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ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION

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VOLUME II OF III

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1 and I understand it is basically because of lobbying
2 efforts on the Gulf Coast by the maritime industry in the
3 Gulf Coast. Not necessarily the oil industry or the
4 tanker industry, but some of the offshore operators that
5 operate port boats and tugs. They have resisted that
6 because it would require a different mode of operation
7 than they are traditionally used to.

8 MR. PARKER: Your training requirements. Where
9 would that kind of training normally be handled?

10 MR. DORSCH: Well, the officers on board -- we
11 talk about officer training. The officers on most of our
12 ships have gone through four year maritime academies where
13 they have received extensive training, shipboard and
14 ashore. And, they have received Coast Guard license after
15 sitting through an extensive exam process. My exam was
16 five days long. I don't know of any bar exam that
17 requires five days of examination. It's an extensive
18 review process. There's also a Bachelor Science Degree
19 issued to the graduate of the maritime academies. We
20 generally hire people from the maritime academies.
21 License renewal is every five years. Renewal generally
22 requires that you sit down and take an exam to prove your
23 continued proficiency. Virtually very few other profes-
24 sions, licensed professionals have to go through such
25 process and certainly doctors and lawyers don't. Although

1 they should.

2 Radar simulators are required when you renew your
3 exams. Radar simulator process is a week long process
4 each time you renew your license. Firefighting school is
5 required now. CPR class was required before you renewed
6 your exam. I don't know if the Coast Guard dropped the
7 CPR, I believe, I don't know.

8 Then, in addition to that we feel that simply by
9 virtue of the fact that you graduate from maritime
10 academies you are not necessarily capable of handling oil
11 aboard a tanker. We have a policy of where we hire
12 maritime -- top maritime academy graduates into the decker
13 engine department. Myself served a six month to a year -
14 - six months as an ordinary seaman before I was allowed to
15 move up. This gives the person some on-the-job training
16 and to learn his way about an oil tanker and how to
17 operate cargo.

18 We also require of our officers that they go to
19 simulator schools. I am sending two of my tug officers to
20 a simulator school back in Kingspoint next month -- this
21 month. We also require firefighting school in addition to
22 what the Coast Guard requires. We also conduct, as many
23 other companies do, officer training seminars. We have
24 Masters in, I set up a scenario where a selected group of
25 Masters where we analyze casualties. If you were the

1 Master of this ship and the ship started to break up what
2 would you do? And, the seminar was to generate a discus-
3 sion amongst the participants to what the best thing to do
4 for the ship and for it's crew.

5 MR. PARKER: Okay. Any other questions?

6 MR. WENK: Mr. Chairman? Just one brief one.
7 If I understood correctly, you've been describing the
8 additional requirements by Chevron?

9 MR. DORSCH: Correct.

10 MR. WENK: Is there any industry wide
11 discussion or agreement on this question of training and
12 standards?

13 MR. DORSCH: That has not been defined. There
14 is -- the API does call for additional training standards,
15 yes, of officers in particular. As far as I know, it has
16 not been pinpointed as to -- or has not been nailed down
17 as to what they specifically want. In other words, how
18 often should a person go to firefighting school, how often
19 should a person go to rada simulator school. On the job
20 training has traditionally been left up to the individual
21 companies and I've got to say one company is probably
22 better than another company. And, I know that BP and
23 Shell and the major oil companies who operate tankers have
24 too much to lose to entrust their ships and their cargos
25 to unqualified people. The same cannot be said of perhaps

1 independent operators.

2 MR. WENK: You mentioned, if I recall
3 correctly, five days of examinations. Is this for your
4 first.....

5 MR. DORSCH: That was my exam. Since then it
6 has been reduced a multiple choice, where I think it's
7 probably three days. Two or three. .

8 MR. WENK: My understanding is that it's not
9 only been reduced in terms of the number of days, but the
10 multiple choice type of question is a lot less stringent
11 on the person being examined than was the case when you
12 took the exam and you were obliged to go into considerable
13 scenario narrative.

14 MR. DORSCH: It was primarily an essay type of
15 test which took much longer. It doesn't necessarily mean
16 it was any better. Multiple choice is a mixed blessing.
17 It's easier to take the test, but it's also easier to miss
18 the answer. Especially with the Coast Guards propensity
19 for throwing trick questions in there.

20 Typically, let's say, the rules of the road exam.
21 When they ask you to describe the lights required of a tug
22 towing a barge, you had to go into great depth and details
23 to describe what the distance between the lights was, what
24 the visibility of distance between lights was. The ark of
25 visibility for the light. What color the light was, of

1 course, and where the light had to be displayed. To cover
2 all the bases, it took you considerably longer than it
3 would now. Now, with the multiple choice question it
4 makes it easier for you, but it doesn't mean you are any
5 less competent.

6 MR. WENK: Well, I asked Coast Guard officers
7 about this very point. They were unanimous in saying that
8 the new exams are considerably easier. They were also
9 unanimous in saying they would have preferred not to have
10 gone to these multiple choice questions, but were obliged
11 to by cuts and budget.

12 MR. DORSCH: I understand that when they first
13 came out -- I didn't have to take my exam under the
14 multiple choice format. My initial exam. I understand
15 that when they first came out 75% of the people taking
16 them could not pass them. Whereas when I took it under
17 the old system 90% of us passed.

18 MR. WENK: That also says something about
19 training. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

20 MR. DORSCH: The next.....

21 MR. HAVELOCK: One question on that. If both of
22 the oil moving into the United States is coming in under
23 foreign flag, then this aspect of the cure, that is
24 licensing and training of mariners is catching only a
25 small fraction of the problem. Is that right?

1 MR. DORSCH: Is catching -- it's catching the
2 U.S., yes. It's catching what we can control. We hire,
3 as I mentioned to you, we have 41 ships in our fleet,
4 Chevron does. Seven of which are U.S. the other the
5 Liberian, the Bahamian, Bermuda flag with the officers
6 from other countries. And, I've got to say that I'd be
7 very chauvinistic if I told you that U.S. officers were
8 better than all the rest. It is simply not the case. We
9 have some excellent Italian officers, excellent British
10 officers and some excellent Scandinavian officers. We are
11 also starting to hire some officers from India and the
12 Philippines. We are hiring them in the lower ranks and
13 letting them work up. We think that they have excellent
14 potential as well. To say that their educational level is
15 any less than the United States would be very misleading
16 and totally inaccurate. In some cases there training, I
17 would have to say, is superior to ours. In some ways not
18 as well. They have excellent maritime academies, school
19 ships and training programs.

20 MR. HAVELOCK: But, they meet no U.S. ad-
21 ministered standards. Is that right?

22 MR. DORSCH: No. No, but the adoption of the
23 STCW, did I get that right, would give the Coast Guard
24 jurisdiction over ensuring that these people were properly
25 licensed by their flag states and that the bridge watchers

1 are maintained properly.

2 So, when the ship does come here right now the
3 Coast Guard does not have that jurisdiction. As I
4 understand it.

5 MR. HAVELOCK: Does API support the giving the
6 Coast Guard jurisdiction?

7 MR. DORSCH: That's what I mentioned before in
8 the previous issue. Yes.

9 The next issue, to move along, is the question of
10 automatic pilots that you brought up earlier, here. The
11 recommendation, again, is short. Alarm systems for
12 automatic pilots should be retrofitted for all tankers.
13 The alarm system that they are eluding to there is one
14 that would tell you when the automatic pilot is engaged.
15 There's already alarm system on automatic pilots to
16 indicate when you have drifted off -- when your automatic
17 pilot has failed and you are starting to drift off course.
18 If you drift off course 2 degrees or so, an example, an
19 alarm comes on and tells you there is something wrong.
20 The alarm that is being referred to here is an alarm that,
21 I guess, to use the Exxon Valdez case as an example, if
22 the automatic pilot is engaged and the helmsman, perhaps,
23 is not aware of it and he thinks he's turning the ship
24 with the wheel and in actual fact the computer's in
25 control, when he starts to turn that wheel the alarm will

1 come off and indicate, 'hey, you are not doing any good
2 turning this wheel, the automatic pilot is control'. That
3 is the alarm that's being eluded to there.

4 The use of automatic pilots is another issue.
5 Generally any ship that I've been on the automatic pilot
6 is being engaged in restricted waters nor in restricted
7 visibility. There are occasions, though, when you are on
8 a long course for an extended period of time when the
9 automatic pilot could properly be used. Because in many
10 cases the computer can steer better than the individual.
11 Not the computer, but the compass
12 can steer better than the individual. Having steered
13 myself, I'll tell you, I was a terrible helmsman and that
14 automatic pilot could steer a lot straighter course than
15 I ever could.

16 Questions on automatic pilots?

17 MR. PARKER: I don't think so.

18 MR. DORSCH: The next issue is shipboard
19 response capability. The recommendation is ships'
20 specific oil spill prevention and control contingency plan
21 should be required, but shipboard oil spill response
22 equipment should not be required. This is a fairly
23 controversial issue here. An update on that: API has
24 actively supported provisions in the House and Senate Oil
25 Spill Bills respectively to mandate ship's specific

1 contingency plans. Initial efforts by API to develop an
2 industry stand to replace (?) on hold due to this legisla-
3 tion.

4 API still opposes mandating spill response equip-
5 ment on tankers. Once it's research program begins API
6 will request the petroleum industry response organization,
7 PIRO, to make a high priority research on ship's specific
8 oil spill response capability.

9 Contingency plans are being worked on. As Mr.
10 Dooley pointed out in our previous meeting, contingency
11 plans for a ship mostly consist of a phone number. Who do
12 you call? But, they should also consist of emergency
13 cargo handling plans, cargo hazards, to go with particular
14 cargos, such as the High H2S cargo I previously mentioned.
15 Notification requirements as we just mentioned. Emergency
16 ship handling outlines and vessel salvage plans. Another
17 words, damage control plans.

18 But, when a ship runs aground or comes into
19 collision, the Master and the Officer's responsibility in
20 that particular case is to save his ship and to save the
21 lives of his crew on that ship. It is unrealistic to
22 think that he can initiate efforts to control oil spill.
23 He can initiate efforts to stop the oil spill, seek the
24 source on board his ship and stop it, but his first
25 responsibility is to salvaging his vessel. It is virtual-

1 ly impossible for a ship to carry and deploy oil spill
2 booms and clean-up equipment. It is unsafe to do so. In
3 storm tossed waters it would very difficult and unsafe for
4 a limited crew to watch and deploy oil spill booms when
5 their primary responsibility is saving that ship and
6 saving it from breaking up on that rock that it is hung up
7 on.

8 The question came up a little bit earlier about
9 containment by Mr. Sund. About containment around the
10 vessel. That is a debatable issue inasmuch as containment
11 around a vessel implies the containment of explosive hydro
12 carbons around the primary source of ignition. The paper
13 I read the other day referred to a ship that spilled
14 gasoline and the ship could not transmit on it radio
15 antenna for fear of igniting that gasoline. There was a
16 similar fear with the Exxon Valdez that you contained that
17 oil around that light hydro carbons bake off or release
18 from that crude oil and drift around the ship, and provide
19 a hazard to the crew. There's many sources of ignition on
20 board the ship, primarily, of course, the stack of the
21 ship, the exhaust stack. That's not to say that it
22 shouldn't be contained in the vicinity, but it's not a
23 clear cut issue that it should be contained around that
24 vessel. In some cases it could be more of a hazard than
25 anything else, than help. If that oil does ignite, you

1 could start a fire on the ship and cause much more of the
2 oil to spill and be released.

3 MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, it just reiterates
4 my point that I don't know why PIRO is spending 90% of
5 their budget figuring out how to clean up oil when nobody
6 wants to worry about how to contain it to clean it up. We
7 ought to spend 90% of the budget on figuring on how to
8 prevent the ship from hitting the rocks and about 10% on
9 how to deal with the rest of this problem out here. We
10 just run into these conflicts. If you don't want to
11 contain it -- you can't clean it up unless you contain
12 unless you contain it, you can't contain it because it
13 will cause a hazard to the ship, so you've got to let it
14 go. Once it's free in the ocean, you can't clean it up,
15 because you can't contain it. So, why are we worried
16 about it? I don't know. I think the priorities are in
17 the wrong place.

18 MR. DORSCH: Well, I agree and unfortunately in
19 our today's scheduling got the cart before the horse. I
20 should have preceded the previous speaker in talking about
21 all this oil spill prevention. Many of your questions
22 that was directed to him that were about prevention and
23 that was not his point in being here. That was my point
24 in being here. I fully agree with you that prevention is
25 a much higher priority than response. But.....

1 MR. SUND: I'd ask you then, why does the API
2 budget only have \$150,000.00 out of 9.3 million working on
3 the issue?

4 MR. DORSCH: Again, I could only speculate.
5 I'm not qualified to answer that. I didn't come up with
6 the API budget. I am not part of the API.

7 MR. SUND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 MR. HERZ: Mr. Chairman? You mentioned the
9 contingency plans but you don't mention anything to do
10 with training or drilling. Does API does a position on
11 whether crew tankers should as part of that Contingency
12 Plan be required to do training and be subjected to drills
13 either announced or unannounced in the same way that
14 landbased terminal operators and terminal contingency
15 plans require those kinds of things?

16 MR. DORSCH: Again, we get back to the ship
17 response capability. You are talking about... yes,
18 shoreside establishments do conduct drills frequently.
19 Ships do not conduct, nor is it intended that they conduct
20 oil spill clean up drills. Because, as I said before, we
21 favor the shoreside response and not the ship. The ship
22 can --- the ships do conduct drills, yes. But, not for
23 clean up. Ships conduct fire and lifeboat drills on a
24 weekly basis and they conduct other drills, too.

25 MR. HERZ: But, fire depression and lifeboat

1 drills are very different than what people on the vessels
2 should do in case of a spill. That is not life threaten-
3 ing -- I mean, yes, there's always the possibility of
4 fire, but a lot of other things. The question is whether
5 either in licensing certification and training or in the
6 ship or oil spill response capability, whether API has
7 thought about, and if they haven't you think they should
8 think about, some component of training and drilling for
9 the shipboard people in terms of what to do.

10 MR. DORSCH: The API report that I've been
11 asked to address does not particularly bring that up.
12 That doesn't mean that your idea is not a good idea. I
13 personally think that's probably an excellent idea. The
14 present API report, however, does not address that
15 particular aspect.

16 MR. HERZ: Thank you.

17 MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, just one last
18 comment here. The issue here is that the ship and its
19 cargo are the predominantly important thing to save its
20 salvage.

21 MR. DORSCH: True.

22 MR. SUND: And that's kind of been admiralty
23 law for.....

24 MR. DORSCH: I would say the crew is predomina-
25 ntly.....

1 MR. SUND: Okay, the crew. Okay and then the
2 ship and the cargo next. Do you see a point in history
3 here where maybe the surrounding environment is more
4 important than the ship and the cargo? I'm not going to
5 put it more important than the crew. But, in terms of how
6 we should respond to these things. If we evacuate the
7 ship of the crew, then we can weigh off the values of --
8 is it more important to contain that oil around the ship
9 even if it causes a danger to the loss of the ship and the
10 cargo and whether to let it go.

11 MR. DORSCH: You asking for my personal
12 speculation. I believe that the ship and the cargo should
13 be sacrificed to a greater -- if it can be shown that the
14 greater exposure is to the environment. Yes. Yes, I
15 don't think you could sacrifice the environment for the
16 sake of the ship and its cargo. The crew, however, is top
17 importance.

18 MR. SUND: I recognize that. I know we are
19 late here, Mr. Chairman. I just want to put that down.
20 I might follow that with you, again, on how do we get from
21 here to there. We are not there now. Under the current
22 law. The question is how we get there. Thank you.

23 MR. DORSCH: There are two remaining issues.
24 Vessel configuration and design, i.e., double hulls. I'm
25 sure you want to talk about. And, finally, moving along,

1 vessel size. The recommendation regarding vessel con-
2 figuration is the merits of full application of ballots(?)
3 sides reduce tank size and double bottom construction
4 should be carefully studied by the National Academy of
5 Science or other independent body. Changes in vessel
6 design criteria should be developed and implemented
7 through the International Maritime Organization. And, the
8 International Academy of Science is the body that has been
9 asked to study this that was being referred to earlier.
10 It was not the accurate number that was previously being
11 tossed around. The National Academy of Science has been
12 asked by the Coast Guard and API supports their study of
13 this.

14 You probably heard this before. But, we in the
15 industry do not necessarily view double hulls as the cure
16 all to oil spills. In my opinion, it's a simplistic
17 approach that's been grasped by the public to make a
18 complex issue simple. If one hull is good, two hulls is
19 better. Why not three hulls? It has been shown that in
20 many cases a double hull is more of a hazard than a single
21 hull. I'm not taking one side or the other. I'm just
22 playing the devil's advocate here in showing you that
23 there are problems with double hulls. I came up with --
24 our company came up with a little diagram here to show
25 what some of the problems are with double hulls are. And,

1 salvage ability is the main problem. If, you know, a
2 double hull ship the void space between the two hulls is
3 that vessels reserve buoyancy. In the case of, let's use
4 the Exxon Valdez as an example. Have that ship in a
5 double hull, that double hull would have been punctured.
6 That void space would have then been flooded by water.
7 That ship would have sunk further down onto that rock
8 making salvage efforts more difficult. In a single hull
9 ship, when that single hull is punctured the ship releases
10 a certain amount of oil until the oil reaches a state of
11 equilibrium with the water on the outside of the hull and
12 then the remaining oil in that tank stays there. The ship
13 is actually lost weight then and it floats up above what
14 it grounded upon making salvage efforts much more easy.
15 Double hulls, there's a diagram and as it indicates, that
16 was an example of the 35 and 39,000 ton ship. Single hull
17 ship versus double hull ship. I think it indicates that
18 the double hull ship would sit almost three foot harder on
19 the rock than the single hull ship. There has been, I
20 know, Mr. Sund mentioned earlier that in his mind the
21 Exxon Valdez, or it as been shown to him that the Exxon
22 Valdez would not have leaked as much oil or any oil had it
23 been a double hull ship, but I believe the Coast Guard
24 testimony as well as the findings of the shipyard that
25 built the ship has indicated had the Exxon Valdez been a

1 double hulled ship it would have sunk with the virtual
2 loss its entire cargo and not just the 110,000 barrels
3 that it did lose. That ship ruptured 10, I'm talking off
4 the top of my head here, 10 of 13 tanks, 10 of 15 tanks,
5 something like that. If that ship had been a double hull
6 ship and ruptured all those tanks and all those tanks had
7 filled with water, then in my mind and in the minds of the
8 ship builders and many others, certainly that ship would
9 have sunk. Then you would have had all that oil.

10 MR. SUND: Well, Mr. Chairman, I just want to
11 make the record clear that I didn't make that statement.
12 That was Admiral Kyme of the Coast Guard, who was also a
13 Naval Architect testifying to this Commission stated that
14 50% of the oil that escaped from the ship would not have
15 escaped if had it been a double hull.

16 MR. DORSCH: Initially.

17 MR. PARKER: We don't have time to get into it
18 here, but I would like to get some people that have really
19 been working on letting -- we are not going to get them
20 before this group, but I hope the National Academy does.
21 Because there's something about this argument that is just
22 not ringing, ringing to me, you know. I've been going
23 over this argument now since 1971 and we've got stacks of
24 papers everybody else has brought in and I just -- it's
25 hard for me to accept the instability in the, you know,

1 put it on the rock harder argument. I mean it's --
2 there's too many people going the other way on it. And,
3 the... Anyway....

4 MR. DORSCH: Mr. Chairman, I submit that some
5 of the other people are going the other way, because it is
6 simpler for them to understand.

7 MR. SUND: Well, you know.....

8 MR. DORSCH: I think it's a simple.....

9 MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, I don't want to get
10 into it here, either. But, I will. Our ferry system are
11 all double hulled and we've put them on the rocks and
12 stuck them on the islands and grounded them several times
13 and it hasn't cause any problems at all. As a matter of
14 fact it didn't leak any oil, either. They carried large
15 chunks of rocks to Seattle with them to be taken out of
16 the hull. But, it seems to me, I'll just give you my
17 point of view. I think it has to do with what the society
18 deems to hazardous of the cargo. We put L&G in a double
19 hull tanker. Why?

20 MR. DORSCH: I'm not familiar with L&G tankers,
21 myself.

22 MR. SUND: Well, they are all double hulled.
23 They've got double hulls in the bottom. They got side
24 walls. And, we do it because we are afraid of an ex-
25 plosion which will vaporize whoever's around when it

1 explodes. Nobody argues about those tankers being
2 unstable. Nobody argues about that they are going to sink
3 if they penetrate one of their hulls when they drown.
4 They talk about the fact that if it's punctured the cargo
5 will blow up. So, my point when I discussed this with the
6 Coast Guard in Washington was that, you know, if we
7 determined oil to be as hazardous as L&G we would get
8 beyond the buoyancy question and a sinking and grounding
9 question, we'd get into whether society wants to protect
10 itself, it's environment from the cargo inside leaking
11 outside.

12 MR. HERZ: And, in fact, the bottom line on
13 your demonstration here points that up. It doesn't say
14 anything about the amount of oil being released or the
15 environmental damage, which is the think that I'm the most
16 concerned about. It says that the double hull vessel
17 would be three feet higher than the single hull vessel
18 with the associated greater difficulty of salvage. I
19 don't care about the salvage. That's the shipper's
20 problem. I care about the environment and about prevent-
21 ing the oil from damaging the environment. And, the
22 strongest case you can make is that the double hull vessel
23 is going to be more expensive for you to salvage, that's
24 not.....

25 MR. DORSCH: No, that's.....

1 MR. HERZ:an issue. In my.....
2 MR. DORSCH: No. The concern is not at all the
3 expense of salvaging the vessel, it's the fact that you've
4 got get that ship off that rock before the heavy weather
5 sets in. You let that ship sit on a rock as you are
6 implying and it is going to break up and it's going to
7 sink and you're going to lose all that oil.
8 MR. HERZ: Okay.
9 MR. DORSCH: You've got to get that ship off
10 the rock soon.
11 MR. HERZ: The Exxon Valdez was impaled for
12 quite some time and they were able to safely offload the
13 oil and there was some pretty nasty weather that came up
14 three days after the grounding. I mean, I think the
15 argument really is encapsulated in this statement right
16 here. The associated greater difficulty of salvage which
17 is really the industry's concern about the cost of
18 salvaging.....
19 MR. DORSCH: No.....
20 MR. HERZ:the vessel.
21 MR. DORSCH: No. Negative. Negative.
22 Negative.
23 MR. PARKER: Is it -- normally you are not
24 going to get the ship off the rocks until you lighten the
25 oil anyway. You've got to get some of the oil.....

1 MR. DORSCH: I know. I couldn't agree with you
2 that if normally, there is a normally situation.
3 MR. PARKER: Yeah.
4 MR. DORSCH: There's a number of different
5 scenarios that you would have to address. I couldn't say
6 that there's a normal situation.
7 MR. PARKER: Well, if you do get it off and
8 it's still leaking, why you are just going to continue to
9 leak oil wherever the ship proceeds.
10 MR. DORSCH: Well, then you do have to lighter
11 it off, yes.
12 MR. PARKER: Yeah.
13 MR. DORSCH: You have to light it off the
14 ruptured tanks, yes. Or transfer them to another tank.
15 MR. WENK: Very briefly. Two questions. The
16 first is if I recall correctly, you said that some of the
17 Chevron tankers are double bottomed.
18 MR. DORSCH: We have five double bottomed
19 ships.
20 MR. WENK: Why?
21 MR. DORSCH: We have them for other reasons
22 than safety. They have proven because the -- in the
23 double bottom ship, the strength members are in that void
24 space. They are not in the cargo tank itself. That
25 allows you to have cargo tanks that are flat sided, flat

1 bottomed, no strength members that can gather oil, and
2 the tanks strip up much easier, they clean up much easier.
3 That allows -- you can put your cargo suction in the
4 bottom of, because that's in the void space. You can
5 strip out virtually every drop of oil in that cargo tank.
6 It also allows for the segregated ballast to be on the
7 sides of that ship which is the void space in a loading
8 situation to be pumped out concurrent with cargo being
9 pumped in so it makes a much quicker turnaround on the
10 ship.

11 MR. WENK: Do you feel that you traded off
12 safety for these other advantages?

13 MR. DORSCH: No. No. I'm not saying.....

14 MR. WENK: Well, then, it sounds to me like
15 there's.....

16 MR. DORSCH:that double hulled ships.....

17 MR. WENK:something not quite consis-
18 tent in what you have been saying.

19 MR. DORSCH: I'm not saying that double hulled
20 ships are less safe. I am saying there are certain
21 circumstances where they provided more of a hazard than a
22 single hull. There are also circumstances where they are
23 safer.

24 MR. WENK: But.....

25 MR. DORSCH: Collisions.

1 MR. WENK: But, all things considered.
2 Assuming there is no such thing as zero risk. Anyway.
3 And, I think we'd all agree on that. But, all things
4 considered, if I heard you correctly, you don't feel that
5 you traded off, all things considered, safety by going to
6 the double bottom?

7 MR. DORSCH: No.

8 MR. WENK: Okay. Thank you.

9 MR. DORSCH: Again, this is a complex is-
10 sue.....

11 MR. WENK: Oh, yes.

12 MR. DORSCH: that I think the National
13 Academy of Science should come up with. And, that is an
14 independent body. Independent of the oil companies,
15 independent of the API, independent of the Coast Guard.

16 MR. WENK: Incidentally, just for the record.
17 In Admiral Yost letter I think it refers to the National
18 Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences and
19 the National Academy of Engineering are the parent
20 organizations of the National Research Council which is
21 the contract body of the research arm. It's a minor,
22 really a minor point, but the Academy of Sciences never
23 does any research itself.

24 MR. DORSCH: Uh-huh.

25 MR. PARKER: I hope, you know, I hope when we

1 get the results from the National Academy on double
2 bottoms they know more about the issue than Prima Prost(?)
3 Committee of the Academy knew about pipelining when we
4 took the issue to them. So, you know, it depends upon who
5 the Academy's got on the group.

6 MR. WENK: Well, that's why, Mr. Chairman, I
7 suggested we get a report from them so that you can make
8 that judgement.

9 MR. SUND: I think, Mr. Chairman, Captain
10 Elsenjohn, who is to be here this afternoon, is aware of
11 who is on that body. He might be able to tell us

12 MR. PARKER: Okay. Well, we can obviously go
13 into this for a long time. We'll go ahead on vessel size.

14 MR. DORSCH: Okay. Well, I had other things to
15 say about vessel configuration design, but I think that I
16 agree with you that we can move onto the next issue.

17 Mr. Dooley attended a speech by Mr. Roland who we
18 talked to extensively about double bottoms and design and
19 I have a copy of that speech if you care to have.....

20 MR. PARKER: Love to have it.

21 MR. DORSCH:it if Mr. Dooley does not
22 already have it. Do you have it?

23 MR. SUND: We appreciate it.

24 MR. DORSCH: Okay. Finally, vessel size.
25 Puget Sound presently limits vessel tanker size to 125,000

1 tons. That -- kind of putting that in perspective here,
2 in 1988 the U.S. imported 6 million barrels per day into
3 the United States. That came out to be 3800 port calls.
4 That was on an average size of 80,000 deadweight ton
5 vessels. That's just an average size. 20,000 tons on up
6 to VLCCs. ULCC's. If you took that average size and
7 decreased that by 25% to maybe a maximum of 60,000
8 deadweight vessel, you would be increasing the port calls
9 by 1100 from 3800 to 4900 or 30%. The risk there is the
10 more ships you have the more possibilities for breakdowns,
11 collisions, groundings. So, there's a tradeoff there.
12 You can have less exposure because of the small ship, but
13 you have more ships. More accidents. I think Puget Sound
14 is -- well, they've come up with this 125,000 ton that
15 works out -- it works out reasonably well for them.
16 Because it worked the Alaska Trade, but I don't think
17 that's necessarily the solution for all ports in the
18 world.

19 MR. HERZ: Mr. Chairman?

20 MR. PARKER: Yes?

21 MR. HERZ: Well, the next question is, if
22 that increased number, 30% increase number of tanker trips
23 is in double hulled vessels don't the actuarial figures
24 show that we will be better off? Because although there
25 may be an increase in an number of incidents, the safety

1 will be such that the damage to the environment from those
2 incidents will be reduced?

3 MR. DORSCH: I believe that's probably reach-
4 ing, but I don't know.

5 MR. HERZ: Those figures should be obtainable
6 from the actuarial data that exist. It should be a very
7 easy question to answer.

8 MR. PARKER: And, the other fact, of course, is
9 that you can establish more terminals and that also
10 spreads your risk somewhat, but reduces your traffic
11 congestion.

12 MR. DORSCH: You can establish more terminals?

13 MR. PARKER: Yeah.

14 MR. DORSCH: I, I.....

15 MR. PARKER: Or, you know, you can establish
16 more deep water, more offshore terminals, more single
17 point worrying systems, whatever. There's ways of
18 spreading.

19 MR. DORSCH: There is. That's a -- from a
20 practical standpoint I don't know if that's possible in
21 today's environment. Not my backyard seems to be the
22 current thinking. Offshore oil terminals have their own
23 attendant risk, you know. I think that offshore oil
24 terminals are much more subjected to weather and I think
25 the potential for oil spills is higher yet than it is in

1 an inland oil spill terminal --

2 MR. PARKER: Well, yeah.....

3 MR. DORSCH: Spreading the risk, spreading your
4 terminals, it's a bit of a premium right now and I don't
5 think you are going to find any state that is going to
6 encourage more oil terminals than less terminals.

7 MR. PARKER: I think, you know, the point is
8 the sizing the ship to the trade it's in is what needs to
9 be done. And, whether some ships have been oversized for
10 the ports habitually frequented is -- oh, should be
11 strongly considered.

12 MR. WENK: Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
13 I think that when you deal with the question of size
14 merely the total volume of imports and so on over a number
15 of equally sized ships, may really not get to the point of
16 the question that I think Commissioner Herz was driving
17 at, and I think to dramatize it a little bit further, if
18 my information is correct we have had some new LCC's tie
19 up at the offshore loading/unloading in the Gulf of
20 Mexico.

21 MR. DORSCH: That's the terminal in Louisiana,
22 yeah.

23 MR. WENK: One of which I think ran 477,000
24 tons and it strikes me that there really is a serious
25 question about size limit that you can approach without

1 getting down to this matter of just averaging everything
2 out and coming to some general conclusion. I think that,
3 if I may suggest it in terms of dealing with the issue of
4 size limit, that one had to approach it somewhat dif-
5 ferently than simply this question of how many more
6 tankers you'd have if they were smaller size.

7 MR. PARKER: Okay. Any other questions.
8 Esther?

9 MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, my question is,
10 maybe somewhat off the topic. But, we appreciate your
11 coming. You know, as you say you are not a part of the
12 American Petroleum Institute. But, the experience that
13 you have in Chevron dealing with American vessels as well
14 as foreign vessels. Would there be any merit in the
15 shipping companies making a part of their contract
16 standards with foreign flag vessels the same kinds of
17 recommendations that they make for U.S. vessels. Because
18 I think we are all grafting with the problem of some of
19 this being out of the jurisdiction of the United States.

20 MR. DORSCH: I agree with you entirely on that.
21 Yes, there is benefit to doing that and the actual factor
22 is that there is efforts to do that already. When we
23 charter in a ship we go through a rather extensive review
24 process of that ship and it's owners. We require him to
25 belong to certain conventions, insurance conventions. We

1 require him to have certain equipment on board these
2 ships. We require him to have a number of mooring lanes,
3 proper type, that meets our personal approval. We review
4 what type of ship he has. But, no we don't want to
5 transport our oil on a ship of a questionable character.
6 We review the owners tract record and we also review his
7 accident record through Lloyds of London regarding his
8 accidents and casualties. Decide if that's the type of
9 ships we want.

10 That can be further expanded to incorporate some
11 of what you are talking about here, yes. And I think
12 that's probably appropriate.

13 MR. PARKER: Any other questions?

14 MR. DORSCH: Well, thank you for having me.....

15 MR. PARKER: Thank you.

16 MR. DORSCH: and I'm sorry I took so long.

17 MR. PARKER: Well, Commissioners you've run out
18 of your lunch period. What do you want to do?

19 MR. HERZ: Eat.

20 MR. WUNNICKE: Next time I am bringing a doggie
21 bag.

22 MR. PARKER: Do we want to send out for
23 something or do we want to delay the whole afternoon?

24 MR. WENK: Why don't we send out for someth-
25 ing?

1 MR. PARKER: I think our best alternative is to
2 send out for sandwiches and keep on schedule.
3 MR. HERZ: Can we take the time of 15
4 minutes?
5 MR. PARKER: Oh, yeah. We're gonna do that.
6 But,.....
7 MR. HAVELOCK: Well, we'll send out for some
8 sandwiches, then. Is that it?
9 MR. PARKER: Yeah, that's it.
10 (Off the record)
11 LUNCH
12 (On the record)
13 MR. PARKER: Alright, Mr. King.
14 MR. KING: For the record, my name is Richard
15 King. I am with United Cook Inlet Drift Association. I
16 have with me Loren Flagg from the Kenai Peninsula Fisher-
17 men's Association, as well as Ken Casnor, from the North
18 Pacific Fisheries Association.
19 MR. PARKER: Are the mikes on? (Referring to
20 PA mikes).
21 MR. KING: Testing, hello?
22 MR. SUND: Just speak up.
23 MR. KING: Okay. Between the three of us we
24 are going to give you, we hope, a comprehensive final
25 overview of what we think should happen in Cook Inlet.

1 I'd like to start -- I did start by passing you our
2 recommendations. We have come before you before with
3 these recommendations. We have refined them a little bit.
4 Two reasons. Well, we have a multitude of reasons why we
5 think these recommendations should be considered. We are
6 still uncomfortable with the fact that what seems to be
7 good enough for Prince William Sound isn't good enough for
8 Cook Inlet in the eyes of the Department of Environmental
9 Conservation and we would urge you to consider our
10 recommendations and consider the reasons why we think they
11 are good enough for, at least a start, for Cook Inlet.

12 We feel like there seems to be an international
13 double standard in terms of the Industry and how they deal
14 with their prevention and their response capabilities in
15 Cook Inlet. And in Alaska in general, when it's compared
16 to other places around the world. Loren will go a little
17 further on that when he describes his trip over seas to
18 some other oil terminals around the world.

19 I'd like to go back in time a little bit about the
20 time that you guys came down to Kenai and what has shook
21 out since that time. There has been a variety of develop-
22 ments there. One thing that happened was the Department
23 of Environmental Conservation created a position in the
24 Anchorage office to deal specifically with Cook Inlet
25 which was a positive step in our mind and in doing that

1 DEC invited the industry, the Cook Inlet oil industry and
2 the shippers to address a list of concerns that they had
3 concerning prevention and response capabilities in Cook
4 Inlet. Those recommendations as far as an agenda and
5 issues that they asked the Industry to review, of course,
6 center around putting an emergency response vessel or
7 vessels on line and, I guess what I would like to do is go
8 back through and tell you what the Department Environmen-
9 tal Conservation asked of the Industry and then review
10 what I feel is having happen.

11 What Joe did, Joe Sontner (ph) who is the new
12 Department Environmental Conservation person, is he gave
13 them an agenda that he would like to have addressed and a
14 supplement to that. The first thing that he was inter-
15 ested in talking about was station response vessels or
16 tugs in strategical cases around Cook Inlet. Industry got
17 together on October 5th. They came out with a new
18 release. I think, Dennis, you were a party to that
19 meeting and are undoubtedly current on what they came out
20 with in terms of what they thought was necessary.

21 In a response vessel, as it shook out, was a boat
22 called the Gulf Coast 69 and it was to be on line in Cook
23 Inlet as of November 1st and it was suppose to be able to
24 deploy 500,000 feet of oil boom. The standby ready
25 response personnel and primarily I think it's used as a

1 response tool as opposed, or in their minds, a response
2 tool as opposed to a prevention tool. It's also rated for
3 ice operations.

4 On Thursday, November 9th, I drove out to Rig
5 Tender's Dock and took a look at the boat. At that point
6 there was crew of three on deck with steam thawing
7 equipment trying to get ice off of the boat so that the
8 vessel could be loaded with the equipment and while I
9 certainly wasn't -- I didn't wish the Industry and bad
10 luck in terms of their progress on this thing, I think it
11 is indicative of the overall attitude of the Industry and
12 their agenda for getting on with the business of preven-
13 tion and response in that ten days after it was supposed
14 to be on line these guys were struggling at the Rig
15 Tender's Dock trying to get this boat even clean or
16 cleared of ice before they could put the equipment that
17 was necessary to do the job on the boat.

18 I sure wouldn't have wanted to have been in their
19 position if the boat was moving around. It was 3 foot sea
20 state and a steady 20 knot wind. It was boiling and it
21 was maybe 19 degrees outside and I guess the bottom line
22 was that the boat was icing as fast as they were de-icing
23 and the progress was -- there was none. In their news
24 release they mentioned that it would be rated for ice
25 operation. I'm having a hard time believing anything's

1 going to be able to operate in terms of prevention and
2 response in Upper Cook Inlet under the conditions that I
3 saw last week on November 9th. It was bad weather -- bad
4 wind, icing conditions and just a bad situation to be
5 working.

6 However, in the background as you look at Rig
7 Tender's Dock from the North side you see the Kenai
8 Pipeline Dock and there with the ARCO River (ph) unloading
9 or loading oil, whichever was they were doing. And,
10 again, I think that speaks for the Industry's attitude.

11 I believe that if the Department Environmental
12 Conservation would have said "okay, guys, as soon as you
13 get this vessel, the emergency response vessel together,
14 you can go back to work at loading your tankers". Their
15 attitude would have been considerably different in terms
16 of dealing with the prevention and response vessel.

17 And, this goes back to my original request that
18 you take a look at making recommendations that EO --
19 Emergency Orders be used here in Cook Inlet similar to as
20 they have in Prince William Sound.

21 One of the things that I didn't notice on the Gulf
22 Coast 69 was a (indiscernible) package of any sort or a
23 push/pull capacity -- equivalence to do so. If the
24 emphasis is going to be on prevention, then it again needs
25 to be there for those guys to be able to get ahold of one

1 of those tankers that's in distress and hold on to them
2 until they can either get back onto power or some more
3 equipment can be brought on line to help hold onto it.
4 I'm certainly not comfortable with the Industry's position
5 that if they have a distressed tanker they can drop the
6 hook and hold it. Everybody knows that the Glacier Bay
7 was on the hook when he went on the rock. The Exxon
8 Houston was on the hook -- the (indiscernible) over off
9 the Coast of Hawaii when he went on the rocks, or when he
10 broke his gear and eventually went on the rocks.

11 I think that if that's going to be a primary
12 component of the prevention plan, then you need to get
13 some expert opinions from perhaps the pilot in terms of
14 anchoring up in different conditions. Particularly in
15 Cook Inlet where the tides are running so hard.

16 And the last thing that I want to talk about that
17 particular boat, was the 5,000 foot of expand BC boom that
18 they intend to put on it. While I don't really know what
19 the capacity of a vessel like that is to set boom and to
20 handle it once it's in position, I have read some reviews
21 of expand booms primarily by the Department Environmental
22 Conservation. They have serious questions in their minds
23 whether Expand DC Boom can operate in 3 meter state which
24 is very criteria that they set in Prince William Sound for
25 the operations of safe boom. So.

1 Oh, you might notice in our recommendations that
2 we made a recommendations that on-sight capabilities in
3 terms of boom should be 30,000 feet. I pulled that right
4 off the DEC Emergency Order. The 30,000 feet seems to be
5 a criteria that's been established in other places around
6 the world and places where they appear to have the role
7 model prevention plans. One thing that I have noted in a
8 review of that emergency order in the industry's response
9 to that order over in Prince William Sound, was that Dan
10 Long noted in his report that when the Valdez quit leaking
11 the perimeter of the spill was 18 miles. So, that's
12 approximately 95,000 feet and all I am suggesting is that
13 the industry feels comfortable with a figure of 5,000
14 feet, then maybe they ought to take another look and at
15 least consider some of the other aggregate booming
16 capacities that are around the world.

17 One of the -- the second of the Industry's seven
18 point plan that they are interested in manifesting is that
19 a committee of oil industry members to develop specifica-
20 tions for long term vessels.

21 I really feel like, again, they need to look to
22 criteria established by outside resource, perhaps Foss
23 (ph) Tug and Barge. They put out volumes of information
24 what will and won't work in different C states and
25 different weather conditions. They made one positive step

1 in my mind. All vessels inward and outward bound to and
2 from the Kennedy Entrance will maintain 25 mile clearance
3 from the Southern Coastline to the Kenai Peninsula. That
4 I think is pretty positive. I really feel like staying
5 off that beach, off of that outer district coast line is
6 important. I think that if they have a tanker in distress
7 that's 25 miles off, they are probably going to need to
8 have their response vessel or their tug vessels in either
9 Seward or Homer.

10 You will notice that in our suggestions or our
11 recommendations. Before we had specific amounts of tugs
12 in specific places. Now, we have backed off of that and
13 decided that the appropriate way to deal with it is to ask
14 them to respond in a two hour timeframe, because that's
15 what they are doing in Prince William Sound, again. They
16 are saying that if you can respond in two hours then you
17 can have as many of them as you need. Or, the inverse.

18 I noticed and I think -- I noticed that in Solum
19 Voe in Scotland two hour response capability seems to be
20 fairly common numbers to work with. So, I think that
21 again, if it's good enough for Prince William Sound it
22 should be good enough for Cook Inlet.

23 The next component of their seven point plan is
24 the continued work with the organization and further
25 investment of equipment. One thing that they say is that

1 they are going to define worldwide resources available by
2 air to quickly respond to major incidents. I have a
3 little bit of problem with that only from the standpoint
4 that if the two hour time perimeter is going to be used
5 then flying out of wherever it is they'll have to bring
6 that equipment from into Kenai, or Homer, or Seward,
7 certainly doesn't allow them to stay within the two hour
8 timeframe that we are looking for.

9 One thing that I noted. I took the \$.10 tour of
10 CIRO here a couple of weeks ago. I looked at their
11 inventory and their equipment and I talked to some of the
12 guys that were working there. They were basically working
13 on equipment to get ready for the response vessel. They
14 were going to pull the boom and the skimmer as well as
15 some of the other components vital to the operation of the
16 emergency response vessel off of the shelf. They do seem
17 to have a fairly comprehensive inventory of response
18 equipment there. One thing that I did note was a ton of
19 curexit. I'm not sure I'm comfortable with, again, the
20 attitude of the Industry in that right way to deal with
21 oil spill is to dump curexit on it. Certainly there are
22 weather perimeters that have been established that are
23 going to keep the use of those dispersants from being the
24 primary source of response for a major portion of the year
25 up in Upper Cook Inlet. And in any sub-arctic conditions,

1 for that matter.

2 And, the last thing, the last thing that they
3 mentioned as far as a direction action that they would be
4 willing to do is to work with the Department Environmental
5 Conservation in assuring requirements that all vessels
6 have approved Contingency Plans before they can be allowed
7 to move cargo. Well, it was not but two weeks later that
8 the San Finino Two (ph), of course, was held up and made
9 to wait on the hook, because they were operating without
10 an approved Contingency Plan in State waters. And, it
11 wasn't the Industry's self-monitoring that made that
12 vessel stay off -- it was the addition of that extra man
13 in the Department Environmental Conservation. He went
14 through the books and he found that the vessel wasn't
15 operating with an approved Contingency Plan.

16 So, I'm having a hard time believing that they are
17 very sincere about that, at least at this point. They
18 promised as well to organize all interest groups, all user
19 groups, in the Cook Inlet drainages and provide a form
20 that could serve as a policy and education tool for the
21 citizens in the area. Well, I guess submit to this Board
22 that the education tool should be for the Industry
23 themselves to find out that the citizens of this area are
24 not comfortable with the pollution problem that the
25 industry has. And, in my mind anyway, if they don't get

1 a handle on the pollution problems, sooner or later they
2 are going to be regulated or legislated completely out of
3 business. That information needs to go two ways. It
4 needs to come from them as well as to them.

5 There was a multitude of requests by DEC in asking
6 them to participate in this meeting that weren't ad-
7 dressed. Those are skimming capacities, booming capaci-
8 ties, lightening storage, weather conditions, minimum
9 weather conditions, spill drills, risk assessment, oily
10 waste disposal, research and development. To date I
11 haven't read where the Cook Inlet Industry has been
12 dealing with any of these things even though I did learn
13 something today from Steve in terms of the R&D plan.

14 I guess the bottom line in my mind is that if we
15 continue to let this Industry monitor itself and be
16 responsible to the people in a way that their record has
17 indicated their going to be, it's not unlike me -- when I
18 make request of this sort and I don't take these recommen-
19 dations lightly, it's not unlike me telling my nine year
20 old daughter to clean up her bedroom and after making her
21 bed she comes back to me and says "well, I'll do my dirty
22 laundry if I can go play for a little bit longer". I make
23 this analogy because it has such an affect on my life and
24 my relationship with my children and it has for the last
25 three years. In '87 we dealt with the Glacier Bay, in '88

1 we had a spill of unknown origin in Upper Cook Inlet and
2 obviously in 1988 we were put out of business in complete-
3 ly. We got our paychecks alright, but we stood in line
4 for our paycheck. And, my nine year old daughter got her
5 crew share, but she didn't earn a dime of it. And, it
6 goes every work ethic that my father ever taught me to be
7 in this position. And, that is why, in my mind, at least
8 personally I'm here.

9 So, I'll end it with that and if you have ques-
10 tions about our recommendations, please feel free to ask
11 them. I'm sure that your recommendations are going to be
12 a lot more comprehensive than mine are. And, I would
13 happy to help in anyway that I can.

14 MR. PARKER: Okay. Thank you, Rich. Commis-
15 sioners, any questions? Counsel?

16 MS. WUNNICKE: Thank you.

17 MR. PARKER: Okay. We'll go over your revised
18 one and I'll see you again before too long. Loren?

19 Loren Flagg. Kenai Fishing Peninsula Association
20 and just back from Norway. Welcome.

21 MR. FLAGG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
22 appreciate the opportunity for the Commission to hear the
23 Cook Inlet Fishermen here one more time. Hopefully, we
24 will have a few new things to add here to the process.

25 Two years ago I retired from the Alaska Department

1 of Fish and Game after working 19 years as a fisheries
2 biologist in the Cook Inlet area. In 1973 I was the area
3 biologist for Commercial Fisheries in Homer when the State
4 of Alaska leased portions of outer Kachemak Bay and
5 adjacent lower Cook Inlet for oil and gas exploration.
6 Concerned for the threat to the valuable fisheries
7 resources and environment of the area resulted in the
8 legislature funding a comprehensive baseline study of the
9 marine environment of Kachemak Bay and Lower Cook Inlet.

10 I was transferred to the Habitat Division at that
11 time and became field project leader for the studies. At
12 the same time I was responsible for investigating oil
13 spills and reviewing oil spill contingency plans for ADF&G
14 in the Cook Inlet area.

15 I would like to take just a few minutes to relate
16 some personal experience from this period in hopes that by
17 remembering the past we can gain better control of our
18 future.

19 Some of you may recall the George Ferris (ph), an
20 oil drilling rig which was used in Cook Inlet in 1977.
21 After experiencing mechanical problems off of Cape
22 Caseloff (ph) in the Fall of 1977 it was moved down to
23 Kachemak Bay for repairs and winter storage. When the rig
24 became stuck in the Kachemak Bay mud and the tide began
25 flooding over it's decks, the oil spill containment boom

1 on board was covered by water and not available for
2 deployment. As the ferris began to sink, containment boom
3 and all, oil began to escape from the fuel tanks and since
4 there was no contingency plan to cover this event, the oil
5 escaped to the Bay. The oil was not contained until the
6 second day due to a comedy of errors. The first boom to
7 finally be deployed around the ferris was not of the heavy
8 duty deep skirted variety suitable for ocean use. It was
9 a flimsy piece of equipment that was unable to contain
10 this relatively small spill, even under ideal conditions.

11 I personally observed the clean up operations from
12 an airplane above and could plainly see oil freely
13 escaping under the boom. At the time the seas were calm.
14 The second boom was brought in. This was one of the heavy
15 duty variety. However, this boom had a leak and when it
16 was deployed it gradually filled with water and eventually
17 sank.

18 Well, while oil continued to escape and spread
19 around Kachemak Bay a third boom was rushed to the scene.
20 However, this boom arrived still heavily coated with oil
21 from a previous spill and could not be used.

22 Oil spills in offshore waters present a far
23 greater challenge than the Ferris which took place in the
24 relatively calm waters of Kachemak Bay. There's only one
25 chance of containing an oil spill in Cook Inlet. There

1 must be an adequate amount of the best available equipment
2 that technology can provide located at strategic response
3 stations available for immediate deployment. There must
4 also be trained response teams at the sites which can be
5 activated immediately. A delay of more than one hour --
6 one or two hours before booms are deployed is too late as
7 the tides and wind disburse the oil over too large an area
8 to allow containment. We learned this in 1987 with the
9 Glacier Bay and, of course, again this year with the Exxon
10 Valdez.

11 Initiating these measures may give us some chance
12 of preventing oil from reaching our shores. However, we
13 should all be aware that even with these types of measures
14 we are still going to need luck on our side. Equipment
15 and response strategies have not yet been developed
16 capable of containing oil on the ocean on the open seas
17 during rough weather conditions.

18 This point was underscored to me recently while I
19 was in Norway attending the first International Conference
20 on Fisheries and Offshore Oil Exploration. You have all
21 heard how advanced the Norwegians are in the field of oil
22 spill response capability. They have the most technically
23 advanced booms and skimmers in the world. The state
24 pollution control authority has an extensive network of
25 people and equipment located at 12 depots along the

1 Norwegian Coast. They have a total clean up capacity of
2 15,000 barrels per hour. At each depot there are ten
3 trained people assigned on an on-call basis.

4 In addition to SPCA, the oil companies have formed
5 a clean up co-operative called NOPO (ph) made up of 13 of
6 the major offshore oil exploration and production com-
7 panies. Each of these companies have the requirement to
8 be able to clean up 60,000 barrels per day in 3 meter seas
9 with a 1.5 knot current. Each oil platform must have
10 skimming capacity standing by to respond, to contain and
11 pick up a minimum of 600 barrels per hour. All within two
12 hours while the equipment is on route. NOPO has five
13 strategically located bases along Norway's west coast. At
14 each of these bases are 27,000 feet of oil booms. 14 oil
15 recovery and transfer systems with a capacity of 26,500
16 barrels per hour and 12 sets of disbursants units.

17 In addition to SPCA NOPO the oil terminals in
18 Norway are also well equipped with oil response equipment.
19 I visited the Stir (ph) Terminal to which is Norway's
20 newest facility at the Osborn Pipeline. The spills
21 adjacent to the terminal and out to the entrance of the
22 fjords, response must be within two hours with the
23 capability of picking up 36,500 barrels within 24 hours.

24 All the above sounds pretty impressive. In fact,
25 on paper it would appear that even a spill the size of the

1 Exxon Valdez could be picked up in less than two days if
2 all of this equipment were pooled. So, what happens in a
3 real life situation.

4 While attending the conference in Bergan, Norway,
5 I had the opportunity to observe how the best available
6 technology and the best available strategy really works
7 when the sea kicks up. The opening day of our conference,
8 the morning newspapers headlined the story entitled,
9 "Disaster Tanker On The Rocks". Some of the Norwegians
10 heading the conference had to leave to respond to a medium
11 size oil spill just a few miles up the coast near the
12 entrance to Sonja Fjord. There were 30 knot winds and 8
13 to 10 foot seas in the vicinity of the tanker. Which had
14 broken in two and was leaking bunker sea fuel. Due to
15 weather conditions, very little of the oil could be
16 contained or recovered for two days following the acci-
17 dent. The oil was driven ashore into the Fjords by winds
18 and tide. Mariculture farms, sand and streams, marine
19 birds, and private properties were all threatened by the
20 spill. Most of the oil ended up on shore and an extensive
21 clean up expected to last several weeks was begun. The
22 press was critical of the Norwegian Government in the oil
23 industry for it's slow and inadequate response.

24 Mariculture owners were scared there was not
25 enough containment boom to protect the salmon.

1 Audubon folks scrambled to set up bird recovering
2 cleaning stations. Private property owners threatened to
3 sue government and industry for failing to contain the
4 spill. Does any of this sound familiar?

5 The point I am trying to make here is that
6 prevention cannot be overemphasized. The Norwegians with
7 the best equipment and response capabilities in the world
8 could not control this relatively small spill. Once the
9 oil is in the water, especially in Cook Inlet with the
10 extreme range of tides and excessive tidal currents, the
11 ballgame is over. This should be painfully obviously to
12 anyone who is involved in the clean up of the Exxon Valdez
13 spill. All of the best equipment and response plans in
14 the world are not going to do any good at all under
15 certain conditions.

16 Recognizing this we must all work to designing and
17 implementing the best protection plan possible for Cook
18 Inlet and other areas of Alaska. The seven point plan
19 recently outlined by the oil industry for improvements in
20 Cook Inlet is a good start, but just that. A start. I
21 believe that you see these recommendations that Rich has
22 outlined are reasonable and definitely worthy of serious
23 considerations.

24 I have had a chance to briefly examine ECO's (ph)
25 report on Assessment of Transportation Systems in Cook

1 Inlet and Prince William Sound. Walt had brought down a
2 copy on Friday night at a discussion in Homer and we had
3 a chance to look at it over the weekend. For the most
4 part I believe this is a very good report and KPFA
5 supports ECO's recommendations for improvements in Cook
6 Inlet.

7 I would like to end with just a few comments on
8 this report and a few recommendations for your considera-
9 tion.

10 One. I strongly disagree with any policy that
11 does not allow Alyeska's oil spill response equipment to
12 be used in Cook Inlet. Refineries in the Cook Inlet area
13 are receiving Prudhoe Bay oil from Valdez on a regular
14 basis. And, a thus and instate extension of the Trans
15 Alaska Pipeline. It is imperative that agreements are
16 worked out ahead of time to allow full use of this
17 equipment in the event of a major oil spill in Cook Inlet.

18 Two, the concept of a state port authority with
19 powers to close down ports if conditions are unsafe must
20 be given serious considerations. The port authority and
21 operational guidelines should be modeled after Solum Voe
22 in the Shetland Island. Local citizens, fishing groups
23 and other local interests must be involved in the process
24 of oil spill prevention and contingency planning. Support
25 is needed, right now, for the oversight and monitoring

1 amendment by the Senate and now being considered a pre-
2 conference committee in Washington, D.C.

3 Three. I was disappointed that ECO's report which
4 included a section on improved tanker design did not
5 address the vacuum method designed by Sweden to minimize
6 escape of oil from damaged cargo tanks. The vacuum method
7 or emergency cargo transfer system, would have greatly
8 reduced the outflow of oil from the Exxon Valdez according
9 to Swedish Naval experts.

10 I would ask the Oil Spill Commission to recommend
11 to the State, Federal and Industry planners to seriously
12 examine this method. Last month, Christenson, from the
13 National Swedish Administration of Shipping and Naviga-
14 tion, reported to the International Conference on fisher-
15 ies and offshore oil exploration that the major, technical
16 and safety problems regarding this method have been solved
17 during the past two years. A series of reports and a
18 video on this method are available from Mr. Christenson.
19 I have his address and phone number if you are interested
20 in that.

21 Oil tankers presently in use in Alaska could be
22 converted to take advantage of this new technology. The
23 vacuum method should also be employed in the design of any
24 new tankers in Alaska.

25 Four. All tankers transporting petroleum pro-

1 ducts in Cook Inlet should be equipped with towing
2 packages. This is now a requirement in Prince William
3 Sound.

4 Five. An anchor system inspection program should
5 be carried out by the U.S. Coast Guard on all tankers
6 transporting petroleum products in Cook Inlet. The recent
7 accident in Norway and the accident in Hawaii earlier this
8 year involving an Exxon tanker, point out the need for
9 this action. Both of these accidents were related to
10 anchoring problems.

11 Six. ECO has recommended that two emergency
12 response pollution control vessels be provided for Cook
13 Inlet. KPFA recommends that a third vessel of this type
14 be considered for Seward. The cost of this vessel could
15 be shared with Alyeska since Seward is approximately
16 midway between the pipeline and Cook Inlet refineries. At
17 a minimum, a standby contract with an ocean going tug or
18 capable response vessel in the Seward area should be
19 negotiated. Without this response time to the outer coast
20 of the Kenai Peninsula, including the Kenai Fjords
21 National Park, could be too long to assist the tanker in
22 distress.

23 And, finally, I believe that the oil industry in
24 Cook Inlet should either greatly expand CIRO's (ph) role
25 in oil spill response or form a new organization with more

1 emphasis on shipping concerns. We need a single entity
2 similar to Alyeska to represent Cook Inlet Industry to
3 cooperate with state, federal, borough, city and citi-
4 zen's groups in planning for future improvements in oil
5 spill prevention and response.

6 Thank you. And, I'd be glad to answer any
7 questions.

8 MR. PARKER: Thank you, Loren. Are you going
9 to leave us a copy of your report?

10 MR. FLAGG: Yes, I have a copy for you.

11 MR. PARKER: Questions? Mike?

12 MR. HERZ: Do you have any figures on what
13 actually was recovered in that spill that you were talking
14 about in Norway?

15 MR. FLAGG: No. I don't I left there about
16 the third day after the spill. At that time there was
17 something like 38,000 gallons in the water with probably
18 2 to 3 times more that aboard the vessel and they were
19 expecting it all to break up and into the water. But, I
20 haven't followed up on that to see what the total amount
21 was.

22 MR. HERZ: Is your conclusion from what you
23 saw that even with the best technology their performance
24 was not that much better than what we have seen?

25 MR. FLAGG: Their performance was nil for two

1 days and it's strictly because of the weather conditions.
2 They weren't able to get out there to do anything. The
3 booms they have are designed to work in 3 meter seas and
4 that's about what they had, but there was just no way to
5 do anything. They could not put a container boom around
6 the vessel and the only thing they could do was to go to
7 some of the inshore areas, kind of like we did in the
8 outer district near Homer, and set booms here and there
9 and try to protect some of the salmon streams and some of
10 the critical habitats. But, as far as preventing any of
11 the oil getting away from the ship, they were pretty much
12 helpless for two days.

13 MR. HERZ: I think it would be valuable to us
14 if there's anyway that with the contacts that you've had
15 there that you could get a documentation, you know, a
16 report that summarizes the performance that would be
17 useful information for us.

18 MR. FLAGG: I'd be glad to do that. I have
19 some contacts to do that.

20 MR. HERZ: Okay. Thank you.

21 MR. PARKER: John?

22 MR. SUND: Yeah. Loren, what's the average
23 current in Cook Inlet?

24 MR. FLAGG: I believe there's some figures in
25 the ECO report. I'm not sure what the average was. They

1 mentioned an extreme of about 8 to 10 knots. I would
2 guess average tide and so forth, you are looking at maybe
3 4 to 6. The upper Inlet and probably something less than
4 that in the lower Inlet.

5 MR. SUND: Do you know of any boom that will
6 work in excess of 1 or 1 1/2 knots?

7 MR. FLAGG: No. There's no boom that's gonna
8 work in over about 1.5 knots in a stationary fashion.
9 Now, you can deploy a boom and float with it. You can go
10 with it in that kind of a current, but you cannot hold it
11 at any kind of an angle in that kind of current.

12 MR. SUND: So, your recommendations is just
13 to get boom that you could put in a circle and float along
14 with oil, then.

15 MR. FLAGG: I think that's almost mandatory in
16 Cook Inlet, except at slack tide which is a very short
17 period of time. As I understand, the operation procedure
18 in Cook Inlet, that the vessels being loading and not
19 boomed as they are in Prince William Sound just because
20 they can't, doesn't do any good.

21 MR. SUND: The point I was getting at is that
22 all the available technology says it doesn't do any good
23 so why do we even bother to stock boom?

24 MR. FLAGG: Well, I think.....

25 MR. SUND: Isn't it kind of useless?

1 MR. FLAGG: Yeah. I think one reason to
2 stock boom is that it can be used to protect critical
3 habitat areas. Salmon streams and, you know, bird
4 sanctuaries and these types of things. It can be used in
5 most situations. Inshore, but as far as out in the Inlet,
6 the only application that I see is being able to move with
7 the oil. You know, you surround it with two vessels. And
8 you go with it, the skimmer goes with it. It's not a
9 matter of pulling it in one place and being able to skim
10 it up.

11 MR. SUND: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

12 MR. PARKER: One second. The most graphic
13 demonstration you can have of Cook Inlet currents is to be
14 on a tanker, either L&G (indiscernible) -- it's just
15 absolutely one tight and requiring, you know, two-thirds
16 power just to hold it against the current. It's a tough
17 port.

18 Go ahead, Mike.

19 MR. HERZ: You mentioned that you had been
20 involved in supervising the baseline studies -- the
21 characterization reports. And, you mentioned that you had
22 reviewed the ECO report. I was very struck by the fact
23 that the ECO report, number one, makes it sound as if
24 relatively little is known about the current regimes in
25 Cook Inlet and, number two, there was no discussion of

1 characterization of habitats, identification of sensitive
2 habitats. From your perspective, is there more now than
3 was reflected in that and, secondly from our perspective,
4 it is very important to know what the State of Art is in
5 terms of identification of sensitive habitats and mitiga-
6 tion measures that can be laid out in advance. So that if
7 you have a limited amount of response capability, contain-
8 ment booms and recovery equipment, where do you deploy it.
9 Because you don't want to waste your time going to the
10 vessel. You want to go to the place where you are going
11 to prevent the damage from occurring.

12 Do we have enough information to do that job
13 right?

14 MR. FLAGG: Yeah, I think I saw this as one of
15 the weaknesses of the ECO report, and I'm sure it's just
16 a matter of the time that they had to put that kind of
17 report together. They did not get into the environmental
18 sensitivities of Cook Inlet. All that information is
19 available through Fish and Game Habitat Division. There
20 is a whole series of reports. Some of them from the OCS
21 days identifying all the salmon streams, all the crab
22 spawning areas, critical habitats. There's also a very
23 comprehensive study done of circulation patterns in Cook
24 Inlet that's contained in those reports. That show the
25 current transport system in Cook Inlet. How the water

1 enters the Inlet and how it filters around. That was one
2 of the things that I had questions on for them -- they had
3 showed models of a spill in Mikisski (?) coming back on
4 the east side and into Kachemak Bay. And, from my
5 understanding of the currents, the general transport would
6 not result in that type of movement.

7 Now, maybe under certain wind conditions it could.
8 But, yes, the short answer is -- all that information is
9 available in Fish and Game who I believe you are going to
10 hear tomorrow. They have volumes of information on Cook
11 Inlet.

12 MR. HERZ: A related question is -- if that
13 information is available then it should be integrated into
14 this -- CIRO have an overall contingency plan which takes
15 segment by segment the shoreline, inlet and talk about how
16 you can -- what you can do to protect those segments and
17 does it prioritize the segments and so on. Is that --
18 does that work exist.

19 MR. FLAGG: CIRO has a fairly comprehensive
20 plan that has some of that in there. I haven't looked at
21 it for some time. I can't tell you how comprehensive, you
22 know, how finally it's broken down into area. But, they
23 do have a plan on file.

24 MR. HERZ: There are people who are residents
25 of Cook Inlet and connected with the fishing industry

1 there. I would think that would be prime importance.
2 Somebody must have reviewed to a degree to which CIRO plan
3 does in fact speak to protecting areas that do -- Do we
4 have any information? Have we gathered any information on
5 that?

6 MR. PARKER: It's the Department of Environmen-
7 tal Conservations' responsibility to review that plan. I
8 don't know if they -- if you ever asked them that specific
9 question. You were here when they were before us.
10 Dennis?

11 MR. DOOLEY: At the CIRO meeting that I
12 attended, maybe Loren and I are talking about two
13 different instruments, but CIRO was pretty clear that they
14 are an equipment depot. Other people have the plan. Not
15 CIRO themselves and other people will provide the manning.
16 Other people have their view of what the response was.
17 They are an equipment depot and that came across pretty
18 clearly at the CIRO meeting. And, I not aware that CIRO
19 itself has a massive contingency plan as such for Cook
20 Inlet. They do have some familiarity with it, but they
21 pretty much said it's up to the spillers to have his plan.

22 MR. HERZ: I have to plead complete ignorance
23 about Cook and it's only because we have the ECO report
24 deal with probabilities of spill there, but I was struck
25 by the fact that the other side of that issue is what are

1 the resources that need to be protected and is there
2 adequate information? I don't know if that's within our
3 scope or not, but it certainly seems like a relevant
4 question that should be addressed.

5 MR. PARKER: That's not within our scope
6 because of the massiveness of the detail. The -- we'd
7 probably be talking about several large volumes to
8 identify all of the environmental resources in Cook Inlet
9 that you are going to have to think about. Certainly,
10 several hundred salmon streams and shell fish habitat and
11 it would be a massive job.

12 I'm not even sure that's within the scope of the
13 State's \$650,000.00 contract that DEC is negotiating on
14 contingency plan review. I don't think it is.

15 Any other questions for Loren?

16 MR. FLAGG: Thank you.

17 MS. WUNNICKE: I have a question, Mr. Chairman.
18 When you were in Norway you mentioned Solum Voe. Do the
19 Norwegian ports have a similar kind of authority? Over
20 tankers entering their ports?

21 MR. FLAGG: I don't believe that their system
22 or prevention is quite as good as Solum Voe's. They have
23 probably a better -- they have better equipment. They
24 have more equipment and trained response teams. Their
25 capability for cleaning up and reacting to an oil spill is

1 probably better than Scotland's. But, I think the
2 Scotland program stresses more the prevention. They have
3 a very close tie with citizen involvement in that program.
4 And, they are able to get that by getting in on the ground
5 floor early before terminals were built there and they had
6 some control of the land in the area where oil was to be
7 brought ashore.

8 MR. PARKER: Okay. Thank you, Loren.

9 MR. FLAGG: Thank you.

10 MR. PARKER: Next we have Captain Robert
11 Elsenjohn.....

12 MS. WUNNICKE: No. I think they have one more.

13 MR. PARKER: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't know
14 that.

15 MR. CASNOR: Mr. Chairman, my name is Ken
16 Casnor. I'm with North Pacific Fisheries Association out
17 of Homer. Unlike the other two groups, our group is not
18 just exclusively salmon fishermen. We have a large
19 percentage of fishermen who fish halibut, crab and shrimp.
20 And, a significant number of fishermen that live in Homer
21 that fish over in Prince William Sound.

22 I'd like to touch on a couple of topics before I
23 get to the main point of my -- we certainly agree with
24 everything that was said by the other two fishing or-
25 ganizations.

1 There's a lot that we don't know about the Cook
2 Inlet oil industry. For example, I don't know anything
3 about the decanting facilities over at Drift River. I
4 don't know how many gallons they put into the water every
5 day and I don't know how many parts per million of oil go
6 into the water from those decanting facilities. I do know
7 that at Valdez the decanting facilities are built for one
8 purpose only and that's to recover oil. They are not
9 water cleaning facilities. It is an oil recovery facility.
10 And, something that I don't think many people realize
11 about the Valdez facility is that every drop of water that
12 falls with the rain or snow gets pumped through that
13 facility. And, when you start talking about the volumes
14 of water that go through that decanting facility you
15 wonder how much oil is really decanted out and how much
16 has been pumped back into the water in Valdez.

17 All that is besides the point. There really is no
18 reason that we have to continue mixing oil and water as
19 ballast. We could either go to a double hulled tanker
20 system and include the ballast there or we certainly have
21 the technology to be put deep flatible or flexible
22 bladders into the existing cargo hulls and fill those with
23 sea water and then pump those out as you are putting in
24 oil on top of them. There's really no reason why we need
25 to keep mixing oil and water and then going through this

1 whole decanting process.

2 The ECO report -- I was really disappointed in the
3 ECO report in that when I went to the Table of Contents
4 and started looking at it there were a number of what I
5 thought very hot topics listed for each page. And, all of
6 this is on the same page as that. I knew that it wasn't
7 going to be anything like an in depth report. But, there
8 are a couple of things that I want to point out about
9 that.

10 First of all, I don't believe that all of the oil
11 that goes out of Cook Inlet goes to the West Coast of the
12 United States. I believe some of that oil goes down the
13 Aleutian Chain and has markets in the Far East, and Japan.
14 A spill along the chain would really have significant
15 consequences. Also, oil is not the only toxic that's
16 transported in Cook Inlet. Large amounts of ammonia and
17 liquid natural gas are also moved in volumes that are
18 significant to warrant concern both for environmental and
19 public safety.

20 The ECO proprietary model that they used has one
21 failure. And that is the assumption that the oil stays on
22 the surface. Commissioner Sund asked about corralling the
23 oil and whether that does any good. Well, in 1987 there
24 were short shots of boom floating up and down Cook Inlet
25 with black centers in the middle of these donuts where the

1 oil was. You could fly over it one time and there would
2 be a lot of oil in there and you could fly over it again
3 and it would disappear. Well, I think that it is sig-
4 nificant to remember that this oil gets neutrally buoyant
5 as it emulsifies. It became neutrally buoyant about the
6 fifth day after the Valdez spill and in fact, it became
7 neutrally buoyant and moved undetected across southern
8 Cook Inlet and then re-emerged in Shelikoff Strait as a
9 20-mile spill. Everybody seems to kind of forget that.
10 So, it's not always oil. When it gets emulsified it turns
11 into some other creature.

12 The other thing that I believe that people haven't
13 paid enough attention to is the fact that there's ex-
14 pediential growth between the raw crude oil in this moose.
15 I heard one expert say that the volume increased by 30
16 times. I'm not sure if it's 3 times or 30 times, but when
17 you start getting engaged in a numbers game with the oil
18 industry, I think that it is something that is significant
19 and people ought to remember.

20 North Pacific Fisheries Association wants to urge
21 that stronger requirements for pilots, at least, to match
22 the requirements of the pilots associations be required.
23 We also believe that really should be a person like an
24 independent marine pilot that oversees the loading and
25 unloading of both and ballast water. That person will be

1 licensed by the state and would have mandatory inspection
2 and reporting responsibilities.

3 I heard on Friday night a suggestion that maybe
4 the EPA should be the lead agency. It certainly hasn't
5 demonstrated any desire to involve itself in oil clean up
6 technology. But, then again it's silly to have one lead
7 agency for water spills and another for land spills. And,
8 so I would like to see one agency that takes care of all
9 of this pollution.

10 Also, there should be more of a dichotomy of
11 missions. Both for the Coast Guard and the industry. The
12 very fact that there is a spill is a failure of their
13 prevention mission. Why are the same players deemed
14 competent to best handle the mission of containment clean
15 up?

16 The delivery systems that bring oil from the North
17 Slope, Swanson River fields and upper Cook Inlet are for
18 most part systems that made up of several aging com-
19 ponents. Pipelines, tankers, supply boats, oil rigs,
20 pumps valves, gauges and probes are all subject to failure
21 in time and it's only conjecture is to which one of those
22 failures will cause the next spill. So, while others are
23 stressing prevention, prevention, prevention, North
24 Pacific Fisheries Association would like to discuss
25 preparation for the next spill.

1 The Alaska oil spill occurred -- when the Alaska
2 oil spill occurred there were herring tenders in Prince
3 William Sound with hold capacity to carry roughly half of
4 the 11 million gallons that were on the water. Coast
5 Guard regulations prevented pick up because they were not
6 certified and inspected as tankers. It wasn't until much
7 later after the spill had spread to outside Prince William
8 Sound that the oil became so well emulsified it was
9 declared a slug and ordinary boats were allowed to
10 transport it.

11 We all agree that we don't need more unsafe
12 vessels transporting oil. But, we believe that there
13 should be a new class of boat and we just gave it the name
14 of Cue Class. Because there is no such thing as a Cue
15 Class. But, a Cue Class tanker -- Cue Class Tankers would
16 be inspected annually at an Alaskan point, have stability
17 papers and documents reviewed and be the first vessels
18 hired to help with the next spill. What that means is, if
19 I have a herring boat that I can go down do some demon-
20 stration of my knowledge and stability of the vessel
21 itself and get that vessel prequalified to work on a spill
22 and to carry fresh oil that's on the water. Skippers of
23 Cue Class vessels would have to take part in mandatory
24 training exercises yearly in order to keep the vessel and
25 themselves on the priority hiring list. Skippers would

1 also have to demonstrate to the Coast Guard some basic
2 knowledge of the conditions and geography of the area for
3 which they are approved to work. You could consider it a
4 semi-licensed position.

5 Commercial fishermen are used to working with
6 their hands in controlling gear under all conditions.
7 It's a talent that working around the water demands. Such
8 at sea training cannot be taught in the classroom or quite
9 harbor. No piece of technology can supplant it either.
10 Contingency plans that do not use the train resources at
11 hand is not a contingency plan. Contingency plan that
12 does not unleash all regional resources in the first 48
13 hours of a spill is also not a contingency plan.

14 Just one organization should be responsible for
15 all of Cook Inlet and another for Prince William Sound.
16 Those organizations should be responsible for the main-
17 tenance and deployment of all the tools needed to im-
18 mediately contain and recover the oil. If that means
19 pumps, then pumps have to be readily available. If it
20 means buckets and flower scopes, then those have to be
21 readily available. Those organizations should include
22 representatives from all the water users. Fishermen,
23 marine pilots, shipping operators and, of course, the
24 Coast Guard. Industry, only organizations have proven
25 those short comings.

1 The Commission should not recommend laws to
2 correct the faults of the current administration. Laws
3 that were enforced that inhibited the orderly clean up are
4 not necessarily bad laws, they were, however, laws
5 designed for purposes that paled in significance when
6 compared to the gross contamination of the spill. We
7 believe that those laws could have legally been overlooked
8 with a simple declaration by the Governor, but since there
9 was no such declaration, the enforces were only doing
10 their jobs. By those laws I am referring to 'is there an
11 outhouse on this beach where you are trying to take care
12 of things and such'?

13 In conclusion the cost of an oil spill is largely
14 the long and short term detriment of the coastal com-
15 munities. Fishermen do not ever want to sit again idle
16 watching as an industry that is infatuated with high
17 technology fails to control and recover the oil lost in
18 the next spill. No amount of paperwork, correspondence,
19 plans, shoreside training or barrel disbursants can match
20 the weight and ingenuity of Alaska's commercial fishing
21 operators. They should be among the first employed not
22 held in reserve until all other attempts have failed.
23 While prevention is foremost in everybody's mind, prep-
24 aration should at least be given equal billing.

25 If the 1987 spill in Cook Inlet in the March

1 catastrophe that brings us here today teaches nothing
2 else, it is that preparation is the hardest aspect to
3 relate to in the first aspect to be shined on as time
4 passes. It is not wholly to follow the industry, it's
5 human nature to let things go like that. The weakest link
6 is the person who somehow fails in carrying out a plan.
7 We must discipline ourselves. Get trained, stay sharp and
8 be ready. Maintain the equipment and have it in a place
9 handy for fast employment. Only then can we dare hope
10 that the weather will be warm and calm and the spill to be
11 small and those that have been trained to be close by.

12 So, I thank you for your time and your patience in
13 sitting through which is probably become repetitive
14 testimony.

15 MR. PARKER: Okay. Thank you. Questions?
16 The shipments to Asia probably amount to about five
17 tankers a year according to my calculations, which is
18 enough to cause an oil spill. We only got about a tanker
19 every ten days out of Drift River now. And, I'm not sure
20 when the last time anybody went and inspected Drift River.
21 I guess we should find out.

22 Ahh, Captain Elsenjohn. Masters, Mates and
23 Pilots. Thanking you for making this 8-hour plus stops
24 flights to come talk to us.

25 CAPT. ELSENJHON: Yeah, well, my pleasure

1 and thank you very much for asking me.

2 I'm here today on behalf of Captain Robert Lowen,
3 the President of Masters, Mates and Pilots. My name is
4 Robert Elsenjohn. I'm the director of the Maritime
5 Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies, which is a
6 graduate school for ships' officers basically deck
7 officers, masters, pilots, chief officers, second and so
8 on.

9 I won't go very long in my experience, but I have
10 held a Masters' license for 35 years. I was Master on
11 ship for 13 years in the Columbia River Bar Pilot, for
12 about 13 years and I've been back to the school for about
13 9 years. I've been Master on tankers, freighters, the
14 whole mess. So, I think I am qualified to speak a little
15 bit in the area that I would like to talk about today. I
16 am not going into the Exxon Valdez situation. That's been
17 beat to death by experts.

18 I would like to talk about prevention, basically.
19 And, the Master, Mates and Pilots position with regard to
20 that. We feel that adequately trained personnel and the
21 proper numbers of personnel on ships answer a portion of
22 the prevention problem. I don't know if you are ever
23 going to be able to completely prevent oil spills anytime
24 you are moving or handling oil around areas. We believe
25 that there should be four licensed deck officers on the

1 vessel in addition to the Master. Three watch standing
2 officers, the second and two-thirds, and a chief officer
3 whose responsibility is the cargo and the maintenance of
4 the ship. When a ship comes in port and is loading and
5 discharging, the chief officer is the man who is in charge
6 and responsible and up and rested. He has the assistance
7 of the other officers. You don't have watch standing
8 officers who maybe tired from navigation and confined
9 waters or restrictive visibilities either coming in or
10 going out trying to handle the ship. The incident in Cook
11 Inlet -- I'm sorry, in Prince William Sound, indicated
12 that they may have been a fatigue factor. I am a member
13 of the National Academy of Sciences Marine Board doing a
14 study now that's ongoing for the last two years with
15 regard to fatigue of ships' officers. And the result in
16 casualties related thereto and reduce crews. And, one of
17 the interesting -- we have no conclusion in that as yet,
18 but we should have a report out in January.

19 An interesting thing. There was an oil spill off
20 Providence or Newport, Rhode Island, in early October or
21 September. Nearly 300,000 gallons of heating oil. The
22 Master on the ship said that he had gone 36 hours with
23 little sleep, had no look out, was overworked and dis-
24 tracted at the time of the incident. He said he had seen
25 the buoys, but he didn't really understand, he couldn't

1 understand why he didn't react or respond to them. We
2 feel that fatigue may be a factor there. He said he had
3 sent his chief officer below to calculate how to unload
4 the cargo in Providence. The Second Officer was down
5 helping the pilot get aboard. I don't know where the
6 third officer, if indeed they had one, was. But, there
7 were only, as we understand, three officers on the ship.

8 I said an adequate number of people, properly
9 trained people are another point that we think is very
10 valid. One of the things that we are stressing at the
11 Maritime Institute and have for the last several years on
12 our ship simulators is Bridge Management and Bridge Team
13 Training.

14 Bridge Management means the proper voyage plann-
15 ing. Not out in the middle of the ocean. Anybody can lay
16 a chart line down, but coming into port to have an
17 adequate crack line, proper crack line for the area you
18 want to go. The times are going to be at places. Time
19 you'll be at the dock, the loading time and back out.
20 That's bridge team management.

21 Now, Bridge Team Training, the team work itself.
22 I have seen so many times when I was piloting a second
23 officer, a third officer comes on the bridge to relieve
24 another officer and say 'oh, the pilot has it'. Well,
25 that's fine. They don't have any idea where the vessel

1 is, what the next courses are, what buoys you are going to
2 change course on. The pilot has the responsibility, the
3 Master the ultimate responsibility. But, every officer on
4 that bridge should have the knowledge of the course line,
5 where they are going, where the dangers are and what to do
6 and that's bridge team management. Bridge Team Training
7 and Management.

8 Now, the third officer should have enough knowled-
9 ge and training to say to the Captain, "Captain, I think
10 that buoy should be on the starboard side rather than the
11 port". And not be afraid to do it. When I first heard,
12 I sailed Master many years, and I first heard of Bridge
13 Team Training I said, "Captain, you are screwing this up.
14 We are going to knock him on hind end and then I'll worry
15 about the rest of it from there." Well, that really isn't
16 the way it is. We train very on simulators. We have four
17 men on the simulator at a time and they go round and
18 around from Master to navigation officer to watch officer
19 to quarter master. And they learn to work together. And,
20 at the end of the two weeks on the simulators, they have
21 very good team training.

22 We think another point that you should look at is
23 to have two pilots on the bridge at all times in the State
24 of Alaska in congested waters. Now, when I say two
25 pilots, there are two types of pilots as I am sure all of

1 you are aware. A federally licensed pilot and a state
2 licensed pilot. There are certain ships under federal law
3 that do not require a state licensed pilot. Those are
4 ships under enrollment or training domestically. Ships
5 under register or under foreign trade, the states have the
6 right to require pilots aboard. You have an arrangement
7 I understand in the Valdez area, where even the ships
8 under enrollment are required to take that role -- or take
9 state licensed pilots. The pilot that's there now has
10 been extended down the Bligh Reef. It's almost impossible
11 to work below Bligh Reef. With a pilot -- to board a
12 pilot on and off safely. We feel that when the ship is in
13 route either inbound or outbound in any Alaska waters, not
14 necessarily Cook Inlet or Prince William Sound, that a
15 state licensed pilot as a minimum of one and an American
16 Flag ship to have the officer of the watch to be also
17 federally licensed. So, you have two licensed pilots
18 aboard. Particularly in the shorter hauls. If no state
19 licensed pilot aboard and it's an American Flag ship, then
20 two of the officers should be federally licensed.

21 We think there's another position -- and some of
22 these things that I am saying may require some legislative
23 action or some may be done by rule making. Some, I have
24 heard some concern about whether or not it's always safe
25 to enter or depart. Particularly Prince William Sound.

1 You have seasons in Columbia Glacier, and the whole area
2 (indiscernible) you go out and you dodge the iceberg. It
3 may not be the most prudent thing to sail or to come in.
4 I think the State of Alaska should exercise the same
5 authority I have seen around Europe for many, many years.
6 And, that's a harbor master type of program. Wherein the
7 state itself has the authority to close the port. Now,
8 the Captain of the port, the United States Coast Guard has
9 jurisdiction under the ports of waterway and safety acts
10 of regulating the ship movement in waters. But, anything
11 the State of Alaska did that was more stringent than the
12 Coast Guard requirements would certainly be looked on very
13 favorably and it could be done. Whoever, if you did go
14 into a harbor master type program or whoever had the
15 position would have to have authority responsibility to do
16 it. If he was just a figure head you are wasting your
17 time. But, if indeed the channel is closed it may not be
18 prudent to try and go out and dodge icebergs. It may be
19 better to wait till the tide changes when they clear out
20 the way and give you some room. You would have to have
21 equipment. That's something you might want to look into.

22 I have one other thing. Pilots, themselves as we
23 have heard of gentlemen from the fishing industry say the
24 pilot should be involved. The pilots are the main stay of
25 ship movement in congested waters. Your state of Alaska

1 pilots are well trained. All federally licensed and then
2 state licensed afterwards. The pilots themselves say a
3 problem recently. You obtain a license and generally it
4 starts out as a main ship channel license. It doesn't
5 cover the ports themselves. You can take it in the main
6 ship channel, but you can't get out of the main ship
7 channels. To get that in the State of Alaska -- to get
8 that main ship channel limitation lifted, it requires 20
9 dockings and undockings.

10 The law doesn't specify where these dockings and
11 undockings should take place. Theoretically, you can take
12 a small ship and go into Dutch Harbor or someplace and
13 dock and undock 20 times and get your limitation lifted
14 all over the state of Alaska. It doesn't make any sense.
15 The Southeast Alaska pilots presented a program to the
16 Alaska State Pilot Commission last week wherein they said
17 let's change that and make it 3 dockings in every major
18 dock. Docks are different. Everyone of them. Some are
19 peered, some are pilings, some have bendering systems
20 (ph), some don't. The current acts differently. If you
21 have wind, rocks around, they said make it 3 in everyone.
22 There's about 15 major docks, so, in their area, so it
23 would be about 45 dockings rather than the 20 the law
24 requires. The State Attorney General said we can't do
25 that, that's too restrictive. Restricted of what?

1 Incompetence? It certainly isn't restrictive on ex-
2 perience. That's what you need. You need good pilots.
3 I guess the point I am making here is that those who are
4 in charge of regulation should not only understand the
5 problems, but understand the possible consequences of not
6 enforcing the most stringent requirements feasible.

7 That's really all I have. I thought I would
8 answer any questions that you might want to ask me.

9 MR. PARKER: Well, thank you very much. On the
10 Bridge Team Training, how much of the industry has
11 received that kind of training now? What general per-
12 centage would you say?

13 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: To the best of my knowled-
14 ge, Mr. Chairman, very few. We have, since we have
15 implemented the Bridge Team Training concept and courses
16 at the school, we have probably run through 200 officers.
17 There was a symposium in Kings Point up at the Maritime
18 Academy in New York last week that I sent my people to
19 investigate the feasibility of putting it in the various
20 state academies. And, it will be done. We are working
21 now with some of the major oil companies to bring their
22 people into a special one-week training course and it
23 would be ship simulator training, but with heavy emphasis
24 on the Bridge Team Training. So, it's a new concept.
25 Started in Europe, oh, a few years ago and we've traced it

1 probably four years ago.

2 MR. PARKER: How many Maritime Academies on the
3 West Coast?

4 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Pardon me, sir.

5 MR. PARKER: How many Maritime Academies are
6 there on the West Coast?

7 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: There's one with the
8 exception of our school, all of the other schools, the
9 academy type, are cadet, entry level type. Three year,
10 four year schools. We train only licensed officers who
11 are experienced and who have been at sea and then come
12 back up to upgrade their skills and be trained in new
13 concepts and equipment.

14 MR. PARKER: Okay. Questions?

15 MR. SUND: Yeah, Mr. Chairman, I would just
16 like to thank Captain for coming back. I had a chance to
17 meet with him a couple of weeks ago back at his school in
18 Minneapolis and I do have a couple of his flyers here if
19 anybody wants to go to school or see what they have. It's
20 quite impressive. They have a major simulator there that
21 I was impressed with. The full bridge has motion in it,
22 too. You get in it and you feel the ship move around a
23 little bit, but, the point that I think some of us were
24 looking for in terms of prevention and training on the
25 manning of the two issues I wanted to kind of pursue is

1 one, the concept I think the Chairman has been talking
2 about. The aircraft industry where you have two pilots in
3 the front of the plane, but they are both equally com-
4 petent to fly the plane and it's fairly a joint issue and
5 the co-pilot is trained to speak up when he sees something
6 go wrong. Wherein the maritime industry I think we have
7 had an over abundance of fairly strict -- the Master's in
8 control and by-god that's going to be it type of point of
9 view. That, in the high tech world that we are in now
10 that has to change and the school here has started that.

11 I am not sure how you mandate all of the industry
12 to get through it. I did meet a little bit with the Coast
13 Guard after I met with the Captain back there and they are
14 starting to talk about relicensing. I think forcing or
15 requiring people to go through some simulator training -
16 - I think it's every five years you have to get your
17 license renewed, and they were talking to do it. But, at
18 midterm points...

19 I guess I ask you, Captain, the question is, if
20 the regulatory body thought it was a good idea, how would
21 they go about it and what has to change to get crews back
22 through this system to get any training? I mean, it's
23 voluntary, obviously.

24 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Really, John, it is to a
25 certain extent. Radar was introduced on merchant ships

1 somewhere in the early 50's. And there was no requirement
2 for any radar examination or training up until, oh, my
3 goodness, in the early 60's, and then we had to take an
4 examination when we renewed our license every five years.
5 It was a written examination, general questions, and,
6 collision avoidance and a couple of other things. But,
7 now in order to renew your license and to have the radar
8 endorsement on it you have to go to simulator school. It
9 has to be a simulator operation. It isn't just paperwork
10 anymore. And, if indeed the regulatory body felt that the
11 bridge team concept is valid and they certainly do, then
12 it should be a requirement for license renewal.

13 Now there are several simulators, Kings Point for
14 example, our school and a couple of other simulators
15 around that are capable of doing this training. But, it
16 would have to be regulated within the structure of license
17 renewals.

18 MR. SUND: Along the line of the Commissioner
19 Wenk, this morning, brought up the whole licensing
20 structure and the testing that goes on now with the Coast
21 Guard to get the licenses, what's your opinion, I guess -
22 - I don't know if we have had the testimony of the people
23 -- or they've kind of hinted at it that the licensing
24 requirements have become a little bit easier in the last
25 few years.

1 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Well, I don't know if
2 that's necessarily so. The only real change that's been
3 made in the last few years with the license examination
4 itself is that it is now multiple choice questions rather
5 than essay. The questions are mostly worded so that you
6 have to read them very carefully, while the possible
7 answer -- the questions aren't ambiguous, but you have to
8 know your material. I always felt that the essay were the
9 hardest, but I also knew that if I could write a page or
10 a page and a half, I might somewhere find the answer that
11 was in there. I don't believe they've become any
12 harder. The licensed renewal course at the school for
13 Masters is nine weeks. Eight weeks of intensive instruc-
14 tions and one week in sitting for the license. For chief
15 and second officers it is eight weeks. So, it's really
16 quite intensive and very good.

17 The license renewal is another story. Now,
18 license renewal can be done today by mail. It's an open
19 book examination. Once every five years. Now, I've had
20 license since I was 19 years old, Masters license, my
21 11th license altogether and, of course, I renew them every
22 five years after I got the Masters license in 1954.

23 I study the radar for about 2 hours. I read the
24 rules of the road. To take the examination takes about 20
25 minutes. Now, whether or not that should be changed --

1 there has to be a service, you have to have at least one
2 year sea time on the last three years. I don't know.
3 Questions?

4 MR. WENK: One quick question, Captain? With
5 regard to renewal, is any additional physical examination
6 required?

7 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Yes.

8 MR. WENK: Is it as intense, strenuous as the
9 one for getting the license initially?

10 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: It has just become in the
11 last two years about the same examination.

12 MR. WENK: About the same?

13 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Now, the Coast Guard has
14 adopted a new form. I have to have two physicals. One
15 for my state license and one for my federal license. My
16 state pilots license. And, I just went through one back
17 in February that I felt was quite extensive. Made me
18 happy, because everything came up fine. Made my wife
19 happy because she's going to keep me around for a few
20 years, she says.

21 MR. WENK: Thank you.

22 MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman? With respect to
23 your comment about a harbor master authority. Would such
24 an authority have the right to keep a ship in port even
25 though the conditions dictating that were beyond the

1 harbor area? You mentioned ice in the Sound for example.
2 If there were ice in the shipping lanes, even away from
3 the port, would that harbor master have the authority to
4 keep the ship in port?

5 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Madam Vice-Chairman, I
6 would suggest that that would be a legislative problem
7 that in the creation of the harbor masters position that
8 that area should be covered. I would say that anywhere
9 that that ship prances in Alaska waters between the dock
10 it was actually at till it got to the open seas should
11 certainly be a matter of concern and under the harbor
12 master's authority.

13 MS. WUNNICKE: Thank you.

14 MR. PARKER: Mike?

15 MR. HERZ: You seem to come out of the
16 tradition of Captains, but somehow you have evolved
17 through this -- what sounds like a very contemporary view
18 of the bridge team planning and management approach. I
19 wondered what your response would be to some of the
20 discussion we were having this morning about the -- in the
21 traditional view or traditional role of this Captain or
22 Master, he has ultimate responsibility and the discussion
23 had to do with navigation and the possibility of develop-
24 ing vessel traffic system that uses satellite that would
25 set up traffic lanes -- predetermined traffic lanes on the

1 high seas or coastal and if you deviated from those lanes
2 you would be requested or required to go back into those
3 lanes. And, the question is are we in an era where the
4 absolutely monolithic authority of the skipper can be
5 questioned. Or whether the Master's voice is always the
6 correct way to go?

7 CAPT. ELSENJONH: Well, you are in the
8 situation that as long as the ultimate responsibility is
9 the Master's then the ultimate authority has to be the
10 Master's also. But, this bridge, well, the harbor lanes
11 or the traffic lanes have been an accepted thing, not only
12 in the United States, but I was on the North Europe run
13 for seven years before I went piloting and we have lanes
14 up through the North Sea. Because of that heavy volumes
15 of traffic. Now, if you get out of the lanes in one area
16 for 206 miles, the penalty there was you were in a mine
17 field. Everybody pretty well stayed in the lanes. If you
18 got of them in other areas no one really bothered you, but
19 it was ideal to stay in them, because a sea lane is like
20 a highway. Everybody stays on the right side of the road.
21 You go up and somebody comes down here. If you get out on
22 the other lane, you're kicking people out of the way and
23 it's dangerous. Everyone stays in it. But, the bridge
24 team concept, when I was on this North Europe run I did
25 all my own piloting to the North Sea except in the

1 harbors. And, the traffic is very extremely heavy there
2 and if I caught fog at land's end I had 44 hours on the
3 bridge. I've been asleep standing up looking at the
4 radar. I mean, just -- all of my officers were very good
5 and I always told them that if I say anything or give any
6 orders that don't make sense, correct me right away.
7 Because you do become grumbly. I discharged a pilot in
8 New York harbor one morning -- I was headed for Philadel-
9 phia, the course was 206 and I was steering 200 -- this is
10 after 30 odd years at sea, and I started that compass and
11 radar trying to decide whether I had to go right or left
12 I was so tired. You need qualified people on a ship who
13 also know and who aren't afraid to say. And, the Masters
14 is now -- because ships are so much bigger than they used
15 to be, they are accepting very well the assistance and the
16 input they get from the other officers. It isn't the old
17 Captain Bligh routine like it used to be or like they
18 mentioned when I was a young Master. You need the help.
19 Ships used to be 10,000 tons and 10 knots. Now, they are
20 200,000, 450,000 tons. Some of them make 30 knots. And,
21 equipment on them is very sophisticated. One man cannot
22 do it all.

23 MR. HERZ: What about relinquishing control
24 to an outside authority who is dictating from his satel-
25 lite view of where you are?

1 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Well, that's not a new
2 concept. My company's first new ship was built in 1957
3 and I was the Master on it. It was one of the largest
4 ships in the world, at the time. Right now, it would
5 make a light boat on some of these things. But, I came
6 into Rotterdam, dense, dense fog and there were 40 ships
7 at anchor and I nosed around and pushed my snout up
8 against the pilot boat till I got the pilot aboard and he
9 said, "well, I have to go to anchor, Captain", and I said,
10 "Damn". He said we do have a new system we just put in
11 and it's radar control. Controlled by pilots and I think
12 that is one of the important things in that type of an
13 operation. And he said we can make a few round turns
14 until they pick us up and identify us and then they'll
15 start us in. We had 28 miles up the Maze River to go and
16 he said they will give us every order, speed and helm
17 order and we must obey them. If we don't our only
18 alternative is to go to anchor. So, we tried it. They
19 say we're 13 meters off buoy so and so, now come right 5
20 degrees. But it was a working pilot operating the system.
21 We went into the dock, discharged, came out the next day,
22 the ships had anchored. So, it's not a new concept. But
23 if you have shoreside control with the authority --
24 mandatory authority, then you have to have qualified
25 people running it.

1 I don't say this derogatorily about the Coast
2 Guard's vessel traffic system. It's a good system, it has
3 worked well where it has been, but they've been more or
4 less advisory and have the yeomen on their and they are
5 good kids. But, they don't have the experience. And, if
6 you have the type of system there it should be working
7 pilots or retired pilots of the area that have the
8 equipment, have the radars where they can see every thing
9 that is going on. Then you can give them the mandatory
10 control.

11 But, also, when you do that you have to accept
12 financial responsibility, too. Because you give the bad
13 order, the ship goes aground, and there's damage, let
14 alone the environmental damage potential, somebody has to
15 take the financial responsibility.

16 MR. PARKER: Anyone else? John?

17 MR. SUND: Well, I just wanted to follow up
18 a little bit on the manning issues, Captain, that you
19 brought up on the manning level. You direct the man in
20 restricted waters and I'm assuming inside of entrances of
21 restricted waters?

22 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Yes.

23 MR. SUND: How do you feel what you laid out
24 is different than what is being done today?

25 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Because the competitive

1 pressure is over the last few years, we reduced on most
2 ships one mate. One deck officer. So, right now there's
3 the Master generally. Well, the Master always and
4 generally a chief officer, second officer and a third
5 officer. In addition to the various duties that they have
6 there are also watch standers. The chief officer in
7 addition to standing normally the 4 to 8 watch, is in
8 charge of cargo and maintenance on the ship.

9 The second officer, the 12 to 4 watch, is also in
10 charge of the navigation of the ship. Correction of
11 charts, laying the charts out, between he and the Master
12 somebody puts the courses down, etc.

13 The third officer in addition to standing the 8
14 to 12 watch is in charge of the safety, lifeboats, flairs,
15 signals, everything that has to go on there. So, they all
16 have additional duties besides standing their watch. Now,
17 if you have the chief officer who is in charge of cargo
18 standing the four day watch and the ship arrives at 10 at
19 the dock and starts to load, he's stood the four days
20 watch, he's in there, he's on deck loading the cargo. He
21 may work through his watch that afternoon and on into the
22 next morning, finish the cargo and then he goes back on
23 watch at 4 o'clock again. Now, the law says that he has
24 to have six hours rest in the last 12 hours before he can
25 take a watch role. Believe me, that is never seldom, if

1 ever adhered to. Your officers when there are three of
2 them work around, help each other. I said I wasn't going
3 to get into the Exxon Valdez thing and I don't intend to,
4 but I think you'll find out that the one officer who
5 should have been on watch, they let him rest because he
6 was tired. The man who was on watch wasn't the man who
7 should have been there to begin with. But, that's one of
8 those things.

9 So, if you have a cargo officer whose sole job it
10 is to take care of the loading and discharging of the
11 cargo, and I'm thinking particularly of tankers now,
12 because that's where the bulk of the problems are. It's
13 a problem on all the ships. But, he's always fresh,
14 alert, you don't grind your other officers into the ground
15 trying to handle the cargo.

16 The most dangerous part of any tanker operation is
17 the loading operation. Discharging you can have a spill
18 or cargo contamination, but the loading is the most
19 dangerous. So, everybody is the most alert there. You
20 get several people out helping you. Pump man on deck.
21 Your AB's if you have them.

22 On some of the freighters a couple of our com-
23 panies with Master, Mates and Pilots now have gone back
24 and put the fourth mate on the ship. They took them off,
25 oh, six, eight, ten years ago because of competitive

1 pressure and they have put them back on now. Because it's
2 working everybody too hard and the overtime -- you can pay
3 for an extra man with the overtime.

4 MR. SUND: I want to get into my favorite
5 issue here, Mr. Chairman. Captain, this is the great
6 double hull, single hull issue -- it kind of keeps coming
7 up every meeting, probably because I bring it up, but do
8 you have an opinion? And, the way it's come out so far,
9 today anyway, is safety, ballast issues, groundings,
10 recovery of the ship is one issue. And the other issue is
11 safety to cargo or containment of the cargo.

12 CAPT. ELSENJHON: Well, that double hull
13 situation is something that is kicked around for a lot of
14 years and it has been rejected in many instances because
15 of the cost factor and the lack of any strong indication
16 that it will accomplish too much. If you go to a 15'
17 double hull and you hit a rock that sticks up 20' you are
18 five feet into the other hull anyway. Because you start
19 moving 200,000 tons mass into a rock it is not going to
20 slow down. It's steel, it will cut right through it.

21 It's good in the areas if you're loading, you
22 settle the ship on the bottom or if the outer hull
23 fractures, it's still contained. I don't presume to even
24 know enough about the subject to get into the cost
25 effectiveness of. I don't know what it would cost to

1 double hull those ships. I did hear a comment earlier
2 that the freighters that run around are double hulled.
3 They are, but they are carrying oil in the space between
4 the hull. That's where they carry their bunkers. Most of
5 them.

6 So, I didn't give you much of an answer on that,
7 John, I know, but I am really not knowledgeable in the
8 area to speak as an expert on it.

9 MR. SUND: Thank you.

10 MR. HAVELOCK: Sir, do you have any observations
11 regarding how low a bridge team should be assigned sea
12 duty without a break?

13 CAPT. ELSENJONH: Do you mean the team
14 itself or the watch officer on watch?

15 MR. HAVELOCK; The team.

16 CAPT. ELSENJONH: No, I don't. But I would
17 -- I see no problem with them. Four hours, six hours.
18 Because the team consist of the watch officer on watch,
19 the Master, quarter Master, a look out, I would guess four
20 hours. That's good nominal number.

21 MR. HAVELOCK: You keep the team running for a
22 matter of months? Is that.....

23 CAPT. ELSENJONH: Oh, no. Oh, I see. I
24 misunderstood your question. The team itself, per se,
25 only operates in restricted waters. It's always a team

1 out in the middle of the ocean, but they work four hours
2 on and eight hours off. And, when you are coming into
3 congested waters or, for example, Prince William Sound,
4 you have Hitchenbrook on up to Valdez. And, the Master
5 the watch officer, the quarter Master and the lookout.
6 That's a specialized area. The normal routine watch is at
7 sea if there are the watch officer and two other persons
8 on watch they act as a team then, too. But, it can go on
9 for months.

10 MR. HAVELOCK: Is there any difference in the
11 risk in loading and unloading tankers and unloading and
12 loading, say, container ships?

13 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Oh, very much so.
14 Container ships, well, it all depends on what's in the
15 container, I guess. But, it's a limited amount in any
16 event. A 40 foot container with acid products, there is
17 a hazardous problem, there, but it's not the spill or the
18 contamination problem. And that's generally done, of
19 course, some container ships are self-containment, but,
20 generally it's done with a shark -- your danger is wire
21 breaking or pad pulling. But, on tanker when you are
22 loading at the rate of 20,000 barrels an hour or higher
23 and a hose goes, an awful lot of oil can be in the water
24 before anybody can get that hose shut down. Or if
25 somebody doesn't close the value on #9 center tank, you

1 can blow a lot of oil out of there. So, there's more
2 danger in the tankers than anything else. From the
3 contamination standpoint.

4 MR. HAVELOCK: We heard it said that pressure
5 generated by the owners need to move oil quickly. That it
6 is to meet refinery schedules or to meet tank farm
7 limitation -- in Valdez have created pressure to cut
8 corners. Would there be anything in your maritime
9 experience that would support that? Or is that just a
10 mythology?

11 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: No. That's, of course,
12 the whole world is a competitive place today. I sometimes
13 question some of our steamship companies when they discuss
14 competition because they are really competing with
15 themselves. It's an internal competition. Particularly
16 with some of the oil companies. It's carrying their own
17 cargos to their own refineries. They have very little
18 outside pressure, but it's still competition. I don't say
19 they cut corners. I don't think that's a fair term. They
20 try to expedite the ships as quickly as possible. Time is
21 money on ships, particularly -- the ships used to be worth
22 \$100 an hour and some of them are worth \$6,000.00 an hour.
23 If you could save an hour maybe the difference between
24 profit on that leg of voyage and loss.

25 If you ammoritize the ship out it goes up to a lot

1 more money than that. So, I don't think there's any
2 company who would say to their master, "we recognize this
3 as unsafe situation, but move the ship anyway". Generally
4 that decision is left to the Master and over years of
5 operating experience, companies know how long it should
6 take to process a voyage. Regardless of where it is, too.
7 And, if you get a Master who does it in 30% more of the
8 time you won't be around very long. It's a competitive
9 thing. And, it does, I'm sure on an individual ship basis
10 occasionally, safety sacrificed in certain areas. But, I
11 don't think it's a company policy to sacrifice the safety.

12 MR. HAVELOCK: Have there been any changes in the
13 bureaucracies of oil transportation by sea in the last
14 decade or two from the Master on up? That is, is there
15 changes in the command structure, is there greater
16 frequency of management intervention and management
17 affairs?

18 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: I think there has and part of
19 it's due to the size and value of the ship and part of
20 it's due to the modern communications that we have. It
21 used to be when the ship left the docks, they didn't have
22 to put up with that company for the next two months or
23 whatever it is. But, now they can get me on a telephone
24 in two minutes. So, the companies do have a little more
25 management control than they had ten years ago and

1 particularly more than they had twenty years ago.

2 And, plus, too the ships are worth so much more
3 money now. It requires -- we used to be able to build a
4 ship for 3.5 million dollars. Now it's not uncommon to
5 have 80 or 85 million dollars in a ship. And, upwards to
6 280 million dollars in a ship. Depending on the type of
7 thing. We just converted a ship, a passenger ship
8 granted, but we have 40 million dollars in the conversion.
9 That would have bought 10 ships twenty years ago. So, in
10 order to stay in the business, the companies have to keep
11 more control than they used to have.

12 MR. HAVELOCK: Is there any change in the quality
13 of that commanding control direction? Are there more
14 accountants up there telling you what to do? Or, is that
15 not an issue? A mythology?

16 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: No, I think that may be an
17 issue. I can't speak to it from an authoritative stand-
18 point, but the numbers are getting more involved in these
19 today.

20 MR. HAVELOCK: Well, let me ask you about manning
21 standards. Are you familiar with how the Coast Guard goes
22 about setting the manning requirements?

23 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Yes, I am.

24 MR. HAVELOCK: Maybe you could tell the Commis-
25 sion how that happened?

1 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Well, all of your older
2 ships, of course, have the many standards that have been
3 set for a long time. But, let's take for example a ship
4 that's been running for some time. The company does a
5 study and they come up with a number of jobs that have to
6 be done on a routine basis. They add up the number of men
7 it takes to do it and the number of hours. Then they'll
8 take some emergency situations. Put the men in the number
9 of hours. They'll add that all up in the bottom, figure
10 a man can work "x" number of hours and it divides out to
11 where we require two ordinary seaman, one QMED, so and so
12 and so.

13 It's a number thing. Then the company itself
14 takes their numbers to the Coast Guard and presents them
15 to the OSMI and the port that the ship is running out of
16 and if they can convince him that they can get by with a
17 number of men that their study show, then they will reduce
18 the men in requirements. If they can't convince the OSMI
19 then they don't get a reduction. On a new ship they do
20 basically the same way. It's a numbers thing.

21 MR. HAVELOCK: Does the Coast Guard ever actually
22 come out and examine the vessel and talk to the crew or
23 to the potential Masters in determining.....

24 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Not to my knowledge. I
25 couldn't say they don't, but not to my knowledge they

1 don't.

2 MR. HAVELOCK: Does anybody participate in the
3 establishment of those levels other than the company and
4 the Coast Guard?

5 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: No.

6 MR. HAVELOCK: I guess that's my questions, thank
7 you.

8 MR. PARKER: Fatigue is of a great interest to
9 us and I look forward to reading your report. But, it
10 will come out after our report, so as we get into it we'll
11 probably be talking to you and any others you can recom-
12 mend in the field in this particular subject. It seems
13 like it's been around a long time and you know, when they
14 first brought up the boredom problem on the very large
15 ships, especially on the Gulf to the West Coast to Western
16 Europe and East Coast runs and so forth. And, I -- you
17 think the understanding of the problem is greater now than
18 it was ten years ago, let's say?

19 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Yes, it certainly is.
20 And, that boredom -- ship design is starting to be looked
21 at in that problem. It's possible now to go on a ship and
22 never see anybody except the man you relieve. Crews all
23 have their own individual rooms. There used to be at
24 least three in a room and sometimes upward to 15 or 20 in
25 one big room. So, you had some social contact. They

1 discovered it's very important now. So, they are starting
2 to build a central area, social type of a program and the
3 rooms around us -- so that it opens onto a foyer type of
4 a thing and the T.V. and radio and small beer bar and so
5 they do have to socialize.

6 I was on the study for the Formaread (ph) and we
7 went to Japan four years ago to study that same problem
8 and it's a very definite problem. And, it affects the
9 operation and it affects the work of the people on the
10 ships. Man is a social animal and we are just beginning
11 to learn it.

12 MR. PARKER: Okay. John?

13 MR. HAVELOCK: Could I ask one follow up to a
14 question I already asked? As you described the phases
15 through on which manning requirements are set and since
16 the companies have the opportunity to independently
17 determine above that standard what accruing should be --
18 that is most of our testimony here has been that actual
19 crews are well above the Coast Guard standard or above by
20 a few men. Would it be fair to say then that when the
21 owners go in they are shooting to get the minimum possible
22 requirement that they might have in terms of the Coast
23 Guard minimum so that they would have freedom to move
24 above that with the amount in determining the crewing
25 requirements of the vessel.

1 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: Yes, that's a safe statement
2 MR. HAVELOCK: Thank you.
3 CAPT. ELSENJOHN: One of the things, if I
4 can just qualify that just a little bit. Let me think how
5 I want to say this. Most ships run above the numbers that
6 are required on the certificate of inspection. Simply
7 because it takes that many people to do the job. The
8 things that are problem areas that we see, if everything
9 runs very smoothly you can get by with the minimum that
10 the inspection requires. But, there are a lot of other
11 factors. How many men does it take to fight a fire? I
12 realize you can't operate on the basis that we have to
13 cover every emergency to the maximum. You might fight a
14 fire with seven people. What if you have two fires?
15 Fourteen? Three fires? Twenty-one? You just keep going,
16 so. You have that emergency that has to be looked at
17 secondarily to launch a lightboat, not only for your own
18 sake but to rescue others from another ship. There are
19 all types of lifeboat designs now where they launch one
20 time. They off the shoot, they throw everybody in and
21 strap them down like airplane seatbelts and you drop this
22 thing fifty feet and it hits the water and an injured man
23 is in there and if he isn't dead before he hits the water
24 he will be afterwards.
25 But, this is fine if you are abandoning your ship.

1 But, you go now you have somebody else. You go to rescue
2 them. How do you recover this boat? You can't. It's not
3 recoverable. So, now you've got a ship sinking over here.
4 You are taking the crew off in your life. Well, now
5 you've got your lifeboat out there. You can't get it
6 back. The manning is a serious issue and it really has to
7 be looked at.

8 The unfortunate thing is that to build a ship
9 today, the price is fixed throughout the world. Doesn't
10 matter what flag it is or what type of crews you put on
11 it. To buy insurance on that ship, the price is fixed.
12 To buy bunkers for it the price is fixed. The only
13 variable that can be attacked is crew wages. Numbers of
14 the crew. Now, technology is such that we could probably
15 run a ship across the ocean with nobody on it. And
16 probably put everything there and let it go. Technology
17 has no loyalty. If we can do it as a United States Flag
18 Ship and operate with six men, Singapore ship can operate
19 with six men. We pay our people \$50.00 or \$100.00 or
20 \$200.00 a day, whatever the number is, they can pay them
21 \$5.00 a day and one fish head.

22 So, you really -- the reduction of manning isn't
23 the ultimate answer to this. The quality of transport
24 were the only "maritime" nation. And I put that in quotes
25 because we most certainly are not a maritime nation. We

1 say we are, but it's just in word in only. We are the
2 only one that has no cargo protection other than military
3 cargo, which the law says 100% of military cargos being
4 American bottom(?) - we don't do it. It says 50% of
5 foreign aid cargo's being American bottom (?)-- we don't
6 do it. Period. There's no incentive for an American
7 company to build ships, quality ships and put them under
8 the American flag unless they are engaged in the domestic
9 freight.

10 The Norwegians have just discovered that they
11 can't do it -- they are down to six men on their ships.
12 Running big ships with six men. And, they've just ask now
13 to be able to flag them out, because they can't compete
14 even at six. Because the foreign flag nations are running
15 the six men, too. I don't want to get into my speech of
16 we should have an American Merchant Marine, because it
17 would take me hours.

18 I thank you very much for having me up here. If
19 you need any assistance or whatever, I love your country
20 and I would be pleased to come back. I used to live up
21 here when I was kid. So....

22 MR. SUND: On the minimum manning, Mr.
23 Chairman, I just want to clarify one issue I think that
24 came up here. They do set minimum manning, but the Coast
25 Guard does not take consideration for maintenance or

1 stewards. And, so when we get in the Exxon Valdez, and I
2 think I made the comment earlier, they had a minimum
3 manning requirement of fourteen or fifteen and had twenty
4 people on board. I think I've tried to work through the
5 numbers. I think they only had -- they met the minimum
6 manning with the people they had to have. In other words,
7 the officers and the engine room people, the extra five or
8 six that show up aren't required on the certificate of
9 manning anyway. So, they were real close to the minimum
10 manning requirement on their certificate of manning. And
11 the extra bodies were, I think, a couple of stewards and
12 a cook and I think they might have had an extra AB or
13 something like that. But, so, it just gets to be --- it
14 isn't that they were over on what they were required to
15 have. They were real close to it.

16 Thank you very much for coming.

17 MR. PARKER: Thank you very much.

18 MR. SUND: I do have two brochures from his
19 school here if anybody wants to look at it.

20 MR. PARKER: We will take a five minute stretch
21 and then we will resume with Mano Frey.

22 (Off the record)

23 (On the record)

24 MR. PARKER: Come back to the table, please,
25 otherwise we will be late and everybody will blame me.