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ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION

JUNE 28, 1989

LOCATION: CORDOVA

OIL SPILL COMMISSION MEMBERS

Walter B. Parker, Chairman

Esther C. Wunnicke, Vice-Chairman

Margaret J. Hayes

Michael J. Herz

John Sund

Timothy Wallils

Edward Wenk, Sr.

VOLUME I OF II

Paralegal Plus

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1 (Tape 6/28/89 - Side 1A)

2 MR. PARKER: Good Morning. This is the State
3 of Alaska Oil Spill Commission. My name is Walt Parker
4 and I'm the Chairman of the Commission. On my left is
5 the Vice-Chairman, Esther Wunnicke. On her left,
6 Commissioner Tim Wallis. On my far right, Ed Wenk, next
7 to him John Sund and Meg Hayes.

8 We have one more member, Mike Herz, who had to
9 leave us in Valdez yesterday. He is from San Fransico.
10 Mr. Wenk is from Seattle. They are the two outside
11 members. The rest of us are all from Alaska.

12 The Commission was formed by the legislature and
13 appointed by the Governor. We were given the task of
14 reporting to them by January 8th with recommendations on
15 how to improve tanker operations. Not only out of
16 Valdez, but statewide, concentrating, of course, on the
17 Valdez traffic. And, also on how to improve oil spill
18 response and mitigation or recovery. Also, on a
19 statewide basis.

20 It seems a fairly simple charge, but having gone
21 through this once before in 1974 to 77 prior to opening
22 the Valdez Terminal, it does get somewhat complicated
23 because we have to influence the Federal Government
23 strongly if we are going to wind up where we want to go.
25 So, one of the last times I was in Cordova was for the

1 1977 Conference at which the people of Cordova received
2 many assurances from the Coast Guard, from the industry,
3 and from everybody concerned that everything was going to
4 be alright and nothing bad would ever happen. And, now
5 something bad has happened so we are going to have to --
6 we intend to work as hard as we can in the next seven
7 months to see what we can do to change things.

8 Do you or any of the other Commissioners have
9 anything they would like to say before we begin?

10 MR. WENK: Only because I'm on the end here
11 we'll start, but I know my partner also wants to say a
12 word. I've been identified as one of the two outsiders.
13 I've had to think a little bit about that role, and feel
14 very comfortable in being identified as 'from the
15 outside', but I have to tell you that the insiders have
16 made an outsider feel very welcome here. So, I don't
17 feel like an outsider, whatever that may be. But, I want
18 to just say a word or two about the fact that those of us
19 who are outside despite the geographic separation share
20 your concern and your pain. I live on Puget Sound --
21 it's just a matter of fate that it didn't happen to us.
22 I have been concerned about the safety of tankers in
23 Puget Sound ever since I moved there when the pipeline
23 was challenged for an EIS I was the only one who went to
25 Washington, D.C. in 1971, at my own expense, to challenge

1 the fact that that EIS contained zero words about the
2 maritime extension of the pipeline and the potential
3 harm.

4 The fact of the matter is, that the lessons to be
5 learned from this experience apply to the entire outside
6 world and not even just the United States. And that's
7 one of the reasons why of all the things that could have
8 happened to me at this time, being appointed by your
9 Governor to this Commission has been the greatest
10 pleasure.

11 One last comment. I have become an admirer of
12 this Cordova Fact Sheet. And, I don't know whether --
13 is Nancy here? Will you forgive me if I make one minor
14 correction? First of all it's very informative. I know
15 of another Alaskan group that wants to do the something
16 and they'll never play catch up with you. I can tell
17 you. I was identified in there by a different name.
18 Now, my name has been misspelled throughout my life. In
19 fact there was a time I couldn't get my laundry if I
20 spelled it correctly. But, it's W-, in your newsletter
21 it's W-A-K-E. Now, wakes are known to rock boats and if
22 that in fact is why that slip occurred in the expectation
23 that you've got a boat rocker on the Commission -- you
23 do.

25 MS. WUNNICKE: And not the other definition?

1 MR. WENK: Please don't --.

2 MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, just to open up and
3 identify myself. I'm John Sund from Ketchikan. I am
4 owner of a seafood processing plant - silverlining
5 seafoods. And I have been involved in the fish business
6 and politics -- fish politics for almost all my life.
7 So, I know, at least I heard after the appointments, that
8 there was some concern from the Prince William Sound area
9 that; one, there isn't anybody from Prince William Sound
10 on this Commission and secondly, that the fishing
11 industry has one of seven members here. I hope to be
12 able to; one, represent, not only the state interest
13 here, but to carry the concerns of the fishing community
14 and the impact on the fishing community through this
15 process. And I think I can do that. For those of you
16 who want to have any additional comments, you are more
17 than welcome to call me or any other member of the
18 Commission as we go along.

19 And, that's just kind of to let you know that
20 your interest -- at least there's someone here, I think,
21 that comes out of a community about this size or a little
22 larger who has spent some time in the business and can
23 understand the frustration when they tell you you can't
23 go fishing or you can't process fish.

25 So, we are not going to deal with the damage

1 assessment area that's going on. We are not going -- our
2 Commission is not really charged with getting into figure
3 out how much each individuals' worth or charge -- or the
4 formulas for figuring out what the damages created are.
5 We are more here to figure out what happened from a
6 factual basis and I think we would like to hear that from
7 people here today and try to get into some position of
8 how to prevent it in the future. Or to, if it is going
9 to happen in the future, what the Contingency Plan should
10 contain in it. And, whatever the plans were that they
11 didn't have enough thought going into as to the
12 disruption of the communities and disruption of live
13 styles and disruption of people's lives was not involved
14 in any of the plans earlier. But, just to tell people we
15 are here and we are going to work pretty hard at this, I
16 think, in the next six months. I'm not sure we will be
17 back to Cordova again, but we will be in the
18 neighborhood.

19 MR. PARKER: Meg?

20 MS. HAYES: Well, shucks, Mr. Chairman, I
21 didn't know we were expected to give speeches this
22 morning. I just want to emphasize that in my opinion,
23 the two reasons that I think Cordova is a town that we
23 are particularly interested in is because of it's long
25 history of being concerned of just this kind of event

1 happening in Prince William Sound. Before the pipeline
2 was built, before the terminal was installed. And,
3 second of all because of its response after the spill
4 while a lot of other people were waiting around to do
5 something, Cordova fishermen did it. And, yesterday we
6 heard a very emotional and heartfelt appeal from a young
7 fellow identifying the problem with having volunteers
8 working out being active rather than being passive in the
9 response to a disaster that shook their world. And I
10 guess we are real interested in what Cordova has to tell
11 us about the events that happened and what suggestions
12 they have for the future.

13 MR. PARKER: Thank you.

14 MS. WUNNICKE: Have you already given your
15 speech?

16 MR. PARKER: I have.

17 MS. WUNNICKE; I haven't a speech except to
18 second the idea that we will look to the past in order to
19 identify what went wrong. But, our whole thrust is going
20 to be towards the future in terms of prevention and in
21 terms of mitigation. And, I know there are lots of good
22 ideas that you all have and that's what I am eager to
23 hear.

24 MR. WALLIS: I really don't have anything to
25 say, Mr. Chairman, other than it's a pleasure 'being here

1 and I'd rather here from them.

2 MR. PARKER: Okay. Our first person that has
3 asked to be here is Kelly Weaverling from the Animal
4 Shelter. Okay.

5 MR. WEAVERLING: My name is Kelly Weaverling
6 and I am not from the Animal Shelter but devised the plan
7 for wildlife rescue in Prince William Sound.

8 I was contacted a few days after the oil spill.
9 Exxon had hired -- there's a bird rescue center from
10 Berkley, California, which is rather like the bird world.
11 If there's a spill anywhere they are called and respond.
12 As they arrived on the scene here they made some initial
13 overflights and found that this was a far worse spill
14 than anything in their experience. Which has been
15 considerable. Not only was the worse spill they had seen
16 and also the worse impact impact to wildlife, but also
17 the most difficult area to retrieve wildlife and get it
18 to a rehabilitation center.

19 I have had a great deal of experience in Prince
20 William Sound and organization of logistics. I had
21 called as soon as the oil spilled to Valdez and
22 volunteered my services in resource wherever it may be
23 the best used. I was contacted on the 29th about four
23 days after the spill and was asked to develop a plan to
25 collect and deliver the dead and wounded animals from the

1 field to rehabilitation centers. To my knowledge there
2 was no plan prior to that time. It was developed by me
3 on the spot. We got underway with some volunteers here
4 from Cordova. They arrived in Valdez the next morning at
5 0630 driving all night and then got under way about 9:00
6 out to the spill area. We spent a couple of days trying
7 to devise the techniques required to collect the birds
8 and animals and return them to the field. Return them to
9 the rehab center.

10 I came back to Cordova on the first of April and
11 developed a plan which eventually resulted in 44 vessels,
12 about 250 people, 4 aircraft for air vac and a number of
13 tenders covering the impacted area of the spill. That
14 operated for sometime.

15 I did experience some problems in this activity.
16 I suppose I could -- I have quite a long chronology of
17 events here. I kept track of my activities through the
18 oil spill and wildlife rescue and it would take some time
19 to go through this. So, if you don't mind I'll summarize
20 and give you my opinion on the problems. Kind of cut to
21 the bottom line as it were.

22 First of all I would like to say that although
23 Joe Hazelwood is responsible for putting the ship on the
23 rocks, he's the Skipper of that vessel and he's
25 responsible for everything that goes on, he is not the

1 individual responsible for all the free oil in the water.
2 The main problem, as I see it, is not so much that the
3 tanker went on the rocks, or that Joe Hazelwood was
4 allegedly intoxicated during that period of time, I'm
5 still totally unsatisfied with the story and the way it's
6 changed with the grounding of that vessel. And, I don't
7 believe that we have come to the bottom yet and found the
8 truth of why that vessel actually went aground. My time
9 in the Navy, my trade was navigation and I still have a
10 lot of unresolved questions.

11 However, be that as it may, even if Joe Hazelwood
12 or any other skipper or vessel operator, under the best
13 intentions in the world, perhaps this is strictly a blue-
14 sky hypothetical situation, was in the middle of the
15 ocean where there were no rocks, a meteorite, let's say
16 for a ludicrous example, came out of the sky. He was
17 warned that it was arriving, took evasive action, but
18 through some fluke of fate it skipped across the water.

19 The is with transportation of this material.
20 That's where the problem is. If this stuff was
21 containerized, and I don't know of any other toxic
22 material that is transported that is not containerized.
23 In fact, they measure it in barrels because years ago it
23 used to be transported in barrels. If the Exxon Valdez
25 had been full of barrels of oil or other more compact

1 containers of oil, this amount of free oil would not be
2 on the water and these problems that we have experienced
3 would be much less.

4 My recommendation is to change the transportation
5 of this material. It's a none renewable resource. We
6 can't get anymore. It suppresses fluid. Beyond that it
7 is also toxic. Extremely toxic. That's my first
8 recommendation. Let's go to the source here and quit
9 looking at better ways to mitigate the disaster after
10 it's occurred and look at ways to stop the problem before
11 it arises. The containerization of this stuff is a very
12 simple solution, although it is not simplistic. It will
13 work.

14 My second recommendation is that given a disaster
15 of this nature occurs again, we need to have some sort of
16 response mechanism that will allow us to deploy with the
17 speed that's required. What we have here through my
18 observations is a situation requiring mobility, tactics
19 and supply not unlike a military operation. However, it
20 is being uprated by a corporate bureaucracy who has no
21 experience in these matters and regulated by a number of
22 various state and federal bureaucracies as well. One
23 thing that occurs in all bureaucracies is that there are
23 a few individuals who are not right up at the top of the
25 list. As far as getting things done. Not especially

1 effective. In a large emergency like this these
2 individuals who may be shuffled off in some appropriate,
3 ineffectual position in this bureaucracy are called to
4 the floor and given positions of responsibility which
5 they do not rate.

6 If you take as a little parable; if your house
7 catches on fire, you do not call your lawyer or your
8 banker. You call the fire department. The fire
9 department has people sleeping on call 24-hours a day.
10 When they receive the call, they slide down their
11 gleaming brass pole, jump into their shining machine, put
12 on their protective clothing, gather their specialized
13 equipment and they drive at all speed through red lights
14 to the scene of the fire. In the meantime, you and your
15 neighbors have responded to the best of your ability to
16 put this fire out. When the fire department arrives on
17 the scene they do not look for court orders to enter your
18 home. If you are not there they break the door down.
19 They get in and they take their hoses and they spray the
20 walls down, they hose all your expensive furniture and
21 put the fire out. Once the fire is out, the cause of the
22 problem is determined and insurance agents or other
23 responsible parties are then involved. There is no such
23 mechanism right now to respond to an oil spill of any
25 size. And it is very unfortunate.

1 My third recommendation is that tanker vessels
2 should have equipment on board to adequately contain and
3 retrieve oil spills. And those are the three basic
4 bottom line things I think you should address yourself
5 to. The first one being that change in the
6 transportation regulations of this fluid. I have had
7 problems with all these bureaucracies. Every single one.
8 Not the least of which is the United States Fish and
9 Wildlife. And, the head of Fish and Wildlife, Walt
10 Stiglos in particular.

11 Initially, when we went out to the field to
12 respond there were boats and otter boats. We were bird
13 boats. When we came across our first distressed otter we
14 could not in all conscience leave it there to die while
15 we collected the birds. With us that time was an
16 individual named Jay Holcomb from Bird Rescue Center with
17 a great deal of experience and life capture of many
18 animals. He instructed us in the capture of otters and
19 we reasoned that it would make more sense if the bird
20 boats captured otters and the otter boats captured birds.
21 Given that our job description, as it were, was to save
22 wildlife, we saw no reason to discriminate in which
23 wildlife we saved.

24 When I returned to Cordova I began dispatching
25 boats. Not without some degree of difficulty in that at

1 that time we had no Exxon or Veco representative here to
2 sign contracts or supply funding for materials, food,
3 fuel or special equipment.

4 MS. WUNNICKE: How were you funded initially?

5 MR. WEAVERLING: Initially it was all
6 volunteer. Boxes were donated by local canneries.
7 Lights, seringes, were supplied by the local hospital
8 here. Personnel were supplied through the community as
9 were the vessels.

10 At any rate, as we began deploying boats, once
11 the initial deployment was under way, we had about 35
12 boats in the field... That was divided into 8 units
13 basically. Prince William Sound was divided into 8
14 areas. When the last boats were dispatched I received a
15 phone call from the Otter Rehabilitation Center in Valdez
16 saying stop sending in otters. The facility there was
17 full. I didn't think that was a real good reason not to
18 stop sending in otters, so I flew to Valdez to inspect
19 their initial facility and I must admit the initial
20 facility was wolfffully inadequate. I don't know who
21 advised the individuals to set that facility up, but the
22 small room that it was in was totally inadequate for the
23 amount of otters that anyone could assume would be oil in
23 a spill of this size.

25 I inspected the new facility which was very

1 impressive and I spoke with Dr. Randall Davis who is the
2 head of that project over there. He gave me a tour. At
3 the time I was told to stop sending otters in from the
4 Wildlife Rescue Fleet, only one of 8 units was sending in
5 otters at that time. With a little calculation it was
6 easy for Dr. Randall Davis and myself to see that the
7 brand new facility in Valdez would be filled, the most
8 pessimistic, two more days after my units came on line or
9 at the most optimistic, five days after those units came
10 on line. Dr. Randall Davis and I established a need for
11 a large otter facility. He was extremely busy dealing
12 with what he had to do there and had no time to do it.
13 He said if I could get another facility built that I
14 should do it. I went to Exxon, spoke at a private
15 meeting with Michele O'Leary, a person here from Cordova,
16 myself and Don Coronet. I expressed my concerns and my
17 conversations with Dr. Randall Davis and he agreed that
18 what was needed was a new facility. And, basically told
19 me to do it. Gave me the power and resource of Exxon to
20 get it done post haste.

21 With that in hand I went and contacted the
22 contractor who had built the new facility in Valdez and
23 it was arranged to fly to Cordova and use a few key
23 personnel from his construction operation there, local
25 hire here, begin air lifting material in in the construc-

1 tion of a new facility here in Cordova.

2 I went back and talked to Dr. Randall Davis. We
3 had a large meeting with all the concerned otter people
4 there. He again expressed his support for this project.
5 I had another small meeting with some of the
6 veterinarians and other biologist involved and they
7 expressed some concern of whether it should be located in
8 Cordova, Seward, Whittier or wherever. They finally
9 decided that Cordova was a satisfactory location and the
10 last step was to talk to fish and wildlife for the
11 necessary approval. I spoke with two representatives of
12 that organization and they took notes and went off for a
13 teleconference with Walt Stiglos, Steve Zimmerman and
14 some other individuals who I do not know. I was not
15 privy to that teleconference. At any rate, the upshot
16 is. They came back about 4 hours later and informed me
17 in a closed room that they agreed that a new otter
18 facility needed to be built, but that if it was built it
19 should be built in Seward and further that my vessels in
20 the field were to cease and desist in otter capture as
21 they were untrained and unauthorized sea mammal handlers.

22 I wasn't very happy with this and I'm sure a
23 considerable amount of otters died as a consequence. At
23 the very maximum the otter rescue fleet had four vessels
25 in Prince William Sound collecting otters. They had an

1 opportunity to have 48 vessels collecting otters and
2 other wildlife out there.

3 Later on, a few days later, I read in the
4 newspaper that Fish and Wildlife said that they were not
5 about to give anybody a ticket or arrest them for picking
6 up otters. Later on when the oil moved out of Prince
7 William Sound towards Seward they decided that they
8 should have one built in Seward and Walt was complaining
9 that Exxon was dragging their feet in getting a new otter
10 facility build. This facility could have been built much
11 sooner.

12 Well, I can go on and on about my problems with
13 Fish and Wildlife. Fish and Game, however, has been very
14 good.

15 MR. PARKER: Before you leave Fish and
16 Wildlife, one public statement they came out with was
17 that the pups were being picked up out of the pelt bags
18 where their mothers had parked them. Would you comment
19 on that statement? I never saw an particular follow-up
20 on that. That was just.....

21 MR. WEAVERLING: Fish and Wildlife, to my
22 knowledge, at the time they told us to cease our
23 activities had never inspected the methods that we used
23 to capture these animals. It was an assumption on their
25 part that we were untrained. It's true that we were

1 unauthorized by Fish and Wildlife, but we were trained.

2 MR. PARKER: Was there any effort made by Fish
3 and Wildlife -- any offer of training to, you know,

4 MR. WEAVERLING: No, there was not.

5 MR. PARKER: Uh-huh.

6 MR. WEAVERLING: There was not. If an oil
7 spill occurs again, I would like to point out that all
8 the vessels involved in otter and bird rescue came from
9 Cordova. All the aircraft involved in medi-vacing these
10 animals to rehab center came from Cordova. The
11 difficulty we had in logistics was that the rehab center
12 was in Valdez. It would seem much more logical to me
13 that if all the personnel, vessels, and aircraft involved
14 also had the rehabilitation center involved in it. It
15 would seem that Valdez should have been the center for
16 the oil spill containment and clean up activities and
17 Cordova should have been the center for a wildlife
18 activities.

19 MS. WUNNICKE: But, until Fish and Wildlife
20 told you that they would not approve your continuing and
21 that the next otter rescue center was to be built in
22 Seward, you had approval from all other parties to
23 continue doing what you were doing except Fish and
23 Wildlife Service? Am I correct?

25 MR. WEAVERLING: That's correct. I had funding

1 from Exxon, the contractor had been contacted, and we
2 were ready to go. The contractor assured me that we
3 could have a facility the full size of the new facility
4 in Valdez up and running in Cordova in one week.

5 Our intent was to build that facility in modular
6 units that could be disassembled after the spill and
7 stored. And/or stored and transported by air lift to
8 some other site, should this occur again.

9 MS. WUNNICKE: Thank you.

10 MR. PARKER: Did Fish and Game make any effort
11 to intercede on your behalf with Fish and Wildlife? That
12 you are aware of? There doesn't seem to be any reference
13 to any part they played in this incident which received a
14 good deal of publicity.

15 MR. WEAVERLING: No, actually I did not request
16 any intercession on my behalf. United States Fish and
17 Wildlife basically has the final say.

18 MR. PARKER: Oh, yeah.

19 MR. WEAVERLING: I have also had problems with
20 the Coast Guard. At one time I attempted to find the
21 chain of command and could not find it. I've had a lot
22 of difficulties. I can make available this chronology of
23 events. It's summarized and you will have to read
23 between the lines or if you like I can amplify any part
25 of this.

1 MR. PARKER: We would love to have a copy of
2 your chronology, because it would be of great value.
3 MR. WENK: Would you care to amplify a wee bit
4 now?
5 MR. WEAVERLING: Certainly. I just don't want
6 to take up your time. I understood I was scheduled for
7 about 15 minutes and I'm about 7 minutes over that.
8 MR. WENK: It's up to the chairman.
9 MR. PARKER: No, go ahead.
10 MR. WEAVERLING: Alright. The individual in
11 charge of all ecological activity -- the ecological
12 scientist for Exxon is Dr. Al Maki. M-A-K-I. He is
13 involved with all the environmental concerns. The
14 individual underneath him at Exxon in charge of wildlife
15 rescue is Tom Monahan, who occasionally is replaced by an
16 individual named Rocky Ortega, as they cycle themselves
17 in and out.
18 Cycling in and out has been a problem. We've had
19 no less than nine people in charge of Exxon control here
20 in Cordova since the oil has spilled. I don't know if
21 it's planned way to avoid accountability, but certainly
22 it is difficult to find who is responsible for what.
23 When they rotate these individuals in and out with such
23 frequency.
25 Excuse me, I have a cold right now. Just in

1 general it has been a mess. It's been a horrible mess.
2 Not just the oil on the water but the way the whole thing
3 has been handled. It's been a terrible scramble. I do
4 not believe there was any plan for wildlife rescue at
5 all. Outside of calling the International Bird Rescue
6 Center in Berkley. I'm a bookstore owner in Cordova and
7 I developed the plan and implemented it with volunteers
8 and local efforts.

9 MS. WUNNICKE: Your original plan was just for
10 Prince William Sound?

11 MR. WEAVERLING: That's correct.

12 MS. WUNNICKE: Your plan didn't extend beyond
13 that?

14 MR. WEAVERLING: That's correct. In other
15 areas they have had different ways of dealing with the
16 problem. Some have been similar to this operation, some
17 of them, I am not real familiar with those although I
18 have helped them out and given them some advice, built
19 some equipment for them. We developed some new
20 technology here in bird capture techniques. Throw nets.

21 MS. HAYES: Mr. Weaverling, I.....

22 MR. WEAVERLING: Please, call me Kelly.

23 MS. HAYES: Kelly, I'm a little confused about
23 what, -- when Exxon called the bird rescue center in
25 Berkley. What was the center asked to provide?

1 MR. WEAVERLING: Well, I'm not sure.

2 MS. HAYES: Was it advice or was it facilities

3 or was it people? What were they looking for there that

4 they couldn't find here?

5 MR. WEAVERLING: You will probably have to

6 address that question to Exxon. I was not contacted by

7 Exxon. I was contacted by the Bird Rescue Center. And,

8 once they arrived in Valdez.....

9 MS. HAYES: How many individuals came from the

10 Center?

11 MR. WEAVERLING: I did not spend a lot of time

12 at the Center. Most of my time was spent in the field or

13 organizing the fleet here in Cordova to go in the field

14 or going for tours of the fleets to see how things were

15 working.

16 MS. HAYES: And, so part of what you arranged

17 was the logistics, the volunteer effort. Were you

18 worried about liability? Did you have some arrangement

19 with Exxon about insurance if an aircraft had gone in the

20 ditch. Was that a.....

21 MR. WEAVERLING: Our initial response was

22 strictly volunteer with no concern towards liability. We

23 wanted to get out in the field and do what we could for

23 the disaster. When I returned and had the plan which I

25 devised and okayed by Exxon, they began contracting the

1 vessels and the crew members and were therefore covered
2 by insurance.

3 MS. HAYES: Okay.

4 MR. PARKER: Well, you have certainly acquired
5 a good sense of problems with the corporations and
6 agencies involved in this. That's problems with all
7 corporations and agencies that don't have a focus on the
8 mission they are supposed to accomplish or, you know....
9 We'll certainly get into the Contingency Plan and your
10 testimony has been most helpful in ways to approach our
11 future discussions with all who have responsibility in
12 Contingency Plans. Alyeska... And, the Exxon, all the
13 others and DEC, Fish and Wildlife, Fish and Game. We'll
14 get to them all and see what they have got to say. But,
15 my feeling is that we are not going to find that in the
16 original Contingency Plan there was a great deal of
17 effort devoted to this. Because there's been nothing in
18 the record so far that indicates that a real plan was in
19 place. Meg?

20 MS. HAYES: Mr. Chairman, thanks. What is the
21 status of the animal rescue effort now?

22 MR. WEAVERLING: I was relieved of command by
23 Exxon who put pressure on the Bird Rescue Center
23 approximately two and half or three weeks ago. At the
25 moment I believe there are four vessels involved in

1 wildlife rescue. At the moment they are being co-
2 ordinated by an individual named Darryl. I do not know
3 his last name. He is a Veco employee and I understand is
4 prime responsibility is public relations. I don't know
5 what experience he has in co-ordinating wildlife rescue
6 efforts. I suspect it is very little. I know he was not
7 here for the beginning of the project.

8 MR. PARKER: What about Dr. Davis? Was he an
9 Exxon employee or...?

10 MR. WEAVERLING: Dr. Randall Davis is an
11 employee of SeaWorld.

12 MR. PARKER: Okay. Was he under contract to
13 Exxon or...?

14 MR. WEAVERLING: I believe that's correct.

15 MR. PARKER: Yeah.

16 MS. WUNNICKE: Is the Valdez center the
17 headquarters for Seward and Homer rescue centers or do
18 you know?

19 MR. WEAVERLING: As the oil moved out of the
20 Sound other rehabilitation centers were set up for the
21 wildlife. Seward, Homer and Kodiak. What happened was
22 the people from Valdez split up and spread out to take up
23 the slack of the other communities and were staffed
23 largely by volunteers.

25 MS. WUNNICKE: I guess my question... You may

1 not be the one to know this, was whether then those
2 centers had to respond to the Valdez center as the mother
3 ship, so to speak?

4 MR. WEAVERLING: I do not know. You would have
5 to direct that, I think, to Jay Holcomb who is now in
6 Seward and in charge of the International Bird Rescue.
7 From Berkley.

8 MS. WUNNICKE: Okay.

9 MR. WEAVERLING: One thing that I would like to
10 bring out is that a Mr. Tom Copeland, a fisherman here in
11 town, finally responded by going out on his own with a
12 bucket brigade basically. Grain scoops, flour scoops and
13 buckets and four people on his same boat outperformed two
14 skimmers in the same period of time. I'm totally
15 convinced that if we had been allowed to respond strictly
16 as volunteers as one would if their house were on fire,
17 that we could have retrieve more free oil in those first
18 four days and a lot less oil would have been on the
19 water. I'm 100% certain of this fact.

20 There were no outside experts. If there were
21 I've yet to see one. The experts, as I see it, were all
22 inside. No one knows these waters or booming operations
23 or collecting wildlife or just catching things in
24 general.

25 MR. PARKER: Ed?

1 MR. WENK: Kelly opened with a recommendation
2 with regard to containerization of oil, as he said, the
3 same way is required of hazardous material. This is a
4 little footnote to confirm the validity of that
5 observation. Early in World War II when I was the
6 structural designer for the Navy, I was given the
7 commission to design an unsinkable tanker. It was to be
8 a Q-ship. We were losing tankers on the East Coast.
9 This was to be a decoy that would attract German
10 submarines, be tarpetoed, but not sunk. We did it and it
11 succeeded and we did it by filling it with oil barrels.
12 Now, why isn't that done today? It's pretty obvious that
13 the cute phrase "cost effectiveness" is what drives
14 tanker design, tanker operations, management decisions
15 and the whole problem is that nobody considers cost to
16 whom. It turns out it's cost to the organization that
17 responsible for the transportation. I think one of the
18 important general lessons to be derived from this is that
19 you've demonstrated what some of the other costs are to
20 our natural surroundings and to people. And, somehow or
21 another that was never factored into the equation. I
22 think this is one of the things the Commission might do.
23 How successful we will be is another matter. That's
23 going to be a political decision, but at least, I think,
25 we can be an early warning device.

1 Thank you.

2 MR. WEAVERLING: I have seen it in print that
3 Exxon corporation makes 12 million dollars in clear
4 profit after taxes per day. If this is the case, the
5 term cost effectiveness, I think, is totally
6 inappropriate. The expense, even if it were past onto
7 the consumer, I certainly would be happy to pay
8 additional expense for the containerization of this
9 stuff. A containerized ship will not sink as you know.
10 You will not get as much free oil in the water. The ship
11 could totally break up and we would be able to retrieve
12 floating barrels.

13 MR. PARKER: To comment on one of your other
14 points that oil is a hazardous substance, it's something
15 that I and some of the other Commissioners have been
16 fighting with the Coast Guard and EPA for 20 years now,
17 you know, oil should be a hazardous substance. The
18 reason it is not classified as hazardous is because you
19 can build ships more cheaply and crew them more cheaply
20 if it's not hazardous. It's not classified as hazardous
21 or some of the other materials. You have to take some
22 special steps. So, we'll get into this particular item
23 once again very deeply, you know. Maybe it's time to win
23 this one. We'll certainly give it a try.

25 MR. WEAVERLING: Thank you very much. I

1 certainly hope you can. All the legislation that I have
2 seen introduced as a result of this oil spill so far only
3 addresses ways to mitigate the problem after it's
4 occurred. I've yet to see any legislation introduced or
5 any steps taken to stop the problem before it occurs.
6 And I think this is what needs to be pursued. Any of the
7 rest of it is zippo. As it were.

8 MR. PARKER: Thank you, very much.

9 MR. WEAVERLING: Thank you.

10 MR. PARKER: Next is Mead Treadwell. Good to
11 see you Mead.

12 MR. TREADWELL: Good to see you, Walt. Good
13 morning, Commissioners. My name is Mead Treadwell and I
14 am the director of the Cordova Oil Spill Disaster
15 Response.Office. The Oil Spill Disaster Recovery Office
16 was established by the Cordova City Council to work and
17 co-ordinate with a Citizen's Committee here which formed
18 very quickly after the spill. Called the Oil Spill
19 Disaster Response Committee. You'll be meeting with the
20 committee this afternoon and I understand that at least
21 some of you heard our Mayor's testimony yesterday in
22 Valdez. I'm not sure he testified before your group
23 directly or before the other Mayors.

23 MS. WUNNICKE: Before the other Mayors.

25 MR. TREADWELL: He will be giving testimony

1 this afternoon and so will Connie Taylor, the chairman of
2 the committee, and then you will actually hear from
3 almost every other group represented on the committee,
4 either on your agenda today or at the committee meeting
5 this afternoon. So, I really don't want to take very
6 much time at all. I especially am aware of the fact that
7 I am not a Cordovan and was not really here until after
8 the first part of the fire drill was over. But, what I
9 wanted to do today was just to very quickly bring you up
10 to speed on the way this has been a financial impact on
11 the City of Cordova which is a city which has about a 4.7
12 million dollar annual budget. And, this spill has
13 already met at least \$800,000.00 of expenditures by the
14 city. And it is likely to meet about another 700 or 800
15 thousand before it's all over.

16 A couple of other things and we can get into that
17 in a second, I guess John said you weren't sure if you
18 were coming back to Cordova. One of the fears around
19 here is that as of September 30th everybody's pulling out
20 and going home. And we have now received assurances from
21 Exxon that they will have a claims office and a community
22 relations office here for some time to come because
23 frankly with the fishing season and trying to pick up
23 after the spill and so forth, people have not been able
25 to sort things out in a way they feel they need to.

1 The second thing I would like to say is that our
2 office is staffed up in the city of Cordova and the
3 people on our committee want to work with you. You've
4 mentioned the Cordova Fact Sheet. We will publish that
5 as long as we can and I would encourage you, because you
6 pick up volumes of information, as you are trooping
7 around the state, if you would like Nancy to receive some
8 of that to publish ahead of time... just things that you
9 think the rest of the world ought to know about, send it
10 on to us and we are happy, first to keep our own citizens
11 informed, but there are a lot of other people on that
12 mailing list and it may serve as a way for your -- to
13 rechannel testimony that you receive.

14 Finally, because it's early in the day, maybe
15 what I should just do quite quickly is turn the status
16 report on the numbers that I think is on about the third
17 page of the file that I gave you. Go to the point of our
18 testimony this morning. The emergency oil spill response
19 activities that the city has undertaken since March 24th
20 totaled at this point about \$805,000.00. We have
21 expended \$315,000.00 on various things within the city,
22 and billed those to Exxon and we spent \$200,000.00 in the
23 first week of the spill to buy boom to go off and protect
23 the hatcheries that are run for Cordova. And, I think
25 you may have heard about that and may hear more about

1 that in the future. We were only able to collect back
2 that money from DEC after a very quick piece of
3 legislation in the legislature that allowed us to get
4 money from DEC on a retroactive basis or to sign a
5 contract with DEC after we had already spent the money.
6 And, we were happy with that. We signed a \$500,000.00
7 contract with DEC at that time to cover our emergency
8 activities and we've still yet to see anymore of the
9 money that we have put in to cover some of our expenses.
10 We have also billed the same expenses to Exxon and of
11 course would sort out who we get what from. Exxon has
12 given us a \$100,000.00 advance, but no more. But, we are
13 in the process of discussion right now.

14 Exxon has also committed \$183,000.00 to cover the
15 housing -- the need for additional housing here this
16 summer during the clean up season. We've opened up --
17 we're in the process now of building about 110 bunk
18 spaces, which should be operational in the next week or
19 so. We have about 100 tent sites that are also being
20 cleaned up. The city did a number of surveys showing
21 that right after the spill a fifth of Cordova's labor
22 force had run off to the oil grounds and that in the fish
23 processing industry, a third of the labor force had run
23 off to the grounds. Ken Romhilt, one of the processors
25 who was on the committee that testified, that as of next

1 week when the seining season starts the labor shortage is
2 going to be acute again. So, we are working as hard as
3 we can to get the housing up and under way.

4 Childcare has been a major issue in Cordova.
5 Since the time of the spill you have had all of a sudden
6 both members of the family working. People working
7 longer hours and a real need to do this and a real need
8 to have their children taken care of. And this is a
9 basic need far beyond some of the psychological pressures
10 that people have been under. The State Department of
11 Emergency Services came through fairly quickly with a
12 \$45,000.00 grant that allowed us to expand the childcare
13 here and Exxon has come through with an \$18,000.00 grant
14 to add to that.

15 The fact sheet that you have seen to date has
16 cost about \$43,000.00 and we are just about out of that.
17 And we are trying to extend that contract right now with
18 Exxon. So, that adds up to about \$805,000.00. Just to
19 tell you what that \$315,000.00 went for. It's gone for a
20 variety of things. From covering the staff at the
21 response office, covering extra employee overtime on the
22 part of the city. Covering legal bills and --these were
23 not legal bills in intention for litigation. But,
23 frankly it would be very irresponsible for a city
25 government to have an oil spill like this without at

1 least asking it's lawyers what it's rights were. And,
2 we've had to do that.

3 The second thing is that if we've gone through
4 this contractual process with Exxon as all the Mayors of
5 these communities have tried to have a contract with
6 Exxon you have lawyers working on that for you. We have
7 not spent very much in the way of economic analysis as
8 yet. And that's what I wanted to leave you talking about
9 or talk about as I leave you today. Because the real
10 long term economic impact of this bill on Cordova's
11 economy, which is very much based on fishing, is
12 something that won't be known for a while. And right now
13 we feel we don't have the means to study it properly and
14 we kind of feel a bit a drift by both Exxon, who doesn't
15 want to pay for that kind of costs, and by the State of
16 Alaska that has funded itself to look at it's own needs,
17 but has not pulled municipalities into that equation.

18 We see a need, our city council sees a need to
19 keep a response office opened through the end of April of
20 next year. And that's at a cost of about \$188,000.00
21 with about \$69,000.00 in support costs. We would like to
22 keep the Cordova Fact Sheet going through the -- up to a
23 year after the spill. We have down there a need of
23 \$20,000.00 for additional auditing. And I tell you the
25 reason why for that. It's simply that our auditors are

1 also BP's auditors and they have a conflict. They are
2 not able to add up any cost differences that the city
3 might have or anything that might eventually result in a
4 claim because of their conflict.

5 Bond council. The city council which meets in
6 this room canceled a school bond election that was
7 scheduled the middle of June because of fears in the
8 community and because of fears in the New York financial
9 community that this oil spill may have an effect on the
10 bond ratings of these various communities in the Sound.
11 So, we have budgeted an amount to work on that to look at
12 what's necessary to maintain and assure that and I'm not
13 sure we need to spend that kind of money, but that's
14 something that our counsel, again, feels it is prudent to
15 do.

16 We have down there economic analysis of
17 \$45,000.00. The way we see that being spent is really to
18 work with an accounting firm and with other cities so
19 that we have a common way of looking at this. While
20 you've been at the Mayors' meetings, several of them
21 where they have expressed concerns that Exxon and it's
22 response may be dividing and conquering. You know, there
23 is a memo in here from John Glevoe (ph), the Department
23 of Community and Regional Affairs where he shows that
25 Kenai was given 2 million dollars up front to do with

1 what they want to, you know, but Cordova has not been
2 able to get a long term continuity of it's funds. And,
3 one thing the Mayors did decide to do Sunday, was to try
4 to get together and hammer out a common set of questions
5 for economic analysis so that this can be looked at
6 together.

7 In our discussions with Bob he has said that
8 their economic analysis is being done for litigation and
9 it's going to be very hard to share information with us.
10 So, we still see a need to do that separately and we
11 don't want to undercut anybody's strategy overall, but
12 there is a need for the cities to be able to stand up and
13 look at their own interests.

14 Finally, there's a large number down there for
15 legal research and representation. That's, again,
16 something that, you know, I can happily say up front that
17 it's not with the preparation of litigation in mind for
18 the city. It does involve watching all this legislation
19 that's going on. Because, quite frankly one of the first
20 things the attorneys found after this spill is that the
21 rights of city's affected by a spill like this are not
22 clearly stated in the law. There may be rights imputed
23 under the law, but they are not clear. So, this is not a
23 large loting effort by any means, but it's simply
25 watching what is going on there and this is a contingency

1 fee or a contingency sum on the budget more than anything
2 else. But, it is something the cities themselves are not
3 prepared to do with the kinds of budgets that they have
4 right now. I just have to say that the legal budget of
5 this community is less than \$50,000.00 a year and that's
6 less than what they spent in the first month after the
7 spill, just in watching it's own needs.

8 So, where we are with this is I don't think -- we
9 are kind of looking at funding these things from a
10 patchwork of sources, we believe it's necessary to do --
11 all the Mayors believe this kind of work is necessary to
12 do. We have asked Governor Cooper to free up some of the
13 \$35 million dollars that was appropriated by the
14 legislature to go do direct grants, municipalities so
15 that they can cover some of these costs that Exxon won't
16 directly and in some ways can't directly be expected to
17 cover. And, I've talked with one of the Commissioners in
18 your group last night and if there is at all a chance
19 that you might make a recommendation to the Governor that
20 he pay very special attention to the municipalities and
21 their financial needs after the spill, and that become a
22 recommendation earlier, perhaps this week when decisions
23 are being made, I know that the cities would support
23 that.

25 In the letter that I have written to you we have

1 talked about two principles. The first principle is that
2 because this spill represents an economic emergency to
3 places like Cordova, where the oil did not hit, it's a
4 little bit different from Kodiak, for instance, where
5 they are mobilizing still to clean up beaches. But, here
6 it is an economic emergency where the real concern is
7 what's going to happen to the long term affect on our
8 economy. We're asking that emergency funds that are
9 available through DEC continue to be available.

10 The second principle that we are asking is that
11 while the legislature's \$35 million that was given to the
12 Governor to spend had one caveat. Which is 'you can't
13 spend this unless you have an AG's opinion that you can
14 recover it from Exxon'. I think we all know full well
15 that the way the State intends to recover those funds
16 from Exxon are two ways. One by direct negotiation and
17 second by some kind of long term settlement. And, all we
18 are asking for is that when the State goes out beyond
19 what Exxon immediately pay for to undertake these kinds
20 of studies, they wrap the municipalities in with them.
21 And I believe the municipalities would be happy to fold
22 their claim for that particular portion of that costs
23 back to the state.

23 And it's those two principles that if backed up
25 by this Commission I think could help free up some of

1 that and really solve a problem that, as I understand it,
2 the big conclusion that came out of the Oil Mayors of
3 France is that after a spill like this there's a lot of
4 people that draw a lot of circles. And if you draw the
5 circle and leave out the local communities you are not
6 drawing it properly.

7 So, with that I'll conclude and I'm happy to
8 answer any questions.

9 MR. PARKER: Okay. After the first Oil Mayor's
10 meeting I attended, I talked to the Governor about that
11 and the need for the State to take more decisive role on
12 community impact. And, at that time he brought out the
13 concept of community grants that he later went public
14 with at Fort Graham. And I don't know what the current
15 status of that program is, but certainly will follow-up
16 on it. Another question, on the economic analysis, in
17 your discussions with the other communities, is it your
18 general feeling you would want an overall economic
19 analysis which would have a group that would do with each
20 community, with each community, of course, being provided
21 funds to do it's own part? Or would you rather that each
22 community simply was funded and went ahead on it's own?
23 Has there been an consensus on that?

23 MR. TREADWELL: I think we are in the process of
25 building that consensus right now. The points that we

1 made, and Cordova was asked by the Mayors to make a
2 presentation on this last Sunday and we did. The main
3 point is that we try not to come up with different ways
4 of measuring these things because, you know, it could
5 present problems and people could pick their favorite way
6 which may not be the best way to do it.

7 The other thing is that it is very important and
8 I think you should be aware that in all these discussions
9 we've had with the Governor, I think that we could say
10 that the State has not turned around and asked us what we
11 thought our needs were. And, we've talked with the
12 people who are formulating the State's economic analysis
13 itself and I asked them 'did you consider these potential
14 things with the municipalities'? And they said 'no, we
15 haven't done that'. And I said, 'well, let's think about
16 these things', and she said, 'okay, let's get together'.
17 But, the point is whether the money is State money that's
18 spent for state purposes or money that is doled out to
19 communities, it should be co-ordinated in such a way that
20 we are using the same kind of measures. Number one, and
21 number two you are having enough local input and enough
22 local responsibility that the information is available to
23 people as it's being developed and not locked up in room
23 in case it's going to be used for evidence in a lawsuit
25 years hence.

1 MR. PARKER: Ed?

2 MR. WENK: Mr. Chairman, first I think it is
3 commendable that you responded as swiftly as you did
4 after meeting with the Oil Mayors and transmitting this
5 message to the Governor. I'd like to suggest that the
6 Commission as a whole move much further beyond that.
7 What we heard from Mead this morning as I recall as a
8 fourth item of immediate agenda that cannot wait for the
9 publication of a report in January. I don't think it is
10 useful to recount the other items here, but I think this
11 is important enough that I would like to suggest, Mr.
12 Chairman, that the Commission during this four day
13 session arrive at some consensus on such items that need
14 immediate attention with the rationales that we've heard
15 from affected parties, communicate this in a letter to
16 the Governor. I don't think it would hurt to provide
17 Nancy with a copy of that letter. And, see if we can't
18 get similar response from members of the legislature for
19 some mitigating measures now. And at the time that these
20 are needed. For example, this point about having
21 uniformity of reporting on economic impact. Without that
22 you'll just have soup. And, I think this is the kind of
23 thing that the Commission can do now.

23 MR. PARKER: Yeah, I think, Ed, the Governor's
25 established a mini-cabinet to deal with this and I have

1 asked the mini-cabinet to deal with it, you know, -- move
2 it up to the top of the priority, because it can't wait.
3 Things are happening now on all fronts. Health,
4 childcare and... happening in every communities.

5 Yeah, I think we have to make our presence known
6 there? Any...?

7 MS. WUNNICKE: I would like to ask Mead a
8 question that -- he's observation and recognizing, as you
9 said, that you're not from Cordova but you're certainly
10 helping the people of Cordova. In addition to this
11 economic affect, and social disruption in the community
12 of Cordova, do you feel that the community maintained its
13 own authority and maintained its own presence in dealing
14 with Exxon, Veco and so forth? Were there instances
15 where the authority of the community was overridden in
16 ways that would have some long term detriment to the
17 structure of the community and the relationships within
18 the community?

19 MR. TREADWELL: If you take a look at the
20 breakdown of the Oil Mayors agreement, I think that
21 points to the answer of the question that you have asked.
22 What the Oil Mayors were asking for was for Exxon to
23 reimburse basic funds that the cities would have the
23 autonomy to decide to spend on itself. And what Exxon
25 said was we won't reimburse anything that we do not

1 approve ahead of time and here are things we specifically
2 don't approve ahead of time. You have all the atonomy in
3 the world, but you don't have means, in certain cases.
4 And, you know, in the case of a community like Cordova,
5 and I speak of terms like leverage not to suggest that we
6 wanted use them, at all. But this is a community that
7 has no tax base related to the oil industry in it. It
8 has no funding source unless the legislature gives it to
9 it. It had no funding source in the spill unless Exxon
10 gives it to it. So, there was no other source besides
11 that DEC money, which people are now saying the emergency
12 is over. That policy is not clear yet. But, aside from
13 those DEC funds under the state taps liability fund there
14 is no place a city can go and draw the means to fulfill
15 it's needs without walking around on its knees with a
16 silver cup and saying 'please, sir may I have a nickel to
17 solve the problems of my constituents'. And that has
18 been a real frustration of our City Council. It's been a
19 real frustration of the members of the response committee
20 that I am aware of because, quite honesty, I think the
21 Lt. Governor said it well in a meeting we had with him
22 last week. He said, "This is one kind of an emergency.
23 Or one kind of a situation where the state government is
23 no better equipped to respond than the local government."
25 Except for the fact that the state government has the

1 funds. And, what the state government has in funds it
2 doesn't have in local knowledge. And, time and again we
3 have had a situation where we have had local knowledge
4 where we had no desire whatsoever to waste money, we have
5 no desire whatsoever to gouge, we have no desire
6 whatsoever to freely spend. We have plenty of self-
7 discipline within and we would happily spend with the
8 right of audit later. There's all the self-discipline
9 that you build into government, except the means to go
10 out and do the spending that you are talking about. And,
11 as you can see by this chart, we have done some of that
12 and right now you have a council and a community that's
13 quite concerned that it may not get it back when it's
14 only done what it's really responsible to do and that any
15 government entity should do when there is a tragedy and
16 an emergency like this.

17 So, it's a long answer to a short question. But,
18 basically I don't think we have ever had our autonomy
19 taken away from us. What we have is the question of
20 means. And, if there is a policy by the Governor's mini-
21 cabinet that these DEC funds -- that response that the --
22 we consider and the city does consider that what we are
23 doing now is still part of the emergency first response.
23 There are some things that are more optional to do today
25 then perhaps -- the second week of the spill, but under

1 the law that set up those funds for emergency first
2 response. There are some things that are more optional
3 to do today than were perhaps optional the second week of
4 the spill. But, under that law that set up those funds
5 for emergency first response we believe that the
6 community ought to be able to have access to those and we
7 are in discussion with DEC right now and I won't say that
8 we are in disagreement. We're just not certain what it
9 is going to come down to, yet.

10 The last document that Brenda just passed around
11 is a, as you all may be aware, the legislature
12 appropriated \$35 million for state response and then went
13 to agencies for their various wish lists. And agencies
14 came up with over \$140 million worth of ideas. The mini-
15 cabinet has committed to spend \$10 million right now on
16 fish and wildlife research, but the other \$25 million
17 isn't set. Within Community and Regional Affairs they
18 had asked for \$1.6 million to be given to communities.
19 Community and Regional Affairs was bounced out of the
20 mini-cabinet. They have not gotten...

21 MS. WUNNICKE: They're not part of that?

22 MR. TREADWELL:they are not part of the
23 mini-cabinet. The Mayors have complained about that.
23 Have signed resolutions to the Governor and, again,
25 that's something that if you want to state an opinion

1 early, that's a good one to raise questions about.

2 MR. PARKER: I'll sure talk to Commissioner

3 Hoffman about it.

4 MR. WENK: As an outsider that name went by me

5 just a little too fast. Could you say.....

6 MS. WUNNICKE: Community and Regional Affairs.

7 MR. PARKER: Formed with a special mission to

8 take care of the needs of the small communities.

9 MR. TREADWELL: And we've gone to them and

10 said can you help us with grants on this. And they have

11 said no all we can be is an information source and they

12 send somebody to the Mayor's meetings. But, the \$1.6

13 million dollars they've asked for, which would include

14 \$700,000.00 in block grants, which is, I'm not sure

15 enough, but, you know, it's the right start in the right

16 direction, is it's just not yet been made available by

17 the Governor.

18 MR. PARKER: I must say I never fail to be

19 surprised and I wasn't aware that CRA was not on the

20 mini-cabinet. Anyone else? Okay. Thank you, Mead.

21 MR. TREADWELL: Thank you, very much and we'll

22 do our best to cooperate.

23 MR. PARKER: Next CDFU has asked to...

23 MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, while she is

25 coming forward I would like to say to the Oil Spill Dis-

1 aster Response Committee it seemed to me that throughout
2 this tragedy that there's been a tremendous need for
3 official regular reporting of facts. And, I'd like your
4 thoughts some -- perhaps at one of the breaks, in terms
5 of how you translate your newsletter. And a future
6 situation for a command center, for example, of the facts
7 and how it be disseminated. It seems that there are lots
8 of misperceptions floating around both in and out of
9 Alaska that could have been avoided with a good
10 communications effort from the beginning. And, I'd like
11 your thoughts on it.

12 MR. PARKER: Good Morning.

13 MS. LEOND (ph): Good Morning.

14 MR. PARKER: Just like old times sitting at the
15 table with CDFU.

16 MS. LEOND: My name is Marilyn Leond. I am the
17 Executive Director of Cordova District Fishermen United.
18 I'm also a member of the Cordova Oil Spill Disaster
19 Response Committee. What I would like to talk to you
20 about this morning is the initial response.

21 On the first morning just before 7:00 on Good
22 Friday morning, I received a phone call at my home from
23 Jack Lamb, who was Vice President of CDFU and he told me
23 had just been informed that there was a tanker on Bligh
25 Reef. He had been trying to get ahold of Ricky Ott who

1 is also a member of our Board of Directors and hadn't
2 been able to reach. I told him I would go to our office
3 and get on the phone and see what I could find out. He
4 was going to go to her cabin and see if he could find
5 here. So, I was in the office at about 10 after 7:00 the
6 first morning. My first attempted phone call was to
7 Alyeska. I had an emergency phone number for them. I
8 tried to call them and I got no answer. I called the MSO
9 Valdez Coast Guard Station and they confirmed to me that
10 yes in fact there was a tanker on the reef. I continued
11 trying to call Alyeska off and on, but now knowing there
12 really was a tanker on the reef, I called a couple of
13 local fishermen to find out if their boats were in the
14 water and if they were available to go help.

15 I called our representative, the Senator's
16 offices down in Juneau and got a couple of people there.
17 Left messages on others machine. About every ten minutes
18 I would try to call Alyeska and continued -- I was told
19 this was their emergency phone number and would never get
20 an answer. Meanwhile, then Jack Lamb and Ricky Ott came
21 into the office just before 8:00 and they also got on the
22 phone calling local fishermen. We got a phone call from
23 a local charter service who said he was going to Valdez
23 and did anyone from our office want to go. So, Ricky
25 went to the airport and flew over to Valdez immediately

1 to see what she could do over there.

2 Fishermen started coming into the office as they
3 turned on the news in the morning and heard what was
4 going on. Our office became rather busy. The phone
5 started ringing and by 9:00 when I still hadn't gotten
6 any answer at Alyeska's emergency phone number, I called
7 the KCHU Radio Station in Valdez and talked to a friend
8 of mine who works there and said do you have any idea how
9 to get a hold of these people and he gave me a phone
10 number. At that time we had thirty votes on our list
11 that were in the water, fueled up and ready to go help.
12 I called up Alyeska, I talked to a switchboard operator,
13 I didn't get a name, but she told me yes, we are
14 maintaining a list and we will put you on the list. I
15 told her who it was, that it was CDFU, that we had 30
16 boats ready. And, she said we'll call you back.

17 Meanwhile, more people are coming to the office,
18 the phones are ringing off the wall and we're making more
19 phone calls getting fishermen that are ready to go. By
20 noon we had 75 boats on our list. Fifteen of those boats
21 were in Tatitilik. They were fifteen minutes away from
22 the tanker. At that time I called Alyeska again. I
23 talked to someone different and they told me yes, we have
23 assigned a person to that task and I will give him your
25 name and he will call you back. To this day, no one has

1 ever called me back.

2 Okay. So, we continued -- people coming into the
3 office. The list is growing, we are really concerned,
4 I've got fishermen who are literally begging me to send
5 them someplace. But, I don't have any equipment, we
6 don't, you know, know where to send them. What they can
7 do when they get there. So, we sit and wait. And, quite
8 honesty in retrospect I kept on thinking somewhere along
9 the line the system has got to kick in and they'll send
10 our people someplace. I called the Coast Guard, I called
11 DEC. I called anyone that I could think of to let them
12 know that we've got people that are ready to go. I
13 continued calling Alyeska and the response that I got
14 from them was 'well, we're real concerned about using
15 amateurs'. People that were not on their payroll. And I
16 tried to explain to them, these are not amateurs. These
17 are people who have been working in the Sound, many of
18 them most of their lives. And, they know the Sound alot
19 better than anybody that they are going to bring in to
20 help them.

21 On Saturday, mid-afternoon on Saturday, finally I
22 got a phone call from DEC. Actually it was a contractor
23 for DEC. And he said we hear you've got some boats that
23 can go out and work. And, I said yes we do. He said
25 "well, is it possible that you could have four of them

1 ready to go within about two hours and two more on
2 standby?" And I said "No, problem". Because by that
3 time I'm sure we had well over 100 boats on our lists.
4 So, I made phone calls, I had four who were ready to go
5 at a moments notice and another 50 who said let me know
6 as soon as you want me.

7 So, we got the phone call back from DEC and that
8 afternoon we did indeed dispatch four boats. I was told
9 th at they were going to go to Valdez, fuel up, get
10 supplies and that they were going to go out and boom off
11 some of the streams and areas in the immediate area
12 around the tanker. That's the night the wind started
13 kicking up, three of the boats made it to Valdez. One
14 had up in the Bay and never made it to Valdez that night
15 because it was blowing so hard. The other three got to
16 Valdez and waited for the storm to subside. When they
17 were released, where they went was not to go boom off
18 streams, but to go boom off the tanker. They were
19 tending the boom in that area.

20 On Monday, early evening on Monday, I got another
21 phone call from DEC. And, they said it appeared that the
22 hatchery in San Juan was in jeopardy and they wanted to
23 know again if we had boats that were ready to go. This
23 was around 7:00 in the evening. I said yes we did. And,
25 they were looking for fifteen boats to go out. So, I

1 commandeered another person to come help me. We got on
2 the phone and in all of these cases, too, it wasn't just
3 simply getting a boat and a skipper. It was -- we needed
4 a seine boat, with a jetney in the water and a skipper
5 and four crew members. So, there was some coordination
6 among themselves. But, we had no problem in getting the
7 people who were willing to go out. So, on Monday night
8 until about midnight, we were calling up people and
9 dispatching boats. We called up the fuel dock here and
10 got them to open up at midnight so that these people
11 could get fuel. There were a couple of boats that
12 weren't ready for fuel. And, they opened up and the
13 people went out.

14 Back in those days there was no such thing as an
15 Exxon contract. These people never asked if they were
16 going to get paid. Didn't care if they were going to get
17 paid. Their crew didn't care if they weren't getting
18 paid. They put their own fuel in the boats, they bought
19 their own groceries. They just wanted to save the Sound
20 and their hatcheries. So, the pay was not an issue at
21 that point.

22 My point in telling you that is that we were
23 ready. The fishermen never expected to have to be ready.
23 We were told that Alyeska could take care of themselves.
25 First it wouldn't happen, but if it did happen, Alyeska

1 could take care of it. They were not ready, we were
2 ready. And our people didn't expect to get paid.

3 MR. PARKER: You ever get any response from the
4 Coast Guard on your initial calls to -- give you any idea
5 that anything was ever going to happen? Were you ever
6 able to break through to the Coast Guard?

7 MS. LEOND: No, actually I never got much
8 better response out of the Coast Guard than I did out of
9 Alyeska. They confirmed to me yes it has happened and I
10 would tell them we had boats ready, but no, they never
11 responded in wanting any use of our boats, either. The
12 only agency that did respond was DEC.

13 MR. WENK: Question and a comment. First to
14 follow-up your question, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the
15 Coast Guard, were you aware of a Coast Guard Contingency
16 Plan itself? A regional Contingency Plan for this sort
17 of accident? And in connection with that plan were you
18 aware that there were any provisions for volunteer
19 assistance of the kind that you described?

20 MS. LEOND: I was aware of the plan, I'll admit
21 that I'm not an expert on the plan. I haven't gone
22 through it with a fine tooth comb, but my understanding
23 was that part of the Contingency Plan was to use local
23 volunteers. Recognizing that the local volunteers knew
25 the area and were well qualified to do the work.

1 MR. WENK: My comment, Mr. Chairman, is that
2 this kind of direct first person testimony seems to me to
3 be enormously valuable. We were fortunate by a shear
4 accident to gain similar testimony from the Mayor of
5 Valdez and the Lt. Governor because they were passengers
6 on the same ship that was touring the site. But, if that
7 hadn't happened I'm not sure that there would have been a
8 permanent record. The thought occurs to me that -- and I
9 don't know that this is a Commissions' responsibility,
10 but somebody's responsibility to go around with a tape
11 recorder while people's memories are fresh as yours still
12 is and collect this information. This is powerful,
13 descriptive, authentic, incredible eye-witness accounts
14 of what happened. And, I think this is the kind of
15 record in an emergency, put aside all this question of
16 legal liability. I'm thinking about what the Commission
17 is about in terms of what lessons we can learn.

18 MS. LEOND: You are giving my memory more
19 credit. It's not fresh anymore.

20 MR. LUND: Mr. Chairman, I think Ed has a
21 proper point. And I've always felt that that is one of
22 the primary duties of the Commission in that we're just
23 like any other bureaucracy getting our Commission staffed
23 up is taking a little bit of time and I think we are
25 going to start resolving that tomorrow. But, one of the

1 items that I think in our full structure is to come out
2 with the credible statement of what happened. And from
3 the volunteer side from each of the communities and to
4 put that together will take -- I guess, we would call it
5 an investigator or something to send around to put this
6 document or put these comments together, so that we can
7 put it together with our report. The factual situation
8 of what did happen and then we can move on from there.

9 MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, this is one of
10 the reasons we are in Cordova and why we decided -- as
11 Sund says not being organized ourselves that the first
12 thing that we wanted to do is come into the communities
13 in Prince William Sound and here from the people who were
14 directly involved.

15 MR. SUND: We're here without the staff. We
16 haven't hired them yet but we thought we'd better get on
17 with the show.

18 MS. LEOND: Well, I'd like to say, too, that
19 Cordova wasn't organized at first either. But, we jumped
20 in and got organized. We made up the system as we went
21 along. And, also with our office, prior to the oil
22 spill, I was the only employee. We have a Board of
23 Directors of nine members, but I am the only full time
23 staff. We have had now at times up to 29 people on our
25 staff. Not all at one time, but filling in different

1 times. The first weekend I was pretty much handling it
2 myself other than someone else would walk in and if the
3 phone rang and I was on the phone I'd say, answer that.
4 Our staff came about by wives and fishermen who didn't
5 have boats in the water wondering into the office saying
6 'what can I do' and I would put them to work. If the
7 phone rings, answer it. If somebody comes to the door,
8 see what they want. That's how that all evolves.
9 Thereto, in the beginning, I told these people, you are
10 volunteers. We don't have any money. We have two sides
11 to our organization. CDFU and Cordova Quatic Marketing
12 Association. CDFU side's annual budget is normally
13 \$50,000.00 a year. We did get advance assistance from
14 Exxon in the amount of \$250,000.00. We have now gone
15 through most of that money. So, we have gone through
16 about a five year budget in three months.

17 MR. PARKER: I'm sure it must be haunting the
18 memory of all those who were responsible for Contingency
19 Planning on what the effect might have been on piling a
20 few dollars worth of boom in Cordova and having an
21 agreement with CDFU or whoever that they could dispatch
22 boats on their own authority. We'll certainly dig into
23 those contingency plans and see what, you know, if the
23 Coast Guard has said there were provisions for volunteers
25 we are certainly going to dig in there and find out what

1 Meg?

2 MS. HAYES: Mr. Chairman, I'm curious about the
3 first four boats that were sent out. That you thought
4 were going to go to boom off streams and bays around the
5 tanker and instead got assigned to.....

6 MS. LEOND: Boom tending at the tanker.

7 MS. HAYES: Yeah. Is there any reports that
8 you've heard of or any speculation on their part that you
9 may be aware of about why there wasn't a greater effort
10 at removing the oil or booming it at the very beginning
11 instead of trying to remove the oil that was existing in
12 the tanker?

13 MS. LEOND: We've heard several.....

14 MS. HAYES: I guess I'm encouraging you to, if
15 you have speculation or have heard of something, we've
16 heard a lot of it in the last couple of days of
17 conflicting stories and we are just very curious and
18 interested in that aspect of it.

19 MS. LEOND: Well, specifically, on your
20 question, I don't think I really have an answer. It was
21 interesting though because I -- the boats when they came
22 back to Cordova, the fishermen were real frustrated
23 because they weren't booming off the streams, but they
23 were booming off the tanker and they felt that the job
25 they were doing was very ineffective. They felt the boom

1 was a show piece. That it was not doing what it was
2 supposed to be doing and they spent all of their time
3 just trying to keep it together. And, they felt that
4 with any wind at all, they would be losing oil. And,
5 they were losing oil. So, they felt that they were being
6 used for something that was merely a show piece anyway.
7 But, why that decision was made to have them do that
8 rather than booming the streams, I don't know.

9 MR. PARKER: Ed?

10 MR. WENK: One quick question. We're aware of
11 the somewhat invisible transfer of responsibility from
12 Alyeska to Exxon. Now, your initial calls were all to
13 Alyeska and for understandable reasons. At any time were
14 you aware when this transfer of responsibility occurred?

15 MS. LEOND: Well, I guess I remember hearing
16 about it at the time, but it didn't really have precise
17 affect on us that I could say 'yes, that's when it
18 happened.

19 MR. SUND: Did you ever get a response from
20 Alyeska in the first day or two?

21 MS. LEOND: No.

22 MR. SUND: Do you have the phone number. Could
23 you give us a phone number you were given to call?

23 MS. LEOND: I could probably come up with it.
25 I don't have it right off, but I could probably go back

1 in my notes and find it.

2 MS. HAYES: You want to call it, John, and find

3 out.....

4 MR. SUND: Yeah, I just thought I'd dial it

5 and see who answers the phone.

6 MS. LEOND: No one answers.

7 MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, one of the things I

8 was curious about is your attempt to contact Alyeska and

9 what Alyeska was telling you and I was looking forward to

10 getting a comment other than that they didn't answer the

11 phone. Because there's a lot of curiosity of what

12 happened in that first twenty-four, thirty-six hours and

13 one of the things -- you have to have patience with us,

14 we weren't here and a lot of this I know is rehashed. A

15 lot of people have been through it for months and the

16 concept of sitting down to another Commission and telling

17 the same old story again seems to be kind of old and

18 boring to you, but it's relatively new information to us.

19 MS. LEOND: Uh-huh.

20 MR. SUND: But, that first twenty-four, thirty-

21 six, forty-eight hour period in terms of what happened

22 from all different perspectives. Your perspective,

23 Alyeska's perspective, Exxon's perspective, the Coast

23 Guard's, it's something the Commissions very concerned

25 with and we'd like to come out with a document of here's

1 what really happened.

2 MS. LEOND: Well, I did make contact with
3 Alyeska by 9:00 that morning and I could never get beyond
4 the person who answered the phone and she always assured
5 me that someone would call me back.

6 MR. SUND: So, you got to the switchboard,
7 basically.....

8 MS. LEOND: I got to the switchboard with 75
9 boats and they weren't interested.

10 MR. SUND: Do you get the feeling that the
11 person at the switchboard was being overwhelmed with
12 other calls?

13 MS. LEOND: Oh, I'm sure she was. I know what
14 our phone was like. We started out with three phone
15 lines. By Monday we added two more phone lines and I
16 was sorry I had done that because they were all busy.
17 But, I'm sure she was overwhelmed. It didn't appear to
18 me that they had a system in place to be able to use all
19 of this information that was coming in. I also know that
20 we had a lot of information coming into us. Some of
21 which was usable and some of which was not. And it is
22 difficult to filter through that. But, it does seem to
23 me that when someone calls you and their forty miles away
23 from the tanker and they've got 75 boats ready to go,
25 that that's worthy of note.

1 MR. SUND: I just wonder, I guess, Mr.
2 Chairman, I haven't really been familiar with big
3 companies and the mentalities, but there seems to be a
4 fortress mentality at Alyeska. We went to drive through
5 their yesterday and I think they wanted to search our
6 luggage and our wallets before they would let us in the
7 compound. It's interesting that when you get that
8 mentality, say we're self-sufficient, we're ourselves and
9 we will take care of ourselves and I wonder if that even
10 extends over to the switchboard. If it's not Alyeska or
11 not oil it doesn't count. Any reaction or feeling of how
12 you got treated by them?

13 MS. LEOND: Yeah, I would say that I had the
14 feeling that we didn't count.

15 MR. SUND: You were amateurs?

16 MS. LEOND: They were politely taking our
17 number and I'm not sure what they were doing with it
18 after that.

19 MR. SUND: Well, they didn't use it.

20 MS. LEOND: No, they didn't use it.

21 MR. SUND: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 MR. PARKER: Just before the spill, Marilyn, I
23 was spending the winter reviewing the aftermath of the
23 '64 quake. And, you know, the Command Center at the
25 quake which was just put together by Governor Eagen and

1 Mayor Sharrock of Anchorage, then, you know, the help
2 from everybody else did work. And worked very
3 effectively. It was on top of things from day one. So,
4 you know, Command Centers can work if someone wants them
5 to.

6 MS. LEOND: Well, I think they had a great
7 resource here that could have helped them in the early
8 hours that they didn't use.

9 MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, and this was also
10 an evolving event. I mean, the earthquake happened and
11 true, there were some aftershocks. But, then it was over
12 and everybody turned to deal with the aftermath. This
13 was such an evolving event that went on for so long as
14 the spill spread and affected more and more areas, more
15 and more people.

16 MR. PARKER: I think the main difference,
17 though, was that there was the desire to communicate.
18 Whether the desire by the agencies, by Alyeska, by Exxon
19 existed through this, you know, are things we are really
20 going to be probing into. You have to be willing to
21 incorporate the community into your actions if it's going
22 to work.

23 MS. LEOND: Well, somewhere along the line,
23 too, someone from, I'm not sure if this was Alyeska or
25 Exxon, it may have been a little bit later as we were

1 trying to get more involved with our boats. I referred
2 to the fact that they were concerned about their
3 liability. And, at that point I did have the feeling
4 that they were spending more time talking to their
5 lawyers about whether or not they should use our boats.

6 MR. PARKER: Anyone else?

7 MS. LEOND: I would like to make one other
8 statement. I really appreciate your coming here and
9 taking the input from the community. I think it would be
10 helpful if on the state level there were some sort of an
11 additional committee or group of affected parties. The
12 oil spill committee in Cordova works really well. We've
13 got people from various parts of the community. Right
14 now we have five members. The city is in the process of
15 expanding by two more members and we've got fishing, the
16 city itself, Chamber of Commerce, processors, they are
17 going to be adding native and at large seat. And I think
18 that would be real helpful if the state had some sort of
19 a group like that of affected parties so that you could
20 have continuing input. It's great that you are coming
21 around and getting the testimony now, but as you say, it
22 is an evolving incident. It is still evolving. And,
23 things will be different next week.

24 MR. PARKER: You sponsored a meeting here
25 recently with the other communities.

1 MS. LEOND: Right.

2 MR. PARKER: Larry Smith called and questioned

3 myself to talk about your efforts and yeah, I think that

4 we are going to need all of the communications with the

5 oil spill area that we can muster. And I'm going to

6 watch the development of that particular group that you

7 are forming there. Bob Laresche has his people out in

8 the communities. I'm glad you brought that point up

9 because we will certainly see whether the group here

10 forming is going to be able to serve along with constant

11 contact with the Oil Mayors and so forth. We are going

12 to keep all of the lines opened that are available to us

13 for now and see whether we need to form or urge the

14 Governor to form such a group. Whichever.

15 MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, we did discuss, if

16 you will recall, at our first meeting, an advisory group

17 to this Commission. Structured much like your

18 describing. One of the barriers to that is just that the

19 short term nature of this commission in terms of its

20 tasks and how it has to focus in on the facts and focus

21 in on the ultimate questions. It certainly is something

22 to consider and yet the structure of it and the

23 maintenance of it just may be beyond the six month term

23 of this Commission and the funding of this Commission.

25 MS. LEOND: Also on Jerry McCuen who's presi-

1 dent of CDFU would like to make a short statement, too.

2 MR. PARKER: Okay.

3 MS. LEOND: Thank you.

4 MS. WUNNICKE: Thank you.

5 MR. MCCUEN: Commissioners (cough) -- get my
6 voice back. I've been talking alot. I am the President
7 of the Cordova District Fishermen's United. I was here
8 at the very beginning of the pipeline battle, so to
9 speak. Although I was pretty young, then. I got pretty
10 grey recently. I can't take up -- I don't want to take
11 up a lot of your time, because I've been following all
12 the bills and the reactionary things to this oil spill
13 and it's really hard to sort them all out. There is some
14 good bills. There's some bad ones, but I might go back.
15 Where I visited Alyeska four years ago, I was in a
16 meeting with George Nelson and the Alyeska staff and two
17 lawyers from Washington D.C. and we wanted some answers
18 to our questions about why they didn't have oil response
19 spill team and I was told that they couldn't afford one.
20 And I wanted some other answers about the water treatment
21 plant and the overall condition of the terminal and we
22 couldn't get any answers there either. So, I know what
23 you mean about going to Fort Knox. You can't -- it's
23 pretty ridiculous when DEC has to have two hour advanced
25 notice to go there. I don't pretend to say all the

1 blames on Alyeska, it has to lay some with the state and
2 the federal government. They've laxed in the thirteen
3 years of tankers going in and out of there without any
4 inspection of what the plans in place were. Nobody
5 inspected any tankers. Nobody inspected the oil response
6 spill team that was -- We made all kinds of noise to the
7 federal government and the state about that after that
8 meeting and no response. We couldn't get any response
9 out of anybody.

10 MR. PARKER: Who did you talk to specifically
11 primarily, who's the Commissioner of DEC then?

12 MR. MCCUEN: I don't remember that. I'd have to
13 go back and get all the letters out. Ted Stevens, we
14 addressed him. Don Young, of course, and Senator
15 McCowsky.

16 MR. PARKER: Yeah, I'm just interested in, you
17 know, just who you contacted.

18 MR. MCCUEN: The Governor, Jay.....

19 MR. PARKER: Is this during the Sheffield.....

20 MR. MCCUEN: This was about three years ago when
21 I went over there. During the Sheffield Administration.

22 MR. PARKER: Okay.

23 MR. MCCUEN: Everybody was pretty well aware...
23 They responded that they were aware of these things but
25 nothing was being done. That's why I say when bills like

1 the one that requires tankers to have boom on tankers is
2 ridiculous. I mean, what are they gonna --- lower
3 lifeboats and put the boom around. I mean the response
4 vessels that voluntarily that BP says they are going to
5 put in place now, that we are supposed to see in action
6 in August, with their separate spill team would be an
7 answer to a lot of it if -- we'll have to wait and see
8 how that's all put together. And alot of this we are
9 going to have to wait and see down the line a little bit
10 to get an idea of what we really do need. Instead of
11 being so reactionary to a lot of it. Because there is a
12 lot of things that need to be done. You know, to upgrad
13 the terminal and upgrade the tanker traffic. The radar
14 needs upgrading. I think there could be a system to put
15 little beepers on there if any tanker left the lane.
16 There's, you know, I could go on and on, but what'll do
17 is submit our list from CDFU that addresses alot of our
18 concerns of having our citizens port authority and what
19 we think needs to be done at the Coast Guard level,
20 terminal level and the tanker level and the agencies'
21 level.

22 If you'd like to ask some questions or something
23 I'll just do that.

23 MR. PARKER: I'll try to run down that boom on
25 board which Brock Adams has in his bill and several other

1 bills that -- no ones made it clear to me how the booms
2 get from the deck and the ship gets boomed up, how much
3 crew they are going to carry on board to do this and all
4 this extra and so forth.

5 MR. MCCUEN: I can understand their reaction to
6 that but when a crew has an accident, I am sure that the
7 whole crew is busy checking the ship and doing whatever
8 they can to prevent things like rolling over and things
9 like that. They are not going to be able to deploy any
10 boom.

11 MR. PARKER: According to NTSB hearings, of
12 course, some crew stayed in the stateroom, which I found
13 most unusual. Normally, you know, when a ship casualty
14 occurs, well you go to general quarters and I found
15 something's very strange there.

16 MR. MCCUEN: Well, there's two things to commit
17 to. Excuse me, go ahead.

18 MR. SUND: Well, I was just going to comment
19 on the boom on board that came up yesterday in Valdez and
20 the Admiral talked about it. Dave Kennedy -- no one's
21 talked about it being very functional or useful. I guess
22 I take a little different point. I would look at it as a
23 stockpile of materials that -- it may not be deployable
23 by the crew, but it may be deployable by a specialty
25 squad that shows up to use it. Instead of having to

1 bring all the equipment.....

2 MS. HAYES: Thirty boats from Cordova.

3 MR. SUND:or thirty boats from Cordova.

4 Whatever. It's the same. You know, you've got to get
5 beyond the issue of Kennedy's point that boom is useless
6 anyway. That he doesn't think most booms are very
7 functional in their current technology in any way, shape
8 or form. But, you get beyond that and say "well, boom
9 does provide some function", then it probably is a useful
10 thing to have booms stockpiled in various locations so
11 it's more accessible. It's the same as fighting fires or
12 same as the fire department having a stockpile of
13 equipment at the end of the road so they don't have to
14 carry it all that way. Having equipment on board a
15 vessel to help in some containment may be useful down the
16 road. I am not the walking expert in it, but it makes
17 some logical sense to me.

18 MR. PARKER: It's a good concept. Our missing
19 Commissioner Mike Herz who had to go home yesterday
20 afternoon makes a point, you know, the Contingency Plans
21 should probably go with the vessel. In which, you know,
22 having a stockpile with the vessel as Commissioner Sund
23 just pointed out makes -- yeah, those are the sort of
23 things that as we get into this hopefully it will start
25 shaking out some answers. You know, everybody's pointed

1 out since this happened, the state of the art hasn't
2 advanced much in twenty years. So, advancing state of
3 the art is part of what we are all about.

4 MR. MCCUEN: Although, Norway is alot further
5 ahead than we ever dreamed to be. That's what I am
6 saying by -- I can respond to that. One, these response
7 vessels, we met with Alyeska owners not too long ago,
8 about four or five days ago, I think. If they respond
9 with the vessels they were talking about with a boom
10 already on the reels and those escort every tanker out
11 there. And they have enough boom capability to boom the
12 whole ship off and they have so much ocean boom on them
13 and so much inflammable boom. Also, the warehouses we
14 were talking about would be stationed in Cordova, one in
15 the village right there where they could drag that boom
16 out. The reason I made that comment was I think it was
17 very inefficient to have booms on the tankers. It's
18 going to get in the way. Nobody's going to be able to
19 deploy it. But, he'd go the routes that we are talking
20 about here and BP is the lead for the Alyeska owners, if
21 they do respond with these vessels and they are suppose
22 to have them in place by August 1st, as much equipment as
23 they can gather and get there, with a demonstration
23 somewhere within August 1st. Those vessels as they
25 followed each tanker out -- there's enough capability on

1 those vessels, skimming capability and boom capability to
2 surround a whole ship without hampering the crew that's
3 already busy enough and doesn't have enough storage space
4 on those tankers to put the boomers. So that may be -- I
5 can clear that matter up a little bit there. And I will
6 submit a list of what we think -- it's not a complete
7 list, but it's a stab at what we think should be done
8 right now immediately. That is not the complete list.
9 Although, I like the idea better of moving the taps lines
10 to the Midwest where we originally thought it should go.

11 MR. PARKER: Yeah, you were pretty young when we
12 went through that one, yeah.

13 MR. MCCUEN: Anymore questions?

14 MR. PARKER: Anyone else?

15 MS. WUNNICKE: Thank you. We appreciate your
16 list.

17 MR. PARKER: Thank you for the list. And, you
18 know, keep sending your thoughts as you develop them.

19 MR. MCCUEN: Okay. Thank you for coming.

20 MR. PARKER: Okay. You got Cordova processors.

21 MR. ROEMHILDT: I am Ken Roemhildt and I
22 represent North Pacific Processors here in Cordova and I
23 guess we are not prepared with much prepared remarks. I
23 guess we are a little bit interested in what you see
25 going on and I guess we have a few comments.

1 First of all I think it is fair to say that the
2 oil spill has impacted the processing community in our
3 area and others as well. We are stumbling along. We've
4 had some major dislocations with crew. We've had, I was
5 just telling the guys outside, of the nine tenders that
6 we have on the per seine opening this morning, three of
7 them are part of my regular fleet. The rest of them are
8 tenders that we have borrowed from other areas. Kodiak
9 being the principle area that they've been borrowed from.
10 And they are only available because they are not fishing
11 there. We've had some serious problems earlier this year
12 unavailability of cannery workers to process the red
13 salmon run. Which was -- the fish were in good supply,
14 but processing workers weren't. There were fish that had
15 to be downgraded in quality because of inability to get
16 them processed in time. There were fish that had to be
17 custom processed at other plants because certain plants
18 didn't have enough crew to do it.

19 We're still not out of the woods at this point
20 either. We do have enough crews currently, but when the
21 seine season gets into full force here in another week or
22 so, I know our plant is going to be between somewhere 75
23 and 100 people short. People that we lost... During
23 normal season we have locals that are the backbone of our
25 start-up crew and normally they handle most of the inci-

1 dental fish. When the Cooper River season starts
2 normally we pick up between that and the start of seine
3 season we pick up about 50 to 75 local people in town who
4 work for us most of the year. And, of those people we
5 didn't get a single one this year. And, they came with
6 housing. So, we are not only short the people, but we
7 are short the housing that goes with them. Those people
8 pretty generally end up on the oil spill. So, we are
9 going to end up with about 75 to 100 people short. Plus
10 the housing for most of those people. We have made some
11 arrangements with Exxon to provide some housing and some
12 help in soliciting this extra crew.

13 Another problem we are finding is that we sent
14 out those people that we normally hire, we sent out job
15 offers and they returned the job offers and then we
16 called them a little later and tell them when to come up.
17 Because we don't want them here too early either. The
18 last group that we called for February 5th, over one-half
19 of the people that had already said that they were going
20 to take a job with us, said I'm sorry we found other
21 jobs. You know, your letter said that the season was
22 going to go on as normal, but all we hear in the news is
23 closures and we decided you weren't telling us the truth
23 so we took other jobs. So, that cut down our own effort
25 to get enough crew here.

1 Tenders are critical. While Kodiak isn't fishing
2 we are able to get by. But of our normal, like about ten
3 tenders that we sent out, we have three that are from our
4 normal fleet right now. And that's all. And if Kodiak
5 starts up then we'll lose, I think we have five Kodiak
6 boats over here right now. If we loose any of them,
7 we're going to be in real problems. We thought we had
8 people coming off the oil spill, but it appears that it
9 isn't happening. We were led to believe a couple of
10 weeks ago, that they were going to start laying off some
11 boats, and the indication was that it was going to be the
12 most expensive boats first, which would be the bigger
13 boats, the tenders. So far it hasn't really happened.
14 So we're concerned. We're on track as far as organizing
15 as much as we can. We do believe that there is going to
16 be a reasonable, and orderly fishery. I guess I'm
17 looking forward to September when it's all over. Then
18 we'll know what really is happening. That's about all I
19 have to say about processing in general. I would like to
20 make one comment about future legislation, or how we look
21 at oil spills. I think it is very inappropriate to have
22 a private party making decisions about things are
23 handled. Corrective action, things of that nature. I
23 don't think that that is an idea that we should
25 perpetuate. Not just from that idea that you don't let

1 the criminal set the penalties. It just doesn't work
2 that way. They've got a whole different set of
3 priorities, and values than we do. I think that whatever
4 legislation, whatever response ideas that come out of
5 this spill, there has to be some one person in command,
6 and it must not be the party that caused the problem. We
7 must have somebody who's looking at the interests of
8 everybody making these decisions. I'm on the Cordova
9 response committee, and I've seen, just in these last
10 couple of meetings, several examples of, well, Exxon says
11 that they are not going to handle this particular thing
12 at all, or in this way. That's probably a good decision
13 for Exxon, but that's not necessarily a good decision for
14 everybody else. So I think that if I have one comment
15 that we need to set up an ability for someone, some one
16 agency or individual to take control, and also to make
17 sure that they are responsive to the public in general,
18 and not just trying to get out of something as cheaply as
19 possible. Are there any questions?

20 MR. PARKER: Okay, thank you Kennel. Will you
21 spell your last name please, so we get it correct on the
22 record?

23 MR. ROEMHILDT: R-O-E-M-H-I-L-D-T.

23 MR. PARKER: Okay.

25 MR. ROEMHILDT: One more time? R-O-E-M-H-I-L-D-T

1 I'll leave a card over here with your recorder.

2 MR. PARKER: Probably our most decision will be
3 on just the point you brought up. What kind of
4 organization are we going to recommend to handle this?

5 MR. SUND: I just have a comment to Ken. I have
6 a fish processing company a Ketchikan, and we lost our
7 seine tender to the Prince Williams Sound oil spill clean
8 up, so I have a little feeling of having to go out and
9 scramble to find a substitute vessel and there's a lot of
10 processors in the southeast who a lot...there a lot of
11 tenders who came up here that were missing down there
12 too. We don't have a closure somewhere to draw on, so
13 its having an impact on us. Just so the commission can
14 get a feel for how this feels here you know, where
15 Ken's...you know looking at a day labor force to provide
16 some of the normal help. Now he's got an outside labor
17 force to provide housing. That is a disruption in the
18 Cordova economy and the crew, or fish economy in a major
19 way, but it's also a disruption in the entire fish
20 industry elsewhere. That is a ripple effect that is felt
21 in southeast Alaska, in terms that there is a body of
22 people that come out and go working, and now there's a
23 crew that comes into Ketchikan that goes to work at Werco
23 Packing or the far west cannery, or Phillips, or in some
25 cases even us, although we're not a big processor that

1 the crew now says it paid for housing in Cordova. Why
2 don't you pay for housing in Ketchikan?

3 MR. ROEMHILDT: Or transportation.

4 MR. SUND: Or transportation. You know, so
5 there's this, you know, the cost goes up another notch
6 level, which is a rippling effect, and if you think you
7 have trouble collecting from Exxon, try to be a processor
8 in Southeast Alaska, and make a claim that your business
9 has been disrupted by this oil spill. You're not going
10 to get anywhere. It is in fact, it is a factual thing
11 that has g happened. It's part of it. I think you have
12 a much bigger problem than we have. I think the
13 other...might you know more about it than I do, at least
14 the rumor was is that on the copper river opening, there
15 were no cash buyers out there, which is a normal
16 traditional thing. That's form a fisherman's view, that
17 you might be getting a little nickel, or a dime a pound
18 more on a cash buying basis. I don't know if that was
19 true or not.....

20 MR. SUND: I think that the market pretty well
21 settled itself this year. I don't know just how much
22 that would have helped. There weren't very many, if any.
23 The tender that you got to replace the one that you lost,
23 were you able to get them for the same money. I didn't
25 negotiate the deal, my partner is working on that right

1 now. It's a much smaller boat, and I'm not sure, just
2 from a structural point of view that the boat is even
3 going to work. It's more than what we've had, which is
4 nothing.

5 MR. ROEMHILDT: In general, we've had to pay more
6 for everything we've done this year.

7 MR. SUND: Yeah.

8 MR. ROEMHILDT: The new boats that we've
9 had...and then we've picked up basically everything that
10 was available. The choices are very limited, very
11 limited.

12 MS. HAYES: Thank you so much.

13 MR. SUND: I'd just like one more comment, and if
14 Ed has a comment on your recommendation for future
15 legislation, I think that's of the essence of what the
16 committee here has been wrestling with since we walked
17 in. We all have kind of our ideas, and one of the
18 examples that we put forth is that Exxon may not be doing
19 everything we want them to be doing, or doing it
20 correctly, but if you take the scenario of the tanker
21 that went grounded, is financially irresponsible. It's a
22 bankrupt charter company that has no money, then what do
23 you do? What is your contingency plan for dealing with
23 an oil spill with a tanker that grounds out, that is
25 bankrupt? And then you're left with looking to other

1 resources, and nobody's really come up with one that
2 could the State Government, or could the Federal
3 Government respond as quickly with checks, and with
4 money, and mobilizing this to get it going. Even though
5 they may not have done it right or wrong, at least
6 there's people out there doing something. And I think
7 that's kind of what your comment get's at here, the one
8 person in command, and not the person who caused the
9 problem. Generally, that means some governmental entity.

10 MR. ROEMHILDT: You could be a combination.
11 We've had...we've talked in our response committee about
12 several ideas, and we'd be happy to discuss that further.
13 As far as the tanker, I think that it's kind of silly not
14 to have some sort of bonding type arrangement. If they
15 can't pay the fare, then they don't belong here. Just
16 because somebody can scrape up enough fuel to bring a
17 tanker in here, that doesn't appear to me that they
18 would be very responsible.

19 MR. SUND: That's true. We won't get into the
20 technicalities of how they do it, but it's done that way
21 on most of the tankers in the world. The tankers are run
22 through one time corporations that are set up for that
23 one specific run. The corporation, I think the federal
23 law, is that they are only liable to the cost of the
25 tanker, and the cargo on board. So they are, most of the

1 tankerage fuel in the world is done on a, basically no
2 liability limit.

3 MR. ROEMHILDT: It doesn't protect me very
4 well.

5 MR. SUND: No it doesn't.

6 MR. PARKER: It's designed not to.

7 MR. SUND: If you look at the fifteen mayors from
8 the Britany coast of France who were just visiting here,
9 AMOCO crash on France, they have not received one dime.
10 And AMOCO has never paid one dime to clean up any drop of
11 oil. This happened over ten years ago.

12 MR. ROEMHILDT: I don't think we can afford to do
13 that in our State, where we do have some control.

14 MR. ED: Mr. Chairman, I'm much taken by Ken's
15 comment on the difference in values between corporate
16 organizations that are the transporters of oil, and the
17 values held by people affected by that transportation
18 when there is indeed an accident. This is a beautiful
19 case study of what goes under the popular label of
20 privatization. In terms of Exxon taking over. All of
21 the decision making, all of the funding after, and one of
22 the problems with that is this difference of values, that
23 you put your finger on, mainly whether to not you're
23 going to make every decision on the basis of least cost.
25 I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is a fundamental question

1 that the commission should look at. I believe that the
2 first hand evidence of this kind is a ay to dramatize the
3 issue.

4 MR. PARKER: Okay, thank you. Anyone else.
5 Thank you Ken.

6 MR. ROEMHILDT: Thank you.

7 MR. PARKER: Public testimony. We've scheduled
8 public testimony through the noon hour, until.....

9 MR. SUND:(INAUDIBLE).....or at least one
10 more.

11 MR. PARKER: Okay, I'm sorry.

12 MR. CAMBRONERO: I just have a few comments, my
13 name is Larry Cambronero, that's C-A-M-B-R-O-N-E-R-O-.
14 I'm a Vice President for Chugach Alaska Fisheries.
15 Basically, Mr. Roenhildt had summarized our problems.
16 We're also a processor of different species of salmon and
17 Alaskan sea foods. I can tell you as I speak here today,
18 I'm loosing vessels to the oil spill. Just before I left
19 our plant, I had a couple of guys heading towards the oil
20 spill. These are new guys that have never worked on the
21 spill this year, gill netters. I've looked at my
22 records, and I think to date, we have about thirty eight
23 percent of our seiners are out on the spill. I'm not
23 sure how many will be back. I hope I get most of them
25 back comes seining time. Some tells me they are going to

1 miss this first opening, they'll be back on the next one,
2 but time will tell. That's just on the seiners, we have
3 more gill netters out there. We've experienced a course
4 of a lower than normal charity catch this year. We've
5 also lost tenders earlier from the beginning of the
6 Copper River, we've lost three tenders to this spill.
7 Out of the normal six, that's fifty percent of our tender
8 fleet for the Copper River. Basically, I've lost those
9 tenders two, three days before the opening, and it wasn't
10 until the fifth opening until we were able to replace
11 them with whomever we can get. By that time the run was
12 also down. We also have a housing problem for employees.
13 Although we're fortunate, more fortunate than most
14 processors in Cordova that I think we have, we have more
15 housing in our plants. Still I think come by next, we're
16 going to need about forty people, I'm going to be about
17 forty people short, and I'm going to have to hire. At
18 this point we're maxed out on our housing. We can
19 probably house eighty -- top ninety percent of our crew
20 in our plants. The course that uh...is also the uh...the
21 higher cost of room and board, and our air fare. We
22 tried getting worker from Anchorage, our Anchorage office
23 doesn't have...normally they have a lot of applications
23 going into them. This year, somehow there's hardly
25 anything. Most everybody, the shareholders that we had

1 that were working for us, and the local people that are
2 working for us are all on the oil spill. We do know for
3 a fact that they won't be back this year. They're kind
4 enough to let us know that they'll be working for the
5 spill throughout the summer. So we'll have to go as far
6 as Seattle, or in some cases California to get our
7 people. Basically, we're telling them that we'll
8 reimburse them for their air fare if they stay the whole
9 season. I think for the most part, that we're still
10 paying for a lot of them. We're desperate now that we do
11 need thirty to forty people, and our problem is housing.
12 We need them, but we have no place to put them. We'd be
13 glad to feed them. That basically summarizes our
14 problem, and I share Ken's comments on the legislation
15 and I don't want to take up too much more of your time.
16 I just wanted to voice out our opinion as well, regarding
17 this whole situation. Thank you...

18 MR. PARKER: Thanks.

19 MR. SUND: Just a comment again for the
20 commission, a little enlightenment on this. I think
21 Larry is probably familiar with it, that when you do
22 recruit workers outside, and offer to pay their air fare
23 up, you are mandated by State law to pay their air fare
23 back whenever they basically decide to leave. You can
25 always talk about trying to keep them to the end of the

1 season, but there's a state law regarding...you're liable
2 from the point of hire I think is what the law is. There
3 is something in there, whether they quit, or you fire, I
4 think there's a little discussion, but our labor laws are
5 pretty clear on that, and that makes it very difficult,
6 and very expensive to recruit outside. It's designed to
7 force you to hire locally.

8 MR. CAMBRONERO: It is a problem. We're well
9 aware of that, and it's...we know that we don't have any
10 choice than to return them at our expense.

11 MR. PARKER: Perhaps, John, you might have a
12 discussion with the Commissioner of labor about this, and
13 see if their, if anybody's thinking about it. This
14 temporary redress, or whatever. I'm not sure, I mean,
15 It's not an area that I've been involved in for years.

16 MR. SUND: I think perhaps the answer, rather
17 than changing state laws, to look to the cause of the
18 problem, to solve some of that. That may be something
19 Exxon may want to just pick up, and to get into that,
20 rather than to try to affect state law, which affects
21 everybody all the way to the end of the Aleutian Chain.
22 Thank you very much.

23 MR. PARKER: Thank you. Okay, Public Testimony,
24 any.....

25 MS. ADKINS: Good afternoon, ladies and gentle-

1 men. My name is Marla Adkins. I want to thank you for
2 coming to this meeting, and holding these hearings. I
3 would like to see you come back again on a thirty to
4 sixty day basis. I'm a thirty year resident of Alaska.
5 I'm a nineteen year resident of Prince Williams Sound. I
6 had the only lodge operated on Night Island, the center
7 of the spill. Everytime I've spoke at one of these
8 hearings, which has only been twice, I thing it has cost
9 me between two and three hundred thousand dollars.
10 Nevertheless, we cannot comprise our feelings. You'll
11 forgive me if I don't have much sense of humor about the
12 spill. Being in Night Island, I've been hit with it.
13 There's no sense in it. I will submit to this
14 commission, and I would like it read at a later date, so
15 it is on tape. Three sheets of paper that I don't think
16 I should waste your time with now. Two of them are data
17 that was faxed to the President. Several Congressmen,
18 and to our State Government at the beginning of the
19 spill. I'd like to hit some highlights now, because I
20 have some facts that I think that you will find
21 important. Alyeska has always been hard to deal with.
22 They've always had an iron door policy. Several times, a
23 couple of their leaders have been real open, however the
23 gentlemen in charge over there have always made it almost
25 impossible to deal with them. DEC has had to fight con-

1 tinuously to be allowed over there. I feel that was
2 dereliction of duty on our state policies. I do not
3 blame Alyeska, or Exxon alone for this spill. Alyeska
4 was on line as the clean up people. Exxon was the
5 spiller. I say that because of complacency and my
6 statements will back this up. Many things that have not
7 been done that was promised thirteen years ago, we have
8 to look to our federal government, and to our state, and
9 to myself as a citizen, and ourselves. The Senator
10 summed it up at one of his last meetings. He said we had
11 twenty third century tankers, and we were using
12 eighteenth century technology. I find that deplorable,
13 in the fact that we have the money, and the technology at
14 hand. It has been around the world. We did not have it
15 in place, and I as a private citizen is just as
16 responsible. I immediately, again the barn door is
17 closed, and the horse is out, and I don't think that it
18 is fair to continue to beat Exxon to death. They were
19 the spiller. They are having to live, with not only the
20 monetary debt of this to a point. And naturally they're
21 going to protect their back door, we all do. But they
22 have been faced, the oil industry around the world with
23 tramatic reprocussions and I think we must all be fair
23 about that. There have been demonstrations, I have had
25 calls from New York, from Europe, from Hawaii, young

1 people who have worked for me in my lodge, telling me
2 what has been going on. So, to beat Exxon to death any
3 longer. They're not alone in this. We're all
4 responsible. Immediately upon the spill, I faxed the
5 availability of my lodge, because of bird clean up, ect.
6 I knew what we were going to be faced with. Living
7 fourteen years in the Sound, and my caretaker lived there
8 eighty years, George Flemming, was born up there. I knew
9 what we were going to be faced with. I faxed them
10 information about a vessel that was available, and my
11 lodge, I received no response. I was given a name, Jim
12 Arkessie, in Valdez. Nothing came back. I waited a few
13 days. Meanwhile, I started asking, where is the backup
14 equipment, where is the boom material? I called various
15 agencies. I must, in all fairness, to Exxon, to the
16 Coast Guard, to DEC, we all know we didn't have the right
17 set up in order. The right hand didn't know what the
18 left hand was doing. Even as far as last week, I've seen
19 one more incident of that. We're getting there, but it's
20 a little late. I waited a few more days. I was told the
21 boom material was on its way. Finally, about the night
22 of the fourteenth, my attorney, Randy Farley flew the
23 Sound from Anchorage. Bob Keen, a private citizen flew
23 the sound. These are all men who have used the sound for
25 years. Boats worked there, played there. They wanted to

1 be of help. They were told that they didn't need any
2 inexperienced help out there. Boats called me from
3 Seward, people wanting to go out. I have these names, I
4 can make them available. They were told that the
5 streams, the wildstock streams which I have been really
6 concerned about through this whole thing, and I am still
7 bitterly concerned about. I screamed from day one,
8 because we're not protected. They were told they were
9 being boomed off, we were told that Thumb Bay would be
10 boomed off, and that all the streams on that passage were
11 being boomed off. Three days later they flew back, no
12 booms. The fourth day, one little boom, not the correct
13 size, up in upper Herring Bay. One vessel. My attorney
14 again called Valdez, he attempted to talk to Exxon, he
15 was shuffled about three or four times. He gave up, and
16 went back to Seward, he flew back out to the Sound.
17 Still no more booms material. A fisherman, Bill Black,
18 from Cordova called me. I'm quite outspoken, and quite
19 politically involved in Alaska, so people unfortunately
20 come to me to bitch. I guess I bitch so well. He told
21 me that Utimar, in Seattle, an Anchorage firm, which I
22 have the man's name, and a firm in Oregon, had worked
23 with Exxon in the Mexico Exacto oil spill. That they had
23 equipment, the top of the line equipment, and skimmers on
25 line down there, even though the waters were different

1 temperatures. He told me that on the twenty sixth,
2 immediately following the fill of the twenty eighth, I
3 would have to look on my calendar, I've kept daily
4 records, that they've made bids available to Exxon, and
5 two weeks later when they called me, they still had not
6 heard from Exxon. In the second or the third week, of
7 course I flew out there, and I don't need to tell you
8 that I cried. When I flew out there, by this time boom
9 material was being put around in the Sound. There was
10 some on Point Hill, and they were fighting to save the
11 hatcheries. Again, I've said and stressed, we all know
12 that the hatchery fish are subject, to if you feed them
13 the wrong kind of food, they die, they're not as strong
14 as out wildstock streams, still no boom material was
15 placed. Only in Upper Herring Bay. They told me they
16 had boom material in Thumb Bay for me, and they had
17 boomed off my stream. I got there, and there was three
18 hundred feet of boom material thrown on the beach, that
19 was of an inferior quality and size. The city councilman
20 told me that there was fourteen thousand feet of boom
21 material, Dave Roans, that Exxon had told him that it was
22 due any day. Three weeks later it still wasn't here.
23 When I called Valdez about this, I got the shuffle.
23 Again I must, must say that it was total confusion in
25 Valdez. Not only with Exxon, so we cannot blame them.

1 With Coast Guard, DEC, I can't stress that. Again I
2 offered a bird clean up station, because Kelly Weaverling
3 came to me and said, you are on a prime location, rather
4 than transporting the otters, and transporting the boons,
5 Thumb Bay is perfect. I am assuming, I can only assume,
6 because of my earlier speech that went around the world,
7 television teams came to see me again, I did not make
8 that speech again, I said it one time, and I have not
9 repeated it since. My lodge was not hired. And as to
10 this day, I've still been trying to work for them. I
11 have had better luck with the local claims office and
12 things. My facility is still not being used. I would
13 have upgraded, of course, because of the spill and recent
14 demands to meet the qualifications, but anyway. So
15 therefore, there was no bird clean up done in that part
16 of the Sound. And no otter clean up. We had to
17 transport, which I felt was a mistake. I felt that on
18 sight, we might have saved a few of the wildstock. When
19 I flew out, it was the night of the fourteenth, with an
20 engineer who is now on Exxon's payroll. I'd hired him to
21 come out and upgrade my system. We flew across the
22 Sound, and I noticed the silence of course, and as we
23 rounded Point Helen, the hatchery at San Juan, Army was
23 fighting to save its stock, the boon in Poine Helen was
25 spilling thick crude oil, and it was running right down

1 to the hatchery, in the channel, on Moneque Straits.

2 There was two vessels, and a Coast Guard Ship
3 working off shore, and something else, a larger...but
4 this was thick heavy oil. I immediately went into Thumb
5 Bay, I got on the radio. I called the helicopter that
6 flew over, because one of the men on the beach told me
7 that that was an Exxon helicopter. I asked him how he
8 knew that, because he told me the Exxon command barge was
9 parked in my front yard. I got no response. Finally I
10 went to one on the vessels from Valdez that I knew was on
11 charter, and when I said to him, what's going on, why
12 aren't you emptying the oil out of the boom on Point
13 Helen? We're defeating our purposes at that cannery. He
14 said, Marla, I'm just under contract, and a paid salary
15 man, what can I say? I said, they won't answer me, I
16 know they're listening. I said, what channel are they on?
17 So they told me another channel to try. I went to the
18 other channel, nobody answered me. Ten minutes later I
19 went to another radio, and I proceeded to scan the
20 channels, and I heard an Exxon command ship come on, and
21 instruct someone, would they go over to Point Helen and
22 remove some of the material off of the boomw, and I said,
23 some of it my ass, remove it all.

23 During this time, a couple of fisherman called
25 me. I talked to Ralph Losie, she has worked on the

1 tanker. Another fisherman called me, he was real upset.
2 I didn't know what to do. I wasn't doing very well, I
3 had already shot my load. He told me that he was told on
4 the tanker that they didn't have enough boon material,
5 that alaska hadn't responded, and the boon material they
6 had out there was merely for show. Ralph Losie also
7 confirmed this, and I understand that he quit at a later
8 date. He's a local fisherman you can contact. I was
9 told during my time in the sound, and I don't know the
10 young man that came in, he was with an older man who's
11 due to retire. I was told they made a night flight for
12 dropping disbursents unauthorized. This is hearsay, and
13 this gossip, and I'm sure Exxon will come back with this
14 is not true, or it is true. There was a fisherwoman at
15 the last Senator McKousky's hearing. I do not know her
16 name, I know the woman, I can get her name. She said to
17 me that when she was coming across the Sound, that one
18 tanker captain was talking to another, and she just
19 happened to be on the channel. He mentioned that the
20 conditions, which I might add, came up at one of the
21 either Kelso's hearings, or Senator Stephen's hearings,
22 the fifteen percent of the fleet was marginal in safety
23 factor wise. Because of age, because of being foreign
23 vessels, Greek. She mentioned that one of the tankers
25 told another tanker, she heard the conversation as she

1 was coming in. I couldn't get her to speak up, she was a
2 very shy type woman. She said the one tanker said to the
3 other captain, that he wouldn't use his tanker up here in
4 the winter, because when it iced up, it had the tendency
5 to want to yaw, and roll over. I can get her name. I'm
6 sure that Exxon would like to know that, they don't want
7 another one of these messes. I resent the fact that we
8 have to go to inexperienced people, such as myself with
9 the money and the technology that is available. On the
10 other hand I left it to the experts, and I'm sorry to say
11 that the experts didn't do too well. Long term, it's we
12 when you all go home, we are going to have to live with
13 this spill. I don't know if any of you seen the paper
14 last night. About the Eagle. There will be
15 repercussions for years. that we don't know about. I
16 have asked that I want a long term follow up office
17 jointly with federal state agencies for the next five to
18 ten years established in February in Alaska. This is
19 in my documentary to President Bush, to the Governor. I
20 also have a letter that I sent to the Governor, that he
21 should have on file. Of course, we want you to correct
22 the immediately, the lack of clean up equipment, response
23 teams, adequate storage facilities up and down the Coast.
23 I'm not talking about Prince Williams Sound. We were
25 talking about Quiet Waters, God was with us, and luck

1 held out on the weather. That was at our backyard at
2 Valdez where there was a highway. We're talking about up
3 and down that Coast along with the Cruise ships that are
4 carrying two and three thousands people up here now.
5 We're talking about long term devastation. I want to see
6 compensation. And every sector related to fish, and not
7 only fish in the business losses of this area. And if it
8 means that we have to establish a fund and a long term
9 process. Because it is a terrible burden. Perhaps the
10 oil companies in joint are going to have to
11 establish...we know that this was passed on to us at the
12 fumps, we're realistic. That isn't the issue here. We
13 have to be able to take care of ourselves in the future.
14 I want to see more richy control, and that's already been
15 implemented in hiring practices. Again, I you know,
16 Exxon is being lashed to death here. I feel sorry,
17 because they were kind to a man that has been with them
18 for sixteen or seventeen years. I was on a probationary
19 status or something. I mean, they were aware of the
20 situation, yes. Someone pointed it out in the Wall
21 Street Journal, USA the other day, the USA News. How
22 many of us don't get a second chance. So is it fair to
23 condemn Exxon for giving that man a second chance? I
23 know he's ruined our environment. But what if it would
25 had been him not doing that. What if his ship had split

1 open? What if he had ceased the engine, and it ran in
2 the Engine Brook Entrance, or Icy Bay, or Yakatat, or the
3 Copper River Flats. We control a tremendous amount of
4 the Bird Pass Flights. Our rearing grounds out there.
5 Noah has not kept above and underwater charts update on a
6 regular basis. I know for a fact, because I worked with
7 Noah in 1976 and 1977, when the Davison was out there.
8 When they made new charts, they missed three rocks. They
9 did go to the locals, and try to deal with them. Coast
10 Guard monitoring, that's a real sore one with me.
11 Because I screamed about this, and just two years
12 before, a year before, I spoke about this. How are we
13 doing? Do we still have the captains on the ships? In
14 the early days, we were told that escort captains who are
15 in unknown waters in the South would be going to
16 Hennenbrook. Again, complacency, on our Federal
17 Governments part, on our States part, we let it slide,
18 and then we find out that we introduced a bill to cut
19 back the radar, they cut back the radar, so we haven't
20 had the radar that we need. We not only need the radar,
21 we need it up and down the coast. To kind of wrap this
22 up on one other note. And I did not come here to get you
23 on a controversy, but I must go on record. We're talking
23 about caring about caring about our environment. And
25 we're talking about massive clean up, maybe lives. We're

1 talking about areas. We know the devastation that it can
2 take. We know the logistics, the clean up, and the back
3 up support that has taken in the over land route it took
4 into Valdez. We do not have a highway into Cordova. It
5 has been laying for fifty years, uncompleted. Because
6 they didn't want to share a few ducks. They didn't want
7 to share a few fish with the tourists. They didn't want
8 to get behind the motorhomes. When we know that Fish and
9 Game, all these things can be worked out logistically.
10 We have history now. We need an oil response road
11 between Cordova and Yakutat. And we need completion on
12 Copper River highway. We are in direct, direct
13 direction of duty, to ourself, to the State, the
14 Federal leaders, our wildstock out there, our fish runs
15 of the Copper River Flats, and the rest of America. I
16 think after waiting fifty years, we can't back up any
17 amount of clean up in Cordova without that highway. Go
18 to Valdez to check it out. How would you like to fly
19 everything in, or boat it from Seattle, and have to wait
20 two weeks to work on a response down at Yakutat or Icy
21 Bay, or in the middle of the Copper River Flats. If our
22 fisherman, or the few dissidents, and the few people are
23 so worried about a few fish, they better look long term
23 at the Copper River Flats streams. At the bird control,
25 and migratory patterns. That's all I have to say, and

1 thank you. Oh, any questions?

2 MR. PARKER: Thank you. Commissioners, Any
3 questions?

4 MR. SUND: I'm just curious, you opened your
5 comments with quite a bit the, sharing the blame, and
6 that we're all at fault, or your comment that you were at
7 fault. I'm just curious to thinking what you thought you
8 could have done personally in the last few years that
9 would have made any difference in terms of either
10 preventing this accident, or the response to it.

11 MS. ADKINS: Because, I was told a number of the
12 captains leaving port in Valdez, not only the tanker
13 captains, but the small boat captains had alcoholic
14 beverages with them from time to time. I know one
15 incidence when I sat at a bar, and watched one of them
16 drinking, three hours later, he was out there escorting
17 one of the tankers. I know that I went to bed at Kato
18 one time, and asked her, how's things going, how's
19 everything functioning over at the plant there, how's the
20 spill up? And yet I'd heard Ricky Ought and a couple of
21 people talking, and I knew the DEC teams were having
22 trouble. Dan Long, Tom McCarty, getting entrance to the
23 plant, their hands were slapped every time they turned
23 around. I knew all these things, but I kept leaving it
25 to my heads in Juneau, and in Washington, and I thought

1 that they were on top of these things. I should have
2 perused this further, as I told you, I have a tendency...
3 my grandson got me a pen, it's Garfield pen, so they have
4 the mouth of the death wish. I don't know how to look at
5 that, my size or my mouth. And since I bitch so much,
6 and so many people call me and ask me to bitch, I get
7 tired of it. So consequently, when I see these things
8 going, I let it slide. And I have to live with that.

9 MR. SUND: So you feel, in the sense that, when
10 you say I, that you feel that if you would have spoken
11 out at that time, you could have made a difference?

12 MS. ADKINS: Someone said to me the other day,
13 I'm going to give up Marla. I'm going to leave Cordova.
14 I said, I can't, because if I give up, and something like
15 this happens again. I may go away, and I may take trips,
16 because I have bad arthritis, but I can't give up, and I
17 can't compromise, I found that out. It's no matter the
18 price to me.

19 MS. WUNNICKE: There are a lot of people in
20 Alaska who feel the way you do. So you're not alone.

21 MS. ADKINS: We need not only individual
22 citizens, we need the experts, and we need to let our
23 DEC, and...we better pattern after England, and a few of
23 the foreign countries that seem to know what they are
25 doing, since we don't. I'm ashamed.

1 MR. PARKER: I'm not sure the Britts are that far
2 ahead of us, possibly the Norwegians are in some
3 respects, but the power of the United States is enormous
4 when it's brought to bare, but it has presently ran away
5 from this particular issue for the last ten years. The
6 Coast Guard, and the Federal Maritime Administration.
7 Now it's back on center stage, but on some of the points
8 you made, I think an examination of the Alyeska fleet is
9 in order. I think that I know where that information is.
10 We will get that at a minimum, and some of the other
11 points you made in monitoring and so forth, is all a part
12 of the things that I would feel somewhat remiss in my
13 duty and not following up strongly, and at least having
14 one more showdown in the Congress as to what we're going
15 to do about this. There's thirty bills that Congress has
16 introduced. There are some members on both the House and
17 Senate who have indicated that they are going to follow
18 up on this. The time is here for action. We certainly
19 hope to follow through to the maximum degrees that our
20 energies permit on that.

21 MS. ADKINS: Now as I told you, Mr. Farley, Mr.
22 Keen can back up some of the testimony that I made. I
23 want to go one step further. Exxon has the people, and I
23 know that they care. I've had some dealings with them
25 lately. Now that they are getting somewhat of a system

1 going the last month, and I just want to go on record
2 that once they got their act together, once they were
3 over the massive shock...our own Coast Guard Commander
4 was in total shock three weeks later, when he came and
5 made the statement, he just said, and it just keeps
6 running and running everywhere.

7 MR. PARKER: Who was that, Steve McCall?

8 MS. ADKINS: Yes, he was in total shock three
9 weeks later at the amount of oil. We just were not
10 prepared.

11 MR. PARKER: Still not a happy looking man. I
12 haven't talked to him recently, but he was in the back of
13 the room yesterday in Valdez, and he was not a happy
14 looking man.

15 MS. ADKINS: Well, you know, he's like Exxon,
16 he's whipped to death. And yet, we're not whipping
17 ourselves. I know I am. Thank you.

18 MS. WUNNICKE: Thank you

19 (BREAK)

20 MR. PARKER: Any one else for public
21 participation?

22 MR. DENNIS H.: My name is Dennis Holan. I'm a
23 local commercial fisherman, and I guess I came here out
23 of frustration. I didn't know this thing was taking
25 place, and I stopped in a book store. I'm the captain of

1 a wildlife rescue boat. It appears that they're going to
2 discontinue from what I heard from the testimony.
3 There's going to be four boats left. I find it really
4 frustrating. I flew to town yesterday, and I saw a lot
5 of oil in the water still. The situation that I've
6 experienced here in the last month or so, has been, there
7 are all these critters, birds, nests, eggs out there. My
8 communication with this Monahan, Tom Monahan, was that
9 they were going to discontinue the wildlife rescue fleet,
10 was because body count was down. I told them I felt that
11 that was our experience, was that the body count was
12 going to start going back up again. I relayed that to
13 fish and wildlife person in Valdez as well. The response
14 there was that they were in agreement with Exxon. Just
15 previous to coming to town a day before, we got our first
16 two chicks martlied. I don't know that it was from oil.
17 I don't' know what they died from. I've got them in the
18 freezer in the boat. They'll end up going through
19 channels to Valdez to be analyzed. Pretty frustrating,
20 this whole thing. I've been given quite an opportunity,
21 personally, to experience the Sound in a whole different
22 way. This wildlife rescue thing has really been a
23 valuable experience, personally for me. The problem,
23 frustration I have. We did this thing a long time ago,
25 and they said, don't worry, we'll take care of it all.

1 Now they're out there doing that. After trying to filter
2 through answers and questions for myself, I guess the
3 thing that bothers me most, is that Exxon is out there
4 running the show. These people, they individually they
5 are nice people, they are sympathetic, that has been my
6 experience. The level of inability to function in chaos
7 that's going on out there is ridiculous. The amount of
8 money that is being spent is obscene. I'm taking part in
9 that. My boat is getting thirty two hundred dollars a
10 day out there. I don't know how I've been impacted, I've
11 got more money in the bank now, than I'm supposed to have
12 this time of the year. I just needed to voice these
13 things. I really appreciate the opportunity to listen
14 today. To the testimony. To you guys responses. It's
15 encouraging, but I don't know. There really needs some
16 heavy duty action to be taken. In which way I don't
17 know. I really don't know. It's embarrassing to know
18 that the level of our technology of this great country is
19 what it is when I see out there. It's embarrassing. The
20 most affective thing is an oil absorbent pad. I've not
21 seen anything that complements that. Personally.
22 There's a lot of people out there now with attitudes.
23 It's all their attitudes are, they're not doing anything,
23 just making a lot of money. I don't know, I don't have
25 any answers, but I needed to voice that. I hope you guys

1 have some luck. There's some real heavy duty ass kicking
2 that needs to be done somewhere. I don't know where it
3 is, but thanks for listening to me.

4 MS. HAYES: I have a few questions.

5 MR. PARKER: Sure.

6 MS. HAYES: You said...I was struck about what
7 you said about having more money in the bank than you're
8 supposed to do by this time of the year. But you're
9 still feeling frustrated.

10 MR. DENNIS H.: The money doesn't.....

11 MS. HAYES: If the money doesn't compensate you
12 for what you've lost in terms of.....

13 MR. DENNIS H.: Well, it's kind of strange here,
14 I guess what I mean when I say that, is my experiences
15 out there, and watching what's happening. As far as a
16 fisherman is concerned, I know enough of the culture, and
17 I really don't have any fear for the future. Personally,
18 I really don't. I think we have that technology. We've
19 taken that in our hands, and had to deal with that.
20 We've done really well with it. So I'm not worried about
21 my economic future, and the economic future of this
22 community. I really am not. There's a lot of money in
23 this town right now. To me right now, is what I
23 experienced out there, is I have five Eagle's nests with
25 chicks sitting out there, right over the oil. There's a

1 whole bunch of rock piles and dangerous things I've
2 experienced in the island. They got chicks coming out,
3 or all these different critters right. And they're going
4 into that stuff. That's my real frustration. This
5 person I talked to, he's a neat guy, he has communicated
6 well. And was obviously sympathetic to the situation.
7 He's an oil field worker, head of what Kelly was doing,
8 right. I've learned a whole new dimension that Kelly
9 really appreciated what he was able to accomplish, in
10 that time they allotted him to do it. That's my
11 frustration. Exxon running the show. I'd like to give
12 them a big black eye, concerning what I saw out there
13 right now. It's another level of compensation that they
14 have to pay for. Who are they paying for, the fisherman
15 already got enough. Somebody's got to pay for that some
16 way. We've got to take responsibility for it. You read
17 the news paper, and what do you see? That's going on all
18 over, and what's their ability to deal with it? That's
19 my frustration.

20 MR. SUND: I kind of have a sense of the same
21 frustration that we went out and viewed one of the
22 spills, I guess, Northwest Bay. In one sense you get
23 fairly upset at Exxon or the industry for having a tanker
23 cracked up and Exxon comes in to clean it up, you know.
25 I got internally very frustrated with the way the clean

1 up was going. But, I found myself later saying "God it's
2 really hard, you know". One you'd say Exxon get out and
3 do the job which they did. And now you get mad at them
4 for the way they are spending the money. Because I think
5 it is an obscene amount of money that is being spent and
6 maybe not being spent in the best fashion.

7 But it's being done. You know, maybe in some way
8 it's hard to say you can get the same amount of work,
9 same amount of clean up done for half the price. I'm not
10 sure how relevant that is, but it's a frustrating issue.
11 I guess my question comes down -- I would like to know
12 who picked \$16.00 an hour as a number. Also, on the boat
13 charters, was there any negotiation or how did it come
14 down, I mean why is your boat \$3200 a day, I know they
15 are paying my same tendor \$3000 a day on a 90 day
16 charter. He said, hey I can't afford to stay in
17 Ketchikan and you know he might have made a 100 grand or
18 more if it was a good year, but here he's got 880 grand,
19 200 grand in the bank. Who made up these numbers?

20 MR. DENNIS H.: I don't know. I was really
21 fortunate, being in Hawaii at school at the time and so
22 my son negotiated the contract and took the boat out and
23 did...

23 MR. SUND: What size a boat is it?

25 MR. DENNIS H.: 42 foot seiner.

1 MR. SUND: So are they on some per foot basis, I
2 mean how do they even come to the number.

3 MR. DENNIS H.: I really can't tell you. Now
4 today, the contracts would be negotiated and would be
5 negotiated against \$45 a foot.

6 MR. SUND: \$45 a foot?

7 MR. DENNIS H.: Right, that's the formula, but
8 then I have no idea and when he told me the price I just
9 could not believe it.

10 MR. SUND: Yea, I've got a friend from Ketchikan
11 who has a 26 foot boat up here and he's getting \$1000 a
12 day for it. \$90,000 for a boat that only costs \$45,000
13 to build it new.

14 MR. DENNIS H.: The stories I use in these loaded
15 words and in my frustration, I - I - you know, I don't
16 have any answer, what you're hearing is just frustration
17 or because there is no end to these kinds of stories.

18 MR. SUND: But it's interesting that the
19 frustration level that's coming out is, you know, I made
20 more money than I could ever dream of making and I'm
21 still mad. You know, it's a real interesting phenomina.
22 And at the same time, there's losses being occurred out
23 there, you know, losses to the environment which are
23 public losses which are my losses, which I have losses
25 where there's individuals getting great deals of gain and

1 it, maybe the two aren't matching up there.

2 MR. DENNIS H.: No, they're not matching up and
3 that's, I think that's where my frustration is now. I
4 agree to the amount that I'm sick of this thing and not
5 saying as long as they maintain this thing. I really
6 don't know what kind of good it can do, but I know by
7 observing, that I'm seeing things I've never seen before.
8 You know, and there hasn't been, and I talked to a really
9 good friend of mine who did the work and there wasn't one
10 (inaudible) that attributable that I'm aware of at least
11 that he was aware of at just two days ago. But they're
12 coming down now and I see them on islands, you know the
13 size of this room in heavily oil impacted areas. You
14 know, now it's gonna start happening.

15 MS. WUNNICKE: So what about the volunteerism
16 that people felt and experienced in the beginning. The
17 spirit of volunteerism that Kelly was telling us about.
18 Is it that the price is so high now that what you forego
19 that people can't afford to either do it or...

20 MR. DENNIS: When you're dealing as something as
21 powerful as that, the amount of money is really mind
22 boggling. You know, 6, 7, 800 thousand dollars. You
23 know, people have never earned any money in there life.
23 That are not...

25 MS. WUNNICKE: So the big money has changed - the

1 initial response people had?

2 MR. DENNIS H.: I'd say so. Yea, the whole

3 thing - the chaos. This has been chaos and it's still

4 chaos. There's no, you know, light at the end of the

5 tunnel to solve the frustration, I mean to me, if they

6 would value, in some way, the rescue fleet and go along

7 those rapture people out there, bird people out there now

8 doing those kind of things, I don't know anything about

9 birds. I learned everything I've know here in the last

10 couple of months and I just know how to move around in

11 that town down there and what's become really personal to

12 me and real loyalty that would take the kind of

13 professionals when I see them, I have a real attitude

14 about that. They just wouldn't be able to do it and same

15 with the volunteer spirit. It's there, we have a history

16 of that. We voluntarily assessed ourselves for the legal

17 cost to oppose the terminess of the pipeline and did that

18 to a pretty high degree and it'll happen again down the

19 line, I think when the smoke clears from this. But right

20 now, there's chaos out there. I know families that are

21 fighting really internally because of these issues. I'm

22 gonna get every damned dime Exxon's got and the other one

23 says, you know, it's a real moral issue. They can't buy

23 me. It's - they impact is not so much of the oil spill

25 out there and all the attentive things there. For us

1 personally here in town, it's very personal.

2 MR. PARKER: Who have you been the most
3 frustrated with? The Exxon contact? Your agency
4 contact?

5 MR. DENNIS H.: I think it's the system. How
6 does it work? It does the best we can, you know that we
7 are here today, dealing with this issue and we were
8 dealing with this issue, not in this room, but in a
9 different room in the same town, a long time ago. I
10 don't think we've moved very far in that time. I don't
11 understand a lot of this stuff, it's embarrassing to me
12 to know the level of technology to deal with something
13 like this. I can't believe that. I really can't,
14 industry functions at the real high level for the profit
15 margin. But we don't have any interest in this kind of
16 stuff and I don't know - how do you do that? How do
17 you pinch the right nerve?

18 MR. SUND: With the same level of technology of
19 oil clean up we've been carrying the oil from Prudhoe Bay
20 to Valdez in pick up trucks.

21 MR. WENK: Mule carts

22 MR. DENNIS H.: Mule carts, yes.

23 MS. WUNNICKE: Do you have any ideas of how you
23 make it in the interest of the shippers to get the 21st
25 Century technology for prevention and clean up?

1 MR. HOLAN: This is all new to me because the
2 feeling is new to me because I experienced this out there
3 and watching what I've watched, that the attitude of the
4 general public seems to be more responsive to eagles.
5 There's this thing in the front page of the paper, right
6 now, I didn't read that, but, that's real important to me
7 now and watching what's happened around this, this is
8 gonna go on for a long time. I don't know how long its
9 gonna last. I know its going on right now. And they
10 seem to be more responsive to that kind of thing to know
11 that the fuel prices are gonna have to go up and they are
12 gonna have to start paying a price for it. We're gonna
13 have to do something about, you know, Exxon running the
14 show out there. I have nothing personal against Exxon,
15 but you know the persons run to prison, right? If these
16 guys did it. Someone's gotta say uhuh, no you can't do
17 that and that's what's happening now, I mean,...

18 MR. SUND: Did I understand you correctly to feel
19 some concern that even though the body count has dropped
20 off using your expression, thatas I understand
21 though, you see the problem of one of an increase in the
22 future of threat to wildlife. Do you sense AF&G is aware
23 of this? Do they have anyone here on a regular basis
23 monitoring this?

25 MR. DENNIS H.: Not to my knowledge. Just like

1 everybody else. The efforts of AF&G, right now would be
2 centered around fish and whatever they're responsibility
3 to management. Budget cuts and everything else, they
4 would tax is - before we went into this local office
5 place. In the state like this, I have no idea, really
6 don't. I talked to J. Reynolds, who is the authority on
7 mammals and deer and done a lot of work around here.
8 And he left me with that sympathy that right now we're in
9 a different time. The deer acted differently. Now is
10 the time that there will be slumps acceptable.

11 MR. PARKER: Did you run into anybody out there
12 in your travels around the Sound who acts like they
13 really want to get on top of that particular issue and
14 really

15 MR. DENNIS: Not anybody that's left. The
16 Kelly's, was offering a lot of questions, like let's do
17 this. And I think most of what he was saying lets do was
18 gonna give someone a real black eye. Something really
19 strange that has emerged, my fellow fishermen, you say
20 you're a bird boat (it's a negative thing) accept for the
21 people that were in their bird boats and we all seem to
22 be affected by it. Our point of view changed because we
23 were looking at it in a different point of view rather
23 than towing booms down or protecting a stream or whatever
25 they were doing. There was mutual sympathy there, but -

1 no I've been looking for somebody. That's why I came
2 here, I was hoping you guys would probably know.

3 MR. PARKER:strong in Valdez and why you
4 really brought it here that somebody's looking for some
5 leadership here from somewhere other than what Exxon is
6 providing and Exxon seems to be a leader because of an
7 abdication of responsibility somewhere, I don't know, I'm
8 wrestling with this as much as you are, so at the moment
9 at this particular part of it is hard to grab a hold of.

10 MS. WUNNICKE: But to be sure I understand it,
11 and I think that we all agree that the damage assessment
12 for biological change as well as the social disruption of
13 this event is going to go on for years in order to
14 determine what those changes are. And yet you're telling
15 us that the effort is being reduced.

16 MR. DENNIS H.: Yes. I was part of what the
17 remaining of the nine boats. So we just got cut
18 yesterday and I didn't find it out until I came to town.
19 Yeah, and you know, I don't know how he would best speak
20 to what it would take to do that kind of thing and ask
21 you to be ..., but just for record keeping, that kind of
22 - just know what's happening out there. The area that I
23 was in, it's just the way the current moved and certain
23 areas really heavily impacted by all. Just to pay
25 attention to that. Sea otter, sea otter pups, seal pups

1 the whole bananas, right there.

2 MR. PARKER: Anyone else? Thank you very much
3 Dennis and.....We didn't establish any order for this
4 part of it.

5 MR. ARMETSON: Hi, my name's Bob Armetson, I'm a
6 Cordova resident, I was born in Cordova and I've lived
7 here 50 years more or less. I'm here today to present to
8 you a small paper I wrote on April 22 about the spill and
9 since I'm here I thought I'd testify as well. I thought
10 I'd start out by saying that a little chronology of what
11 I've done since the oil spill. I learned about the oil
12 spill about 9:00 on the morning of March 24, my wife
13 called me and I got a sinking feeling at that time of
14 what might happen to ORCA and later on to the Prince
15 William Sound in general and to tell you the truth, I
16 still have that feeling today I've seen the oil and I've
17 flown over a few times and what I thought is that I've
18 tried to find out if there was a Contingency Plan for
19 Cordova, and so I asked the city manager and I asked
20 Exxon representatives, I asked CDFU representatives,
21 nobody could give me a Contingency Plan for ORCA Inlet.
22 I was concerned since my wife and myself, we live on ORCA
23 Inlet on the shores of ORCA Inlet, we have small harbor
23 and we wanted to protect this. That was one of my major
25 concerns and so I couldn't find a plan so I went to CDFU

1 Saturday, day two, and asked if I could get a boom. They
2 had a meeting in Cordova and they were negotiating for
3 booms and so, you know, I wanted a boom. They didn't
4 have one, so I went to see the city manager and asked if
5 I could get a boom and he didn't have a boom. So, I
6 went, my wife went to Exxon when they came to town, day
7 four, five, six, I can't remember exactly when it was and
8 she talked about getting a boom and R.J. Cop checked the
9 Vice-Mayor was up there at that time, too. He's on a
10 disaster committee and no booms. So I went to boom
11 school, they held in this room on April 4. I think it
12 was the first school they had here. Al Allen of Spill
13 Tech Corporation conducted the boom school and so that
14 was April 4 and I went down April 5 and talked to the
15 Exxon secretary, Tina Fox at the time. At city hall they
16 had an office there at that time and asked if I could get
17 a boom for... not just for my private harbor but across
18 is an important habitat there's a dozen homes in the
19 area, harbors and things like that. Well low and behold
20 on April 6, Exxon called me up or R.J. called me up and
21 said Exxon will give me a boom so I was quite please and
22 I went down and signed the releases or got releases and I
23 obtained 900 feet of 4 inch swamp boom and 400 feet of
23 sorbent boom from Exxon. And I was quite pleased to have
25 it and I put some of the boom out that day and the next

1 day I stretched 600 feet across Odiak Slew (ph) and for
2 the record, it was the only boom in town. There was one
3 other boom in ORCA Inlet and that was in an oyster farm
4 in De Bay. Those are the only two booms I know about in
5 ORCA Inlet and I maintained that boom till last Saturday.
6 Exxon wanted it back a little sooner, I talked to them
7 and invited them down, Rich Miller was the manager at
8 that time, he came down June 4 and he decided that even
9 though we didn't have oil it was important that I keep
10 the boom till I was satisfied that oil wouldn't come to
11 Cordova. One of the factors was the exit of the Exxon
12 Valdez from Prince William Sound. Another factor was the
13 boat cleaning station and the third factor was the
14 Alyeska interim operating plant and that has been changed
15 quite a bit and have quite a bit equipment on hand.
16 Mark Hutton is here, he's familiar with that, he's
17 writing the Contingency Plan for Cordova. They were in
18 town here 10 days or so ago and I went to their meeting
19 as well. So I kept trying to pursue the Contingency
20 Plans and that became a consuming interest with me. Oil
21 did come to the cut off on March 30. Pete Micholson told
22 me oil was five miles from town. Well the cut off is a
23 little more than five miles, it's more like 10 or 15
23 miles and that was on March 30. And according to the
25 report that the President by Skinner and Riley they did

1 drop boom in the cut off area on March 31st. And as
2 several people are familiar with it and the CDFU
3 people, the NADC people are familiar with dropping the
4 booms at the cutoff. So, I pursued the Contingency Plan
5 and I found that only one side in ORCA Inlet was targeted
6 for boom exclusion in the Alyeska Contingency Plan.
7 That's sight number 35 that's Humpback Creek, that's
8 north of Cordova here. So I wrote this little paper
9 which I'll give to you and criticizing that, I think that
10 there should have been more sights targeted for boom
11 exclusion. There's at least 30 salmon streams in ORCA
12 Inlet, there's several homes, there's harbors, there's
13 important habitats to approximately 20 million birds
14 migrate through stage, feeding stage, in ORCA Inlet
15 during the spring migratory period, there's salmon, king
16 salmon, in the spring there's halibut, clams, sea otter,
17 probably the largest world concentration is right here at
18 ORCA Inlet at this time. So, that was the main thing
19 that I was concerned about and I, my wife and I,
20 maintained our boom for until, like I said until last
21 Saturday. Something that occurred to me and hadn't
22 occurred to me earlier was that when I was away for a few
23 hours, last Thursday, when I came home my wife was out
23 taking pictures and it was a rare sight. There was 6 to
25 800 sea gulls in ORCA Inlet on either side of the boom

1 and there was about 20 sea gulls sitting on the boom. We
2 have pictures of that, we haven't had them developed yet,
3 but what occurred to me is what might happen to Cordova
4 if oil came and we weren't properly boomed, the birds,
5 particularly the sea gulls would land in that oil, they
6 might land in the oil in the water anyway, but they were
7 seen to land in the mud flat there anyway, because they
8 always do, then they might fly to a reservoir and land in
9 the reservoir. Then that might contaminate the water
10 supply. I've ran this idea thesis, theory by several
11 people and there is some interest in it because Cordova
12 had a problem before - the garbage dump is quite near
13 Odiak Slue actually and they were concerned years ago
14 about the birds going to the dump and landing in the
15 reservior. The reservior is only about 1/2 mile away.
16 So anyway, that's a thought that occurred to me. You
17 could have a contamination of the water supply, if you'd
18 had the oil spill in Cordova.

19 Some other questions or thoughts that I did have
20 in mind here when, that I wrote down here was, also I was
21 very concerned about the Copper River Flats. There's no
22 Contingency Plan that I know of for the Copper River
23 Flats and in the report that the President, both ORCA
23 Inlet and the Flats are mentioned twice as high priority
25 area for boom exclusion. In fact, in reading, I reviewed

1 three or four of the major contingency plans, the Federal
2 RCP Plan, I don't understand really what the boundaries
3 are for Prince William Sound or for the areas of
4 responsibility of these different agencies whether the
5 federal, state or local. According to the RCP the cut
6 off point for Prince William Sound runs on a line in that
7 area there. I didn't bring that with me today, but I
8 think the Copper River Flats should be included in any
9 contingency plan for Prince William Sound. It's
10 certainly a major fishery area for the gillnets, sockeyed
11 king and silver salmon, as well as the mitigatory area
12 for birds. So I would like the Commissioner or I'd
13 suggest to the Commissioner whatever, the boundaries set
14 for Prince William Sound in terms of the Contingency
15 Plan. I'm not quite sure where the western boundary is
16 either, in my mind, whether it's Cape Puget, on one Plan
17 it is, and on another Plan it isn't. And as that report
18 said they were operating about six different contingency
19 plans and my main point here is to find out what it is
20 exactly. And you would need particularly special boats
21 for the Copper River Flats. Shallow water boats, jet
22 boats, inboard/outboards, skiffs and things like that and
23 the Coast Guard Plan. I reviewed it and the Captain's
23 report plan and for a minute I was concerned too. What
25 are the major entrances to Prince William Sound? They

1 listed Hinchinbrook entrance and they also listed the
2 Monague Straight entrance. Those major waterways there
3 -- Strawberry channel here that leads into ORCA Inlet
4 here also is a major entrance into Prince William Sound
5 and that should be considered, too. And, maybe
6 considered for boom exclusion in the case of another oil
7 spill. I'm thinking forward to another oil spill now.

8 During the early periods, I did talk with Exxon,
9 I went down and talked with them after I placed my boom
10 about contingencies and they did prepare a plan for
11 Hockins cut off and it's included in the Exxon Cordova
12 Response Plan. I believe it's dated, April 26 and I
13 believe those are the same plans or a variation of them
14 that Al Allen prepared in early April for Hawkins Cut
15 Off. They take from 6 to 10,000 feet of booming, but
16 actually those sites should be tested with booms to see
17 whether or not the booms would be adequate, because
18 there's a lot of water coming to Hawkins Cut Off. And, I
19 also asked them if they had anything for the Sound LaPoid
20 (ph) entrance which should be north of here and they
21 didn't have anything there. I'd like to see that
22 included in the next plan, too.

23 I feel we were quite fortunate that we didn't get
23 oil here and I feel part of the reason is because of the
25 windfactors that -- the wind could have blown it to Cor-

1 dova as easily as it went in the other direction. So, I
2 think there should be some consideration given to the
3 Sound or Channel Island entrances east of here more to
4 the Hawkins Cut Off and then to the Strawberry Channel
5 entrance.

6 So, that's about the extent of my comments at
7 this time. If you have any questions.....

8 MR. PARKER: Thank you very much. The point is
9 well taken. You can't write the Contingency Plan based
10 on the wind conditions that came immediately after the
11 spill on this one. Nobody knows those wind conditions
12 better than the people who have lived here a long time.
13 So, having the next one reviewed comprehensively by all
14 the residents, you know, in Cordova, Valdez, and
15 Tititilik and indeed Seward and Whittier and everywhere
16 else on the Sound so we get the maximum input, the
17 maximum amount of local knowledge brought to this seems
18 to be a key factor. You would think it would have been
19 done the first time around.

20 But on the booming off the Copper River I guess
21 you would envision booming them off as inside the surf
22 line as soon as you got to a place where you could hold
23 boom inside the surf line.

23 MR. ARMETSON: Well, I think it would be a
25 major problem to boom off the Copper Flats and I think

1 they should be boomed off both within -- inside and
2 outside the bar.

3 MR. PARKER: Uh-huh.

4 MR. ARMETSON: You could have deep water, you
5 know -- I have reviewed some of the things that Alyeska
6 or British Petroleum has for these major vessels, the
7 deep water vessels that could contain oil outside the
8 bar. But, inside the bar you'd need shallow vessels and
9 there are river mouths where they could be boomed off at
10 the river mouth, but an attempt could also be made to
11 boom them off at the bar. But, there is quite a bit of
12 current there. There's usually rough water there. It
13 would be a very difficult thing, but it is something to
14 consider. I don't know how I would boom off outside the
15 bar.

16 MR. PARKER: Yeah.

17 MR. ARMETSON: But, I do know that you could
18 boom off the river entrances. But once you get oil in
19 the sand or in the mud there, it's going to be impossible
20 to remove it. It would destroy the fisheries for
21 indefinitely.

22 MR. PARKER: Yeah.

23 MR. ARMETSON: But, if a tanker accident
23 occurred south of here, the prevailing winds and tides
25 would shove that into the Copper River Flats area. I

1 don't know how to do that, but I do think that
2 consideration should be given to it.

3 And, same with ORCA Inlet. There's a lot of
4 problems with tidal currents here and the Cut Off and
5 Strawberry Channel there. But, I do feel already there
6 is a complacency setting in ORCA Inlet since oil didn't
7 come here. You can't look out your window and see it --
8 I might say, too, I got a lot of flax from a lot of
9 people because I had a boom and there was no oil, people
10 could not see any oil coming and wondered why my boom
11 wasn't somewhere else. Why I wasn't out protecting other
12 area. And, you know, I tried to answer that as best as I
13 could. Once I had that boom I wasn't going to let it go
14 until I was satisfied the emergency was over. But, I did
15 return it to Exxon. In fact they came and picked it up.

16 MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, in that connection
17 would you anticipate any change with winter storms that
18 might bring oil that's not been cleaned up in other parts
19 of the Sound to ORCA Inlet?

20 MR. ARMETSON: I don't think it's that likely,
21 but I don't think it's impossible. I've been concerned
22 really of... When Senator Stevens was here in early
23 April I talked with him and I was concerned about the
23 sediment in the Sound. You know, about oil and sediment
25 and sinking and then currents taking it and we wouldn't

1 know where that oil is. He convinced the City really, or
2 tried to convince them that the oil wouldn't sink. Now,
3 we know oil will sink. Particularly since it goes on
4 beaches. So, we don't know what's under the surface how
5 the oil's reacting under there and it might pop up and
6 the Northwest wind might come and blow it right into ORCA
7 Inlet. That's quite a possibility there. People talking
8 about this gyro effect, too. I'm not that familiar with
9 it, of the oil going around and coming back again. I
10 don't know if that's a possible theory or not. But, we
11 had a log spill here this spring. We had severe north
12 winds, I believe it was in January or February, and the
13 boom broke for the logging company. These logs disbursed
14 all over the Sound and they came into where I live in
15 Odiak Sleuth (ph). Seven of them. You know, I was going
16 to -- at that time I wanted to latch onto them, but
17 everyone said 'hands off' on them. So, they left them
18 floating around -- they did go, so. This was from down
19 in the Inlet here about 4 miles. Three or four miles
20 down there. We had heavy, strong north winds, you know,
21 in the area of 70 miles an hour. North and northwesterly
22 winds and in the summer we get west winds that would blow
23 oil/ And we don't usually get a west wind that much in
23 the winter, but we do get southwest winds with snow and
25 that moves a lot of current

1 and swell into ORCA Inlet from the Gulf area.

2 The point I might mention, too, in Cordova here,
3 I monitor the tides quite a bit, since where we live we
4 have to be careful. In fact, one time we went walking
5 closely enough, when we lived on the vessel, and actually
6 sank. We didn't think it would, but it did, because the
7 tide came in three feet above prediction. The Gulf
8 storms will set in at least 3 feet of extra water here.
9 That's the most I've ever seen, anyway. So, if you have
10 those combinations, it's quite possible, but hopefully it
11 won't come this way.

12 MR. PARKER: In the question with the gyro, I'm
13 trying to visualize the Gulf gyros and I'll check on that
14 or have Tom the Oceanographer at the University --talk to
15 him and get his opinion on that for the best remote
16 sensing information they can on tracking this. There's
17 no reason why we shouldn't. I'm pretty sure that they've
18 got to have some sensors on some of the other satellites.
19 I'm not sure on that. I think we've reached the stage
20 where overflights cannot hack it anymore. I think we are
21 at least starting to lose a sense of what's happening to
22 the spill. I will pick up on that.

23 What else?

23 MR. BIRD: My name is Eugene Bird. I'm from
25 outside. I've spent about 20 years in large companies,

1 petroleum and as a consultant. I know alot about oil
2 petroleum trade and that sort of thing. I listened to
3 the testimony of Mr. Kennedy yesterday. Remarkable. And
4 a very fine specialist in his area. I do think that the
5 bottom line is always cost in any company. Yet, the
6 effectiveness of doing things rapidly and competently
7 depends on spending a lot of money in upfront
8 organization and keeping that organization in being.

9 Obviously what happened here was that the
10 financial Vice-President of the oil companies and
11 probably including Alyeska got to the point where they
12 didn't want to spend the money on maintaining something
13 which had not been used in a long, long time. Your
14 Norwegien cruise, I think I've been told, are maybe 500
15 people dedicated to just sitting there and doing what any
16 volunteer fire department does or any fire department
17 does. Just sit there and wait for things to happen. We
18 know now that fire prevention is probably more important
19 than actual suppression of fires. And, the samething is
20 true in prevention of oil spills. I've seen a lot of oil
21 spills and I have seen some real bad ones. I think the
22 real problem is what we call an inability to recognize
23 that if you are going to be putting in say 50 million
23 gallons -- it was only 10 million gallons this time, in
25 24 hours, if you have a real wreck, like the Amocco, you

1 had over 60 million gallons in just a few hours or days
2 spilled, you have to have the capability of picking that
3 much up. All-- except for what goes into the
4 atmosphere.

5 Most of your skimmers and most of the skimmer
6 technology is completely inadequate to the size of the
7 spills. And, if there's anything you can do to ring
8 alarms bells in the industry on that score, I would say
9 that it would be very valuable.

10 Secondly, there's an obvious solution to a lot of
11 this to an outsider. An outsider from the oil industry
12 standpoint, not outsider from the way you Alaskans talk
13 about outsiders. I think that there are surplus tankers
14 sitting around the world and that the tanker is equipped
15 with pumps with a lot of capability of growing enormous
16 amounts of water and oil mixed in a spill situation back
17 into tanks and holding it.

18 Now, even if you'd had skimmers you wouldn't have
19 had any place to put that oil. Where on earth would you
20 put 10 million gallons of oil. And, your Contingency
21 Plan, I've had no chance to look at that in any detail,
22 but I don't think that they could have handled even half
23 that size adequately in the time before it was disbursed
23 and they depended more on Mother Nature than they did on
25 something that they had right at hand. Which was empty

1 tankers. When they brought the San Fransico up along
2 side the Exxon Valdez, if they had had two or three San
3 Fransico's in the area and if they had been able to make
4 use of your small boats here and have the capability of
5 surrounding that spill, they could have sucked that oil
6 into the tankers. That probably would have gotten a lot
7 of water, too, but that doesn't matter. Once you get it
8 aboard the tankers you can send it off and go in the
9 settling tanks in the terminal where they take 50,000
10 barrels a year out of the waste water treatment that
11 comes in for balanced water. They get 50,000 barrels
12 of oil out of that and they treat it and then send it
13 out.

14 You could even have a full treating system. Put
15 aboard some of these tankers. There are some very large
16 tankers that are sitting not being used in the world and
17 I thing the industry needs to be reminded that they are
18 going to have to put the money a complete system that we
19 just assume there's going to be an Exxon Valdez every ten
20 years.

21 Secondly, -- that's one thing. I think you ought
22 to look at the technology and I think you ought asked
23 some tough questions and make some good hard
23 recommendations. That might apply not just here but
25 through out the world. Secondly, I see the networking

1 that's developing. I think that that is very much
2 needed. I think local people are the only one that are
3 going to say the king doesn't have any clothes on. And,
4 I think you are going to have to start networking with
5 this Commission. Talking either in Norway or with
6 Norweigiens being brought here. I think you ought to
7 keep communication with the industry, because as I say,
8 they are going to be the most effective people. Once you
9 get their attention you may have to treat them like a
10 mule and a 2x4, but once you get their attention, they
11 will respond. They don't want to make a spill. Their
12 interest is not in that.

13 One think I haven't heard mentioned up here is
14 the American Petroleum Institute which came out with that
15 recommendation which didn't make any reference to putting
16 a station up in Alaska whereby the year of 2000 probably
17 50% of all the oil being produced in the United States is
18 going to be produced. Whatever you do, I think it's very
19 obvious there's going to be more oil produced here in
20 Alaska. You are producing 2 million barrels a day. I
21 think by 2000, 2010 you'll be 4 or 5 million barrels and
22 you will have to find some way of moving it. And, of
23 course, it should go down the land route, but it's not
23 very likely that it will from the politics of the
25 situation.

1 I think if you can't go down to Washington and
2 hold a hearing down there, which would be quite
3 interesting, I think to do, then you ought to get API to
4 send some of their people up here and ask them some of
5 these searching questions.

6 That's all I have to say.

7 MR. PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Bird.
8 The Commissioners might want to talk to you somemore.

9 MR. BIRD: I'm not sure I do.

10 MR. PARKER: Your concept of the super skimmer
11 is one that immediately after the spill I started calling
12 around to a network of people that I have worked with
13 through the years and that concept was advanced there
14 exactly in the way you described it. And, of course, the
15 Corp of Engineers worked very well on this spill. Their
16 problem was no place to put it. They could suck it, but
17 their designed to -- let all the water flow out. You
18 know, cobble together a little imagination and you could
19 put the drudge in front of the tanker and just have hoses
20 running in or you could use the same equipment that's in
21 the dredge and mount it in the tanker. But, the one
22 thing the oil industry does well is design pumps. They
23 are better at designing pumps than anyone else. And
23 that's what you need. Big pumps that they can use. The
25 same pumps that they pump the oil into the tankers with

1 to take it out of the water. Yeah, I think we very
2 definitely encourage all concerned, including the
3 industry to follow up on advancing the state of the art
4 of skimmers. Because they are very small for the job
5 they are given to do.

6 Esther?

7 MS. WUNNICKE: We do have the American
8 Petroleum Institute. I want to ask, you said you were
9 outside the industry? What is your background, Mr. Bird?
10 What is your discipline?

11 MR. BIRD: Well, very undisciplined. I was a
12 graduate in Mechanical Engineering from the University of
13 Washington. But, then I went on to become a journalist
14 and eventually Foreign Service Officer Specialist and
15 retired from that. Then I joined General Electric and
16 was the Vice-President there. And, then I went into
17 computers. So, it's a very varied background.

18 I think the thing that you can't leave -- there's
19 alot of talk here about the way in which people get
20 treated by companies. I think one of the recommendations
21 you ought to look at or one of the fields is community
22 relations. It takes two to tango, but I think the
23 military -- U.S. Military are far better at community
23 relations. Real community relations. Which means that
25 you are listening if you are a big corporation or a big

1 agency, you are listening as well as PRing, as well as
2 giving out communications. It's a two way street here.
3 The other thing besides communication is that I think
4 very definitely if you run across an industry that says I
5 consider everybody outside that industry an amateur. I
6 don't think that's necessarily true of most of the oil
7 industry. They are always searching at the higher levels
8 for good ideas. But, you still can't leave war up to the
9 Generals. And you can't leave oil just up to the oil
10 companies. That's for sure. Because they run away with
11 themselves. Those financial Vice-Presidents with their
12 bottom line considerations will ruin the community
13 relations as well as ruin the company eventually.

14 MR. PARKER: Ed?

15 MR. WENK: Two points that I would like to pick
16 up, Gene, that struck me as quite important. Let me take
17 the chronologically second one first.

18 Community relations. I just want to share with
19 you another example of how that is done right by a
20 situation which has enormous potential for danger. I've
21 served as a ombudsman for safety of people living around
22 a nuculer test site in Nevada. And, it turns out that in
23 serving as a ombudsman I'm hired by the agency
23 responsible for safety, not by the citizens.
25 Nevertheless, the obligation on my part was to look at

1 just that point of community relations. And, this meant
2 having meetings with people living around the test site,
3 Las Vegas, meeting with local sheriffs who's got an
4 emergency responsibility and so on. That is a
5 potentially explosive situation and yet the communities
6 nearby have felt comfortable because the enormous care
7 that is now being taken not to have a repetition of the
8 situation that existed at the test site 30 years ago when
9 residents were exposed now lawsuits still remaining. All
10 I can say is your point really deserves a lot of
11 exploration and especially with the networking that has
12 been conducted.

13 One last quick point. The super skimmer idea,
14 does anyone know whether following your suggestion and
15 principle, thought was given to using some of the empty
16 tankers coming into Valdez that were held back.....

17 MR. BIRD: I wondered about that.

18 MR. WENK:going through. We know about
19 the San Fransico, of course. But, this idea of super
20 skimming with what must have been, I'm just guessing, at
21 least four tankers backed up somewhere in the area at the
22 time. Does anyone know whether that thought was.....

23 MR. BIRD: The problem is you don't have the
23 pumps available, I mean, the skimmers that they have out
25 there have very small pumps on them. And, if you are go-

1 ing to pour a million barrels an hour into a place like
2 this you are going to have to have the capability
3 probably of picking up at least that much or maybe more.
4 A million gallons an hour is...

5 I guess it would be possible to use something
6 like what you've suggested here. A barge mounted with
7 the pumps necessary and the skimmers out there. I think
8 that would be possible. I think the problem here is that
9 everything seemed to be left up to the individual company
10 and I don't know how many of those four tankers were
11 Exxon, but probably none of them were. Therefore, there
12 was a lot of bureaucracy to go through and -- 'I'm not
13 going to risk my tanker to save you, Exxon', in the
14 beginning.

15 MR. WENK: The thing that strikes me as having
16 such virtue in your suggestion is that when you've got a
17 big problem you think big. Instead of thinking about the
18 lowest level thing you can do with these tiny skimmers
19 and small quantities of dispersants and booms of
20 uncertain effectiveness to go at it just the other way,
21 what's the most you could do fast? And, getting in some
22 pumps by air, not easy, but feasible, something to think
23 about for future Contingency Planning perhaps.

23 MR. SUND: Mr. Chairman, I would just make a
25 comment that when you are talking about tankers and what

1 they are looking at, they were looking at using tankers
2 as their #1 priority was offloading the existing oil and
3 not containing the free oil that was spilled in the
4 water. It kind of came up yesterday and before, but
5 those are not mutually exclusive concepts that you should
6 be able to proceed with containment of the spilled oil
7 and offloading of the cargo at the same time and not have
8 to make an either/or decision. Which, in this case, I
9 think they did. I don't know if they did or not. We're
10 going to find out. But, at least the preliminary
11 testimony we've had is that they made an either/or
12 decision and the thing they decided to do was to
13 concentrate on offloading the contained cargo before they
14 proceeded with trying to pick up the free oil.

15 MR. BIRD: Well, another concept comes right
16 out of the fishery industry here. You've got 11 million
17 gallons sitting there. It's not a static thing. It's
18 moving. And, if you are talking containment booms, it
19 really is impossible. But, if you have the concept of
20 two very powerful ships and they had between them a sort
21 of -- or you have another name for it, I think the kind
22 of fishing net that goes between two ships and they
23 proceed.....

23 MR. SUND: Trawl.

25 MR. BIRD: Trawl of some sort. If you trawl the

1 oil instead of containing it, you'd have a lot better
2 chance of either directing it, moving it out of wherever,
3 keeping it off of the sensitive parts at least and
4 meanwhile moving in a third tanker to -- a super skimmer
5 to skim the oil in the center. It just makes much better
6 sense from a standpoint of physics to trawl it rather
7 than contain it.

8 MS. WUNNICKE: How do you trawl the oil? I
9 don't...

10 MR. BIRD: Well, you have to have very
11 powerful.....

12 MR. SUND: Vessels.

13 MR. BIRD:vessels on each side.

14 MS. WUNNICKE: Uh-huh.

15 MR. BIRD: And in between you'd have to invent
16 some kind of a containment boom, or a boom in between.
17 You wouldn't try to net it. There's no way, I guess, of
18 netting it necessarily. But, I could even foresee that
19 maybe you would have a floating boom and underneath that
20 boom you would have a pipe -- flexible pipe, and actually
21 pump directly from the edge of that spill into those
22 tankers at each side. It would make sense to try that
23 technology and see if it'll work.

23 MR. SUND: Small scale.

25 MR. PARKER: Anyone else?

1 MR. WENK: This was being done on a very tiny
2 scale . At the site we saw two ships pulling booms and a
3 skimmer in the middle.
4 MR. BIRD: Makes sense.
5 MR. PARKER: I think the main problem was simply
6 that, you know, Exxon was determined to use it's own
7 equipment wherever possible, but I'm glad you brought
8 that up. Does anybody else have anymore questions?
9 Thank you, Mr. Bird.
10 MR. BIRD: Alright.
11 MS. WUNNICKE: Thank you.
12 MR. PARKER: Next.
13 MS. WUNNICKE: We have two more.
14 MR. HUTTON: Would you rather wait till.....
15 MR. PARKER: No, let's go. These guys are
16 tough and we will feed them eventually.
17 MR. HUTTON: My name is Mark Hutton, Mr.
18 Chairman. And I would be neglectful if I didn't take
19 this opportunity to tell you maybe something you already
20 know about the planning process that's currently going on
21 for the new Contingency Plan. The Alyeska Owners
22 Committee through the Chairman have hired a man named Wes
23 Whitten, a former Vice-President of Arco, who in turn has
23 hired a BP Vice-President who has assemulated a task
25 force from oil representatives around the world who have

1 been working just about a month now on what will be
2 called the New Oil Spill Prevention Contingency Plan. To
3 that end I have been asked to help the task force use the
4 lessons of the Exxon Valdez as they were learned in the
5 fishing communities to create what will probably come out
6 to be a plan that will then be held up as quite possibly
7 the best in the world. I don't say that lightly and
8 maybe the most important thing I could do before I get
9 into trouble and you ask questions I can't answer is to
10 tell you some of the critical components of the plan.
11 And, I will send up to invite us at some point when it
12 is convenient to you, to lay out the entire plan before
13 you.

14 MR. PARKER: Yeah, Mr. Whitten's already been
15 on the phone so we will do that.

16 MR. HUTTON: Yeah, I knew that he had.

17 By and large the plan has two basic elements that
18 stand out different than anything else. The first two
19 are Prevention and the last two are Rapid Response.

20 In the prevention aspect you carry over from the
21 interim plan which was approved by the State on May 1
22 which in essence says that you are going to have two
23 emergency response vessels that are approximately 210
23 feet. Large horsepower. They have towing packages on
25 each one. They have boom and skimmers on each one. They

1 will escort every laden tanker from Valdez to
2 Hetchenbrook. By and large roughly 80% of the time there
3 will be two of these large vessels escorting it. The
4 other 20% of the time there will be one escort vessel and
5 one ocean tug escorting it.

6 In addition to this will be the staging
7 throughout Prince William Sound. Various pieces of
8 equipment including barges to handle oil that has been
9 skimmed off. So, you have storage areas for staging
10 equipment and also around the sensitive sites. The plan
11 for the first time designates a command structure which
12 will never change from beginning to end. Being based in
13 part on the fire fighters principle, the instant command
14 function program. As an intrecal part of this is the
15 regional response teams which we are dealing with in
16 Cordova and a number of other places whereby the panic
17 button is pushed by one of the emergency response vessels
18 back to Valdez. They then call the Cordova Fire Chief,
19 as we are developing Cordova's response plan. This is an
20 example. He then has the system before him to call out
21 the entire volunteer fire department which is not far.
22 We've pretty well arranged boat training, boat
23 liabilities, storage of equipment, communications,
23 instructions, training, exercise and all contingency
25 plans in using boats.

1 The two escorts vessels -- there's going to be a
2 demonstration sometime in August to show their ability to
3 move a laden tanker around. And the idea is that with
4 two of these vessels with each laden tanker your
5 biggest response is that it has the capability to be a
6 pair of eyes for the traffic lane, pair of eyes for
7 navigation hazards and then the absolute towing and
8 stopping capability for a laden tanker that is
9 disabled.

10 Recognizing two basic principles. Number one,
11 prevention is the most important thing going for the plan
12 and number two, you have the vessels on site fully
13 capable with 9,000 feet of boom, a mixture of some kind
14 of boom and an ocean boom and then two skimmers each on
15 each of the response vessels that you're primary goal is
16 the absolute rapid containment of any oil. Pumping down
17 to where your levels are such that the oil coming in
18 whatever crack there is is minimized. But, you know,
19 once the oil gets passed ten hours you haven't done your
20 job, because you can skim on a millimeter of oil till
21 hell freezes over with all the equipment in the world and
22 you might as well, you know...

23 I don't know how much more to go into it. We're
23 fortunate, you know, we believe strongly a road through -
25 - a Contingency Plan goes through local areas like this.

1 Cordova has exceptional resources, you know. Bob already
2 testified, has a command of contingencies. He asked the
3 hard questions about the definition of what is Prince
4 William Sound? How do you include the Copper River
5 Flats? This is -- our process we are going through is
6 an opened process. I can state to you that it is going
7 to include an advisory committee that will grow and form
8 and function and branch off into other categories.
9 Similar in part to what you see, different in some
10 aspects.

11 I don't think I need to say anymore. If you have
12 questions?

13 MR. PARKER: Okay. Questions.

14 MS. WUNNICKE: We'd be very happy to see the
15 plan as soon as possible. Do you have anything in terms
16 of a draft with respect to the command structure?

17 MR. HUTTON: On July 1 we will be submitting to
18 Denny the outline and some written sections that will
19 include the basis for the command structure. August 1 he
20 would like to see the completed plan to the extent that
21 it is completed. It will not have such things as the
22 models, which will take quite a while to develop.

23 The regional response plans from the fishing
23 communities are taking -- the first part is real easy on
25 that with regard to establishing the structure within the

1 community where you make the phone call and you get the
2 volunteer votes on site, fully trained, prepared with
3 equipment and a command structure.

4 The second part where you match equipment with
5 staging areas where you actually deal with the liability
6 of the boats, the contracts of the boats, the training of
7 the boats, the contingency of the boats for fishing
8 season, on-fishing season, bad weather, it's going to
9 take a little longer to do and we can't pretend to have
10 that, because we are right in the middle of fishing
11 season now and we are not going to go around the
12 industry. They are going to be owners of this plans with
13 the task force.

14 But, as you will see within roughly a week we
15 will include you as a very major player in this oversight
16 role.

17 MR. PARKER: That was my intention when Mr.
18 Whitten, whoever he brought along with, together with the
19 Commission sometime at one of our July meetings, to go
20 through the preliminary and then pick up again as you --
21 around August 1 and first part of August and to go over
22 it again and see how it was going. Because, we would
23 very much want to be a participant in it's development
23 rather than just a reviewer.

25 MR. HUTTON: There can be a promise of that

1 role.

2 MS. WUNNICKE: Wonderful.

3 MR. PARKER: Anyone else?

4 MR. WALLIS: I have one question.

5 MR. PARKER: Okay, Tim.

6 MR. WALLIS: On the use of the fire
7 departments. I heard that mentioned last night, too. Is
8 there any thought given as to what liability the fire
9 department or the community would be taking on. For
10 example, if you are responding to someone else's
11 emergency and somebody's home catches on fire and you
12 weren't available for their protection that they were
13 paying for, what that would do -- What problems would
14 be encountered there?

15 MR. HUTTON: I just can't answer that. I know
16 that with the fire department here they have a memorandum
17 of agreement between the areas that they serve, which is
18 five communities, that their liability is shared and
19 encompassed in their emergency response. It's kind of a
20 Good Samaritan waiver, to a degree. And we've chosen the
21 fire department here on a temporary basis, because he
22 emerged as the logical person that already had an idea of
23 how you respond to emergencies. They do that for a
23 living. That won't be the case in every place that we
25 deal with, but it is here.

1 MS. HAYES: Mr. Hutton.....
2 MR. HUTTON: Mark, please.
3 MS. HAYES: Mark, are you a Cordova resident?
4 MR. HUTTON: No, maam. I'm a Bristol Bay
5 fishermen of ten years. The last five years I've fished
6 in the ocean for eight months of the year. Prior to that
7 sorted history I was Deputy Director of the North Pacific
8 Fishery Council. I taught fishery at the University and
9 had an International Consulting Company of my own.
10 MS. HAYES: You sound like a fireman. Do you
11 have any experience in emergency reponse or anything?
12 MR. HUTTON: I worked in government.
13 MS. HAYES: It's the suspenders.
14 MR. HUTTON: No, I have no background. I'm a
15 student of the process of different ways to accomplish
16 things. I'm not a student of the details of how many
17 barrels per hour were pumping, or the tanks or stuff like
18 that. We have an extraordinary talent with Mike
19 Williams from BP and Nick Mitchell who's probably one of
20 the better experts from the North Sea with us now. So,
21 our equipment today is state of the art. Right down
22 from the flex arms to the ocean booms to the vessel --
23 deck configurations to be able to both tow and deploy
23 booms.
25 MS. HAYES: How long does it take to get a

1 tanker, a ladened tanker from the terminal to
2 Hinchinbrook Island? How long a sail? Period of time?

3 MR. HUTTON: Six hours, I'm guessing.

4 MS. HAYES: Okay.

5 MR. HUTTON: I think it's six hours.

6 MR. PARKER: Ed?

7 MR. WENK: Would you like to comment on the
8 extent to which the Coast Guard, EPA, other federal
9 agencies are either observers or partners in the
10 development of this plan and the extent to which various
11 State of Alaska agencies are involved?

12 MR. HUTTON: The Coast Guard, DEC, Alaska
13 Department of Fish and Game, EPA, are the four agencies
14 that come to mind that are are or will be involved in not
15 just a review of the final plan, but the development of
16 the plan as it goes through the writing, the approval of
17 each section, right down to the submission on August 1 to
18 the State.

19 MR. PARKER: Okay.

20 MS. HAYES: (Inaudible)...to Kelso?

21 MR. HUTTON: Yeah. What you see here is a
22 very open process recognizing the value of using people
23 that have gone through this experience, recognizing that
23 people that were impacted, or could have been or should
25 have been or are involved in and have an ownership right

1 in the plan, and to that extent the idea is that this is
2 not a closed door plan anymore. It has to work. It has
3 to have the trial runs, the periodic training, testing,
4 fire drills. And, our attitude is that anybody that has
5 a right to be involved has a moral obligation to assist
6 us from this point on.

7 MR. PARKER: Ed?

8 MR. WENK: Could I just follow up then by asking
9 whether this plan anticipates in emergency response roles
10 by these various agencies and in a sense then would you
11 need their sign off somewhere along this process of a
12 committment on their part to be doing what you expect
13 them to do?

14 MR. HUTTON: I will make a note that you said
15 that and all I can say to you is that if you deal with
16 the... Take Yellow Stone where they have 28,000 people
17 fighting that fire. You take the one agency that deals
18 with crisis as a routine part of their daily mission and
19 that's the firefighters, they have an incident command
20 function that divides up from the Commander on down. You
21 have operations, logistics, planning and finance. And
22 they do that because everything they do crosses agency
23 and jurisdictional boundaries and so you plug the people
23 into the box, you don't plug the boxes into the different
25 agencies. And, our attitude with this one is that you

1 have a command structure that cannot be influenced by
2 multi-jurisdictional boundaries in time of a crisis.
3 We'd like to carry that thought right down through to the
4 regional response teams that are going to be responsible
5 for providing 30 boats or 75 boats out in Cordova, for
6 example. So, we're very aware of it and I'll make sure
7 I'll take a note of that back, because a pre-agreement
8 that they accept the terms and conditions, you know...
9 And also the use of the Alaska Division of Environmental
10 or the emergency services will be a very, very important
11 person in this issue.

12 MR. SUND: I'll bring that up at the
13 emergency services and division of military. Big part of
14 the Alaska Command structure and I think -- that's what I
15 am a little frustrated about here, now. I just made a
16 note to myself, you know, the State is so divided on its'
17 response to this issue. There's DEC and Fish and Game
18 over here and everybody's going around and the federal
19 agencies, you know, the guys fighting with Fish and
20 Wildlife Service on one side and the Coast Guard on the
21 other. It's just a big bureaucratic.

22 MR. PARKER: I think in meshing this effort the
23 legislation already passed (INAUDIBLE - Tape fades in and
23 out)...the shape of the future will start to become much
25 clearer.

1 MS. HAYES: That was the geographical extent of
2 the plan. Is it from the terminal to outside of Alaska
3 waters? What happens on the high seas? Where
4 geographically is the application of the Contingency
5 Plan?

6 MR. HUTTON: I was hoping you wouldn't ask
7 that. It's very difficult to exclude Kodiak Island, for
8 example. Fifty-one of fifty-two fishing districts are
9 closed because they have oil on the beaches. It's very
10 difficult to exclude the lower Cook Inlet which has major
11 disruption of their economic social pattern because of
12 oil.

13 By the same token it's very difficult to write an
14 oil spill plan that promises to respond to an oil spill
15 that might happen outside Prince William Sound by a
16 shipper that's not part of the owner company. So, what
17 you have in a situation where you have to deal with it,
18 you have to deal with it with owners from within Alyeska
19 and from outside of Alyeska. It's a complicated process.
20 The only way to address it is to say it's time to become
21 a catalyst have them buy into the promise that oil comes
22 from Prince William Sound to Kodiak. We will have the
23 equipment there, the plan in place... We are developing
23 the Kodiak Emergency Reponse, the Homer Emergency
25 Response as a part of this plan to the extent that you

1 just about have to.

2 It's not as serious for the first ten hours as it
3 is for Cordova for example. So, your first phone calls
4 say 'you're on red alert, or yellow alert' or whatever it
5 is you say. Then you start in process all the things
6 you have to do for them to get ready. It's a difficult
7 question because it gets into owner companies outside
8 Prince William Sound, but it is not being ignored,
9 because oil has proven where it will go now.

10 It's a poor answer to your question, but it's the
11 best I can do.

12 MR. SUND: A bigger question is one of the
13 charges our commission has been given is the deal with
14 oil discharge on a statewide basis. And, we are not
15 necessarily limited to what happens in Prince William
16 Sound. We have Bristol Bay, Southeast Alaska, other
17 areas, and we haven't really focused on that, but that's
18 kind of where we are at. You know, drawing up this plan
19 here is necessary for Prince William Sound, but I think
20 some people are looking at us to provide the Contingency
21 Plans for all the rest of the state, too. Pipeline.
22 So, maybe the thesis that you go through ought to do it
23 and are valuable to be applied someplace else.

23 The rest of the state doesn't quite have the
25 margin in their profit structure that the oil industry

1 does in dealing with these problems.

2 MS. WUNNICKE: Mr. Chairman, I have a
3 question. You said you were looking first at prevention
4 and then rapid response. But, as a part of your
5 Contingency Plan are you including Wildlife Rescue as a
6 part of the Contingency Plan. Maybe you were not here
7 this morning when we.....

8 MR. HUTTON: I did hear. That's absolutely
9 yes.

10 MS. WUNNICKE: Okay.

11 MR. HUTTON: Absolutely.

12 MS. WUNNICKE: May I have one more question,
13 please, Mr. Chairman. I know you are hungry.

14 Since you have given a lot of thought to this and
15 you can have a Good Samaritan exception on my ability for
16 firemen, have you given any thought to how you might
17 devise a Good Samaritan exception for volunteers in other
18 areas in responding to an oil spill?

19 MR. HUTTON: Well, let me, since this goes on
20 record, I use Good Samaritan because I was kind of
21 searching for a generic way to describe something that I
22 didn't fully understand. Which is the fire chiefs here
23 memorandum with five communities so that they shared
23 liability and didn't have to worry about it. If we sent
25 a fishing vessel out from Cordova, or 30 of them, to res-

1 pond to a spill, we would have pre-arranged, pre-
2 contracted liability.

3 MS. WUNNICKE: Alright. That's what I was
4 talking about, I guess. And, I'd like your shorthand way
5 of characterizing it. How do you break through that
6 barrier of liability in order to use volunteers who are
7 not contracted? Any thoughts along that way? Or do you
8 have prearranged contracts? The core of volunteers, I
9 guess, like a volunteer fire department?

10 MR. HUTTON: I guess I can't answer it. It's a
11 good question, but I can't answer it.

12 MS. WUNNICKE: Well,.....

13 MR. PARKER: I think it's one we can certainly
14 work on.

15 MR. SUND: I've spent three or four years
16 working on that question. There is not an easy answer.

17 But would you include economic impact to local
18 communities in your contingency plan?

19 MR. HUTTON: I can't answer that because I don't
20 know.

21 MR. SUND: Why don't you make a note down on
22 that, that that seems to be -- of how to deal with the
23 economic impact in communities based upon emergencies.
23 That's what we are facing right here. Nobody seems to
25 have the answer 100 days after the spill. So, we might

1 as well figure out the plan for it next time.

2 MR. WALLIS: Excuse me. The contingency plan
3 deals with a situation. I think what you are talking
4 about is recommendations (inaudible)...influence our --
5 I don't know how it would. This is a response, a
6 reactionary type situation and what you are talking about
7 is something else that has to come into some type of
8 recommendation that this committee will have to come up
9 with separate from a response plan.

10 MR. SUND: You defined it rightly. The
11 planning for a contingency, for an event. And I am
12 saying that the event includes things beyond the tanker
13 or the oil. It includes fish, animals and in this case
14 we've discovered it includes the economy and it includes
15 people. It includes daycare centers. As you pull these
16 volunteers out to the spill, what part of your plan gets
17 people in to take care of kids. I think that's all part
18 of the process.

19 MR. WALLIS: Excuse me, except your plan is to
20 deal with the situation, right? Prevention or clean up
21 of the oil?

22 MR. HUTTON: Yes. The issue is that you have
23 certain guidelines because the state signs off on the
23 plan right now and the definition of the contingency plan
25 itself probably is subject to scrutiny right now.

1 Subject to some change, subject to a lot of oversight to
2 the extent that it gets put in or it gets left out and
3 maybe it's charged back to a state policy to deal with it
4 in terms of a bonding. Or, a liability fund as a
5 guarantee.

6 That other question has been asked, generally,
7 not specific but, not yet, and of course, there's no
8 range of options yet proposed except through the
9 liability funds.

10 MR. PARKER: I think we are going to have to
11 have, you know, some very intensive analysis. You know,
12 the best way to approach this and look into that is to
13 have an extensive workshop on this. But, you are right,
14 John. There's no easy answer on this one. Whether we
15 use a classic disaster relief approach, that does not
16 include real economic compensation. It just gets things
17 back in place. A lot of work.

18 MR. WENK: Do you have time for another
19 question?

20 MR. PARKER: Well, if you gotta.

21 MR. WENK: I'll make it brief and I think
22 there's a quick answer. As I asked you before whether or
23 not you were consulting the federal and state agencies to
23 collaborate with your planning, are they consulting you
25 with theirs? Because we are aware of the fact that at

1 least two federal agencies are involved in some major
2 contingency planning.

3 MR. HUTTON: The Coast Guard is the reciprocal,
4 yes. But, the others no.

5 MR. PARKER: Thank you, Mark.

6 MS. WUNNICKE: Thank you, very much. How do we
7 get ahold of you?

8 MR. HUTTON: All you do is call Les and he knows
9 where I'm at all the time. Thank you.

10 MR. PARKER: Alright. Thank you. We have one
11 more perons who wishes to.....(INAUDIBLE -- airplane
12 overhead).

13 MS. COLLIN: I'm Nancy Collin. I'm the
14 editor of the Cordova Times and I just wanted to make
15 some few comments based on what people were talking about
16 today. The spirit of volunteerism was mentioned. I
17 don't see why that can't continue if Exxon would allow
18 volunteers to go out there and the agencies as well. A
19 lot of fishermen were prevented from collecting otters
20 and going to Fish and Wildlife. They were bringing in
21 otters that were not impacted. I don't know. I have not
22 been out on the spill. I have basically been covering
23 what's been happening to the community of Cordova.

23 I remember on Day 1 of the spill being down at
25 CDFU which was the only place in Cordova where anyone

1 could find out anything that was happening. And it was
2 just incredulous that nothing could happen right away.
3 And they were talking about all the impacts that could
4 happen. How Alyeska had already been forwarned about
5 this and the oil companies and nothing was being done.
6 The first two weeks in this town were just utter madness.
7 Meeting after meetings after meetings. Nobody knew what
8 was going on. No one knew what was going on in Valdez.
9 People were travelling between the two communities and
10 they would go to Valdez and come back with different
11 recommendations on how things should be done here and
12 people were still looking for somebody in control to make
13 decisions.

14 A lot of people left their jobs to go work on the
15 oil spill. There were a lot of problems with Veco in the
16 beginning and they've worked to resolve that. This is a
17 disaster that no one has ever been prepared for and it
18 caught everyone short. Everyone was not prepared for
19 it.

20 A lot of people who stayed in town at their
21 regular jobs during the first couple of months worked
22 many hours. I know myself that I reached a burnout at
23 the end of the first month. There was too many things to
23 do. There were not that many people in town and a lot of
25 people who were going to go unrecognized doing their reg-

1 ular jobs trying to keep everyday life going. The
2 childcare workers, the grocery store workers, hardware
3 store workers, everybody. I hear people talking around
4 town that summer's just started and we are already burnt
5 out and they are very worried about what the winter is
6 going to bring. They think all these fishermen that have
7 made all this money will not be here so they are not
8 expecting to see any of this money staying for the
9 winter.

10 I am new to the community. I just moved up here
11 in October and the population decreases by half during
12 the winter and it might even decrease more this winter.

13 I don't know anything about the economic
14 situation. I do think it is very important that all
15 these communities impacted by the oil spill need economic
16 analysis and Exxon should be responsible for paying for
17 that.

18 The way the money is being given out to different
19 groups I find atrocious whereas the Cordova Chamber of
20 Commerce can get a check for \$20,000.00, and child care
21 can get \$18,000.00 and quarrelling can go, friendships
22 can be ruined, enemies become worse and it's just the
23 psychological ramifications and sociological
23 ramifications. It's just amazing in a small community of
25 this size. I hear it's worse in Whittier which has a

1 population of 300 and that's tripled to 900. Luckily
2 Cordova has the Oil Spill Response Office which was very
3 important in stablizing information. Coming out with a
4 daily fact sheet telling people what is happening on a
5 daily basis. The only news that we got outside the
6 Anchorage papers was the KTU reports and I'm the only
7 that puts it together and there's no way I could have
8 covered everything. So, I tried to focus basically on
9 Cordova. I have not flown over. I don't know what it
10 looks like out there. The first time I saw oiled otters
11 -- the first week, I didn't have time to watch the news
12 until after the first week.

13 I had a lot of people come into my office
14 complaining and saying that VECO needs to be
15 investigated, Exxon needs to be investigated, what's the
16 priority on hiring the boats, how is this working, how
17 come certain people are out there longer than other
18 people? They were trying to get a rotation system in
19 place. I don't know how that's working right now.

20 I do know of one fisherman who went out there on
21 the oil spill and it seems he's not doing anything and
22 he's making a lot of money. He says that they are
23 sitting on the boats, they are stocking up food from the
23 Exxon barges, supplying fishermen with food. He says
25 their having steaks for dinner every night. There's a

1 phone system where you can call out at Exxon's expense.
2 I find that outrageous and I'm sure there's other
3 fishermen out there that have the horror stories that
4 tell about working out there 24 hours a day.

5 I don't know how it's working. How's it's
6 organized. Who's keeping track of who's doing what.

7 Let's see. Another woman came into my office
8 yesterday and she was sorry she wasn't going to be here
9 to speak to you. One thing, I don't understand, she
10 mentioned how come something wasn't done about salt licks
11 for the deer. And, she also mentioned that she wants to
12 be able to go and look at her property out on the Sound
13 and she doesn't want Exxon preventing her from doing
14 that. She voiced her fear, as others, that Cordova would
15 become a ghost town. When the train left, I guess in the
16 30s, it was fishing that kept this community going and
17 there are, you know, attempts now to get economic
18 diversification with the Prince William Sound Technology
19 Institute. This was in the works before the spill
20 occurred.

21 It's a very different group of people here that
22 Exxon does not know how to deal with. They have the
23 corporate mind set. People here know their environment.
23 They like the way their life is here and they don't want
25 to see it change. There's a lot of stress and I think

1 all that needs to be looked at. That's what I want to
2 say.

3 MR. PARKER: What is the focus of the Technology
4 Institute?

5 KATHY ABARR (ph): That will be addressed this
6 afternoon.

7 MR. WALLIS: You said that some lady was worried
8 that Exxon wouldn't let her go out and see her property
9 and Exxon won't let us pick up any otters anymore. Why
10 do people listen to them? What authority do they have to
11 keep you from doing anything?

12 MS. COLLINS: That's what I find very curious.
13 I don't know, I know Fish and Wildlife set down the
14 regulations about the otters. I can't say -- you need to
15 talk to Fish and Wildlife. And, Exxon, you know, they
16 are working in conjunction with each other. You'd have
17 to talk to Fish and Wildlife and Exxon officials.

18 MR. SUND: If you have property.....

19 MS. COLLINS: She's a shareholder and she was
20 just, I don't know.... She hasn't gone to see it yet.
21 She's just saying "they better not prevent her from
22 seeing it". I guess it's in the oil sections of the
23 Sound and I would think the only reason she would be
23 prevented, if she went in a boat she would be tracking
25 oil into unoiled areas. That's the only thing I could