervisory control from Central Dispatch Center at Willow. (Abnormal or emergency situations only).

(iii) Computer-Aided Control System

Traditionally, control systems for power plants in general, and hydro plants in particular, have utilized hard-wired switchboard type equipment (such as electro-mechanical relays, instruments, alarm annunciators, signal lamps, mimic diagram and control switches) for the operation, indication, alarm and control of the power plant. Such equipment was installed both at the plant local control area on the machine floor as well as in the control room, with a limited degree of miniaturization of equipment at the control desks in the control room.

While traditional switchboard type equipment is still utilized at the local control level, supplemented with programmable control systems at many plants, the design of control and display equipment at modern central control rooms has been rapidly moving towards computer-aided or fully computer-controlled systems, especially where remote control operations are contemplated. One of the problems encountered by utilities is the necessity for operating personnel familiar with the conventional control systems to adapt to the new computer-aided control systems. In this context, establishing a modern computer-aided control

system in the Alaska Power Authority electrical system for the Susitna Project complex should not pose any special problems for the adaption and training of operators.

The computer-aided control system at the Susitna Area Control Center at Watana will provide for the following:

- Data acquisition and monitoring of unit (MW, MVAR, speed, gate position, temperatures, etc.);
- Data acquisition and monitoring of reservoir headwater and tailwater levels;
- Data acquisition and monitoring of electrical system voltage and frequency;
- Load-frequency control;
- Unit start/stop control;
- Unit loading;
- Plant operation alarm and trip conditions (audible and visual alarm on control board, full alarm details on VDU on demand);
- General visual plant operation status on VDU and on giant wall mimic diagram;
- Data logging, plant operation records;
- Plant abnormal operation or disturbance automatic recording; and
- Water management (reservoir control).

The block diagram of the computer-aided control system is shown in Plate 34. The supervisory control and telemetering system and central dispatch center system details are described in Section 14.

(iv) Local Control and Relay Boards

Local boards will be provided at the powerhouse floor equipped with local controls, alarms, and indications for all unit control functions. These boards will be located near each unit and will be utilized mainly during testing, commissioning, and maintenance of the turbines and generators. It will also be utilized as needed during emergencies if there is a total failure of the remote or computer-aided control systems.

The unit electrical protective relays will be mounted on relay boards, with one board for each generator located near the unit. Differential protection will be provided for each generator and transformer. The differential zones of protection overlap will include all electrical equipment and connections. The 345 kV oil-filled cable to the surface switchyard will be protected by a pilot-wire differential protection relay. The overall differential relay protects the generators, transformers, and 345 kV cable. Sensitive ground fault stator protection will be provided for the generator. Protection will also be provided for negative phase sequence operation, loss of excitation, overvoltage, and under frequency. A phase impedance relay will provide backup protection for the generator.

(v) Load-Frequency Control

The load frequency control system will provide remote control of the output of the generator at Watana and Devil Canyon from the central dispatch control center through the supervisory and computer-aided control system at Watana. The basic method of load frequency control will use the plant error (differential) signals from the load dispatch center and will allocate these errors to the power plant generators automatically through speed-level motors. Provision will be made in the control system for the more advanced scheme of a closed-loop control system with digital control to control generator power.

The control system will be designed to take into account the digital nature of the controller-timed pulses as well as the inherent time delays caused by the speed-level motor run-up and turbine-generator time-constants.

The load set-point for the Susitna area generation will be set at the Central Dispatch Center. The summated power will be telemetered from the Susitna Area Control center to the Central Dispatch Center, from which the required differential plant generation ("error") will be determined and transmitted by the supervisory system to Susitna Area Control Center. From this point, the remaining functions for the automatic generation control will be carried out by the plant supervisory control systems to load the individual generating units at Watana and Devil Canyon.

The unit will be automatically removed from load-frequency control for various conditions including failure of supervisory system, unit controller or computer system, abnormally high plant frequency, unit shut-down, and dc power

failure. When the unit is taken off automatic load-frequency control, it will be returned to manual load and frequency control by the operator at Watana Control room.

(h) Station Service Auxiliary AC and DC Systems

(i) Auxiliary AC System

The station service system will be designed to achieve a reliable and economic distribution system for the power plant and switchyard, in order to satisfy the following requirements:

- Station service power at 480 volts will be obtained from two 2,000 kVA auxiliary transformers connected directly to the generator circuit breaker outgoing leads of Units 1 and 3;
- Surface auxiliary power at 34.5 kV will be supplied by two separate 7.5/10 MVA transformers connected to the generator leads of Units 1 and 3;
- Station service power will be maintained even when all the units are shut down and the generator circuit breakers are open;
- 100 percent standby transformer capacity will be available;
- A spare auxiliary transformer will be maintained, connected to Unit 5; and
- "Black start" capability will be provided for the power plant in the event of total failure of the auxiliary supply system, 500 kW emergency diesel generators will be automatically started up to supply the power plant and switchyard with auxiliary power to the essential services to enable startup of the generators.

The main ac auxiliary switchboard will be provided with two bus sections separated by bus-tie circuit breakers. Under normal operating conditions, the station-service load is divided and connected to each of the two end incoming transformers. In the event of failure of one end supply, the tie breakers will close automatically. If both end supplies fail, the emergency diesel generator will be automatically connected to the station service bus.

Each unit will be provided with a unit auxiliary board supplied by separate feeders from the two bus sections of the main switchboard interlocked to prevent parallel opera-

tion. Separate ac switchboards will furnish the auxiliary power to essential and general services in the power plant.

The unit auxiliary board will supply the auxiliaries necessary for starting, running, and stopping the generating unit. These supplies will include those to the governor and oil pressure system, bearing oil pumps, cooling pumps and fans, generator circuit breaker, excitation system, and miscellaneous pumps and devices connected with unit operation.

The station essential service supplies will include powerhouse sump pumps, drainage pumps, compressors for circuit breakers, and generator brakes, dc battery chargers, control and metering devices, communications, fire pumps, and other miscellaneous essential power requirements.

The station general supplies will include powerhouse lighting, heating, ventilating and air-conditioning, elevators, cranes, machine shop and tools, and other miscellaneous pumps and general requirements.

The 34.5 kV supply to the surface facilities will be distributed from a 34.5 kV switchboard located in the surface control and administration building. Power supplies to the switchyard, power intake, and spillway as well as the lighting systems for the access roads and tunnels will be obtained from the 34.5 kV switchboard.

The unit auxiliary board will supply the auxiliaries necessary for starting, running, and stopping the generator-turbine unit. These supplies will include those to the governor and oil pressure system, bearing oil pumps, cooling water pumps and fans, generator circuit breaker, excitation system, and miscellaneous pumps and devices connected with unit operation.

The station essential service supplies will include powerhouse sump pumps, drainage pumps, compressors for circuit breaker, air and generator brakes, dc battery chargers, control and metering devices, communications, fire protection pumps, and other miscellaneous essential power requirements.

The station general supplies will include powerhouse lighting, heating, ventilating and air-conditioning, elevators, cranes, machine shop and tools, and other miscellaneous pumps and general requirements.

The 34.5 kV supply to the surface facilities will be distributed from a 34.5 kV switchboard located in the surface

control and administration building. Power supplies to the switchyard power intake, and spillway as well as the lighting systems for the access roads and tunnels will be obtained from the 34.5 kV switchboard.

The two 2000 kVA, 15000/480 volt stations service transformers and the spare transformer will be of the 3-phase, dry-type, sealed gas-filled design. The two 7.5/10 MVA, 15/34.5 kV transformers will be of the 3-phase oil-immersed OA/FA type.

Emergency diesel generators, each rated 500 kW, will separately supply the 480 volt and 34.5 kV auxiliary switchboards during emergencies. Both diesel generators will be located in the surface control building.

An uninterruptible high security power supply will be provided for the computer control system.

(ii) DC Auxiliary Station Service System

The dc auxiliary system will supply the protective relaying, supervisory, alarm, control, tripping and indication circuit in the power plant. The generator static excitation system will be started with "flashing" power from the dc battery. It will also supply the emergency lighting system at critical plant locations.

Separate duplicate lead-acid batteries for 125 volt dc will be provided in the powerhouse. The 48 volt battery supply for the supervisory and computer aided control system and microwave communications will be located in the surface control building.

The main battery system will be supplied by double charging equipment consisting of a full wave rectifier system with regulated output voltage which normally will supply the continuous dc load in the system. The battery capacity will be suitable for an emergency loading based on a failure of ac station service lasting 5 hours.

(iii) "Black Start" Capability

The Watana power plant will have a built-in capability of starting up a completely blacked-out power system in a very short time. Only a few basic requirements will have to be satisfied:

- Sufficient water will be available in the reservoir for the minimum generation required for "black start" operation;

- The governor oil system will have sufficient stored energy capable of operating the turbine wicket gates to full open position;
- The generators will be equipped with static exciters capable of being flash-started from the station battery system
- Dc control power will be available for the startup circuits.

The above described emergency power requirements will not exceed about 200 kw for one unit and will be easily supplied from the emergency diesel generator. With the startup of a single unit, the complete power plant and switchyard auxiliary power will be immediately available, enabling all the units in the power plant to be started up sequentially within the hour.

(i) Grounding System

The power plant grounding system will consist of one mat under the power plant, one mat under the transformer gallery, risers, and connection ground wires. Grounding grids will also be included in each powerhouse floor. The power plant grounding system will be connected to the switchyard grounding system by three 500 MCM copper ground conductors to minimize the overall resistance to ground. The grounding system will be designed to provide a ground resistance of 1 ohm or lower. All exposed metal part and neutral connections of generators and transformers will be connected to the grounding system for the purpose of protecting personnel and equipment from injury or damage.

(j) Lighting System

The lighting system in the powerhouse will be supplied from 480/208-120 volts lighting transformers connected to the general ac auxiliary station service system. The lighting system will be all fluorescent and incandescent fixtures operating on 120 volts and all outdoor type high pressure sodium fixtures operating on 208 volts. The lighting level varies generally from 20 to 50 foot candles depending upon the powerhouse area; the higher levels will be at control areas. Adequate illumination will be provided on vertical switchboards with local lighting canopies.

An emergency lighting system will be provided at the power plant and at the control room at all critical operating locations with an illumination level of 2 foot candles. The emergency lighting system will operate from a separate 120 volt ac circuit which, by means of automatic transfer switches, will be automatically connected to the 125 volt dc system upon failure of the ac system.

(k) Communications

The power plant will be furnished with an internal communications system, including an automatic telephone switchboard system. A communication system will be provided at all powerhouse floors and galleries, transformer gallery, access tunnels and cable shafts, and structures at the power intake, draft tube gate area, main spillway, and dam.

The communications system for the central dispatch control system, telemetering, supervisory and protective relaying system is described in Section 15.

(l) Insulation Coordination and Lightning and Switching Surge Protection

The electrical insulation and protective devices will be selected and coordinated to provide a safe margin of insulation strength above the maximum abnormal voltages permitted during lightning, switching, and short-circuit surges. The 1300 kV basic insulation level (BIL) specified for the transformer and other BIL values stated for the electrical equipment and connections are tentative and are subject to detailed study in the design stage of the project.

In principle, lightning arresters will be mounted on or adjacent to all major electrical equipment having wound-type internal construction, and will be provided at the generator 15 kV terminals and the main transformer 345 kV terminals.

12.19 - Switchyard Structures and Equipment

(a) Single Line Diagram

The electric system studies recommended a "breaker-and-a-half" single line arrangement. This arrangement was recommended for reliability and security of the power system. Plate 61 shows the details of the switchyard single line diagram.

(i) Control and Metering

All control and metering functions are handled by the Watana control center. The Willow System Center can also initiate a control function through the Watana control center, thus allowing the system center considerable flexibility in operating the total system.

(ii) Relay Protection

Relay protection for transmission lines is similar to that described in Section 14.5. In addition relay protection is provided for the 345 kV cable from the powerhouse to the

switchyard. This protection will consist of differential relays, and as a backup the overall differential protection zone of the generator and unit transformer relay will also include the 345 kV cable circuit.

(b) Switchyard Equipment

The number of 345 kV circuit breakers is determined by the number of elements to be switched such as lines or in-feeds from the powerhouse. Each breaker will have two disconnect switches to allow safe maintenance.

The auxiliary power for the switchyard will be derived from the generator bus via a 15 - 34.5 kV transformer and 34.5 kV cable. The voltage will then be stepped down to 480 V for use in the switchyard.

(c) Switchyard Structures and Layout

The switchyard layout will be based on a conventional outdoor type design. The design adopted for this project will provide a two level bus arrangement. This design is commonly known as a low station profile.

The two level bus arrangement is desirable because it is less prone to extensive damage in case of an earthquake. It is also easier to maintain low level busses.

Although the present studies are based on conventional switchyard layouts, it is recommended that SF₆ gas-insulated equipment be considered in the design stage. For a more detailed description see Section 14.

12.20 - Project Lands

Project lands acquired for the project will be the minimum necessary to construct access and site facilities, construct permanent facilities, to clear the reservoir, and to operate the project.

A large amount of public land in the Watana area is managed by the Bureau of Land Management. There are large blocks of private Native Village Corporation Lands along the river. Other private holdings consist of widely scattered remote parcels. The state has selected much of the federal land in this area and is expected to receive a patent.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- (1) Acres American Incorporated, Susitna Hydroelectric Project 1980-81 Geotechnical Report, prepared for the Alaska Power Authority, February 1982.
- (2) Barton, et al., Engineering Classification of Rock Masses for the Design of Tunnel Support.

TABLE 12.1: WATANA PEAK WORK FORCE AND CAMP/VILLAGE
DESIGN POPULATION

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Yearly Peak Work Force</u>	<u>Camp/Village Facilities Design</u>
1985	900	1000
1986	1600	1760
1987	2300	2530
1988	2900	3200
1989	3200	3520
1990	3600	3970
1991	3400	3740
1992	2600	2860
1993	1000	1100
1994	200	220

TABLE 12.2: ROCKFILL AND EARTH DAMS IN EXCESS OF 500 FEET

<u>Dam</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Feet</u>
Rogun	USSR	1,066
Nurek	USSR	1,040
Watana	USA	885
Tehri	India	856
Kishaw	India	830
Sulak	USSR	802
Mica	Canada	794
Patia	Colombia	787
Chicoasen	Mexico	787
Chivor	Colombia	778
Droville	USA	771
Esmeradla	Colombia	754
Sayansk	USSR	738
Keban	Turkey	679
Altinkaya	Turkey	640
New Melones	USA	626
Don Pedro	USA	614
Swift	USA	610
Portage Mountain	Canada	600
New Bullards Bar	USA	590
Dartmouth	Australia	590
Okoy	Turkey	590
Ayvacic	Turkey	587
Takase	Japan	577
Hasan Ugurlu	Turkey	574
Nader Shah	Iran	574
Gura Apelor Retezat	Romania	568
Magarin	Jordan	561
Charvak	USSR	551
Boruca	Costa Rica	548
Kremasta	Greece	541
Trinity	USA	538
Thomson	Australia	530
Talbingo	Australia	530
Tokujama	Japan	528
LaGrande No. 2	Canada	525
Palo Quemado	S. America	525
Grand Maison	France	525
Sao Felix	Brazil	525
Fierze	Albania	519
Cougar	USA	519
Yacambu	Venezuela	519
Emborcacao	Brazil	519
Finstertal	Austria	519
Cumberland	Australia	510
Canales	Spain	510
Narmata	Japan	508
Goeschenenalp	Switzerland	508
Salrajina	Colombia	505
Gepatsch	Austria	503
Foz do Areia	Brazil	503
Tedorigawa	Japan	503
Carter	USA	500

TABLE 12.3: SUMMARY OF DESIGN DATA FOR LARGE EMBANKMENT DAMS
IN SEISMICALLY ACTIVE AREAS

Dam	Height Feet	Freeboard Feet	Crest Width Feet	Ratio of Core Width to Dam Height	Upstream Slope	Downstream Slope
Watana (US)	885	25*	35	0.50	2.4	2.0
Mica (C)	794	26	111	0.45	2.25	2.0
Chicoasen (M)	787	33	82	0.42	2.2	2.0
Oroville (US)	771	22	80	0.34	2.6	2.0
Don Pedro (US)	614	-	-	-	2.4	2.1
Ayvacic (T)	587	17	50	0.34	2.5	1.8
Takase (J)	577	17	46	0.40	2.6	2.1
Tedorigawa (J)	503	13	40	0.31	2.6	1.85
Netzahualcoyotl (M)	453	18	50	0.43	2.0	2.0
Iwaya (J)	413	62	33	0.33	2.5	2.0
Kazurya (J)	413	-	39	-	2.6	1.8
Narakura (J)	410	16	39	0.56	2.7	2.7
Pyramid (J) (US)	400	-	36	-	2.5	2.0
Tamahara (J)	380	13	39	0.43	2.7	2.2
Seto (J)	364	20	36	0.29	2.5	2.0

* Watana freeboard - normal maximum operations level to nominal crest
(additional height allowed for seismic settlement)

US - United States
C - Canada
M - Mexico
T - Turkey
J - Japan

TABLE 12.4: DAMS IN SEISMIC AREAS

PROJECT			DIMENSIONS				IMPERVIOUS CORE						FILTERS		FOUNDATION			
Name	Country	Seismic Activity	Height (ft)	Crest Length (ft)	Free-board (ft)	Crest Width (ft)	Core Type	Core Width at Base (ft)	Ratio Core Width to Dam Height	Slopes of Core Zone	Unified Classification	Liquid Limit	Plastic Limit	U/S Thickness (ft)	D/S Thickness (ft)	Type	Treatment	Under Shells
Watana	USA	H	885		25	35	CV	440	0.50	0.25:1	SM	23	8	60	60	R	CG	R/UD
Mica	Canada	L	794	2,600	26	111	S	360	0.45	-	-	-	-	-	-	R	CG	A/UD
Chicoasen	Mexico	H	787	1,640	33	82	CV	330	0.42	0.15:1	CL	40	20	25	25	CB	CG	A/UD
Oroville	USA	L-M	771	5,600	22	80	S	263	0.34	-	GC	-	-	-	-	-	CB	-
Ayvacic	Turkey	M-H	587	1,400	17	50	C	197	0.34	-	CL	-	-	50	50	R	CB	R/UD
Takase	Japan	M-H	577	1,200	17	46	CV	230	0.40	0.15:1	-	-	-	-	50	R	-	A/UD
Palo Quemado	S. America	H	525	1,215	26	40	CV	295	0.56	0.25:1	ML	33	7.5	13	13	R	CG	R/UD
Tedorigawa	Japan	M-H	503	1,380	13	40	CV	157	0.31	0.15:1	-	-	-	26	26	R	-	A/UD
El Infiernilla	Mexico	H	486	1,100	25	40	CV	164	0.34	0.15:1	CL	49	25	8	8	R	CG	A/UD
Tarbela	Pakistan	M-H	469	9,000	18	40	S	262	0.56	-	GM/SM	-	-	-	-	A	-	A/UD
Netzahualcoyotl	Mexico	H	453	1,570	18	50	CV	197	0.43	0.15:1	ML/MH	50	20	-	13	R	CG	A/U
Mangla	Pakistan	H	453	3,400	32	41	S	230	0.51	-	CL	-	-	-	13	R	CG	A/UD
Derbendi Khan	Iraq	M	443	1,460	33	56	CV	330	0.74	0.3:1	CH/CL	50	26	20	30	R	-	R/UD
Tsengwen	Taiwan	H	436	1,440	33	33	CV	410	0.94	0.4:1	SM/GM	22	8	-	-	R	CG	R/UD
Pueblo Viejo	C. America	H	436	820	49	43	CV	157	0.36	0.15:1	CL	41	19	23	23	R	CG	R/UD
Beas	India	M-H	435	6,400	30	45	CV	131	0.30	0.1:1	CL	30	12	20	20	R	-	A/UD
Alicura	Argentina	H	426	2,620	16	39	CV	275	0.65	0.3:1	CL	35	15	10	10	R	-	A/UD
Ranganga	India	M-H	413	-	22	39	CV	197	0.48	0.2:1	CL	-	-	98	79	R	-	A/UD
Iwaya	Japan	H	413	1,200	62	33	C	138	0.33	-	-	-	-	33	65	R	-	R/UD
Narakura	Japan	M-H	410	820	16	39	CV	230	0.56	0.2:1	-	-	-	20	49	R	-	A/UD
Shimokotori	Japan	M-H	390	915	13	36	C	151	0.39	-	-	-	-	39	39	-	-	R/UD
Bao	C. America	H	388	1,312	24	26	CV	184	0.47	0.2:1	CL	40	20	20	20	R	-	CB & CG
Tamahara	Japan	H	380	2,000	13	39	CV	164	0.43	-	-	-	-	79	79	R	CG	R/UD
Seto	Japan	H	364	1,120	13	36	C	105	0.29	-	-	-	-	39	39	R	-	R/UD
Guri	Venezuela	L	361	1,970	20	36	CV	180	0.50	0.2:1	ML	50	15	5	6.5	R	CG	R/UD

Legend

Earthquake: H - High
M - Medium
L - Low

Impervious Core: CV - Central vertical
C - Central very slightly sloped
S - Sloping

Foundation: R - Rock
A - Alluvium
D - Downstream
U - Upstream
CG - Consolidation grouting
CB - Concrete block over rock

TABLE 12.5: GENERALIZED SURFICIAL STRATIGRAPHIC COLUMN
AREA "D" AND RELICT CHANNEL

<u>Column</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Estimated Thickness</u>	<u>Description</u>
-	Surficial	0-5'	Boulders, organic silts and sands.
C	Outwash	0-18' 12' average	Silty sand with some gravel and cobbles occasionally. Usually brown although becomes gray in limited areas. Thickest in northern portions of area, thickening southward, often absent near Susitna River.
D	Alluvium & Fluvial Deposits	0-15'	Sand with some silt, occasional gravel. Generally brown, found only along course of limited drainage channels formed in outwash "E". Generally sorted.
E and F	Outwash	0-35' 15' average,	Sand, silt, gravel and cobbles, partly sorted, with fragments sub-angular to rounded. Silt and sand lenses often present. Brown to gray brown with a cobble/boulder zone often present at the base of Unit "F". Contact between "E" and "F" is often poorly defined.
G	Till/Waterlain Till	2-50' 12' average	Clayey, silty sand, usually gray, often plastic. Contains cobbles and gravel in many areas. Occasionally present as a lacustrine deposit showing laminations and/or varves. Generally a till deposited through or near standing water.
H	Alluvium	0-40'	Sand, silt, gravel, partly to well sorted. Often absent between Units "I" and "G". Unit represents period of melting producing alluvium/outwash between these deposits. Appears as narrow bands representing channel fillings. Thickest in western portion of the area.
I and J	Till	>10' to 65' 20' average	Poorly sorted sand, silt, gravel and cobbles, occasionally with clay. Generally gray to gray brown. Continuity uncertain due to lack of information at depth. Silt or sand layer 2 inches - 6 inches thick often found in center of Unit "I". Base unit on top of bedrock, except in buried channel. Contact between "I" and "J" often poorly defined.
-	Alluvium	to 160'	Sand, gravel, cobbles, boulders, few fines, permeable. Found only in bottom of buried channel. Top at 292 feet extending to rock at 454 feet.

Note: Letters used to define units are arbitrary and were used for correlation purposes. Two letters may define parts of the same unit.

TABLE 12.6: RING FOLLOWER GATES

PROJECT	LOCATION	SIZE (IN.)	DESIGN HEAD (FT)	YEAR OF INITIAL OPERATION
(1) New Melones	California	96	607	1979
(2) New Melones	California	72	591	1979
(3) Portage Mountain	Canada	84	550	1967
(4) Hungry Horse	Montana	96	495	1952
(5) Yellowtail Dam	Montana	84	470	1967
(6) Trinity Dam	California	84	450	1962
(7) Grand Coulee	Washington	102	354*	1940
(8) Glen Canyon	Colorado	96	337	1965
(9) Green Mountain	Colorado	102	261	1943

*Maximum static head; maximum operating head - 250 feet.

TABLE 12.7: PRELIMINARY UNIT DATA

1 - GENERAL DATA

- Number of Units	6
- Nominal Unit Output	170 MW
- Headwater Levels:	
-- normal maximum	El. 2185
-- minimum	El. 2045
- Tailwater Levels:	
-- minimum	El. 1452
-- normal	El. 1455
-- maximum	El. 1475

2 - TURBINE DATA

- Type	Vertical Francis
- Rated Net Head	680 feet
- Maximum Head	728 feet
- Minimum Head	576 feet
- Full Gate Output:	
-- at rated head	250,000 hp
-- at maximum head	275,000 hp
-- at minimum head	195,000 hp
- Best Gate Output	85 percent full
- Full Gate Discharge at Rated Head	3560 cfs
- Speed	225 rpm
- Specific Speed	32.4
- Runner Discharge Diameter	132 in
- Runaway Speed	400 rpm
- Centerline Distributor	El. 1422
- Cavitation Coefficient (sigma)	0.088

3 - GENERATOR DATA

- Type	Vertical Semi-Umbrella
- Rated Output	190 MVA
- Power Factor	0.90
- Voltage	15 kV
- Synchronous Speed	225 rpm
- Inertia Constant (H)*	3.5 MW/sec/MVA
- Flywheel Effect (WR ²)*	57 x 10 ⁶ lb-ft ²
- Heaviest Lift	780,000 lb

*Including turbine

TABLE 12.8: ASSUMED PROPERTIES FOR STATIC ANALYSES OF WATANA DAM

Material	K	Kur	n	Rf	Kb	m	C				Ko
CORE:											
-- Soft(1)	140	200	300	.8	.6	60	.8	0	35	0	.43
-- Stiff(2)	140	700	800	.35	.8	280	.2	0	35	0	.43
TRANSITION(3)	145	1300	1500	.4	.72	900	.22	0	35	6	.43
SHELLS (4)	145	1800	2000	.4	.67	1300	.16	0	35	6	.43

where:

- = Unit weight, pcf
- K = Modulus number, ksf
- Kur = Elastic unloading modulus number, ksf
- n = Modulus exponent
- Rf = Failure ratio
- Kb = Bulk modulus number, ksf
- m = Bulk modulus exponent
- C = Cohesion, psf
- = Friction angle, degrees
- = Decrease in friction angle perlog cycle increase in ϕ , degrees
- Ko = Earth pressure coefficient

Note: Values taken from Duncan et al., 1980, "Strength, Stress-Strain and Bulk Modulus Parameters for Finite Element Analyses of Stress and Movements in Soil Masses," Report No. UCB/GT/80-01, University of California, Berkeley.

- (1) Mica Creek Dam Core, 2 percent wet of optimum
- (2) Mica Creek Dam Core, 2 percent dry of optimum
- (3) Oroville Dam silty sandy gravel
- (4) Oroville Dam Shell - Amphibolite gravel


TABLE 12.9: WATANA DAM - CREST ELEVATION AND FREEBOARD

<u>River Inflow</u>	<u>1 in 50 Year Storm</u>	<u>1 in 10,000 Year Storm</u>	<u>Probable Maximum Flood</u>
Normal maximum reservoir elevation	2185	2185	2185
Storm surcharge	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>17</u>
Still water elevation	2191	2193	2202
Wave runup allowance	6)	6	NIL
Dry freeboard allowance	<u>3)</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Elevation top of core	2200	2199	2202
Roadway over core	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
Minimum crest elevation	2203	2202	2205
Governing elevation for crest of main dam		2205	
Highest still water level to be 2 feet above fuse plug pilot channel			
Sill of pilot channel in fuse plug		2200	

Note: The above elevations do not include allowances for static settlement and seismic slumping.

TABLE 12.10: RECENT HIGH HEAD FRANCIS TURBINES



Number	Plant	Year of Order	Head (ft)	Output (hp)	Speed (rpm)	Specific Speed (Ns)
1	Albi	1972	1141	49,100	750	25.1
2	Alto Anchicaya	1970	1312	158,000	450	22.6
3	Big Creek	1976	737	50,600	450	26.4
4	El Chocon	1971	192	274,000	88.3	64.7
5	Hendrik-Verwoerd	1972	225	137,000	136.4	57.9
6	Estreito	1970	208	239,000	112.5	69.6
7	Grand Coulee III	1973	285	808,000	72	55.3
8	Grand Coulee IV	1973	285	938,000	85.7	70.9
9	Grimsel II	1974	1502	142,000	750	30.2
10	Harspranget V	1974	338	629,000	107.1	58.6
11	Hermillon	1971	535	82,300	333	37.1
12	Inga II	1972	205	239,000	107.1	67.5
13	Kargamakias	1970	443	185,000	214	45.3
14	Langsan	1972	590	70,500	428	39.1
15	La Suassaz	1970	679	109,000	333	31.7
16	LG-2	1975	450	454,000	133	43.2
17	Libby	1970	300	163,000	128.6	41.5
18	Loentsch	1970	1178	54,200	750	25.3
19	Magisano	1972	1215	52,800	750	24.0
20	Malpaso	1974	313	293,000	128.6	52.9
21	Marimbondo	1972	236	248,000	100	53.8
22	Mica	1975	560	595,000	128.6	36.4
23	Mitta	1971	666	132,000	333.3	35.7
24	New Melones	1974	460	205,000	171.4	36.4
25	Nurek	1970	754	416,000	200	32.6
26	Oldan	1972	827	92,400	500	34.3
27	Passo Fundo	1972	853	151,000	300	25.3
28	Porjus	1971	195	323,000	83.3	65.0
29	Peace River	1971	450	410,000	150	36.9
30	Reza Shah-Kabir	1970	541	373,000	166.7	39.0
31	Ritsem	1973	476	442,000	166.7	49.8
32	Revelstoke	1977	427	664,000	112.5	47.2
33	Salas	1970	862	73,000	500	28.9
34	Salto Osorio	1972	236	212,000	120	59.7
35	Sarelli	1973	1149	65,700	750	28.7
36	Sirikit	1972	277	202,000	125	49.7
37	Sodusu II	1973	1246	55,200	600	19.0
38	Tumut 3	1971	530	379,000	187.5	45.3
39	Ust-Ilim	1972	296	328,000	125	58.5
40	Verbano II	1970	932	84,200	500	28.1
41	Waldeck II	1970	1104	295,000	375	32.0
42	Yarnvagsforsen	1973	278.8	72,900	214.3	50.8



WATANA DIVERSION
TOTAL FACILITY RATING CURVE

FIGURE 12.1






WATANA RESERVOIR FILLING SEQUENCE

FIGURE 12.2






WATANA RESERVOIR
EMERGENCY DRAWDOWN

FIGURE 12.3






WATANA
 COMPARISON OF GRAIN SIZE
 CURVES FOR VARIOUS CORE MATERIALS

FIGURE 12.4






WATANA
 REQUIRED GRAIN SIZE CURVES
 MAIN DAM

FIGURE 12.5






G = 2.71


WATANA
COMPOSITE GRAIN SIZE CURVE - BORROW SITE D

FIGURE 12.6






EARTHQUAKE TIME HISTORY




WATANA - UNIT OUTPUT

FIGURE 12.8





**WATANA - TURBINE PERFORMANCE
(AT RATED HEAD)**



FRANCIS TURBINES
 SPECIFIC SPEED EXPERIENCE CURVE
 FOR RECENT UNITS

FIGURE 12.10



13 - DEVIL CANYON DEVELOPMENT

This section describes the various components of the Devil Canyon development, including diversion facilities, emergency release facilities, main dam, primary outlet facilities, reservoir, main and emergency spillway, saddle dam, the power intake, penstocks, and the powerhouse complex, including turbines, generators, mechanical and electrical equipment, switchyard structures, and equipment and project lands.

A description of permanent and temporary access and support facilities is also included.

13.1 - General Arrangement

The evolution of the Devil Canyon general arrangement is described in Section 10. The Devil Canyon reservoir and surrounding area is shown on Plate 40. The site layout in relation to main access facilities and camp facilities is shown on Plate 72. A more detailed arrangement of the various site structures is presented in Plate 41.

The Devil Canyon dam will form a reservoir approximately 26 miles long with a surface area of 7,800 acres and a total volume of 1,092,000 acre feet at a normal maximum operating elevation of 1455. The operating level of the Devil Canyon reservoir is controlled by the tailwater level of the upstream Watana development. During operation, the reservoir will be capable of being drawn down to a minimum elevation of 1405.

The dam will be a thin arch concrete structure with a crest elevation of 1463 and maximum height of 645 feet. The dam will be supported by mass concrete thrust blocks on each abutment. On the left bank, the lower bedrock surface will require the construction of a substantial thrust block. Adjacent to this thrust block, an earth- and rockfill saddle dam will provide closure to the left bank. The saddle dam will be a central core type generally similar in cross section to the Watana dam. The dam will have a maximum height above foundation level of approximately 245 feet.

During construction, the reservoir will be diverted around the main construction area by means of a single 30-foot-diameter concrete-lined diversion tunnel on the left bank of the river.

A power intake, located on the right bank, will comprise an approach channel in rock leading to a reinforced concrete gate structure. From the intake structure four 20-foot-diameter concrete-lined penstock tunnels will lead to an underground powerhouse complex housing four Francis turbines each with a rated capacity of 150 MW and four semi-umbrella type generators each rated at 180 MVA. Access to the powerhouse complex will be by means of an unlined access tunnel approximately 3,200 feet long as well as by a 950-foot deep vertical access

shaft. Turbine discharge will be conducted to the river by means of a single 38-foot-diameter tailrace tunnel leading from a surge chamber downstream from the powerhouse cavern. Compensation flow pumps at the power plant will ensure suitable flow in the river between the dam and tailrace tunnel outlet portal. A separate transformer gallery just upstream from the powerhouse cavern will house six single-phase 15/345 KV transformers. The transformers will be connected by 345-KV, single-phase, oil-filled cable through a cable shaft to the switchyard at the surface.

The primary outlet facility will consist of seven individual outlet conduits located in the lower part of the main dam. These will be designed to discharge all floods with a frequency of 1:50 years or less. Each outlet conduit will have a fixed-cone valve similar to those provided at Watana to minimize undesirable nitrogen supersaturation in the flows downstream. Flows resulting from floods with a frequency greater than 1:50 years but less than 1:10,000 years will be discharged by a chute spillway on the right bank, also similar in design to that provided for Watana. An emergency spillway on the left bank will provide sufficient additional capacity to permit discharge of the PMF without overtopping the dam.

13.2 - Site Access

(a) Roads

At Devil Canyon the main access road will enter the site from the south. A low level bridge crossing the Susitna River will be located just upstream of the dam. In addition to the main access, several auxiliary roads will be required to the camp, village, tank farm, borrow sites, and construction areas. These roads, with the exception of temporary haul roads, are shown on Plate 72.

The construction roads will be gravel-surfaced roads 40 feet wide with small radius curves. Grades will be limited to 10 percent. Major cut and fill work will be avoided where possible. A gravel pad, approximately five feet thick, will be required for the roads. This will provide a drivable surface and also will protect against settlements and heaving caused by localized permafrost.

(b) Bridges

The existing low level bridge upstream of the dam will be used during abutment excavation. Once construction of the cofferdams is complete, the crests of these structures will be used for river crossing.

After completion of the main dam, the crest of the dam will provide access across the Susitna River.



(c) Airstrip

The permanent airstrip at the Watana site, approximately 30 miles west of the Devil Canyon site, will be used for the Devil Canyon development. The airstrip will be capable of accommodating both C-130 Hercules aircraft, as well as small jet passenger aircraft.

(d) Access Tunnel

An access tunnel will be provided to the underground powerhouse and associated works. The main access tunnel will be unlined and approximately 35 feet wide and 28 feet high. The tunnel will be utilized during construction as the main construction access. Adits will branch off from this tunnel to other areas of underground development.

(e) Access Shaft

A vertical 20-foot diameter access shaft with an elevator will also be provided for access to the underground facilities. The shaft will be sited at the end of the access tunnel.

13.3 - Site Facilities

(a) General

The construction of the Devil Canyon development will require various facilities to support the construction activities throughout the entire construction period. Following construction, the planned operation and maintenance of the development will be centered at the Watana development; therefore, minimum facilities at the site will be required to maintain the power facility.

As described for Watana (Section 12), a camp and construction village will be constructed and maintained at the project site. The camp/village will provide housing and living facilities for 2,300 people during construction. Other site facilities include contractor's work areas, site power, services, and communications. Items such as power and communications and hospital services will also be required for construction operations independent of camp operations.

Buildings used for the Watana development will be used where possible in the Devil Canyon development. Current planning calls for dismantling and reclaiming the site after construction. Electric power will be provided from the Watana development. The salvaged building modules used from the Watana camp/village will be retrofitted from fuel oil heating to electric heat.

(b) Temporary Camp and Village

The proposed location of the camp/village is on the south bank of the Susitna River between the damsite and Portage Creek, approximately 2.5 miles southwest of the Devil Canyon dam (see Plate 72).

The south side of the Susitna was chosen because the main access road is from the south. South-facing slopes will be used for the camp/village location.

The camp will consist of portable woodframe dormitories for single status workers with modular mess halls, recreational buildings, bank, post office, fire station, warehouses, hospital, offices, etc. The camp will be a single status camp for approximately 1,780 workers.

The village, designed for approximately 170 families, will be grouped around a service core containing a school, gymnasium, stores, and recreation area.

The two areas will be separated by approximately 1/2 mile to provide a buffer zone between areas. The hospital will serve both the main camp and the village.

This camp location will be separated from the work areas by approximately a mile. Travel time to the work area will generally be less than 15 minutes.

The camp/village will be constructed in stages to accommodate the peak work force as presented in Table 13.1. Table 13.1 also presents the camp/village facility design numbers. The facilities have been designed for the peak work force plus 10 percent for "turnover". The "turnover" includes provisions or buffers for overlap of workers and vacations. The conceptual layouts for the camp/village are presented in Plates 73 and 74.

(i) Site Preparation

Both the camp and the village areas will be cleared in select areas of topsoil, and the topsoil will be stockpiled for future use in reclamation operations. At the village site, selected areas will be left with trees and natural vegetation intact.

Both the main camp and the village site are in well-drained land with natural slopes of 2 to 3 percent. A granular pad varying in thickness up to 8 feet will be placed in selected areas at the main camp to provide a uniform working surface for erection of the high density housing and service buildings as well as serving as a protective barrier for underlying permafrost. In the village area, a granular pad will be placed only as necessary to support the housing units and to provide a suitable base for construction of the temporary towncenter buildings.

All roadways within the camp/village areas will be flanked by roadside ditches, with CMP culverts carrying water across the intersections. In general, drainage will be through a surface network of ditches. Peripheral ditches will intercept surface flow from adjacent non-cleared land and divert it around the camps.



Runoff will ultimately be directed to existing drainage channels leading to the Susitna River for the village and the main camp.

(ii) Facilities

Construction camp buildings will consist largely of trailer-type factory-built modules assembled at site to provide the various facilities required. The modules will be fabricated with heating, lighting, and plumbing services, interior finishes, furnishings, and equipment. Trailer modules will be supported on timber cribbing or blocking approximately two feet above grade.

Larger structures, such as the central utilities building, gym, and warehouses, will be pre-engineered, steel-framed structures with metal cladding.

The larger structures will be erected on concrete-slab foundations. The slab will be cast on a non-frost susceptible layer at least equal to the thickness of the annual freeze/thaw layer. Heated permawalks will connect the majority of the buildings and dorms.

The various buildings in the camp are identified on Plate 73.

(c) Site Power and Utilities

(i) Power

A 345 kV transmission line and substation will be in service during the construction activities. Two transformers will be installed at the substation to reduce the line voltage to the desired voltage levels. One of these transformers will be the same used during the Watana development.

Power will be sold to the contractors by the Power Authority. The peak demand during construction is estimated at 20 MW for the camp/village and 4 MW for construction requirements for a total of 24 MW. The distribution system for the camp/village will be 4.16 kV.

(ii) Water

The water supply system will serve the entire camp/village and selected contractor's work areas. The water supply system will provide for potable water and fire protection. The estimated peak population to be served will be 2,300 (1,780 in the camp and 520 in the village).

The principal source of water will be the Susitna River. The water will be treated in accordance with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) primary and secondary requirements.

A system of pumps and constructed storage reservoirs will provide the necessary system demand capacity.

The water distribution system will be by a ductile iron pipe system contained in utilidors as described in Section 12.3.

(iii) Wastewater

One waste water collection and treatment system will serve the camp/village. Gravity flow lines with lift stations will be used to collect the wastewater from all of the camp and village facilities. The "in-camp" and "invillage" collection systems will be run through the permawalks and utilidors so that the collection system will always be protected from the elements.

At the village, an aerated collection basin will be installed to collect the sewage. The sewage will be pumped from this collection basin through a force main to the sewage treatment plant.

Chemical toilets located around the site will be serviced by sewage trucks, which will discharge directly into the sewage treatment plant.

The sewage treatment system will be a biological system with lagoons. The system will be designed to meet Alaskan state water law secondary treatment standards. The lagoons and system will be modular to allow for growth and contraction of the camp/village.

The location of the treatment plant is shown on Plates 72 and 73. The location was selected to avoid unnecessary odors in the camp.

The sewage plant will discharge its treated effluent to the Susitna River. All treated sludge will be disposed of in a solid waste sanitary landfill.

(d) Contractor's Area

The contractors on the site will require office, shop and general work areas. Partial space required by the contractors for fabrication shops, storage or warehouses, and work areas will be located on the south side of the Susitna River near the owner/manager's office. Additional space required by the contractor will be in the area between the access road and the camp.



13.4 - Diversion

(a) General

Diversion of the river flow during construction will be through a single 30-foot-diameter concrete-lined diversion tunnel on the south bank. The tunnel will have a horseshoe-shaped cross-section and be 1,490 feet in length. The diversion tunnel plan and profile is shown on Plate 54.

The tunnel is designed to pass a flood with a return frequency of 1:25 years routed through the Watana Reservoir. The peak flow that the tunnel will discharge will be 37,800 cfs. The maximum water surface elevation upstream of the cofferdam will be Elevation 944. A rating curve is presented in Figure 13.1.

(b) Cofferdams

The upstream cofferdam will consist of a zoned embankment founded on a closure dam (see Plate 54). The closure dam will be constructed to Elevation 915 based on a low water elevation of 910 and will consist of coarse material on the upstream side grading to finer material on the downstream side. When the closure dam is completed, a cut-off may be constructed to minimize seepage into the main dam excavation if required. Further investigations in later design studies will be necessary to define the type and properties of river alluvium before a cut-off system can be designed.

Cut-offs commonly used for cofferdams are grout curtains and slurry walls. Whichever method is used will be constructed through the closure dam and alluvium material. The abutment areas will be excavated to sound rock prior to placement of any cofferdam material.

The cofferdam, from Elevation 915 to 947, will be a zoned embankment consisting of a central core, fine and coarse upstream and downstream filters, and rock and/or gravel shells with riprap on the upstream face.

The downstream cofferdam will be a similar closure dam constructed from Elevation 860 to 895, with a cut-off to bedrock, if required.

The upstream cofferdam crest elevation will have a 3 foot freeboard allowance for settlement and wave runup. Under the proposed schedule, the Watana development will be operational when this cofferdam is constructed. Thermal studies conducted show that discharge from the Watana reservoir will be at 34°F when passing through Devil Canyon. Therefore, an ice cover will not form upstream of the cofferdam, and no freeboard allowance for ice will be necessary.

(c) Tunnel Portals and Gates

A gated concrete intake structure will be located at the upstream end of the tunnel (see Plate 55). The portal and gate will be designed for an external pressure (static) head of 250 feet.

Two 30 feet high by 15 feet wide water passages will be formed in the intake structure, separated by a central concrete pier. Gate guides will be provided within the passages for the operation of 30-foot high by 15-foot wide fixed wheel closure/control gates. Each gate, which will be operated by a wire rope hoist in an enclosed housing, will be designed to operate with a 75-foot operating head (Elevation 945).

Stoplog guides will be installed in the diversion tunnel to permit dewatering of the diversion tunnel for plugging operations.

The stoplogs will be in sections to facilitate relatively easy handling, with a mobile crane using a follower beam.

(d) Operation During Diversion

The rating curve for the diversion tunnel is shown in Figure 13.1.

(e) Final Closure and Reservoir Filling

Upon completion of the main dam to a height sufficient to allow ponding to a level above the primary outlet facilities (Section 13.7), the intake gates will be partially closed, allowing for a discharge of minimum environmental flows while raising the upstream water level. Once the level rises above the lower level of discharge valves, the diversion gates will be permanently closed and discharge will be through the 90-inch-diameter fixed cone valves in the dam. The diversion tunnel will be plugged with concrete and curtain grouting performed around the plug. Construction will take approximately 1 year. During this time the reservoir will not be allowed to rise above Elevation 1135.

The filling of the reservoir from this elevation will take approximately 2 to 3 weeks to operating Elevation 1455.

13.5 - Arch Dam

(a) General

The basis for selection of a concrete arch dam for Devil Canyon is presented in detail in Appendix B.

The shape of the canyon gives a crest length-to-height ratio of approximately 2. The proposed height of the dam, at 645 feet, is well within precedent. A list of several comparable large arch dams constructed throughout the world is given in Table 13.2.

The Devil Canyon dam will be designed to withstand dynamic loadings from intense seismic shaking. Examples of high arch dams constructed throughout the world in high earthquake areas include the 741-foot high El Cajon Dam in Honduras, the 696-foot high Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam in Iran, and the 548-foot high Vidraru Arges Dam in Romania. The Vidraru Arges Dam and the 372-foot high Pacoima Dam in California have both withstood high earthquake loadings, with the latter experiencing a peak ground acceleration of between 0.6 to 0.8 g.

Green Lake dam is presently being constructed to a height of 210 feet in Sitka, Alaska.

The design of the arch dam is described in Appendix B.

(b) Location

The arch dam will be located at the upstream entrance of the canyon. Bedrock is well exposed along the gorge walls. Detailed discussion of the rock conditions in the damsite area are presented in the 1980-81 Geotechnical Report (1).

(c) Foundations

The arch dam will be founded on sound bedrock. Approximately 20 to 40 feet of weathered and/or loose rock will be removed beneath the dam foundation. All bedrock irregularities will be removed beneath the foundation to eliminate high stress concentrations within the concrete. During excavation the rock will also be trimmed, as far as is practical, to increase the symmetry of the centerline profile and provide a comparatively uniform stress distribution across the dam. Areas of dikes and the local areas of poorer quality rock will be excavated and supplemented with dental concrete.

The foundation will be consolidation grouted over its entire area, and a double grout curtain up to 300 feet deep will run beneath the dam and its adjacent structures as shown in Plate 51. Grouting will be done from a system of galleries which will run through the dam and into the rock. Within the rock these galleries will also serve as collectors for drainage holes which will be drilled just downstream of the grout curtain and intercept any seepage passing through the curtain.

On the right abutment a mass concrete thrust block will be founded at the end of the dam to match the left block and improve the dam symmetry.

(d) Arch Dam Geometry

The design philosophy of the dam is described in detail in Appendix B and is briefly summarized here. The dam geometry is shown in Plates 47 and 48. The crown section at the center of the river will be of a double curved cupola shape inclined downstream. The static load from the reservoir will be taken primarily in the

arches. The three-dimensional action of the structure will tend to induce tension in the downstream face of the cantilever. This will be offset, however, by the gravity forces of the overhanging section which will also counteract any seismic loadings produced by downstream ground motion.

A two-center configuration will be adopted for the arches to counteract the slight asymmetry of the valley and give a more uniform stress distribution across the dam. The arches will be formed by circles with centers located on the vertical axis plane running along the center of the canyon. The radii of the arches on the right (wider) side of the canyon will be greater than those on the left. The thrust will be directed more nearly normal to the rock abutment rather than parallel to the face, as would occur with a smaller radius arch. The radii of the intrados or downstream face will be smaller than those of the extrados, producing a thickening of the dam at the abutments and reducing stress at the rock/concrete interface and within the abutments.

(e) Thrust Blocks

The thrust blocks are shown on Plate 50. The massive concrete block on the left abutment will be formed to take the thrust from the upper part of the dam above the existing sound rock level. It will also serve as a transition between the concrete dam and the adjacent rockfill saddle dam. The inclined end face of the block will abut and seal against the impervious saddle dam core and be wrapped by the supporting rock shell.

A thrust block will also be formed high on the right abutment at the end of the dam and adjacent to the spillway control structure. This block, which will improve the symmetry of the dam profile, will transmit thrust from the dam through the intake control structure and into the rock.

(f) Construction and Schedule

Placing of concrete for the dam will be completed over a five-year period as described in Section 17. Construction will take place throughout the year with cooling coils built into the concrete to dissipate the heat of hydration and special heating and insulation precautions taken in the winter to prevent excessive cooling of concrete surfaces. Concrete aggregates will be obtained from the alluvial deposits in the terraces upstream of the dam (1).

Concrete will be placed by means of three highlines strung above the dam between the abutments.

13.6 - Saddle Dam

The design philosophy for the saddle dam at Devil Canyon is essentially the same as that for the main dam at Watana described in Section 12.6. The most significant difference is the use of rockfill in the shells instead of river gravels used at Watana. The use of gravels in the

upstream shell at Watana is to minimize settlement of the shell on saturation during filling of the reservoir and to ensure a free draining material. These aspects of the design are not as significant for the much smaller structure at Devil Canyon. The amount of settlement will be less and the drainage paths for the dissipation of any excess pore pressures will be much reduced. Many dams of equal or larger dimensions have been constructed of similar materials and the design is well within precedent.

(a) Proposed Dam Cross Section

Details of the proposed saddle dam are shown in Plate 53. The central vertical core will be protected by fine and coarse filters on both upstream and downstream slopes and supported by gravel and rockfill shells. The core will have a crest width of 15 feet and side slopes of 1H:4V to provide a core thickness to dam height ratio slightly in excess of 0.5.

The wide filter zones will provide sufficient material to seal any cracks which might occur in the core due to settlement or as the result of seismic displacement.

The saturated sections of both shells will be constructed of compacted clean gravel or rockfill, processed to remove fine material in order to minimize pore pressure generation and ensure rapid dissipation during and after a seismic event. Since pore pressures cannot develop in the unsaturated section of the downstream shell, the material in that zone will be unprocessed rockfill from surface or underground excavations.

Protection on the upstream slope will consist of a 10-foot layer of riprap.

(b) Sources of Construction Material

No source of material suitable for the core of the saddle dam has been identified closer than the borrow areas at Watana (Sites D and H)(1). The current proposal is to develop Site D for core material at Watana and, since access roads will be established to that area, the same source will be used for the Devil Canyon core. Investigations to date indicate that suitable core material can be obtained from areas above the Watana reservoir level. In the unlikely event that insufficient material is available from Site D, then Site H would be developed. The in-place volume of core material is 306,000 cubic yards.

The filter material will be obtained from the river deposits (Site G) immediately upstream of the main arch dam at Devil Canyon (1). This area will also be exploited for concrete aggregates. The total volume available in Site G is estimated to be 6 million cubic yards, while the concrete aggregate demand is some 2.7 million cubic yards. The estimated volumes required for the dam are 228,000 and 181,000 cubic yards for the fine and coarse filters, respectively. Surplus material from Site G will be used in the

upstream shell. The balance of the shell material will be rockfill obtained primarily from the excavations for the spillways. The total rockfill required will be approximately 1.2 million cubic yards. The proportion of sound rock suitable for use in the dam, which can be obtained from the excavations, cannot be accurately assessed at this stage, but it is proposed to make up any shortfall by deepening and extending the emergency spillway cut. This will be more economical and environmentally acceptable than developing Quarry Site K, some 2 miles from the damsite (1).

(c) Excavation and Foundation Preparation

The excavation and foundation preparation will be as for the Watana site with all alluvium and other unconsolidated deposits under the dam removed to expose sound bedrock to eliminate any risk of liquefaction of the dam foundation under earthquake loading. Weathered and fractured rock will be removed from beneath the core and filters, and local irregularities in the rock surface either trimmed back or concrete added to provide a suitable contact surface for placing the core.

(d) Grouting and Pressure Relief

The rock foundation will be improved by consolidation grouting over the core contact area and by a grouted cutoff along the centerline of the core. The cutoff at any location will extend to a depth of at least 0.7 of the water head at that location as shown on Plate 51.

A grouting and drainage tunnel will be excavated in bedrock beneath the dam along the centerline of the core and will connect with a similar tunnel beneath the adjacent concrete arch dam. Pressure relief and drainage holes will be drilled from this tunnel and seepage from the drainage system will be discharged into the arch dam drainage system and ultimately downstream below tailwater level.

(e) Impervious Core and Filters

The requirements for impervious core and both fine and coarse filters will be as for the Watana dam (Section 12.6).

(f) Shells

The processed gravel and rockfill to be placed in the saturated zones of the dam will have the same grading as the processed alluvium used at Watana. The maximum size shall not exceed 18 inches and not more than 10 percent of the material shall be finer than 3/8 inch size. This restriction on fine material will not apply to rockfill in the unsaturated zone above Elevation 1375 in the downstream shell.

(g) Freeboard and Superelevation

The highest reservoir level will be Elevation 1466 under maximum probable flood (PMF) flows. At this elevation the fuse plug in the emergency spillway will be breached and the reservoir level will fall to the spillway sill elevation of 1434. The normal maximum pool elevation is 1455.

A minimum freeboard of three feet will be provided for the PMF; hence, the crest of the saddle dam will be Elevation 1469. In addition, an allowance of one percent of the height of the dam will be made for potential settlement of the rockfill shells under seismic loading. An allowance of one foot has been made for settlement of both abutments; hence, the final crest elevations of the saddle dam will be 1470 at the abutments, rising in proportion to the total height of the dam to Elevation 1472 at the maximum section. Under normal operating conditions, the freeboard will range from 15 feet at the abutments to 17 feet at the center of the dam. Further allowances will be made to compensate for static settlement of the dam after completion due to its own weight and the effect of saturation of the upstream shell, which will tend to produce additional breakdown of the rock fill at point contacts. Therefore, one percent of the dam height will be allowed for such settlement, giving a maximum crest elevation on completion of the construction of 1475 at the maximum height, and 1471 at the abutments.

The allowances for post-construction settlement and seismic slumping will be achieved by steepening both slopes of the dam above Elevation 1400. These allowances are considered conservative and should be reviewed as more relevant data are obtained during detailed design studies.

(h) Instrumentation

Instrumentation will be installed within all parts of the dam to provide monitoring during construction as well as during operation. Instruments for measuring internal vertical and horizontal displacements, stresses and strains, and total and fluid pressures, as well as surface monuments and markers similar to those proposed for the Watana dam, will be installed.

(i) Stability Analyses

As at Watana, special precautions have been taken to ensure stability under earthquake loading by the use of processed free draining gravel and rockfill in the saturated zones of the dam, the incorporation of very wide filter zones, and the removal of all unconsolidated natural material from beneath the dam.

Static and dynamic stability analyses of the upstream slopes of the Watana dam (Section 12.6), have confirmed stable slopes under all conditions for a 2.4H:1V upstream slope and a 2H:1V downstream slope.

Since these same slopes have been used for the Devil Canyon saddle dam and the construction materials are essentially similar, it was considered unnecessary to carry out further analysis for the specific details of the saddle dam to confirm feasibility, though such analyses will be required during the final design phase.

13.7 - Primary Outlet Facilities

(a) General

The prime function of the outlet facilities is to provide for discharge through the main dam, in conjunction with the power facilities, of routed floods with up to 1:50 years recurrence period at the Devil Canyon reservoir. This will require a total discharge capacity of 38,500 cfs through the valves. Downstream erosion will be minimal and nitrogen supersaturation of the releases will be restricted as much as possible as in the case of the Watana development. A further function of these releases is to provide an emergency drawdown for the reservoir, should maintenance be necessary on the main dam or low level submerged structures, and also to act as a diversion during the latter part of the construction period as described in Section 13.4.

The facilities will be located in the lower portion of the main dam, as shown on Plate 52, and will consist of seven free discharge valves set in the lower part of the arch dam.

(b) Outlet

The discharge valves will be the fixed-cone type located at two elevations: the upper group, consisting of four 102-inch diameter valves, will be set at Elevation 1050, and the lower group of three 90-inch diameter valves will be set at Elevation 930. The valves will be installed nearly radially (normal to the dam centerline) with the points of impact of the issuing jets staggered as shown in Plate 52.

The fixed-cone valves will be installed on individual conduits passing through the dam, set close to the downstream face, and protected by upstream ring follower gates located in separate chambers within the dam. Monorail hoists will be located above each valve and gate assembly to provide for their withdrawal and maintenance. The gates and valves will be linked by a 20 foot high tunnel running across the dam and into the left abutment where access will be provided by means of a vertical shaft exiting through the thrust block. Although secondary access will be provided via a similar shaft from the right abutment, access and installation are both from the left side.

The valve and gate assemblies will be protected by individual trashracks installed on the upstream face. The racks will be removable along guides running on the upstream dam face. The racks will be raised by a travelling gantry crane operating at deck level. Guides will be installed for the installation of stoplogs, if required, at the upstream face.



(c) Fixed-Cone Valves

The 102-inch diameter valves operating at a gross head of 420 feet and the 90-inch diameter valves operating at a head of 525 feet have been selected to be within current precedent considering the valve size and the static head on the valve. The valves will be located in individually heated rooms and will be provided with electric jacket heaters installed around the cylindrical sleeve of each valve. The valves will be capable of year round operation, although winter operation is not contemplated. Normally, when the valves are closed, the upstream ring follower gates will also be closed to minimize leakage and freezing of water through the valve seats.

The valves will be operated remotely by two hydraulic operators. Operation of the valves will be from either Watana or by local operation.

In sizing the valves it has been assumed that the valve gate opening will be restricted to 80 percent full stroke to reduce possibilities of vibration.

(d) Ring Follower Gates

Ring follower gates will be installed upstream of each valve and will be used:

- To permit inspection and maintenance of the fixed-cone valves;
- To relieve hydrostatic pressure on the valves when they are in the closed position; and
- To close against flowing water in the event of malfunction or failure of the valves.

The ring follower gates will have nominal diameters of 102 and 90 inches and will be of welded or cast steel construction. The gates will be designed to withstand the total static head under full reservoir. Existing large diameter, high head ring follower gates are summarized in Table 12.6.

The design and arrangement of the ring follower gates will be as discussed for Watana in Section 10.8.

(e) Trashracks

A steel trashrack will be installed at the upstream entrance to each water passage to prevent debris from being drawn into the discharge valves. The bar spacing on the racks will be approximately 9 inches. Provision will be made for monitoring head loss across the racks.

(f) Bulkhead Gates

The bulkhead gates will be installed only under balanced head conditions using a gantry crane. The gates will be 13 feet and 11 feet square for the upper and lower valves, respectively.

Each gate will be designed to withstand full differential head under maximum reservoir water level. One gate for each valve size has been assumed. The gates will be stored at the dam crest level.

A temporary cover will be placed in the bulkhead gate check at trashrack level to prevent debris from getting behind the trashracks.

The bulkhead gates and trashracks will be handled by an electric travelling gantry type crane located on the main dam crest at Elevation 1468. The crane and lifting arrangement will have provision for lowering a gate around the curved face of the dam.

13.8 - Main Spillway

(a) General

The main spillway at Devil Canyon will be located on the right side of the canyon (see Plate 56). The upstream control structure will be adjacent to the arch dam thrust block and will discharge down an inclined concrete-lined chute constructed on the steep face of the canyon. The chute will terminate in a flip bucket which will traject flows downstream and into the river.

The right bank location for the spillway facilities is considered preferable to the left because of the better quality of the rock, and better downstream alignment for spillway discharges.

The spillway will be designed to pass the 1:10,000 year routed flood at Watana in conjunction with the outlet facilities. The spillway will have a design capacity of 125,000 cfs discharged over a total head drop of 550 feet. No surcharge will occur above the normal maximum reservoir operating level of 1,455 feet. This discharge will be below the design discharge of 150,000 cfs over 600 feet for the Mica Project in British Columbia, which has operated successfully for a number of years.

(b) Approach Channel and Control Structure

The approach channel will be excavated to a depth of approximately 100 feet in the rock with a width of just over 130 feet and an invert elevation of 1375.

The control structure, as shown in Plate 57, will be a three-bay concrete structure set at the end of the channel. Each bay will incorporate a 56-foot-high by 30-foot-wide gate on an ogee-crested weir and, in conjunction with the other gates, will control the

flows passing through the spillway. The gates will be fixed wheel gates operated by individual rope hoists.

A gallery is provided within the mass concrete weir from which grouting can be carried out and drain holes can be drilled as a continuation of the grout curtain and drain beneath the main dam. The main access route will cross the dam across the control structure deck upstream of the gate tower and bridge structure.

(c) Spillway Chute

The spillway chute will cut across the steep north face of the canyon for a distance of approximately 900 feet, terminating at Elevation 1000. The chute will taper uniformly over its length from 122 feet at the upstream end to 80 feet downstream.

The overburden in the spillway area is expected to be generally less than 10 feet, but local depressions may be encountered up to 50 or 60 feet deep. Where such features extend below excavation grades, they will be excavated to sound rock and filled with concrete as required.

The orientation of the spillway is generally parallel to the strike of the bedding planes, and the stability of the northern excavation face is controlled by the bedding. For stability, the rock will be cut back to an angle of 55° to 60°, or parallel to the rock dip. Minimum rock bolting may be required to prevent slabs of rock spalling off the face in closely jointed areas. Wire mesh will be provided over the majority of the face to control small rock falls.

Joint Set I and the major shears are generally vertically dipping and are perpendicular to the spillway axis and will not effect the stability of slopes or structures.

The chute itself will be concrete-lined with invert and wall slabs anchored back to the rock. The profile of the chute will be such that the invert slabs will be founded on sound rock. Part way down the chute on the side closest to the river, the depth of cut will be insufficient to provide the supporting rock to the slabs. In this area the side wall will take the form of a gravity section over approximately a 200 foot length.

The velocity at the bottom of the chute will be approximately 150 ft/s. In order to prevent cavitation of the chute surfaces, air will be introduced into the discharges. Air will be drawn in along the chute via an underlying aeration gallery and offshoot ducts extending to the downstream side of a raised step running transverse to the chute, similar to that provided at Watana.

Adequate underdrainage of the spillway chute is essential for stability of the structure. Uplift pressure will develop from reservoir seepage under the control structure and from ground water and seepage from the high velocity flows within the spillway itself.

Seepage from the spillway flow will generate high pressure within the rock through cracks in the concrete, and with sudden closing of the spillway gates, residual unbalanced water pressures under the slab will result.

An extensive drainage system is therefore proposed similar to that described for Watana. The dam grout curtain and drainage system is continued under the spillway control structure utilizing a gallery through the rollway. A system of box drains is proposed for the entire length of the spillway under the concrete slab. To avoid blockage of the system by freezing of the surface drains, a 30-foot deep drainage gallery is proposed along the entire length of the spillway. Drain holes from the surface drains will intersect the gallery.

Complete drainage of the underside of the slab cannot be assured, and some freezing or blockage of the drains will occur at times. Additional resistance to uplift pressures must, therefore, be provided by means of rock anchors. To ensure adequate foundation quality for anchorage, consolidation grouting is proposed to a depth of 20 feet. This grouted zone will also restrict seepage below the spillway and improve the deformation characteristics of the flip bucket rock foundation.

Drainage holes drilled into the base of the high rock cuts will ensure increased stability of the excavation.

(d) Flip Bucket

The spillway chute will terminate in a mass concrete flip bucket founded on sound rock at Elevation 1000, approximately 100 feet above the river. The curve of the flow surface of the bucket will be adjusted to confine the issuing discharge, but at present it is assumed to be cylindrical and will be modified at the final design stage following model tests. A grouting/drainage gallery will be provided within the bucket to allow for foundation consolidation and relief of uplift pressures.

The jet issuing from the bucket will be trajected downstream and parallel to the river below.

(e) Plunge Pool

The impact area of the issuing spillway discharge will be limited to the area of the downstream river surface to prevent excessive erosion of the canyon walls. This will be done by modification of the flow surface of the flip bucket as described above. Over this impact area the alluvial material in the riverbed will be excavated down to sound rock to provide a plunge pool in which most of the inherent energy of the discharges will be dissipated, although some energy will already have been dissipated by friction in the chute, and in dispersion and friction through the air.

The river material in the plunge pool area will be excavated to prevent excessive erosion and random downstream deposition of material which might occur if discharges were allowed to form their own pool.

13.9 - Emergency Spillway

(a) General

The emergency spillway will be located on the left side of the river beyond the rockfill saddle dam. It will be set within the rock underlying the left side of the saddle and will continue downstream for approximately 2,000 feet.

An erodible fuse plug, consisting of impervious material and fine gravels, will be constructed at the upstream end and will be designed to wash out when overtopped by the reservoir, releasing floods of up to 160,000 cfs in excess of the combined main spillway and outlet capacities and thus preventing overtopping of the main dam.

(b) Fuse Plug and Approach Channel

The approach channel to the fuse plug will be cut in the rock and will have a width of 310 feet and an invert elevation of 2170. The channel will be crossed by the main access road to the dam on a bridge consisting of concrete piers, precast beams, and an in situ concrete bridge deck. The fuse plug will fill the approach channel and will have a maximum height of 31.5 feet with a crest elevation of 1465.5. The plug will be located on top of a flat-crested weir excavated in the rock and protected with a concrete slab. Since the rock surface slopes steeply at the channel location, it is desirable to keep the spillway chute as narrow as possible to reduce the excavation quality. For this reason a drop section downstream of the plug has been introduced to increase the discharge coefficients at the plug sections and thus enable a reduction in the length of the plug.

The plug will be traversed by a pilot channel with an invert elevation of 1464, and will have a similar zoning to that described in Section 12.10 for Watana.

(c) Discharge Channel

The channel will narrow downstream, discharging into a steep valley tributary above the Susitna River. This channel will rapidly erode under high flows but will serve the purpose of training the initial flows in the direction of the valley.

(d) Geotechnical Considerations

Overburden depth in the area of the emergency spillway will be in the order of 10 to 20 feet in thickness. Local depressions in the rock surface may have greater thicknesses of overburden.

The spillway is generally orientated parallel to the strike of the bedding planes on the northside of the canyon.

The northern excavation faces will therefore be controlled by the dip of the bedding planes which varies from 50° to 60° in this area. The excavation will be cut back parallel to the bedding.

In the area of the fuse plug, the sides of the excavation will be 1H:3V to provide a suitable contact slope for the fuse plug embankment.

No allowance for rock support has been made for the excavation faces of the spillway. In some areas the excavated faces without additional rock bolting will have factors of safety approaching unity, but since this channel will be rarely, if ever, used this risk is considered acceptable. A rock fall into the spillway channel will not endanger equipment or personnel and can be removed if sufficient quantity accumulates to effect water flow in the channel.

The consolidation grouting similar to that required under the core of the saddle dam will be carried out over the foundation area of the fuse plug. This grouting will prevent seepage in the slightly weathered rock under the fuse plug and prevent piping of fines from the core of the plug into open rock fissures.

Rock support with some form of rock bolting may be required on the excavation slope in the vicinity of the bridge upstream of the fuse plug.

13.10 - Devil Canyon Power Facilities

(a) Intake

The intake structure is located on the right bank as shown on Plate 64. Separate intakes are provided for each turbine. Reservoir levels will vary between Elevations 1455 and 1405. Each intake has a single intake gate, a set of steel trashracks, and provision for placing a bulkhead gate upstream from the intake gate. A traveling gantry crane on the intake deck at Elevation 1466 will service all four intakes. The mechanical equipment is described in more detail below.

The intake is located at the end of a 200-foot-long unlined approach channel. The overburden in this area is estimated to be approximately 10 feet deep.

The excavation in rock is up to 170 feet in depth. Since the side excavation slopes are at an angle of 60° to the strike of controlling bedding plane, no major stability problems are expected. Since this is a water channel in which rock falls could obstruct

flow and cause damage to intake structures or power facilities, slopes of 1H:4V are required with an allowance for rock bolting over 25 percent of the face area to achieve a satisfactory factor of safety.

The excavation for the intake structure requires four tunnel portals on 60 foot centers. Rock pillars 32 feet wide and 38 feet deep separate the portals. If Joint Sets II and III are significant in this area, these rock pillars may be unstable. During excavation of the portal by blasting, it is likely that portions of these pillars will be loosened and will have to be removed for safety. Rock bolting at 3 foot centers (high yield bolts 1 inch diameter) over the entire face area of the pillars will be required. Bolts will range in length from 32 feet extending right through the pillar to 50 feet long to anchor the pillar back to sound rock. Concrete will be placed where overexcavation has occurred.

The rock face between intakes will be lined with concrete to stabilize the rock surface. The grout curtain and drainage holes will continue beyond the main dam and beneath this structure.

The drainage holes downstream of the grout curtain will be terminated adjacent to the spillway control structure, since the flow paths in this area of the abutment are considerably longer than under the dam and at low head of water pressure.

(b) Intake Gates

The four power intakes will have a single fixed wheel intake gate with a nominal operating size of 20-feet-wide by 25-feet-high. The gates will have an upstream skinplate and seal and will be operated by hydraulic or wire rope hoists located in heated enclosures immediately below deck level. The gates, which will normally close under balanced head conditions to permit dewatering of the penstock and turbine water passages for turbine inspection and maintenance, will also be capable of closing under their own weight with full flow conditions and maximum reservoir water level in the event of runaway of the turbines. A heated air vent will be provided at the intake deck to satisfy air demand requirements when the intake gate is closed with flowing water conditions.

(c) Intake Bulkhead Gates

One set of intake bulkhead consisting of two gate sections will be provided for closing the intake openings. The gate will be used to permit inspection and maintenance of the intake gate and intake gate guides. The gates will be raised and lowered under balanced water conditions only.

(d) Trashracks

Each of the four intakes will have trashracks at the upstream face. The trashrack will have a bar spacing of about 6 inches and be designed for a maximum differential head of about 20 feet. Each trashrack will be constructed in two sections for removal by means of a follower suspended from the intake gantry crane.

(e) Intake Gantry Crane

A 50-ton capacity (approximately) electrical traveling gantry crane will be provided on the intake deck at Elevation 1466 for handling the trashracks, maintenance gates and intake gates.

13.11 - Penstocks

The power plant will have four penstocks, one for each unit. The maximum static head on each penstock will be 638 feet, as measured from normal maximum operating level (Elevation 1455) to centerline distributor level (Elevation 817). An allowance of 35 percent has been made for pressure rise in the penstock under transient conditions, giving a maximum head of 861 feet. Maximum extreme head, corresponding to maximum reservoir flood level will be 876 feet.

The penstock tunnels are fully concrete-lined except for a 250-foot section upstream of the powerhouse which is steel-lined. The inclined sections of the concrete-lined penstocks will be at 55° to the horizontal.

(a) Steel Liner

The first 50 feet of steel liner immediately upstream of the powerhouse will be designed to resist the full internal pressure. The remainder of the steel liner, extending another 200 feet upstream, will require reduced steel assuming a minimum of rock support in this area. For preliminary design, it is assumed that not more than 50 percent of the design head is taken by the surrounding rock over this transition length.

Beyond the steel liner, the hydraulic loads are taken solely by the rock tunnel with a concrete liner.

The steel liner is surrounded by a concrete infill with a minimum thickness of 24 inches. A preliminary analysis has resulted in an optimum internal diameter of the steel lining of 15 feet, based on the minimum total cost of construction and the capitalized value of energy reduction due to head loss. A tapered steel transition will be provided at the junction between the steel liner and the concrete liner to increase the internal diameter from 15 feet to 20 feet.

(b) Concrete Liner

The thickness of the concrete lining will vary with the design head, with the minimum thickness of lining being 12 inches.

Based on preliminary analyses, the optimum internal diameter of the concrete liner is 20 feet.

(c) Geotechnical Considerations

The penstock tunnels will have the same orientation as the draft tube tunnels.

Since the tunnels will be concrete lined for hydraulic considerations, the initial rock support required will generally be minor. However, for estimating, approximately 12 percent of the tunnel length is assumed to have poor rock quality that will require pattern rock bolting and shotcrete rock support.

The spacing of the tunnels is limited to $2.5D$, center to center, where D is the excavated diameter of the tunnels. For penstock tunnels of 20 foot internal diameter with 2 foot thick concrete lining, the spacing required is 60 feet.

The contact between tunnel crown and concrete tunnel lining will be grouted. Generally, the rock has a high modulus, and deformation of the rock around the penstock will be negligible. Highly fractured zones, however, may require consolidation grouting but this will be in localized areas only.

(d) Grouting and Pressure Relief

A comprehensive pressure relief system is required to protect the underground caverns against seepage from the high pressure penstocks. The system will consist of small diameter boreholes set out in an array to intercept the jointing in the rock.

Grouting round the penstocks will be provided to:

- Fill and seal any voids between the concrete infill and the steel liner or rock which may be left after the concrete placing and curing; and
- Fill joints or fractures in the rock surrounding the penstocks to reduce flow into the pressure relief system and to consolidate the rock.

13.12 - Powerhouse and Related Structures

(a) General

The underground powerhouse complex will be constructed in the right abutment. This will require the excavation of three major caverns (powerhouse, transformer gallery and surge chamber), with

interconnecting rock tunnels for the draft tubes and isolated phase bus ducts.

An unlined rock tunnel will be constructed for vehicular access to the three main rock caverns. A second unlined rock tunnel will provide access from the powerhouse to the foot of the arch dam.

Vertical shafts will be required for personnel access by elevator to the underground powerhouse; for oil filled cable from the transformer gallery; and for surge chamber venting.

The draft tube gate gallery and cavern will be located in the surge chamber cavern, above maximum design surge level.

The general layout of the powerhouse complex is shown on Plates 85, 86 and 87. The transformer gallery will be located upstream of the powerhouse cavern and the surge chamber located downstream of the powerhouse cavern. The spacing between the underground caverns will be at least 1.5 times the main span of the larger excavation.

(b) Layout Considerations

The powerhouse is located underground in the right abutment. Water for power generation is taken from an intake structure to the right of the main spillway, and carried through individual penstocks to the turbines. Water is discharged to the river by a single tailrace tunnel 6800 feet in length. The draft tubes and tailrace tunnel are protected against excessive transient pressure rise by a downstream surge chamber, which also provides storage for the turbine start-up sequence.

The intake structure is designed for a maximum drawdown of 50 feet and is located close to the main arch dam thrust block for ease of access. The powerhouse is located to provide the minimum total length of penstock, assuming an inclination of 55° to the horizontal for the sloping section of penstock. The orientation of the powerhouse has been selected as a compromise between the desired orientation for power flow (E-W) and the geotechnical data on known shear zones and joint sets. Minimum clear spacing between major rock excavations is at least 1.5 times the span of the larger excavation. This is considered a conservative estimate for preliminary design purposes.

The downstream surge chamber will be constructed as close as possible to the powerhouse for maximum protection to the draft tubes under transient load conditions. For this reason the underground transformer gallery will be located upstream from the powerhouse. The rock around the powerhouse cavern and transformer gallery is protected against high pressure seepage from the penstocks by a 200-foot continuous steel-lining and an extensive pressure relief system.

(c) Access Tunnels and Shafts

The 3,000-foot long main access tunnel connects the powerhouse cavern at Elevation 852 with the canyon access road on the right bank. A secondary access tunnel runs from the main powerhouse access tunnel to the foot of the arch dam, for routine maintenance of the fixed cone valves. Branch tunnels from the secondary access tunnel will provide construction access to the lower section of the penstocks at Elevation 820. Separate branch tunnels from the main access tunnel give vehicle access to the transformer gallery at Elevation 896 and the draft tube gate gallery at Elevation 908. The maximum gradient on the permanent access tunnel is 8 percent; the maximum gradient on the secondary access tunnel is 9 percent.

The cross section of the access tunnels is dictated by requirements for construction plant. For preliminary design a modified horseshoe shape 35-feet wide by 28-feet high has been used.

The alignment of the access tunnel parallels Joint Sets II and III (1). Geologic surface mapping indicates that the tunnel may intersect 10 shear zones but only three of these are greater than 10 feet in width. Generally, the rock quality is such that excavation and support are not anticipated to be problems.

Based on borings and mapping, it has been assumed that 8 percent of the tunnel length will be in poor rock with RQDs less than 25 percent. In these zones, it is anticipated that extensive shotcrete and rockbolt support and/or steel sets and in situ concrete lining may be required. Additional support may be required for all junctions depending on local rock conditions.

A minimum rock cover to the tunnel will be 1.5 multiplied by the tunnel span. The side slopes of the portal cut are expected to be 1H:4V with localized support as required. The portal face may be excavated at 1H:10V, requiring more extensive rock bolting.

For final design, detailed mapping of the portal area is required. If possible, for economy of excavation a natural rock face should be selected in the canyon wall for the tunnel portals.

The main access shaft will be located at the north end of the powerhouse cavern, providing personnel access by elevator from the surface. Horizontal tunnels will be provided from this shaft for pedestrian access to the transformer gallery and the draft tube gate gallery. At a higher level, access will also be available to the fire protection head tank.

Access to the upstream grouting gallery will be from the transformer gallery main access tunnel, at a maximum gradient of 13.5 percent.

(d) Powerhouse Cavern

The main powerhouse cavern is designed to accommodate four vertical shaft Francis turbines, in line, with direct coupling to overhung generators. Each unit is rated at 150 MW at 575-foot net head.

The overall height of the cavern is governed by the physical size of the turbine and generator, the design dimensions of the turbine draft tube, the overhead travelling crane clearance and size, and the rise of the roof arch. The unit spacing will be 60 feet with an additional 110-foot service bay at the south end of the powerhouse for routine maintenance and construction erection. The control room will be located at the north end of the main powerhouse floor. The width of the cavern will be sufficient for the physical size of the generator plus galleries for piping, air-conditioning ducts, electrical cables, and isolated phase bus.

Compensation flow of 500 cfs will be required to the river immediately downstream of the arch dam, in order to provide environmental flows along the approximate 7000 foot length of canyon upstream of the tailrace outlet. This flow will be provided by two No. 1300 hp vertical shaft mixed flow pumps, installed in a gallery below the service bay. Each pump is rated at 115,000 gpm at 35-foot head. Water will be taken from the base of the surge chamber and pumped 1000 feet to the dam through a discharge pipe laid partly in the secondary access tunnel and partly in a separate outlet tunnel.

Multiple stairway access points will be available from the powerhouse main floor to each gallery level. Access to the transformer gallery from the powerhouse will be by a tunnel from the access shaft or by a stairway through each of the four bus tunnels. Access will also be available to the draft tube gate gallery by a tunnel from the main access shaft.

A service elevator will be provided for access from the service bay area on the main floor to the machine shop, and the dewatering and drainage galleries on the lower floors. Hatches will be provided through all main floors for installation and routine maintenance of pumps, valves and other heavy equipment using the main powerhouse crane.

(e) Transformer Gallery

The transformers will be located underground in a separate unlined rock cavern, 120 feet upstream of the powerhouse cavern, with four interconnecting tunnels for the isolated phase bus. There will be 12 single-phase transformers in four groups of 3, one group for each generating unit. Each transformer is rated at 13/345, 70 MVA. For increased reliability, one spare transformer and one spare HV circuit will be provided. The station service transformers and the surface facilities transformers will be located in the bus tunnels. Generator excitation transformers will be located on the main powerhouse floor.

High voltage cables will be taken to the surface in two 7.5 foot interval diameter cable shafts, and provision will be made for an inspection hoist in each shaft.

Vehicle access to the transformer gallery will be from the south end via the main powerhouse access tunnel. Personnel access will be from the main access shaft or through each of the four isolated phase bus tunnels.

(f) Surge Chamber

A simple surge chamber will be constructed 120 feet downstream of the powerhouse to control pressure fluctuations in the turbine draft tubes and tailrace tunnel under transient load conditions, and on machine start-up. The chamber will be common to all four draft tubes and the inlet pipe to the compensation flow pumps. The chamber design will be governed by an assumed full load rejection surge and the requirement for incipient stability under part load operation, together with estimated floor levels from the tailwater rating curve.

The draft tube gate gallery and crane will be located in the same cavern, above the maximum anticipated surge level. Access to the draft tube gate gallery will be by a rock tunnel from the main access tunnel. The tunnel will be widened locally for storage of the draft tube gates.

The chamber will be an unlined rock excavation with localized rock support as necessary for stability of the roof arch and walls. The guide blocks for the draft tube gates will be of reinforced concrete anchored to the rock excavation by rock bolts.

(g) Geotechnical Considerations for Powerhouse Caverns

The proposed orientation of the powerhouse cavern has been influenced by the orientation of major Joint Set I and the trend of major shears, which are roughly perpendicular to the long axis of caverns. Joint Sets II and III intersect the cavern at about 35°. This may cause some possible wedge block instability in the cavern, but with the good quality rock condition at depth, this is not expected to be a problem.

Boreholes drilled in the vicinity of the powerhouse showed the rock to be good to excellent quality (1).

It has been assumed, however, for cost estimating that a major shear will intersect the powerhouse cavern requiring substantial support over 10 percent of the cavern length.

Preliminary design indicates that a 6-foot by 6-foot pattern of high yield anchors 25 feet long will be adequate in the cavern roof support.

Rock permeabilities are expected to be low, in the order of 1×10^{-6} cm/s at cavern depth. Minimal seepage into the excavation from the surrounding rock is expected during construction.

The in situ stress of the rock is expected to be low. No evidence has been found to indicate high residual stress. Further investigations are required to determine the rock stress in the powerhouse cavern area for final design. However, it is expected that the in situ stress will not affect orientation of the cavern.

The preliminary design of the caverns has been carried out in the same manner as for Watana.

Grouting and pressure relief will be similar to that described for Watana.

The compensation flow tunnel is orientated at 020° and will be intersected by Joint Sets II and III at 35° . These joint sets are not expected to cause any tunneling instability. The tunnel is similar in size and shape to the main access tunnel and it is expected that the similar rock support will be required.

Since the portal will be in a very steep sided part of the canyon, the exact location can be optimized utilizing the natural rock face so that very little portal excavation is required.

Near the portal, the compensation flow tunnel intersects the right abutment drainage tunnel. Access will be maintained to upstream and downstream portions of the drainage tunnel by a secondary inclined shaft.

(h) Draft Tube Tunnels

The 120° orientation of the draft tube tunnels has been determined from the powerhouse alignment. Joint Sets I, II and III and the major shears all intersect the tunnels at about 50° to the tunnel axis. Little rock support is expected to be required in these tunnels.

The tunnels will be 23 feet in diameter and steel and concrete lined, with the concrete having a thickness of about 2 feet.

Rock support will be required mainly at the junctions with powerhouse and surge chamber, where the two free faces give greatest potential for instability.

The contact between tunnel crown and concrete tunnel lining will be grouted. Consolidation grouting will only be required if a highly fractured zone is encountered.

13.13 - Reservoir

The Devil Canyon reservoir, at a normal operating level of 1455 feet, will be approximately 26 miles long with a maximum width on the order of 1/2 mile. The total surface area at normal operating level is 7800



acres. Immediately upstream of the dam, the maximum water depth will be approximately 580 feet. The minimum reservoir level will be 1405 feet during normal operation, resulting in a maximum drawdown of 50 feet. The reservoir will have a total capacity of 1,090,000 acre feet of which 350,000 acre feet will be live storage.

Filling of the reservoir will result in local slope instability. A reconnaissance mapping program performed for this study identified existing and potential areas of slope instability as well as areas of permafrost. Details of this work are presented in the 1980-81 Geotechnical Report (1).

Prior to reservoir filling, the area below Elevation 1460 will be cleared of all trees and brush. A field reconnaissance of the proposed reservoir area was undertaken. This work included examination of aerial photographs and maps, and a collection of recent forest inventory data from the U.S. Forest Service. As described for the Watana reservoir, most of the vegetation within the reservoir consists of trees with very little undergrowth. The trees are generally small spruce. In the Watana reservoir area, an estimated 3,200,000 cubic feet of wood exists. Approximately 87 percent of the available timber are soft woods.

The steep terrain, moderate-light tree stocking levels, small trees, erosive potential of the reservoir slopes, remoteness, and very restricted access to the reservoirs will affect the choice of harvesting to be utilized for this project.

Present market demand for the timber at Susitna is low; however, the worldwide demand for wood fluctuates considerably. It is anticipated that use of the harvested material would be limited to either sale as wood-waste products or as fuel.

Slash material including brush and small trees, which will be suitable for either of the above uses, will be either burned in a controlled manner consistent with applicable laws and regulations, or hauled to a disposal site. Material placed in disposal areas will be covered with an earthfill cover adequate to prevent erosion and subsequent exposure.

13.14 - Tailrace Tunnel

The tailrace pressure tunnel carries power plant discharge from the surge chamber to the river. The tunnel has a modified horseshoe cross-section with an internal dimension of 38 feet. For preliminary design, it is assumed to be concrete lined throughout with a minimum thickness of 12 inches. The length of the tunnel is 6800 feet.

The size of the tunnel and surge chamber was selected after an economic study of the cost of construction and the capitalized value of average annual energy losses caused by friction, bends and changes of section.

The tailrace portal site will be located at a prominent steep rock face on the right bank of the river. The portal outlet is rectangular in section, which reduces both the maximum outlet velocity (8 ft/s) as well as the velocity head losses. Vertical stoplog guides are provided for closure of the tunnel for tunnel inspection and/or maintenance.

13.15 - Turbines and Generators

(a) Unit Capacity

The Devil Canyon powerhouse will have four generating units with a nominal capacity of 150 MW based on the minimum December reservoir level (Elevation 1405) and a corresponding gross head of 555 feet in the station.

The head on the plant will vary from 555 feet to 605 feet. The maximum unit output will change with head as shown in Figure 13.2.

The rated average operating head for the turbine has been established at 575 feet. Allowing for generator losses, this results in a rated turbine output of 225,000 hp (168 MW) at full gate.

The generator rating has been selected as 180 MVA with a 90 percent power factor. The generators will be capable of continuous operation at 115 percent rated power. Because of the high capacity factor for the Devil Canyon station, the generators will, therefore, be sized on the basis of maximum turbine output at maximum head, allowing for a possible 5 percent addition in power from the turbine. This maximum turbine output (250,000 hp) is within the continuous overload rating of the generator.

(b) Turbines

The turbines will be of the vertical shaft Francis type with steel spiral casing and a concrete elbow type draft tube. The draft tube will have a single water passage (no center pier).

Maximum and minimum heads on the units will be 542 feet and 600 feet, respectively. The full gate output of the turbines will be about 240,000 hp at maximum net head and 205,000 hp at minimum net head. Overgating of the turbines may be possible, providing approximately 5 percent additional power. For preliminary design purposes, the best efficiency (best gate) output of the units has been assumed at 85 percent of the full gate turbine output.

The full gate and best gate efficiencies of the turbines will be about 91 percent and 94 percent, respectively, at rated head. The efficiency will be about 0.2 percent lower at maximum head and 0.5 percent lower at minimum head. The preliminary performance curve for the turbine is shown in Figure 13.3.

A speed of 225 rpm has been selected for the unit for preliminary design purposes. The resulting turbine specific speed (N_s) is 37.9, which is within present day practice for turbines operating under 575 feet head.

On the basis of information from turbine manufacturers and the studies on the power plant layout, the centerline of the turbine distributor has been set at 30 feet below minimum tailwater level. The final setting of the unit will be established in conjunction with the turbine manufacturer after the contract for the supply of the turbine equipment has been awarded.

Because of the relatively short penstocks and the surge tank location immediately downstream from the powerhouse, the hydraulic transient characteristics of the turbines are favorable.

The regulating ratio is above the minimum recommended by the USBR for good regulating. The unit speed rise and penstock capacity pressure rise are within normal accepted values. Because of the relatively short distance between the turbine and the tailrace surge tank and the deep unit setting, no problems with draft tube column separation are expected.

As discussed in Section 12.16 for Watana, the units will be capable of operation from about 50 to 100 percent load. Considerations for draft tube surges and corresponding power swings as mentioned for Watana also will apply to Devil Canyon.

As with Watana, the relationship between generator natural frequency and the possible draft tube surge frequency will require study in later design stages. Because of the high capacity factor for the Devil Canyon units, part load operation for these turbines is not as critical as at Watana; therefore, the possibility of problems with power swings will be less of a concern than at Watana.

(c) Generators

The four generators in the Devil Canyon powerhouse will be of the vertical shaft, overhung semi-umbrella type directly connected to the vertical Francis turbines.

The generators will be similar in construction and design to the Watana generators and the general features described in Section 12.16 for the stator, rotor, excitation system, and other details which apply for the Devil Canyon generators.

The rating and characteristics of the generators are as follows:

Rated Capacity: 180 MVA, 0.9 power factor with overload rating of 115 percent.

Rated Power: 162 MW

Rated Voltage: 15 kV, 3 phase, 60 Hertz
Synchronous Speed: 225 rpm
Inertia Constant: 3.5 MW - Sec/MVA
Short Circuit Ratio: 1.1 (minimum)
Efficiency at Full Load: 98 percent (minimum)

(d) Governor System

A governor system with electric hydraulic governor actuators will be provided for each of the Devil Canyon units. The system will be the same as for Watana.

13.16 - Miscellaneous Mechanical Equipment

(a) Compensation Flow Pumps

The two pumps for providing minimum discharge into the Susitna River between the dam and the tailrace tunnel outlet portal will be vertical mixed flow type located in the powerhouse service bay below the main erection floor, as shown on Plate 66. Each pump will be rated at 250 cfs (115,000 gal/min) at 35 feet total head, and will be driven by 1,400-hp induction motors.

A single pump intake will be located in the surge chamber with an 8-foot-diameter intake tunnel leading to the powerhouse. The intake tunnel will bifurcate into individual pump intake conduits within the powerhouse. The pump discharges will converge into a single pump discharge line.

Butterfly type valves will be installed in the intake and discharge lines of each pump to permit isolation of a pump for inspection and maintenance. Trash screen guides and a trash screen will be provided in the surge chamber at the pump intake. It will be possible to remove the trash screen using the draft tube gate crane discussed below. The width of the guides will be selected so that one of the turbine draft tube gates may be installed in the intake to permit dewatering the pump intake tunnel for inspection and/or maintenance of the tunnel or the intake butterfly valves. Stoplog guides and a set of stoplogs will also be provided at the downstream end of the pump discharge tunnel to allow the discharge tunnel to be dewatered. The stoplogs will be handled with a mobile crane and a follower.

Pumping operation will be continuous; therefore, pumping equipment will be conservatively designed to provide efficient operation with minimal maintenance. Crane access will be provided for the pumps, motors, and valves to permit equipment servicing.

In the detailed design stages, consideration will also be given to turbine-driven rather than electric motor-driven pumps. A header from at least two of the main turbine penstocks would supply water to the turbines, with the turbine draft tubes connected to the pump discharge.

(b) Powerhouse Cranes

Two overhead type powerhouse cranes will be provided at Devil Canyon as at Watana. The estimated crane capacity will be 200 tons.

(c) Draft Tube Gates

Draft tube gates will be provided to permit dewatering of the turbine water passages for inspection and maintenance of the turbines. The arrangement of the draft tube gates will be the same as for Watana, except that only two sets of gates will be provided, each set with two 21-foot-wide by 10.5-foot-high sections. At the time of starting of Unit 1, one gate will be installed in Unit 4 with the other gate available for Unit 1. Bulkhead domes will be installed in Units 2 and 3.

(d) Draft Tube Gate Crane

A crane will be installed in the surge chamber for installation and removal of the draft tube gates. The crane will be either a monorail (or twin monorail) crane or a gantry crane. For the preliminary design, a twin monorail crane of approximately 30-ton capacity has been assumed. The crane will be pendant-operated and have a two point lift. A follower will be used with the crane for handling the gates. The crane runway will be located along the upstream side of the surge chamber and will extend over the intake for the compensation flow pumps, as well as a gate unloading area at one end of the surge chamber.

(e) Miscellaneous Cranes and Hoists

In addition to the powerhouse cranes and draft tube gate cranes, the following cranes and hoists will be provided in the power plant:

- A 5-ton monorail hoist in the transformer gallery for transformer maintenance;
- Small overhead, jib, or A-frame type hoists in the machine shop for handling material; and
- A-frame or monorail hoists in other powerhouse areas for handling small equipment.

(f) Elevators

Access and service elevators will be provided for the power plant as follows:

- Access elevator from the control building to the powerhouse;
- Service elevator in the powerhouse service bay; and
- Inspection hoists in cable shafts.

(g) Power Plant Mechanical Service Systems

The power plant mechanical service systems for Devil Canyon will be essentially the same as discussed in Section 12.17 for Watana, except for the following:

- There will be no main generator breakers in the power plant; therefore, circuit breaker air will not be required. The high-pressure air system will be used only for governor as well as instrument air. The operating pressure will be 600 to 1,000 psig depending on the governor system operating pressure.
- An air-conditioning system will be installed in the powerhouse control room.
- Heating and ventilating will be required for the entrance building to the access shaft in the left abutment.
- For preliminary design purposes, only one drainage and one dewatering sump have been provided in the powerhouse. The dewatering system will also be used to dewater the intake and discharge lines for the compensation flow pumps.

(h) Surface Facilities Mechanical Service Systems

The entrance building above the power plant will have only a heating and ventilation system. The mechanical services in the standby power building will include a heating and ventilation system, a fuel oil system, and a fire protection system, as at Watana.

(i) Machine Shop Facilities

A machine shop and tool room will be located in the powerhouse service bay area to take care of maintenance work at the plant. The facilities will not be as extensive as at Watana. Some of the larger components will be transported to Watana for necessary machinery work.

13.17 - Accessory Electrical Equipment

(a) General

The accessory electrical equipment described below includes the following main electrical equipment:

- Main generator step-up 15/345 kV transformers;
- Isolated phase bus connecting the generator and transformers;
- 345 kV oil-filled cables from the transformer terminals to the switchyard;
- Control systems; and
- Station service auxiliary ac and dc systems.



Other equipment and systems described include grounding, lighting system and communications.

The main equipment and connections in the power plant are shown in the single line diagram, (Plate 70). The arrangement of equipment in the powerhouse, transformer gallery, and cable shafts is shown in Plates 65 to 67.

(b) General Design Considerations for Transformers and HV Connections

(i) General

Twelve single-phase transformers and one spare transformer will be located in the transformer gallery. Each bank of the three single-phase transformers will be connected to one generator by isolated phase bus located in bus tunnels. The HV terminals of the transformer will be connected to the 345 kV switchyard by 345 kV single-phase oil-filled cables installed in 800-foot long vertical shafts. There will be two sets of three single-phase 345 kV oil-filled cables installed in each cable shaft. One additional set will be maintained as a spare three-phase cable circuit in the second cable shaft. These cable shafts will also contain the control and power cables between the powerhouse and the surface control room, as well as emergency power cables from the diesel generators at the surface to the underground facilities.

As described in Section 12.18 for the Watana power plant, a number of considerations led to the choice of the above optimum system of transformation and connections. Different alternative methods and equipment designs were also considered. In summary, these are:

- One transformer per generator versus one transformer for two generators;
- Underground transformers versus surface transformers;
- Direct transformation from generator voltage to 345 kV versus intermediate step transformation to 230 kV or 161 kV, and thence to 345 kV;
- Single phase versus three-phase transformers for each alternative method considered; and
- Oil-filled cable versus solid dielectric cable or SF₆ gas-insulated bus.

Reliability considerations are based on the general reliability requirements for generation and transmission described in Section 15 regarding the forced outage of a single generator, transformer, bus or cable in addition to planned or scheduled outages in a single contingency situation, or a subsequent outage of equipment in the double contingency situation. In the first case, the system should be capable of readjustment after the outage for

loading within normal ratings and, in the second case, within emergency ratings.

The one transformer per generator scheme was selected since the operation of the Devil Canyon power plant will essentially be a continuous base-load type operation; also the smaller number of units at Devil Canyon compared to Watana will allow a transformer gallery of reasonable length for a unit generator-transformer scheme.

As at Watana, transport limitations for both dimensions and weight will preclude the use of the larger size three-phase transformers; hence, single-phase transformers will be used. One distinct advantage of single-phase transformers is that a spare transformer can be provided at a fairly low incremental cost.

For the same reasons as given in Section 12.18 for Watana, surface transformers and the double-step transformation scheme (15/161 kV generator-transformer, 161 kV cable and 161/345 kV auto-transformer at the switchyard) were ruled out. The direct transformation (15/345 kV) scheme with 345 kV oil-filled cables is considered a better overall scheme.

(c) Main Transformers

The transformers will be of the single phase, two-winding, oil-immersed, forced-oil water-cooled (FOW) type. A total of twelve single-phase transformers and one spare transformer will be provided, with rating and characteristics as follows:

Rated capacity:	70 MVA
High Voltage Winding:	345 $\sqrt{3}$ kV, grounded Y
Basic Insulation Level (BIL) of HV Winding:	1300 kV
Low Voltage Winding:	15 kV, Delta
Transformer Impedance:	15 percent

(d) Generator Isolated Phase Bus

Isolated phase bus connections will be located between the generator and the main transformer. The bus will be of the self-cooled, welded aluminum tubular type with design and construction details generally similar to the bus at the Watana power plant. The rating of the main bus is as follows:

Rated current:	9,000 amps
Short circuit current momentary:	240,000 amps
Short circuit current symmetrical:	150,000 amps
Basic Insulation Level (BIL):	150 kV



(e) 345 kV Oil-Filled Cable

The general design considerations leading to the choice of the 345 kV oil-filled cable for the connections between the transformer HV terminals and the 345 kV switchyard at the surface are the same as described in Section 12.18 for the Watana plant.

The cables will be rated for a continuous maximum current of 400 amps at 345 kV +5 percent. The cables will be of single-core construction with oil flowing through a central oil duct within the copper conductor. The cables will be installed in the 800-foot cable shafts from the transformer gallery to the surface. No cable jointing will be necessary for this installation length.

(f) Control Systems

(i) General

The Devil Canyon power plant will be designed to be operated as an unattended plant. The plant will be normally controlled through supervisory control from the Susitna Area Control Center at Watana. The plant will, however, be provided with a control room with sufficient control, indication, and annunciation equipment to enable the plant to be operated during emergencies by one operator in the control room. In addition, for the purpose of testing and commissioning and maintenance of the plant, local control boards will be mounted on the powerhouse floor near each unit.

Automatic load-frequency control of the four units at Devil Canyon will be accomplished through the central computer-aided control system located at the Watana Area Control Center.

The power plant will be provided with "black start" capability similar to that provided at Watana, to enable the start of one unit without any power in the powerhouse or at the switchyard, except that provided by one emergency diesel generator. After the start-up of one unit, auxiliary station service power will be established in the power plant and the switchyard; the remaining generators can then be started one after the other to bring the plant into full output within the hour.

As at the Watana power plant, the control system will be designed to permit local-manual or local-automatic starting, voltage adjusting, synchronizing, and loading of the unit from the powerhouse control room at Devil Canyon.

The protective relaying system is shown in the main single line diagram (Plate 70) and is generally similar to that provided for the Watana power plant.

(g) Station Service Auxiliary AC and DC Systems

(i) AC Auxiliary System

The station service system will be designed to achieve a reliable and economic distribution system for the power plant and the switchyard and surface facilities. The auxiliary system will be similar to that in the Watana power plant except that the switchyard and surface facilities power will be obtained from a 4.16 kV system supplied by two 5/7.5 MVA, OA/FA, oil-immersed transformers connected to generators Nos. 1 and 4, respectively. The 4.16 kV double-ended switchgear will be located in the powerhouse. It will have a normally-open tie breaker which will prevent parallel operation of the two sections. The tie breaker will close on failure of one or the other of the incoming supplies. The 1400 hp compensation flow pumps will be supplied with power directly from the 4.16 kV system. Two 4.16 cables installed in the cable shafts will supply power to the surface facilities.

The 480 V station service system will be exactly similar to the Watana system described in Section 12.18, and will consist of a main 480 V switchgear, separate auxiliary boards for each unit, an essential auxiliaries board, and a general auxiliaries board. The main 480 V switchgear will be supplied by two 2000 kVA, 15,000/480 V grounded wye sealed gas dry-type transformers. A third 2000 kVA transformer will be maintained as a spare.

Two emergency diesel generators, each rated 500 kW, will be connected to the 480 V powerhouse main switchgear and 4.16 kV surface switchboard, respectively. Both diesel generators will be located at the surface.

An uninterruptible high-security power supply will be provided for the supervisory computer-aided plant control systems.

(ii) DC Auxiliary Station Service System

The dc auxiliary system will be similar to that provided at the Watana plant and will consist of two 125 V dc lead-acid batteries. Each battery system will be supplied by a double rectifier charging system. A 48 V dc battery system will be provided for supplying the supervisory and communications systems.

(iii) Black Start Capability

As at the Watana power plant, the Devil Canyon power plant will be provided with "black start" capability which will enable the plant to start up in a completely "blacked out" condition of the power plant and/or the power system.



(h) Other Accessory Electrical Systems

The other accessory electrical systems including the grounding system, lighting system, and powerhouse communications system will be similar in general design and construction aspects to the systems described in Section 12.18 for the Watana power plant.

13.18 - Switchyard Structures and Equipment

(a) Single Line Diagram

The electric system studies recommended a "breaker-and-a-half" single line arrangement. This arrangement was recommended for reliability and security of the power system. Plate 89 shows the details of the switchyard single line diagram.

Devil Canyon will be the main switching station for the generation and transmission system. Five lines will emanate from this switchyard, with three going to Anchorage and two going to Fairbanks.

(i) Control and Metering

All control and metering functions are handled by the Watana control center. The Willow System Center can also initiate a control function through the Watana control center.

(ii) Relay Protection

Relay protection for transmission lines is similar to that described in Section 14.5. Protection for 345 kV cable from the powerhouse is described under Section 12.19.

(b) Switchyard Equipment

The number of 345 kV circuit breakers is determined by the number of elements to be switched such as lines or in-feeds from the powerhouse. Each breaker will be equipped with two disconnect switches to allow safe maintenance.

The auxiliary power for the switchyard will be obtained from the generator bus via a 15 - 4.16 kV transformer and 4.16 kV cable. The voltage will then be stepped down to 480 V for local use.

(c) Switchyard Structures and Layout

The switchyard layout will be based on a conventional outdoor type design. The design adopted for this project will provide a two level bus arrangement. This design is commonly known as a low station profile.



The two-level bus arrangement is desirable because it is less prone to extensive damage in case of an earthquake. Due to the lower heights, it is also easier to maintain.

Although the present studies considered conventional switchyard layouts, it is recommended that gas-insulated station equipment be considered in the design stage. A more detailed discussion is presented in Section 14.

13.19 - Project Lands

Project lands acquired for the project will be the minimum necessary to construct access and site facilities, construct permanent facilities, to clear the reservoir, and to operate the project.

A large amount of public land in the Devil Canyon area is managed by the Bureau of Land Management. There are large blocks of private Native Village Corporation Lands along the river. Other private holdings consist of widely scattered remote parcels. The state has selected much of the federal land in this area and is expected to receive a patent.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Acres American Incorporated, Susitna Hydroelectric Project, 1980-81 Geotechnical Report, prepared for the Alaska Power Authority, February 1982.

TABLE 13.1: WATANA PEAK WORK FORCE AND CAMP/VILLAGE DESIGN POPULATION

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Yearly Peak Force</u>	<u>Camp/Village Design</u>
1992	180	200
1993	730	800
1994	1635	1800
1995	2455	2700
1996	3180	3500
1997	3180	3500
1998	2000	2200
1999	770	850
2000	455	500

TABLE 13.2: ARCH DAM EXPERIENCE

<u>Dam (Year Completed)</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Height ft(m)</u>	<u>Crest Length ft(m)</u>
Inguri (1985)	Georgia, USSR	892 (272)	2,513 (766)
Vaiont (1961)	Veneto, Italy	858 (262)	624 (190)
Mauvoisin (1957)	Valais, Switzerland	777 (237)	1,706 (520)
Chirkei (1975)	North Caucasus, USSR	764 (233)	1,109 (338)
El Cajon (1964)	Yoro/Cortes, Honduras	741 (226)	1,253 (382)
Contra (1965)	Ticino, Switzerland	722 (220)	1,246 (380)
Glen Canyon (1964)	Arizona, USA	710 (216)	1,560 (475)
Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlavi (1963)	Khouzestan, Iran	666 (203)	696 (212)
Almendra (1970)	Salamanca, Spain	662 (202)	1,860 (567)
Vidraru	Arges, Rumania	549 (167)	1,000 (305)
Gokcekaya	Turkey	525 (160)	1,622 (495)
Morrow Point	Colorado	465 (141)	720 (218)
Pacoima	California	372 (113)	589 (180)

TABLE 13.3: PRELIMINARY COMPENSATION FLOW PUMP DATA

Pump

Type	vertical, axial, or mixed flow
Rated head (total dynamic level)	35 ft
Rated discharge	115,000 gal/min
Pump input	1,300 hp
Speed	400 rpm
Impeller diameter	51 in (approx.)

Motor

Type	vertical induction
Rated power	1,400 hp
Speed	400 rpm
Voltage	4,160 V
No. phases	3
Frequency	60 hz

TABLE 13.4: PRELIMINARY UNIT DATA

1 - GENERAL DATA

- Number of units	4
- Nominal unit output	150 MW
- Headwater levels	
- normal maximum	E1 1445
- minimum	E1 1395
- Tailwater levels	
- minimum	E1 847
- normal	EL 849
- maximum	E1 868


2 - TURBINE DATA

- Type	vertical Francis
- Rated net head	575 ft
- Maximum head	600 ft
- Minimum head	542 ft
- Full gate output:	
- at rated level	225,000 hp
- at maximum head	240,000 hp
- at minimum head	205,000 hp
- Best gate output	85% full gate output
- Full gate discharge at rated head	3,790 cfs
- Speed	225
- Specific speed	37.9
- Runner discharge diameter	135 in
- Runaway speed	405 rpm
- Centerline distributor	E1. 817
- Cavitation coefficient (sigma)	0.106

3 - GENERATOR DATA

- Type	vertical semi-umbrella
- Rated output	180 MVA
- Power factor	0.9
- Voltage	15 kV
- Inertia constant (H)*	3.5 MW-sec/MVA
- Synchronous speed	225 rpm
- Flywheel effect (WR ²)*	54 x 10 ⁶ lb-ft ²
- Heaviest lift	750,000 lb


* Including turbine



DEVIL CANYON DIVERSION
RATING CURVE

FIGURE 13.1






DEVIL CANYON - UNIT OUTPUT

FIGURE 13.2





DEVIL CANYON - TURBINE PERFORMANCE
(AT RATED HEAD)

14 - TRANSMISSION FACILITIES

The objective of this section is to describe the studies performed to select a power delivery system from the Susitna River basin generating plants to the major load centers in Anchorage and Fairbanks. This system will be comprised of transmission lines, substations, a dispatch center, and means of communications.

The major topics of the transmission studies include:

- Electric system studies;
- Transmission corridor selection;
- Transmission route selection;
- Transmission towers, hardware and conductors;
- Substations; and
- Dispatch center and communications.

Further discussion of the importance of these studies in determining the method of operation of the Railbelt System is presented in Section 15.

In this section, each of the major topics will be discussed with respect to previous studies, methodology, additional data obtained, and conclusions arising from the studies.

14.1 - Electric System Studies

Transmission planning criteria were developed to ensure the design of a reliable and economic electrical power system, with components rated to allow a smooth transition through early project stages to the ultimate developed potential.

Strict application of optimum, long-term criteria would require the installation of equipment with ratings larger than necessary at excessive cost. In the interest of economy and long-term system performance, these criteria were temporarily relaxed during the early development stages of the project. Although allowing for satisfactory operation during early system development, final system parameters must be based on the ultimate Susitna potential.

The criteria are intended to ensure maintenance of rated power flow to Anchorage and Fairbanks during the outage of any single line or transformer element. The essential features of the criteria are:

- Total power output of Susitna to be delivered to one or two stations at Anchorage and one at Fairbanks;
- "Breaker-and-a-half" switching station arrangements;

- Overvoltages during line energizing not to exceed specified limits;
- System voltages to be within established limits during normal operation;
- Power delivered to the loads to be maintained and system voltages to be kept within established limits for system operation under emergency conditions;
- Transient stability during a 3-phase line fault cleared by breaker action with no reclosing; and
- Where performance limits are exceeded, the most cost effective corrective measures are to be taken.

(a) Existing System Data

Data compiled in a draft report by Commonwealth Associates Inc., (1) Has been used for preliminary transmission system analysis; and (2) Other system data were obtained in the form of single-line diagrams from the various utilities.

(b) Power Transfer Requirements

The Susitna transmission system must be designed to ensure the reliable transmission of power and energy generated by the Susitna Hydroelectric Project to the load centers in the Railbelt area. The power transfer requirements of this transmission system are determined by the following factors:

- System demand at the various load centers;
- Generating capabilities at the Susitna project; and
- Other generation available in the Railbelt area system.

Most of the electric load demand in the Railbelt area is located in and around two main centers: Anchorage and Fairbanks. The largest load center is Anchorage, with most of its load concentrated in the Anchorage urban area. The second largest load center is Fairbanks. Two small load centers (Willow and Healy) are located along the Susitna transmission route. The only other significant load centers in the Railbelt region are Glennallen and Valdez, however, their combined demand is expected to be less than 2 percent of the total Railbelt demand in the foreseeable future. A survey of past and present load demand levels as well as various forecasts of future trends indicates these approximate load levels at the various centers:

<u>Load Area</u>	<u>Percent of Total Railbelt Load</u>
Anchorage - Cook Inlet	78
Fairbanks - Tanana Valley	20
Glennallen - Valdez	2

Considering the geographic location and the currently projected magnitude of the total load in the area, transmission to Glennallen-Valdez is not likely to be economical in the foreseeable future. If it is ever to be economical at all, it would likely be a direct radial extension, either from Susitna or from Anchorage. In either case, its relative magnitude is too small to have significant influence on either the viability or development characteristics of the Susitna project or the transmission from Susitna to the Anchorage and Fairbanks areas.

Accordingly, it has been assumed for study purposes that approximately 80 percent of the generation at Susitna will be transmitted to the Anchorage area and 20 percent to Fairbanks. To account for the uncertainties in future local load growth and local generation development, the Susitna transmission system was designed to be able to transmit a maximum of 85 percent of Susitna generation to Anchorage and a maximum of 25 percent to Fairbanks.

The potential of the Susitna Hydroelectric Project is expected to be developed in three or four stages as the system load grows over the next two decades. The transmission system must be designed to serve the ultimate Susitna development, but staged to provide reliable transmission at every intermediate stage. Present plans call for three stages of Susitna development: 680 MW at Watana in 1993 followed by an additional 340 MW in 1997; and, 600 MW at Devil Canyon in 2002.

Development of other generation resources could alter the geographic load and generation sharing in the Railbelt, depending on the location of this development. However, current studies indicate that no other very large projects are likely to be developed until the full potential of the Susitna project is utilized. The proposed transmission configuration and design should, therefore, be able to satisfy the bulk transmission requirements for at least the next two decades. The next major generation development after Susitna will then require a transmission system determined by its own magnitude and location.

The resulting power transfer requirements for the Susitna transmission system are indicated in Table 14.1.



(c) Transmission Alternatives

Because of the geographic location of the various centers, transmission from Susitna to Anchorage and Fairbanks will result in a radial system configuration. This allows significant freedom in the choice of transmission voltages, conductors, and other parameters for the two line sections, with only limited dependence between them. In the end, the advantages of standardization for the entire system will have to be compared to the benefits of optimizing each section on its own merits. Transmission alternatives were developed for each of the two system areas, including voltage levels, number of circuits required, and other parameters, to satisfy the necessary transmission requirements of each area.

Having established the peak power to be delivered and the distances over which it is to be transmitted, transmission voltages and number of circuits required were determined. To maintain a consistency with standard ANSI voltages used in other parts of the United States, the following voltages were considered for Susitna transmission:

- Watana to Devil Canyon and on to Anchorage: 500 kV or 345 kV
- Devil Canyon to Fairbanks: 345 kV or 230 kV

(i) Susitna to Anchorage

Transmission at either of two different voltage levels (345 kV or 500 kV) could reasonably provide the necessary power transfer capability over the distance of approximately 140 miles between Devil Canyon and Anchorage. The required transfer capability of 1,377 MW is 85 percent of the ultimate generating capacity of 1,620 MW. At 500 kV, two circuits would provide more than adequate capacity. At 345 kV, either three circuits uncompensated or two circuits with series compensation are required to provide the necessary reliability for the single contingency outage criterion. At lower voltages, an excessive number of parallel circuits are required, while above 500 kV, two circuits are still needed to provide service in the event of a line outage.

(ii) Susitna to Fairbanks

Applying the same reasoning used in choosing the transmission alternatives to Anchorage, two circuits of either 230 kV or 345 kV were chosen for the section from Devil Canyon to Fairbanks. The 230 kV alternative requires series compensation to satisfy the planning criteria in case of a line outage.

(iii) Total System Alternatives

The transmission section alternatives mentioned above were combined into five realistic total system alternatives. Three of the five alternatives have different voltages for the two sections. The principal parameters of the five transmission system alternatives analyzed in detail are as follows:

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>Susitna to Anchorage</u>		<u>Susitna to Fairbanks</u>	
	<u>Number of Circuits</u>	<u>Voltage (kV)</u>	<u>Number of Circuits</u>	<u>Voltage (kV)</u>
1	2	345	2	345
2	3	345	2	345
3	2	345	2	230
4	3	345	2	230
5	2	500	2	230

Electric system analyses, including simulations of line energizing, load flows of normal and emergency operating conditions, and transient stability performance, were carried out to determine the technical feasibility of the various alternatives. An economic comparison of transmission system life cycle costs was carried out to evaluate the relative economic merits of each alternative. All five transmission alternatives were found to have acceptable performance characteristics. The most significant difference was that single-voltage systems (345 kV, Alternatives 1 and 2) and systems without series compensation (Alternative 2) offered reduced complexity of design and operation and therefore were likely to be marginally more reliable. The present-worth life cycle costs of Alternatives 1 through 4 were all within one percent of each other. Only the cost of the 500/230 kV scheme (Alternative 5) was 14 percent above the others. A summary of the life cycle cost analyses for the various alternatives is shown in Table 14.2. Full details of the technical and economic comparisons are explained in a separate report (2).

A technical and economic comparison was also carried out to determine possible advantages and disadvantages of HVDC transmission, as compared to an ac system, for transmitting Susitna power to Anchorage and Fairbanks. As outlined in (2), HVDC transmission was found to be technically and operationally more complex as well as having higher life cycle costs.

(d) Configuration at Generation and Load Centers

Interconnections between generation and load centers and the transmission system were developed after reviewing the existing



system configurations at both Anchorage and Fairbanks as well as the possibilities and current development plans in the Susitna, Anchorage, Fairbanks, Willow, and Healy areas.

(i) Susitna Configuration

Preliminary development plans indicated that the first project to be constructed would be Watana with an initial installed capacity of 680 MW, to be increased to 1020 MW in the second development stage. The next project, and the last to be considered in this study, would be Devil Canyon, with an installed capacity of 600 MW.

(ii) Switching at Willow

Transmission from Susitna to Anchorage is facilitated by the introduction of an intermediate switching station. This has the effect of reducing line energizing overvoltages and reducing the impact of line outages on system stability. Willow is a suitable location for this intermediate switching station; in addition, it would make it possible to supply local load when this is justified by development in the area. This local load is expected to be less than 10 percent of the total Railbelt area system load, but the availability of an EHV line tap would definitely facilitate future power supply.

(iii) Switching at Healy

A switching station at Healy was considered early in the analysis but was found to be unnecessary to satisfy the planning criteria. The predicted load at Healy is small enough to be supplied by local generation and the existing 138 kV transmission from Fairbanks.

(iv) Anchorage Configuration

In its 1975 report on the Upper Susitna River Hydroelectric Studies (3), the COE favored a transmission route terminating at Point MacKenzie.

A 1979 report for the Anchorage-Fairbanks Intertie by International Engineering Company, Inc. (4) recommended one circuit from Susitna terminating at Point MacKenzie and another passing through Palmer and Eklutna substations to Anchorage along the eastern side of Knik Arm.

Analysis of system configuration, distribution of loads, and development in the Anchorage area led to the conclusion that a transformer station near Palmer would be of little benefit. Most of the major loads are concentrated in and



around the urban Anchorage area at the mouth of Knik Arm. In order to reduce the length of subtransmission feeders, the transformer stations should be located as close to Anchorage as possible.

The routing of transmission into Anchorage may be chosen from the following three possible alternatives:

- Submarine Cable Crossing From Point MacKenzie to Point Woronzof

This would require transmission through a very heavily developed area. It would also expose the cables to damage by ships' anchors, which has been the experience with existing cables, resulting in questionable transmission reliability.

- Overland Route North of Knik Arm via Palmer

This may be most economical in terms of capital cost in spite of the long distance involved. However, approval for this route is unlikely since overhead transmission through this developed area is considered environmentally unacceptable. A longer overland route around the developed area is considered unacceptable because of the mountainous terrain.

- Submarine Cable Crossing of Knik Arm, In the Area of Lake Lorraine and Six Mile Creek

This option, approximately parallel to the new 230 kV cable under construction for Chugach Electric Association (CEA), includes some 3 to 4 miles of submarine cable and requires a high capital cost. Since the area is upstream from the shipping lanes to the port of Anchorage, it will result in a reliable transmission link, and one that does not have to cross environmentally sensitive conservation areas.

The third alternative is clearly the best of the three options. The details of this configuration are as follows:

- Submarine crossing with three cable circuits;
- Switching station at Knik Arm east terminal;
- Double-circuit, compact, overhead line at 345 kV into Anchorage;
- Major transformer substation near University Substation;

- Routing approximately parallel to CEA's new 230 kV line. An alternative routing may be possible near the Knik Arm shoreline and into Anchorage from the north;
- Tap for supply to Matanuska Electric Association (MEA), with transformation to 115 kV, at Knik Arm east terminal or along transmission route, if preferred; and
- Tap for supply to Anchorage Municipal Light and Power (AML&P), with transformation to 115 kV near AML&P's Generating Station No. 2 or at the transformer station near University Substation.

With this configuration a different option is possible for the submarine cable crossing. To reduce cable costs the crossing could be constructed with two cable circuits plus one spare phase. This option requires a switching station at the west terminal of Knik Arm. A switching station at the west terminal would clearly require increased costs and complications for construction and operation as a result of poor access. It would also require a separate location for the tap to supply MEA.

Plans are presently underway for a bridge crossing at Knik Arm for both railway and road traffic. If these plans should be realized, transmission costs and complications could be significantly reduced by routing the cables across the bridge.

(v) Fairbanks Configuration

Susitna power for the Fairbanks area is recommended to be delivered to a single EHV/138 kV transformer station located at Ester.

(e) Recommended Transmission System

The configuration of the recommended transmission system, (Alternative 2) is shown on the single-line diagram (Figure 14.1). The main characteristics of the recommended system are summarized in Table 14.3.

14.2 - Corridor Selection

(a) Methodology

Development of the proposed Susitna project will require a transmission system to deliver electric power to the Railbelt area. The pre-building of the Intertie system will result in a corridor and route for the Susitna transmission lines between Willow and

Healy. Therefore, three areas require study for corridor selection: the northern area to connect Healy with Fairbanks; the central area to connect the Watana and Devil Canyon damsites with the Intertie; and the southern area to connect Willow with Anchorage.

The corridor selection methodology followed the Susitna study plan formulation and selection methodology. Previous studies, existing data, aerial reconnaissance and limited field studies formed the data base. Using the selection criteria discussed in paragraph (c) below, corridors 3 to 5 miles wide which met these criteria were selected in each of the three study areas. These corridors were then evaluated to determine which ones met the more specific screening criteria (see paragraph (d) below). This screening process resulted in one corridor in each area being designated as the recommended corridor for the transmission line. A more detailed discussion of study methodology and the selection and screening criteria is presented in a separate report (5).

(b) Previous Studies

The two reports reviewed which contained the most information relevant to the transmission line studies were:

- The Upper Susitna River Basin Interim Feasibility Report, prepared by the COE (3), hereafter referred to as the COE report; and
- The Economic Feasibility Study for the Anchorage-Fairbanks Intertie (4), hereafter referred to as the IECO/RWRA report.

The COE report consisted primarily of an evaluation of alternative corridor locations to aid in the selection of those which maximized reliability and minimized costs. Utilizing aerial photographs and existing maps, general corridors connecting the project site with Anchorage and Fairbanks were selected. This study was general in nature and was intended only to demonstrate project feasibility.

The IECO/RWRA report utilized the COE report as background information for both economic feasibility determination and route selection. The corridor selected by IECO/RWRA was very similar to that selected by the COE with further definition. The route selected was based on shortest length, accessibility and environmental compatibility. The report also presented a detailed economic feasibility study for the Anchorage-Fairbanks transmission intertie.

(c) Selection Criteria and Selection Results

(i) Criteria

The objective of the corridor selection conducted by Acres was to select feasible transmission line corridors in each of the three study areas, i.e., northern, central and southern. Technical, economic, and environmental criteria were developed in order to select the most optimum corridors within each of the three areas. These criteria are listed in Table 14.4.

Environmental inventory tables were then compiled for each corridor selected, listing length, number of road crossings, number of river and creek crossings, topography, soils, land ownership/status, existing and proposed development, existing rights-of-way, scenic quality/recreation, cultural resources, vegetation, fish, birds, furbearers, and big game. These tables are included in the Closeout Report.

(ii) Results

Utilizing existing information, 22 corridors were selected based on their ability to meet technical, economic and environmental criteria as listed in Table 14.4.

Three of the corridors are in the southern study area, 15 in the central area, and four in the northern study area. Three of the corridors in the southern study area run in a north-south direction, while one runs northeast to Palmer, then northwest to Willow. Corridors in the central study area are in two general groups: those running from Watana Damsite west to the proposed Intertie, and those running north across the Denali Highway and the Chulitna River. Corridors in the northern study area run either west or east to bypass the Alaskan Range, then proceed north to Fairbanks.

Figures 14.2, 14.3, and 14.4 show the location of these corridors.

(d) Screening Criteria and Screening Results

(i) Criteria

The objective of the screening process was to screen the previously selected corridors to determine which ones best meet the technical, economic, and environmental criteria as listed in Table 14.5. The rationale for selection of these criteria is explained in (5).

In addition to these criteria, each corridor was screened for reliability. Six basic factors were considered:

- Elevation: Lines located at elevations below 4000 will be less exposed to severe wind and ice conditions which can interrupt service.
- Aircraft: Avoidance of areas near aircraft landing and takeoff operations will minimize the risk of power failures.
- Stability: Avoidance of areas susceptible to land, ice, and snow slides will reduce the chance of power failures.
- Topography: Lines located in areas with gentle relief will be easier to construct, repair, and maintain in operation.
- Access: Lines located in reasonable proximity to transportation corridors will be more quickly accessible and, therefore, more quickly repaired if any failures occur.

The screening criteria and reliability factors for each corridor were evaluated utilizing topographic maps, aerial photos, aerial overflights, and published materials. Each corridor was then assigned four ratings (one each for technical, economic and environmental considerations, and one overall summary rating.) Ratings were defined as follows:

- A - recommended
- C - acceptable but not preferred
- F - unacceptable

From the technical point of view, reliability was the main objective. An environmentally and economically sound corridor was rejected if it would be unreliable. Thus, any line which received an F technical rating was assigned a summary rating of F and eliminated from further consideration.

Similarly, because of the critical importance of environmental considerations, any corridor which received an F rating for environmental impacts was assigned a summary rating of F, and eliminated from consideration.

(ii) Results

Table 14.6 summarizes the comparison of the corridors screened in the southern, central and northern study areas. One corridor in each of the three study areas received A

ratings for all three categories. These three corridors, and the rationale for their A ratings, are discussed below. A description of all 22 corridors and the rationale for their ratings is given in (5).

- Southern Study Area

Corridor Two - Willow to Point MacKenzie via Red Shirt Lake

. Description

Corridor ADFC, consisting of Segments ADF and FC (Figure 14.2), commences at the point of intersection with the Intertie in the vicinity of Willow but immediately turns to the southwest, first crossing the railroad, then the Parks Highway, then Willow Creek just west of Willow. The land in the vicinity of this part of the segment is very flat, with wetlands dominating the terrain.

Southwest of Florence Lake, the proposed corridor turns, crosses Rolly Creek, and heads nearly due south, passing through extensive wetlands west and south of Red Shirt Lake. The corridor in this area parallels existing tractor trails and crosses very flat lands with significant amounts of tall-growing vegetation in the better drained locations.

Northwest of Yohn Lake, the corridor segment turns to the southeast, passing Yohn Lake and My Lake before crossing the Little Susitna River. Just south of My Lake, the corridor turns in a southern direction, passing Middle Lake and east of Horseshoe Lake before finally intersecting the existing Beluga 230 kV transmission line at a spot just north of MacKenzie Point. From here, the corridor parallels MacKenzie Point's existing transmission facilities before crossing under Knik Arm to emerge on the eastern shore of Knik Arm in the vicinity of Anchorage, and then on to University Substation. The land in the vicinity of this segment is extremely flat and wet. It supports stands of tall-growing vegetation on the higher or better drained areas.

. Technical and Economical Rating

Corridor ADFC crosses the fewest number of rivers and roads in the southern study area. It has the advantage of paralleling an existing tractor trail for a good portion of its length, thereby reducing the need

for new access roads. Easy access will allow maintenance and repairs to be carried out in minimal time. This corridor also occurs at low elevations and is approximately one-half the length of Corridor One.

- Environmental Rating

This corridor crosses extensive wetlands from Willow to Point Mackenzie. At higher elevations, or in the better drained sites, extensive forest cover is encountered. Good agricultural soils have been identified in the vicinity of this corridor; the state plans an Agricultural Lands Sale for areas to be traversed by this corridor. The corridor also crosses the Susitna Flats Game Refuge. The presence of an existing tractor trail near considerable portions of this corridor diminishes the significance of some of these constraints. Furthermore, its short length, and the fact that it crosses only one river and eight creeks, increases its environmental acceptability.

- Central Study Area

- Corridor One - Watana to Intertie via South Shore, Susitna River

- Description

This corridor, ABCD (Figure 14.3), originates at the Watana Dam site and follows the southern boundary of the river at an elevation of approximately 2,000 feet from Watana to Devil Canyon. From Devil Canyon, the corridor continues along the southern shore of the Susitna River at an elevation of about 1,400 feet to where it connects with the Intertie, assuming the Intertie follows the railroad corridor. The land surface in this area is relatively flat, though incised at a number of locations by tributaries to the Susitna River. The relatively flat hills are covered by discontinuous stands of dense, tall-growing vegetation.

- Technical and Economical Rating

Corridor One is one of the shortest corridors considered. It is approximately 40 miles long, making it economically favorable. No technical restrictions were observed along the entire length of this corridor.

Environmental Rating

Because of its short length, environmental disturbance caused by transmission line construction would be reduced. The more noteworthy constraints are those identified under the categories of land use and vegetation. Corridor One would require the development of a new right-of-way between Watana and Devil Canyon, but would utilize the COE-developed road for access between the Intertie and Devil Canyon. Wetlands and discontinuous forest cover occur in the corridor, especially in the eastern third of the route. Access road development and the associated vegetation clearing present additional constraints to this corridor.

- Northern Study Area

Corridor One - Healy to Fairbanks via Parks Highway

. Description

Corridor One (ABC), consisting of Segments AB and BC, starts in the vicinity of the Healy Power Plant (Figure 14.4). From here, the corridor heads northwest, crossing the existing Golden Valley Electric Association Transmission Line, the railroad, and the Parks Highway before turning to the north and paralleling this road to a point due west of Browne. Here, as a result of terrain features, the corridor turns northeast, crossing the Parks Highway once again as well as the existing transmission line, the Nenana River, and the railroad, and continues to a point northeast of the Clear Missile Early Warning Station (MEWS).

Continuing northward, the corridor eventually crosses the Tanana River east of Nenana, then heads northeast, first crossing Little Goldstream Creek, then the Parks Highway just north of the Bonanza Creek Experimental Forest. Before reaching Ohio Creek, this corridor turns back to the northeast, crossing the old Parks Highway and heading into the Ester Substation west of Fairbanks.

Terrain along this entire corridor segment is relatively flat, with the exception of the foothills north of the Tanana River. Much of the route, especially that portion between the Nenana and the Tanana River crossings, is very broad and flat. It has standing

water during the summer months and, in some places, is overgrown by dense stands of tall-growing vegetation. This corridor segment crosses the heavily wooded foot-hills northeast of Nenana.

An option to the above, not shown in the figures, has been considered, closely paralleling and sharing rights-of-way with the existing Healy-Fairbanks transmission line. While it is usually attractive to parallel existing corridors wherever possible, this option necessitates a great number of road crossings and results in an extended length of the corridor paralleling the Parks Highway. A potentially significant amount of highway-abutting land would be usurped for containment of the right-of-way. The combination of these features precludes this optional corridor from further evaluation.

. Technical and Economical Rating

This corridor crosses the fewest water courses in the northern study area. Although it is approximately four miles longer than Corridor Two, it is technically favored because of the existence of potential access roads for almost the entire length.

. Environmental Rating

Because it parallels an existing transportation corridor for much of its length, this corridor would permit line routing that would avoid most visually sensitive areas. The three proposed road crossings for this corridor (as opposed to the 19 road crossings of the Healy-Fairbanks transmission line) could occur at points where roadside development exists, in areas of visual absorption capability, or in areas recommended to be opened to long-distance views.

Four rivers and 40 creeks with potential for impacts are crossed by this corridor, the fewest number of water courses of any route under consideration in the northern study area. The inactive nest site of a pair of peregrine falcons occurs within this proposed corridor.

As with visual impacts, land use, wildlife, and fishery resource impacts can be lessened through careful route selection and utilization of existing access. Impacts on forest clearing can be lessened through the sharing of existing transmission line corridors.

(e) Conclusions

A review of previous reports, other existing information, and aerial overflights was used to select corridors for consideration in this study. These corridors were screened against certain technical, economic and environmental criteria, resulting in one recommended corridor in each of the southern, central and northern study areas. The corridors shown in Figures 7.1 through 7.8 of the screening are believed to best meet the technical, economic and environmental criteria; therefore, these corridors are the best locations in which to place the Susitna transmission lines.

14.3 - Route Selection

(a) Methodology

After identifying the preferred transmission line corridors, the next step in the route selection process involved the analysis of the data as gathered and presented on the base map. Overlays were compiled so that various constraints affecting construction or maintenance of a transmission facility could be viewed on a single map. The map is used to select possible routes within each of the three selected corridors. By placing all major constraints (e.g., area of high visual exposure, private lands, endangered species, etc.) on one map, a route of least impact was selected. Existing facilities, such as transmission lines and tractor trails within the study area, were also considered during the selection of a least impacted route. Whenever possible, the routes were selected near existing or proposed access roads, sharing whenever possible existing rights-of-way.

The data base used in this analysis was obtained from the following sources:

- An up-to-date land status study;
- Existing aerial photos;
- New aerial photos conducted for selected sections of the previously recommended transmission line corridors;
- Environmental studies including aesthetic considerations;
- Climatological studies;
- Geotechnical exploration;
- Additional field studies; and
- Public opinions.

(b) Selection Criteria

The purpose of this section is to identify three selected routes: one from Healy to Fairbanks, the second from the Watana and Devil Canyon damsites to the intertie, and the third from Willow to Anchorage.



The previously chosen corridors were subject to a process of refining and evaluation based on the same technical, economic, and environmental criteria used in corridor selection (see Table 14.5). In addition, special emphasis was concentrated on the following points:

- Satisfy the regulatory and permit requirements;
- Selection of routing that provides for minimum visibility from highways and homes; and
- Avoidance of developed agricultural lands and dwellings.

(c) Environmental Analysis

The corridors selected were analyzed to arrive at the route width which is the most compatible with the environment and also meet the engineering and economic objectives. The environmental analysis was conducted by the process described below:

(i) Literature Review

Data from various literature sources, agency communications, and site visits were reviewed to inventory existing environmental variables. From such an inventory, it was possible to identify environmental constraints in the recommended corridor locations. Data sources were cataloged and filed for later retrieval.

(ii) Avoidance Routing by Constraint Analysis

To establish the most appropriate location for a transmission line route, it was necessary to identify those environmental constraints that could be impediments to the development of such a route. Many specific constraints were identified during the preliminary screening; others were determined during the 1981 field investigations.

By utilizing information on topography, existing and proposed land use, aesthetics, ecological features, and cultural resources as they exist within the corridors, and by careful placement of the route with these considerations in mind, impact on these various constraints was minimized.

(iii) Base Maps and Overlays

Constraint analysis information was placed on base maps. Constraints were identified and presented on overlays to the base maps. This mapping process involved using both existing information and that acquired through Susitna Project studies. This information was first categorized as to its potential for constraining the development of a

transmission line route within the preferred corridor and then placed on maps of the corridors. Environmental constraints were identified and recorded directly onto the base maps. Overlays to the base maps were prepared indicating the type and extent of the encountered constraints.

Three overlays were prepared for each map: one for visual constraints, one for man-made, and one for biological constraints. These maps are presented as a separate document (6).

(d) Technical and Economic Analysis

Route location objectives are to obtain an optimum combination of reliability and cost with the fewest environmental problems. In many cases, these objectives are mutually compatible.

Throughout the evaluation, much emphasis was made to place the route relatively close to existing surface transportation facilities whenever possible.

The factors that contributed heavily in the technical and economic analysis were: topography, climate and elevation, soils, length, and access roads. Other factors of less importance were vegetation, and river and highway crossings. These factors are detailed in Tables 14.4 and 14.5.

(i) Selection of Alternative Routes

The next step in the route selection process involved the analysis of the data gathered and presented on the base maps. The data were used to select possible routes within each corridor. By placing all major constraints on one map, routes of smallest impacts were selected. Existing facilities, such as transmission lines and tractor trails within the study area, were also taken into consideration during the selection of a least impact route.

(ii) Evaluation of a Primary Route

The evaluation and selection of alternative routes to arrive at a primary route involved a closer examination of each of the possible routes using mapping process and data previously described. Preliminary routes were compared to determine the route of least impact within the primary corridors of each study area. For example, such variables as number of stream and road crossings required were noted. Then, following the field studies and through a comparison of routing data, including the route's total length and its use of existing facilities, one route was designated the

primary route. Land use, land ownership, and visual impacts were key factors in the selection process.

(e) Route Soil Conditions

(i) Description

Baseline geological and geotechnical information has been compiled through photointerpretation and terrain unit mapping (7). The general objective was to document the conditions that would significantly affect the design and construction of the transmission line towers. More specifically, the conditions included the forms of various origins, noting the occurrence and distribution of significant geologic factors such as permafrost, potentially unstable slopes, potentially erodible soils, possible active fault traces, potential construction materials, active floodplains, organic materials, etc.

Work on the airphoto interpretation consisted of several activities culminating in a set of terrain unit maps showing surface materials and geologic features and conditions in the project area.

The first activity consisted of a review of the literature concerning the geology of the Intertie corridors and transfer of the information gained to high-level photographs at a scale of 1:63,000. Interpretation of the high-level photos created a regional terrain framework which assisted in interpretation of the low-level 1:30,000 project photos. Major terrain divisions identified on the high-level photos were then used as an aerial guide for delineation of more detailed terrain units on the low-level photos. The primary effort of the work was the interpretation of over 140 photos covering about 300 square miles of varied terrain. The land area covered in the mapping exercise is shown on map sheets and displayed in detail on photo mosaics (7).

As part of the terrain analysis, the various bedrock units and dominant lithologies were identified using published U.S. Geological Survey reports. The extent of these units was approximately shown on the photographs, and using exposure patterns, shade, texture, and other features of the rock unit as they appeared on the photographs, unit boundaries were drawn.

Physical characteristics and typical engineering properties of each terrain unit were considered and a chart for each corridor was developed. The charts identify the terrain units as they have been mapped and characterize their

properties in numerous categories. This allows an assessment of each unit's influence on various project features.

(ii) Terrain Unit Analysis

The terrain unit is a special purpose term comprising the land forms expected to occur from the ground surface to a depth of about 25 feet.

The terrain unit maps for the proposed Anchorage to Fairbanks transmission line show the aerial extent of the specific terrain units which were identified during the air photo investigation and were corroborated in part by a limited onsite surface investigation. The units document the general geology and geotechnical characteristics of the area.

The north and south corridors are separated by several hundred miles and not surprisingly encounter different geomorphic provinces and climatic conditions. Hence, while there are many landforms (or individual terrain units) that are common to both corridors, there are also some landforms mapped in just one corridor. The landforms or individual terrain units mapped in both corridors were briefly described.

Several of the landforms have not been mapped independently but rather as compound or complex terrain units. Compound terrain units result when one landform overlies a second recognized unit at a shallow depth (less than 25 feet), such as a thin deposit of glacial till overlying bedrock or a mantle of lacustrine sediments overlying till. Complex terrain units have been mapped where the surficial exposure pattern of two landforms are so intricately related that they must be mapped as a terrain unit complex, such as some areas of bedrock and colluvium. The compound and complex terrain units were described as a composite of individual landforms comprising them. The stratigraphy, topographic position, and aerial extent of all units, as they appear in each corridor, were summarized on the terrain unit properties and engineering interpretations chart (7).

(f) Results and Conclusions

A study of existing information and aerial overflights, together with additional aerial coverage, was used to locate the recommended route in each of the southern, central, and northern study areas.

Additional environmental information and land status studies made it possible to align the routes to avoid any restraints.



Terrain unit maps describing the general material expected in the area were prepared specifically for transmission line studies and were used to locate the routes away from unfavorable soil conditions whenever possible.

Figures 1 through 14 in (6) show the selected transmission line route for the three areas of study; namely, the southern study area; the central study area; and the northern study area. As a first step, the 3-to -5-mile-width corridor previously selected for each of the three study areas was narrowed to a half-mile-width corridor based on the previous criteria. The preliminary centerline of the right-of-way is shown in the figures. This centerline represents a right-of-way width of 400 feet. This width is adequate for three, single-circuit, parallel lines with tower structures having horizontal phase spacing of 33 feet. However, between the Devil Canyon damsite and the intertie, the width of the right-of-way is 700 feet which is needed to accommodate five single-circuit lines. Environmental constraint analysis information was placed on base maps and overlays (6).

14.4 - Towers, Foundations and Conductors

A transmission line intertie between Anchorage and Fairbanks is planned by the Power Authority. The intertie will consist of existing lines and a new section between Willow and Healy. The new section will be built to 345 kV standards and will be fully compatible with Susitna requirements.

(a) Transmission Line Towers

(i) Selection of Tower Type

Because of unique soil conditions in Alaska, with extensive regions of muskeg and permafrost, conventional self-supporting or rigid towers will not provide a satisfactory solution for the proposed transmission line.

Permafrost and seasonal changes in the soil are known to cause large earth movements at some locations, requiring towers with a high degree of flexibility and capability for handling relatively large foundation movements without appreciable loss of structural integrity.

The guyed tower is well suited to these conditions. The recommended type of structure for this study is therefore the hinged-guyed steel x-tower (Figure 14.6).

The design features include hinged connections between the leg members and the foundations which, together with the longitudinal guy system, provide for large flexibility combined with excellent stability in the direction of the

line. Transverse stability is provided by the wide leg base which also accounts for relatively small and manageable footing reactions.

The selected tower is rated very favorably concerning reliability, maintenance, construction, economy, and aesthetics.

(ii) Climatic Studies and Loadings

Climatic studies for transmission lines were performed to determine likely wind and ice loads based on historical data. A more detailed study incorporating additional climatic data was performed to confirm or modify the obtained data.

Details of the climatic studies for transmission lines may be found in Appendix A.

The design loads acting on wires and structures are mainly based upon weather conditions. Four cases of loadings were established for the tower design.

(b) Tower Foundations

(i) Geological Conditions

The generalized terrain analysis (7) was conducted to collect geologic and geotechnical data for the transmission line corridors, a relatively large area. The engineering characteristics of the terrain units have been generalized and described qualitatively. When evaluating the suitability of a terrain unit for a specific use, the actual properties of that unit must be verified by onsite subsurface investigation, sampling, and laboratory testing.

The three main types of foundation materials along the transmission line are:

- Good material, which is defined as overburden which permits augered excavation and allows installation of concrete without special form work;
- Wetland and permafrost material which requires special design details; and
- Rock material defined as material in which drilled-in anchors and concrete footings can be used.

Based on aerial, topographic, and terrain unit maps, the following was noted:



- For the southern study area: Wetland and permafrost materials constitute the major part of this area. Some rock and good foundation materials are present in this area in a very small proportion.
- For the central study area: Rock foundation and good materials were observed in most of this study area.
- For the northern study area: The major part of this area is wetland and permafrost materials. Some parts have rock materials.

(ii) Types of Foundations

The recommended two-legged x-frame tower is hinged at the foundation attachment connection for longitudinal freedom and restrained by fore and aft guying to an equalizing yoke. This arrangement will result in relatively smaller loads on the foundations. The recommended types of foundations are shown in Figure 14.7. These are the rock anchor and the pile foundation.

(iii) Design Criteria

The greater part of the combined maximum reactions on a transmission tower footing is usually from temporary loads such as broken wire, wind, and ice. With the exception of heavy-angle, dead-end, or terminal structures, only a part of the total reaction is of a permanent nature. As a consequence, the permissible soil pressure, as used in the design of building foundations, may be considerably exceeded for footing for transmission structures.

The permissible values of soil pressure used in the footing design will depend on the structure and the supporting soil. The basic criterion is that displacement of the footing is not restricted because of the flexibility of the selected x-frame tower and its hinged connection to the footing. The shape and configuration of the selected tower are important factors in foundation considerations.

Loads on the tower consist of vertical and horizontal loads and are transmitted down to the foundation and then distributed to the soil. In a tower placed at an angle or used as a dead-end in the line, the horizontal loads are responsible for a large portion of the loads on the foundation. In addition to the horizontal shear, a moment is also present at the top of the foundation, creating vertical download and uplift forces on the footing.

To select and design the most economical type of foundation for a specific tower location, soil conditions at the site

must be known. Soil investigation will furnish this needed information.

(c) Conductor Requirements

Based on the transmission and power transfer requirements at the various stages of the Susitna development, economic conductor sizes were determined.

The methodology used to obtain the economic conductor size and the results obtained are described elsewhere (8).

When determining appropriate conductor size, the economic conductor is checked for radio interference (RI) and corona performance. If RI and corona performance are within acceptable limits, then the economic conductor size is used. However, where the RI and corona performance are found to be limiting, the conductor selection is based on these requirements.

14.5 - Substations

(a) Recommended System Configurations

In order to ensure the design of a reliable and economic electrical power system for the Railbelt, the electric system studies resulted in a system configuration which is shown in Figure 14.1. The recommended configuration has stations at several locations. The main function of each station is listed below.

- Willow

Intermediate switching of 345 kV transmission to minimize the impact of line outages and facilitate operation; local load can be provided by transformation to 138 kV.

- Knik Arm

Switching of 345 kV transmission from 3 circuits to 2 circuits into Anchorage; local load can be provided by transformation to 115 kV; terminal for submarine cable.

- University

Terminal station for Anchorage, transformation from 345 kV to 230/115 kV.

- Ester

Terminal station for Fairbanks, transformation from 345 kV to 138 kV.



(b) Single Line Diagrams

The electric system studies recommended a "breaker-and-a-half" single line arrangement. This arrangement was recommended for reliability and security of the system. Figure 14.1 shows the single line diagram of the 345 kV transmission system with station configurations at each location.

For further information on single line diagram details see Plates 32, 33, 70, and 71.

(i) Control and Metering

It is proposed to remotely operate all the stations listed above. The control functions, such as closing and opening of circuit breakers, will be initiated from the system control center at Willow. The metering functions will be telemetered to the control center. The system center will monitor equipment status for each station.

The communication medium between the master station and the remote stations will be a microwave system. Enough redundancy will be included in the system to provide highly reliable service. The microwave system will also be used for relay protection.

(ii) 345 kV Relay Protection

The relaying protective schemes proposed for the 345 kV power system are generally in accordance with conventional practices. It is not anticipated, presently, that this project will require any special relaying equipment. Future protective schemes could make use of digital computers. These schemes would be part of an overall computerized system which would involve control, monitoring and protection of the power system. If an integrated system is commercially available at the time of detailed design, it is recommended that such a system should be evaluated for the Susitna project.

The protection philosophy is generally based on dual relaying and the local backup principle. To ensure sound relaying protection, the proposed schemes will provide fault clearance for either of the following contingencies:

- Failure of either the primary or backup relays to operate, or a failure in their secondary and control circuits; or
- Failure of a circuit breaker to interrupt, including a faulted circuit breaker.

A brief description of the proposed protection schemes for various equipment is outlined below.

- Line Protection

For the 345 kV overhead transmission lines, dual primary multi-zone high speed distance protection relays for phase and ground faults are proposed. Microwave will be used for protection signalling between the two ends of a line. It is not proposed to provide high speed single pole automatic reclosing, but delayed three pole auto-reclosing should be considered as an operator's aid to restore a faulted line quickly.

Each section of line from Willow to Knik Arm consists of 36 miles of overhead conductor and 4 miles of submarine cable. It is proposed to protect the cable as part of the overall line distance protection scheme without any provisions for special relays for cable protection.

- Shunt Reactor Protection

Where lines are equipped with shunt reactors, separate protection is provided for the reactors. The protective schemes consist of primary differential relays, backup overcurrent phase fault and neutral ground fault protection, gas pressure, oil level, winding temperature, and overvoltage protection.

- Bus Protection

Differential protection will be provided for each 345 kV bus.

- Transformer Protection

For two winding transformers and autotransformers without a delta tertiary winding, it is proposed to provide a two-winding biased differential relay having a second harmonic restraint. As backup, an overall differential relay is provided. Gas pressure, oil level, winding temperature, and overvoltage protections are also proposed.

For the autotransformer equipped with a loaded tertiary winding, a three-winding biased differential relay is proposed. Additional backup overcurrent relays will also be provided for the tertiary winding.

(c) Station Equipment

The station equipment requirements were determined by the load flow studies and reliability requirements. The breaker-and-a-half arrangement will require 1-1/2 breakers for every element (line or transformer circuit). This will determine the number of breakers required for each station.

The transformer capacities are also determined by the load requirements at each substation shown in Figure 14.1.

(d) Station Layouts

The switchyard layouts are based on a conventional outdoor type design. Figures 14.8, 14.9 and 14.10 indicate the physical layout of the stations. These layouts show the extent of land area required for each station. They also indicate the area required by each voltage level and their location relative to each other. The station geographical orientation was determined by the line entry requirements.

In an area where visual considerations are important, it is essential to maintain a low station profile. The layout adopted for this project will provide a two level bus arrangement. The maximum structure height for 345 kV which only occurs at the line entries will be 75 feet. The bus levels will be at 20 and 35 feet respectively from grade. Figure 14.11 shows a typical elevation of one diameter consisting of three breakers and associated disconnect switches. The tower and bus heights for 230, 138 and 115 kV will be lower; hence, their profile will not be the major factor at any of the stations.

The low profile station is easier to maintain, because crews do not need large cranes or other equipment to deal with extreme heights.

A two level bus arrangement has an added feature which is advantageous in an area prone to earthquakes. The bus structures are lower in height and, hence, less susceptible to damage during an earthquake. A larger station area also permits more space between the major equipment components, thus minimizing the possibility of damage affecting adjacent equipment.

(e) Station Facilities

Although the stations are remotely controlled, each one will be provided with a control building. In some cases, where the land area is large, an additional relay building will be provided. The control building will normally contain all the local control, communication and relaying equipment. Each station will be provided with auxiliary power at 480 V and proper distribution boards. The 480 V ac power will be supplied from the tertiaries on the autotransformers or the local utility.

It should be noted that storage or service buildings will be provided for maintenance purposes.

In the case of Willow, it is recommended that the Energy Management Center be located within the station compound. The service building shown on the same grounds could also be the headquarters

for the maintenance group. This location is close to the major land center at Anchorage and centrally located for the southern area transmission system.

(f) Alternate Station Layout

Although all the studies have been carried out on conventional outdoor stations, there has been considerable development in the last few years in SF₆ gas-insulated equipment. This equipment has been used extensively in substations in urban areas. A gas-insulated substation requires 10 to 15 percent of the area of a conventional substation. The development in this field has been carried up to 800 kV, and hence the Susitna 345 kV is well within the range of experience.

Because of the limited land area required, a gas-insulated station can be conveniently housed in a building. This is an advantage in Alaska where the weather can be severe. Furthermore, enclosing the station will probably create less impact on the environment and visual considerations. Maintenance and equipment repairs will be simpler and faster indoors where the staff will be protected against the weather.

A recent comparison of cost estimates indicated that the capital expenditure for either a conventional or a gas-insulated substation is comparable. It is recommended that SF₆ station equipment should be considered in the detail design phase for Susitna.

14.6 - Dispatch Center and Communications

(a) 1993 Railbelt Power System

The introduction of Susitna hydroelectric power in the Railbelt area will require several hundred miles of transmission lines from the Susitna River basin to Anchorage and Fairbanks. In fact, the ultimate development will require approximately 850 miles of transmission, 5 switchyards and 2 hydro generating stations, one at Watana and one at Devil Canyon. Thermal generation at Fairbanks and Anchorage will remain in operation. The total installed generation capacity will be over 2,000 MW.

To operate such an enlarged Railbelt system, a control system or energy management system (EMS) will be required. This system will insure security of the 345 kV transmission lines and switchyards/substations operations. The system will also exercise remote control and efficient dispatching of the generating units in the Railbelt.

(b) Energy Management System Requirements

To provide an efficient and secure dispatching system for the Railbelt, the following subsystems are proposed:

- Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Subsystem;
- Generation Control Subsystem;
- Power Scheduling and Load Forecasting Subsystem;
- Energy Accounting Subsystem;
- System Security Subsystem; and
- System Support Subsystem.

A detailed description of the functional requirements for each of the above is given in a separate report (8).

(c) Energy Management System Alternatives

An evaluation of alternative system configurations showed that two different approaches to generation control are possible:

- Alternative I provides indirect control of generating units; and
- Alternative II provides direct control of generating units.

To formulate and evaluate these two alternatives, the following criteria were used:

- Configurations must fulfill functional requirements discussed above in paragraph (c);
- Configurations must be technically, economically, and operationally maintainable through the life of the systems (10 to 15 years); and
- Configuration must be technically feasible, as well as proven.

(i) Alternative I System Configuration

The Alternative I system configuration is typical of the present offerings of several EMS equipment manufacturers (see Figure 14.12, EMS Alternative I System Configuration). The configuration is based on the assumptions that:

- An in-plant, computer-based control system, located at Susitna Hydroelectric Control Center, will be provided;
- The Susitna in-plant control system will directly control all hydro generating units and the switching stations at Watana and Devil Canyon. EMS will determine generation participation requirements on the unit level, but the units will be pulsed by the in-plant system. The supervisory control actions for Watana and Devil Canyon generating stations will be initiated at EMS level, but the control functions will be implemented by the in-plant control system;

- The northern and southern computer-based systems will receive generation participation requirements from the EMS, but participation allocation and direct unit pulsing will be accomplished by these systems; and
- EMS will directly monitor and control the following 345 kV substations:
 - . Ester;
 - . Willow;
 - . Knik Arm;
 - . University; and
 - . Others, as required.

(ii) Alternative II System Configuration

The Alternative II system configuration is also typical of present offerings of several EMS equipment manufacturers (see Figure 14.13, EMS Alternative II System Configuration). The configuration is based on the assumptions that:

- An in-plant, computer-based control system, located at Watana, will be provided to monitor generating units performance and control the units;
- All Watana and Devil Canyon generating units will be controlled (raise and lower) directly by EMS from system control center at Willow;
- All northern and southern area generating units will be directly controlled (raise and lower) by EMS, Willow Control Center; and
- The switching stations at Watana and Devil Canyon and the other four 345 kV substations will be directly monitored and controlled by the EMS Control Center.

(d) Communication Requirements

Effective operation of EMS is very dependent on transfer of data and immediate response of supervisory functions such as control and telemetering. Various communication systems to determine the most reliable and cost-effective communication media were evaluated.

Microwave systems are line-of-sight propagation and have an average standard transmission path of approximately 35 to 40 miles in an area of flat terrain. The cost was estimated for approximately 17 towers and repeater stations. A microwave system is recommended for this application.

(e) Control Center Facility

The facility will be the nerve center of the APA power system operations of 345 kV transmission network and the electric power generation. All decisions concerning the operation and maintenance of the power system will be implemented through this complex. The importance of this facility dictates that its location be selected with a great deal of care.

(i) Location of Site

The control center must be located on a site that provides high security against disruption of power system operations by human intervention or by acts of God.

Other factors that have a bearing on the suitability of a site are the availability of land, housing, power and educational facilities. These factors together with transportation accessibility, climatic conditions, centralized location in the power system, and the fact that a major switchyard is already located in the area make it appropriate to recommend Willow as the location for the EMS center.

Willow has additional qualifications as a possible capital site. The Willow center could also be the headquarters for the maintenance staff for the transmission network between Susitna and Anchorage. The Willow site also has flat lands between it and Anchorage which also reinforces the recommendation to use microwave as the communication media.

(ii) Control Center Building

The EMS control center building can be located on the same site as the Willow switchyard. The construction of this building will require special facilities. This is all described in the "Energy Management System (EMS) - System Requirements" report.

Figure 14.14 provides a conceptual layout of the Willow Control Center. This layout is based on a single story building having a total space of 14,500 ft².

(f) Budgetary Cost Estimates

Overall budgetary cost estimates for the development, procurement, system testing, and installation of EMS Alternatives I and II are compared in Table 14.7. Costs for the EMS Control Center and Microwave System are also provided. These costs are representative of what Energy and Control Consultants estimate as the middle price bids for such a project and are given in January, 1982 dollars.

(g) Recommendations

Alternative I, shown in Figure 14.15, is recommended for the Railbelt Energy Management System as the most cost-effective and desirable system approach. Unlike Alternative II, Alternative I system approach allows generation control of the southern (Anchorage) and northern (Fairbanks) areas to remain under their respective utilities. Alternative I also encourages the formation of regional control centers for each area. This is in accordance with the present trend in power system control to decentralize in large geographical areas.

Alternative I is also marginally less costly than Alternative II.

Microwave is recommended as a communicating medium. Once provided, this system will perform the following additional functions:

- Provide a transmission media for protective line relaying; and
- Provide reliable voice communications between the various stations. This is very important in power system operations.

It is recommended that the EMS Control Center be located at Willow within the Willow Switching Station compound. This location has many advantages and is centrally located in the southern Railbelt power system. It would also be reasonable to designate this location as a maintenance center for the transmission system. This area also has room for future expansion. There also appear to be some plans to provide a highway crossing at Knik Arm. If these plans materialize, Willow would only be one hour away by highway from Anchorage.

LIST OF REFERENCES

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- (4) International Engineering Company, Inc., Robert Retherford Associates, Economic Feasibility Study. Prepared for the Alaska Power Authority. December 1979.
- (5) Acres American Incorporated, Susitna Hydroelectric Report - Transmission Line Corridor Screening Closeout Report. Prepared for the Alaska Power Authority. September 1981.
- (6) Acres American Incorporated/Terrestrial Environmental Specialists Inc. Transmission Line Selected Route. Prepared for the Alaska Power Authority. March 1982.
- (7) R&M Consultants Inc., Terrain Analysis of the North and South Intertie Power Transmission Corridors. Prepared for Acres American Incorporated. November 1981.
- (8) Acres American Incorporated, Susitna Hydroelectric Project Electric System Studies. Prepared for the Alaska Power Authority. February 1982.

TABLE 14.1: POWER TRANSFER REQUIREMENTS (MW)

Year	INSTALLED CAPACITY			TRANSFER REQUIREMENT	
	Watana	Devil Canyon	Total Susitna	Susitna to Anchorage	Susitna to Fairbanks
1993	680	--	680	578	170
1997	1020	--	1020	867	255
2002	1020	600	1620	1377	405

TABLE 14.2: SUMMARY OF LIFE CYCLE COSTS

TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVE	1	2	3	4	5
Transmission Lines	1981 \$ x 10 ⁶				
Capital	\$156.70	\$159.51	\$133.96	\$140.94	\$159.27
Land Acquisition	18.73	20.79	18.07	20.13	18.65
Capitalized Annual Charges	127.34	130.14	107.43	112.83	126.91
Capitalized Line Losses	<u>53.07</u>	<u>54.50</u>	<u>64.51</u>	<u>65.82</u>	<u>42.82</u>
Total Transmission Line Cost	\$355.84	\$364.94	\$323.97	\$339.72	\$347.65
Switching Stations					
Capital	\$114.09	\$106.40	\$128.32	\$120.64	\$154.75
Capitalized Annual Charges	<u>121.02</u>	<u>113.30</u>	<u>135.94</u>	<u>128.22</u>	<u>165.02</u>
Total Switching Station Cost	<u>235.11</u>	<u>219.70</u>	<u>264.26</u>	<u>248.86</u>	<u>319.77</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$590.95</u>	<u>\$584.64</u>	<u>\$588.23</u>	<u>\$588.58</u>	<u>\$667.42</u>

TABLE 14.3: TRANSMISSION SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

Line Section	Length (mi)	Number of Circuits	Voltage (kV)	Number & Size of Conductors (kcmil)
Watana to Devil Canyon	27	2	345	2 by 954
Devil Canyon to Fairbanks	189	2	345	2 by 795
Devil Canyon to Willow	90	3	345	2 by 954
Willow to Knik Arm	38	3	345	2 by 954
Knik Arm Crossing*	4	3	345	_____
Knik Arm to University Substation	18	2	345	2 by 1351

*Submarine Cable

TABLE 14.4: TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA
USED IN CORRIDOR SELECTION

Type	Criteria	Selection
1. Technical - Primary	General Location	Connect with Intertie near Gold Creek, Willow, and Healy. Connect Healy to Fairbanks. Connect Willow to Anchorage.
	Elevation	Avoid mountainous areas.
	Relief	Select gentle relief.
	Access	Locate in proximity to existing transportation corridors to facilitate maintenance and repairs.
- Secondary	River Crossings	Minimize wide crossings.
2. Economical - Primary	Elevation	Avoid mountainous areas.
	Access	Locate in proximity to existing transportation corridors to reduce construction costs.
- Secondary	River Crossings	Minimize wide crossings.
	Timbered Areas	Minimize such areas to reduce clearing costs.
	Wetlands	Minimize crossings which require special designs.
3. Environmental		
- Primary	Development	Avoid existing or proposed developed areas.
	Existing Transmission Right-of-Way	Parallel.
	Land Status	Avoid private lands, wildlife refuges, parks.
	Topography	Select gentle relief.
- Secondary	Vegetation	Avoid heavily timbered areas.

TABLE 14.5: TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA
USED IN CORRIDOR SCREENING

Technical

Primary

Topography
Climate and Elevation
Soils
Length

Secondary

Vegetation and Clearing
Highway and River Crossings

Economic

Primary

Length
Presence of Right-of-Way
Presence of Access Roads

Secondary

Topography
Stream Crossings
Highway and Railroad Crossings

Environmental

Primary

Aesthetic and Visual
Land Use
Presence of Existing Right-of-Way
Existing and Proposed Development

Secondary

Length
Topography
Soils
Cultural Reservoir
Vegetation
Fishery Resources
Wildlife Resources

TABLE 14.6: SUMMARY OF SCREENING RESULTS


Corridor	R A T I N G S			Summary
	Env.	Econ.	Tech.	
- Southern Study Area				
(1) ABC'	C	C	C	C
* (2) ADFC	A	A	A	A
(3) AEFC	F	C	A	F
- Central Study Area				
* (1) ABCD	A	A	A	A
(2) ABEC	F	C	C	F
(3) AJCF	C	C	C	C
(4) ABCJHI	F	F	F	F
(5) ABECJHI	F	F	F	F
(6) CBAHI	F	C	F	F
(7) CEBAHI	F	F	C	F
(8) CBAG	F	F	C	F
(9) CEBAG	F	F	C	F
(10) CJAG	F	F	C	F
(11) CJAH	F	C	C	F
(12) JACJHI	F	F	C	F
(13) ABCF	A	C	A	C
(14) AJCD	C	A	A	C
(15) ABECF	F	C	C	F
- Northern Study Area				
* (1) ABC	A	A	A	A
(2) ABDC	C	A	C	C
(3) AEDC	F	C	F	F
(4) AEF	F	C	F	F

A = recommended
 C = acceptable but not preferred
 F = unacceptable

*Indicates selected corridor.

TABLE 14.7: EMS ALTERNATIVES I AND II
COMPARATIVE COST ESTIMATES



	Alternative I	Alternative II
<u>EMS Project</u>		
Hardware	\$ 2,942,000	\$ 3,072,000
Software	3,956,000	4,200,000
Auxiliary	1,210,000	1,350,000
Internal (APA costs)	<u>3,416,000</u>	<u>3,606,000</u>
	\$ 11,524,000	\$ 12,228,000
<u>Susitna In-Plant Control System</u>		
Hardware	\$ 1,131,000	\$ 1,094,000
Software	1,200,000	1,200,000
Auxiliary	750,000	700,000
Internal (APA costs)	<u>1,770,000</u>	<u>1,875,000</u>
	\$ 4,851,000	\$ 4,869,000
<u>Microwave System</u>	\$ 4,920,000	\$ 5,100,000
<u>EMS Control Center Building</u>	\$ <u>3,853,140</u>	\$ <u>3,853,140</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$ 25,148,140</u>	<u>\$ 26,050,140</u>



RAILBELT 345 KV TRANSMISSION SYSTEM SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM

FIGURE 14.1








LEGEND
—— STUDY CORRIDOR
- - - - - INTERTIE
(APPROXIMATE)





ALTERNATIVE TRANSMISSION LINE CORRIDORS
SOUTHERN STUDY AREA



ALTERNATIVE TRANSMISSION LINE CORRIDORS
CENTRAL STUDY AREA

FIGURE 14.3





LEGEND
- - - - - STUDY CORRIDOR
..... INTERTIE (APPROXIMATE)

0 5 10
SCALE IN MILES

ALTERNATIVE TRANSMISSION LINE CORRIDORS
NORTHERN STUDY AREA



FIGURE 14.4






FIGURE 14.5






RECOMMENDED 345 KV TANGENT TOWER




DETAIL A



SECTION A-A




DETAIL B




SECTION B-B

CHAMBER HOLE TO ACCEPT HEAVY DUTY GUY THIMBLE WITH GUY WIRE & PREFORMED GUY ATTACHMENT

X - FRAME GUYED STEEL TOWER




ROCK FOUNDATION



2 EACH, 12" STEEL
H-PILES, 25'-0" LONG


STANDARD FOUNDATION



2 EACH, 12" STEEL
H-PILES, 50' LONG

WET LAND FOUNDATION


TRANSMISSION TOWER FOUNDATION CONCEPTS



WILLOW SWITCHING STATION - GENERAL LAYOUT

FIGURE 14.8







UNIVERSITY SUBSTATION-GENERAL LAYOUT


FIGURE 14.9








ELEVATION A-A




SECTION B-B



345 KV SCHEMATIC




STATIONS TYPICAL ELEVATION-LOW LEVEL BUS ARRANGEMENT



ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, ALTERNATIVE I, SYSTEM CONFIGURATION

FIGURE 14.12






ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, ALTERNATIVE II, SYSTEM CONFIGURATION

FIGURE 14.13






TOTAL: 14,500 SQ. FT.

WILLOW SYSTEM CONTROL CENTER,
FUNCTIONAL LAYOUT

FIGURE 14.14





ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, ALTERNATIVE I,
 CONFIGURATION BLOCK DIAGRAM

FIGURE 14.15



15 - PROJECT OPERATION

This section describes the operation of the Watana and Devil Canyon power plants in the Railbelt electrical system. Under current conditions in the Railbelt, a total of nine utilities share responsibility for generation and distribution of electric power, with limited interconnections. The proposed arrangements for optimization and control of the dispatch of Susitna power to Railbelt load centers is based on the assumption that a single entity would eventually be set up for this purpose. In the year 2010 the projected Railbelt system, with Susitna on line, will comprise:

Coal-fired Steam:	13 MW
Natural Gas GT:	326 MW
Diesel:	6 MW
Natural Gas CC:	317 MW
Hydropower:	<u>1440 MW</u>
Total	2102 MW

It is important to note that the Susitna project will be the single most significant power source in the system. The dispatch and distribution of power from all sources by the most economical and reliable means is therefore essential. The general principles of reliability of plant and system operation, reservoir regulation, stationary and spinning reserve requirements, and maintenance programming are discussed in this section. Estimates of dependable capacity and annual energy production for both Watana and Devil Canyon are presented. Operating and maintenance procedures are described, and the proposed performance monitoring system for the two projects is also outlined.

15.1 - Plant and System Operation Requirements

The main function of system planning and operation control is the allocation of generating plant on a short-term operational basis so that the total system demand is met by the available generation at minimum cost consistent with the security of supply. The objectives are generally the same for long-term planning or short-term operational load dispatching, but with important differences in the latter case. In the short-term case, the actual state of the system dictates system reliability requirements, overriding economic considerations in load dispatching. An important factor arising from economic and reliability considerations in system planning and operation is the provision of stationary reserve and spinning reserve capacity. Figure 15.1 shows the daily variation in demand for the Railbelt system during typical winter and summer weekdays and the seasonal variation in monthly peak demands for estimated loads in a typical year (the year 2000).

15.2 - General Power Plant and System Railbelt Criteria

The following are basic reliability standards and criteria generally adopted in the industry for power systems.

(a) Installed Generating Capacity

Sufficient generating capacity is installed in the system to insure that the probability of occurrence of load exceeding the available generating capacity shall not be greater than one day in ten years (LOLP of 0.1).

(b) Transmission System Capability

The high-voltage transmission system should be operable at all load levels to meet the following unscheduled single or double contingencies without instability, cascading or interruption of load:

- The single contingency situation is the loss of any single generating unit, transmission line, transformer, or bus (in addition to normal scheduled or maintenance outages) without exceeding the applicable emergency rating of any facility.
- The double contingency situation is the subsequent outage of any remaining equipment, line or subsystem without exceeding the short time emergency rating of any facility.

In the single contingency situation, the power system must be capable of readjustment so that all equipment will be loaded within normal ratings, and in the double contingency situation, within emergency ratings for the probable duration of the outage.

During any contingency:

- Sufficient reactive power (MVAR) capacity with adequate controls are installed to maintain acceptable transmission voltage profiles.
- The stability of the power system is maintained without loss of load or generation during and after a three-phase fault, cleared in normal time, at the most critical location.

(c) Summary

Operational reliability criteria thus fall into four main categories:

- (i) Loss-of-load probability (LOLP) of 0.1, or one day in ten years, is maintained for the recommended plan of operation through the year 2010 (Section 6).
- (ii) The single and double contingency requirements are maintained for any of the more probable outages in the plant or transmission system.
- (iii) System stability and voltage regulation are assured from the electrical system studies (Section 14). Detailed

studies for load frequency control have not been performed, but it is expected that the stipulated criteria will be met with the more than adequate spinning reserve capacity with six units at Watana and four units at Devil Canyon.

- (iv) The loss of all Susitna transmission lines on a single right-of-way has a low level of probability as described in Section 18 under Risk Analysis. In the event of the loss of all lines, the hydro plants at Watana and Devil Canyon are best suited to restore power supply quickly after the first line is restored since they are designed for "black start" operation. In this respect, hydro plants are superior to thermal plants because of their inherent black start capability for restoration of supply to a large system.

15.3 - Economic Operation of Units

The Central Dispatch Control Engineer decides which generating units should be operated at any given time. Decisions are made on the basis of known information, including an "order-of-merit" schedule, short-term demand forecasts, limits of operation of units, and unit maintenance schedules.

(a) Merit-Order Schedule

In order to decide which generating unit should run to meet the system demand in the most economic manner, the Control engineer is provided with information of the running cost of each unit in the form of an "order-of-merit" schedule. The schedule gives the capacity and fuel costs for thermal units, and reservoir regulation limits for hydro plants.

(b) Optimum Load Dispatching

One of the most important functions of the Control Center is the accurate forecasting of the load demands in the various areas of the system.

Based on the anticipated demand, basic power transfers between areas and an allowance for reserve, the planned generating capacity to be used is determined, taking into consideration the reservoir regulation plans of the hydro plants. The type and size of the units should also be taken into consideration for effective load dispatching.

In a hydro-dominated power system, such as the Railbelt system would be if Susitna is developed, the hydro unit will take up a much greater part of base load operation than in a thermal dominated power system. The planned hydro units at Watana typically are well suited to load following and frequency regulation of the system and providing spinning reserve. Greater flexibility of operation was a significant factor in the selection of six units of 170 MW capacity at Watana, rather than fewer, larger size units.

(c) Operating Limits of Units

There are strict constraints on the minimum load and the loading rates of machines, and to dispatch load to these machines requires a system wide dispatch program taking these constraints into consideration. In general, hydro units have excellent startup and load following characteristics; thermal units have good part-loading characteristics.

Typical plant loading limitations are given below:

(i) Hydro Units

- Reservoir regulation constraints resulting in not-to-exceed maximum and minimum reservoir levels, daily or seasonally.
- Part loading of units is impossible in the zone of rough turbine operation (typically from above speed-no-load to 50 percent load) due to vibrations arising from hydraulic surges.

(ii) Steam Units

- Loading rates are slow (10 percent per minute).
- The units may not be able to meet a sudden steep rate of rise of load demand.
- Usually have a minimum economic shutdown period (about 3 hours).
- The total cost of using conventional units include banking, raising pressure and part-load operations prior to maximum economic operation.

(iii) Gas Turbines

- Cannot be used as spinning reserve because of very poor efficiency and reduced service life.
- Require 8 to 10 minutes for normal start-up from cold. Emergency start up times are of the order of 5 to 7 minutes.

(d) Optimum Maintenance Program

An important part of operational planning which can have a significant effect on operating costs is maintenance programming. The program specifies the times in the year and the sequence in which plant is released for maintenance. Further details of Watana and Devil Canyon power plant maintenance programs are given in Section 15.8.



15.4 - Unit Operation Reliability Criteria

During the operational load dispatching conditions of the power system, the reliability criteria often override economic considerations in scheduling of various units in the system. Also important in considering operational reliability are system response, load-frequency control, and spinning reserve capabilities.

(a) Power System Analyses

Load-frequency response studies determine the dynamic stability of the system due to the sudden forced outage of the largest unit (or generation block) in the system. The generation and load are not balanced, and if the pick-up rate of new generation is not adequate, loss of load will eventually result from under-voltage and under-frequency relay operation, or load-shedding. The aim of a well-designed high security system is to avoid load-shedding by maintaining frequency and voltage within the specified statutory limits.

(b) System Response and Load-Frequency Control

To meet the statutory frequency requirements, it is necessary that the effective capacity of generating plant supplying the system at any given instant should be in excess of the load demand. In the absence of detailed studies, an empirical factor of 5/3 times the capacity of the largest unit in the system is normally taken as a design criterion to maintain system frequency within acceptable limits in the event of the instantaneous loss of the largest unit. It is recommended that a factor of 1-1/2 times the largest unit size be considered as a minimum for the Alaska Railbelt system, with 2 times the largest unit size as a fairly conservative value (i.e., 300 to 340 MW).

The quickest response in system generation will come from the hydro units. The large hydro units at Watana and Devil Canyon on spinning reserve can respond in the turbining mode within 30 seconds. This is one of the particularly important advantages of the Susitna hydro units. Gas turbines can only respond in a second stage operation within 5 to 10 minutes and would not strictly qualify as spinning reserve. If thermal units are run part-loaded (example, 75 percent), this would be another source of spinning reserve. Ideally, it would be advantageous to provide spinning reserve in the thermal generation as well, in order to spread spinning reserves evenly in the system, with a compromise to economic loading resulting from such an operation.

(c) Protective Relaying System and Devices

The primary protective relaying systems provided for the generators and transmission system of the Susitna project are designed

to disconnect the faulty equipment from the system in the fastest possible time. Independent protective systems are installed to the extent necessary to provide a fast-clearing backup for the primary protective system so as to limit equipment damage, to limit the shock to the system and to speed restoration of service. The relaying systems are designed so as not to restrict the normal or necessary network transfer capabilities of the power system.

15.5 - Dispatch Control Centers

The operation of the Watana and Devil Canyon power plant in relation to the Central Dispatch Center can be considered to be the second tier of a three-tier control structure as follows:

- Central Dispatch Control Center (345 kV network) at Willow: manages the main system energy transfers, advises system configuration and checks overall security.
- Area Control Center (Generation connected to 345 kV system, for example, Watana and Devil Canyon): deals with the loading of generators connected directly to the 345 kV network, switching and safety precautions of local systems, checks security of interconnections to main system.
- District or Load Centers (138 kV and lower voltage networks): generation and distribution at lower voltage levels.

For the Anchorage and Fairbanks areas, the district center functions are incorporated in the respective area control centers.

The details of the Central Dispatch Control Center and of the Watana Area Control Center are given in Section 14. Each generating unit at Watana and Devil Canyon is started up, loaded and operated and shut down from the Area Control Center at Watana according to the loading demands from the Central Dispatch Control Center with due consideration to:

- Watana reservoir regulation criteria;
- Devil Canyon reservoir regulation criteria;
- Turbine loading and de-loading rates;
- Part loading and maximum loading characteristics of turbines and generators;
- Hydraulic transient characteristics of waterways and turbines
- Load-frequency control of demands of the system; and
- Voltage regulation requirements of the system.

The Watana Area Control Center is equipped with a computer-aided control system to efficiently carry out these functions. The computer-aided control system allows a minimum of highly trained and skilled operators to perform the control and supervision of Watana and Devil Canyon plants from a single control room. The data information and retrieval system will enable the performance and alarm monitoring of

each unit individually as well as the plant/reservoir and project operation as a whole.

15.6 - Susitna Project Operation

A reservoir simulation model was used to evaluate the optimum method of operation of the Susitna reservoirs and power plants at Watana and Devil Canyon.

Substantial seasonal as well as over-the-year regulation of the river flow is achieved with the two reservoirs. The simulation of the reservoirs and the power facilities at the two developments was carried out on a monthly basis to assess the energy potential of the schemes, river flows downstream and flood control possibilities with the reservoirs. Details of the computer model are described in Appendix B. The following paragraphs summarize the main features of reservoir operation.

(a) Reservoir Operation

Gross storage volume of the Watana reservoir at its normal maximum operating level of 2185 feet is 9.47 million ac/ft, which is about 1.6 times the mean annual flow (MAF) at the damsite. Live storage in the reservoir is about 4.3 million ac/ft (75 percent of MAF). Devil Canyon reservoir has a gross storage of about 1.1 million ac/ft and live storage of 0.34 million ac/ft.

(b) System Demand and Reservoir Operating Rules

An optimum reservoir operation was established by an iterative process to minimize net system operating costs while maximizing firm and usable energy production. Four alternative operating cases for the Watana reservoir (A, B, C, and D) were selected for study, to define the possible range of operation. Case A represents an optimum power and energy scenario, while Case D reflects a case of "no impact on downstream fisheries" or "avoidance flows". Cases B and C are intermediate levels of power operation and downstream impact. These essentially define monthly minimum flows at Gold Creek that must be maintained while providing energy consistent with other project constraints. For feasibility report purposes, operation model "A" was adopted for project design. Studies with appropriate fisheries mitigation measures were developed based on Case A flows at Gold Creek. Details of the computer simulation runs for energy potential and their impact on project economics may be found in Appendix B. Table 15.1 presents a summary of potential energy generation with different operating rules for Watana and Devil Canyon developments.

(c) Energy Potential of the Watana-Devil Canyon Developments

Average annual energy potential of Watana development is 3460 GWh, and that of Devil Canyon development is 3340 GWh. A frequency

analysis of the river hydrology was made to derive the firm annual energy potential (or the dependable capacity) of the hydro development.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) defines the dependable capacity of hydroelectric plants as: "the capacity which, under the most adverse flow conditions of record can be relied upon to carry system load, provide dependable reserve capacity, and meet firm power obligations taking into account seasonal variations and other characteristics of the load to be supplied" (1). Based on the Railbelt system studies and previous experience on large hydroelectric projects, it was assumed that a dry hydrological sequence with a recurrence period of the order of 1:50 years would constitute an adequate reliability for the Railbelt electrical system.

An analysis of annual energy potential of the reservoirs showed that the lowest annual energy generation has a recurrence frequency of 1 in 300 years (see Figure 15.2). The second lowest annual energy of 5400 GWh has a recurrence frequency of 1 in 70 years. This latter figure has been adopted as the firm energy from the development.

Expressed another way, the firm energy, as defined, may fall short of its value by about 5 percent once in 300 years. This is, again, a conservative interpretation of the FERC definition.

The monthly distribution of firm annual energy as simulated in the reservoir simulation has been used in system generation planning studies. Average monthly energy based on the recorded sequence hydrology is used in the economic analysis.

(d) Reservoir Filling Sequence

Given the relative sizes of the Watana and Devil Canyon reservoirs, it is apparent that the most significant impact on the downstream flow regime will occur during filling of the Watana reservoir. Since this will be the first reservoir filled, careful planning is essential.

(i) Watana Reservoir Impoundment

Minimum monthly flows that must be maintained in the river below the dam during filling were established in consultation with fisheries and other environmental study groups and agencies. Table 15.2 presents the minimum monthly flow that is considered acceptable for river maintenance and fisheries requirements during the filling period. With the above minimum flow requirement, it would take at least 2-1/2 years of average stream flow to fill the reservoir.

It may be noted that the construction of the dam critically controls the reservoir filling in average streamflow years and restricts earlier filling should wet years be experienced. The driest recorded streamflow sequence would extend the filling period by one year (see Figure 12.2).

The filling sequence in the years of average streamflow would allow first power on line by July, 1993. The units could be tested and commissioned prior to this date. A bonus in power and energy could be gained with one or two units installed by July 1992 when the power intake will be submerged sufficiently to allow power generation utilizing the minimum downstream flow requirements.

(ii) Devil Canyon Reservoir

With Watana Reservoir in operation, the filling of the Devil Canyon Reservoir is relatively easily accomplished. Average monthly power flows from Watana between the months October through December in a single year will fill the reservoir while maintaining the minimum downstream flow requirements.

(e) Operating Capabilities of Susitna Units

(i) Turbine Performance

The reservoir operation studies described above show that the Watana plant output may vary anywhere from zero, with the unit at standstill or spinning reserve, to 1,200 MW when the six units are operating under maximum output at maximum head. (Note that there is a limitation in loading of a single unit in the zone of turbine operation from above speed-no-load operation to about 50 percent load). The four units at Devil Canyon have a maximum total output of 700 MW at maximum head.

The operating conditions of the turbines are summarized in Table 15.3.

The turbine design head corresponds to the weighted average head. Based on the predicted daily load curves through the year 2010 and expected reservoir operation, it is expected that each unit at Watana is to supply a load averaging between 196 MW and 100 MW. This is the load which corresponds most closely to the best efficiency operation of the turbine.

Similarly, the Devil Canyon units will supply a load between 174 MW and 100 MW.

(ii) Expected Unit Performance Characteristics

The rated output of the turbine corresponds to full gate operation at the rated head. Each turbine should operate satisfactorily at the maximum head. The output of the generator is limited by its continuous maximum rating of 115 percent with a maximum temperature rise of 80°C. The continuous maximum rating of the generator determines the maximum output of the unit, and it will be necessary to limit the turbine output to this value at the higher heads.

The plant efficiency with different numbers of units in operation is shown in Figures 15.3 and 15.4. In practice, the load following requirements of the plant results in widely varying loading, however, because of the multiple unit installation, the efficiency is relatively constant.

(iii) Stability and Governing of Units

Electrical transient stability studies of the Railbelt system indicate that the "natural" inertia of 3.2 to 3.5 kW-sec/KVA for the Watana and Devil Canyon generators is adequate for electrical stability of the system.

The pertinent plant data for stability and governing are given in Sections 12 and 13 for Watana and Devil Canyon plant, respectively.

Pressure rise and speed rise are within normally acceptable limits of about 40 to 50 percent. A low ratio of the starting time of the water masses to the mechanical starting time of the unit is an indication of the hydraulic stability and acceptable response (promptitude time constant) of the governor. Good governing response and stability are indicated for the Watana and Devil Canyon units and are important from the overall considerations of system load following and load-frequency response of the units.

(f) Watana Plant Daily Simulation Studies

The objective of the plant daily simulation studies is to present performance studies of the selected 6-170 MW unit plant at Watana. The studies demonstrate its improved performance in comparison with a 4-250 MW plant. The simulation program was arranged to:

- Study the operation and load following characteristics of the Watana powerplant with different number and rating of units;
- Determine the effect of minimum and maximum loading constraints of the units;

- Determine the effect of critical single or double contingency outages of units on the amount and type of spinning reserves available in the system;
- Study the effects of maintenance outages and its impact on generation scheduling and system reliability; and
- Check the operation of gas turbines as peaking plant.

(i) Computer Simulation Model

To achieve the stated objectives, a computer simulation program was used to simulate Watana power plant and system operation. The Watana turbines and reservoir were modeled in detail to simulate closely the reservoir regulation and load following characteristics of the turbines.

The model included the following principal features:

- Turbine characteristics as a function of head, gate opening (flow), and efficiency.
- Minimum loading limitations of the turbine due to operation in the zone of rough operation up to 50 percent of the gate openings were constraints for turbine loading and operation.
- Maximum continuous rating (MCR) of the generators constituted the maximum loading of the units.
- Predicted daily system load demand curves were used for two typical load shapes for winter and summer, respectively. Monthly peak load variation of the load was taken into account.
- Reservoir characteristics as a function of level and storage.
- Unit by unit loading and de-loading of Watana generators according to load demand (load-following) was done taking into account all constraints mentioned above. The program loads the units equally for maximum efficiency of operation.
- Loading steam plants as base-load plants, and gas turbines as peaking plants.
- Maintenance scheduling of the generating units.

(ii) Results of the Simulation Studies

Printouts of the results of the simulations are included in Appendix B. For each run, printouts are presented for the following outputs in a typical day for each month of the year 2000 (January to December):

- Watana plant kW output;
- Watana turbine kW output, with flow and efficiency for each unit;
- Watana turbine utilization, showing number of units loaded;
- Watana reservoir level;
- Peaking plant kW output;
- Total system load kW demand;
- Total system reserve, including maintenance outage;
- Watana reserve capacity; and
- Annual energy output of Watana, thermal plant, small hydro, gas turbine plants, and overall annual system energy.

Simulation results of a typical December, 2000 day is shown in Figure 15.5. The simulation indicates that the six unit Watana plant (6-170 MW) has superior overall performance in terms of load following, improved overall efficiency and minimum loading constraints over the four unit plant (4-250 MW).

The overall reliability of the six unit Watana plant is also better than that of the four unit plant. During maintenance the six unit plant has a planned outage of 170 MW, as opposed to 250 MW for the four unit plant. During peak December loading, a double contingency outage of two units brings down system reserve to 107 MW for the 6-170 MW unit plant and to less than zero for the 4-250 MW unit plant.

The simulations indicate that sufficient spinning reserve comprising a minimum of one Watana unit is available for all peak day loadings for the six unit Watana plant for the year 2000 study.

15.7 - Performance Monitoring

(a) Watana Dam

Instrumentation is installed to enable the performance of the dam to be monitored to ensure that its behavior is within the limits assumed in the design, and to enable any variations beyond those limits to be recognized quickly so that remedial action can be taken without delay.

The most important aspects of the monitoring program and likely maintenance requirements are outlined below:

(i) Foundation Abutment Pore Pressures and Discharge From Pressure Relief System

Since sections of the foundation are frozen, the grouted cut-off may not be fully effective, and leakage may increase as the rock temperature increases.

This condition would be indicated by increased discharge from the drainage system and would be remedied by additional grouting from the grouting gallery, possibly combined with additional drainage holes.

(ii) Quality of Discharge from Pressure Relief System

Any discoloration of the drainage system discharge would indicate the leaching of fine material either from the rock foundation or from the core. The problem area would be located and additional grouting carried out. Water quality should also be monitored for any change in mineral content.

(iii) Deformation of the Structure

Most deformation of the structure as observed by settlements and lateral movements is expected to occur soon after construction and under initial filling of the reservoir. Any excessive settlement would be made good to maintain freeboard. Deformation records would be correlated with such data as reservoir level, heavy storms and seismic activity.

(iv) Routine Observations

An essential part of any monitoring program is a regular routine visual inspection of all exposed parts of the structure and the area downstream of the dam for any unusual features such as local settlement or other movement, zones of seepage discharge, wet areas, and changes in vegetation. All exposed concrete surfaces would also be inspected and records kept of any signs of distress, cracking or deterioration.

(v) Relict Channel

Particular attention must be paid to monitoring the entire area of the relict channel, including regular readings of piezometers and thermistors, of surface elevation, survey monitoring and inspections of the discharge zone for changes in seepage flows and any signs of piping failure.

15.8 - Plant Operation and Maintenance

The system demand varies throughout the year from a winter (December/January) peak to a summer (July/August) trough, and from hour-to-hour throughout the day. The Central Dispatch Center operates with the object of ensuring that sufficient plant is available at all times to meet the varying load in accordance with a merit-order schedule with due consideration to reliability.

Notwithstanding this, generating plant must undergo periodic maintenance for various reasons:

- Preventive maintenance, to ensure safe and reliable operation (performed either on load or shut down);
- Corrective maintenance, to restore lost efficiency of plant; and
- Emergency maintenance, arising from plant failure.

(a) Frequency of Inspections and Maintenance

Experience records from machines similar to the Watana and Devil Canyon machines indicate that a minimum maintenance period of 5 to 6 days are required for each machine, resulting in an outage of 150 to 170 MW capacity for an average period of 50 to 60 days in the year. In exceptional cases, certain machines may be down for greater maintenance periods. It is therefore reasonable to allow a total of 2-1/2 to 3 months planned outage as a conservative approach to system generation and maintenance planning for the Susitna units. In principle, these outages are scheduled during the months of June to August when the lower summer load demands make it possible to release the units for maintenance. The actual outages will be coordinated on a week-to-week basis with the planned maintenance of the units in the rest of the system, and will take into consideration emergency shutdowns, breakdowns, delays in construction and maintenance and other unforeseen contingencies.

(b) Access and Maintenance in the Powerhouse

Techniques developed both in the design and the operation of conventional underground hydroelectric power plants have resulted in

underground facilities which are not significantly more difficult to maintain than surface plants. Isolation of underground installations from both penstock water and from tailrace water is a vitally important factor. Downstream water conduits with manifolds require draft tube isolating devices of appropriate design. Drainage and dewatering facilities must be highly reliable and of adequate capacity.

There will be situations where a decision must be made as to whether to carry out maintenance and repair work on components underground or on the surface. Many items are large and heavy and therefore are best handled by the powerhouse crane. Sufficient erection bay space and laydown area between the generating units are provided for all normal maintenance and overhaul needs.

Transformers will be moved within the access tunnel and transformer gallery by means of wheels mounted on the transformer base.

The greatest demand in laydown space within the powerhouse cavern is likely to occur during the initial equipment installation process and the 10 to 15 year major disassembly/maintenance procedure. The working area will be sized to allow the simultaneous placing of turbine and generator components.

(c) Major Overall Activities

The major activities which require special space and handling considerations in the plants include:

- Replacing generator stator winding coils;
- Rotor inspection;
- Replacement of thrust-bearing assemblies;
- Replacement of runner seals;
- Cavitation damage repair to runner;
- Repair and refinishing of waterpassage steel and concrete surfaces;
- Generator circuit breaker repair; and
- Transformer maintenance.

(d) Maintenance Workshops

The Watana and Devil Canyon power plants are each provided with workshops to facilitate the normal maintenance needs of each plant. The workshop block includes operations for fitting and machining, welding, electrical, and relay instrumentation, with adequate stores for tools and spare parts. The Watana power plant will be provided additionally with surface maintenance and central storage facilities to cater to the needs of both plants.

Maintenance operation plannings of both plants are centralized at Watana. Staff will be normally located at Watana and housed at the operators village at Watana. With centralized control of the

Susitna project located at Watana, the Devil Canyon plant will not have a resident operating and maintenance staff. Proper road and transport facilities should be maintained between Watana and Devil Canyon to facilitate movement of personnel and/or equipment between the plants.



LIST OF REFERENCES

1. U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Hydroelectric Power Evaluation, DOE/FERC-0031, August 1979.

TABLE 15.1: ENERGY POTENTIAL OF WATANA - DEVIL CANYON DEVELOPMENTS
FOR DIFFERENT RESERVOIR OPERATING RULES

MONTH	ENERGY POTENTIAL GWH											
	WATANA ONLY						WATANA & DEVIL CANYON					
	FIRM ENERGY			AVERAGE ENERGY			FIRM ENERGY			AVERAGE ENERGY		
	CASE A	C	D	A	C	D	A	C	D	A	C	D
OCT	234	200	172	281	214	178	437	399	334	511	422	346
NOV	270	235	201	348	331	271	502	463	388	543	625	506
DEC	322	276	236	445	397	364	598	547	458	817	751	683
JAN	283	242	208	383	357	325	590	480	403	715	677	618
FEB	228	202	173	318	335	293	452	395	330	599	632	561
MAR	235	201	173	276	330	277	470	398	335	532	629	536
APR	199	165	142	203	214	197	460	332	280	451	419	387
MAY	180	152	131	180	247	174	462	304	286	465	536	399
JUN	170	135	111	175	212	191	492	323	278	478	485	460
JUL	182	209	345	258	267	374	387	471	755	521	579	784
AUG	170	311	531	344	327	545	321	659	1095	598	679	1095
SEP	158	151	155	249	158	166	293	326	390	463	346	395
TOTAL	2632	2479	2578	3459	3389	3354	5394	5099	5332	6793	6781	6768


NOTE: Cases B and C were similar and only Case C was analyzed in detail.

TABLE 15.2: MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE FLOWS BELOW
WATANA DAM DURING RESERVOIR FILLING

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE FLOW CFS</u>
OCT	2050
NOV	900
DEC	900
JAN	900
FEB	900
MAR	900
APR	900
MAY	4000
JUN	4000
JUL	6000
AUG	6000
SEP	4600


TABLE 15.3: TURBINE OPERATING CONDITIONS

	<u>Watana</u>	<u>Devil Canyon</u>
Maximum net head	728 feet	597 feet
Minimum net head	576 feet	238 feet
Design head	680 feet	575 feet
Rated head	680 feet	575 feet
Turbine flow at rated head	3550 feet	3800 feet
Turbine efficiency at design head	91%	91%
Turbine-generating rating at rated head	181,500 kW	164,000 kW




WINTER WEEKDAY
HOURLY LOAD VARIATION

NOTE: PEAK MW DECEMBER 2000 AD = 1084 MW



SUMMER WEEKDAY
HOURLY LOAD VARIATION


NOTE: PEAK MW JULY 2000 AD = 658 MW



LOAD VARIATION
IN YEAR 2000

TYPICAL LOAD VARIATION
IN ALASKA RAILBELT SYSTEM







FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF
AVERAGE ANNUAL ENERGY FOR SUSITNA DEVELOPMENTS

FIGURE 15.2





WATANA-UNIT EFFICIENCY
(AT RATED HEAD)



DEVIL CANYON - UNIT EFFICIENCY
(AT RATED HEAD)

TYPICAL NOVEMBER DAY	TIME	Minimum WATANA versus TIME Maximum			Minimum RESERV versus TIME Maximum			INSTAL	KWLOAD	WATRES	
		1.0821E+05	:	9.0389E+05	4.4711E+05	:	1.1428E+06				
		WATANA	:	N	GENKW	EFF	RESERV	:			
16 HRS.	1.0625E+01	6.4954E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.6239E+05	9.1580E-01	6.0144E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.2956E+05	4.2646E+05
	1.0667E+01	6.8468E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.7117E+05	9.0705E-01	5.6632E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.6468E+05	3.9129E+05
18	1.0708E+01	7.1935E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4387E+05	9.1747E-01	5.3165E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.9935E+05	3.5656E+05
	1.0750E+01	7.0940E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.7735E+05	8.9866E-01	5.4160E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.8940E+05	3.6645E+05
20	1.0792E+01	6.8408E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.7152E+05	9.0661E-01	5.6492E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.6608E+05	3.8971E+05
	1.0832E+01	6.6276E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.6569E+05	9.1455E-01	5.8824E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.4276E+05	4.1298E+05
22	1.0875E+01	6.3935E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.5984E+05	9.1651E-01	6.1165E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.1935E+05	4.3634E+05
	1.0917E+01	5.7272E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.4318E+05	9.1688E-01	6.7828E+05	+	1.5310E+06	8.5272E+05	5.0292E+05
24	1.0958E+01	5.0609E+05	+	3.0000E+00	1.6870E+05	9.1049E-01	7.4491E+05	+	1.5310E+06	7.8609E+05	5.6951E+05
0 HRS.	1.1000E+01	4.8959E+05	+	3.0000E+00	1.6320E+05	9.1560E-01	7.6141E+05	+	1.5310E+06	7.6959E+05	5.8598E+05
2	1.1042E+01	4.6429E+05	+	3.0000E+00	1.5476E+05	9.1785E-01	7.8671E+05	+	1.5310E+06	7.4429E+05	6.1123E+05
	1.1083E+01	4.3900E+05	+	3.0000E+00	1.4633E+05	9.1944E-01	8.1200E+05	+	1.5310E+06	7.1900E+05	6.3649E+05
4	1.1125E+01	4.1381E+05	+	3.0000E+00	1.3794E+05	9.1258E-01	8.3719E+05	+	1.5310E+06	6.9381E+05	6.6165E+05
	1.1167E+01	4.3549E+05	+	3.0000E+00	1.4516E+05	9.1847E-01	8.1551E+05	+	1.5310E+06	7.1549E+05	6.3994E+05
6	1.1208E+01	4.5717E+05	+	3.0000E+00	1.5239E+05	9.1854E-01	7.9383E+05	+	1.5310E+06	7.3717E+05	6.1822E+05
	1.1250E+01	4.7897E+05	+	3.0000E+00	1.5966E+05	9.1657E-01	7.7203E+05	+	1.5310E+06	7.5897E+05	5.9638E+05
8	1.1292E+01	5.5847E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.3962E+05	9.1393E-01	6.9253E+05	+	1.5310E+06	8.3847E+05	5.1684E+05
	1.1333E+01	6.3796E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.5949E+05	9.1662E-01	6.1304E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.1796E+05	4.3730E+05
10	1.1375E+01	7.1726E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4346E+05	9.1706E-01	5.3372E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.9726E+05	3.5792E+05
	1.1417E+01	7.1728E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4346E+05	9.1705E-01	5.3372E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.9728E+05	3.5786E+05
NOON	1.1458E+01	7.1728E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4346E+05	9.1704E-01	5.3372E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.9728E+05	3.5780E+05
	1.1500E+01	7.1729E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4346E+05	9.1704E-01	5.3371E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.9729E+05	3.5773E+05
14	1.1542E+01	7.2690E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4418E+05	9.1762E-01	5.3010E+05	+	1.5310E+06	1.0009E+06	3.5405E+05
	1.1583E+01	7.2451E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4490E+05	9.1820E-01	5.2649E+05	+	1.5310E+06	1.0045E+06	3.5038E+05
16	1.1625E+01	7.2821E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4564E+05	9.1880E-01	5.2279E+05	+	1.5310E+06	1.0082E+06	3.4662E+05
	1.1667E+01	7.6626E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.5326E+05	9.1833E-01	4.8470E+05	+	1.5310E+06	1.0463E+06	3.0847E+05
18	1.1708E+01	8.0389E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.6078E+05	9.1629E-01	4.4711E+05	+	1.5310E+06	1.0839E+06	2.7081E+05
	1.1750E+01	7.9310E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.5862E+05	9.1688E-01	4.5790E+05	+	1.5310E+06	1.0731E+06	2.8153E+05
20	1.1792E+01	7.4701E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.5356E+05	9.1826E-01	4.8319E+05	+	1.5310E+06	1.0478E+06	3.0675E+05
	1.1833E+01	7.4252E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4850E+05	9.1963E-01	5.0848E+05	+	1.5310E+06	1.0225E+06	3.3198E+05
22	1.1875E+01	7.1711E+05	+	5.0000E+00	1.4342E+05	9.1655E-01	5.3389E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.9711E+05	3.5732E+05
	1.1917E+01	6.4405E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.6121E+05	9.1619E-01	6.0615E+05	+	1.5310E+06	9.2485E+05	4.2953E+05
24 HRS.	1.1958E+01	5.7258E+05	+	4.0000E+00	1.4315E+05	9.1671E-01	6.7842E+05	+	1.5310E+06	8.5258E+05	5.0174E+05

WATANA PLANT
OUTPUT (KW)

NUMBER OF WATANA
UNITS IN OPERATION

WATANA GENERATOR
OUTPUT (KW, EACH UNIT)

UNIT EFFICIENCY
(PERCENT)

SYSTEM RESERVE
CAPACITY (KW)

SYSTEM INSTALLED
CAPACITY (KW)

SYSTEM TOTAL
LOAD (KW)

WATANA PLANT
RESERVE (KW)

WATANA PLANT SIMULATION
DECEMBER 2000



16 - ESTIMATES OF COST

This section presents estimates of capital and operating costs for the Susitna Hydroelectric Project, comprising the Watana and Devil Canyon developments and associated transmission and access facilities. The costs of design features and facilities incorporated into the project to mitigate environmental impacts during construction and operation are identified. A cash flow schedules, outlining capital requirements during planning, construction, and start-up are presented. The approach to the derivation of the capital and operating costs estimates is described.

The total cost of the Watana and Devil Canyon projects is summarized in Table 16.1. A more detailed breakdown of cost for each development is presented in Tables 16.2 and 16.3.

16.1 - Construction Costs

This section describes the process used for derivation of construction costs and discusses the Code of Accounts established, the basis for the estimates and the various assumptions made in arriving at the estimates. For general consistency with planning studies, all costs developed for the project are in January, 1982 dollars.

(a) Code of Accounts

Estimates of construction costs were developed using the FERC format as outlined in the Federal Code of Regulations, Title 18 (1).

The estimates have been subdivided into the following main cost groupings:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Description</u>
Production Plant	Costs for structures, equipment, and facilities necessary to produce power.
Transmission Plant	Costs for structures, equipment, and facilities necessary to transmit power from the sites to load centers.
General Plant	Costs for equipment and facilities required for the operation and maintenance of the production and transmission plant.

<u>Group</u>	<u>Description</u>
Indirect Costs	Costs that are common to a number of construction activities. For this estimate only camps and electric power costs have been included in this group. Other indirect costs have been included in the costs under production, transmission, and general plant costs.
Overhead Construction Costs	Costs for engineering and administration.

Further subdivision within these groupings was made on the basis of the various types of work involved, as typically shown in the following example:

- Group:	Production Plant
- Account 332:	Reservoir, Dam, and Waterways
- Main Structure 332.3:	Main Dam
- Element 332.31:	Main Dam Structure
- Work Item 332.311:	Excavation
- Type of Work:	Rock

The detailed schedule of account items is presented in Appendix C.

(b) Approach to Cost Estimating

The estimating process used generally included the following steps:

- Collection and assembly of detailed cost data for labor, material, and equipment as well as information on productivity, climatic conditions, and other related items;
- Review of engineering drawings and technical information with regard to construction methodology and feasibility;
- Production of detailed quantity takeoffs from drawings in accordance with the previously developed Code of Accounts and item listing;
- Determination of direct unit costs for each major type of work by development of labor, material, and equipment requirements; development of other costs by use of estimating guides, quotations from vendors, and other information as appropriate;

- Development of construction indirect costs by review of labor, material equipment, supporting facilities, and overheads; and
- Development of construction camp size and support requirements from the labor demand generated by the construction direct and indirect costs.

The above steps are discussed in detail in the following:

(c) Cost Data

Cost information was obtained from standard estimating sources, from sources in Alaska, from quotes by major equipment suppliers and vendors, and from representative recent hydroelectric projects. Labor and equipment costs for 1982 were developed from a number of sources (2,3) and from an analysis of costs for recent projects performed in the Alaska environment.

It has been assumed that contractors will work an average of two 9-hour shifts per day, 6 days per week, with an expected range as follows:

Mechanical/Electrical Work	8-hour shifts
Formwork/Concrete Work	9-hour shifts
Excavation/Fill Work	10-hour shifts

These assumptions provide for high utilization of construction equipment and reasonable levels of overtime earnings to attract workers. The two-shift basis generally achieves the most economical balance between labor and camp costs.

Construction equipment costs were obtained from vendors on an FOB Anchorage basis with an appropriate allowance included for transportation to site. A representative list of construction equipment required for the project was assembled as a basis for the estimate. It has been assumed that most equipment would be fully depreciated over the life of the project. For some activities such as construction of the Watana main dam, an allowance for major overhaul was included rather than fleet replacement. Equipment operating costs were estimated from industry source data, with appropriate modifications for the remote nature and extreme climatic environment of the site. Fuel and oil prices have also been included based upon FOB site prices.

Information for permanent mechanical and electrical equipment was obtained from vendors and manufacturers who provided guideline costs on major power plant equipment.

The costs of materials required for site construction were estimated on the basis of suppliers' quotations, adjusted for Alaskan conditions.

(d) Seasonal Influences on Productivity

A review of climatic conditions, together with an analysis of experience in Alaska and in Northern Canada on large construction projects was undertaken to determine the average duration for various key activities. It has been assumed for current study purposes that most aboveground activities will either stop or be curtailed during the period of December and January because of the extreme cold weather and the associated lower productivity. For the main dam construction activities, the following assumptions have been used:

- Watana dam fill - 6-month season; and
- Devil Canyon arch dam - 8-month season.

Other aboveground activities are assumed to extend up to 11 months depending on the type of work and the criticality of the schedule. Underground activities are generally not affected by climate and should continue throughout the year.

Studies by others (4) have indicated a 60 percent or greater decrease in efficiency in construction operations under adverse winter conditions. Therefore, it is expected that most contractors would attempt to schedule outside work over a period of between 6 to 10 months.

Studies performed as part of this work program indicate that the general construction activity at the Susitna dams site during the months of April through September would be comparable with that in the northern sections of the western United States. Rainfall in the general region of the site is moderate between mid-April and mid-October ranging from a low of 0.75 inches precipitation in April to a high of 5.33 inches in August. Temperatures in this period range from 33° to 66° for a twenty-year average. In the five-month period from November through March, the temperature ranges from 9.4°F to 20.3°F with snowfall of 10 inches per month.

(e) Construction Methods

The construction methods assumed for development of the estimate and construction schedule, are generally considered as "normal", in line with the available level of technical information. A conservative approach has been taken in those areas where more detailed information will be developed during subsequent investigation and engineering programs. For example, normal drilling, blasting, and mucking methods have been assumed for all underground excavation. Also conventional equipment has been considered for major fill and concrete work. Various construction methods were considered for several of the major work items to determine the most economically practical method. For example, a comprehensive evaluation was made of the means of excavating material from Borrow Site E and the downstream river for the

Watana dam shells. A comparison of excavation by dragline, dredge, backhoe, and scraper bucket methods was made, with consideration given to the quantity of material available, distance from the dam, and location in the river or adjacent terraces.

(f) Quantity Takeoffs

Detailed quantity takeoffs were produced from the engineering drawings using methods normal to the industry. The quantities developed are those listed in the detailed summary estimates in Appendix C.

(g) Indirect Construction Costs

Indirect construction costs were estimated in detail for the civil construction activities. A more general evaluation was used for the mechanical and electrical work.

Indirect costs included the following:

- Mobilization;
- Technical and supervisory personnel above the level of trades foremen;
- All vehicle costs for supervisory personnel;
- Fixed offices, mobile offices, workshops, storage facilities, and laydown areas, including all services;
- General transportation for workmen on site and off site;
- Yard cranes and floats;
- Utilities including electrical power, heat, water, and compressed air;
- Small tools;
- Safety program and equipment
- Financing;
- Bonds and securities;
- Insurance;
- Taxes;
- Permits;
- Head office overhead;
- Contingency allowance; and
- Profit.

In developing contractor's indirect costs, the following assumptions have been made:

- Mobilization costs have generally been spread over construction items;
- No escalation allowances have been made, and therefore any risks associated with escalation are not included;

- Financing of progress payments has been estimated for 45 days, the average time between expenditure and reimbursement;
- Holdback would be limited to a nominal amount;
- Project all-risk insurance has been estimated as a contractor's indirect cost for this estimate, but it is expected that this insurance would be carried by the owner; and
- Contract packaging would provide for the supply of major materials to contractors at site at cost. These include fuel, electric power, cement, and reinforcing steel.

16.2 - Mitigation Costs

As discussed in previous sections, the project arrangement includes a number of features designed to mitigate potential impacts on the natural environment and on residents and communities in the vicinity of the project. In addition, a number of measures are planned during construction of the project to mitigate similar impacts caused by construction activities. The measures and facilities represent additional costs to the project than would be normally required for safe and efficient operation of a hydroelectric development. These mitigation costs have been estimated at \$149 million and have been summarized in Table 16.4. In addition, the costs of full reservoir clearing at both sites has been estimated at \$85 million. Although full clearing is considered good engineering practice, it is not essential to the operation of the power facilities. These costs include direct and indirect costs, engineering, administration, and contingencies.

A number of mitigation costs are associated with facilities, improvements or other programs not directly related to the project or located outside the project boundaries. These would include the following items:

- Caribou barriers;
- Fish channels;
- Fish hatcheries;
- Stream improvements;
- Salt licks;
- Recreational facilities;
- Habitat management for moose;
- Fish stocking program in reservoirs; and
- Land acquisition cost for recreation.

It is anticipated that some of these features or programs will not be required during or after construction of the project. In this regard a probability factor has been assigned to each of the above items, and the estimated cost of each reduced accordingly. The estimated cost of these measures, based on this procedure, is approximately \$9 million. These costs have been assumed to be covered by the construction contingency.

A number of studies and programs will be required to monitor the impacts of the project on the environment and to develop and record various data during project construction and operation. These include the following:

- Archaeological studies;
- Fisheries and wildlife studies;
- Right-of-way studies; and
- Socioeconomic planning studies.

The costs for the above work have been estimated to be included in the owner's costs under project overheads.

16.3 - Operation, Maintenance, and Replacement Costs

The facilities and procedures for operation and maintenance of the project are described in Section 15. Assumptions for the size and extent of these facilities have been conservatively made on the basis of experience at large hydroelectric developments in northern climates, notably Canada. The annual costs for operation, maintenance, and interim replacement for the Watana development have been estimated at \$10 million. When Devil Canyon is brought on line these costs increase to \$15.2 million per annum.

16.4 - Engineering and Administration Costs

Engineering has been subdivided into the following accounts for the purposes of the cost estimates:

- Account 71
 - . Engineering and Project Management
 - . Construction Management
 - . Procurement

- Account 76

- Owner's Costs

The total cost of engineering and administrative activities has been estimated at 12.5 percent of the total construction costs, including contingencies. This is in general agreement with experience on projects similar in scope and complexity. A detailed breakdown of these costs is dependent on the organizational structure established to undertake design and management of the project, as well as more definitive data relating to the scope and nature of the various project components. However, the main elements of cost included are as follows:

- (a) Engineering and Project Management Costs

- These costs include allowances for:

- Feasibility studies, including site surveys and investigations and logistics support;
- Preparation of a license application to the FERC;
- Technical and administrative input for other federal, state and local permit and license applications;
- Overall coordination and administration of engineering, construction management, and procurement activities;
- Overall planning, coordination, and monitoring activities related to cost and schedule of the project;
- Coordination with and reporting to the Power Authority regarding all aspects of the project;
- Preliminary and detailed design;
- Technical input to procurement of construction services, support services, and equipment;
- Monitoring of construction to ensure conformance to design requirements;
- Preparation of start-up and acceptance test procedures; and
- Preparation of project operating and maintenance manuals.

(b) Construction Management Costs

Construction management costs have been assumed to include:

- Initial planning and scheduling and establishment of project procedures and organization;
- Coordination of onsite contractors and construction management activities;
- Administration of onsite contractors to ensure harmony of trades, compliance with applicable regulations, and maintenance of adequate site security and safety requirements;
- Development, coordination, and monitoring of construction schedules;
- Construction cost control;
- Material, equipment and drawing control;
- Inspection of construction and survey control;
- Measurement for payment;
- Start-up and acceptance test for equipment and systems;
- Compilation of as-constructed records; and
- Final acceptance.

(c) Procurement Costs

Procurement costs have been assumed to include:

- Establishment of project procurement procedures;
- Preparation of non-technical procurement documents;
- Solicitation and review of bids for construction services, support services, permanent equipment, and other items required to complete the project;
- Cost administration and control for procurement contracts; and
- Quality assurance services during fabrication or manufacture of equipment and other purchased items.

(d) Owner's Costs

Owner's costs have been assumed to include the following:

- Administration and coordination of project management and engineering organizations;
- Coordination with other state, local, and federal agencies and groups having jurisdiction or interest in the project;
- Coordination with interested public groups and individuals;
- Reporting to legislature and the public on the progress of the project; and
- Legal costs (Account 72).

16.5 - Allowance for Funds Used During Construction

At current high levels of interest rates in the financial market-place, AFDC will amount to a significant element of financing cost for the lengthy periods required for construction of the Watana and Devil Canyon projects. However, in economic evaluations of the Susitna project, the low real rates of interest assumed would have a much reduced impact on assumed project development costs. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 18, direct state involvement in financing of the Susitna project will also have a significant impact on the amount, if any, of AFDC. For purposes of the current feasibility study, therefore, the conventional practice of calculating AFDC as a separate line item for inclusion as part of project construction cost, has not been followed. Provisions for AFDC at appropriate rates of interest are made in the economic and financial analyses described in Section 18.

16.6 - Escalation

As noted, all costs presented in this Section are at January, 1982 levels, and consequently include no allowance for future cost escalation. Thus, these costs would not be truly representative of construction and procurement bid prices. This is because provision must be made in such bids for continuing escalation of costs, and the extent and variation of escalation which might take place over the lengthy construction periods involved. Economic and financial evaluations discussed in Section 18 take full account of such escalation at appropriately assumed rates.

16.7 - Cash Flow and Manpower Loading Requirements

The cash flow requirements for construction of Watana and Devil Canyon are an essential input to economic and financial planning studies discussed in Section 18. The basis for the cash flow are the construction cost estimates in January, 1982 dollars and the construction schedules presented in Section 17, with no provision being made as such for escalation. The cash flow estimates were computed on an annual basis and do not include adjustments for advanced payments for mobilization or for holdbacks on construction contracts. The results are presented in Figures 16.1 through 16.3. The manpower loading requirements, which

are included in Appendix C, were developed from cash flow projections. These curves were used as the basis for camp loading and associated socioeconomic impact studies.

16.8 - Contingency

A contingency allowance of 17.5 percent of construction costs has been included in the cost estimates. The contingency is estimated to include cost increases which may occur in the detailed engineering phase of the project after more comprehensive site investigations and final designs have been completed and after the requirements of various concerned agencies have been accounted for. The contingency estimate also includes allowances for inherent uncertainties in costs of labor, equipment and materials, and for unforeseen conditions which may be encountered during construction. Escalation in costs due to inflation is not included. No allowance has been included for costs associated with significant delays in project implementation.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 18, Conservation of Power and Water Resources, Parts 1 and 2, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1981.
2. Alaska Agreements of Wages and Benefits for Construction Trades. In effect January 1982.
3. Caterpillar Performance Handbook, Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, Illinois, October 1981.
4. Roberts, William S., Regionalized Feasibility Study of Cold Weather Earthwork, Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, July 1976, Special Report 76-2.

TABLE 16.1: SUMMARY OF COST ESTIMATE

<u>Category</u>	<u>January 1982 Dollars \$ X 10⁶</u>		
	<u>Watana</u>	<u>Devil Canyon</u>	<u>Total</u>
Production Plant	\$1,986	\$ 835	\$2,821
Transmission Plant	391	91	482
General Plant	5	5	10
Indirect	<u>378</u>	<u>188</u>	<u>566</u>
Subtotal	\$2,760	\$ 1,119	\$3,879
Contingency 17.5%	<u>482</u>	<u>196</u>	<u>678</u>
Total Construction	\$3,242	\$ 1,315	\$4,557
Overhead Construction	<u>405</u>	<u>165</u>	<u>570</u>
TOTAL PROJECT	\$3,647	\$1,480	\$5,127



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.2

WATANA

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility

PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00

FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09

SHEET 1 OF 5

BY _____ DATE _____

CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	TOTALS	REMARKS
		(x 10 ⁶)	(x 10 ⁶)	
	<u>PRODUCTION PLANT</u>			
330	Land & Land Rights	\$ 51		
331	Powerplant Structures & Improvements	73		
332	Reservoir, Dams & Waterways	1,532		
333	Waterwheels, Turbines & Generators	65		
334	Accessory Electrical Equipment	21		
335	Miscellaneous Powerplant Equipment (Mechanical)	14		
336	Roads & Railroads	230		
	TOTAL PRODUCTION PLANT		\$ 1,986	



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.2

WATANA

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility

PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00

FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09

SHEET 2 OF 5

BY _____ DATE _____

CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	TOTALS	REMARKS
	TOTAL BROUGHT FORWARD	(x 10 ⁶)	(x 10 ⁶) \$ 1,986	
	<u>TRANSMISSION PLANT</u>			
350	Land & Land Rights	\$ 8		
352	Substation & Switching Station Structures & Improvements	12		
353	Substation & Switching Station Equipment	129		
354	Steel Towers & Fixtures	130		
356	Overhead Conductors & Devices	99		
359	Roads & Trails	13		
	TOTAL TRANSMISSION PLANT		\$ 391	
			\$ 2,377	



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.2

WATANA

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility

PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00

FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09

SHEET 3 OF 5

BY _____ DATE _____

CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	TOTALS	REMARKS
		(x 10 ⁶)	(x 10 ⁶)	
	TOTAL BROUGHT FORWARD		\$ 2,382	
	<u>INDIRECT COSTS</u>			
61	Temporary Construction Facilities	\$ -		See Note
62	Construction Equipment	-		See Note
63	Camp & Commissary	378		
64	Labor Expense	-		
65	Superintendence	-		See Note
66	Insurance	-		See Note
69	Fees	-		See Note
	Note: Costs under accounts 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, and 69 are included in the appropriate direct costs listed above.			
	TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS		\$ 378	
			\$ 2,760	



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.2

WATANA

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility

PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00

FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09

SHEET 4 OF 5

BY _____ DATE _____

CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	TOTALS	REMARKS
		(x 10 ⁶)	(x 10 ⁶)	
	TOTAL BROUGHT FORWARD (Construction Costs)		\$ 2,760	
	Contingency 17.5%		482	
	TOTAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS		\$ 3,242	
	<u>OVERHEAD CONSTRUCTION COSTS (PROJECT INDIRECTS)</u>			
71	Engineering/ Administration	\$ 405		
72	Legal Expenses	-		Included in 71
75	Taxes	-		Not applicable
76	Administrative & General Expenses	-		Included in 71
77	Interest	-		Not included
80	Earnings/Expenses During Construction	-		Not included
	Total Overhead		405	
	TOTAL PROJECT COST		\$ 3,647	



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.2

WATANA

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility

PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00

FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09

SHEET 5 OF 5

BY _____ DATE _____

CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	TOTALS	REMARKS
	TOTAL BROUGHT FORWARD	(x 10 ⁶)	(x 10 ⁶)	
	GENERAL PLANT		\$ 2,377	
389	Land & Land Rights	\$ -		Included under 330
390	Structures & Improvements	-		Included under 331
391	Office Furniture/Equipment			Included under 399
392	Transportation Equipment			" "
393	Stores Equipment			" "
394	Tools Shop & Garage Equipment			" "
395	Laboratory Equipment			" "
396	Power-Operated Equipment			" "
397	Communications Equipment			" "
398	Miscellaneous Equipment			" "
399	Other Tangible Property	5		
	TOTAL GENERAL PLANT		\$ 5	
			\$ 2,382	



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.3

DEVIL CANYON

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility

PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00

FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09

SHEET 1 OF 5

BY _____ DATE _____

CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT (x 10 ⁶)	TOTALS (x 10 ⁶)	REMARKS
	<u>PRODUCTION PLANT</u>			
330	Land & Land Rights	\$ 22		
331	Powerplant Structures & Improvements	71		
332	Reservoir, Dams & Waterways	635		
333	Waterwheels, Turbines & Generators	42		
334	Accessory Electrical Equipment	14		
335	Miscellaneous Powerplant Equipment (Mechanical)	12		
336	Roads & Railroads	39		
	TOTAL PRODUCTION PLANT		\$ 835	



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.3

DEVIL CANYON

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility

PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00

FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09

SHEET 2 OF 5

BY _____ DATE _____

CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	TOTALS	REMARKS
	TOTAL BROUGHT FORWARD	(x 10 ⁶)	(x 10 ⁶)	
	TRANSMISSION PLANT		\$ 835	
350	Land & Land Rights	\$ -		Included in Watana Estimate
352	Substation & Switching Station Structures & Improvements	7		
353	Substation & Switching Station Equipment	21		
354	Steel Towers & Fixtures	29		
356	Overhead Conductors & Devices	34		
359	Roads & Trails	-		Included in Watana Estimate
	TOTAL TRANSMISSION PLANT		\$ 91	
			\$ 926	



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.3

DEVIL CANYON

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility

PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00
 FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09
 SHEET 3 OF 5
 BY _____ DATE _____
 CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	TOTALS	REMARKS
	TOTAL BROUGHT FORWARD	(x 10 ⁶)	(x 10 ⁶) \$ 926	
	<u>GENERAL PLANT</u>			
389	Land & Land Rights	\$		Included under 330
390	Structures & Improvements			Included under 331
391	Office Furniture/Equipment			Included under 399
392	Transportation Equipment			" "
393	Stores Equipment			" "
394	Tools Shop & Garage Equipment			" "
395	Laboratory Equipment			" "
396	Power Operated Equipment			" "
397	Communications Equipment			" "
398	Miscellaneous Equipment			" "
399	Other Tangible Property	5		
	TOTAL GENERAL PLANT		\$ 5	
			\$ 931	



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.3

DEVIL CANYON

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY

TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility

PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00

FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09

SHEET 4 OF 5

BY _____ DATE _____

CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	TOTALS	REMARKS
		(x 10 ⁶)	(x 10 ⁶)	
	TOTAL BROUGHT FORWARD		\$ 931	
	<u>INDIRECT COSTS</u>			
61	Temporary Construction Facilities	\$ -		See Note
62	Construction Equipment	-		See Note
63	Camp & Commissary	188		
64	Labor Expense	-		See Note
65	Superintendence	-		See Note
66	Insurance	-		See Note
69	Fees	-		See Note
	Note: Costs under accounts 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, and 69 are included in the appropriate direct costs listed above.			
	TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS		\$ 188	
			\$ 1,119	



ESTIMATE SUMMARY

TABLE 16.3
DEVIL CANYON

CLIENT ALASKA POWER AUTHORITY
PROJECT SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT


TYPE OF ESTIMATE Feasibility
APPROVED BY JDL

JOB NUMBER P5700.00
FILE NUMBER P5700.14.09
SHEET 5 OF 5
BY _____ DATE _____
CHKD JRP DATE 2/82

No.	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	TOTALS	REMARKS
		(x 10 ⁶)	(x 10 ⁶)	
	TOTAL BROUGHT FORWARD (Construction Costs)		\$ 1,119	
	Contingency 17.5%		196	
	TOTAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS		1,315	
	<u>OVERHEAD CONSTRUCTION COSTS (PROJECT INDIRECTS)</u>			
71	Engineering	\$ 165		
72	Legal Expenses	-		Included in 71
75	Taxes	-		Not Applicable
76	Administrative & General Expenses	-		Included in 71
77	Interest	-		Not Included
80	Earnings/Expenses During Construction	-		Not Included
	Total Overhead Costs		165	
	TOTAL PROJECT COST		\$ 1,480	

TABLE 16.4: MITIGATION MEASURES - SUMMARY OF COSTS INCORPORATED
IN CONSTRUCTION COST ESTIMATES


<u>COSTS INCORPORATED IN CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATES</u>	<u>WATANA \$ X 10³</u>	<u>DEVIL CANYON \$ X 10³</u>	
<u>Outlet Facilities</u>			
Main Dam at Devil Canyon Tunnel Spillway at Watana	47,050	14,610	
Restoration of Borrow Area D	1,617	NA	
Restoration of Borrow Area F	551	NA	
Restoration of Camp and Village	2,260	990	
Restoration of Construction Sites	4,050	2,016	
Fencing around Camp	350	217	
Fencing around Garbage Disposal Area	125	125	
Multilevel Intake Structure	18,400	NA	
Camp Facilities Associated with trying to Keep Workers out of Local Communities	10,156	9,000	
Restoration of Haul Roads	<u>756</u>	<u>505</u>	
SUBTOTAL	85,315	27,463	
Contingency 17.5%	<u>14,930</u>	<u>4,806</u>	
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION	100,245	32,269	
Engineering 12.5%	<u>12,530</u>	<u>4,034</u>	
TOTAL PROJECT	112,775	36,303	<u>149,078</u>




WATANA DEVELOPMENT
 CUMULATIVE AND ANNUAL CASH FLOW
 JANUARY, 1982 DOLLARS

FIGURE 16.1





DEVIL CANYON DEVELOPMENT
 CUMULATIVE AND ANNUAL CASH FLOW
 JANUARY, 1982 DOLLARS



SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT
 CUMULATIVE & ANNUAL CASH FLOW ENTIRE PROJECT
 JANUARY, 1982 DOLLARS



17 - DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULES

This section describes the development schedules prepared for both Watana and Devil Canyon to meet the on-line power requirements of 1993 and 2002, respectively. These schedules span the period from 1983 until 2004. Schedules for the development of both Watana and Devil Canyon are shown on Plates 75 and 76. The main elements of the project have been shown on these schedules, as well as some key interrelationships.

17.1 - Preparation of Schedules

Preliminary schedules were first developed by estimating the durations of the main construction activities and arranging these in logical sequence. Some activity adjustments were then made to reduce excessive demands on resources, such as underground excavation or concrete placing. The preliminary schedules were then used as a basis for the preparation of cost estimates. The schedules were also reviewed for overall compatibility with major constraints such as licensing, on-line power requirements, and reservoir filling.

At both sites it became apparent that the period for construction of the main dam would be critical and that other activities should be fitted to the main dam work. A study was made of the front end requirements at Watana, and it was concluded that a pioneer road would have to be completed before 1985 to permit a sufficiently rapid build-up of manpower and equipment after licensing to meet the construction requirements for the main dam.

During development of the final project arrangement and preparation of the cost estimates (Section 16), the preliminary schedules were modified and refined. As estimating data were developed, the production rates and construction durations were calculated. Networks were developed for the main construction activities and the durations and sequences of activities determined. The overall schedules were modified to suit.

17.2 - Watana Schedule

The Watana schedules were developed to meet two overall project constraints:

- FERC license would be issued by December 31, 1984; and
- Four units would be on-line by the end of 1993.

The critical path of activities to meet the overall constraints was determined to be through site access, site facilities, diversion and main dam construction. These are highlighted as follows:

(i) Access

Road access to site is required by January 1, 1985. A pioneer road from Gold Creek is required to mobilize labor, equipment, and materials in the first part of 1985 for the following major construction activities:

- Main access road/railhead;
- Site facilities;
- Diversion; and
- Main dam.

(ii) Site Facilities

Site facilities must be developed in a very short time to support the main construction activities. A camp to house more than 1,000 men must be constructed during the first year. Site construction roads and contractors' work area have to be started. An aggregate processing plant and concrete batching plant must be operational to start diversion tunnel concrete work by January 1986. Construction power supply must also be started in 1985 for completion by mid-1987. One circuit of the permanent transmission line should be built from the proposed intertie at Gold Creek to Watana.

(iii) Diversion

Construction of diversion and dewatering facilities, the first major activity, should start by mid-1985. Excavation of the portals and tunnels requires a concentrated effort to allow completion of the lower tunnel for river diversion by August 1986. The upper tunnel is needed to handle the spring runoff by 1987. The upstream cofferdam must be placed to divert riverflows in August 1986 and raised sufficiently to avoid overtopping by the following spring.

(iv) Main Dam

The progress of work in the main dam is critical throughout the period 1986 through 1992. Mobilization of equipment and start of site work must begin in 1985. Excavation on the right abutment proceeds in 1986, as well as river alluvium under the dam core. During 1987 and 1988, dewatering, excavation and foundation treatment must be completed in the riverbed area and a substantial start made on placing fill. The construction schedule is based on the following program:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Quantity (cy x 10⁶)</u>	<u>Accumulated Quantity (cy x 10⁶)</u>	<u>Fill Elevation October 15 (feet)</u>	<u>Reservoir Elevation (feet)</u>
1987	3	--	--	--
1988	6	9	--	--
1989	12	21	1660	--
1990	13	34	1810	1460
1991	13	47	1950	1865
1992	12	59	2130	2050
1993	3	62	2210	2185

The program for fill placing has been based on an average six months season. It has been developed to provide high utilization of construction equipment required to handle and process fill materials.

(v) Spillways and Intakes

These structures have been scheduled for completion one season in advance of the requirement to handle flows. In general, excavation for these structures does not have to begin until most of the excavation work has been completed for the main dam.

(vi) Powerhouse and Other Underground Works

The first four units are scheduled to be on line by late 1993 and the remaining two units in early 1994. Excavation of the access tunnel into the powerhouse complex has been scheduled to start in 1987. Stage I concrete begins in 1989 with start of installation of major mechanical and electrical work in 1991. In general, the underground works have been scheduled to level resource demands as much as possible.

(vii) Transmission Lines/Switchyards

An initial line from Gold Creek is scheduled for completion by mid-1987. Construction of the remaining lines has been scheduled to begin in 1989 and be completed before commissioning of the first unit.

(viii) General

The Watana schedule requires that extensive planning, bid selection and commitments are made before the end of 1984 to permit work to progress on schedule during 1985 and 1986. The rapid development of site activities requires commitments particularly in the areas of access and site facilities in order that construction operations have the needed support.

The schedule has also been developed to take advantage of possible early reservoir filling to the minimum operating level by October 1992. Should this occur, power could possibly be generated by the end of 1992.

17.3 - Devil Canyon Schedule

The Devil Canyon schedule was developed to meet the on-line power requirement of all four units in 2002. The critical path of activities was determined to follow through site facilities, diversion and main dam construction. It has been planned that site facilities should start in 1994 with the main construction activities starting in 1995.

(i) Access

It has been assumed that site access facilities built for Watana exist at the start of construction. The bridge crossing upstream of Devil Canyon will be replaced by a temporary crossing downstream when reservoir impoundment takes place, and will finally be across the completed dam.

(ii) Site Facilities

Camp facilities should be started in 1994. It has been assumed that buildings can be salvaged from Watana. Site roads and power could also be started at this time.

(iii) Diversion

Excavation and concreting of the single diversion tunnel should begin in 1995. River closure and cofferdam construction will take place to permit start of dam construction in 1997.

(iv) Arch Dam

The construction of the arch dam will be the most critical construction activity from start of excavation in 1996 until topping out in 2001. The concrete program has been based on an average 8-month placing season for 4-1/2 years. The work has been scheduled to maintain a fairly constant effort during this period to make best use of equipment and manpower.

(v) Spillways and Intake

The spillway and intake are scheduled for completion by the end of 2000 to permit reservoir filling the next year.

(vi) Powerhouse and Other Underground Works

Excavation of access into the powerhouse cavern is scheduled to begin in 1996. Stage I concrete begins in 1998 with start of installation of major mechanical and electrical work in 2000.

(vii) Transmission Lines/Switchyards

The additional transmission facilities needed for Devil Canyon have been scheduled for completion by the time the final unit is ready for commissioning in late 2001.

(viii) General

The development of site facilities at Devil Canyon begins slowly in 1994 with a rapid acceleration in 1995 through 1997. Within a short period of time, construction begins on most major civil structures. This rapid development is dependent on the provision of support site facilities which should be completed in advance of the main construction work.

18 - ECONOMIC, MARKETING AND FINANCIAL EVALUATION

18.1 - Economic Evaluation

This section provides a discussion of the key economic parameters used in the study and develops the net economic benefits stemming from the Susitna Hydroelectric Project. Section 18.1 (a) deals with those economic principles relevant to the analysis of net economic benefits and develops inflation and discount rates and the Alaskan opportunity values (shadow prices) of oil, natural gas and coal. In particular the analysis is focused on the longer-term prospects for coal markets and prices. This follows from the evaluation that in the absence of Susitna, the next best thermal generation plan would rely on exploitation of Alaskan coal. The future coal price is therefore considered in detail to provide rigorous estimates of prices in the most likely alternative markets and hence the market price of coal at the mine-head within the state.

Section 18.1 (c) presents the net economic benefits of the proposed hydroelectric power investments compared with this thermal alternative. These are measured in terms of present valued differences between benefits and costs. Recognizing that even the most careful estimates will be surrounded by a degree of uncertainty, the benefit-cost assessments are also carried out in a probabilistic framework as shown in Section 18.2. The analysis therefore provides both a most likely estimate of net economic benefits accruing to the state and a range of net economic benefits that can be expected with a likelihood (confidence level) of 95 percent or more.

(a) Economic Principles and Parameters

(i) Economic Principles - Concept of Net Economic Benefits

A necessary condition for maximizing the increase in state income and economic growth is the selection of public or private investments with the highest present valued net benefits to the state. In the context of Alaskan electric power investments, the net benefits are defined as the difference between the costs of optimal Susitna-inclusive and Susitna-exclusive (all thermal) generation plans.

The energy costs of power generation are initially measured in terms of opportunity values or shadow prices which may differ from accounting or market prices currently prevailing in the state. The concept and use of opportunity values is fundamental to the optimal allocation of scarce resources. Energy investment decisions should not be made solely on the basis of accounting prices in the state if the international value of traded energy commodities such as coal and gas diverge from local market prices.

The choice of a time horizon is also crucial. If a short-term planning period is selected, the investment rankings and choices will differ markedly from those obtained through a long-term perspective. In other words, the benefit-cost analysis would point to different generation expansion plans depending on the selected planning period. A short-run optimization of state income would, at best, allow only a moderate growth in fixed capital investment; at worst, it would lead to underinvestment in not only the energy sector but also in other infrastructure facilities such as roads, airports, hospitals, schools, and communications.

It therefore follows that the Susitna Project, as other Alaskan investments, should be appraised on the basis of long-run optimization, where the long-run is defined as the expected economic life of the facility. For hydroelectric projects, this service life is typically 50 years or more. The costs of a Susitna-inclusive generation plan have therefore been compared with the costs of the next-best alternative which is the all-thermal generation plan and assessed over a planning period extending from 1982 to 2040, using internally consistent sets of economic scenarios and appropriate opportunity values of Alaskan energy.

Throughout the analysis, all costs and prices are expressed in real (inflation-adjusted) terms using January 1982 dollars. Hence, the results of the economic calculations are not sensitive to modified assumptions concerning the rates of general price inflation. In contrast, the financial and market analyses, conducted in nominal (inflation-inclusive) terms, will be influenced by the rate of general price inflation from 1982 to 2051.

(ii) Price Inflation and Discount Rates

- General Price Inflation

Despite the fact that price levels are generally higher in Alaska than in the Lower 48, there is little difference in the comparative rates of price changes; i.e., price inflation. Between 1970 and 1978, for example, the U.S. and Anchorage consumer price indexes rose at annual rates of 6.9 and 7.1 percent, respectively. From 1977 to 1978, the differential was even smaller: the consumer prices increased by 8.8 percent and 8.7 percent in the U.S. and Anchorage (1).

Forecasts of Alaskan prices extend only to 1986 (2). These indicates an average rate of increase of 8.7 percent from 1980 to 1986. For the longer period between

1986 and 2010, it is assumed that Alaskan prices will escalate at the overall U.S. rate, or at 5 to 7 percent compounded annually. The average annual rate of price inflation is therefore about 7 percent between 1982 and 2010. As this is consistent with long-term forecasts of the CPI advanced by leading economic consulting organizations, 7 percent has been adopted as the study value (3,4).

- Discount Rates

Discount rates are required to compare and aggregate cash flows occurring in different time periods of the planning horizon. In essence, the discount rate is a weighting factor reflecting that a dollar received tomorrow is worth less than a dollar received today. This holds even in an inflation-free economy as long as the productivity of capital is positive. In other words, the value of a dollar received in the future must be deflated to reflect its earning power foregone by not receiving it today. The use of discount rates extends to both real dollar (economic) and escalated dollar (financial) evaluations, with corresponding inflation-adjusted (real) and inflation-inclusive (nominal) values.

. Real Discount and Interest Rates

Several approaches have been suggested for estimating the real discount rate applicable to public projects (or to private projects from the public perspective). Three common alternatives include:

- .. the social opportunity cost (SOC) rate;
- .. the social time preference (STP) rate; and
- .. the government's real borrowing rate or the real cost of debt capital (5,6,7).

The SOC rate measures the real social return (before taxes and subsidies) that capital funds could earn in alternative investments. If, for example, the marginal capital investment in Alaska has an estimated social yield of X percent, the Susitna Hydroelectric Project should be appraised using the X percent measure of "foregone returns" or opportunity costs. A shortcoming for this concept is the difficulty inherent in determining the nature and yields of the foregone investments.

The STP rate measures society's preferences for allocating resources between investment and consumption. This approach is also fraught with practical measurement difficulties since a wide range of STP rates may

be inferred from market interest rates and socially-desirable rates of investment.

A sub-set of STP rates used in project evaluations is the owner's real cost of borrowing; that is, the real cost of debt capital. This industrial or government borrowing rate may be readily measured and provides a starting point for determining project-specific discount rates. For example, long-term industrial bond rates have averaged about 2 to 3 percent in the U.S. in real (inflation-adjusted) terms (3,8). Forecasts of real interest rates show average values of about 3 percent and 2 percent in the periods of 1985 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000, respectively. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also analyzed the choice of discount rates for investment appraisal in the electric utility industry and has recommended a 3 percent real rate (24). Therefore, a real rate of 3 percent has been adopted as the base case discount and interest rate for the period 1982 to 2040.

Nominal Discount and Interest Rates

The nominal discount and interest rates are derived from the real values and the anticipated rate of general price inflation. Given a 3 percent real discount rate and a 7 percent rate of price inflation, the nominal discount rate is determined as 10.2 percent or about 10 percent*.

(iii) Oil and Gas Prices

- Oil Prices

In the base period (January 1982), the Alaskan 1982 dollar price of No. 2 fuel oil is estimated at \$6.50/MMBtu.

Long-term trends in oil prices will be influenced by events that are economic, political and technological in nature, and are therefore estimated within a probabilistic framework.

As shown in Table 18.1, the base case (most likely escalation rate) is estimated to be 2 percent to 2000 and 1 percent from 2000 to 2040. To be consistent with

* $(1 + \text{the nominal rate}) = (1 + \text{the real rate}) \times (1 + \text{the inflation rate}) = 1.03 \times 1.07$, or 1.102

Battelle forecasts, a 2 percent rate was used throughout the OGP planning period 1982 to 2010 and 0 percent thereafter. In the low and high scenarios the growth rates were estimated at 0 percent from 1982-2051, and at 4 percent to 2000, and 2 percent beyond 2000, respectively. These projections are also consistent with those recently advanced by such organizations as DRI (9), World Bank (10), U.S. DOE (11), and Canadian National Energy Board (12).

- Gas Prices

Alaskan gas prices have been forecast using both export opportunity values (netting back CIF prices from Japan to Cook Inlet) and domestic market prices as likely to be faced in the future by Alaskan electric utilities. The OGP analysis used market prices as estimated by Battelle, since there are indications that Cook Inlet reserves may remain insufficient to serve new export markets.

. Domestic Market Prices

Table 18.2 depicts the low, medium and high domestic market prices used in the OGP5 analysis. In the medium (most likely) case, prices escalate at real rates of 2.5 percent from 1982 to 2000 and 2 percent beyond 2000. In the low case, there is zero escalation and in the high case, gas prices grow at 4 percent 1982 to 2000 and 2 percent beyond 2000.

. Export Opportunity Values

Table 18.2 also shows the current and projected opportunity value of Cook Inlet gas in a scenario where the Japanese export market for LNG continues to be the alternative to domestic demand. From a base period plant gate price of \$4.69 MMBtu (CIF Japan), low, medium and high price escalation rates have been estimated for the intervals 1982 to 2000 and 2000 to 2040. The cost of liquefaction and shipping (assumed to be constant in real terms) was subtracted from the escalated CIF prices to derive the Cook Inlet plant-gate prices and their growth rates. These Alaskan opportunity values are projected to escalate at 2.7 percent and 1.2 percent in the medium (most likely) case. Note that the export opportunity values consistently exceed the domestic prices. In the year 2000, for example, the opportunity value is nearly double the domestic price estimated by Battelle.

(iv) Coal Prices

The shadow price or opportunity value of Beluga and Healy coal is the delivered price in alternative markets less the cost of transportation to those markets. The most likely alternative demand for thermal coal is the East Asian market, principally Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The development of 60-year forecasts of coal prices in these markets is conditional on the procurement policies of the importing nations. These factors, in turn, are influenced to a large extent by the price movements of crude oil.

- Historical Trends

Examination of historical coal price trends reveals that FOB and CIF prices have escalated at annual real rates of 1.5 percent to 6.3 percent as shown below:

- . Coal prices (bituminous, export unit value, FOB U.S. ports) grew at real annual rates of 1.5 percent (1950 to 1979) and 2.8 percent (1972 to 1979) (11).
- . In Alaska, the price of thermal coal sold to the GVEA utility advanced at real rates of 2.2 percent (1965 to 1978) and 2.3 percent (1970 to 1978).
- . In Japan, the average CIF prices of steam coal experienced real escalation rates of 6.3 percent per year in the period 1977 to 1981 (20,21). This represents an increase in the average price from approximately \$35.22 per metric ton (mt) in 1977 to about \$76.63/mt in 1981.

As shown below, export prices of coal are highly correlated with oil prices, and an analysis of production costs has not predicted accurately the level of coal prices. Even if the production cost forecast itself is accurate, it will establish a minimum coal price, rather than the market clearing price set by both supply and demand conditions.

- . In real terms export prices of U.S. coal showed a 94 percent and 92 percent correlation with oil prices (1950 to 1979 and 1972 to 1979).*
- . Supply function (production cost) analysis, has estimated Canadian coal at a price of \$23.70 (1980 U.S.

* Analysis is based on data from the World Bank.

\$/ton) for S.E. British Columbia (B.C.) coking coal, FOB Roberts Bank, B.C., Canada (18,23). In fact, Kaiser Resources (now B.C. Coal Ltd.) has signed agreements with Japan at an FOB Price of about \$47.50 (1980 U.S. \$/ton) (19). This is 100 percent more than the price estimate based on production costs.

- . The same comparison for Canadian B.C. thermal coal indicates that the expected price of \$55.00 (1981 Canadian \$) per MT (2200 pounds) or about \$37.00 (1980 U.S. \$) per ton would be 60 percent above estimates founded on production costs (18,19,23).
- . In longer-term coal export contracts, there has been provision for reviewing the base price (regardless of escalation clauses) if significant developments occur in pricing or markets. That is, prices may respond to market conditions even before the expiration of the contract.**
- . Energy-importing nations in Asia, especially Japan, have a stated policy of diversified procurement for their coal supplies. They will not buy only from the lowest-cost supplier (as would be the case in a perfectly competitive model of coal trade) but instead will pay a risk premium to ensure security of supply (see Battelle 18,23).

- Survey of Forecasts

Data Resources Incorporated is projecting an average annual real growth rate of 2.6 percent for U.S. coal prices in the period 1981 to 2000 (9). The World Bank has forecast that the real price of steam coal would advance at approximately the same rate as oil prices (3 percent/a) in the period 1980 to 1990 (10). Canadian Resourcecon Limited has recently forecast growth rates of 2 percent to 4 percent (1980 to 2010) for subbituminous and bituminous steam coal (22).

- Opportunity Value of Alaskan Coal

. Delivered Prices, CIF Japan

Based on these consideration, the shadow price of coal (CIF price in Japan) was forecast using conditional

**This clause forms part of the recently concluded agreement between Denison Mines and Teck Corporation and Japanese steel makers.

probabilities given low, medium, and high oil price scenarios. Table 18.3 depicts the estimated coal price growth rates and their associated probabilities, given the three sets of oil prices. Combining these probabilities with those attached to the oil price cases yields the following coal price scenarios, CIF Japan.

<u>Scenario</u>	<u>Probability</u>	<u>Real Price Growth</u>
Medium (most likely)	49 percent	2 percent (1982-2000) 1 percent (2000-2040)
Low	24 percent	0 percent (1982-2040)
High	27 percent	4 percent (1982-2000) 2 percent (2000-2040)

The 1982 base period price was initially estimated using the data from the Battelle Beluga Market Study (18). Based on this study, a sample of 1980 spot prices (averaging \$1.66/MMBtu) was escalated to January 1982 to provide a starting value of \$1.95/MMBtu in January 1982 dollars.*

As more recent and more complete coal import price statistics became available, this extrapolation of the 19 sample was found to give a significant underestimate of actual CIF prices. By late 1981, Japan's average import price of steam coal reached \$2.96/MMBtu.** An important sensitivity case was therefore developed reflecting these updated actual CIF prices. The updated base period value of \$2.96 was reduced by 10 percent to \$2.66 to recognize the price discount dictated by quality differentials between Alaskan coal and other sources of Japanese coal imports, as estimated by Battelle (18). Tables 18.2 and 18.3 illustrate the range of recent CIF and FOB prices of steam coal imports to Japan.

* The escalation factor was 1.03×1.14 , where 3 percent is the forecast real growth in prices (mid-1980 to January 1982) at an annual rate of 2 percent, and 14 percent is the 18-month increase if the CPI is used to convert from mid-1980 dollars to January 1982 dollars.

**As reported by Coal Week International in October 1981, the average CIF value of steam coal was \$75.50 per MT. At an average heat value of 11,500 Btu/lb, this is equivalent to \$2.96/MBtu.

. Opportunity Values in Alaska

.. Base Case - Battelle-based CIF Prices,
No Export Potential for Healy Coal

Transportation costs of \$0.52/MMBtu were subtracted from the initially estimated CIF price of \$1.95 to determine the opportunity value of Beluga coal at Anchorage. In January 1982 dollars, this base period net-back price is therefore \$1.43. In subsequent years, the opportunity value is derived as the difference between the escalated CIF price and the transport cost (estimated to be constant in real terms). The real growth rate in these FOB prices is determined residually from the forecast opportunity values. In the medium (most likely) case, the Beluga opportunity values escalate at annual rates of 2.6 percent and 1.2 percent during the intervals 1982 to 2000 and 2000 to 2040, respectively.

For Healy coal, it was estimated that the base period price of \$1.75/MMBtu (at Healy) would also escalate at 2.6 percent (to 2000) and 1.2 percent (2000 to 2040). Adding the escalated cost of transportation from Healy to Nenana results in a January 1982 price of \$1.75/MMBtu.* In subsequent years, the cost of transportation of which 30 percent is represented by fuel cost (which escalates at 2 percent) is added to the Healy price resulting in Nenana prices that grow at real rates of 2.3 percent (1982 to 2000) and 1.1 percent (2000 to 2040). Table 18.3 summarizes the real escalation rates applicable to Nenana and Beluga coal in the low, medium, and high price scenarios.

.. Sensitivity Case - Updated CIF Prices,
Export Potential for Healy Coal

The updated CIF price of steam coal (\$2.66/MMBtu after adjusting for quality differentials) was reduced by shipping costs from Healy and Beluga to Japan to yield Alaskan opportunity values. In January 1982, prices are \$2.08 and \$1.74 at Anchorage and Nenana, respectively. The differences between escalated CIF prices and shipping costs result in FOB prices that have real growth rates of

* Transportation costs are based on Battelle (18,23).

2.5 percent and 1.2 percent for Beluga coal and 2.7 percent and 1.2 percent for Healy coal (at Nenana). Table 18.3 shows escalation rates for the opportunity value of Alaskan coal in the low, medium, and high price scenarios, using updated base period values.

(v) Generation Planning Analysis - Base Case Study Values

Based on the considerations presented in Sections (i) through (iv) above, a consistent set of fuel prices was assembled for the base case probabilistic generation planning (OGP5) analysis, as shown in Table 18.4. The study values include probabilities for the low, medium and high fuel price scenarios. The probabilities are common for the three fuels (oil, gas and coal) within each scenario in order to keep the number of generation planning runs to manageable size. In the case of the natural gas prices, domestic market prices were selected for the base case analysis with the export opportunity values used in sensitivity runs. The base period value of \$3 was derived by deflating the 1996 Battelle prices to 1982 by 2.5 percent per year. Coal prices were also selected from the base case using Battelle's 1980 sample of prices as the starting point, with the updated CIF prices of coal reserved for sensitivity runs. Oil prices have been escalated by 2 percent (1982 to 2040).

(b) Analysis of Net Economic Benefits

(i) Modeling Approach

Using the economic parameters discussed in the previous section and data relating to the electrical energy generation alternatives available for the Railbelt, an analysis was made comparing the costs of electrical energy production with and without the Susitna project. The primary tool for the analysis was a generation planning model (OGP5) which simulates production costs over a planning period extending from 1982 to 2010.

The method of comparing the "with" and "without" Susitna alternative generation scenarios is based on the long-term present worth (PW) or total system costs. The planning model determines the total production costs of alternative plans on a year-by-year basis. These total costs for the period of modeling include all costs of fuel and operation and maintenance (O&M) for all generating units included as part of the system, and the annualized investment costs of any generating and system transmission plants added during the period of 1993 to 2010. Factors which contribute to

the ultimate consumer cost of power but which are not included as input to this model are investment costs for all generation plants in service prior to 1993 investment, cost of the transmission and distribution facilities already in service, and administrative costs of utilities. These costs are common to all scenarios and therefore have been omitted from the study.

In order to aggregate and compare costs on a significantly long-term basis, annual costs have been aggregated for the period of 1993 to 2051. Costs have been computed as the sum of two components and converted to a 1982 PW. The first component is the 1982 PW of cost output from the first 18 years of model simulation from 1993 to 2010. The second component is the estimated PW of long-term system costs from 2011 to 2051.

For an assumed set of economic parameters on a particular generation alternative, the first element of the PW value represents the amount of cash (not including those costs noted above) needed in 1982 to meet electrical production needs in the Railbelt for the period 1993 to 2010. The second element of the aggregated PW value is the long-term (2011 to 2051) PW estimate of production costs. In considering the value to the system of the addition of a hydroelectric power plant, which has a useful life of approximately 50 years, the shorter study period would be inadequate. A hydroelectric plant added in 1993 or 2002 would accrue PW benefits for only 17 or 9 years, respectively, using an investment horizon that extends to 2010. However, to model the system for an additional 40 years it would be necessary to develop future load forecasts and generation alternatives which are beyond the realm of any prudent projections. For this reason, it has been assumed that the production costs for the final study year (2010) would simply reoccur for an additional 41 years, and the PW of these was added to the 18-year PW (1995 to 2010) to establish the long-term cost differences between alternative methods of power generation.

(ii) Base Case Analysis

- Pattern of Investments "With" and "Without" Susitna

The base case comparison of the "with" and "without" Susitna plans is based on an assessment of the PW production costs as outlined in 18 (c) (i) for the period 1993 to 2051, using mid-range values for the energy demand and load forecast, fuel prices, fuel price escalation rates, capital costs, and capital cost escalation rates. Load forecasts, fuel prices and construction costs are

analyzed in Sections 5, 18.1 (b) and 16, respectively. As discussed in Section 18.1 (b), a real interest and discount rate of 3 percent is used.

The with-Susitna plan calls for 680 MW of generating capacity at Watana to be available to the system in 1993. Although the project may come on-line in stages during that year, for modeling purposes full-load generating capability is assumed to be available for the entire year. The second stage of Susitna, the Devil Canyon project, is scheduled to come on-line in 2002. The optimum timing for the addition of Devil Canyon was tested for earlier and later dates. Addition in the year 2002 was found to result in the lowest long-term cost. Devil Canyon will have 600 MW of installed capacity.

The without-Susitna plan is discussed in Section 6.7. It includes 3200 MW coal-fired plants added at Beluga in 1993, 1994, and 2007. A 200 MW unit is added at Nenana in 1996. In addition, nine 70 MW gas-fired combustion turbines (GTs) are added during the 1997 to 2010 period.

- Base Case Net Economic Benefits

The economic comparison of these plans is shown in Table 18.5. During the 1993 to 2010 study period, the 1982 PW cost for the Susitna plan is \$3.119 billion. The annual production cost in 2010 is \$0.385 billion. The PW of this level cost, which remains virtually constant for a period extending to the end of the life of the Devil Canyon plant (2051), is \$3.943 billion. The resulting total cost of the with-Susitna plan is \$7.06 billion in 1982 dollars, presently valued to 1982.

The non-Susitna plan which was modeled has a 1982 PW cost of \$3.213 billion for the 1993 to 2010 periods with a 2010 annual cost of \$0.491 billion. The total long-term cost has a PW of \$8.24 billion. Therefore, the net economic benefit of adopting the Susitna plan is \$1.18 billion. In other words, the present valued cost difference between the Susitna plan and the expansion plan based on thermal plant addition is \$1.18 billion in 1982 dollars. This is equivalent to a 1982 per capita net economic benefit of \$2,700 per capita for the 1982 population of the State of Alaska. Expressed in 1993 dollars (at the on-line date of Watana), the net benefits would have a levelized value of \$2.48 billion.*

* \$1.18 billion times 2.105, where 2.105 is the general price inflation index for the period 1982 to 1993.



It is noted that the magnitude of net economic benefits (\$1.18 billion) is not particularly sensitive to alternative assumptions concerning the overall rate of price inflation as measured by the CPI. The analysis has been carried out in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Therefore, the present valued cost savings will remain close to \$1.18 billion regardless of CPI movements, as long as the real (inflation-adjusted) discount and interest rates are maintained at 3 percent.

The Susitna project's internal rate of return (IRR), i.e., the real (inflation-adjusted) discount rate at which the with-Susitna plan has zero net economic benefits, or the discount rate at which the costs of the with-Susitna and the "alternate" plans have equal costs, has also been determined. The IRR is about 4.1 percent in real terms, and 11.4 percent in nominal (inflation-inclusive) terms. Therefore, the investment in Susitna would significantly exceed the 5 percent nominal rate of return "test" proposed by the State of Alaska in cases where state appropriations may be involved.*

It is emphasized that these net economic benefits and the rate of return stemming from the Susitna project are inherently conservative estimates due to several assumptions made in the OGP5 analysis.

. Zero Growth in Long-term Costs

From 2010 to 2051, the OGP5 analysis assumed constant annual production costs in both the Susitna and non-Susitna plans. This has the effect of excluding real escalation in fuel prices and the capital costs of thermal plant replacements, and thereby understating the long-term PW costs of thermal generation plans.

. Loss of Load Probabilities

The loss of load probability in the non-Susitna plan is calculated at 0.099 in the year 2010. This means that the system in 2010 is on the verge of adding an additional plant, and would do so in 2011. These costs are, however, not included in the analysis, which is cut off at 2010. On the other hand, the Susitna plan has a loss of load probability of 0.025, and may not require additional capacity for several years beyond 2010.

* See State of Alaska's SB-25, Section 44.83.670.

. Long-term Energy From Susitna

Some of the Susitna energy output (about 350 GWh) is still not used by 2010. This energy output would be available to meet future increases in projected demand in the summer months. No benefit is attributed to this energy in the analysis.

. Equal Environmental Costs

The OGP5 analysis has implicitly assumed equal environmental costs for both the Susitna and the non-Susitna plans. To the extent that the thermal generation expansion plan is expected to carry greater environmental costs than the Susitna plan, the economic cost savings from the Susitna project are understated. It is conceivable that these so-called negative externalities from coal-fired electricity generation will have been mitigated by 1993 and beyond as a result of the enactment of new environmental legislation. However, such government action would simply internalize the externality by forcing up the production and market costs of thermal power.

(iii) Sensitivity Analysis

Rather than rely on a single point comparison to assess the net benefit of the Susitna project, a sensitivity analysis was carried out to identify the impact of modified assumptions on the results. The analysis was directed at the following variables:

- Load forecast;
- Real interest and discount rate;
- Construction period;
- Period of analysis;
- Capital costs;
 - . Susitna
 - . Thermal alternatives
- O&M costs;
- Base period fuel price;
- Real escalation in capital costs, O&M costs, and fuel prices;
- System reliability; and
- Chackachamna.

Tables 18.6 to 18.14 depict the results of the sensitivity analysis. In particular, Table 18.14 summarizes the net economic benefits of the Susitna Project associated with each sensitivity test. The net benefits have been compared

using indexes relative to the base case value (\$1.176 billion) which is set to 100.

The greatest variability in results occurs in sensitivity tests pertaining to fuel escalation rates, discount rates, and base period coal prices. For example, a scenario with high fuel price escalation results in net benefits that have a value of 253 relative to the base case. In other words, the high case provides 253 percent of the base case net benefits. In general, the Susitna plan maintains its positive net benefits over a reasonably wide range of values assigned to the key variables.

A multivariate analysis in the form of probability trees has been undertaken to test the joint effects of varying several assumptions in combination rather than individually. This probabilistic analysis reported in Section 18.2 provides a range of expected net economic benefits and probability distributions that identify the chances of exceeding particular values of net benefits at given levels of confidence.

18.2 - Probability Assessment and Risk Analysis

(a) Introduction to Multivariate Sensitivity Analysis

The feasibility study of the Susitna Hydroelectric Project included an economic analysis based on a comparison of generation system production costs with and without the proposed project using a computerized model of the Railbelt generation system. In order to carry out this analysis, numerous projections and forecasts of future conditions were made. These forecasts of uncertain conditions include future electrical demand, costs, and escalation. In order to address these uncertain conditions, a sensitivity analysis on key factors was carried out. This analysis focused on the variance of each of a number of forecast conditions and determined the impact of variance on the economic feasibility of the project. Each factor was varied singularly with all other variables held constant to determine clearly its importance.

The purpose of this multivariable analysis was to select the most critical and sensitive variables in the economic analysis and to test the economic feasibility of the Susitna Project in each possible combination of the selected variables.

While a number of variables were identified and tested in the single variable sensitivity analysis for the Susitna economic feasibility study, the variables which were chosen for the multivariate sensitivity analysis represent the key issues such as load forecasts, capital cost of alternatives, fuel escalation and Susitna capital cost.

The methodology for the multivariate analysis was implemented by constructing probability trees of future conditions for the Alaska Railbelt electrical system, with and without the Susitna Project. Each branching of the tree represents three values for a given variable. These were assigned a high, medium, and low value as well as a corresponding probability of occurrence. The three values represent the expected range and mid-point for a given variable. In some cases, the mid-point represents the most likely value which would be expected to occur. End limbs of the probability tree represent scenarios of mixed variable conditions and a probability of occurrence of the scenario.

The OGP5 production cost model was then used to determine the PW (in 1982 dollars) of the long-term cost of the electric generation related to each variable. The PW of the long-term costs for each "with" and "without" Susitna scenario in terms of cumulative probability of occurrence were determined and plotted. Net benefits of the project have also been calculated and analyzed in a probabilistic manner.

Figures 18.1 and 18.2 present the non-Susitna and Susitna probability trees with resultant long-term costs.

(b) Comparison of Long-term Costs

Figure 18.3 presents the two histograms of long-term costs for the "with" and "without" Susitna cases plotted on the same axes. From these plots it is seen that the non-Susitna plan costs could be expected to be significantly less than the Susitna plan costs for about 6 percent of the time, approximately equal to the Susitna costs 16 percent of the time, and significantly greater for 78 percent of the time.

A comparison of the expected value of long-term costs of the "with" and "without" Susitna cases yields an expected value net benefit of \$1.45 billion. This value represents the difference between the non-Susitna LTC of \$8.48 billion and the Susitna LTC of \$7.03 billion.

(c) Net Benefit Comparison

A second method of comparing the "with" and "without" Susitna probability trees is by making a direct comparison of similar scenarios and calculating the net benefit which applies. As in the case of the individual tree cases, the net benefits were ranked from low to high and plotted against cumulative probability. This graph has been represented as a single line due to the number of points on the curve. It, however, would be most accurately portrayed as a histogram in the manner of Figure 18.3. The net benefits vary from a negative \$2.92 billion with an associated probability of .0015 to a high of \$4.80 billion with an associated

probability of .018. The single comparison with the highest probability of occurrence of .108 has a net benefit of \$2.09 billion.

Figure 18.4 plots the net benefit with the cross-over between the "with" and "without" Susitna costs occurring at about 23 percent. This is consistent with the previous comparison and with the expected value net benefit calculated by this method of \$1.45 billion.

(d) Sensitivity of Results to Probabilities

In assigning the probabilities of occurrence for each set of variables, a number of subjective assumptions were made. An exception was the Susitna capital cost probability distribution which was supported by a probabilistic risk assessment of construction cost. The probabilities for load forecast of 0.2, 0.6 and 0.2 for the low, medium and high cases respectively, reflect the analysis by Battelle and the probability of exceedence of approximately 10 percent for the high level of demand.

Capital costs, for alternative generation modes as estimated by EBASCO for Battelle reflect a 0.20, 0.60 and 0.20 distribution, again within a range of a 90 percent chance of exceedence of the low and 10 percent exceedence of the high level.

The single variable to which the results are most sensitive is the rate of real fuel escalation adopted. (This conclusion is supported by the single variable analysis as well.) The distribution of probabilities was 0.25, 0.50 and 0.25 for low, medium and high fuel cost escalation scenarios. A case can be made for the agreement that some of the combined events, for example high fuel cost escalation, load and capital cost are not (as our results assume) independent of each other. High fuel prices, it may be argued, would result in lower load and increased capital cost. It is probable, however, that the greater revenues consequent on higher fuel prices would result in greater economic activity in Alaska thus increasing demand for energy. This and other considerations led to the conclusion that the results would be relatively insensitive to probable ranges of interdependence.

(e) Approach to Risk Analysis

A separate risk analysis was undertaken to provide a basis for determining the extent to which perceived risks are likely to influence capital costs and schedule. In addition, because Susitna Project when operating would represent a major portion of the total generation system, a further risk analysis was made to assess the probability and consequences of a long-term outage of the proposed transmission system. Paragraphs (e) to (h) summarize both risk analyses. A more detailed treatment is included in the reference report "Economic, Marketing and Financial Evaluation" (25).

Any major construction effort is inevitably exposed to a large number of risks. Low probability magnitude floods may occur at critical periods of construction: accidents may happen: sub-surface investigations, no matter how thorough, cannot always predict actual conditions uncovered when the major excavations are undertaken: the normal estimating process implicitly assumes a set of reasonably "normal" expectations as direct costs are developed, adding a contingency to the directly computed total on the grounds that problems usually do occur even though their specific nature may not be accurately foreseen at the outset.

The Susitna risk analysis took explicit account of 21 different risks, applying them, as appropriate, to each major construction activity. The effort involved combining reasonably precise data (e.g., the probability that a particular flood crest will occur in any given year can be determined from analysis of hydrologic records) with numerous subjective judgments (e.g., until a particular flood crest does occur, it cannot be known with any degree of certainty what damage it will cause). The overall methodology is illustrated in Figure 18.5.

(f) Elements of the Risk Analysis

Figure 18.6 depicts graphically important questions which were addressed at the start and relates them to elements of the analysis. Each element is further subdivided as follows:

(i) Configurations

Three primary configurations were considered:

- The Watana hydroelectric project (with transmission);
- The Devil Canyon hydroelectric project (with transmission); and
- The Susitna transmission system alone.

Separate risk studies of these configurations permitted the production of data which can be aggregated in various ways to accommodate alternative "power-on-line" dates which differ according to the various demand forecasts.

(ii) Configuration States

Two configuration states were considered:

- Construction Period - applicable to Watana and Devil Canyon
- Operation Period - applied only in this analysis, to the transmission system configuration.

(iii) Risks

Twenty-one risks were identified for consideration in the analysis and were grouped as follows:

- Natural Risks - 7 risks including flood, ice, seismic effects, geologic conditions, etc.
- Design Controlled Risks - 2 risks, seepage piping erosion and ground water.
- Construction Risks - 6 risks including availability of equipment, labor and material and weather.
- Human Risks - 4 risks including accidents, sabotage and factors relating to contractor capability.
- Special Risks - 2 risks, regulatory delay and estimating variance.

(iv) Activities

For each configuration state involving construction, up to 22 activities were considered. For Watana, for example, these included facilities ranging from the main dam to transmission lines and major key events such as impoundment and start-up.

(v) Damage Scenarios

Up to ten different damage scenarios were associated with each logical risk-activity combination. While these varied significantly from one risk-activity combination to another, they generally described a range of possibilities which accounted for discrete increments extending from "no damage" to "catastrophic loss".

(vi) Criteria

The consequences of realizing particular risk magnitudes for each activity were measured in terms of cost and schedule implication and manpower requirement.

(vii) Boundary Conditions

The following assumptions and limitations were established to permit a reasonable and consistent analysis of the problem:

- All cost estimates were made in terms of January 1982 dollars. Thus, results are presented in this report in

terms only of real potential cost variations, exclusive of inflation.

- The analysis was limited only to the construction periods for Watana and Devil Canyon since the greatest potential cost and schedule variance would be possible during these periods. The risk analysis for the operating period was associated solely with the transmission system since that configuration represents the most likely source of a major system outage during the project operation.
- The risk analysis was accomplished concurrently with finalization of the total project cost estimate and was necessarily associated with the feasibility level design. There is clearly some potential for design change as the project proceeds; a further risk analysis should be undertaken coincident with completion of final detailed design and prior to commitment to major construction activities. Even so, the "estimating variance" risk takes into account the fact that some design changes are likely to appear as detailed design effort proceeds.

(g) Risk Assessments

For each of the risks identified in paragraph 18.2 (f) (iii) above, the assessment commenced with detailed definition of credible events. Where flood was identified as a risk, for example, the potential magnitudes and associated probabilities of the floods were estimated. Data sources ranged from reasonably accurate scientific data (particularly applicable to the natural risk category), historical experience on water resources projects, to subjective group judgments where data gaps existed.

In each case, the maximum credible event was first established. This choice set an upper limit on a scale of possible events starting at "no damage" situation. Continuing with flood as an example, the maximum credible event was considered to be the probable maximum flood which had been computed in the hydrologic studies (corresponding to a return period of more than 10,000 years and an annual probability of occurrence of less than .0001).

Once risks were defined and logical risk-activity combinations were reviewed, the consequences of realizing each selected risk magnitude were considered (if this risk magnitude is realized, will a partially completed structure be damaged? Will it fail? If it fails, is some other work in progress disrupted?). Because of the uncertainties associated with these projections, a range of damage scenarios and associated probabilities of them occurring was established.

Even if a particular risk level is realized and a particular damage is suffered, the cost and schedule of restoring the



activity are difficult to precisely establish. Each of the risk analysts therefore provided three values for each criterion:

- a minimum value corresponding to the one time in twenty that the weather is particularly good, materials are readily available, no accidents occur, etc.;
- a modal value associated with the most likely expectation of the analyst;
- a maximum value corresponding to the one time in twenty that everything is more difficult than expected.

In the computerized calculation process, the three criterion values supplied by the risk analyst were fitted to a triangular distribution, which approximated the beta distribution illustrated at the bottom of Figure 18.7.

In effect, then, designation of the three conceptual criterion values led to generation of a histogram with relatively narrow intervals and a nearly continuous range of possible values over a relatively wide spectrum.

Figure 18.7 illustrates the structural relationship for handling risk-activity combinations, damage scenarios, and criterion values.

(h) Interpretation of Results

(i) Presentation of Data

Minor variations in activity costs were generated by the estimating team concurrent with development of the risk analysis. In addition, account was taken of the expectation that construction costs will escalate at a faster rate than normal inflation - both in the economic analyses and the risk analyses. To avoid confusion regarding absolute cost values, the results of the risk analysis are presented in this section as percentages of the estimated project cost or as ratios between actual costs and estimated costs.

(ii) Watana Cost-Probability Distribution

Figure 18.8 illustrates the cumulative distribution of total direct costs and their related non-exceedance probabilities as determined in the risk analysis. Certain important points noted on the figure are interpreted as follows:

- The project direct cost estimate, including contingencies, was presented in Chapter 16. Point "A" on Figure 18.8 corresponds to this project estimate: the analysis suggests that the probability of completing Watana for less than the project estimate which includes a 17.5 percent contingency allowance is 73 percent.
- Point "B" corresponds to the "low" cost estimate which was tested for sensitivity in the OGP5 system cost analysis. The probability that Watana will be completed for less than this cost estimate is about 46 percent.
- Point "C" on Figure 18.8 corresponds to a cost equal to the "high" estimate tested in the OGP5 analysis to determine the effect of such a cost on total project economics. The risk analysis suggests that there is a 90 percent probability that this cost will not be exceeded.
- As will be noted from Figure 18.8, there remains a small but measurable possibility that the project costs will exceed even the "high" estimate value at Point "C". It can be argued that the degree of conservatism which was used in the analysis has overstated the possibility of extreme upper limits on total cost. Paragraph (v) below addresses this issue, comparing these results with historical data.
- The expected value of the actual cost is 90.25 percent of the project estimate.

(iii) Devil Canyon - Probability Distributions

Figure 18.9 provides the cumulative probability distribution for Devil Canyon costs. Points A, B, and C on the curve correspond to those discussed above for Watana and are associated with probabilities of 74 percent, 47 percent, and 90 percent, respectively, for actual percentages of the project estimate being less than indicated values. Once again, a not insignificant long "tail" in the extreme upper righthand portion of the distribution provides a measure of the potential exposure to large overruns. The expected value of the actual cost is 91.5 percent of the project estimate.

(iv) Total Project Distribution

Figure 18.10 combines the separate Watana and Devil Canyon projects, providing a cumulative distribution for the Susitna Hydroelectric Project as a whole. Points A, B, and C now have associated probabilities of non-exceedance of 73 percent, 47 percent and 90 percent, respectively, suggesting that a broad range of total project cost ratios are

possible. In the 10 percent range and 90 percent probability interval, the cost range spans nearly \$3 billion. If the project follows historical patterns, it may be expected that this range will narrow over time as detailed design and construction proceed. Note that the cost distributions are in every case based upon January 1982 dollars and do not account for the effects of inflation. Interest during construction and finance charges are not included. Only the potential for extraordinary construction cost escalation (over and above inflation) has been taken into account. It follows that if the project is completed in the next several decades, the final "actual" cost will have to be adjusted to equivalent 1982 dollars if it is to be compared with risk analysis results presented herein.

(v) Comparison with Available Data

During the assessment of the important "estimating variance" risk, historical data for 49 federal water resources projects completed prior to passage of NEPA was considered. Figure 18.11 offers a cumulative probability historical program for various cost ratios. In each case, the cost ratio reflects the actual project cost (after adjustment for inflation) divided by the "initial" estimated cost. It will be seen that relatively large overruns have occurred in the past, while there is also evidence that a substantial number of water resources projects have been accomplished for less than the originally estimated costs.

In order to compare this information with the Susitna risk analysis results, it is necessary to determine the meaning of the "initial" estimate in terms of the historical data. In each case, the "initial" estimate is the estimate presented to the Congress at the time that a request was made for project authorization. Thus, it would be inappropriate to regard the current Susitna estimate (as discussed in Chapter 16) as an "initial" estimate in the federal sense. Fortunately, however, the Susitna Project does have a long history of federal involvement. Indeed, the Corps of Engineers provided a detailed "initial" estimate in 1975 as the basis for seeking authorization for important design activities. This "initial" estimate was further updated by a second "initial" estimate in 1979 after some additional exploratory work and further analysis were requested by the Office of Management and Budget. Inclusive of contingencies and excluding lands, the direct cost "initial" Corps of Engineers' estimate (from the 1979 report) in January 1982 dollars for the Watana/Devil Canyon (thin arch dam) Project was used as the denominator for display of possible Susitna cost ratios.

Figure 18.12 overlays the results of the Susitna risk analysis on the historical data. Note that the cost ratios differ on this display from those on Figure 18.10 because of the necessity to use the "initial" estimate for comparison purposes.

As may be seen from Figure 18.12, the Susitna risk analysis results reflect a more pessimistic expectation at low cost levels than the historical data would appear to indicate is appropriate.

(vi) Schedule Risks

At the same time that minimum, modal, and maximum cost values were estimated for each damage scenario in each risk-activity set, estimates were also made of similar values for potential schedule changes. As a result, schedule probability distributions were generated for each major activity. However, these individual distributions could not be combined in the same manner in which the cost data were handled.

A critical path network was prepared for the entire set of activities for each configuration. Individual probability distributions for critical activities were then combined to yield a distribution for the total project schedule.

Several critical paths were identified in the process, since a long delay on a non-critical activity can, of course, place that activity on a new critical path. The "raw" schedule delay distribution was then considered in the context of a one-year schedule contingency which had been built into the original estimate and in light of regulatory delay risks. The resulting distributions are discussed and interpreted as follows:

- Figure 18.13 provides a cumulative probability distribution in months from the scheduled completion data for the Watana Project. It reflects all risk contributions except those posed by regulatory requirements. It is based upon a critical path through the main dam construction and takes into account the one-year schedule contingency. The indicated probability of completing the project ahead of schedule or on time is about 65 percent. There is only a 17-percent chance of completing the project a year early (i.e., in 1992).
- Figure 18.14 provides a similar distribution after regulatory risks are accounted for. Two components are included: (1) prior to the start of construction, a license must be issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission. There is a small chance (estimated to be 25 percent) that the license will be issued a year earlier than the current 30-month licensing schedule anticipates. The probability of meeting or improving upon the 30-month estimate is about 72 percent and there is a 90 percent probability that not more than 38 months will be required; (2) during the construction period, regulatory delays may be imposed as a result of various permitting requirements, injunctions, etc. These delays yield only increases in schedule and range from a 50 percent probability of delays of a month or less to a 95 percent probability that regulatory delays during construction will not exceed 12 months.

As may be seen from Figure 18.14, the net effect of the regulatory risks is to broaden the range of possible values. At the lower end of the distribution, it will be noted that the chances of completing at least a year early will have increased to nearly 40 percent - primarily because of the chance of getting a license early and therefore, starting early. No significant change appears for the probability of meeting or improving upon the schedule. A substantial effect is evident in the upper portion of the curve where the chances of long regulatory delays have pushed out the 95 percent confidence level to an expectation of no more than three months attributable to risks other than regulatory, as may be seen on Figure 18.13.

While similar distributions can be plotted for Devil Canyon, they are less meaningful since there is flexibility associated with its starting date.

(vii) Transmission Line Risks

The separate risk analysis of the Susitna transmission system (which is described in detail in Section 14) was conducted to determine the probability of significant power supply interruptions at the two major load centers in Anchorage and Fairbanks. The methodology was generally similar to that described in preceding paragraphs. Recognizing that the system is assumed to be in an operating mode, those risks which had applied only for construction in the preceding analysis (e.g., contractor capability) were eliminated from the risk list. Additions to the list were made to account for the potential effects of lighting, aircraft, collisions, and anchor-dragging in Knik Arm (applicable to the submarine cable segment). Account was taken of redundancies designed into the system (e.g., a loss of one line in the three-line system extending south toward Anchorage can be tolerated with no loss of energy delivery capability).

In addition, special attention was given to dependencies (e.g., an earthquake which causes the loss of two lines will very likely knock out the third. On the other hand, vandalism which causes an outage on one line is only infrequently expected to extend to all lines). Important assumptions included the availability of well-trained repair crews and equipment, and a reasonable supply of spare components.

The results of the analysis provide the cumulative probability of not exceeding a given number of days of reduced energy delivery capability. Figures 18.15 and 18.16 display this information for Anchorage and Fairbanks, respectively. Interpretations are as follows:

- In the particular case of Anchorage (Figure 18.15), it will first be noted that the probability scale includes only the extreme upper range of non-exceedance probabilities. The intersection of the distribution curves on the probability axis indicates that the probability of no lost energy delivery capability in a given year is 0.958 and of not having 50 percent reduction of 0.955. Beyond these points the curves rise sharply, indicating that outages beyond five days are extremely unlikely. The "expected" annual value of 0.06961 days for a total delivery loss may be compared with the "loss of load probability" of 0.1 (one day in ten years) which had been used in the generation planning efforts in the economic studies. In short, the risk analysis confirms that the reliability of the transmission system for energy delivery to Anchorage is consistent with the requirements of the overall Railbelt generation system. The "expected" annual value of 0.09171 days for a 50 percent reduction in energy delivery appears to be similarly acceptable when compared to assumed loss of load probability.
- The cumulative probability distribution for Fairbanks (Figure 18.16) has a slightly different intercept on the probability axis and its shape is also slightly different from those for Anchorage. These differences stem from the fact that delivery to Fairbanks requires no submerged crossing and certain other risks (e.g., flood, temperature extremes) would be expected to have different probabilities for northern and southern segments of the system. In spite of the absolute differences, it may be seen from the display that "expected" annual value of .08116 does not exceed the loss of load probability criterion of 0.1 days per year. No 50 percent loss for Fairbanks is shown since the loss of one of two lines causes no reduction in delivery capability. Two lines lost is, of course, a 100 percent loss.

(viii) Emergency Response

In spite of the apparent reliability of the transmission system, it is nonetheless true that a small but finite chance of relatively long-term outages does exist. It is also unfortunately true that certain extreme risk magnitudes (e.g., combination of extreme loss temperature, wind, and ice) which could lead to an outage also tend to coincide with high demands by users on the generating system. The "response" in this case is extremely important. The section dealing with risk analysis, in the Reference Report "Economic, Marketing and Financial Evaluation" (25) provides such a response in the form of a preliminary emergency plan which includes such measures as shedding non-essential loads, putting reserve capacity on-line, and energy transfers from military generation systems. Prior to the time that the Susitna Hydroelectric Project comes into operation, this plan should be updated and occasional tests should be made.

(i) Conclusions

The central conclusions of the Probability Assessment are that the expected value of the PW net benefit from Susitna is \$1.45 billion and that this value has a 0.5 probability of being exceeded. There is also only a 0.36 probability of the net benefit falling below \$0.5 billion.

Based upon the Risk Analysis, it is concluded that:

- The probabilities that actual costs will not exceed values subjected to sensitivity tests in the economic analysis are as follows:

<u>Value</u>	<u>Probability That Value Will Not Be Exceeded</u>
Project Estimate	73%
Low Capital Cost Tested in the Economic Analysis	47%
High Capital Cost Tested in the Economic Analysis	90%

- Exposure to potential costs above the project estimates does exist and there is about a 1 percent chance that an overrun of 40 percent or more (in 1982 dollars) will occur.
- The annual probability that no interruption in energy delivery to major load centers will occur as a result of transmission line failures is in excess of 95 percent.

- Expected values of energy delivery interruptions are less than one day in ten years and are consistent with loss of load probabilities assumed in the generation planning efforts.
- There is a 65 percent probability that the Watana Project will be completed prior to the scheduled time in 1993. Exposure to schedule delays is heavily influenced by regulatory requirements and there is a 10 percent probability that the Watana Project will not be completed until 1995 or later.

18.3 - Marketing

This section presents an assessment of the market in the Railbelt Region for the energy and capacity of the Susitna development. A range of rates at which this power could be priced is presented together with a proposed basis for contracting for the supply of Susitna energy.

(a) The Railbelt Power System

Susitna capacity and energy will be delivered to the "Railbelt Region Interconnected System" which will result from the linkage of the Anchorage and Fairbanks systems by an intertie to be completed in the mid-1980s.

The Railbelt Region covers the Anchorage-Cook Inlet area, the Fairbanks-Tanana Valley area, and the Glennallen-Valdez area (Figure 18.17). The utilities, military installations and universities within this Region which own electric generating facilities are listed in Table 18.15. The service areas of these utilities are shown in Figure 18.18 and the generating plants serving the region are listed in Table 18.16.

The Railbelt Region is currently served by nine major utility systems; five are rural electric cooperatives, three are municipally owned and operated, and one is a federal wholesaler. The relative mix of electric generating technologies and types of fuel used by the Railbelt utilities in 1980 is summarized in Figure 18.19.

In 1980, the Anchorage-Cook Inlet area had 81 percent, the Fairbanks-Tanana Valley area 17 percent, and the Glennallen-Valdez area 2 percent of the total energy sales in the Railbelt Region.

If the recommendations of the May 1981 Gilbert/Commonwealth Report are implemented, the Anchorage and Fairbanks power systems will be intertied before the Susitna Project comes into operation. The proposed intertie will allow a capacity transfer of up to 70 MW in either direction. The proposed plan of interconnection envisages initial operation at 138 kV with subsequent uprating to 345 kV allowing the line to be integrated into the Susitna transmission facilities.

(b) Regional Electric Power Demand and Supply

A review of the socioeconomic scenarios upon which forecasts of electric power demand were based is presented in Section 5 of this report. The forecasts adopted here are the mid-range levels presented by Battelle Northwest in December 1981. Subsequent forecasts which introduce price/demand elasticity considerations have not been used at this stage. The results of studies presented in Section 5 call for Watana to come into operation in 1993 and to deliver a full year's energy generation in 1994. Devil Canyon will come into operation in 2002 and deliver a full year's energy in 2003. Energy demand in the Railbelt Region and the deliveries from Susitna are shown in Figure 18.20.

(c) Market and Price for Watana Output in 1994

It has been assumed that Watana energy will be supplied at a single wholesale rate on a free market basis. This requires, in effect, that Susitna energy be priced so that it is attractive even to utilities with the lowest cost alternative source of energy. On this basis it is estimated that for the 3315 GWh of energy generated by Watana in 1994 to be attractive, a price of 145 mills per kWh in 1994 dollars is required. Justification for this price is illustrated in Figure 18.21. Note that the assumption is made that the only capital costs which would be avoided in the early 1990s would be those due to the addition of new coal-fired generating plants (i.e., the 2 x 200 MW coal-fired Beluga station). The Susitna energy price of 145 mills/kWh suggested here matches closely the value determined from OGP5 analysis in the financial evaluation (18.4).

The financing considerations under which it would be appropriate for Watana energy to be sold at approximately 145 mills kWh price are considered in Section 18.4 of this report; however, it should be noted that some of the energy which would be displaced by Watana's 3387 GWh would have been generated at a lower cost than 145 mills, and utilities might wish to delay accepting it at this price until the escalating cost of natural gas or other fuels made it more attractive. A number of approaches to the resolution of this problem can be postulated including pre-contract arrangements considered in (c) (i) below.

(i) Contractual Preconditions for Susitna Energy Sale

It will be necessary to contract with Railbelt Utilities for the purchase of Susitna capacity and energy on a basis appropriate to support financing of the project. This should be a precondition for the actual commencement of project construction. Delay in contract negotiations until after the project was truly committed would be undesirable as the project would then represent a trapped resource with no alternative markets.

Pricing policies for Susitna output are assumed to be constrained by both cost (as defined by Senate Bill 25) and by the price of energy from the best thermal option.

Marketing Susitna's output within these twin constraints would ensure that all state support for Susitna flowed through to consumers and under no circumstances were prices to consumers higher than they would have been under the best thermal option. In addition, consumers would also obtain the long-term economic benefits of Susitna's low cost energy.

(d) Market Price for Watana Output 1995-2001

After its initial entry into the system in 1994, the price and market for the 3387 MWh of Watana output is consistently upheld over the years to 2001 by the projected 20 percent increase in total demand over this period.

There would, as a result, be a 70 percent increase in cost savings compared with the best thermal alternative: the increasing cost per unit of output from a system without Susitna is illustrated in Figure 18.22.

(e) Market and Price for Watana and Devil Canyon Output in 2003

A diagrammatic analysis of the total cost savings which the combined Watana and Devil Canyon output will confer on the system compared with the present thermal option in the year 2003 is shown in Figure 18.23. These total savings are divided by the energy contributed by Susitna to indicate a price of 250 mills per kWh as the maximum price which can be charged for Susitna output. Here again, the problem of competing with lower cost combined cycle, gas turbines, etc., will have to be addressed; however, this problem is likely to be short term in nature, as by this time period these thermal power facilities will be approaching retirement.

Only about 90 percent of the total Susitna output will be absorbed by the system in 2002, the balance of the output being progressively absorbed over the following decade. This will provide increasing total savings to the system from Susitna, with no associated increase in costs.

(f) Potential Impact of State Appropriations

In the preceding paragraphs the maximum price at which Susitna energy could be sold has been identified. Sale of the energy at these prices will depend upon the magnitude of any proposed state appropriation designed to reduce the cost of Susitna energy in the earlier years. At significantly lower prices it is likely that the total system demand will be higher than assumed. This,

combined with a state appropriation to reduce the energy cost of Watana energy, would make it correspondingly easier to market the output from the Susitna development; however, as the preceding analysis shows, a viable and strengthening market exists for the energy from the development that would make it possible to price the output up to the cost of the best thermal alternative.

(g) Conclusions

Based on the assessment of the market for power and energy output from the Susitna Hydroelectric Project it has been concluded that, with the appropriate level of state appropriation and with pricing as defined in Senate Bill 25, an attractive basis exists, particularly in the long term, for the Railbelt utilities to derive benefit from the Project. It should be recognized that contractual arrangements covering purchase of Susitna output will be an essential precondition for the actual commencement of project construction.

18.4 - Financial Evaluation

(a) Forecast Financial Parameters

The financial, economic, and engineering estimates used in the financial analysis are summarized in Table 18.17. The interest rates and forecast rates of inflation (in the Consumer Price Index - CPI) are of special importance. They have been based on the forecast inflation rates and the forecast of interest rates on industrial bonds as given by Data Resources Incorporated, and conform to a range of other authoritative forecasts. To allow for the factors which have brought about a narrowing of the differential between tax-exempt and non-taxexempt securities, it has been assumed that any tax-exempt financing would be at a rate of 80 percent rather than the historical 75 percent or so of the non-tax-exempt interest rate. This identifies the forecast interest rates in the financing periods from 1985 in successive five-year periods as being of the order of 8.6 percent, 7.8 percent, and 7 percent. The accompanying rate of inflation would be about 7 percent. In view of the uncertainty attaching to such forecasts and in the interest of conservatism, the financial projections which follow have been based upon the assumption of a 10 percent rate of interest for tax-exempt bonds and an ongoing inflation rate of 7 percent.

(b) The Inflationary Financing Deficit

The basic financing problem of Susitna is the magnitude of its "inflationary financing deficits". Under inflationary conditions these deficits (early year losses) are an inherent characteristic of almost all debt financed, long life, capital intensive projects (see Figure 18.24). As such, they are entirely compatible (as in the Susitna case) with a project showing a good economic rate of

return. However, unless specific measures are taken to meet this "inflationary financing deficit" the project may be unable to proceed without imposing a substantial and possibly unacceptable burden of high early-year costs on consumers.

(c) The Basic Financial Options

A range of financing options compatible with the conditions laid down in Senate Bill 25 have been considered as a means of meeting the inflationary financing deficit. The options basically consist of a range of appropriations by the State of Alaska with the balance of the project financing made up by either 35-year tax-exempt revenue bonds or by a combination of General Obligation (G.O.) bonds and 35-year revenue bonds, with the G.O. bonds refinanced into revenue bonds at the earliest opportunity. Throughout central estimates of capital costs, revenues, etc., are used.

(i) 100 Percent State Appropriation of Total Capital Cost (\$5.1 billion in 1982 dollars)

This conforms to the possible outcome of Senate Bill 25 and represents the simplest financing option. It could take the form of the State of Alaska appropriating funds to meet capital costs as incurred over the 15-year construction schedule detailed in Table 18.18.

On the basis of the present wholesale energy rate setting requirement incorporated in Senate Bill 25, the APA would, however, not be able to charge more than the actual costs incurred. Given that in this case the only costs would be the very small year-to-year operating costs, this option would involve the output from Susitna being supplied at only a fraction of the price of electricity from the best thermal option.

(ii) State Appropriation of \$3 Billion (in 1982 dollars) with Residual Bond Financing

The outcome for this option is summarized in Figure 18.25 and Table 18.19. It would still enable Susitna energy to be produced at a price 46 percent less than that of the best thermal option. It would also enable the project to be completed with only \$0.9 billion (in 1982 dollars) of revenue bonds or G.O. bonds over the period 1991-93. The Devil Canyon stage could then be completed with a further \$2.3 billion (in 1982 dollars) of revenue bonds over the period 1994 to 2002.

This level of appropriation would enable Susitna energy prices to be held virtually constant at their initial level for nearly a decade. A temporary "step-up" in price of Susitna output to the cost of the electricity from the best thermal option would be required when Devil Canyon was

completed on the basis of its 100 percent revenue bond financing. Thereafter, however, the cost of the Susitna energy would again stabilize and give ever-increasing savings compared with cost of the best thermal option.

(iii) "Minimum" State Appropriation of \$2.3 Billion
(in 1982 dollars) with Residual Bond Financing

The "minimum" state appropriation is taken as the minimum amount required to meet a debt service cover of 1.25 on the residual debt financing by revenue bonds and makes Susitna's wholesale energy price competitive with the best thermal option in its first normal cost year (1994). This level of appropriation would require \$1.7 billion (in 1982 dollars) of bond financing in 1990-93 and a further \$2.1 billion (in 1982 dollars) over the period 1994 to 2002 to complete Devil Canyon (see Figure 18.26 and Table 18.20).

These levels of state appropriation would all therefore eliminate Susitna's "inflationary financing deficit".

(d) Issues Arising from the Basic Financing Options

(i) Need for Financial Restructuring

Irrespective of Susitna being chosen as the best means of meeting the Railbelt energy needs, significant financial restructuring of some Railbelt utilities will be required to enable them to offer adequate financial security in their power contracts and debt financing to meet generation expansion. It is assumed that this restructuring will take place.

(ii) Tax-exempt Bond Financing

In the \$2.3 billion state appropriation case interest cost, on the basis of tax-exempt financing, accounts for 90 percent of the unit price of Susitna output in 1994. Failure to obtain tax-exempt bond financing would increase these interest costs by approximately one-quarter. Ensuring tax-exempt status for the Susitna bond issues is therefore of fundamental importance to the economics of the project under these options.

This issue has been extensively reviewed by tax advisers and consultants and it has been concluded that at the stage at which bond financing is required in the early 1990s, tax-exempt financing should be possible in compliance with Section 103 of the IRS code.

(iii) Options for Residual Financing

Tables 18.21 and 18.22 set out the estimated requirements for bond financing with State Appropriations of \$3 billion and \$2.3 billion respectively. Several options are available to meet these financing needs and these are summarized below.

- Revenue Bonds with a Completion Guarantee

A completion guarantee must be assumed to be a precondition of bond financing at the Watana stage (up to 1993). A State of Alaska guarantee of project completion would probably enable all residual financing to be met by revenue bonds. (The completion guarantee may of necessity have to take the form of a G.O. bond authorization of an amount to be determined prior to the timing of the issuance of revenue bonds).

- Guaranteed Revenue Bonds with Post-Completion Refinancing

If the revenue bonds were guaranteed by the State of Alaska they could be issued without the provision of a completion guarantee.

- G.O. Bonds with Post-Completion Refinancing

G.O. Bonds on the "full faith and credit" of the State of Alaska are effectively identical to guaranteed revenue bonds and would also avoid the necessity of a completion guarantee.

In this case, as with that of guaranteed revenue bonds, the burden on the credit of the state could be minimized by making the bonds subject to "call" after a few years (when project viability was established) and refinancing into non-guaranteed revenue bonds.

(iv) Refinancing Watana and the Financing of Devil Canyon

Early refinancing of any guaranteed or G.O. bonds used to finance Watana, and the ongoing financing of Devil Canyon entirely by revenue bonds is taken to be an important financing objective. The main factor determining the date at which such refinancing will be possible is the magnitude of the initial state appropriation. This is dealt with in terms of the risk analysis in 18.5 below.

The basic conclusion from the analysis is that, with a state appropriation of \$2.3 billion (in 1982 dollars), there is a very high degree of certainty that refinancing

into non-guaranteed revenue bonds could occur within a few years of project completion.

(v) Importance of Adequate State Appropriation

The principal effect of appropriations significantly less than \$2.3 billion would be a possible need for additional guaranteed or G.O. bond financing for Devil Canyon. This is because the impact of lesser appropriations would (as illustrated in Figure 18.27) give rise to inadequate earnings coverage in the early years of Watana, and subsequently Devil Canyon, so that the raising of revenue bonds requiring such cover would have to be delayed. In addition, such inadequate funding would force the Susitna price to "track" the cost of energy from the best thermal option until adequate revenue had been built up to allow such re-financing.

(vi) Impact on State Credit Rating of Guaranteed or G.O. Bond Financing

The impact on state credit rating of guaranteed or G.O. bond financing of the order of \$1.7 billion in the \$2.3 billion (both in 1982 dollars) state appropriation case has been assessed by the Alaskan Power Authority's investment banking and financial advisers First Boston Corporation and First Southwest Company. They have concurred in the following statement.

"We are only able to render a conditional estimate of the possible impact on the credit of the State of Alaska as a result of the contemplated general obligation bond financing of \$1.7 billion for the Watana stage of the Susitna hydroelectric project. Alaska's presently favorable ratings are greatly influenced by its low debt to assessed value ratio which helps to overcome the unusually high per capita debt statistics. Given the dramatic growth of assessed valuation and the fact that interest expense through start-up of Watana is to be capitalized from bond proceeds the envisaged financing should not significantly impair the credit of the state. Even if the State of Alaska's general obligation bond rating were reduced one full letter grade, the cost in terms of interest rates on future bond issues would likely be in the approximate range of 1/4 percent to 1/2 percent per annum."

(e) Financing Options Under Senate Bill 646 and House Bill 655

As proposed these bills would permit financing of approved energy developments by state funding to be repaid at the rate of 3 percent per annum with an "uplift" reflecting past inflation.

(i) 100 Percent State Appropriation

The outcome in this case is illustrated in Figure 18.28 and would differ from that covered by the outright appropriation (c) (i) above in that the resulting charge for Susitna energy to cover the repayment of state funding would be 81 mills/kWh in 1994 compared with 19 mills/kWh in the (c) (i) case.

(ii) "Minimum" State Appropriation of \$3 Billion
(in 1982 dollars)

The outcome of a state appropriation of \$3 billion (in 1982 dollars) is shown in Figure 18.29. This also would differ from the \$3 billion outright appropriation dealt with in (c) (ii) in representing the minimum compatible with residual financing by revenue bonds, since the increasing payments to the state create an earnings cover shortfall in 2003. It would also result in a consequent higher charge for Susitna energy. In this case it would be 120 mills/kWh in 1994 compared with 80 mills/kWh under (c) (ii).

In both (i) and (ii) Susitna energy would still be produced at a price competitive with the best thermal option. These scenarios would also be compatible (subject to certain legislative requirements) with residual financing by revenue bonds.

(f) Future Development and Resolution of Uncertainties

Prior to the decision to proceed with actual construction of Susitna, several significant uncertainties affecting the project will have been reduced. Demand forecasts will be more certain and the impact of the electrical intertie between Anchorage and Fairbanks will be known. Fuel cost trends and energy prices from alternative generation sources will be more precisely known. More advanced engineering work and definition of the basis for construction contracts will have firmed up requirements for capital funds. In addition, the passage of time will have allowed better definition of the level of state appropriation required and the ability of the state to provide the necessary financial support.

The development of the institutional structure of the Railbelt utilities by this date should also permit power contracts and legislative proposals to be drawn up which would equitably share these then more clearly delineated risks between the utilities, the Power Authority and the State of Alaska. The key requirements for state guarantees and financing could then be more precisely defined in an appropriately limited form which would be acceptable to the state and adequate for project financing.

(g) Conclusion

The principal conclusion of the financial evaluation is that with a state appropriation of not less than \$2.3 billion (in 1982 dollars) and consent for guaranteed or G.O. bond financing of \$1.7 billion (in 1982 dollars), Susitna would be financially viable. It would also be able to market its output at an initial price competitive with the most efficient thermal option and produce substantial long-term savings compared with this option.

The evaluation, however, stressed the importance of establishing the project on a strong financial basis that would enable it to secure conversion of the guaranteed or G.O. bonds issued for the construction of Watana into non-guaranteed revenue bonds and obtain a highly competitive rate of interest. These objectives (together with the marketing of the Watana output in 1994 and a price 46 percent below that of the most efficient thermal option), could be secured by state appropriation of \$3.0 billion (in 1982 dollars).

It should also be noted that the cost benefit analysis shows that full recovery long-term of any state appropriation would be possible with a better than 10 percent rate of return. Meeting the Susitna "inflationary financing deficit" by such appropriations can therefore be considered as a separate issue from subsidization of electricity prices by foregoing recovery of all or part of the state appropriation designed to meet this deficit.

18.5 - Financial Risk

The financial risks considered are those arising to the State of Alaska and to Alaskan consumers. The analysis of these risks is restricted to the period up to 2001 covering the completion of Watana and its first eight years of operation.

(a) Pre-completion Risk

The major pre-completion risk is simply the risk that the project will not be completed. The possibility of this arising owing to natural hazard is dealt with in Sections 9 and 10, and on the basis of this analysis this outcome has a negligibly small probability of occurrence.

The risk of non-completion owing to capital overrun is also assessed to have negligible probability. This is on the grounds that the project only involves well-established technology, has been extensively evaluated by Acres and wholly independent consultants and shown by formal probability analysis to have only a 27 to 20 percent probability of any real capital overrun.

(b) Post-completion Risks

(i) The Generation of Post-completion Risks

A probabilistic financial model was developed taking into account the probability distributions of the major engineering and financial variables on which the financial outcome for Susitna depends. This model, the basic parameters of which are given in Table 18.23, was then used to consider in detail critical specific and aggregative risks posed by the project.

(ii) Specific Risks

- Specific Risk I; Risk of Bond Requirement Overrun (Figure 18.30)

Extensive analysis was undertaken to assess the probability that the bond financing requirements would overrun the forecast values as a result of capital costs, inflation, interest rates, etc., being less favorable than forecast. In the \$2.3 billion state appropriation case it was found that the probability of the bond financing requirement exceeding the forecast of \$1.7 billion (in 1982 dollars) by more than 50 percent was only 0.12. There is also a significant probability (0.71) that the bond financing requirements will be less than the forecast \$1.7 billion.

- Specific Risk II; Inadequate Debt Service Cover (Figure 18.31)

Adverse impact on state credit rating might occur if the project failed to earn adequate debt service and cover and consequently conversion into non-guaranteed revenue bonds was delayed. The analysis showed that in the \$2.3 billion state appropriation case:

- . The probability of forecast coverage being less than adequate (1.25 coverage) in 1994 (first normal year of Watana) is 0.22.

Given that the probability of coverage shortfall diminishes with time (due to increased cost of alternative fuels), the risk of delayed conversion due to inadequate cover is minimal.

- Specific Risk III; Early Year Non-viability (Figure 18.32)

The measure of financial non-viability in the early years is taken as the ratio of Watana's unit cost to the costs

of the best thermal option in Watana's third year (1996). (For comparability excess debt service cover was excluded.) If this ratio is less than forecast it would reflect "non-viability" in the sense of the project not realizing its forecast savings in these important early years. This analysis indicates that in the \$2.3 billion appropriation case there is only a 0.29 chance of the Susitna costs exceeding their forecast value (51 percent of the best thermal).

(iii) The Aggregate Risk

While specific risks of the type considered above are of importance basic concern must center on the aggregate risk. In long-term economics this is measured by the risk attaching to the rate of return. For the purpose of the financial risk, however, it is taken as represented by accumulative net operating earnings at the end of the first eight years of operation of Watana. Since this statistic is net of interest and debt repayment, it effectively subsumes all the risks involved in capital expenditure, inflation, interest rates, revenue, etc., deviating from their forecast values. This statistic was also adjusted to allow the pricing up of Watana energy to the cost of the best thermal option so that the statistic reflects the "upside" risk as well as the "downside."

On this basis in the \$2.3 billion state appropriation case the statistic (see Figure 18.33) was found to have only a 0.27 chance of being below forecast level of \$0.8 billion (in 1982 dollars) by more than \$0.2 billion. There is also a 0.73 probability of the statistic exceeding \$0.8 billion and thus creating greater savings for the Alaskan consumer.

(c) Conclusions

The analysis shows the exposure of the project, either to critical specific risks or to aggregative risk, at the Watana stage is relatively limited. The qualification attaching to this analysis is that the estimates and probabilities used are free from any systematic biases. The structure of the plan of the overall plan of study for Susitna and analysis of its alternatives has however been specifically designed to take every reasonable precaution against this possibility by seeking extensive independent verification of the key variables by Batelle and Ebasco operating wholly as independent consultants.

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TABLE 18.1: REAL (INFLATION-ADJUSTED) ANNUAL GROWTH IN OIL PRICES

	Growth Rates (Percent)		Probability
	1982-2000	2000-2040	
Low Case	0	0	0.3
Medium (most likely case)	2.0	1.0	0.5
High Case	4.0	2.0	0.2

Base Period
(January 1982)

Price of No. 2 Fuel Oil - \$6.50/MMBtu.

TABLE 18.2: DOMESTIC MARKET PRICES AND EXPORT OPPORTUNITY VALUES OF NATURAL GAS

Probability of Occurrence	Domestic Market Price ¹			Export Opportunity Value		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	27%	46%	27%
Base Period Value	-	\$3.00/MMBtu	-	-	\$4.65/MMBtu ²	-
Real Escalation CIF Price, Japan ³						
1982 - 2000	-	N.A.	-	0%	2%	4%
2000 - 2040	-		-	0%	1%	2%
Real Escalation Alaska Price ⁴						
1982 - 2000	0%	2.5%	5.0%	0%	2.7%	5.2%
2000 - 2040	0%	2.0%	2.0%	0%	1.2%	2.2%

¹ OGP5 analysis used domestic market prices with zero escalation beyond 2010. (Source: Battelle)

² Based on CIF price in Japan (\$6.75) less estimated cost of liquefaction and shipping (\$2.10). (Source: 13, 14, 15).

³ Source: (9), (16).

⁴ Alaska opportunity value escalates more rapidly than CIF prices as liquefaction and shipping costs are estimated to remain constant in real terms.

TABLE 18.3: SUMMARY OF COAL OPPORTUNITY VALUES

	Base Period (Jan. 1982) Value (\$/MMBtu)	Annual Real Growth Rate		Probability of Occurrence %
		1980 - 2000 (%)	2000 - 2040 (%)	
<u>Base Case</u>				
Battelle Base Period CIF Price				
Medium Scenario				
- CIF Japan	1.95	2.0	1.0	49
- FOB Beluga	1.43	2.6	1.2	49
- Nenana	1.75	2.3	1.1	49
Low Scenario				
- CIF Japan	1.95	0	0	24
- FOB Beluga	1.43	0	0	24
- Nenana	1.75	0.1	0.1	24
High Scenario				
- CIF Japan	1.95	4.0	2.0	27
- FOB Beluga	1.43	5.0	2.2	27
- Nenana	1.75	4.5	1.9	27
<u>Sensitivity Case</u>				
Updated Base Period CIF Price ¹				
Medium Scenario				
- CIF Japan	2.66	2.0	1.0	49
- FOB Beluga	2.08	2.5	1.2	49
- FOB Nenana	1.74	2.7	1.2	49
Low Scenario				
- CIF Japan	2.66	0	0	24
- FOB Beluga	2.08	0	0	24
- FOB Nenana	1.74	-0.2	-0.1	24
High Scenario				
- CIF Japan	2.66	4.0	2.0	27
- FOB Beluga	2.08	4.8	2.2	27
- FOB Nenana	1.74	5.3	2.3	27

¹ Assuming a 10 percent discount for Alaskan coal due to quality differentials, and export potential for Healy coal.

TABLE 18.4: SUMMARY OF FUEL PRICES USED IN THE
OGP5 PROBABILITY TREE ANALYSIS

	<u>Fuel Price Scenario</u>		
	<u>Low</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>High</u>
Probability of occurrence	25%	50%	25%
Base period January 1982 prices (1982\$/MMBtu)			
Fuel Oil	6.50	6.50	6.50
Natural Gas	3.00	3.00	3.00
Coal			
- Beluga	1.43	1.43	1.43
- Nenana	1.75	1.75	1.75
Real escalation rates per year (percent)			
Fuel Oil			
- 1982 - 2000	0	2.0	4.0
- 2000 - 2040	0	2.0	2.0
Natural Gas			
- 1982 - 2000	0	2.5	5.0
- 2000 - 2040	0	2.0	2.0
Beluga Coal			
- 1982 - 2000	0	2.6	5.0
- 2000 - 2040	0	1.2	2.2
Nenana Coal			
- 1982 - 2000	0.1	2.3	4.5
- 2000 - 2040	0.1	1.1	1.9

¹ Beyond 2010, the OGP analysis has used zero real escalation in all cases.

TABLE 18.5: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
SUSITNA PROJECT - BASE PLAN

<u>Plan</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>Components</u>	1982 Present Worth of System Costs \$ x 10 ⁶			
			<u>1993- 2010</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>Estimated 2011-2051</u>	<u>1993- 2051</u>
Non Susitna	A	600 MW Coal-Beluga 200 MW Coal-Nenana 630 MW GT	3,213	491	5,025	8,238
Susitna	C	680 MW Watana 600 MW Devil Canyon 180 MW GT	3,119	385	3,943	7,062
Net Economic Benefit of Susitna Plan			-	-	-	1,176

TABLE 18.6: SUMMARY OF LOAD FORECASTS
USED FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

	<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>		<u>High</u>	
	<u>MW</u>	<u>GWh</u>	<u>MW</u>	<u>GWh</u>	<u>MW</u>	<u>GWh</u>
1990	892	4,456	802	3,999	1,098	5,703
2000	1,084	5,469	921	4,641	1,439	7,457
2010	1,537	7,791	1,245	6,303	2,165	11,435

TABLE 18.7: LOAD FORECAST SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

<u>Plan</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>Components</u>	<u>1982 Present Worth of System Costs (\$ x 10⁶)</u>				<u>Net Economic Benefit</u>
			<u>1993-2010</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>Estimated 2011-2051</u>	<u>1993-2051</u>	
Non-Susitna with Low Forecast	K ₁	400 MW Coal-Beluga 200 MW Coal-Nenana 560 MW GT	2,640	404	4,238	6,878	-
Susitna with Low Forecast	K ₂	680 MW Watana (1995) 600 MW Devil Canyon (2004)	2,882	360	3,768	6,650	228
Non-Susitna with High Forecast	J ₁	800 MW Coal-Beluga 200 MW Coal-Nenana 700 MW GT 430 MW Pre-1993	4,176	700	6,683	10,859 ¹	-
Susitna with High Forecast	J ₂	680 MW Watana (1993) 600 MW Devil Canyon (1997) 350 MW GT 430 MW Pre-1993	3,867	564	5,380	9,247 ¹	1,612

¹ From 1993 to 2040

TABLE 18.8: DISCOUNT RATE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

<u>Plan</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>Real Discount Rate (Percent)</u>	<u>1982 Present Worth of System Costs (\$ x 10⁶)</u>				<u>Net Economic Benefit</u>
			<u>1993-2010</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>Estimated 2011-2051</u>	<u>1993-2051</u>	
Non-Susitna	Q ₁	2	3,701	465	7,766	11,167	-
Susitna	Q ₂	2	3,156	323	5,394	8,550	2,617
Non-Susitna	A	3	3,213	491	5,025	8,328	-
Susitna	C	3	3,119	385	3,943	7,062	1,176
Non-Susitna	S ₁	4	2,791	517	3,444	6,235	-
Susitna	S ₂	4	3,080	457	3,046	6,126	109
Non-Susitna	P ₁	5	2,468	550	2,478	4,946	-
Susitna	P ₂	5	3,032	539	2,426	5,459	(513)

TABLE 18.9: CAPITAL COST SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

<u>Plan</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>1982 Present Worth of System Costs (\$ x 10⁶)</u>				<u>Net Economic Benefit</u>
		<u>1993-2010</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>Estimated 2011-2051</u>	<u>1993-2051</u>	
<u>Non-Susitna Capital Costs Up 20 Percent</u>						
Non-Susitna	G	3,460	528	5,398	8,858	-
Susitna	C ¹	3,119	385	3,943	7,062	1,976
<u>Non-Susitna Capital Costs Down 10 Percent</u>						
Non-Susitna	G	3,084	472	4,831	7,915	-
Susitna	C ¹	3,119	385	3,943	7,062	853
<u>Susitna Capital Costs Less Contingency</u>						
Non-Susitna	A	3,213	491	5,025	8,238	-
Susitna	X ₂	2,710	336	3,441	6,151	2,087
<u>Susitna Capital Costs Plus Doubled Contingency</u>						
Non-Susitna	A	3,213	491	5,025	8,238	-
Susitna	Y ₂	3,529	434	4,445	7,974	264

¹ An adjustment calculation was made regarding the + capital costs of the 3GT units added in 2007-2010 since the difference was less than \$10 x 10⁶. Beyond 2010, this effect was not included.

TABLE 18.10: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - UPDATED BASE PLAN (JANUARY 1982) COAL PRICES

	<u>Base Period Beluga Coal Price (1982 \$/MMBtu)</u>	<u>1982 Present Worth of System Costs (\$ x 10⁶)</u>		
		<u>Costs of Non-Susitna Plan</u>	<u>Costs of Susitna Plan</u>	<u>Net Economic Benefits</u>
Base Case	1.43	8,238	7,062	1,176
Sensitivity (Updated) Case	2.08	9,030	7,062	1,968

TABLE 18.11: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - REAL COST ESCALATION

Plan	ID	1982 Present Worth of System Costs (\$ X 10 ⁶)					Net Benefit
		1993-2010	2010	Estimated 2011-2051	1993-2051		
<u>Zero-Escalation in Capital and O&M Costs</u>							
. Non-Susitna	O ₁	2,838	422	4,319	7,157	-	
. Susitna	O ₂	2,525	299	3,060	5,585	1,572	
<u>Escalation in Capital Costs and O&M (Battelle)¹</u>							
. Non-Susitna	X ₁	3,142	477	4,881	8,023	-	
. Susitna	X ₂	2,988	366	3,745	6,737	1,286	
<u>Double Escalation Capital and O&M Costs</u>							
. Non-Susitna	P ₁	3,650	602	6,161	9,811	-	
. Susitna	P ₂	3,881	503	5,148	9,029	782	
<u>Zero-Escalation in Fuel Prices</u>							
. Non-Susitna	V ₁	2,233	335	3,427	5,660	-	
. Susitna	V ₂	3,002	365	3,736	6,738	(1,078)	
<u>High Escalation in Fuel Prices</u>							
. Non-Susitna	W ₁	4,063	643	6,574	10,367	-	
. Susitna	W ₂	3,267	403	4,121	7,388	2,979	

¹Capital and O&M costs assumed to escalate at 1.4 percent 1982 to 2010

TABLE 18.12: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - NON-SUSITNA PLAN WITH CHAKACHAMNA

Plan	ID	Components	1982 Present Worth of System Costs (\$ X 10 ⁶)					Net Benefit
			1993-2010	2010	Estimated 2011-2051	1993-2051		
. Non-Susitna with Chakachamna	B	330 MW Chakachamna 400 MW Coal-Beluga 200 MW Coal-Nenana 440 MW GT	2,038	475	4,861	7,899	-	
. Susitna	C	680 MW Watana 600 MW Devil Canyon 180 MW GT	3,119	385	3,943	7,062	837	

TABLE 18.13: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS -
SUSITNA PROJECT DELAY

	<u>ID</u>	<u>\$ x 10⁶</u> <u>1982 Present Worth</u> <u>of System Costs</u>	<u>\$ x 10⁶</u> <u>Net Economic Benefit</u>
Susitna Base Case	C	7,062	1,176
One-year delay for Watana (1994)	C3	7,105	1,133
One-year delay for Devil Canyon (2003)	C4	7,165	1,134
One-year delay for Watana and Devil Canyon (1994, 2003)	C5	7,230	1,138

TABLE 18.14: SUMMARY OF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS INDEXES
OF NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS

	<u>Index Values</u>
<u>BASE CASE (\$1,176 MILLION)</u>	100
Fuel Escalation	
- High	253 ¹
- Low	-92 ²
Discount Rates	
- High-High (5%)	-44
- High (4%)	9
- Low (2%)	223
Susitna Capital Cost	
- High	23
- Low	178
Load Forecast	
- High	137
- Low	19
Non-Susitna (Thermal) Capital Costs	
- High	168
- Low	73
Capital and D&M Cost Escalation	
- High	67
- Intermediate (Battelle)	109
- Low	134
Chakachamna (included in Non-Susitna Plan)	71
Updated Base Coal Price	167
Planned Delay in Susitna Project	
- One-year delay, Watana	96
- One-year delay, Watana and Devil Canyon	96
- Two-year delay, Watana and Devil Canyon	97

¹ High fuel escalation case provides net benefits equal to 253 percent of the base value, $2.53 \times \$1,176$, or \$2,975.

² Low fuel escalation case provides minus 92 percent of the base case net benefits, $-.92 \times \$1,176$, or -\$1,082.

UTILITY	Generating Capacity 1981 MW at 0°F Rating	Predominant Type of Generation	Tax Status Re: IRS Section 103	Purchases Wholesale Electrical Energy	Provides Wholesale Supply	Utility Annual Energy Demand 1980 GWh
IN ANCHORAGE-COOK INLET AREA						
Anchorage Municipal Light and Power	221.6	SCCT	Exempt	*	—	585.8
Chugach Electric Association	395.1	SCCT	Non-Exempt	*	*	941.3
Matanuska Electric Association	0.9	Diesel	Non-Exempt	*	—	268.0
Homer Electric Association	2.6	Diesel	Non-Exempt	*	—	284.8
Seward Electric System	5.5	Diesel	Non-Exempt	*	—	26.4
Alaska Power Administration	30.0	Hydro	Non-Exempt	—	*	—
National Defense	58.8	ST	Non-Exempt	—	—	—
Industrial — Kenai	25.0	SCCT	Non-Exempt	—	—	—
IN FAIRBANKS — TANANA VALLEY						
Fairbanks Municipal Utility System ¹	68.5	ST/Diesel	Exempt	—	—	116.7
Golden Valley Electric Association ¹	221.6	SCCT/Diesel	Non-Exempt	—	—	316.7
University of Alaska	18.6	ST	Non-Exempt	—	—	—
National Defense ¹	46.5	ST	Non-Exempt	—	—	—
IN GLENALLEN/VALDEZ AREA						
Copper Valley Electric Association	19.6	SCCT	Non-Exempt	—	—	37.4
TOTAL	1114.3					2577.1

¹Pooling Arrangements in Force

TABLE 18.15 — RAILBELT UTILITIES PROVIDING MARKET POTENTIAL



PLANT LIST

PLANT No.	NAME OF PLANT	UTILITY	TYPE OF OWNERSHIP
2	Anchorage No. 1	Anchorage Municipal Light and Power	Municipal
3	Anchorage	Anchorage Municipal Light and Power	Municipal
6	Eklutna	Alaska Power Administration	Federal
7	Chena	Fairbanks Municipal Utilities System	Municipal
10	Knik Arm	Chugach Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative
22	Elmendorf-West	United States Air Force	Federal
23	Fairbanks	Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative
32	Cooper Lake	Chugach Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative
34	Elmendorf-East	United States Air Force	Federal
35	Ft. Richardson	United States Army	Federal
36	Ft. Wainright	United States Air Force	Federal
37	Eilson	United States Air Force	Federal
38	Ft. Greeley	United States Army	Federal
47	Bernice Lake	Chugach Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative
55	International Station	Chugach Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative
58	Healy	Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative
59	Beluga	Chugach Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative
75	Clear AFB	United States Air Force	Federal
80	Collier-Kenai	Collier-Kenai	Municipal
81	Eyak	Cordova Public Utilities	Municipal
82	North Pole	Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative
83	Valdez	Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative
84	Glennallen	Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.	Cooperative

TABLE 18.16 – LIST OF GENERATING PLANTS SUPPLYING RAILBELT REGION



TABLE 18.17: FORECAST FINANCIAL PARAMETERS

	<u>Watana</u>	<u>Devil Canyon</u>	<u>Total</u>
Project Completion - Year	1993	2002	
Energy Level - 1993			3 387 GWh
- 2002			5 223 "
- 2010			6 616 "
Costs in January 1982 Dollars			
Capital Costs	\$ 3.647 billion	\$1.470 billion	\$ 5.117 billion
Operating Costs - per annum	\$10.0 million	\$5.42 million	\$15.42 million
Provision for Capital Renewals - per annum (0.3 percent of Capital Costs)	\$10.94	\$4.41	\$15.35
Operating Working Capital		15 percent of Operating Costs 10 percent of Revenue	
Reserve and Contingency Fund		100 percent of Operating Costs 100 percent of Provision for Capital Renewals	
Interest Rate		10 percent per annum	
Debt Repayment Period		35 years	
Inflation Rate		7 percent per annum	
Real Rate of Increase in Operating Costs			
- 1982 to 1987			1.7 percent per annum
- 1988 on			2.0 percent per annum
Real Rate of Increase in Capital Costs			
- 1982 to 1985			1.1 percent per annum
- 1986 to 1992			1.0 percent per annum
- 1993 on			2.0 percent per annum

 DATAOK WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002) INFLATION 7%-INTEREST 10%-CAP COST \$5.117 BN 23-FEB-82

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
CASH FLOW SUMMARY ==(\$ MILLION)==										
73 ENERGY GWH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3387	3387
521 REAL PRICE-MILLS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.65	7.98
466 INFLATION INDEX	126.72	135.59	145.08	155.24	166.10	177.73	190.17	203.48	217.73	232.97
520 PRICE-MILLS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.94	18.59
-----INCOME-----										
516 REVENUE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.9	63.0
170 LESS OPERATING COSTS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.9	29.3
517 OPERATING INCOME	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.6
214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6
550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.8
391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.5
-----CASH SOURCE AND USE-----										
549 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.5
446 STATE CONTRIBUTION	403.7	472.7	479.7	499.5	938.3	1550.4	1247.1	676.4	333.1	229.7
143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	17.7
549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS	403.7	472.7	479.7	499.5	938.3	1550.4	1247.1	676.4	431.1	276.9
320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	403.7	472.7	479.7	499.5	938.3	1550.4	1247.1	676.4	333.1	259.2
448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	17.7
260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
249 SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
444 CASH RECOVERED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-----BALANCE SHEET-----										
225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	56.5	61.6
371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	41.5	54.1
454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	403.7	876.4	1356.1	1855.6	2794.0	4344.3	5591.4	6267.8	6600.9	6860.1
465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED	403.7	876.4	1356.1	1855.6	2794.0	4344.3	5591.4	6267.8	6698.9	6975.8
461 STATE CONTRIBUTION	403.7	876.4	1356.1	1855.6	2794.0	4344.3	5591.4	6267.8	6600.9	6830.6
462 RETAINED EARNINGS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.5
555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	115.7
554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
543 CUM. DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
519 DEBT SERVICE COVER	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

100% STATE APPROPRIATION OF TOTAL CAPITAL COST (\$5.1 BILLION IN 1982 DOLLARS)



 DATA/DK WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)- INFLATION 7%-INTEREST 10%-CAP COST \$5.117 BN 23-FEB-82

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
CASH FLOW SUMMARY ==(\$ MILLION)==										
73 ENERGY GWH	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	5223	5414	5605
521 REAL PRICE-MILLS	8.24	8.38	8.74	8.88	9.04	9.17	9.30	7.66	8.84	8.68
466 INFLATION INDEX	249.28	266.73	285.40	305.38	326.75	349.62	374.10	400.29	428.31	458.29
520 PRICE-MILLS	20.55	22.36	24.93	27.13	29.53	32.06	34.79	30.64	37.86	39.80
-----INCOME-----										
516 REVENUE	69.6	75.7	84.4	91.9	100.0	108.6	117.8	160.0	204.9	223.1
170 LESS OPERATING COSTS	32.0	35.0	38.1	41.6	45.4	49.6	54.1	91.1	99.4	108.5
517 OPERATING INCOME	37.6	40.8	46.3	50.2	54.6	59.0	63.7	69.0	105.5	114.6
214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS	6.2	6.7	7.3	8.0	8.7	9.5	10.4	11.4	19.1	20.9
550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT	11.6	12.4	15.3	16.4	17.7	18.7	19.8	21.0	33.8	36.3
391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS	32.2	35.1	38.3	41.8	45.6	49.8	54.4	59.3	90.9	99.2
-----CASH SOURCE AND USE-----										
548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS	32.2	35.1	38.3	41.8	45.6	49.8	54.4	59.3	90.9	99.2
446 STATE CONTRIBUTION	363.1	382.1	303.8	1022.3	1177.5	1204.8	913.1	303.0	0.0	0.0
143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS	8.1	29.3	11.2	12.2	10.6	10.4	12.3	128.0	24.7	42.8
549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS	403.4	446.5	353.3	1082.4	1233.7	1265.1	979.8	490.3	115.6	142.0
320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	395.3	417.2	342.1	1070.1	1223.2	1254.6	967.5	362.3	90.9	99.2
448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS	8.1	29.3	11.2	12.2	10.6	10.4	12.3	128.0	24.7	42.8
260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
249 SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
444 CASH RECOVERED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-----BALANCE SHEET-----										
225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND	67.2	73.4	80.1	87.4	95.4	104.1	113.7	191.3	208.8	227.8
371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL	56.6	79.7	84.2	89.1	91.7	93.4	96.2	146.6	153.8	177.6
454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	7255.4	7672.6	8014.7	9084.8	10308.0	11562.6	12530.1	12892.5	12983.3	13082.5
465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED	7379.2	7325.7	8179.0	9261.4	10495.1	11760.2	12740.0	13230.3	13345.9	13487.9
461 STATE CONTRIBUTION	7193.7	7575.8	7879.6	8907.9	10085.4	11290.3	12203.4	12506.4	12506.4	12506.4
462 RETAINED EARNINGS	61.6	96.8	135.1	176.9	222.6	272.4	326.7	386.1	477.0	576.1
555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM	123.9	153.1	164.3	176.6	187.1	197.6	209.9	337.8	362.6	405.4
554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
543 CUM. DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
519 DEBT SERVICE COVER	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	TOTAL
CASH FLOW SUMMARY ==(\$MILLION)===										
73 ENERGY GWH	6092	6147	6250	6472	6544	6616	6638	6660	6682	104826
521 REAL PRICE-MILLS	8.18	8.27	8.33	8.24	8.30	8.35	8.48	8.57	8.67	0.00
466 INFLATION INDEX	490.37	524.69	561.42	600.72	642.77	687.77	735.91	787.42	842.54	0.00
520 PRICE-MILLS	40.12	43.39	46.75	49.49	53.35	57.45	62.39	67.48	73.02	0.00
-----INCOME-----										
515 REVENUE	244.4	266.7	292.1	320.3	349.1	380.1	414.1	449.4	487.9	4530.0
170 LESS OPERATING COSTS	113.4	129.2	141.0	153.9	168.0	183.4	200.1	218.4	238.4	2202.0
517 OPERATING INCOME	126.0	137.4	151.1	166.3	181.1	196.7	214.0	231.0	249.5	2328.0
214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS	22.8	24.9	27.1	29.6	32.3	35.3	39.5	42.0	45.9	412.4
550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT	40.5	44.2	49.3	55.2	59.8	64.4	69.6	73.4	77.5	746.6
391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
540 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS	108.2	118.1	128.9	140.7	153.6	167.6	182.9	199.7	217.9	1993.8
-----CASH SOURCE AND USE-----										
540 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS	108.2	118.1	128.9	140.7	153.6	167.6	182.9	199.7	217.9	1993.8
446 STATE CONTRIBUTION	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12506.4
143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
243 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS	36.4	51.3	59.3	45.8	45.9	52.0	37.7	41.2	44.9	819.7
549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS	144.7	169.4	188.2	186.5	199.4	219.6	220.6	240.8	262.8	15319.9
320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	108.2	118.1	128.9	140.7	153.6	167.6	182.9	199.7	217.9	14500.2
448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS	36.4	51.3	59.3	45.8	45.9	52.0	37.7	41.2	44.9	819.7
260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
249 SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
444 CASH RECOVERED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-----BALANCE SHEET-----										
225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND	248.7	271.4	296.2	323.3	352.8	385.1	420.3	458.7	500.6	500.6
371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL	193.2	221.7	256.2	274.9	291.2	310.9	313.4	316.2	319.2	319.2
454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	13190.7	13308.9	13437.8	13578.5	13732.1	13899.7	14082.6	14282.3	14500.2	14500.2
465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED	13632.6	13801.9	13990.2	14176.7	14376.1	14595.7	14816.3	15057.1	15319.9	15319.9
461 STATE CONTRIBUTION	12506.4	12506.4	12506.4	12506.4	12506.4	12506.4	12506.4	12506.4	12506.4	12506.4
462 RETAINED EARNINGS	684.4	802.5	931.4	1072.1	1225.7	1393.3	1576.3	1775.9	1993.8	1993.8
555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM	441.8	493.1	552.4	598.2	644.0	696.0	733.7	774.8	819.7	819.7
554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
543 CUM. DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
519 DEBT SERVICE COVER	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

100% STATE APPROPRIATION OF TOTAL CAPITAL COST (\$5.1 BILLION IN 1982 DOLLARS)

 DATA10K WATAMA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)-\$3.0 BN(\$1982) STATE FUNDS-INFLATION 7%-INTEREST 10%-CAPCOST \$5.117 BN 23-FEB-82

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
CASH FLOW SUMMARY ==(\$MILLION)===										
73 ENERGY GWH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3387	3387
521 REAL PRICE-MILLS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	29.74	34.38
466 INFLATION INDEX	126.72	135.59	145.08	155.24	166.10	177.73	190.17	203.48	217.73	232.97
520 PRICE-MILLS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	64.76	80.08
-----INCOME-----										
516 REVENUE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	219.3	271.2
170 LESS OPERATING COSTS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.9	29.3
517 OPERATING INCOME	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	192.4	241.9
214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6
550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.8
391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	154.0	183.4
548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	38.5	54.3
-----CASH SOURCE AND USE-----										
548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	38.5	54.3
446 STATE CONTRIBUTION	403.7	472.7	479.7	499.5	938.3	1550.4	462.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	784.7	754.9	294.6	211.6
248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	17.7
549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS	403.7	472.7	479.7	499.5	938.3	1550.4	1247.1	754.9	431.1	283.7
320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	403.7	472.7	479.7	499.5	938.3	1550.4	1247.1	754.9	333.1	259.2
448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	17.7
260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.8
141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
249 SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
444 CASH RECOVERED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-----BALANCE SHEET-----										
225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	56.5	61.6
371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	41.5	54.1
454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	403.7	876.4	1356.1	1855.6	2794.0	4344.3	5591.4	6346.3	6679.4	6938.6
465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED	403.7	876.4	1356.1	1855.6	2794.0	4344.3	5591.4	6346.3	6777.4	7054.3
461 STATE CONTRIBUTION	403.7	876.4	1356.1	1855.6	2794.0	4344.3	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7
462 RETAINED EARNINGS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	38.5	92.8
555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	115.7
554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	784.7	1539.5	1834.2	2039.0
542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	412.6	371.0	135.3	90.8
543 CUM. DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	412.6	783.6	918.9	1009.7
519 DEBT SERVICE COVER	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.25	1.25

\$3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO
 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST



 DATA10K WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)-\$3.0 BN(\$1982) STATE FUNDS-INFLATION 7%-INTEREST 10%-CAPCOST \$5.117 BN 23-FEB-82

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
CASH FLOW SUMMARY ==(\$ MILLION)==										
73 ENERGY GWH	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	5223	5414	5605
521 REAL PRICE-MILLS	32.59	30.81	29.37	27.83	26.39	25.04	23.79	58.55	55.54	50.49
466 INFLATION INDEX	249.28	266.73	285.40	305.38	326.75	349.62	374.10	400.29	428.31	458.29
520 PRICE-MILLS	31.25	82.18	83.81	84.97	86.24	87.54	89.00	234.36	237.89	231.37
-----INCOME-----										
516 REVENUE	275.2	278.3	283.8	287.8	292.1	296.5	301.4	1224.0	1287.8	1296.7
170 LESS OPERATING COSTS	32.0	35.0	38.1	41.6	45.4	49.6	54.1	91.1	99.4	108.5
517 OPERATING INCOME	243.1	243.4	245.7	246.2	246.6	246.9	247.3	1132.9	1188.4	1188.2
214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS	6.2	6.7	7.3	8.0	8.7	9.5	10.4	11.4	19.1	20.9
559 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT	11.6	12.4	15.3	16.4	17.7	18.7	20.0	21.9	34.7	36.3
391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT	182.7	182.0	181.2	130.3	179.3	178.2	177.0	883.4	895.7	891.5
548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS	55.0	55.7	56.6	57.5	58.4	59.5	60.7	239.0	277.2	281.4
-----CASH SOURCE AND USE-----										
548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS	55.0	55.7	56.6	57.5	58.4	59.5	60.7	239.0	277.2	281.4
446 STATE CONTRIBUTION	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS	368.9	427.7	395.4	1163.0	1432.3	1604.7	1473.5	137.8	0.0	0.0
243 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS	8.1	29.3	11.2	12.2	10.6	10.4	12.3	128.0	24.7	42.8
549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS	432.0	512.8	463.1	1232.7	1501.3	1674.7	1546.5	504.8	301.9	324.3
320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	416.4	475.3	442.9	1210.5	1479.8	1654.5	1527.9	362.3	90.9	99.2
448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS	8.1	29.3	11.2	12.2	10.6	10.4	12.3	128.0	24.7	42.8
260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS	7.4	8.2	9.0	9.9	10.9	12.0	13.2	14.5	42.6	46.8
141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-2.3	-6.8	0.0	143.7	135.4
249 SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	6.8	0.0	-9.1	0.0
444 CASH RECOVERED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	134.6	135.4
-----BALANCE SHEET-----										
225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND	67.2	73.4	80.1	87.4	95.4	104.1	113.7	191.3	208.8	227.8
371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL	56.6	79.7	84.2	89.1	91.7	93.4	96.2	146.6	153.8	177.6
454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	7355.0	7830.3	8273.2	9483.7	10963.5	12618.0	14145.9	14508.2	14599.1	14698.3
465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED	7478.8	7983.4	8437.5	9660.3	11150.6	12815.6	14355.8	14846.1	14961.7	15103.7
461 STATE CONTRIBUTION	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7
462 RETAINED EARNINGS	147.8	203.5	260.1	317.5	376.0	435.5	496.2	735.2	877.8	1023.8
555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM	123.9	153.1	164.3	176.6	187.1	199.8	219.0	346.9	362.6	405.4
554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM	2400.5	2820.0	3206.4	4359.4	5780.8	7373.5	8833.8	8957.1	8914.6	8867.7
542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	148.0	160.4	138.5	380.8	438.3	459.0	393.9	34.4	0.0	0.0
543 CUM. DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	1157.7	1318.0	1456.6	1837.4	2275.7	2734.7	3128.6	3163.0	3163.0	3163.0
519 DEBT SERVICE COVER	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25

\$3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO
 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	TOTAL
CASH FLOW SUMMARY ==(\$ MILLION)==										
73 ENERGY GWH	6092	6147	6250	6472	6544	6616	6638	6660	6682	104826
521 REAL PRICE-MILLS	43.82	40.97	38.08	34.79	32.53	30.45	28.74	27.13	25.63	0.00
466 INFLATION INDEX	490.37	524.69	561.42	600.72	642.77	687.77	735.91	787.42	842.54	0.00
520 PRICE-MILLS	214.89	214.98	213.79	208.98	209.12	209.41	211.54	213.62	215.95	0.00
-----INCOME-----										
516 REVENUE	1309.0	1321.4	1336.1	1352.4	1368.4	1385.3	1404.1	1422.6	1442.9	18656.4
170 LESS OPERATING COSTS	118.4	129.2	141.0	153.9	168.0	183.4	200.1	218.4	238.4	2202.0
517 OPERATING INCOME	1190.6	1192.2	1195.0	1198.5	1200.4	1202.0	1204.0	1204.2	1204.5	16454.4
214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS	22.8	24.9	27.1	29.6	32.3	35.3	38.5	42.0	45.9	412.4
550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT	40.5	44.2	49.3	55.2	59.8	64.4	69.6	73.4	77.5	748.6
391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT	886.8	881.6	876.0	869.7	862.9	855.3	847.0	837.9	827.9	12013.6
548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS	286.1	291.2	296.9	303.1	310.0	317.5	325.8	335.0	345.0	4104.6
-----CASH SOURCE AND USE-----										
548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS	286.1	291.2	296.9	303.1	310.0	317.5	325.8	335.0	345.0	4104.6
446 STATE CONTRIBUTION	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4806.7
143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9049.0
248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS	36.4	51.3	59.3	45.8	45.9	52.0	37.7	41.2	44.9	819.7
549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS	322.5	342.5	356.2	349.0	355.9	369.5	363.6	376.1	389.9	18780.1
320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	108.2	118.1	128.9	140.7	153.6	167.6	182.9	199.7	217.9	16115.9
443 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS	36.4	51.3	59.3	45.8	45.9	52.0	37.7	41.2	44.9	819.7
260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS	51.5	56.7	62.3	68.6	75.4	83.0	91.3	100.4	110.4	880.9
141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT)	126.3	116.4	105.6	93.9	81.0	67.0	51.6	34.9	16.7	963.5
249 SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
444 CASH RECOVERED	126.3	116.4	105.6	93.9	81.0	67.0	51.6	34.9	16.7	963.5
-----BALANCE SHEET-----										
225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND	249.7	271.4	296.2	323.3	352.8	385.1	420.3	458.7	500.6	500.6
371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL	193.2	221.7	256.2	274.9	291.2	310.9	313.4	316.2	319.2	319.2
454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	14806.5	14924.6	15053.6	15194.3	15347.9	15515.5	15698.4	15898.1	16116.0	16116.0
465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED	15248.3	15417.7	15605.9	15792.4	15991.9	16211.4	16432.1	16672.9	16935.7	16935.7
461 STATE CONTRIBUTION	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7	4806.7
462 RETAINED EARNINGS	1183.5	1358.3	1549.6	1758.9	1987.9	2238.5	2512.7	2812.8	3141.1	3141.1
555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM	441.3	493.1	552.4	598.2	644.0	696.0	733.7	774.8	819.7	819.7
554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM	8816.2	8759.5	8697.2	8628.6	8553.2	8470.2	8378.9	8278.6	8168.1	8168.1
542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3163.0
543 CUM. DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	3163.0	3163.0	3163.0	3163.0	3163.0	3163.0	3163.0	3163.0	3163.0	3163.0
519 DEBT SERVICE COVER	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	0.00

**\$3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO
 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST**



 DATA LOK WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)-\$2.3 BN (\$1982) STATE FUNDS-INFLATION 7%-INTEREST 10%-CAP COST \$5.117 BN 23-FEB-82

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
CASH FLOW SUMMARY ===(\$ MILLION)===										
73 ENERGY GWH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3387	3387
521 REAL PRICE-MILLS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.85	58.76
466 INFLATION INDEX	126.72	135.59	145.08	155.24	166.10	177.73	190.17	203.48	217.73	232.97
520 PRICE-MILLS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	110.73	136.90
-----INCOME-----										
516 REVENUE	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	375.0	463.6
170 LESS OPERATING COSTS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.9	29.3
517 OPERATING INCOME	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	348.1	434.3
214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6
550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.8
391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	303.1	331.9
548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	45.0	98.3
-----CASH SOURCE AND USE-----										
548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	45.0	98.3
446 STATE CONTRIBUTION	403.7	472.7	479.7	499.5	938.3	738.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	812.0	1328.3	890.4	288.1	173.2
248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	17.7
549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS	403.7	472.7	479.7	499.5	938.3	1550.4	1328.3	890.4	431.1	289.2
320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	403.7	472.7	479.7	499.5	938.3	1550.4	1328.3	890.4	333.1	259.2
448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	17.7
260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.2
141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
249 SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
444 CASH RECOVERED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-----BALANCE SHEET-----										
225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	56.5	61.6
371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	41.5	54.1
454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	403.7	876.4	1356.1	1855.6	2794.0	4344.3	5672.6	6563.0	6896.1	7155.3
465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED	403.7	876.4	1356.1	1855.6	2794.0	4344.3	5672.6	6563.0	6994.1	7271.0
461 STATE CONTRIBUTION	403.7	876.4	1356.1	1855.6	2794.0	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4
462 RETAINED EARNINGS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	45.0	143.3
555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	115.7
554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	812.0	2140.2	3030.7	3318.7	3479.6
542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	456.8	698.4	437.6	132.3	74.3
543 CUM. DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	456.8	1155.3	1592.9	1725.2	1799.5
519 DEBT SERVICE COVER	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.15	1.25

\$2.3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) MINIMUM STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO
 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST

 DATAJK WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)-\$2.3 BN (\$1982) STATE FUNDS-INFLATION 7%-INTEREST 10%-CAP COST \$5.117 BN 23-FEB-82

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
CASH FLOW SUMMARY ==(\$ MILLION)==										
73 ENERGY GWH	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	3387	5223	5414	5605
521 REAL PRICE-MILLS	55.38	52.11	49.27	46.43	43.78	41.29	38.96	63.57	59.90	55.83
466 INFLATION INDEX	249.28	266.73	285.40	305.38	326.75	349.62	374.10	400.29	428.31	458.29
520 PRICE-MILLS	138.06	139.00	140.63	141.79	143.06	144.36	145.75	254.47	256.58	255.86
-----INCOME-----										
516 REVENUE	467.6	470.8	476.3	480.2	484.5	488.9	493.6	1329.0	1389.0	1434.0
170 LESS OPERATING COSTS	32.0	35.0	38.1	41.6	45.4	49.6	54.1	91.1	99.4	108.5
517 OPERATING INCOME	435.6	435.8	438.1	438.6	439.1	439.3	439.5	1237.9	1289.6	1325.5
214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS	6.2	6.7	7.3	8.0	8.7	9.5	10.4	11.4	19.1	20.9
550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT	11.6	12.4	15.3	16.4	17.7	18.7	19.8	21.0	33.8	36.3
391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT	330.6	329.3	327.8	326.2	324.4	322.4	320.3	982.5	994.1	988.8
548 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS	99.5	100.8	102.3	104.0	105.8	107.7	109.9	245.8	280.8	321.3
-----CASH SOURCE AND USE-----										
548 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS	99.5	100.8	102.3	104.0	105.8	107.7	109.9	245.8	280.8	321.3
446 STATE CONTRIBUTION	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS	326.5	381.2	344.2	1106.6	1370.3	1538.8	1405.6	142.8	0.0	0.0
248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS	8.1	29.3	11.2	12.2	10.6	10.4	12.3	128.0	24.7	42.8
549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS	434.2	511.3	457.7	1222.8	1486.6	1657.0	1527.8	516.5	305.5	364.2
320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	412.6	467.2	430.2	1192.7	1456.3	1624.8	1491.6	362.3	90.9	99.2
448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS	8.1	29.3	11.2	12.2	10.6	10.4	12.3	128.0	24.7	42.8
260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS	13.5	14.8	16.3	17.9	19.7	21.7	23.9	26.2	53.9	59.3
141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	136.0	162.8
249 SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
444 CASH RECOVERED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	136.0	162.8
-----BALANCE SHEET-----										
225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND	67.2	73.4	80.1	87.4	95.4	104.1	113.7	191.3	208.8	227.8
371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL	56.6	79.7	84.2	89.1	91.7	93.4	96.2	146.6	153.8	177.6
454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	7567.9	8035.1	8465.3	9657.9	11114.2	12739.1	14230.7	14593.0	14683.8	14783.0
465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED	7691.7	8188.2	8629.6	9834.5	11301.4	12936.6	14440.5	14930.8	15046.4	15188.4
461 STATE CONTRIBUTION	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4
462 RETAINED EARNINGS	242.8	343.7	446.0	550.0	655.7	763.4	873.3	1119.1	1263.9	1422.4
555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM	123.9	153.1	164.3	176.6	187.1	197.6	209.9	337.8	362.6	405.4
554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM	3792.7	4159.0	4486.9	5575.6	6926.2	8443.3	9825.0	9941.5	9887.6	9828.2
542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	131.0	142.9	120.6	362.4	419.4	440.1	375.7	35.7	0.0	0.0
543 CUM. DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	1930.5	2073.4	2194.0	2556.3	2975.7	3415.8	3791.5	3827.2	3827.2	3827.2
513 DEBT SERVICE COVER	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.22	1.22	1.25

\$2.3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) MINIMUM STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO
 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST



 DATA0K WATANA-DC (ON LINE 1993-2002)-\$2.3 BN (\$1982) STATE FUNDS-INFLATION 7%-INTEREST 10%-CAP COST \$5.117 BN 23-FEB-82

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	TOTAL
CASH FLOW SUMMARY ===(\$ MILLION)===										
73 ENERGY GWH	6092	6147	6250	6472	6544	6616	6638	6660	6682	104826
521 REAL PRICE-MILLS	48.42	45.23	41.99	38.32	35.80	33.46	31.55	29.75	28.07	0.00
466 INFLATION INDEX	490.37	524.69	561.42	600.72	642.77	687.77	735.91	787.42	842.54	0.00
520 PRICE-MILLS	237.42	237.31	235.75	230.18	230.09	230.15	232.21	234.23	236.49	0.00
-----INCOME-----										
516 REVENUE	1446.3	1458.6	1473.3	1489.6	1505.6	1522.6	1541.3	1559.8	1580.1	21929.6
170 LESS OPERATING COSTS	118.4	129.2	141.0	153.9	168.0	183.4	200.1	218.4	238.4	2202.0
517 OPERATING INCOME	1327.8	1329.4	1332.3	1335.7	1337.6	1339.2	1341.2	1341.4	1341.7	19727.6
214 ADD INTEREST EARNED ON FUNDS	22.8	24.9	27.1	29.6	32.3	35.3	38.5	42.0	45.9	412.4
550 LESS INTEREST ON SHORT TERM DEBT	40.5	44.2	49.3	55.2	59.8	64.4	69.6	73.4	77.5	746.6
391 LESS INTEREST ON LONG TERM DEBT	982.8	976.3	969.1	961.2	952.5	943.0	932.5	920.9	908.2	14428.0
543 NET EARNINGS FROM OPERS	327.3	333.8	341.0	348.9	357.5	367.1	377.6	389.2	401.9	4965.4
-----CASH SOURCE AND USE-----										
549 CASH INCOME FROM OPERS	327.3	333.8	341.0	348.9	357.5	367.1	377.6	389.2	401.9	4965.4
446 STATE CONTRIBUTION	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3532.4
143 LONG TERM DEBT DRAWDOWNS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10107.8
248 WORCAP DEBT DRAWDOWNS	36.4	51.3	59.3	45.8	45.9	52.0	37.7	41.2	44.9	819.7
549 TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS	363.7	385.0	400.2	394.7	403.4	419.0	415.3	430.3	446.8	19425.3
320 LESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	108.2	118.1	128.9	140.7	153.6	167.6	182.9	199.7	217.9	16200.7
448 LESS WORCAP AND FUNDS	36.4	51.3	59.3	45.8	45.9	52.0	37.7	41.2	44.9	819.7
260 LESS DEBT REPAYMENTS	65.2	71.8	78.9	86.8	95.5	105.1	115.6	127.1	139.9	1165.5
141 CASH SURPLUS(DEFICIT)	153.8	143.9	133.1	121.3	108.4	94.4	79.1	62.4	44.1	1239.3
249 SHORT TERM DEBT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
444 CASH RECOVERED	153.8	143.9	133.1	121.3	108.4	94.4	79.1	62.4	44.1	1239.3
-----BALANCE SHEET-----										
225 RESERVE AND CONT. FUND	248.7	271.4	296.2	323.3	352.8	385.1	420.3	458.7	500.6	500.6
371 OTHER WORKING CAPITAL	193.2	221.7	256.2	274.9	291.2	310.9	313.4	316.2	319.2	319.2
454 CASH SURPLUS RETAINED	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
370 CUM. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	14891.3	15009.4	15138.3	15279.0	15432.6	15600.2	15783.2	15982.8	16200.7	16200.7
465 CAPITAL EMPLOYED	15333.1	15502.5	15690.7	15877.2	16076.6	16296.2	16516.8	16757.6	17020.5	17020.5
461 STATE CONTRIBUTION	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4	3532.4
462 RETAINED EARNINGS	1595.9	1785.8	1993.7	2221.2	2470.3	2743.0	3041.5	3368.3	3726.1	3726.1
555 DEBT OUTSTANDING-SHORT TERM	441.8	493.1	552.4	598.2	644.0	696.0	733.7	774.8	819.7	819.7
554 DEBT OUTSTANDING-LONG TERM	9763.0	9691.2	9612.3	9525.4	9429.9	9324.8	9209.2	9082.1	8942.2	8942.2
542 ANNUAL DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3827.2
543 CUM. DEBT DRAWDOWN \$1982	3827.2	3827.2	3827.2	3827.2	3827.2	3827.2	3827.2	3827.2	3827.2	3827.2
519 DEBT SERVICE COVER	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	0.00

\$2.3 BILLION (1982 DOLLARS) MINIMUM STATE APPROPRIATION SCENARIO
 7% INFLATION AND 10% INTEREST

TABLE 18.21: FINANCING REQUIREMENTS - \$ BILLION

For \$3.0 billion State Appropriation Scenario

		Interest Rate 10%	
		Inflation Rate 7%	
			1982
			Actual Purchasing
			Power
			<u>\$ billion</u>
1985 State Appropriation		0.4	0.3
86	"	0.5	0.4
87	"	0.5	0.3
88	"	0.5	0.3
89	"	0.9	0.6
90	"	0.5	0.9
91	"	1.5	0.2
Total State Appropriation		4.8	3.0

1990 Guaranteed or G.O Bonds		-	-
1	"	0.8	0.4
2	"	0.7	0.4
3	"	0.3	0.1
Total Watana Bonds		1.8	0.9

1994 Revenue Bonds		0.2	0.1
5	"	0.4	0.1
6	"	0.4	0.2
7	"	0.4	0.1
8	"	1.2	0.4
9	"	1.4	0.4
2000	"	1.6	0.5
1	"	1.5	0.4
2	"	0.1	0.1
Total Devil Canyon Bonds		7.2	2.3

Total Susitna Bonds		9.0	3.2

TABLE 18.22: FINANCING REQUIREMENTS - \$ BILLION

For \$2.3 billion State Appropriation Scenario

	Interest Rate 10%	
	Inflation Rate 7%	
	1982	
	Actual Purchasing	
	Power	
	<u>\$ billion</u>	
1985 State Appropriation	0.4	0.3
86 " "	0.5	0.4
87 " "	0.5	0.3
88 " "	0.5	0.3
89 " "	0.9	0.6
90 " "	0.7	0.4
Total State Appropriation	3.5	2.3

1990 Guaranteed or G.O Bonds	0.8	0.5
1 " "	1.3	0.7
2 " "	0.9	0.4
3 " "	0.3	0.1
Total Watana Bonds	3.3	1.7

1994 Revenue Bonds	0.2	0.1
5 " "	0.3	0.1
6 " "	0.4	0.2
7 " "	0.3	0.1
8 " "	1.1	0.4
9 " "	1.4	0.4
2000 " "	1.5	0.4
1 " "	1.4	0.4
2 " "	0.2	-
Total Devil Canyon Bonds	6.8	2.1

Total Susitna Bonds	10.1	3.8

BASIC PARAMETERS OF RISK GENERATION MODEL

COAL PRICE ESCALATION (% REAL)			
	0	2.6 to 2000 1.2 thereafter	5.0 to 2000 2.2 thereafter
PROBABILITY	.25	.50	.25

INTEREST RATES %				
	5 - 7	7 - 9	9 - 11	11 - 13
PROBABILITY	.10	.32	.43	.15

INFLATION RATE DIFFERENCE FROM INTEREST RATE			
	- 2%	- 3%	- 4%
PROBABILITY	.33	.34	.33

CAPITAL COSTS (REAL 1982 \$billion)				
	Below 3.1	Below 3.6	Below 4.3	Below 5.1
PROBABILITY	.46	.73	.90	1.00




FIGURE 18.1 – PROBABILITY TREE – SYSTEM WITH ALTERNATIVES TO SUSITNA






FIGURE 18.2 – PROBABILITY TREE – SYSTEM WITH SUSITNA






FIGURE 18.3 – SUSITNA MULTIVARIATE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS – LONG-TERM COSTS VS CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY







FIGURE 18.4 – SUSITNA MULTIVARIATE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS – CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY VS NET BENEFITS






RISK ANALYSIS STUDY METHODOLOGY

FIGURE 18.5




QUESTION:

STUDY ELEMENT:




ELEMENTS OF THE RISK ANALYSIS

↑
PROBABILITY OF A PARTICULAR RISK MAGNITUDE




① A SERIES OF DISCRETE RISK PROBABILITY LEVELS EXISTS FOR EACH RISK-ACTIVITY COMBINATION. THE ANNUAL PROBABILITY OF EACH IS DETERMINED.

↑
PROBABILITY OF A PARTICULAR DAMAGE LEVEL IF A PARTICULAR RISK MAGNITUDE IS REALIZED




② IF A RISK EVENT OCCURS, IT CAN CAUSE A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE DAMAGE LEVELS, EACH WITH A PARTICULAR PROBABILITY OF OCCURENCE. IF RISK MAGNITUDE (A) OCCURS, THE PROBABILITY IT WILL CAUSE MODERATE DAMAGE IS THE VALUE OF (P) ON THE DIAGRAM.

↑
PROBABILITY OF A PARTICULAR CRITERION RISK




③ FOR ANY GIVEN DAMAGE LEVEL, THREE CRITERION VALUES ARE ESTIMATED AND FIT TO A MODIFIED BETA DISTRIBUTION.

STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIP FOR HANDLING RISK ACTIVITY COMBINATIONS, DAMAGE SCENARIOS AND CRITERION VALUES



CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
FOR WATANA PROJECT COST


PROBABILITY THAT ACTUAL COST WILL NOT EXCEED INDICATED PERCENTAGE



CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
OF DEVIL CANYON COSTS

FIGURE 18.9






CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
FOR SUSITNA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

FIGURE 18.10






DATA FOR 48
WATER RESOURCES
PROJECTS

HISTORICAL WATER RESOURCES
PROJECT COST PERFORMANCE (48 PROJECTS)

FIGURE 18.11






COMPARISON OF SUSITNA RISK RESULTS WITH
 HISTORICAL WATER RESOURCES PROJECT
 COST PERFORMANCE (48 PROJECT)

DATA FOR 48
 WATER RESOURCES
 PROJECTS

FIGURE 18.12







WATANA SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION
EXCLUSIVE OF REGULATORY RISKS

FIGURE 18.13






WATANA SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION
INCLUDING THE EFFECT OF REGULATORY RISKS





CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION FOR DAYS OF REDUCED
ENERGY DELIVERY TO ANCHORAGE



CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
FOR DAYS PER YEAR WITH NO SUSITNA
ENERGY DELIVERY TO FAIRBANKS

FIGURE 18.16





**FAIRBANKS
AREA INSERT**

**ANCHORAGE
AREA
INSERT**

**RAILBELT REGION
GENERATING AND TRANSMISSION FACILITIES**

0 65 130 KILOMETERS

0 65 130 MILES



FIGURE 18.17






FIGURE 18.18 – SERVICE AREAS OF RAILBELT UTILITIES






1. Does Not Include Self Supplied Energy from Military Installations and The University of Alaska

A ENERGY SUPPLY
(Based on Net Generation 1980)




B GENERATING FACILITIES
(Based on Nameplate Generating Capacity 1980)



1. Does Not Include Generation by Military Installations and The University of Alaska

C NET GENERATION BY TYPES OF FUEL
(Based on Net Generation 1980)



D RELATIVE MIX OF ELECTRICAL GENERATING TECHNOLOGY - RAILBELT UTILITIES - 1980




FIGURE 18.20 — ENERGY DEMAND AND DELIVERIES FROM SUSITNA



WATANA ONLY IN 1994




FIGURE 18.21 – ENERGY PRICING COMPARISONS – 1994






FIGURE 18.22 – SYSTEM COSTS AVOIDED BY DEVELOPING SUSITNA






FIGURE 18.23 – ENERGY PRICING COMPARISONS – 2003






FIGURE 18.24 – ENERGY COST COMPARISON – 100% DEBT FINANCING 0 AND 7% INFLATION






FIGURE 18.25 – ENERGY COST COMPARISON – STATE APPROPRIATION \$3 BILLION (1982 \$)






FIGURE 18.26 – ENERGY COST COMPARISON \$2.3 BILLION (1982 \$) – MINIMUM STATE APPROPRIATION






FIGURE 18.27 -ENERGY COST COMPARISON-PRICING RESTRICTED 94/95 AND 03/04






FIGURE 18.28 – ENERGY COST COMPARISON MEETING SB 646 REQUIREMENTS WITH 100% FINANCING






FIGURE 18.29 – ENERGY COST COMPARISON MEETING SB 646 REQUIREMENTS WITH \$3.0 BILLION APPROPRIATION



SPECIFIC RISK I: RISK OF BOND REQUIREMENT OVERRUN




FIGURE 18.30 – BOND FINANCING REQUIREMENTS

SPECIFIC RISK II: IMPAIRMENT OF STATE CREDIT




FIGURE 18.31 – DEBT SERVICE COVER



SPECIFIC FINANCING RISK III: EARLY YEAR NONVIABILITY




FIGURE 18.32 – WATANA UNIT COSTS AS PERCENT OF BEST THERMAL OPTION IN 1996

AGGREGATE RISK: POTENTIAL NET OPERATING EARNINGS




FIGURE 18.33 – CUMULATIVE NET OPERATING EARNINGS BY 2000



19 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The proposed development of the hydroelectric potential of the Upper Susitna River Basin is technically and economically feasible. Financing of this large undertaking is also feasible with appropriate state funding assistance. Although the project will result in irreversible environmental impacts, the consequences of these impacts are not severe and adequate measures are economically available to mitigate against them. It is therefore recommended that a FERC license application be filed for construction of the project.

The findings set out in this Feasibility Report lead to the conclusions and recommendations discussed in the following sections.

19.1 - Conclusions

It is concluded that:

- The projections of demand for electricity in the Railbelt by ISER and Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, in December 1981, are reasonably representative of possible load growth scenarios. Projected energy demand in 2010 under a medium growth scenario is 7,791 GWh, requiring 1,537 MW of generating capacity;
- The proposed Susitna project of 1,020 MW in 1993/94 at Watana and 600 MW at Devil Canyon in 2002, represents the optimum basin development plan from technical, economic, and environmental perspectives and use of the available resource. This plan is also economically and environmentally superior to other thermal and hydroelectric alternative generation plans;
- The proposed 1,020 MW Watana development will be capable of generating an average 3,450 GWh of electrical energy and the 600 MW Devil Canyon project 3,340 GWh. Firm energy for each development is estimated as 2,630 GWh and 2,770 GWh, respectively. Susitna will represent more than two thirds of projected total Railbelt system capacity in 2010;
- The only known seismically active faults in the region of the proposed project sites are the Denali Fault 40 or more miles to the north, the Castle Mountain Fault 65 miles or more to the south, and the Benioff Zone 31 miles or more beneath the sites. The proposed project structures can be designed to safely withstand the maximum earthquakes which can be predicted to occur on these faults, or as a result of other possible seismic events, such as a Terrain earthquake or reservoir induced seismicity;
- The construction of a 1,020 MW hydroelectric project at Watana involving a 885-foot-high earthfill dam and appurtenant facilities,

can be accomplished within all applicable requirements of technical feasibility, safety, and environmental impact in 1993/94;

- The construction of a 600 MW hydroelectric project at Devil Canyon involving a 645-foot-high concrete arch dam and appurtenant facilities, can be accomplished within all applicable requirements of technical feasibility, safety, and environmental impact by the year 2002 or earlier;
- An access road constructed from the Parks Highway south of Hurricane to Gold Creek and thence south of the Susitna River to Devil Canyon and north of the river to Watana, is the best compromise of technical, economic, and environmental tradeoffs;
- A transmission line system consisting of up to five 345 kV lines westward from the sites to Gold Creek, with 2 lines north to Fairbanks, and 3 lines south to Anchorage via a cable crossing at Knik Arm, is the best compromise of technical, economic, and environmental tradeoffs;
- The environmental consequences of construction and operation of the Susitna project are not unduly severe. The most important impacts will occur on downstream fisheries, and adequate mitigation measures to compensate for these and other impacts can be incorporated in the project without adversely affecting the viability of the development; and
- The Watana project, costing \$3647 million in 1982 dollars and the Devil Canyon project, costing \$1480 million in 1982 dollars, represent an optimal plan for meeting projected Railbelt electric energy needs through 2010 and beyond. A minimum state appropriation of \$2.3 billion in 1982 dollars, with residual financing from bonds, represents an appropriate mechanism for obtaining the necessary funds to construct the project, which will realize an 11 percent return on the state's investment.

19.2 - Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- The state authorize the filing of a FERC license application for construction of the project by September 30, 1982, with the objective of receiving such license by December 31, 1984. Environmental and engineering studies necessary to provide additional information in support of this application and development of mitigation plans, should be continued as necessary;
- Planning, permitting, and related logistical support activities should be initiated as soon as possible for construction of a pioneer access road from Gold Creek to Watana to commence in mid-1983;



- Planning, permitting, and related logistical support activities should be initiated as soon as possible for geotechnical exploration of the relict channel, riverbed, and construction material borrow areas;
- Planning, permitting, and related logistical support activities should be initiated in fiscal 1983 for geotechnical exploration and engineering for the Watana project;
- Detailed design of the Watana Project and associated facilities should commence in fiscal 1983;
- A decision to construct the Watana Project should be reviewed periodically in light of additional engineering, cost, environmental and financial information generated during the design phase; and
- If a decision is taken to proceed with the project, discussions should take place and agreement in principle be reached with Railbelt utilities on the form of contractual relationships under which Susitna output should be committed for sale.