1 ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION NOVEMBER 15, 1989 ANCHORAGE, ALASKA ALASKA OIL SPILL MEMBERS Walter B. Parker, Chairman 10 Esther C. Wunnicke, Vice-President 11 Margaret J. Hayes 12 Michael J. Herz 13 John Sund 14 Timothy Wallis 15 Edward Wenk, Jr. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 VOLUME II OF II 24 25

1	wants to hang around is wercome to do so.
2	MR. PARKER: We have reservations for 20.
3	MS. WUNNICKE: Is this mandatory?
4	(Laughter)
5	(Off Record)
6	(On Record - AOSC Tape # 2A, 11/15/89)
7	MR. PARKER: You want to discuss mandatory traffic
8	control any further or wait for the Staff to flush it out.
9	Quickly, what vessels other than tankers should be
10	mandatorily included, you can work with the Staff on that.
11	You want ferries you wanta recommend the State put its
12	ferries under such a system? Tote? Sea Land, etc.? I
13	think that'll follow very naturally.
14	MR. SUND: I think you deal with a vessel you deal
15	with a vessel size or purpose.
16	MR. PARKER: Yeah. And its possible hazard in the
17	system. You know, the environmental system or the traffic
18	system.
19	MS. WUNNICKE: Or the human system.
20	MR. PARKER: People are part of the environment.
21	MS. WUNNICKE: Glad to hear that.
22	MR. WENK: You have many recreational vehicles in
23	Prince William Sound in the summer time?
23	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.
25	MR. PARKER: Yeah, but there's such a big Sound they
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tend to get lost in the expanse.

MR. SUND: You have a lot of recreational vehicles but I don't think any of them can hurt a tanker. It's a question of the opposite.

MR. WENK: Oh, of course. But I'm thinking certainly you'd want to exempt them from mandatory traffic control.

MR. SUND: Yeah, that's like I was saying that.... Mr. Chairman, is it possible on these issues here, I don't know, John's not back yet, but I mean you just -- we put this down, I mean -- are we gonna get back a flushed-out position with -- somebody's gonna have to make some assumptions if -- and flush it out and put 'em down and then, you know, either make a recommendation or say it's -- here's the two sides, or three sides and leave it up to the Commission....

MR. PARKER: Well, in my discussions with Counsel, I've said, you know, we have to have paper on these things eventually if the Commissioners are going to be able to, and some of that is present in a fledgling form at this meeting. I think it was his plans to have that documented for the December meeting and in your hands far enough in front of that so you could have time to review it. Is that your understanding, Dennis?

MR. DOOLEY: It's my understanding we're gonna flush these out and I don't know how much far in advance that

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and the....

means. What -- two and a half weeks away.

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MR. PARKER: Well I think that depends on the energy

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MR. DOOLEY: Some of the things, like the vessel traffic system, there's a big difference between discussion

of Cook Inlet versus Prince William Sound. You have

fishermen that for one group who've agreed to it in Prince

William Sound and find it to be in their best interests.

That is not shared in Cook Inlet.

MR. SUND: Yeah, I understand that very well. It's not fair to Southeast Alaska either. So it's....

MR. PARKER: It's not necessary to have a consensus of all stake-holders to go ahead with a -- it is necessary to define the problems, though.

MR. DOOLEY: Well, I guess that's why I'm ask.....

MR. SUND: I think one of the issues in the mandatory system, you know, that comes up in Southeast a lot, and I think in Cook Inlet, is not whether you have a mandatory control system, it's whether you have mandated traffic And that's the big fear the fishermen have and lanes. they've got away in Prince William Sound. You can have these mandated traffic lanes 'cause it happens not to interfere with any fishing.

MR. DOOLEY: That was worked out in con -- it did when it was originally proposed. We have not had those group

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gropes for Cook Inlet. But there was a vicial reaction against those traffic lanes when they were originally proposed for Prince William Sound as well.

MR. SUND: And you see that off the California coast too, if you go down there, and the same arguments occur. But, you know, I think there's some issues that you have draft out and say this is what we're here and we all agree. And then there's that list of controversial ones, or how to approach them, that have to be kind of decided on. don't know that we can get through all of that list here. I would assume that we can give some general direction where we're thinking and let them come back and then we'll have to nail it down later. For those of us who feel very strong about some issues we can write some papers ourselves, I quess. Following with Commissioner Wenk's concept.

MS. HAYES: Realizing it's one Commissioner's opinion only.

MR. WENK: One Commissioner shot his wad.

No, I wasn't say write a whole report -- I MR. SUND: mean write 'em to the Staff if we have some concerns we want them to take care of.

MR. WALLIS: Mr. Chairman, are we talking about all traffic control systems for all ships or are we talking about traffic control for crude-carrying vessels, or

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product-carrying vessels.

MR. PARKER: We're talking about traffic control right now for crude carriers and possibly product tankers. Also, and I would assume you certainly would want to put the LNG in there, and that's what -- we haven't decided. haven't given any direction from the Commission yet, and the Staff has not given us any input yet on whether container ships, cruise ships and State ferries, at a minimum, should be included in that group. I don't....

MR. DOOLEY: If they offer a hazard to those vessels they should be included. To your tanker -- if your vessels are at risk it's a two-way risk. If a ferry can do damage to your tanker it ought to be in this system.

MR. PARKER: How about fishing boats over 70'.

MR. DOOLEY: I think you can arrive at some sort of nominal tonnage limit and say vessels above this size should be in your vessel system.

I used 70' PARKER: in order to eliminate (indiscernible) seiners.

MR. SUND: Yeah, but you got long (indiscernible).....

Well, I'm somewhat in agreement with MR. WENK: Dennis' approach on this, not only in terms of potential damage to tankers but we've had experiences in Puget Sound where tankers trying avoid traffic did some rather foolish things, so that if there had been more control you woulda

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MR. PARKER: Joe.

MR. PORRICELLI: Well I was gonna mention Mr. Chairman (indiscernible) from my perspective I can't envision any fishing vessel that would be a hazard to a tanker in terms of it striking a tanker and giving it sufficient harm to cause (indiscernible).

MR. PARKER: 280' processor?

MR. PORRICELLI: I don't think so, no.

MR. SUND: Well I think the episode is the one that Commissioner Wenk laid out, is the tanker attempting to avoid a collision with a smaller vessel and therefore getting into very weird situations.

MR. PARKER: We got into this in the past and, you know, in training tanker operators are at least, you know, laying out some guidelines, you know, as to whether you are in narrow waters, and I think that some jurisdictions get into this. In narrow waters you're expected to crush the small boy instead of putting it on the rocks.

MR. SUND: We've had ferry boats run over the top of fishing boats, so that's --....

MR. KEITH: One of the things, Mr. Chairman, too, you might want to remember for the ferry boats we do have people here to consider. One might want to put that type of control on the ferry boats to protect the people. In

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*	other words, it's going to increase a for of the safety of
2	the Alaska Ferry System by monitoring it for a number of
3	reasons. Just like Commissioner Wenk brought out, keeping
4	the two vessels apart to make them part of the system for
5	their safety as well as the release of oil.
6	MR. PARKER: Yeah. I think we've had enough input on
7	that, then, to give Staff some guidelines unless anybody
8	wants to add to that. Do you want to vote on the motion
9	now, or do you want any further discussion, or do you want
10	to table the motion until the next meeting.
11	MR. KEITH: Mr. Chairman, we have that short 10-
12	minute tape ready to role if the Commission's ready to see
13	that. That's on the vessel traffic system.
14	MR. PARKER: Do you want to see it or do you want to
15	look at it during a break?
16	MR. WALLIS: During a break.
17	MR. PARKER: Okay.
18	MR. SUND: I'll look at it later. We need to really
19	crank up here.
20	MR. WALLIS: If we're gonna vote on the motion, do we
21	have direction to give to the Staff on what we want them to
22	look at? Or are we looking at the whole monitoring system,
23	are we looking at traffic lanes, or what?
23	MR. PARKER: Yeah, I think we're looking at everything
25	you've seen so far, plus strong consideration for
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recommending that some vessels other than oil tankers be

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motion? Okay, we'll carry on with manning.

MR. WENK: Mr. Chairman, I just wonder whether it's worth breaking that into two separate items. The reason I mention it is that the term manning seems so widely used now to mean crew size and not to also embrace, as indeed I intend to, the question of certification, training, qualifications and so on. I just wonder.... I don't think there's any issue before us at all on this, it's simply whether we want to split it into two.

MR. PARKER: Is there anything you want to say on manning, Counsel, above what you've written here?

MR. HAVELOCK: No. I think I'm....

MR. PARKER: Okay, the -- as Commissioner Wenk has said the issues are size, the composition of the bridgewatch, especially when they're in interior waters, and the recommendation of our consultants is there be two certified watch standers certified in the sense that both are certified for pilotage, right? In those interior waters, both have Federal pilot licenses at a minimum? Or a Federal and a State pilots.....

We're saying it's preferable, and the MR. KEITH: Commission has heard testimony from Captain Murphy, that preferable is with a State pilot, and then one person on board with the Federal (indiscernible). And those cases where the State pilot can't stay on, like off Hinchinbrook,

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MR. PARKER: But the purpose of our recommendation is to encourage Federal certification of as many watch standers as possible on each ship, right? So that we have two all the way from Hinchinbrook in, two Federal until they pick up the State pilot, the State pilot on in. Two Federal from Kennedy Entrance in to Anchor Point till they pick up the State pilot on in.

MR. WENK: Excuse me, are we down to the pilotage issue.

MR. SUND: Yeah.

MR. PARKER: No, we're still on the crew. Pilotage is a little different discussion. It only gets into this because of the intermixing -- because it's intermixing with the two watch stander requirement. But -- the --....

MR. WENK: Okay, that's another -- as guidance to the Staff, though, I'd like to suggest on the size alone, the tabulation of the different crew sizes used by different shippers, and if possible, some explanation as to why there's such a wide range. My recollection, hazy as it is, is that as low as 17 and as high as 27.

MR. PARKER: Yeah, I'd --....

MR. WENK: Same route, same -- you know, everything's the same except crew-size.

MR. PARKER: Yeah, I'd like to some exposition on that

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'cause we got a lot -- a fair amount of testimony on it and there's gotta be some reason why ARCO runs with 29 and Exxon runs with 17 and so forth.

MR. SUND: Well, for their knowledge, it's total numbers that they could break out who they are, in terms of bridge guys, and engineers, and....

MR. HERZ: The things that Captain Nelson (indiscernible) talked about the teaming, planning and management -- does that come in this section?

MR. PARKER: It sure does.

MR. HERZ: Because I think -- I certainly am interested in having some sort of recommendation regarding that. It seems like a very, very valuable way to try to modify the traditional master, autonomous master role.

MR. PARKER: The Chair, you know, remembers NTSB getting into this very tentatively, and I would like to come up with something on this which would encourage NTSB to take bridge-resource management to the extent at least to the level that they've taken cockpit resource management. And really start putting some pressure on from the NTSB to make some dramatic upgrading on this whole thing that we heard from Captain Elthason (ph). And the - on the other training aspects, the general upgrading of crew capability to respond to disasters, operating in hazardous waters and so forth, through simulator training,

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as we heard from Captain Elthason (ph) mainly, and others. I hope that -- and we have the recommendations from ECO here. There's a whole area that I personally would like to see expanded -- also and -- is there anything you want to add to what's in the report on simulators and crew training?

MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, if I understood your issue. One we were asking for some more research on the difference of crew sizing, but there's also a minimum-level crew-size recommendation that has been made in, I think, in the ECO report and also by Captain Elthason (ph) that I didn't read -- moving on that minimum requirement here or recommendation.

MR. PARKER: I think we can -- yeah -- I don't know how many motions you need on manning, I haven't sorted that out yet. But other than the two certified officers on the bridge at all times -- are you making that as a motion or....

MR. SUND: No, I was just trying to clarify what the issues were here because the other portion of the issue is more of an institutional issue, as how do you enforce the current law regarding rest before you go on watch which is a loading problem. The current law is probably adequate if it was just followed.

MR. PARKER: Well, you bring up an important point.

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Fatigue is one of the major factors and Counsel is planning a contract crew-fatigue so....

MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, to follow up on John's I think that one way to approach this -- manning by itself I agree with Commissioner Wenk mean one thing, whereas the topic that we're addressing is to cure several problems. One is fatigue, the other is as many eyes as possible to address a problem, and the second is the chain of command strictures on people under the captain who may not want to call his attention to deviations. So it seems to me those are three things that you're trying to address if you could accomplish all those things with a certain number of people. I don't think that we should get hung up on numbers at all. I think that we should be addressing those problems -- the training. Training, fatigue, lookout, ability to tell the captain that he's making a mistake. Is that what you're trying to cure, or are we trying to make some kind of union standards.

MR. SUND: Yeah, I think the overall recommendation is you can cure -- I don't know how you'd do the training thing -- but you can cure most of the other ones with additional people. So I don't know what to do on that. I think the recommendation isn't necessarily that there's

more people on the ship. The recommendation is that there's certain amounts of people on the bridge when

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MR. PORRICELLI: Yes, sir. That is correct. Basically we made -- in regard to what the Commissioner is referring to as manning, we made two basic recommendations. One was a recommendation that when the vessel enters, what we call restricted waters -- in the case of Prince William Sound from the Hinchinbrook on upwards to Valdez, and in the case of Cook Inlet from the Kennedy entrance on upwards -- that on the bridge there be two qualified persons one of which where possible and when possible to be the State pilot, and the other being a shipboard qualified personnel, and as I think that Chairman Parker said a couple of minutes ago, both prior to the boarding of the State pilot at Homer or up at Bligh Reef in the case of Prince William Sound. Then there be two qualified shipboard people. that was one recommendation.

The second was -- pertained to training. And this was that people periodically need to have training in emergency situations in restrictive waters. And the notion is that people need to be reminded of what to do in an emergency situation. It's something that doesn't happen routinely. It's something that they need to be reminded and even more so with the ability to use a simulator we can create emergency situations in the environment in which they'll be operating, whether that be Prince William Sound or Cook

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Inlet, and therefore bring them through these training situations so that in the case of an actual emergency there will be some recollection of proper things to do.

MR. WENK: Mr. Chairman. Commissioner Wunnicke was making a point just now that I think has a broader implication. And it has to do with the degree of detail that the Commission wants to get into. Now, I understand this discussion from one of you of self-education. I look at this list and see the number of different items there I think we are confronted with the question, are we gonna make recommendations on every single one of these. What comes to mind is really the ultimate performance that we're after. And I'm wondering whether there isn't a way to sharpen attention on what constitutes an economical and safe maritime world transportation system without getting down into this type of micro-scale -- I hate to say microscale -- micro management -- but the kind of detail that is not necessary if indeed we talk about the ultimate performance of the system, to which each of these factors is a contributing element. But not getting -- not expecting ourselves, or necessarily Staff, to bring us to the point that we can take a position on -- at this level of detail.

MR. PARKER: Well, there's been mention to me in the past of examining the total marine system environment and

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it's a -- or the mega-system -- and it's difficult for me to examine the system without examining the parts, so -- I

MR. WENK: I'm not suggesting not examining the parts. All I'm wondering about is, for example, whether we're going to get down into detail as to how many people ought to be on the bridge with precisely how much training and so on. That's what I was beginning to hear.

MS. WUNNICKE: I don't think we're in disagreement, Mr. Chairman. My sense is from this body, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that we're unwilling to put all our faith in automated, technological systems. But that what we want to have are alert, trained, qualified crew on oil transport vessels. So whether that means 40 people, or 30 people, or 100 people, I'm not qualified to make that judgment, but I think I would be qualified to say that those are the elements of the crew on an oil transport vessel that we want to achieve. So I don't think we're in disagreement on it.

I'm not sure. I think the -- two on the MR. PARKER: bridge and two in the engine room is pretty basic and has been pretty well defined. If we make our recommendations so broad as to be subject to interpretation I think we'd be right back in the -- at the mercy of the regulatory system of the Coast Guard and its industry-dominated advisory

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MS. WUNNICKE: Would it add another factor of that redundancy on the bridge and redundancy in the engine room?

MR. PARKER: Yeah.

MS. WUNNICKE: Okay.

MR. PARKER: I think that's -- however you state redundancy, that's what we're after both in crew and in the automated and propulsion and other systems on board.

MR. DOOLEY: One of the suggestions by Captain Elthajohn (ph) was that you have a mate whose duties are loading -- restricted to loading and maintenance so that he isn't one of the watch keepers and he has not -- deals with the fatigue as well as the responsibility issues, and you want to incorporate that as well as your main guidelines.

MR. PARKER: I think we want to examine it at least with some -- have you pursue it further at least. The idea of the two third-mates, which I think was what he was talking about -- I wouldn't be ready to phrase it quite that way yet but --....

MR. SUND: I think that, Mr. Chairman, it kind of comes out the way I see it, as, you know, we recommend that there'll be adequate manning with adequately trained people. I mean that's kind of a generic-type statement and maybe the report goes on to say here's some of the concepts

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that we're concerned with. We're concerned with crewsize, with training, with fatigue, number of people on the watch, etc., right -- I mean lay out what the Commission had in consideration and some of the parameters that were discussed, I mean that's -- the issue is adequately trained crew in a position and I would just let it go at that. think the Staff can take this issue now and write a recommendation. Our contractors have come back with this specific number watch standers of two qualifications and certain licensing. I don't have any 10 problem with that, I..... 11 MR. PARKER: Putting on your old legislative hat, what 12 13 15

would you want to see coming before you as committee chairman from this board. How would you want it stated. Would you want some specifics or would you want it in some form that you would have to go out and get the specifics vourself.

You want it as simple and as clear as MR. SUND: possible. You want the number that you want if you want....

MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, you raise a whole kettle of fish. I don't think we should be in the business of drafting legislation. I think....

MR. PARKER: Well, Ι was talking the recommendations I wasn't talking about legislation.

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industry, has

(indiscernible). And I -- one in which we've heard a good deal of testimony but of which we haven't had a chance to have any real intensive work sessions with the pilots. So -- the Southwest pilots, at least, are strongly desirous of getting from the Alaska Legislature a substantial upgrading of State pilotage requirements. And -- they haven't furnished us with those requirements yet. I don't know if the Southeast pilots are as strong about that as Southwest or not. But we need to contact them also. The -- how far do you wanta -- Counsel, do you want to go any further than that on this issue at this time?

MR. HAVELOCK: As my notes indicate I'm kind of -- I wanted to call it to your attention that we need more factual development on this before we can come in with more specific recommendations.

MR. PARKER: The other issue, as you remember, is Federal pilotage which means in the minds of the industry eliminating the State's requirement to have a State pilot. They would like Congress to preempt the State's requirement for a State pilot on that. We will need to have a position on that if that does proceed in the Congress. Where does it stand now? Did they get that in the bill in the House?

MARILYN: I'll have to check on that.

MR. PARKER: Well, don't worry. Go ahead and check on it later, but it's something that keeps hanging out there

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but industry obviously would prefer not to have to pick up State pilots. And in industry I include anybody who can put a Federal pilot on their bridge, meaning cruise ships, and container ships, and everyone else, so....

MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, I think it's important that we maintain the State pilotage system that we have now. That perhaps the license requirements for handling certain types of vessels be upgraded. That's just a couple of basics. And I think the other areas -- area requirement for pilots -- and that seems to be a little battle being fought down in Prince William Down -- whether they have to go up beyond Bligh Reef or they can do it inside of that. I think in a specific recommendation for Prince William Sound that the pilotage ideally would be to Hinchinbrook, but because of weather and safety considerations it's -- I would recommend where it is today in the Cook Inlet just to maintain what they have now. That's a little micromanagement but -- seeing as that's where the battle-lines are being drawn I think the Commission can take a position.

MR. PARKER: Okay.

MS. WUNNICKE: I don't have any problem with that.

MR. SUND: Well, I am curious -- the guy from API was gonna come back with that list of what states have ranking of where their pilot training ends up in the rankings. They made some recommendations that state pilots aren't

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qualified in all states to do what they're doing.

MS. WUNNICKE: But wasn't the point, John, that at least all the Alaska State pilots are also Federally licensed?

MR. SUND: All them are. of Ι think their recommendation was that the state pilots should be subject to disciplinary action under -- by the Coast guard.

MR. PARKER: As far as I know all State pilots are Federal pilots, but few Federal pilots are State pilots. Just about every skipper that has been at sea a while has a Federal license for some port and some of them probably have 'em for 20 or 30 ports, wouldn't you say?

MR. KEITH: That's correct, Mr. Chairman.

MS. WUNNICKE: May I ask a question at the risk of offending all the pilots. This is not a feather-bedding kind of thing, is it? I mean, I believe there is a real need for someone with local knowledge of the area to serve as a pilot on these vessels, but when you get into two or three pilots is that a feather-bedding --....

MR. SUND: I don't really understand this battle going on in Prince William Sound and Southeast. They gotta take on a pilot when the hit the pilot station on the cruise ships, and they basically have two pilots on board those cruise ships throughout Southeast Alaska. They gotta have 'em on board, they're in pilotage waters, and they run day

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anything more anybody wants to say about these two recommendations other than what's in your....

MS. HAYES: I guess I have a question as whether they are intended to apply mutually into what we heard yesterday to Cook Inlet and to Prince William Sound.

MR. SUND: Well the Cook Inlet plan, I think, is a availability plan isn't it?

MS. HAYES: I'm not sure what the recommend -- is this recommendation that we duplicate Prince William Sound in Cook Inlet?

MR. PARKER: No. Let me explain it. In Prince William Sound we have the tugs which assist the tankers in docking and which are also part of the escort. they'll remain there as part of the escort (indiscernible) the escort vessels or not remains to be seen. But we do have the docking tugs. And then we have the escort vessel and the tugs which take the ships out to Hinchinbrook Entrance. And we've gone over why we have -- what the many duties of the escort vessels are earlier. In Cook Inlet, because of its different bottom, the system of operation has grown up for years there, as you heard Bob Williams describe yesterday, the tugs are no good to you at Nikisky because when you dock at Nikisky you throw your anchors out and back down on your anchors until you're against the And there have been discussion about the need for dock.

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tugs in Cook Inlet, but certainly not even the beginning of a consensus among the Cook Inlet shippers as I understand it. Dennis, did you ever -- did you arrive in that second day of that Cook Inlet session?

MR. DOOLEY: Their discussion was that they have a diversity of terminals in addition and do require -- if you ended up with every terminal receiving a vessel on the same day, you end up requiring yourself to have six stand-by vessels escorting these up and down, as you're requiring in Prince William Sound. Or do you locate them in a strategic location to where you have a response time in the event that there's a failure somewhere. And where is that strategic location to be. And their discussion was that trying to look for stand-by vessels that are in a ready state of preparedness with a crew on board to be able to respond in the event, you know, somebody pushes the button. And -- but not escorting each vessel up and down Cook Inlet.

MR. PARKER: How about the tugs. Did you get on the berthing tugs, did you get....

MR. DOOLEY: No, we didn't get -- didn't deal with that issue.

MR. PARKER: Okay. That's essentially the big difference between the two and -- I --....

MS. HAYES: If given that, what are talking about

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MR. PARKER: Pretty much what it says there.

MR. HERZ: In this discussion of escort vessels are we talking a single purpose tug with towing capacity, which has the redundant navigation capacity, or are we talking a multi-purpose vessel that might be capable of fire-fighting as well. Fire-fighting is something that we have not discussed at all. I guess you don't have much of a -- you haven't had a serious need for that, but what's the sense of whether these escort vessels -- do the new Alyeska ones -- I think they do have monitors don't they? Fire monitors?

MR. PORRICELLI: Yes.

MR. HERZ: Because it seems to me now that some of the portable pumping packs that are available that you can add at a not very high expense -- fire-fighting capacity on the escort vessels.

MR. KEITH: I certainly think that's a big feature in Cook Inlet, that you need that type of capability both for the Port of Anchorage as well as for the facilities down in Kenai (indiscernible) that basically you don't have the shore-side support if they would have a large fire at one of those chemical complexes. Or for the Port of Anchorage itself. And to have one of those vessels on, like you say Commissioner, it's not a big deal to put on pumping like -

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- a monitor up high and 20,000 GPM (indiscernible) so now you can -- and especially if that was on a (indiscernible) reinforced vessel that you could get on the scene very quickly and fight those pier fires from the water side. I think that's a very important -- especially for Cook Inlet because you really, with the ice out there, you -- and especially with the facilities down in Kenai, the Urea (ph), the LNG, and the refinery, that that would be a very, very important item.

MR. HERZ: As well as a vessel fire itself?

MR. KEITH: If one of the container ships had a fire you could fight that from the ship. When you -- the whole Port of Anchorage -- and you said this many times -- is completely vulnerable to fire.

MR. HERZ: There's no fire-fighting plus no water source.

MR. KEITH: None from the water side. From the tug boat side. Unlike San Francisco or the other areas that you're familiar with.

MR. HERZ: But we have our World War II tug conversions that hardly can be defined as fire boats, but....

MR. SUND: We just bought one from Washington didn't we?

MR. PARKER: We seem to be in agreement that that

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should be incorporated as a part of escort vessels underway and the other than that they are, as you described, the mutli-purpose ships with -- being able to tow and provide immediate response in case of a spill.

MR. HERZ: Are we gonna talk about what we're gonna have for those specifications or are we gonna discuss it in the response section.

MR. PARKER: It says, "see also containment requirements under response capacity." I guess we'll discuss it again. Escort vessels docking, other than the bow-thrusters -- do the tugs working Valdez now have bow-thrusters?

MR. PORRICELLI: Not to my knowledge. It may be presumptuous of me to say, but I think what you're saying is the thrusters and the docking tugs are really alternatives to one another. If one would recommend, for example, that all the vessels have bow-thrusters on, you might be a little bit hard-pressed in the same breath to say but I also want docking tugs. I think.....

MR. PARKER: That's what it says, I read it.

MR. PORRICELLI: Okay, I don't have it in front of me.

MR. PARKER: Collision prevention. We covered that, that goes under traffic control. Terminal control. Or port authority, as it says -- as it indicates here. Counsel....

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MR. HAVELOCK: Mr. Chairman, I think there are several issues here and we just sort of start sliding into the institution section here. That is, this is directed at controlling the terminal activity itself -- that is the terminal. There's also the question of -- an institutional question -- of who are you gonna have to administer some of the systems you've already discussed locally. And I think the main idea that's been floating around that is the port authority concept, which is not necessarily the same thing as the terminal control issue. And then you have the larger institutional question of whether you're gonna have a locus for prevention in State government generally and where is that going to be if you have such a locus for oversight of the whole mega-system. So you've got those three related questions there that require an institutional discussion.

MR. PARKER: You want to put it off till institutions then?

MR. HAVELOCK: Well, we're only minutes away from that anyway, if you want to -- yeah -- if you want to look at this weather and the specific question of whether you're gonna do something about that tank farm problem.

MS. WUNNICKE: Before we leave the terminal control though, before the break, in looking at the traffic control, is there any merit in combining the powers of

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Ŧ	cerminal control with traffic control in a public body.
2	MR. HAVELOCK: Well, they're different functions.
3	MS. WUNNICKE: I know they're two different functions.
4	MR. HAVELOCK: Maybe even differently located
5	physically. You're talking about controlling vessels
6	moving in and out, and then you're talking about oversight
7	of the tank farm, loading facility and dock itself as a -
8	- well as determined right now there's a set of people at
9	Alyeska as they're Alyeska employees that oversee that
10	terminal and the loading and unloading activities from the
11	perspective of the shore-based facilities.
12	MS. WUNNICKE: I'm not thinking so much of loading and
13	unloading as I am the authority to keep a ship in port in
14	the light of hazards or to direct a ship to leave port
15	unfilled. That kind of authority.
16	MR. HAVELOCK: That goes with the traffic control side
17	of it.
18	MS. WUNNICKE: Well, that's why I'm wondering if that
19	couldn't be combined. John?
20	MR. SUND: Yeah, Mr. Chairman, I have been kind of
21	waiting I guess - we're under institutions now?
22	MR. PARKER: Not yet.
23	MR. SUND: I don't know, it sounds pretty much like
23	institutions to me.
25	MR. HAVELOCK: That's what it is unless you want to

dispose of whether you want to do something about weather information.

MR. SUND: I have an institution theory when you get to it, Mr. Chairman.

MR. WALLIS: I've got a question on terminal control here.

MR. SUND: Sounds like institutions to me.

MS. WUNNICKE: We're gonna be in one if we don't....

MR. WALLIS: You're right. You're right. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I'm half asleep.

MR. WENK: Mr. Chairman, before we leave the menu here, just one overview with regard to Staff work. To help -- my impression is that the Commission has highlighted these as significant issues on which we may need to make -- we may need to review that decision, but we may need to go to a lower level of detail and decision. My proposal would be that the Staff would help us a great deal if in going to this next level of detail you outline the options -- this begins to sound like decisions process -- but give us some idea of what options are available and what the consequences are of A versus B. This is somewhat different than simply putting in pros and cons.

MR. HAVELOCK: I understand. And we'll do that.

MR. WALLIS: Mr. Chairman. Where are we at, are we on weather information.

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MR. PARKER: No we're -- weather information, anybody want to say anything about weather information? MR. HAVELOCK: I call your attention to Marilyn has a memo, has a paragraph 4 indicates that the State, she says, which is an institutional question, "should maintain computerized data on geographical, meteorological oceanographic characteristics in coastal areas so equipment and personnel can be sent where they're most needed." course, that's also pertinent to navigation. And I guess I should say that that's the 10 MARILYN: I didn't make it up. Governor's recommendation. 11 MR. PARKER: And the tank storage capacity at Valdez. 12 We're awaiting a response from Alyeska on this. 13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do we have a letter out? 14 MR. PARKER: Yes, you've all read the letter. 15 16 MR. WALLIS: What -- can I ask a question. MR. PARKER: Yeah. 17 Why do we want to require that? MR. WALLIS: 18 they're going to do other things and -- it seems to me that 19 that would be a decision that they would make as to how 20 they would take care of that type of situation. 21 MR. PARKER: It governs that period when tankers 22 cannot sail because of high winds. 23 I understand that. So I guess I wanted MR. WALLIS: 23 to question whether we require them to add tanks or whether 25

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what's it's going to do.....

MR. PARKER: What's the other decision?

we let them make that decision on their own. I don't know

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Whether -- if they want to put in a --MR. WALLIS: put in additional tanks.

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MR. PARKER: Yeah, well the problem is that if you don't have the tank capacity it takes a while to shut down the pipeline and so the pressure is on the system to have tankers sail in bad weather. That's why we put the requirement in the original Valdez (indiscernible simultaneous talking) requirements.

MR. WALLIS: I understand that, Mr. Chairman. guess what I'm saying is do you think they would come to that conclusion on their own?

MR. PARKER: I don't know that's what was waiting for the answer in the letter -- to -- and the letter hasn't been answered yet, so I don't know. But, yeah, until it is why it's still hanging. Fire here is an important part of the prevention system, I think. You know, we regarded it as important in 1976 and the -- you know, in the years before the terminal was opened and I think it still is important 'cause, you know, when through-put was -- I said in the letter -- when through-put was increased from 1.2 million to 2.2 million, why nothing was done about storage, and....

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MR. WALLIS: I understand. I guess the question, the way I'm looking at it is there was really never any requirements to shut down shipping -- or authority to shut down shipping.

MR. PARKER: Yeah, there was.

MR. DOOLEY: Yeah. Weather constraints.

MR. WALLIS: Yeah, okay. But now they're going to be a little bit more diligent about doing that and preventing ships from sailing.

MR. PARKER: Yeah. 'Cause we are -- the record indicates -- a historical record indicates there has been severe slippage in that particular area and the original requirement was you didn't go out in -- 40 knots was the cut-off point and.....

MR. WALLIS: But I think we're going to have someone recommend that we have someone now -- someone other than industry that's going to be making that decision. So the threat is there, I guess, that the possibility of being shut down for 10 days is now very real. So it seems to me that they would make that decision to build some extra tanks, otherwise whosever in charge isn't going to be there very long.

MR. DOOLEY: There may be a request on people reviewing this report. What are the economic consequences of shutting down your port?

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MR. WALLIS: I guess I can see -- our point is not timing to do it but, you know, if you do it these are requirements that you have to follow.

MR. PARKER: Yeah, I think our main job is to identify the problem. The problem is identified, it's out there for everyone to see, whether it's necessary for how firmly we should request that, I think we can....

MR. WALLIS: I guess the deal is if we tell them to do it they're going for a higher rate, but they do it, so....

MR. PARKER: Okay. Well, I was thinking about that too, so.... We have a discussion on storage increase -- tank storage increase. Moving to regional response depot.

MR. HAVELOCK: Mr. Chairman.

MR. PARKER: Yes.

MR. HAVELOCK: I would suggest that we move the agenda and not do the response stuff at the moment, but go to the institutional side of prevention in view of Mr. Wenk's departure tomorrow and his interest in having input into institutions. So I would recommend that you review what you have now done with respect to the institutional framework, and I would suggest you start with the question of -- that I just posed to you, as to what kind of combination of new, or reordered, institutions you want for port management, terminal management and management of the prevention interests of the State overall.

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MR. HERZ: I think that's a good idea but I was gonna suggest that since -- Ed, when are you leaving?

MR. WENK: Why don't we break up at 3:30 here today?

MR. HERZ: Okav. It seems to me that we were able to

MR. HERZ: Okay. It seems to me that we were able to go through just putting that list up there without discussing it in about 10 minutes, for prevention. It might be useful before Mr. Wenk leaves to do the same thing for both prevention and response. This will get the list up there and should take us 15, 15 or 20 minutes to go through that list and then go through your discussion.

MR. SUND: Nothing takes 20 minutes.

MR. HERZ: We did that one in.....

(Laughter)

MR. HERZ: Well, before we make our change, I think we left off of the escort vessel discussion the towing pact - didn't we want to say something about towing pacts for Cook Inlet.

MR. PARKER: There's only one proposal under response. It has several elements, but it in essence is regional response depot, and it has several elements under it. So how many of those elements did you want to put on the menu very quickly.

MR. HERZ: Well, it seems to me that there's some other things that could be added to that -- should be added to that list. That was why I wanted.....

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example, the requirement of animal/bird rescue, housing and 2 3 equipment. And waste disposal. And what about local staging of equipment MR. HERZ: 5 I don't think is covered in your regional response depot, is it? Or is it. I couldn't tell. 6 7 MARILYN: Staging and equipment in regional response depots? 8 MR. HERZ: No, no. I meant more loc -- I don't have 9 a sense from this what "regional" means. 10 MARILYN: I don't know what she means either. 11 MR. HERZ: But my thought was that the staging would 12 be done on a smaller than regional scale, that it would be 13 done on, you know, very local -- I don't know. But that 14 may be what you mean by regional here, I think there's a 15 semantic problem. 16 I think regional in this case would be MR. PARKER: 17 defined as Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet as a 18 beginning with other regions to..... 19 MR. HAVELOCK: That's what the intention was when I 20 was writing it. 21 Well, then my -- what I'm talking MR. HERZ: Okay. 22 about is agendizing very local staging of equipment and the 23 utilization of training local fire departments and/or other 23 personnel capable of responding very locally. 25 -136-

Right.

Marilyn has some, also.

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MR. HAVELOCK:

MR. PARKER: Yeah, it's 9.9 down here on the work force. I think the staging -- the local staging of equipment just didn't get in here, but, you know, it's an important point that....

MS. HAYES: Yeah, Mr. Chairman, I would say that especially after yesterday's discussion, it refocused attention from the futility of trying to sweep up the spilled oil in comparison to looking at response as a prevention method from having the oil reach resources of high value. And I -- and that shifts the foc -- at least it does for me and perhaps other members of the Commission, to focusing our attention on locating those resources near places that have had value, rather than necessarily where the oil might be most likely to be spilled.

MR. HAVELOCK: Well, they're not exclusive. I assume that you have your regional response center, you're not gonna sprinkle all your containment gear up and down the coast. But you'll have a little depot whose job it is to protect a specific fishery and so on. And then you'll have a main regional depot for Prince William Sound where they will have a master inventory for the main response.

MS. HAYES: And I personally was also quite taken with the graphics that came out of the ECO report about the location of maybe corralling oil if it happened to be spilled in the right spots, to keeping the damage under

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MR. HERZ: I frankly think that we have -- we really don't have the finding laid out clearly in terms of what contain -- what is possible with containment and recovery. You know, we -- yesterday I think we were moving in the direction of being convinced that with a catastrophic spill you can't clean up very much, but I heard the ECO people saying that they felt that containment and recovery shouldn't be written off because with smaller spills there's a higher probability of collecting more and I really don't think that we have collected the data that we need to really have findings and recommendations about containment and recovery.

MR. PARKER: Well, I think getting some idea -between a 70,000 ton tanker and the 250,000, since that's
what we've been talking about, what kind of hourly recovery
rate do you need to have a satisfactory recovery?

MR. KEITH: Mr. Chairman, for one, I think Bob Schulze could maybe take just two or three minutes and kind of put that in perspective the necessity of (indiscernible) do not ignore the small spills, which are 90% of the spills, as well as what Commissioner Hayes says -- if you have a large spill in certain areas you possibly could block that off. And just kind of put that in perspective -- if you want to do that.

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Ed.

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MR. PARKER: Well, we can do that tomorrow or....

Just a point of reminding all of us as to MR. WENK: what to seem to be the most incandescent issues that had arisen with regard to response. My recollection from a range of witnesses is that, number one, you have to move And it seems to me that the importance of the swiftly. first eight hours, maybe as many as 12, has got to be reflected in some operational way that is not just a question of institutional jurisdiction. It's a lot more than that, it's a state of mind. The second point has to do with the clarity of authority of an on-scene commander. And I looked at this -- the institutional part of response in the material that's been provided us and that didn't come out quite as loud and clear as I thought it might, again in light of the kind of inputs that we've had and what went wrong in the past. There are two or three other elements that could be underscored and I don't think we ought to take the time now to do this, but all of this adds up to the following. In dealing with contingency planning, there are a whole host of different elements that go to make up a plan. And you can go down telephone numbers and so on and so on, just as Commissioner Hayes and others here have singled out the value, and I think that it was John Lathrop that called this to our attention, the value of

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looking at the ultra-sensitive spots and not -- going at it with a rifle rather than a shotgun. I think the same thing is true with regard to going to this response. Trying to find those targets where we ought to shoot a rifle and not try to cover equally all the elements that go into response. I mentioned two, I think there are two or three

It's a little short of time to get into it.

MR. PARKER: Even in that short time, however, you set up the dichotomy between the fast response and the -protecting the sensitive areas, and I think that's where we need, in order to get it right in that economy, we have to treat it as a dichotomy and do both. And they're not exclusive. It's part of a total system. But that gets back to the point, you know, how fast do you have to recover oil in that initial phase, in that first eight hours. If you're gonna have a total catastrophic spill of a 250,000 ton tanker obviously you have to recover oil at a rate in excess of 30,000 tons per hour. Can we recover oil in excess of 30,000 tons per hour. No. We cannot. So -- what is the fastest rate we can recover oil under ideal conditions getting it all nicely boomed and with the skimmers sucking away at the greatest rate. 10,000 tons per hour? No. Three? Okay.

MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, for what it's worth, I passed out to everyone just a talking paper on what I saw

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others.

as the major elements, at least in terms of institutions with respect to prevention, and in the second half with respect to response. And the second item under response has to do with a system that would -- actually, as it turns out in light of this discussion, three duties. The lightering of the cargo and ship safety, the spill containment, and the protecting of sensitive areas, which I would add to that. So, this paper is just, I hope, to kind of keep us focused on the elements that we want to address no matter what configuration the institutions might take. But I would add protecting sensitive areas under 2A there, under response.

MR. PARKER: Okay. Getting into continuing with prevention, then. Counselor, do you want to go ahead with your first proposal, number 10, then. Your blockbuster.

MR. HAVELOCK: Well you can start at either end. I've talked with Commissioner Wunnicke before about how I arrived at the conclusion that you should consider the department, because you have this issue of if you create smaller institutions in a state government, then the question arises where do you put them. And you can either put them in, you know, existing facilities or you can say, well, the whole structure of state government isn't quite right for the oil and gas industry anyway, and you could, therefore -- you get to this larger -- much larger question

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1	that affects a great many other things besides the
2	transportation of oil. And I suggest that simply
3	because logic compels one to consider it as a proposition.
4	That is that one of the larger macro-systematic problems
5	with the way the State addresses not only safety of
6	carrying of oil at sea, but a great many of its other
7	problems involving the industry, is it simply that its
8	response is scattered among a variety of small institutions
9	and subsets that are scattered around State government.
10	You know, the argument on the other side of that is that
11	maybe by being scattered around they're more protected
12	from being co-opted by the industry. Because if you are
13	gonna set up a substantial set of prevention institutions
14	you must face the issue of where are they gonna be housed
15	within State government. And maybe you can you might
16	feel more comfortable with starting at the bottom end and
17	looking at an authority to deal with some of these
18	technological fixes. And I'm not sure that those
19	technological fixes provide you answers to the large
20	questions that the State's addressing its systematic
21	responsibilities in the long run.
22	MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, in the discussions with

MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, in the discussions with Counsel on it, I guess the points that I raised in terms of creating a department of oil and gas or a department of energy, was to add the other aspects of leasing and control

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of drilling and all of those other aspects, would detract from this responsibility and also be open to the criticism of being captured by the industry. But in looking at it just in pure functional terms, it seems to me that something on the order of the Department of Public Safety is a better type of institution than one that has the other leasing and regulatory responsibilities of oil and gas.

MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, this discussion reminds me of the -- Mr. Wenk's presentation of why you go to the President and the Skinner-Riley report, why it has 13 logos on the cover of the report. The State agencies have the same amount of entities involved in this whole thing here and how you pull it together, but I just offer my comments. I kind of came from the other end of this spectrum of saying -- this harbor master concept has kind of got me intriqued, and I started thinking about -- at first it came from the point of do we have a State entity to control the port on the basis of weather. And then you sat down and said well, what are some of the other things that may concern the State. Well, whether there's escort vessels or not -- that's an issue. Whether there's adequate drug and alcohol testing of the crews is an issue. Who's gonna run the monitor system, the vessel control system -- that's an issue that's there. And then you just go on down the line. Who runs the emergency drills on contingency plans. And so

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it all kind of started coming in one sense that there's a need for all of these things out there and you can split 'em up. You can put the emergency drills in DEC, and the monitoring systems in the Coast Guard, and the drug and alcohol testing, give it up to Alyeska, and the escort vessels -- I don't know why they're doing it. They're just doing it 'cause they want to or we told them to do it or something. We exerted some State authority.

MR. PARKER: Because the Governor was gonna shut the terminal down if they didn't.

MR. SUND: Okay, so we exerted some State authority there. And what do we have authority to close the port - because of weather or not, I think that's a research issue that we probably gotta work on, but.... And then I saw John's management department theory here, which has a lot of other little strings out there, but.... And I think Tim wrote a little paper the other day talking about the harbor master concept or port concept. So maybe there's a port authority concept here that's always rattled around in the State government for a long time -- that we could look at in terms of controlling the port and access to the port and vessels in and out of the port.

MR. DOOLEY: How would you approach that concept with Cook Inlet?

MS. WUNNICKE: What was the question?

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MR. DOOLEY: How would you approach that port authority concept to Cook Inlet.

MR. SUND: I was trying to build the idea, not tear it down. I have a steel plate in the back of this chair. You can shoot all you want.

MARILYN: I spoke with Jim Butler from the Kenai Peninsula Borough when I was in Homer last week. And he talked about this idea too, for Cook Inlet. And I don't know very much of the specifics, but one of the things he said was that you could -- if the Borough does have those sorts of authority powers, port authority powers. And one of the things that he was most interested in was making sure that there was a depot with equipment that would be available for response that would apply to any oil spill that occurred in that area, and having the shippers pay fees, or some sort of structure like that. Because there isn't one port there, there's several ports, so.....

MR. SUND: Are they all within the Borough?

MARILYN: I believe so but I'm not sure.

MR. DOOLEY: Well, Port of Anchorage isn't. Just across the top -- and (indiscernible) emerging Port McKenzie if it ever gets real.

MR. WENK: First of all, it doesn't take my plea of naivety to say I know very little about Alaska State government. So what I would like to contribute to this

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discussion comes from some general principles of public administration. Two things. First, and this is sort of preaching to the choir, 'cause I know everybody here knows this. But the creation of a government agency is a political act in the first instance. In the second instance it's a functional act from the point of view of getting something done. What I mean by being a political act is very simply expressed in terms of the medium is the message. You look at the whole history of creating Federal agencies and you'll find time after time after time when they were created it was in response to some politically incandescent demand. Not necessarily functional, but coincidentally functional. NASA could just as well have been done within the Department of Defense, but there was a good political reason not to do it. The same thing is true of AEC. There was a good political reason not to do The functions would have been almost the same. matter of fact, AEC ended up spending most of its time making bombs, anyway, that they sold to DOD. suggesting is, from the point of view of analyzing the importance of this proposal, is the medium is the message, whether or not you want to send a message vis-a-vis the importance of energy the State of Alaska.

Now, someone earlier has said that Fish and Game has gotten a heck of a lot more attention in departmental

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structure than energy. Did I hear that correctly?

MS. WUNNICKE: Well, yeah.

In terms of structure? MR. WENK:

MS. WUNNICKE: Oil and gas is a division in the Department of Natural Resources. Department of Fish and Game is a full department. And it certainly makes sense in terms of the importance of oil and gas in Alaska for it to be a full department. But the reasons for that are quite different from the regulatory reasons that I think that we're addressing here, and that's my only point.

Right. No, but a good one. But because MR. WENK: what I'm bringing out is that the rationale for creating a department of energy is based on this importance in the State of Alaska and not on this question of the functions that are being defined here. The two might coincide completely. But I think one ought to approach this from point of view of two parallel rationales, one political and one functional, and see where you come out.

MS. WUNNICKE: We're really talking about regulatory I think that's what John Sund's talking about when he talks about port authority. You're talking about regulatory authority.

MR. WENK: (Indiscernible) quick point and I'll quit. But from the point of view of function I could imagine your laying out before coming to the department of energy a

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MR. DOOLEY: One of the things that came across to me yesterday listening to Mr. Hawkins, was that they're receiving information which could be readily employed in terms of contingency planning and review of and timing of permits. It did not come across very clear that that was being utilized in such a fashion. And as a matter of fact, you mentioned, well, I think I get PIG reports. He has no idea and you're saved from his presentation. No one in his department has a clear idea of where they ought to be focusing some concern in terms of review of pipeline And yet they're getting the reports. It's integrity. lost. It's in that morass, and if you had that in a -- and I'm playing Devil's advocate here -- but there's one

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structure you could hopefully achieve that kind of coordinated approach to the best aims you get out of all that information.

MR. PARKER: One of the interesting aspects of this whole thing is we wrote the Department of Transportation to have authority over pipelines, have the authority to create port authorities and so forth, and to do all these things. And of course the Department of Transportation has resolutely stayed away from this issue for the past 12 years, as far away from it as it could get. In fact it has taken no action that I'm aware of to exercise any of those responsibilities. So.....

MR. DOOLEY: Well, I think pipelines were struck out in the enabling legislation.

MR. PARKER: Alright. Dirty devils.

MR. HAVELOCK: (Indiscernible) The point he's making there is they're still dealing this in a very piece-meal way if you do something and you're gonna leave out the whole pipeline. Which is where the next break may be.

MR. PARKER: Yeah, that's the critical thing in this discussion. Do you want to treat your oil and gas as a total system, because once it leaves Pump One -- well, actually once it comes out of the ground because there's very little storage capacity at Pump One. So once it's out of the ground it's on it's way and our ability to stop it

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we talked about a little bit earlier, but the only ability to stop it is to, in effect, shut the entire system down because there's little storage capacity either in the line or at the Valdez Terminal to take over a long delay. So you are committed once it's out of the ground. All the more reason for treating it as a total system. The next storage capacity is in the automobile tanks of the 140,000,000 automobiles that Americans operate, or however many there are now. Tim.

MR. WALLIS: If the point is, is what happens to the pipeline from a prevention point of view, is what you're saying or asking that we create a new department someplace to oversee all these things? Is that what you're....

MR. HAVELOCK: I guess we're suggesting that there - is there enough commonality in the prevention systems to
suggest that they be clustered administratively as opposed
to being spread out among different agencies as they are
today.

MR. WALLIS: You mean oil and gas as a whole.

MR. PARKER: Counselor just wants to know if you want him to pursue this or not.

MR. WALLIS: Well -- no.

MR. HAVELOCK: Otherwise I'd be.....

MS. HAYES: No. Yeah I'm only -- I'm intrigued with the idea of port authorities simply because, if my

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understanding's right, port authorities were created to deal with the problem of multiple jurisdictions, multiple ports, the complexity that's involved transportation -- marine transportation. And I like the idea as a port authority for the marine transportation I might even be lead into bringing in the transportation of oil -- petroleum products -- as a function of -- you know, I must be tainted by sitting so close to the Chairman but the Department Transportation, partly because of the type of people, the engineering background, that kind of expertise that already resides there. But I think it would be a real mistake to take all of the people that are involved with oil and gas leasing decisions and the public process there involved with that, and lump them -- the Fish and Game people, the DEC people, and all of that -- into one department. Because one of the reasons that those decisions are rough and tumble here is because we have different departments with different points of view. And it's one reason the public knows about it, is because there's always scrapping between the agencies. I think that's a valuable -- perhaps inefficient -- but a valuable part of the Alaskan system for making decisions on resources now. So, that's sort of my feeling on it. That there're some parts of it I don't

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encompassed within something like Transportation, but I like the concept of a port authority, as John suggested.

MR. DOOLEY: I'd like to address the port authority for a minute. There have been seminars sponsored by both the Department of Transportation and Community and Regional Affairs in the past in conjunction with a Municipal League regarding the development of port authorities. three of those exercises, that issue was abandoned. At one time there was a bill presented in front of the Legislature and it was just shelved in committee. The port authority as a concept, as an operation concept, is -- carries a lot of baggage unless you're particularly focused to a very narrow view that -- if we're only focusing on it for monitoring the traffic in and out of the port -- I guess my problem is we're using a term that represents a whole lot of other things to a whole lot of other people.

MARILYN: That's where you (indiscernible) the Chairman's term, which is the "prevention and response authority" rather than the "port authority."

MR. WALLIS: Speaking from prevention and looking at the need to review contingency plans, etc. and enforcement. That's what DEC is set up for, I do believe, to do that. When you get up to response — that can go elsewhere. I don't think it should be in DEC. But as far as prevention, regulation, enforcement, etc. I think that can be handled

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very well within the Department -- within DEC. Thev've already got the statutory authority to do all that stuff. I mean, you know, why reinvent the wheel here.

MARILYN: There's some question of whether they have authority on prevention.

MR. WALLIS: Well, what are we talking about in prevention. Making sure that people have a contingency plan. Making sure that they follow the law? Police 'em, fine 'em. Do whatever? You know, what other big mystical thing are we talking about here?

MR. HAVELOCK: I don't have a problem with that as -- in terms of giving us that direction you say DEC. that tells us is that we need to look at all the ways in which DEC has failed and figure out ways to patch DEC, rather than creating a substitute institutional framework. And that's a reasonable way to go to.....

If there's other (indiscernible) they MR. WALLIS: need then let's recommend they pass that.

MR. HAVELOCK: Yes, that's right.

MR. WENK: Chairman, along this line -- I think, John, your point about finding out what went wrong in the past will serve a very valuable purpose, but things went wrong in other than DEC also. In fact, my impression is things went wrong almost everywhere. Two thoughts come to mind. The first is that it would be interesting as you go through

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the next cycle to look at these alternative homes for this function. And I've written down four, and there are probably more than that. But there's an additional function that I'd like to suggest be on the agenda. Commissioner Hayes says, there are a number of activities already in the Department of Natural Resource, Fish and Game, and so on, that have functional reasons for being there because the expertise is there. And there needs to be a way to mobilize the different authorities and expertises in a variety of agencies -- I'm not sure it's 13 logos, John, as was the case with the Feds -- but nevertheless there is a group here. There are a lot of models in terms of how to get some interagency, and I don't like the word coordination -- I think the better word is integration -- next to the Governor. It has to be in the shadow of the Governor's office to, in a sense, reflect the authority of the only one person who, in a sense, is boss of every one of these agencies. But it.....

MS. HAYES: But there's already a group like that. The Governor's Office of Intergovernmental Coordination.

MR. WENK: Well, set up by legislation.

MS. HAYES: I'm not sure -- it's under the Coastal Management Act. And I'm not sure whether you'd find that as a positive or negative example.

MR. HAVELOCK: Well, my own experience with public

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administration is a rather negative one. But as we all -- those of us that have sat at cabinet meetings know that cabinet meetings are with no doubt the exception of the incumbent, are a waste of time for the most part. And that putting a group people in meetings once in a while with the Governor with major departmental functions does not make them into a cohesive whole, but you end up with more of a show-and-tell session. So I guess I really would take with public administration issue, Dr. Wenk, your perspective here. What are you using as a model where this has worked?

Well, the model is the Marine Sciences Cabinet-level, chaired by the vice-Council, 1966-71. president, to advise and assist the president, first of all in recommendations for action, but secondly in assisting the president with implementation, the chief executive. And the people who have been outside of this, observers writing about it, had some laudatory things to say. There are a variety of reasons why it worked and I've tried to make an analysis of why it works why so many of 'em don't. As a matter of fact, you use much kinder words describing interagency committees than I have. Because they unfortunately are often made up of people who have no And therefore this just adds to the other job to do. But we're confronted with a viscosity of the system.

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dilemma here. Even granted what you say is a reality all to often, you still do have these different functions and different expertise that are spread around, and there has to be a technique of mobilizing them to achieve some Statewide function. Not necessarily emergency response. We're talking about prevention as well.

MS. HAYES: But, Commissioner Wenk, those people are not sitting around with nothing to do right now. I mean, those — the people I'm talking about having the type of expertise have other jobs to do. It's not a question — simply a question of mobilizing people who happen to have the type of experience you need to make them look more at tankers and pipeline safety. Those people already have highways, they're building bridges, they're designing — you know, the stuff that they're doing.

MR. WENK: I agree, but I'm not sure what your point is.

MS. HAYES: Well, I'm just saying that you -- at least what I hear you saying is simply mobilizing existing work force is not gonna be sufficient.

MR. WENK: No, no. I wasn't saying that.

MS. HAYES: Okay.

MR. WENK: What I was saying is that that is exactly what you need to do. That is that you've got these elements of expert -- first of all, you're faced with two

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choices. You either centralize it or you decentralize it. And in decentralizing you're gonna make use of existing capabilities. But if you're gonna use a decentralized system you still need to integrate these to some common purposes. Otherwise each is gonna follow own bureaucratic direction, having if very little, any, connection to the partner.

MR. DOOLEY: That may be an argument for creating a department such as John's presented. Because one of the constraints we've heard in testimony is you want a careerist to be able to provide that adequate kind of response. The individuals you're talking who sit at the right hand of the Governor, and other omniscient beings, they go rather rapidly. In organizational reviews and institutions in Alaska the greatest turnover is from deputy commissioner on up, and including all the Governor's staff. You're not getting that continuity. You're not getting that professional discipline imposed that we have heard repeatedly is a great ingredient for success.

MR. WENK: The other model I've suggested -incidentally this was done at a cabinet-level to again use
the medium as a message. The stake this country had in the
oceans was of such importance to make the vice president
cheerleader. But another model, the Federal Council for
Science and Technology, to try to bring together the

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expertise in all the Federal agencies with research and development, was done at the most senior level of the Civil Service in order, and you put your finger on it, to maintain that continuity. And that was in existence for quite a few years until it too was killed. resurrected now in new legislation. But, all I'm laying out are the two options you have. I put 'em into stark simplicity of the centralized versus decentralized, and there are lots of variations on this. And none of them are perfect. So it strikes me that if you list the functions and list the available capabilities you incidentally, I'm not advocating one or another, I hope you sense that -- all I'm saying is that you're on the horns of a real dilemma here and I've tried to make it as simple as possible in terms of what I think the choices are in front of this Commission. I think we are gonna have to choose one or the other.

MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, maybe a way to get down the road here is to let's maybe identify the functions that we feel the need -- and I get back to say, what are our recommendations, right? There's gotta be a list of recommendations. Secondly is, how do you get 'em implemented. Who is the controlling body in the world today that's gonna implement each of our recommendations. And then you have to figure out how do you motivate that

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body to implement what you want 'em to do. Whether it's the Coast Guard, or the Government, or industry, or whatever. And then the third part I think we all have in the back of our minds is how do you maintain this awareness or a continuity of interest in. particularly, the prevention and the response side. You know, what institutionalized functions can you put in that will maintain a level of awareness that we're concerned with, or to combat this, quote, "complacency" is the word we've used for the last 10 years. And I think we're -- what we're getting into is we haven't really clearly identified our recommendations. And then we'll try and figure out how to implement them in an entity that will carry on the function for a long period of time.

MR. WENK: Well I wonder if the Staff couldn't follow just that guidance and lay out the functions. I said a minute ago I wasn't taking sides on this. The one side I would take is I think with the medium being the message you do need a new institutional entity. But that's not necessarily a department. There's -- if you're gonna go to the decentralized model....

MR. WALLIS: I don't like creating new entities to handle things. You know we're facing budget cuts and everything else as it is. And, you know, the ability -- I mean, just the fact that it may not even get funded, you

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know, and then we've wasted our time. I think there's -I think we ought to work within the existing framework.

MR. PARKER: Point out, you know, in response to that, that we created the Department of Corrections, our last one, and crime has risen exponentially, so possibly if we create a new department oil spills may rise exponentially in response to that.

MR. WALLIS: Well you did too good a job in building the jails. But in any case, let me just follow up and give you a little bit of my thought. You know, we can't have a department sitting around waiting for a spill. You know, the people have got to be doing other things. That's why I viewed DEC as kind of the prevention, the watchdog, assessing penalties if you will, and all that good stuff. From a response point of view, I look at it as something from more like the National Guard. If the Coast Guard admiral is gonna be in charge from the Federal side let's have him an Alaskan general from here to kind of meet with He's got equipment to deploy, he's got people to deploy, and you know, there may be National Guard in the town that is closest to where it hits. I don't know. But these people, you know, already do stuff. They're already assault orientated, if you will. They have the ability to move in and set up a camp and take care of human waste or, you know, all the other stuff you want to deal with.

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I don't think it's going to be that much more of a burden financially on the State by using the existing framework.

MR. PARKER: That brought us to then, we're at Proposal #11. (Indiscernible - simultaneous talking) department, the Division of Emergency Service would be given an enhanced capability and role.

MR. SUND: We've already created some of these. year's legislation created the Oil and Hazardous Substance Response Office within DEC. I mean the entity is already I think we commented earlier this year that we there. though it should be higher than a director level position, possibly. But there's a vehicle on the hazardous substance response. And I think somehow in DEC's legislation we have 'em the authority to work on prevention too. Although I question how they were gonna do it.

Yeah, 261. It's very minimal though. 261 MARILYN: (indiscernible).

So the question then is if Commissioner MR. DOOLEY: Wallace's recommendation were followed that port would be transferred, essentially, to military affairs.

MR. PARKER: As far as response goes, yes. I think we should examine it in that guide as to whether it more properly belongs there than in the DEC, yeah.

MR. HAVELOCK: Which is DES, basically you're saying, which is already in Military Affairs, so. Tim, how do you

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get around the, or where do you put the functions you're involved in managing a port if you don't create an authority to do it? Do you say strengthen the Coast Guard, is that what you say?

MR. WALLIS: Well, I'm kind of hesitant to say anything about the Coast Guard 'cause I don't know our ability to influence that. But, you know, as far as managing a port I don't know why we'd want to manage a port other than if we're gonna have these traffic lanes set up, etc. You know, I don't think we need to establish anything all that fancy. I don't know -- a simple harbor master - is the kind of idea I like.

MR. PARKER: That's a good point when you talk authority, port authority, what kind of authorities you want to give it. Which....

MR. WALLIS: Of course, port authority, I agree, you know, I think that's the wrong wording to use for what we're talking about. You know, I think the port authority (indiscernible - simultaneous talking) economic-type (indiscernible - simultaneous talking).

MS. HAYES: Use harbor master.

MR. SUND: Well, let's use the harbor master (indiscernible - simultaneous talking) I want to give 'em control beyond the harbor, that's the only reason I expanded the concept -- the traditional sense of harbor

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MS. WUNNICKE: The other point to keep in mind is that even were we to design a single institution that had all of these responsibilities and was fully funded and had all these capabilities, you still are operating, necessarily, within dual system where there are Federal responsibilities and interactions. And I think, again, something that's less costly but takes a great deal of time is a number of interagency agreements and kind of crosscommissions, as the Chairman and I were talking over lunch, to avoid those Federal/State impediments to efficiency and still accomplish your purpose. I'm a little uncomfortable with Department of Energy as a title, because we do now have the Alaska Energy Authority and, so I just.....

MR. PARKER: We don't have to keep them, of course.

MR. HAVELOCK: Well, I think from what I hear you've moved beyond that anyway and department is out. So we're talking about when do you have an authority and what kind of powers you give it if you do, and what do you do with those left over oversight functions and higher management functions that an authority may well be too parochial in its orientation to address.

MS. WUNNICKE: But just as we -- in talking about response, and I mentioned earlier, you have really the three functions that Staff has illustrated. The lightering

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and and ship safety, which may very well be one agency's primary responsibility. The containment, which may very well be another agency's responsibility. And the identification of -- or protecting sensitive areas. very separate functions, but to each one of those agencies that function is their primary responsibility so that you don't have that terrible dilemma of do I save the ship or contain the oil, or do I contain the oil or protect the hatchery. And I don't see any problem with that kind of a division.

MR. WENK: Mr. Chairman. I wonder if we aren't at a stage where we need to depend on Staff to do a little more studying and come back to us with two thoughts in mind. Again, this inventory of functions. But to do this in the context, again, of a backward look at where those functions were up to and including the Exxon Valdez, and this question of what went wrong. An argument might be made -- I don't think it will be -- but an argument might be made that the remedies are not organization at all. functions, all the necessary functions, are already laid out, already authorized by existing legislation, but were poorly implemented for some reason.

MS. WUNNICKE: Or funded.

Or funded. And therefore that the MR. WENK: solutions may lie only partially in the organizational

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realm. I haven't any feel for this at all. All I'm suggesting is that I think -- I feel an appetite for more input from Staff in terms of what these functions are, what they have been in the past, and where they went awry because it's very clear they did. And then to see whether the remedy does lie down the organizational trail.

MR. HERZ: Yes, Mr. Chairman. As Staff does that it seems to me that one of the elements that's been left out - hasn't been left out entirely -- but it hasn't received full attention, it seems to me -- and it's a discussion of the way in which you integrate the resource management information and the sensitive habitat information into these other functions that we are now talking about. And it almost sounds as if, at least with the existing structure, government structure as I read it, that you want to take a person out of DEC, and a person out of DNR, and a person out of Fish and Game and require that they do some sort of coordinated, interactive planning.

MS. WUNNICKE: But they do.

MR. HERZ: Just that small -- one representative from each?

MS. WUNNICKE: Oh (indiscernible).

MR. HERZ: And integrate it into the contingency planning operation that we were talking about yesterday, because it sounds like some of that is going on, but it

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doesn't sound like all the players are involved at the right time. And functionally, they should be.

MR. WENK: Moreover, this decentralized notion, which is one of these two models we talked about, today can be done without people leaving their desk. I mean, this is one of the things that we have to discover in terms of how to use new technology for management purposes of this kind. And with facts, with interacting graphic display and so on, there're all kinds of ways where people from different organizations that are used to thinking vertically, can have access to information horizontally that used to be denied them. At least at the Federal level the competition among agencies is so great they treat each other like Chrysler and General Motors. They don't share information. To the extent they share it they might say to each other what they did last year, but do you think they'll tell each other what they're gonna do next year?

MR. PARKER: Nothing changes at the State level, you know.

Well, does that sound familiar? MR. WENK:

(Indiscernible - simultaneous talking) MR. PARKER: State I found it -- in fact, the barriers were higher and less sharing, so.....

Well, I'm sorry but I have to disagree MS. HAYES: with that because I think that recently that -- that

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computer-sharing of equipment has already been institutionalized with the intergovernmental coordination system for permitting purposes, and certainly in terms of regional planning, there's been a great deal of work already done on that. And I don't -- like I don't think that that's the problem. I mean in fact the people that are contacted for making those kind of decisions is a much bigger group than those agency people. I mean, the stakeholders in terms of private land-owners, the Native corporations, the fishermen, the recreational users, the miners, the -- it goes on. The groups of 60 and plus are involved with that regional planning process already. What the linkage needs to be made between that and the individual contingency plans hasn't been made yet. think that the process is there, it just has to be explained.

MR. PARKER: Tim.

MR. WALLIS: Yeah, I don't know whether we're going to make this too hard or what. I kinda like to look at, you know a simple way to do things. You know, if you're lazy you like try to find an easy way to do it. Once we decide that DEC is going to perform one set of services, the National Guard another set and we start looking at the different agencies and what do they do in this type of situation. I kind of just, you know, without getting too

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complicated, envision the people that are there now that have the experience kind of sit down and decide what their own department are going to do during that set of emergencies, from experience. And basically, set out a procedures manual.

MS. HAYES: Just sort of like the way that the wildland fire has changed the way of fighting fires to organizing certain places as being let-burn areas and minimal first response, and all the gradations in between it. It's a real similar system.

MR. WALLIS: The Fish and Game knows what they have to do, you know. The CRA knows what they have to do, they've already, you know, it's a matter of putting it down so people have to read 'em like they were asking industry to read their contingency plans.

MR. SUND: In the non-spill season we just let it burn.

MS. WUNNICKE: It does seem like there are two new organizations, well not necessarily -- yeah. Two new organizations, though, that we should talk about. If we can....

MR. WENK: New functions or new organizations.

MS. WUNNICKE: No, new organizations. And that has to do with local advisory councils or local response groups, for two purposes. One, to be part of that trained cadre of

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people available to respond quickly, and two, to be the watchdogs to avert complacency in the future. And another organization which I think we need to discuss for similar purposes with respect to complacency and also increasing the ability of Alaska to get its point of view across nationally, is the interstate compact. But in terms of the other organizations, I think that properly directed, and you were making this point and I think it's a good one, if the regulatory policy function stays, let's say in the Department of Environmental Conservation, the operational emergency response function probably more properly belongs with the office of environmental -- I mean, Emergency Services as an operational arm. And on the Federal side you have the same kind of dichotomy of function, I think, with the Coast Guard having the operational capability and NOAA and EPA providing the policy direction. But I do think there are two new things that we should talk about in terms of additions to the systems, and that's the local groups and the interstate compact.

MR. HAVELOCK: Mr. Chairman. I guess we'll take -I'm satisfied -- I think I've got a sense of direction for
the Staff, and I think it's coming basically from what
Commissioner Wallace has stated, which is for the most
part, that the existing institutional arrangements are
satisfactory and do not need -- although they may need

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bolstering and we need to, particularly in the case of DES,	
say that it's basically okay. But I just want to remind	
you that you started out with a different assumption when	
you set up a committee on institutions, and I felt it my	
responsibility to give a good strong shake to it and just	
so that you I'm happy for you to come back to this kind	
of a decision, but it's not necessarily where you thought	
you were going in the first place. Let me start from the	
other end of the institutional by looking at existing	
institutions and performance. Let me pick the two main	
Federal ones. As a result of the preemption, the Coast	
Guard was given prevention responsibility. I think that	
there is a sufficient factual case that the Coast Guard has	
failed. Now, I don't know what kind of patching that you	
are gonna recommend to the Congress, to the Coast Guard, to	
improve that, but that seems to me there is a case to be	
made there. Maybe you say, no it's not, that's not the	
case and they're just some flukes and some human failures	
and the likes and it happened. You look at the accident -	
- the main accident that didn't happen, which was the big	
break on the uplands. I think you've had enough	
information that the Environmental Protection Agency	
would've made the Coast Guard look like one of the great	
all-time success stories, they are so badly under-prepared	
for responding to an upland. Yet I haven't heard you	

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suggest, you know -- maybe that's unfair because I'm talking about Federal agencies and we started with State. But that plate is, you know, there's obviously a very serious problem there. Those are maybe two of the more obvious simply because of the preemption issue, but you turn, I think, that same spotlight on the various state agencies, and you say, well what did happen to -- what happened to the State overall with respect to prevention. The State abdicated, maybe because of the lawsuit, maybe because some people said they were lulled into a false sense of security by their riches or something, but the State as a whole set of institutions did not respond to prevention at all. There is no prevention capability. shouldn't say "no", but at least in terms of the marine leg. Essentially there was no oversight. With respect to the upland leg we heard VNR, it would appear, had the substantial part of the authority as a result of the permits and DEC has another part of the responsibility with Now, the testimony you've heard from their oversight. those departments may have inspired you all with a great sense of confidence that they are going to prevent anything serious from happening in the upland, and they may have encouraged you to think that if something did happen they're there and they're gonna have a great response. the other hand, you can have exactly the opposite

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conclusion that you might arrive at from the evidence and I was hoping to get some guidance from the Commission as to where the Commission stood on those issues. Are you -- and what I'm hearing is that you are essentially satisfied with State agency performance, at least in a....

MS. WUNNICKE: No.

MS. HAYES: No, we haven't said that.

MS. WUNNICKE: State agency structure, not performance.

MR. HAVELOCK: Not in -- all right, that structure is -- you don't think that structure's the issue, let's put it that way. So institutions are not the issue.

MS. WUNNICKE: Well, you mis-define institutions. If you think the institutional working group was formed to pick up new institutions I think you're in error. I think that institutions working group was to look at the legal and organizational barriers to a better performance on the part of all the parties. And I certainly never saw the institutional working group dedicated solely to creating new.....

MR. HAVELOCK: Well, I didn't think it was totally, but I thought you were examining whether there were problems -- structural problems that caused the response. Then, you can find, no there weren't.

MR. PARKER: One thing we can look at is some

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MR. WENK: Mr. Chairman. It seems to me this type of discussion is exactly what this Commission is gonna do best Because this is a tough, ambiguous, murky situation. My friend over there and I seem to agree on most things, but I could tell he was not taken with my notion that he may need some new entity. But Commissioner Wallace, let me just make this observation, from -- again as an outsider This activity of prevention is gonna from where I sit. take some more money. In this State. I wouldn't trust the Feds for the whole thing for all kinds of reasons we've already covered. I think the State of Alaska is gonna have to take more responsibility in the future ont this question of prevention than it has ever given thought to in the And I must confess I have difficulty seeing how to do this without some more money someplace. That doesn't necessarily mean new organization, but i -- I guess I'm raising a little flag saying, I think to do what this Commission feels the State has to do to keep it from happening again is gonna cost something. I don't know how much, but it's gonna cost something. Whether or not it takes a new organization, I don't know. And we came back to the point, though, that I think all of us feel, John, that we want to see what the functions are that need to be

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MR. WALLIS: Let me just say one thing, Mr. Chairman. Because I don't disagree that it's going to take money. You know, if you're looking for an argument you're not going to get one. But -- because it is going to take money. It's just the fact that, in my opinion, that by creating something new you're increasing government, it's going to set bad with politicians in election year. I think when you can work within existing framework, that's what I prefer to do.

MR. WENK: For whatever it's worth, in the last 10 years when I've been consulted on questions like this I have universally been against starting something -- new organization.

MR. SUND: Maybe if we're into prevention institutions, back to the topic at hand here -- let's maybe

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look at some of the recommendations that our contractors have made and a couple of the items -- I don't see port port closures Ι wanted closures, to see recommendation list, I didn't see it there -- but, anyway, back to the simple approach. Mr. Wallis' baseline here, keep it simple. Maybe you just look down and say, well, how do those are the recommendations you implemented and who's gonna do each one of those. we have an existing entity or don't we or will the existing one be modified or something else. But the worse thing I guess have is sitting here looking at all this saying it'll cost more money. And you can do all of these things, and guess what, within 14 years you'll have a spill bigger that the one we've had now and we still won't be able to do anything about it. I mean, that's the best message we've come up with so far. We cut it from five years to 14 years but we still don't know how to pick it up. I feel a little depressed. But I would just kind of wander down the list and figure out who's gonna do what on it and see what institution and State government can or can't handle it and

MR. PARKER: Okay, that gives us to minimum vessel Sea Grant offered a tentative answer to this design. question about how the State government could involve itself in itself in that, so we went totally dependent on

then make a recommendation, I guess.

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the Coast Guard. That was a very narrow area.

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MR. SUND: I would say my overriding direction would be to figure out how the State can get involved in any one of these issues to the maximum extent possible. That would be a direction to the Staff if we gotta figure it out. I'm willing to take the step on it from Ed's position here too, is that the State should be willing to take on the responsibility, the authority and the cost to the highest degree possible to prevent this from happening again. And just as an underlying decision-making basis.

MR. HAVELOCK: Do you want to spend any money on that?

MR. SUND: I don't mind spending money on it at all. My bad point about it is I can't walk into the Legislature and say, if you had \$100,000,000 to spend you still can't stop what's gonna happen. That's the depressing side of this.

MR. WENK: Oh, excuse me. Mr. Chairman, I didn't identify my colleague here as a fundamental pessimist.

MR. SUND: Cynic.

MR. WENK: No that's pessimism.

MR. SUND: Pessimism. Okay, I'm sorry. Well, it's 3:30, I'm pessimistic.

MR. WENK: Okay, but I have a feeling that we've got other highly complex and very dangerous technological systems where we have so far been able to maintain safety.

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I start with nuclear weapons. As dangerous as they are, and for as long as we've had 'em, we've been lucky with regard to nuclear power plants. We did have a Three-Mile Island, the Soviets had Gernoble (ph), but there are also some pretty good track records in France and so on. There is no such thing as zero risk. But I'm not one to give up on the notion that we can reduce the risk below what it is today, and I don't -- I would say today the risk is darn near as high as it was before Exxon Valdez. We're moving slowly toward reduction, but we haven't gotten there yet. And that comes back to your point, John, about the (indiscernible).

MR. DOOLEY: Mr. Chairman, have we followed up on the three activities that were described -- salvage, pollution abatement and the beach -- and then approached that relationship with the Federal agencies first, and then if - following up on what Commissioner Sund is saying -- seeing which of those organizations would afford the State the greater interplay, you may come up with models, such as a recommendation that the Coast Guard be made in charge of salvage operations and safety of the vessel and its crew. You may also well come up -- because there's a immediate need, as well, for response in terms of containment, to suggest that another Federal agency, whether it's the EPA or the Corps of Engineers be in charge of that. That

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creates an institutional vector there where the cleanup agency has a public digression from the Coast Guard in terms of how effective the Coast Guard was in prevention, by vessel-design standards. It's not all being housed in The open concept of conflict that one little shop. Commissioner Hayes has brought up. EPA, on the other hand, has the ability by the Clean Water Act that has dealt with this pollution thing, to transfer those authorities to the State so the State is in charge, if indeed, that's the role that Commissioner Sund is (indiscernible). Those kinds of relationships may fall out and give you some suggestions on where to organize if you approach it from the Federal side first and then see how your mission in terms of making a major role to the State would emerge.

MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, what John was starting to do was take our first recommendation, which is vessel -- double-hulls and vessel-design recommendations and ask what can the State do in terms to -- in ways of accomplishing that. Well, you can require that be legislation. Then the question becomes how do you enforce it and where do you put that enforcement. Does that lie within the -- assuming that we can wend our way through the preemption mine-field in terms of making that kind of a legislative requirement.

MR. HAVELOCK: Well, let me say I -- probably you can't -- is that if I think we've probably that what you

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can do there is you can follow Dick Plotter's proposal and do all stuff by way of rule-making recommendations.

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MS. WUNNICKE:

And who enforces it?

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MR. HAVELOCK:

Pardon?

5 6 MS. WUNNICKE:

Then who enforces it? Who sees to it

that no ship comes into port after a certain time that

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doesn't meet that standard.

I assume that once those -- that MR. HAVELOCK: they're Coast Guard rules there's gonna be Coast Guard enforcement and you gotta -- but it doesn't end the question, as it did when Federal preemption came through, you know, within the litigation, to say that it's a Coast Guard responsibility. That is you can -- if you are prepared to commit the resources, there's nothing to stop you from having a safe person who oversees what the Coast Guard is doing to see whether they're doing their job. And there's nothing to prevent you, indeed, that -- again, the question -if you make regulation resource recommendations to the Coast Guard are you prepared, then, to follow that up by committing resources to have somebody -- you know, go to the rule-making process with their -- to put on the State's case. Are you prepared to, you know, to follow that up with the pressuring the Congress. I mean just the fact that the rule of final say lies in the Federal authority -- it's their forum -- that you can be

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there. And we're not likely to be there if we simply make a recommendation and go home.

MS. WUNNICKE: Well, then the next question is where in State government do you have the expertise and the ability, and the will, to follow-up that kind of requirement?

MR. SUND: I would propose that to attack double-hulls, right, from a rule-making potential, what I would do is ask the Governor -- back to there -- to put an interstate organization together of all the West Coast states and go after the Federal Government and go after the Federal Government from a position of West Coast states linked together on the executive level, and then I'd also ask the Legislature to make appropriate lengths on the legislative level amongst West Coast states to adopt that same position. You know, as a mechanical means of how to get from here to there.

MS. WUNNICKE: And I think that's a general rule that's probably a good procedure wherever you're dealing with something that's within the Federal Government's purview. 'Cause you're gonna need as much support from other states as you can get, and not go it alone.

MR. DOOLEY: Well the record indicates that hasn't been effective.

MR. SUND: Well, I don't think it's been tried very

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much.

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MR. WALLIS: Oh yeah. It's tried very hard, you see, specifically on this issue by the West Coast states.

MR. WENK: But I think the mood's different now.

(Indiscernible - simultaneous talking)

MR. WALLIS: So basically what you're saying, John, is our recommendation is that the State require double-hulls in its waters and that the Governor, Legislature, do everything to carry it out.

Well, I could give some specific ways on MR. SUND: how they should -- I'd recommend that they'd carry it out.

MR. WENK: But isn't it true your -- even though let's say this governor does make music with three others, carrying out this function is gonna be down at one or two echelons further down the line and there's gotta be some expertise in the State of Alaska to protect Alaska's own interests?

Just for example, if the Senate MR. SUND: Yeah. provision got adopted, that's the double-hulled provision Which I think says use double-hulls unless you can show there's some other means and methods that's safer, you know, that's a rule-making thing that's gonna happen within the Coast Guard, and it's gonna be ship industry guys and And I think, you know, the State of the Coast Guard. Alaska ought to get itself involved in the middle of that.

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And you know that you have to develop that expertise or hire it, whatever you want to have, and stay on it, right? Right through that whole process.

MR. WENK: Right. But you need a home for it. That's how we got into this issue is that institutional process. I'm not proposing a home, but I think that's part of the question.

MR. SUND: Well, my recommendation for the home is up in the Governor's office. Because I think it's not an ongoing it's -- we're gonna fight this one battle. It's gonna be fought -- on an intergovernmental level. The history of the State of Alaska with the Governor's office is to shed all operational functions out of the Governor's office. We've done it for years and years and years. Most governors wanted to get operational stuff out of there. Occasionally they spring it back for special functions but no for on-going issues.

I just want to correct myself, I made a mistake on the record, Mr. Chairman, back where I said if we did everything that's recommended here that it would reoccur every 14 years. That's not true. In Prince William Sound the ECO report says we have a recurrence interval of 57 years if we adopt all three levels of their recommendations on a 3 - 11,000,000 gallon spill so..... Under 3,000,000 it's every 6.1, though. So it's not quite as pessimistic

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MR. HAVELOCK: How 'bout the traffic control. Again, are you gonna do that through rule-making? And I -- here backing away from the authority notion that there's nothing to stop you from going in and proposing rule-making for the whole traffic control system that you've discussed and -- again you've got the issue of whether you're going to go beyond the recommendation to have a institutionalized and State follow-up and institutionalize the State oversight over what is what is, then, gonna be conceded to be a Federal function. Or are you gonna try to cut a deal with the Coast Guard, which we heard talked about in the Portland -- Maine to have a joint operating agreement, and if so, what do you put the State's part of that function in. Are you backing into an authority (indiscernible).

MR. SUND: I'm not quite sure what the legal authority of the State is to get involved -- I mean, from if we just wanted to go and say, hey, to enter our fort you've got to have this kind of equipment, or control, or abilities on board your vessel -- I don't know where we are on that level. But, I think most of us have thought about having the Coast Guard adopt the regulations of say, Prince William Sound anyway, laying out traffic lanes and traffic monitoring systems. And the issue that's always been left open is who's gonna be the monitor on the shore-based side

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2	Coast Guard monitoring system that's at Valdez today.
3	That's there. And the other level is you know some
4	other types of qualifications or levels of the person in
5	the monitor position, which I think immediately if you go
6	to anything higher you go into a civilian-type based
7	person, and whether that civilian-base person works for the
8	Coast Guard, which there is a lot of that around, or
9	whether the civilian-based person works for the State or a
10	joint-operating agreement. I don't know what the options
11	are.
12	MR. WALLIS: Let me ask you a question. What's the
13	harbor master going to do besides shut down the port?
14	MR. SUND: Well, I thought he'd watch the screen so -
15	- while he was making that decision.
16	MR. WALLIS: So he could he could be a dual-purpose
17	guy, then, right?
18	MR. SUND: Well, yeah. That's something to do. Is
19	that what you were thinking about?
20	MS. WUNNICKE: Is your means of accomplishing this any
21	different than has already been accomplished with the
22	escort vessels and the pilotage by the State's emergency
23	order?
23	MR. SUND: That's I didn't know where the State
25	jurisdiction is.

and there's not going anywhere you could end up with the

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1	MR. PARKER: Well, I think the means of the difference
2	is in the whole concept of the vessel-monitoring system.
3	What you've got at Valdez now is simply a communications
4	system, or they talk to the tankers and watch them on the -
5	- radar as far as Bligh Reef and they
6	MS. WUNNICKE: No John is talking about how you
7	require this. Can you just require it through an emergency
8	order as the State did when it required escort vessels and
9	pilotage to Hinchinbrook and I mean, do you have to rely
10	on the Coast Guard?
11	MR. HAVELOCK: Well, historically speaking, pilotage
12	is, of course, a function the State has. And you've got a
13	piloting board.
14	MS. WUNNICKE: Escort vessels? I mean, all those
15	elements that were included in the State's emergency order
16	what was the authority behind that besides the ability
17	to close down the terminal?
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	MS. HAYES: I think we did it until they said we
19	MS. HAYES: I think we did it until they said we couldn't.
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19	couldn't.
19 20	couldn't. MR. HAVELOCK: It was the DEC authority.
19 20 21	couldn't. MR. HAVELOCK: It was the DEC authority. MS. WUNNICKE: Okay. So don't you still have that
19 20 21 22	couldn't. MR. HAVELOCK: It was the DEC authority. MS. WUNNICKE: Okay. So don't you still have that same authority?
19 20 21 22 23	couldn't. MR. HAVELOCK: It was the DEC authority. MS. WUNNICKE: Okay. So don't you still have that same authority? MR. PARKER: We had it on the you know, basic

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Sund's premise that the State take as much control as possible.

MR. SUND: Well, I'm asking staff. It looks to me like it's a research issue and I don't know whether our Sea Grant lawyers have looked at it or.....

MARILYN: Well, I could speak to that a little bit because there has been some (indiscernible) and I can at least give people an idea -- a little piece of that, if you'd like. But (indiscernible) there's a couple things here that I sort of wanted to say. One thing is that all of these things obviously can be regulated in various different ways. One of the approaches that Allison Reeser speaks to in her report is -- their approaches California -- proposed legislation which uses the terminal as authority to regulate these types of things. And I can just sort of point out in this legislation what it says. Under their Chapter Two Prevention, Inspection, Response and Clean-up Program, they say no marine terminal or facility in the State may be used to transfer oil to or from any tanker of more than 10,000 dead-weight tons unless they meet certain criteria. And one of the things that Allison Reeser says in her paper is that the -- the pending Senate Assembly bill used the State's regulatory authority over shore-site terminal facilities to impose risk-reducing standards on tankers. Now, this is a questionable area.

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I mean certainly preemption is a question, but what I guess what she's pointing out is that tides are changing, preemption was discussed in Congress. There's a different sort of view of the world and maybe courts aren't gonna be as quick to preempt the states from doing some of these things, particularly losing their shore-side authority, especially since the Coast Guard showed an inability in this last spill to really prevent an oil-spill, given their authority. So -- I mean those kinds of things are happening and that may be something that the Commission could think of about in making their recommendations.

MR. HERZ: In a related item in California and Santa Barbara County, for example, and Santa Barbara Channel, the County is the one who reviews and approves contingency plans (indiscernible). I mean, clearly preemption isn't the problem.

NARILYN: Santa Barbara also has a set of advisory committees and involvement by the community, almost a regulatory function there. So there are ways to bring those kinds of things in.

MR. DOOLEY: Commissioners, Coast Guard and EPA don't review contingency plans now. I mean, that isn't a preemption. That isn't a preemption issue now.

MARILYN: Although they do under the new -- under the House bill, and I'm not sure the Senate bill, they do

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require a review of contingency plans now. But, of course, 1 2 nothing is (indiscernible). 3 MR. PARKER: Okay, I -- should we go on out to the Clarion now? 4 5 MR. DOOLEY: Do you want to see this tape before you 6 go -- it might make sense of what you're about to look at. 7 MS. WUNNICKE: I just want to add one other element to 8 institutional prevention. And that is a systematic, scientific research system on hazards and resources. 9 10 MR. PARKER: Okav. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Aren't you announcing an end to 11 12 the day here.... 13 MR. PARKER: No, we're going to recess to the Clarion Hotel to look at the demonstration of the monitoring 14 system. 15 MR. DOOLEY: Yeah. You might look at that tape before 16 It'll make what you're going to see much clearer. 17 (Off Record) 18 19 20 21 22 23 23 25 -188-

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