3.24 SPILL RISK

The purpose of this section is to discuss the risks associated with potential spills of oil and other substances involved in the proposed project. This section begins with an outline of the regulatory framework, planning requirements, and potential for spills; this is to introduce the structure for large-scale industry projects. To provide context for regional preparedness, the current capacity for responding to spills of the hazardous materials in the region of the proposed project is also provided. The fate and behavior of spilled substances is addressed to describe how materials react in the environment.

Finally, several spill scenarios are presented to allow description of possible response actions and environmental impacts. The scenarios are a representative example of the types of spills that could occur, and do not represent “worst case” possibilities. Instead, the focus is on high-consequence, low probability occurrences. The impact to each resource from Sections 3.1 to 3.23 is detailed for each scenario. The impacts described are not part of the project design, but represent upset or system failure. If any were to occur, it would likely result in regulatory and punitive action against the project.

Hazardous substances discussed include fuel (diesel) transported in barges, trucks, pipelines and stored in tanks, liquefied natural gas (LNG) releases, and cyanide and mercury released to the environment during transport. Natural gas releases are also discussed in Section 3.25, Pipeline Reliability and Safety. The substances and scenarios discussed are not intended to be comprehensive of all substances that would be used at the mine. Diesel, LNG, cyanide, mercury, and dam tailings were selected based on likelihood of a spill, concerns brought up from the scoping period, and potential impacts to the environment. A list of other reagents used in the mine process is presented in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.1.6.

The impact of mercury released into the air on health and the environment is discussed in the Section 3.8, Air Quality.

SYNOPSIS

This section outlines the risks associated with potential spills of five substances of concern for the proposed Donlin Gold Project: diesel, LNG, mercury, cyanide, and tailings. For each substance, there is a discussion of the regulatory framework, existing response capacity, spill frequency and volume, fate and behavior of the material. Finally there are hypothetical spill scenarios, and the impacts to each resource analyzed in this EIS.

The substances would be regulated by a variety of federal, state, and international standards, described in Section 3.24.1. Diesel storage, transportation, and distribution would be managed according to required plans like Oil Discharge and Prevention Contingency Plans and Facility Response Plans. LNG is managed by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration regulations, cyanide by the International Cyanide Management Code and other state and federal agencies, and mercury by various federal regulations. The safety of the tailings dam would be under authority of the Alaska Department of Natural Resources.
There is little existing response capacity in the region of the project. During transportation and storage of the materials, Donlin Gold would pre-position response equipment and supplies in the event of spills (such as booms, skimmers, boats, and sorbents for diesel) and personnel would be trained in using it. Donlin Gold would contract to oil spill removal organizations for response to diesel spills. Section 3.24.2 discusses these in more detail. LNG, cyanide, mercury and tailings are currently not used in the region, and therefore there is no response capability at this time. New plans and response capacities could be required.

Section 3.24.3, Spill Frequency and Volume, provides an overview of the potential spill sources, projected rates and likelihoods of occurrence, and spill volume, by alternative, for each of the five hazardous substances. Potential sources of release for diesel, LNG, cyanide and mercury would be vessels, storage containers, vehicles, transfer operations, and pipelines. Tailings could be released in the event of a partial dam failure. Table 3.24-1, Table 3.24-4, Table 3.24-5, Table 3.24-6, and Table 3.24-7 list the expected relative rates of occurrence for diesel spills, LNG spills, cyanide spills, mercury spills, and the probability of occurrence for a tailings release, respectively, from main project sources.

How the substances behave when released into the environment is discussed in Section 3.24.4. Substances are influenced by environmental factors (for example weather and the season), the environment onto which the spill occurs, and the physical and chemical properties of the spilled material. The fate and behavior of spilled materials do not change as a result of project components; therefore, the information presented is applicable to all action alternatives.

Spill scenarios presented in Section 3.24.5 summarize potential causes, behavior, and volumes of spills that could occur during the transport and storage of materials, as well as potential impacts and responses. This analysis considers a variety of accidental spills, from minor to major. These scenarios are conceptual and represent possible sets of potential accidents. The nine scenarios include:

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea. If an ocean-going barge were damaged, releasing 735,000 gallons of diesel into the ocean, south of the Kuskokwim River.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release. If a river diesel barge were damaged, releasing 37,817 gallons into the Kuskokwim River.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release. If a diesel tank were to fail at a tank farm, releasing the contents into secondary containment or during transfer operations, releasing less than 2,000 gallons into the environment.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release. If tanker trucks were to rollover or collide, releasing up to 13,500 gallons into the environment.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release. If the diesel pipeline were to have pinhole leaks (releasing less than 100 gallons into the environment) or rupture (releasing 422,000 gallons into the environment).
Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas Release. If there were leaks or ruptures in LNG tanks, releasing up to 55,000 gallons of LNG into the environment, or if a truck accident released 1,150 gallons into the environment.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release. If cyanide containers were lost or ruptured during transportation, releasing into the environment.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release. If mercury containers were lost or ruptured during transportation, releasing into the environment.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure. If the tailings dam failed, releasing 2.6 million cubic yards of water or a mixture of water and tailings into Anaconda Creek.

Section 3.24.6 analyzes the potential impacts of the nine spill scenarios on the 23 resources under each of the action alternatives. Spill impacts would not occur under Alternative 1, the No Action Alternative, and not all scenarios are applicable to each alternative. Resources would be differentially impacted under the scenarios; Table 3.24-27 provides a succinct summary of impacts, by resource and scenario.

3.24.1 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

An Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) plan would be developed and submitted to the State of Alaska with the volumes and locations of hazardous materials on the site. EPCRA requirements vary, depending on the volumes and toxicity of the chemical used at a facility. Once Donlin Gold establishes the volumes and types of hazardous materials at the facility, the appropriate EPCRA requirements will be addressed. All hazardous materials storage will comply with the latest version of the Fire Code.

Reporting a release into the environment would be done according to spill plans and regulatory requirements for the substance.

3.24.1.1 DIESEL FUEL AND OTHER OIL

The Donlin Gold Project and alternatives propose to transport diesel fuel to the mine site either by barge and truck or via a diesel pipeline. The storage, transportation, and distribution would be managed according to a number of required plans that needed to comply with state and federal regulations. These plans would be developed, signed, and stamped by a professional engineer registered in the State of Alaska. The primary plans are described below.

Oil Discharge and Prevention Contingency Plan (ODPCP). An ODPCP describes the measures to be taken to prevent a spill, and, in the event of a spill, the response actions, equipment, procedures, and other elements necessary to respond to and effectively manage a response to an oil spill. Operators of a non-crude oil terminal facility with a capacity of 10,000 barrels or greater (including piping) and/or a tank barge that transports oil as cargo (not for its own use) are required to prepare the ODPCP, obtain Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC)
approval, and submit a renewal every five years. 18 AAC 75.425 describes the requirements for preparing ODPCPs. These requirements apply to the proposed Donlin Gold Project.

AS 46.04.030 requires sufficient oil discharge secondary containment, storage, transfer, and cleanup equipment, personnel, and resources to meet the following response planning standards:

- For a discharge from an oil terminal facility, cleanup or control capacity equal to the capacity of the largest tank within 72 hours,
- For a discharge from a pipeline, cleanup or control capacity for the realistic maximum oil discharge within 72 hours, and
- For a discharge from a tank vessel or barge carrying non-crude oil in bulk as cargo, be able to contain or control 15 percent of the maximum capacity of the vessel or barge or the realistic maximum oil discharge, whichever is greater, within 48 hours and cleanup the discharge within the shortest possible time consistent with minimizing damage to the environment.

Based on these requirements, Donlin Gold, LCC (Donlin Gold) has prepared two ODPCPs for the proposed project:

- Terminal and Tank Farm Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan (SLR 2012a), and
- Vessel Operations Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan (SLR 2012b).

These ODPCPs are included as Appendix R and describe the proposed project’s pre-deployed equipment planned at Angyaruq (Jungjuk) Port and the mine site tank farm, and discharge and response scenarios. These ODPCPs would be updated and approved by ADEC prior to construction.

Due to a similarity of requirements, ODPCPs can be written as a single purpose document to meet multiple documentation requirements with the appropriate cross-referencing tables. This includes the following plans.

**Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plan.** The SPCC Plan would be required for any facility which could reasonably be expected to discharge oil in quantities that may be harmful into navigable waters of the United States, per 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 112. The operator would prepare and provide an SPCC signed by a professional engineer to ADEC and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) prior to initiation of the project. Information on the potential sources of spills and the equipment and materials available onsite for cleanup would be included. This plan would contain spill prevention measures such as oil storage and transfer guidelines, planned secondary containment to meet the containment requirements, and cleanup procedures (including on-site spill equipment, personnel training and management of associated wastes) if a spill were to occur.

**Facility Response Plans (FRP).** EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) may require an FRP for the storage and transfer facilities. These plans would be prepared and provided to the agencies prior to initiation of the project. FRPs which are required by 33 CFR 154 (USCG) and 40 CFR 112 (EPA) include emergency response action plans, facility information, worst-case spill scenarios, and response training records. USCG covers the section from the connection with the vessel to
the first valve within secondary containment; EPA covers the facility from the first valve within secondary containment.

**Waste Management Plan.** Donlin Gold would prepare a comprehensive Waste Management Plan prior to the generation of wastes. This plan would include effective mitigation measures, including: waste minimization, product substitution, beneficial reuse, recycling, sampling, analysis, waste characterization, disposal profiling, manifesting, and proper off-site disposal. The Waste Management Plan would address storage, analysis, labeling, transportation, and disposal of wastes generated during construction, drilling, and operations. Depending on the type of waste, there are numerous regulatory agencies and local government requirements that need to be addressed to maintain compliance, such as EPA, and ADEC (18 AAC 60, Solid Waste). Donlin has prepared an integrated waste management plan; but if needed, a waste management plan specific to the oil spill response would be drafted in the event of an oil spill. Where appropriate, this event-specific plan would be tailored to coincide with Donlin Gold’s waste management plan.

3.24.1.2 LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has regulatory authority over the LNG facilities proposed. Construction, operation, and maintenance of land-based LNG facilities are subject to the PHMSA regulations codified in 49 CFR Part 193, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards. These regulations incorporate many of the requirements of National Fire Protection Association Standard 59A and specify the siting, design, construction, equipment, and fire protection requirements that would apply to the LNG plant.

The LNG liquefaction plant would be subject to inspection during construction and thereafter annually by PHMSA regional staff to ensure that the plant is constructed, operated, and maintained in accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR Part 193. PHMSA is able to enforce these requirements through civil penalties and correction action orders in order to quickly rectify any circumstances that it deems hazardous (PHMSA 2011a).

See Section 3.25, Pipeline Reliability and Safety, for PHMSA regulatory authorities for the proposed pipeline.

3.24.1.3 CYANIDE

Sodium cyanide is a reagent used to extract gold during the mining process. The International Cyanide Management Code (Code) is a voluntary industry code of practice for the use of cyanide in the mining of gold. The Code was developed in 2001 under the auspices of United Nations Environment Program and the International Council on Mining and Metals. The Code’s mission statement is “To assist the global gold mining industry in improving cyanide management, thereby minimizing risks to workers, communities, and the environment from the use of cyanide in gold mining, and reducing community concerns about its use.”

The Code consists of nine principles and 31 standards of practice that address best management practices (BMPs) for all aspects of the safe use of cyanide by gold mines, including production of cyanide and its transportation to the mine site, handling of reagent-strength cyanide, use of cyanide in the gold production process, decommissioning of cyanide facilities, worker safety, worker training, emergency response, independent auditing, and public dialogue.
Implementation of the Code is overseen by the International Cyanide Management Institute (International Cyanide Management Institute 2014). The proposed Donlin Gold Project relies on purchased supplies of sodium cyanide rather than producing it, but all other standards apply.

Sodium cyanide is designated as a hazardous substance in accordance with Title 40 CFR Part 116. The State of Alaska also recognizes cyanide as a hazardous substance and lists appropriate soil cleanup levels (18 AAC 75). This section details the regulations governing the transportation, storage and use of sodium cyanide at the proposed Donlin Gold Project.

**Transportation.** Transportation of sodium cyanide would comply with agency requirements that would include, but not be limited to, the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT), the USCG, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Specifically, sodium cyanide would be transported in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations, including, but not limited to, the following requirements:

- Sodium cyanide would be transported using containers and transporters certified by the USDOT for safe handling.
- Containers would be prepared for shipment according to the requirements of Title 49 CFR Part 172 for the preparation of shipping papers, marking, labeling and placarding.
- Materials would be packaged according to Title 49 CFR 173, 178 and 179.
- Emergency response information would be provided and maintained according to Title 49 CFR 172.
- Personnel involved in the transportation of hazardous materials would be trained according to Title 49 CFR 172.
- Where applicable, Safety and Security Plans would be developed and implemented in accordance with Title 49 CFR 172.
- Transportation of hazardous materials by vessel would be conducted in accordance with Title 33 CFR and Title 49 CFR 176, which includes requirements for general handling, storage, and segregation, port security, and the preparation of a Dangerous Cargo Manifest, in addition to specific requirements for the various classes of hazardous materials.

Where applicable, international shipments of hazardous materials would be shipped in accordance with the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code).

**Handling and Storage.** Sodium cyanide handling and storage practices and processes would be in accordance with the Code, as developed by the International Cyanide Management Institute, and to all applicable laws and regulations. Sodium cyanide would be stored based on the hazard classifications identified in their material data safety sheets and in compliance with the applicable OSHA or MSHA regulations. For example cyanide would not be stored with incompatible materials, i.e., acids.

Employees handling sodium cyanide would be trained in the appropriate and safe handling of these materials as required by OSHA, MSHA, and/or USDOT based on the duties of the employees. Records of training would be maintained on file according to the applicable
regulations. For example, employees working with cyanide would use ventilation and personal protective equipment as appropriate.

### 3.24.1.4 MERCURY

Naturally occurring, mercury-containing waste materials would be generated during the extraction of gold in the mining process. If mercury containing waste is extracted with the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) and the leachate exceeds the TCLP mercury criterion, the waste is designated as a characteristic hazardous waste in accordance with Title 40 CFR Part 261. Hazardous wastes are regulated in the State of Alaska under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) federal regulations contained in Title 40 CFR, Parts 260 to 279. Alaska is one of the few states that does not have the authority to administer hazardous waste regulations and, therefore, defers to federal RCRA regulations.

This section describes the regulations governing the disposal of mercury waste for the proposed project.

**Transportation.** Hazardous wastes would be shipped off site to appropriate recycling/disposal facilities in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations. Specifically, mercury hazardous wastes would be transported in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations, including, but not limited to, the following requirements:

- The waste would be sampled, analyzed, characterized, and profiled for recycling/disposal.
- Containers would be prepared for shipment according to the requirements of Title 49 CFR Part 172 for the preparation of shipping papers, marking, labeling and placarding.
- Materials would be packaged according to Title 49 CFR 173, 178 and 179.
- Emergency response information would be provided and maintained according to Title 49 CFR 172.
- Personnel involved in the transportation of hazardous materials would be trained according to Title 49 CFR 172.
- Where applicable, Safety and Security Plans would be developed and implemented in accordance with Title 49 CFR 172.
- Transportation of hazardous materials by vessel would be conducted in accordance with Title 33 CFR and Title 49 CFR 176, which includes requirements for general handling, stowage, and segregation, port security, and the preparation of a Dangerous Cargo Manifest, in addition to specific requirements for the various classes of hazardous materials.

Where applicable, international shipments of hazardous materials would be shipped in accordance with the IMDG Code; however, the sale, distribution, transfer, or export of elemental mercury is prohibited.

Shipments would be accompanied by a hazardous waste manifest and the appropriate land disposal restriction (LDR) notification and certification forms where applicable.
Handling and Storage. Hazardous materials would be handled and stored in the workplace according to the U.S. Department of Labor OSHA and MSHA hazard communication standards as detailed in Title 29 CFR 1910.1200 and Title 30 CFR 47.

The requirements for managing hazardous waste are found in the RCRA regulations at Title 40 CFR Parts 260 to 282. The specific requirements that apply to a particular waste depend mainly on the classification of the waste generated and the generator status, which is based on the quantity of waste generated in a month and the total quantity of waste accumulated on site at any one time. The proposed project would maintain an inventory of the volumes of hazardous waste generated each month and the total volume of hazardous waste on site to ascertain its generator status and would comply with the applicable regulations.

The applicable training, inspection, reporting, preparedness, spill prevention, contingency planning, and emergency procedures required by RCRA and ADEC Division of Spill Prevention and Response would be implemented.

3.24.1.5 TAILINGS

Spills of tailings at the mill or from piping to the TSF can occur during mine operations but these would be relatively small and easily contained and cleaned up. However, a spill from the tailings dam, especially the failure of such a structure and the release of wet tailings downstream into the environment, was a concern expressed during scoping and is appropriate for discussion in this section.

In Alaska, dam safety is regulated by the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (ADNR) primarily under Alaska Statute (AS) 46.17 “Supervision of Safety of Dams and Reservoirs” and 18 AAC 93 “Dam Safety.” Enforcement powers granted to ADNR under Dam Safety regulations include requirements for ADNR approval to construct, enlarge, repair, alter, remove, maintain, operate, or abandon a dam or reservoir. ADNR can inspect dams and enter private lands for this purpose without notice if there is reason to believe that a dam or reservoir may be unsafe or presents an imminent threat to life or property. ADNR may order the owner to take action to protect life and property if it determines the dam or reservoir is unsafe, and may take supervisory control of the dam from the owner in emergency situations.

ADNR also has financial assurance requirements associated with dam safety (11 AAC 93.171 and 172), and may enter into cooperative agreements with other state and federal agencies for the purpose of reclamation and bonding of tailings dams in accordance with AS 27.19.060. Financial assurance must be established to pay for costs of reclamation and post-closure monitoring and maintenance, or for breaching a dam and restoring the stream channel and land to natural conditions.

ADNR considers the TSF to be Hazard Class I, which means there is a probable loss of one or more lives if failure were to occur; a potentially significant danger to public health; and probable losses or damage not limited to the owner of the dam. There is also probable loss of or significant damage to waters identified under 11 AAC 195.010(a) as important for spawning, rearing, or migration of anadromous fish.

The ADNR (2005) guidelines contain design requirements for hydrology (inflow flood, precipitation, snowpack); hydraulics (flood routing, spillway, freeboard); stability under a variety of loading conditions; design earthquake levels; seepage analysis; and cold regions
factors such as permafrost foundation issues, ice loading, and other cold temperature effects on construction materials and operations. Dry stack tailings dams are regulated by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) under their solid waste permitting program (18 AAC 60). However, the primary intent of the dam below the dry stack under Alternative 5A would be to contain operating pond water from flowing into the dry stack, and as such, would likely be regulated under the ADNR dam safety program as Hazard Class II.

Two levels of design earthquakes are required to be addressed by ADNR (2005): (1) an operating basis earthquake (OBE) representing ground motion or fault movement with a reasonable probability of occurrence over the project life, during which dams must remain functional and easily repairable; and (2) a Maximum Design Earthquake (MDE) representing the most severe earthquake that could potentially occur relative to an established acceptable risk level, during which dams must resist collapse, failure, or uncontrolled release. Risk levels for the OBE and MDE are defined in terms of earthquake return period, that is, the frequency with which a certain size earthquake is expected to occur.

For Class I dams, the return period for the OBE is specified as 150 to > 250 years, and for the MDE, the return period is specified as 2,500 years to the return period of the maximum credible earthquake (MCE). For Class II dams, the return period for the OBE is specified as 70 to 200 years, and for the MDE, the return period is specified as 1,000 to 2,500 years. Seismic hazard analyses conducted for the mine site relative to these levels are described in Section 3.3.2.1.2, Geohazards and Seismic Conditions.

The ADNR (2005) dam safety guidelines also contain requirements governing different phases of the project life, such as construction plans and construction quality assurance/quality control; operations, maintenance, and repairs; monitoring and inspections; emergency action planning; and closure. Emergency Action Plan (EAP) requirements under 11 AAC 93.164(b) identify specific requirements for dam failure analysis and detailed inundation maps which estimate the extent of downstream flooding in the event of a dam breach. With respect to dam failure analysis, guidance is provided by ADNR (2005) for appropriate levels of engineering evaluation; quantitative dam break models; weather, breach size, and failure mode parameters; flood wave attenuation; considerations for fish habitat; and consideration of potential domino effects of dam failure on other dams located downstream.

3.24.2 EXISTING RESPONSE CAPACITY

In the region of the proposed project, there are no industry operations at the scale of the proposed project. Because the area is remote and little infrastructure exists, the capacity for response to spilled substances is limited. While the statewide capacity for oil spill response is well established, there is minimal capacity to handle a spill of LNG, cyanide, mercury. These gaps in response capacity would need to be planned for, and new plans created for the proposed project.

3.24.2.1 OIL SPILLS

As noted in Section 3.24.1.1, there are regulations that require spill prevention and response planning for companies that store or transport diesel. As these companies operate in remote areas, response gear is prepositioned as appropriate (e.g. carried on each tank barge, stationed at storage and transfer facilities etc.) that would be used by initial responders in the event of a
spill. This response equipment typically includes sorbents, containers, deflective or sorbent booms, pumps, skimmers, and/or skiffs. In some areas companies collaborate to share equipment and responders in order to maximize their ability to respond while keeping costs down. Should a response require additional equipment and/or personnel for recovery or cleanup operations, the contracted oil spill removal organization (OSRO) would be called upon to provide additional resources from their bases in Anchorage, Nikiski, Dutch Harbor, or other locations as appropriate.

3.24.2.1.1 OIL SPILL REMOVAL ORGANIZATIONS

There are several OSROs in Alaska; most with a focus on a single geographic region. There are two OSROs whose coverage includes Western Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and Cook Inlet; these are described below.

Donlin Gold is a member of Alaska Chadux Corporation (Chadux), the only OSRO that covers Western Alaska and the Aleutians. In the event of a spill, Chadux provides experienced response personnel and equipment for recovery and cleanup operations. They are based in Anchorage; however, they also maintain prepositioned response equipment in several locations around the state, including Dutch Harbor and Bethel. In the event of a spill, personnel would come from Anchorage within 24 hours of notification of a spill. They regularly update their inventory, including absorbent pads, sweeps, and booms, land bladders, towable bladders, tanks, skimmers, rope mops, drums, and harbor, river, and shore seal booms. In addition, the Chadux Anchorage hub has vessels, pumps, and a variety of safety equipment.

Cook Inlet Spill Prevention & Response, Inc. (CISPRI) was created as a response to OPA 90 requirements to serve operators in Cook Inlet, and its focus remains recovery and cleanup operations in the Cook Inlet region. In the event of a spill, they provide experienced response personnel and equipment for recovery and cleanup operations. CISPRI is based in Nikiski, and remains the only OSRO capable of responding to a large or very large spill in Cook Inlet, through their prepositioned response equipment around the Inlet. CISPRI maintains a broad inventory of response equipment.

Chadux and CISPRI both provide spill response training to their clients’ on-site personnel, and can be contracted to provide personnel on-site. This allows for the possibility of a limited but immediate response in the event of a spill.

3.24.2.1.2 UNIFIED AND SUBAREA CONTINGENCY PLANS

The Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Discharges/Releases, commonly referred to as the Unified Plan, along with the supplementary Subarea Contingency Plans, represents a coordinated and cooperative effort by government agencies to be prepared to respond in the event of a spill. As part of these plans, the EPA, USCG, and ADEC each have prepositioned response equipment around the state, as described in Annex E of the Unified Plan. This equipment may be used to supplement a Responsible Party’s response to a spill; however, it is generally reserved for spills where the Responsible Party fails to respond to a spill.
3.24.2.1.3 ALASKA PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTORS & TRANSPORTERS AGREEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

Tank barge operators planning to be engaged in lightering operations in the Western Alaska Captain of the Port Zone must be signatories to the Alaska Petroleum Distributors and Transporters (APD&T) Agreement for Compliance, per USCG Marine Safety Information Bulletin 07-13. As stated in the Agreement’s preamble: “Due to the remote operational environment, seasonal operations, and lack of an Oil Spill Response Organization to meet the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90) compliance needs of the operators, the purpose of APD&T was to develop and implement an oil spill response scheme that would meet the OPA-90 requirements as an alternative planning criteria acceptable to the USCG in accordance with 33 CFR 155.1065 (f).” One of the elements in this agreement is a memorandum of understanding regarding the use of tank barges of opportunity to provide temporary storage in support of an oil spill response. Therefore, additional response resources beyond those listed on Chadux’s or CISPRI’s websites can potentially be brought to bear during a response, especially to a catastrophic discharge.

3.24.2.2 LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS

LNG is not currently used in the Project Area. Therefore, no plan or capacity for response is presently available for this area. New plans and response capacities could be required for the proposed project.

3.24.2.3 CYANIDE

Cyanide is not presently used or transported in the Project Area. Therefore, no plan or capacity for response is presently available for this area. New plans and response capacities could be required for the proposed project.

3.24.2.4 MERCURY

Mercury is not presently used or transported in the Project Area. Therefore, no plan or capacity for response is presently available for this area. New plans and response capacities could be required for the proposed project.

3.24.2.5 TAILINGS

This area is not currently being mined; therefore, no plan or capacity for response is presently available for this area. New plans and response capacities would be required for the proposed project, which would be detailed in the EAP required under ADNR dam safety permitting (Section 3.24.1.5). These would involve the extensive use of excavation and earthmoving equipment from the mine itself. As described in BGC (2015n), if a situation arises that requires immediate attention, Donlin Gold would have the necessary equipment, material, labor, and engineering expertise already onsite for mining operations that could be deployed to respond to an emergency immediately.

The specific equipment and supplies would be outlined in the EAP. For example, stockpiles of fine and coarse filter materials, as well as rockfill and transitional rockfill, would be located in the vicinity of the dam to be readily available in an emergency to arrest or retard internal or
external erosion of the dam, and plug an erosion channels that may have formed on the dam crest or downstream face. In addition, pumps would be on hand to lower the TSF pond level, utilizing the reclaim system to divert water to the open pit for temporary storage (BGC 2015n).

3.24.3 SPILL FREQUENCY AND VOLUME

This section describes, by alternative, the expected relative rate of occurrence and estimated volumes of spills from the proposed project. The likelihood of a spill is a qualitative assessment based on the rate or frequency of occurrence. The rate of occurrence is a function of several factors, including operating procedures, personnel training and awareness, maintenance, and human error. The relative rates listed below are based on the experience of several personnel with spill background, peer-reviewed and “gray” literature, and reports as referenced. The assessment is a subjective evaluation and the categories are relative to each other in the context of area operations.

3.24.3.1 DIESEL FUEL AND OTHER OIL

3.24.3.1.1 ALTERNATIVE 1 – NO ACTION

Under the No Action alternative, the project would not be developed and none of the materials necessary for the action alternatives would be transported, used, stored, or disposed. Therefore, there would be no additional spill risk under this alternative.

3.24.3.1.2 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under Alternative 2, diesel would be used as a primary fuel source for electricity generation for the project until natural gas became available to be used to fuel the power plant at the mine. Diesel would also be the fuel source for the mining haul trucks. The peak annual usage would be expected to be 42.3 Mgal during the operational phase of the mine; during the construction phase, annual diesel usage would be anticipated to be approximately 7.05 Mgal to 21.15 Mgal. After the closure of the mine, diesel would be used in relatively small amounts by the annual inspection and maintenance crews. As a result, the potential for a spill of any size would be lowest during the post-closure phase and highest during the operational phase.

Based on the spills database maintained by ADEC, the Donlin Gold Oil Spill Risk Assessment (ERM 2014), and Etkin (2006), Table 3.24-1 provides an estimate for the likelihood of diesel spills for this project by source.

Table 3.24-1: Expected Relative Rate of Occurrence for Diesel Fuel Spills from Main Project Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Very Small &lt; 10</th>
<th>Small 10 - 99.9</th>
<th>Medium 100 - 999.9</th>
<th>Large 1,000 - 100,000</th>
<th>Very Large &gt; 100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Storage tanks / Tank farms</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels (Barges)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker trucks</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Would not occur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.24-1: Expected Relative Rate of Occurrence for Diesel Fuel Spills from Main Project Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spill Size (US gallons)</th>
<th>Very Small</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Large</th>
<th>Very Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>&lt; 10</td>
<td>10 - 99.9</td>
<td>100 - 999.9</td>
<td>1,000 - 100,000</td>
<td>&gt; 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Probability of Spill: Very high has a probability approaching one, very low has a probability approaching zero.

Potential Sources of Spilled Material

Vessels

On-water transportation of diesel would be accomplished by bulk oil tanker to Dutch Harbor, then by double-hulled ocean-going barge from Dutch Harbor to Bethel. The Donlin Gold Project Plan of Operations, Volume 6 - Transportation Plan indicates planning for deliveries to Bethel of up to 2.94 million gallons of diesel per ocean-going barge. Barges of this size typically have between six and eight compartments that can vary in size. The likelihood of a large spill from a barge going to Donlin is very low for several reasons. The potential effects of severe weather will be minimized because the season for shipping is limited to the ice-free period on the Kuskokwim River. The risk would be further limited because the barges would be double-hulled, so that even if there is a collision or grounding, the likelihood of breaching the diesel-containing compartments is much lower than for a single-hulled vessel. Spills of more than 10,000 gallons involving a barge transporting petroleum products in Alaska did not occur between January 1995 through July 2013, and because of this a spill of this size is not projected to occur during the life of the Donlin Gold Project (ERM 2014).

From 1990 to 2011, only 10 instances of a vessel suffering hull failure, grounding, or sinking were recorded on or in the vicinity of the Kuskokwim River. Eight of the 10 incidences resulted in the release of 20 gallons or less of petroleum products (ARCADIS 2013a). The risk of such a spill would be minimized by the use of double-hulled barges, the implementation of operational procedures that are in compliance with all applicable regulations, and the use of licensed pilots on all tank vessels approaching Bethel. Double-hulled river-going barges would be used between Bethel and Angyaraaq (jungjuk) Port. Most potential spills are likely to be small or very small. It is possible, although very unlikely, that a large or even a very large spill could result if a vessel carrying a large amount of diesel grounds, sinks, or is otherwise compromised, resulting in a cargo tank being breached and the contents released to the riverine or marine environment. The projected frequency of large spills is greater than the life of the Donlin Gold Project; between once in 33 years and once in 1,000 years (ERM 2014). Double-hulled tank vessels provide an additional layer of spill prevention—in the case of hull rupture caused by a grounding or collision, usually the outer hull absorbs the damage and the inner hull remains unharmed with contents intact (NOAA 2014c). The cargo tanks of tank vessels and barges are compartmentalized, which adds additional mitigation in that if one or more cargo compartments are breached, only the cargo in those compartments is released, and not the
vessel’s whole cargo. The design of the river barges currently incorporates eight cargo compartments in each barge, along with the double hull.

Donlin has committed to using only double-hulled river barges on the Kuskokwim River to further reduce the risk of a spill. In the Donlin Gold Project River Barge and Fleet Operation Plan, each delivery from Bethel to Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port would be accomplished by a tow of four specially-built double-hulled barges, each barge with a maximum capacity of 336,150 gallons in eight compartments of about 42,000 gallons each. However, the maximum operating capacity will be 95 percent of the maximum capacity: 319,342 gallons per barge (AMEC 2013). The actual operating capacity will generally be lower, as the maximum operating capacity is based upon the maximum draft of the barges during the highest river flows; the draft will be determined individually for each transit upriver, and will likely result in actual operating capacities of 80 percent to 90 percent of the maximum capacity: 268,920 to 302,535 gallons per barge.

Oil Spill Risk Assessment Study

In 2014, ERM reviewed ADEC and USCG data, as well as other studies and documents to conduct an oil spill risk assessment for diesel barges along the Kuskokwim River. The assessment looked at the frequency and potential volume of spills by specified modes of transport, cause of spills, spill volumes, likelihood that the cause would result in an incident, and potential receptors. In general, the study found that:

- On average, spills occurring as a result of groundings, collisions/allisions, and equipment failures tend to result in larger spill volumes than other spill causes;
- With the exception of unknown spill causes, human factors, equipment failures, and collisions/allisions are the primary causes for petroleum product barge spills occurring along rivers and around ports;
- Spill volumes from spills occurring in rivers and around ports tend to be similar to spill volumes reported for all spills; and
- Majority of spills resulted in small volumes, less than 50 gallons.

This information was considered in the above discussion, and incorporated in the impact analyses in Section 3.24.6.

Tank Farms

Storage of diesel would occur in tank farms located in Dutch Harbor, Bethel, Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port, and the mine site. Storage at Dutch Harbor, Bethel, and Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port would be used to facilitate the transfer of diesel from one form of transportation to the next; the mine site tank farm would be the final storage and distribution point (the diesel would be used for the operation of mining equipment and for power generation). Tanks used for storage at the mine site would have a capacity of 2.5 Mgal each, with a combined planned capacity of 37.5 Mgal. The diesel storage tank at Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port would have a planned capacity of 2.8 Mgal and would be above the 100 year floodplain and more than 500 feet from the active floodplain. Federal regulations mandate that all storage tanks have secondary containment equal to 110 percent of the total maximum volume of the largest tank in the secondary containment area (SCA). State regulations require an SCA sufficiently sized to accommodate the largest tank “plus enough additional capacity to allow for local precipitation” which may require the SCA to have a capacity greater than 110 percent.
Data indicates that tank failures are uncommon, and that the volumes released during these occurrences are small relative to the total storage volume of the tanks. Often there is complete recovery in SCAs (ARCADIS 2013a). Most potential spills are likely to be small or very small, and mostly due to a combination of human factors and structural or mechanical factors. It is possible, although very unlikely, that a large or even a very large spill could occur from a storage tank failure, resulting in a spill into the tank farm’s impermeable (lined) SCA. The SCA would be designed to contain a minimum of 110 percent of the largest tank. In the event of a failure of the secondary containment simultaneously with a tank failure, or the failure of multiple tanks at once, it is possible, but unlikely, for a large amount of diesel to be released to the surrounding environment.

Vehicles

A fleet of ten 13,500-gallon capacity B-train tanker trucks (with two tanks of approximately 6,750 gallons each) would be used to transport diesel from Angyaruq (Jungjuk) Port to the mine site. There would be an average of 2,424 round trips per year during the shipping season of operations, (approximately 22 per day). Research has been conducted into the probability of accidents on a number of different types of roads, but no research has been identified that examines accident rates on controlled access, private industrial roads such as the proposed mine access road (ARCADIS 2013a). Most potential spills would likely be small or very small. It is possible for a medium to large spill (up to 13,500 gallons) to occur in the unlikely event of a rollover or collision that results in a cargo tank being breached and the contents released to the surrounding environment. The risk of a release would be reduced to some degree with provisions made for driver safety through the continued use of BMPs such as travelling at safe speeds. There would be no transport of fuel during winter and trucking would be curtailed during extreme weather events, such as high wind, during the shipping season. The tanker trucks would be equipped with spill response kits, and the drivers would be trained to minimize and contain low-volume spills.

Transfer Operations

Potential spill sources include transfer operations between vessels and tank farms, between tanker trucks and tank farms, and from pipelines to barges, trucks, and tanks. Most potential spills would be likely to be small to very small. It would be possible for a spill to occur due to a combination of human factors and structural or mechanical factors. A spill during a transfer operation to or from a tanker truck would likely result in the diesel being spilled within the tanker truck loading/unloading area equipped with secondary containment. State regulations require the loading/unloading areas to be impermeable and sized to hold the capacity of the largest compartment of the largest tanker truck serviced. The event of a catastrophic discharge from a tanker truck at the transfer area would be very unlikely, but could result in a discharge reaching the surrounding environment. In the event of a transfer failure at the fueling dock, such as from a hose rupture, during a transfer to or from a vessel, diesel may reach water. Operators would be trained to respond to spills during transfer operations.

Fuel storage and vehicle and equipment refueling and lubricating would not take place within riparian areas, closer than 100 feet from waterbodies, or within 500 feet of the active floodplain (generally would be considered the 1-year floodplain) of any fish-bearing stream. Fuel storage and refueling areas would have secondary containment, and spill response equipment would be staged at Angyaruq (Jungjuk) Port and at the mine site.
Pipelines

Short pipelines are proposed at Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port and at the mine site to transfer diesel between barges, trucks, and tanks. The potential for spills from these pipelines is covered in Transfer Operations above. Releases from the proposed natural gas pipeline would not result in contamination of soil or water and are discussed in Section 3.25, Pipeline Safety and Reliability.

3.24.3.1.3 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, annual diesel usage during the construction phase is anticipated to be the same as for Alternative 2; however, during the operational phase annual diesel deliveries would be reduced from 42.3 Mgal/year to 13.3 Mgal/year. Under Alternative 3A, a limited amount of diesel would be transported to the mine site during the initial construction phase to serve as a backup fuel source for electrical generation, and fuel a smaller fleet of equipment during the operations phase. This would result in a reduced number of barge trips annually, from an estimated 122 round trips to 83, and reducing the number of tanker truck trips from 2,424 to 932 per season. The decrease in barge volume would dramatically reduce the spill risks associated with diesel fuel transport. For this alternative, the potential for a spill of any size is highest during the construction phase, reduced for the operational phase, and lowest for the post-closure phase.

3.24.3.1.4 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, annual diesel usage during the construction phase would be anticipated to be the same as for Alternative 2, and the diesel would be barged up the Kuskokwim River as described in Alternative 2. For this alternative, the potential for a spill of any size over the Western Alaska delivery route would only exist during the construction phase.

Barge tows on the Kuskokwim River would be reduced, and the diesel storage requirements in Dutch Harbor, Bethel Fuel Terminal, and Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port would be eliminated under Alternative 3B. Diesel fuel shipments (during operations and closure) would be routed to Tyonek, and a pipeline segment would run from Tyonek to Beluga. The reduction in barge volume would dramatically reduce the spill risks associated with diesel fuel transport using river barge, tank farm storage, and tanker trucks. However, this alternative introduces additional spill risks associated with the transportation of fuel along the pipeline corridor.

On completion of the diesel pipeline, approximately 120 Mgal of diesel would be delivered to the mine via pipeline from Tyonek; diesel would be delivered to Tyonek by tankers in 12 annual shipments of 10 Mgal. This differs from Alternative 2; with the addition of the pipeline, less fuel is required to be stored at the mine site. For the Cook Inlet delivery route there would be an increasing risk for a potential spill during the construction to operational phase, with a diminished risk during the closure phase. Additionally, the use of a pipeline would eliminate the need for tanker truck deliveries from Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port to the mine site (being replaced by occasional tanker truck deliveries from the mine site to Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port solely to provide fuel for the power generator), thereby potentially reducing the total risk of a potential spill of any size from tanker trucks during the operational and closure phases.
Transportation of diesel by pipeline involves risk to the public and the environment in the event of an accident, incident, or an unauthorized action, and subsequent release of diesel. According to PHMSA, the 10-year average for releases from diesel pipelines is as follows in Table 3.24-2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Average # of Incidents/yr</th>
<th>Average Property Damage / year (dollars)</th>
<th>Average Amount Lost/Recovered (gallons)</th>
<th>Miles of Pipeline (miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Onshore refined product</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>$52,712,410</td>
<td>15,552 / 7,754</td>
<td>63,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PHMSA 2013a.

Only half the diesel fuel released from refined product lines is ever recovered. Because of this, the duration and scope of a release is likely to be much more significant than Alternative 2 based on the physical and chemical properties of diesel compared to natural gas.

The risk of a potential spill of any size from the pipeline would be highest during the operational phase, when the pipeline would actively be transporting diesel, and lowest during the construction and closure and reclamation phases, when the pipeline would not be transporting diesel. Generally, pipelines are less prone to very large spills compared to trucks and railcars (Furchtgott-Roth 2013).

Operational spills may occur also anywhere along the proposed pipeline, including pump stations and within long runs of straight line pipe. Pipeline operation leaks, drips, and spills could occur due to corrosion, external forces such as thaw settlement, or other causes. Pump station operational leaks can occur due to circumstances similar to pipeline operational leaks, with additional risks related to filter change and pig launching or receiving operations.

Spills from the proposed pipeline, associated pump stations, valves, or pigging facilities could occur during project operations at several general locations including the pipeline ROW, pump stations, and staging areas for major maintenance and other contractor activities. Although leak detection systems would be in place that would automatically shut down the pumps on loss of pressure, some leaks might not be detected by the system for an extended period of time. For example, a pinhole leak could potentially be undetectable for days or weeks, especially if the release volume rate was small. Detection of diesel from small pinhole leaks would most likely occur through visual or olfactory identification, either during regular pipeline aerial inspections, ambulatory patrols, or landowner or citizen observation. Larger leaks/breaks would be detected much quicker. A study calculated that spill volumes for Alternative 3B for pinhole leaks could range from 25,620 to 812,280 gallons while volumes from large leaks could range from 3,360 to 790,020 gallons (Michael Baker Jr., Inc. 2014). The high range estimates would be considered worst case for spill response planning and very unlikely to occur.

DieSEL fuel spills could occur during the operations and maintenance phase if a bulk carrier tanker ran aground navigating to the Tyonek facility or during the transfer of the diesel from the tanker to the tank farm. The carrying capacity of the tankers is estimated to be 10.5 Mgal of diesel fuel. However, only one or two barge compartments would be expected to fail in a grounding, and transfer facilities would have secondary containment, so the amount that would be spilled would likely be less. These scenarios are unlikely to occur.
Rupture of a tank at the tank farm would have the potential to release a maximum of 2.5 Mgal of diesel (equivalent to the storage capacity of the tank) but would most likely be contained by the secondary containment system.

If this alternative were selected, Donlin would revise the Vessel Operations Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan (SLR 2012b) and the Donlin Gold Terminal and Tank Farm Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan (SLR 2012a) to include diesel spill prevention, response activities, and procedures for the tankers delivering diesel to the Port of Tyonek and the tank farm at the proposed Operations Center and Pumping Facility.

3.24.3.1.5 ALTERNATIVE 4 - BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, the only change from Alternative 2 would be the upriver port and road location to the BTC Port instead of the proposed Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port.

The BTC Port would be 69 river miles downriver from the proposed Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port, which is a 38 percent decrease in barging river miles. This alternative would allow for the avoidance of the shallowest areas on the barge route, which are upriver of BTC. The transits would be completed more quickly due to the shorter route, but the total number of transits would remain the same because the estimate is based on the number of barges needed to carry a certain amount of fuel in a given time frame. The potential for a spill risk due to a grounding of a river fuel barge is significantly reduced; however, the potential risk for a spill due to accident or collision would not be substantially reduced. The same BMPs would be used.

The BTC Port would require a road of approximately 76 miles for delivery of the fuel to the mine site, up from the approximately 30 miles from Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port to the mine site. Increasing the trucking portion by 2.5 times increases the potential spill risk for a spill of any size by a tanker truck; the same number of tanker truck deliveries of diesel from the port to the mine site would still be required (approximately 22 per day, during the 110 day shipping period), and so approximately 20 or more trucks (and operators) would be required in order to accomplish the transfer of diesel to the mine site from BTC Port in the same time frame as from Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. This increased risk can be mitigated to some degree with provisions made for driver safety through the continued use of BMPs, making modifications to the design of the route such as allowing for rest stops and maintenance pull off areas, requiring two-man driving teams, and ensuring no gaps in radio communication along the whole road. An additional consideration would be for greater diesel storage capacity at BTC Port to allow for a longer transfer time, using fewer trucks and/or a lower speed limit. However, lengthening the trucking season would increase the likelihood of weather-related risks, which would increase the chances of truck accidents.

However, it should be noted the incidence is relatively small for refined fuel released by truck in accidents. In Alaska, the following fuel spill incidents (Table 3.24-3) from trucks have been reported to ADEC in the last 5 years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Volume Spilled</th>
<th>Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Glenn Hwy</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Propane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Glenn Hwy</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.24-3: Fuel Spill Incidents from Trucks in Alaska (2010-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Volume Spilled</th>
<th>Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Parks Hwy</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Manley Hot Springs</td>
<td>Rollover - no spill</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Fairbanks</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>Heating Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Rampart Airport</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Dalton Hwy</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Dalton Hwy</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Dalton Hwy</td>
<td>2,561</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Richardson</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Wiseman</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dalton Hwy (MP 86)</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ADEC 2015b.

The number of releases of fuel from truck accidents averages 2 per year. There is not a good source of information on the number of fuel truck miles in Alaska per year; however, the number is thought to be very substantial. For example, Colville Inc. supplies most of the fuel on the North Slope by driving it from Valdez, Fairbanks, and Anchorage. This is done by using 24 dedicated tractor trailers. In 2011, they logged 1.2 million miles transporting fuel to Prudhoe Bay (Colville, Inc. 2015). Only one spill occurred during that year. As such, their spill rate per mile is very low.

Therefore, because the BTC Road is longer, there is an increased risk of a fuel spill; however, the overall risk remains very small.

Diesel usage for the project would increase slightly due to the additional requirements of trucking; across the life of the project this small increase would likely be insignificant in increasing the potential for a spill of any size.

3.24.3.1.6 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Alternative 5A evaluates a dry stack tailings method. Under Alternative 5A, annual diesel usage during the construction, operation, and closure phases of the project and the associated spill risk is anticipated to be approximately the same as for Alternative 2.

3.24.3.1.7 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, the natural gas pipeline route would depart to the northwest through Dalzell Gorge from the Alternative 2 alignment at approximately MP 106.5. The route would not otherwise differ from Alternative 2. Under Alternative 6, annual diesel usage during the construction, operation, and post-closure phases of the project and the associated spill risk is anticipated to be the same as for Alternative 2.
3.24.3.2 LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS

Analysis of Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration datasets indicates that approximately 0.0003 incidents would occur per mile of the proposed natural gas pipeline each year of operation, equating to a potential of 1.9 incidents over the 30-year operational life of the pipeline (ARCADIS 2013a). Because of the unlikelihood and negligible impacts of escaped natural gas to the environment, that scenario is not discussed in this analysis.

3.24.3.2.1 ALTERNATIVE 1 - NO ACTION

Under the No Action alternative, the project would not be developed and none of the materials necessary for the action alternatives would be transported, used, disposed of, or stored. Therefore, there would be no spill risk under this alternative.

3.24.3.2.2 ALTERNATIVE 2 - DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Alternative 2 would use diesel fuel to power the large haul trucks that would move waste rock and ore from the open pits. Because LNG would not be used under this alternative, there would be no risk associated with LNG spills.

3.24.3.2.3 ALTERNATIVE 3A - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, the large haul trucks that would move waste rock and ore from the open pits would use LNG instead of diesel for fuel. This alternative would include the addition of a LNG Plant and storage tanks. Table 3.24-4 provides an estimate for the likelihood of LNG spills for this project by source.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spill Size (Gallons)</th>
<th>Very Small &lt;10</th>
<th>Small 10 - 99</th>
<th>Medium 100 - 999</th>
<th>Large 1,000 - 50,000</th>
<th>Very Large &gt;50,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haul Trucks</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Would not occur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage Tanks</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Probability of Spill: Very high has a probability approaching one, very low has a probability approaching zero.

Because LNG-powered haul trucks are not commercially available at this time, it is unknown how much fuel a LNG-powered truck would carry. Caterpillar is currently in the early stages of development of LNG-powered mining trucks, which will include the Cat 793, 795, and 797 (Caterpillar 2013). The fuel tanks for Caterpillar’s existing diesel-powered trucks in the 793, 795, and 797 classes range in capacity from 750 gallons for the Cat 793F, to 1,150 gallons for the Cat 793D (Caterpillar 2010a and 2010b). Therefore, it is assumed that the maximum spill from a LNG-powered truck would be approximately 1,150 gallons.

The eight conceptual storage tanks at the LNG plant would have a capacity of 55,000 gallons of LNG.
Potential Sources of Spilled Material

Haul Trucks

Because LNG-powered haul trucks are not commercially available at this time, no data exist about the rates of accidental LNG release from these vehicles. LNG tanker trucks would not be used in Alternative 3A and these vehicles are not equivalent to LNG-powered haul trucks; however, data on LNG tanker truck incidents were examined in the absence of any data on LNG-powered haul trucks. A summary of LNG tanker truck incidents compiled by CH-IV International through February 2012 shows that since the year 2000, one accident has occurred which resulted in an LNG release and subsequent vapor ignition (CH-IV International 2012).

It is unlikely that a large LNG release would occur under Alternative 3A; however, frequent but very small to small LNG spills would be more likely to occur. Very small and small LNG spills could result from haul truck accidents, fuel transfer operations, and pinhole leaks from the storage tanks. This alternative would have the same requirements for secondary containment and operator training that would be required with diesel fuel.

Storage Tanks

For Alternative 3A, a 220,000-gallon per day LNG plant would be constructed near the terminus of the gas line at the mine site, and the LNG would be stored in a series of tanks. An explosion of an LNG container is a highly unlikely event that is possible only if the pressure relief equipment or system fails completely. If the pressure builds up to the point where the vessel bursts, the resulting explosion is known as a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) with the container pieces propelled outward at a very high velocity. There have been no reports in the literature reviewed of any BLEVE occurring with LNG (USDOT 1995).

Leaks and spills from storage tanks are not considered high risk. One of the major provisions at any LNG storage facility is the requirement to provide an impounding area surrounding the container to minimize the possibility of accidental discharge of LNG from endangering adjoining property on important process equipment and structure, or reaching waterways. This requirement would ensure that any size spill from tanks would be fully contained and the risk of any fire damage will be minimized (USDOT 1995; Rath and Krol 2013).

3.24.3.2.4 OTHER ALTERNATIVES

Alternatives 3B, 4, 5A, and 6A would use diesel to power the large haul trucks that would move waste rock and ore from the open pits. Because LNG would not be used under these alternatives, there would be no risk associated with LNG spills.

3.24.3.3 CYANIDE

3.24.3.3.1 ALTERNATIVE 1 – NO ACTION

Under the No Action alternative, the project would not be developed and none of the materials necessary for the action alternatives would be transported, used, disposed of, or stored. Therefore, there would be no spill risk under this alternative.
3.24.3.2 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under Alternative 2, sodium cyanide would be used to separate gold from the ore. The sodium cyanide would be transported as solid briquettes in 22-ton International Standards Organization (ISO) approved type 2 watertight sparge tank-tainers. The cylindrical tank-tainers would be permanently and prominently marked with appropriate warning labels and hazard markings, and Donlin would comply with the Code as discussed in Section 3.24.1. The average annual usage of sodium cyanide would be approximately 2,375 tons; and it would only be used during the production phase of the mine. Based on this prediction, approximately 108 containers would be required per annum.

Sodium cyanide only poses an environmental threat if handled improperly, and must come in contact with water to pose immediate toxic and acute health dangers. The likelihood of a very large cyanide spill is very low, as the sodium cyanide would be transported as solid briquettes in ISO-approved type 2 watertight sparge tank-tainers that would be dedicated solely to cyanide, and secured to vessels. This is expected to reduce the risk. Table 3.24-5 provides an estimate for the likelihood of cyanide spills for this project by source.

Table 3.24-5: Expected Relative Rate of Occurrence for Cyanide Spills from Main Project Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Spill Size (Tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very Small &lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels (Ocean Barges)¹</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels (River Barges)²</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer Operations</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Storage</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Storage Area</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Processing Area</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1 Assumes 12 trips per year with the cargo split evenly between each trip (~200 tons per barge).
2 Assumes 64 trips per year with the cargo split evenly between each trip (~75 tons per barge).

Potential Sources of Spilled Material

Vessels

An ocean barge would transport solid sodium cyanide in ISO-approved type 2 watertight sparge tank-tainers from Seattle or Vancouver to Bethel. Sodium cyanide is a USDOT Class 6 hazard, of which 9 metric tonnes were shipped nationally in 2007 (0.5 percent of all hazard material shipments). For all hazardous materials transported in the years 1990, 2000, 2010, 2011, and 2012, there was only one accident-related incident (in 2010) from water transportation. This shows the unlikelihood of a vessel incident carrying Class 6 hazardous materials for the Donlin Gold Project.
There would be approximately 12 ocean barge trips per annum and it is assumed that the annual volume of sodium cyanide required would be split evenly between these barges. Consequently, each ocean barge would be carrying approximately 10 tank-tainers per trip, which equates to 220 tons of sodium cyanide. The sodium cyanide tank-tainer would then be transferred from the ocean barges to the Bethel cargo terminal for storage or onto river barges for towing up the Kuskokwim River to Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. There would be approximately 64 river barge trips per annum and it is assumed that the annual volume of sodium cyanide required would be split evenly between these barges. Consequently, each river barge would be carrying approximately one to two tank-tainers per trip, which equates to 22 to 44 tons of sodium cyanide. Crew members would be educated on the substance and trained in proper handling. During the on-water transportation of sodium cyanide it is possible that a tank-tainer could be lost overboard into the ocean or the Kuskokwim River as a result of improperly secured cargo. The potential for losing a tank-tainer overboard is very low considering they would be secured to the barge deck. In event that the tank-tainers are lost overboard from the ocean or river barges they would be locatable as each tank-tainer has a global positioning system (GPS) unit attached that would allow the container to be tracked while transported. The containers would then be able to be retrieved by salvage divers. In addition, the sodium cyanide must come in contact with water to pose immediate toxic and acute health dangers. However, as the tank-tainers are watertight, they would prevent contact between the solid sodium cyanide briquettes and water, thus minimizing the potential for spills.

Transfer Operations

Transfer operations between vessels and the Bethel cargo terminal and Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port barge terminal would be a potential spill source. Barges would be loaded and unloaded using shore-based container handlers. The potential source results from the unlikely event that a tank-tainer is dropped into the water during these transfer operations. However, the potential for spills is very low because the tank-tainer would be watertight and the solid sodium cyanide would be protected from potential contact with water. Transfer operations would only occur during the shipping season. NICNAS (2010) found that between 1984 and 2010, no reports of incidents occurring during storage or handling prior to transportation to mine sites were encountered, with the exception of an incident in New Zealand in 2004, which had minor environmental impacts.

Port Storage

Storage of sodium cyanide would occur at Bethel and Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. Tractor-trailer units would transport the tank-tainers to the storage yard, where container handlers would be used to place loads into designated storage locations with secondary containment. A reserved secure and isolated sodium cyanide tank-tainer storage area would be provided where public access is prohibited. The sodium cyanide would be stored in the watertight tank-tainers to minimize the potential for contact of cyanide with water. A potential spill could occur in the unlikely event that the tank-tainers ruptured. However, the potential release would be contained as the tank-tainers would be located within secondary containment area. The sodium cyanide tank-tainers would not be stored with incompatible materials (e.g. acids, strong oxidizers, metals, moisture, water, and halogens). This potential source would occur during the shipping season.
The storage areas for cyanide would be well ventilated to prevent the build-up of hydrogen cyanide gas and hydrogen cyanide monitoring would be implemented. Personal protective equipment would be available at the port where the sodium cyanide is stored. Spill neutralization and cleanup equipment should also be readily available at storage locations, and personnel would be trained in its use. This would include water for cleaning up spills of sodium cyanide solution and shovels for cleaning up spills of solid sodium cyanide. Spill residue would be properly disposed.

The Bethel and Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) ports would be operated according to the applicable laws and regulations to ensure the security of the facilities, protection of the environment, and safe storage, handling and transportation of hazardous materials.

Vehicles

The sodium cyanide containers would be offloaded at the port terminal and trucked to the mine throughout the barging season. NICNAS (2010) found that incidences of spilled cyanide internationally from 1984 to 2010 were rare, relative to the amount of sodium cyanide that is annually transported. The spill risk during truck transportation is minimal due to the safeguards at the Donlin Gold access road (design for industrial traffic, dedicated use and low speed limits), and the appropriate containment to prevent a spill if an accident occurred. The sodium cyanide would be transported as dry solid briquettes that would be stored in watertight tank-tainers. Potential spills could occur in the unlikely event of an accident or wildlife collision that results in the tank-tainer rupturing. This event could result in either the dry sodium briquettes being spilled on dry ground or the contents could be spilled on wet ground or surface waters. If solid sodium cyanide is spilled on dry ground, it does not present a danger to people or the environment as long as the sodium cyanide remains dry and is swept up and properly contained for disposal. Spill residues would be properly disposed. Sodium cyanide that comes in contact with water poses immediate toxic and acute health dangers.

Mine Storage Area

Storage of sodium cyanide would occur at the mine. A secure storage area with secondary containment would be constructed, which would include an enclosed structure for the storage of cyanide. The watertight tank-tainers of solid sodium cyanide would be offloaded from the truck using a container handler and stored within the secure storage area. The tank-tainers would be stored within appropriate secondary containment systems designed to contain at least 110 percent of the volume of the largest container within the containment. The secondary containment area would be located on an appropriately-designed concrete surface to prevent spill seepage to the subsurface. The potential for spills is very low or low. It is possible, although very unlikely, that there would be a large spill that could result from a tank-tainer rupture resulting in a spill to a secondary containment area. This potential source exists all year round.

Mine Processing Area

Stock cyanide solution would be prepared by connecting the tank-tainers to sparging tanks and circulating process water with sufficient sodium hydroxide content to maintain a pH of around 10 in the enclosed tank-tainer. The briquettes would be dissolved to create a 30 percent sodium cyanide solution. Once the briquettes were completely dissolved, the solution would be
transferred to a sparging storage tank. The tanks would be equipped with level measuring gauges to ensure the sparging tanks do not overflow. The sparging system would be controlled from an air-conditioned control room such that the operators could monitor operations without risk of being sprayed by cyanide if there was a system failure. In the event of a leak from the sparging system, the process could be shut down remotely. The sparging system would be a closed system and automated such that the exposure risk to cyanide was minimized and the manual handling greatly reduced. The sparging system (the ISO tank-tainer, sparging storage tank and associated pipelines and pumps) would be stored within appropriate secondary containment systems designed to contain at least 110 percent of the volume of the largest tank-tainer or container within the containment. The secondary containment area would be located on an appropriately-designed concrete surface to prevent spill seepage to the subsurface.

The sparging system for cyanide would be well-ventilated to prevent the build-up of hydrogen cyanide gas and hydrogen cyanide and monitored during the course of operations. Personal protective equipment would be available. Spill neutralization and cleanup equipment would also be readily available at the mine storage area. This would include water for cleaning up spills of liquid cyanide and shovels for cleaning up spills of solid cyanide. Spill residues would be properly disposed.

The stock cyanide solution would be used in the mine processing area and would be conveyed using pipes and pumps. The potential for spills could result from mechanical failures relating to the pumping system, and is likely to be small. In the unlikely event of a mechanical failure, the spill would be contained within the secondary containment area.

The stock cyanide solution would be used to dissolve the gold in the carbon in leach (CIL) process. The screened CIL tailings from this process would contain cyanide and would be treated by a sulfur dioxide process prior to being discharged to the tailings storage facility to detoxify residual cyanide from the CIL process. Sulfur dioxide would be added at a rate sufficient to reduce the weak acid dissociable (WAD) cyanide levels to <10 ppm. The detoxified cyanide slurry would be discharged to a lined TSF.

3.24.3.3 OTHER ALTERNATIVES

Under Alternatives 3A, 3B, 4, 5A and 6A the use of cyanide would be the same as in Alternative 2; spill frequency and volume would also be the same as Alternative 2.

3.24.3.4 MERCURY

3.24.3.4.1 ALTERNATIVE 1 – NO ACTION

Under the No Action alternative, the project would not be developed and none of the materials necessary for the action alternatives would be generated, transported, disposed of, or stored. Therefore, there would be no spill risk under this alternative.

3.24.3.4.2 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

The Kuskokwim Gold Belt is plentiful in naturally-occurring mercury and the ore at Donlin Gold is estimated to have an average mercury concentration of 1.7 parts per million. Within the Donlin Gold ore body, mercury is found as a stable sulfide mineral. The mercury sulfide minerals in the ore would be oxidized to yield elemental, divalent and particulate mercury,
during mining and processing. Mercury would not be transported to the mine or used in the process, but would be a byproduct recovered in the abatement systems in the autoclave circuits, hot cure tanks, electrowinning process, refinery furnace, and carbon regeneration process. Donlin Gold has committed to preparation of a detailed mercury handling plan that would detail the BMPs and other measures to be taken to reduce the potential for spills and ensure proper response if a spill occurred. This is expected to reduce the risk. Table 3.24-6 provides an estimate for the likelihood of mercury spills for this project by source.

### Table 3.24-6: Expected Relative Rate of Occurrence for Mercury Spills from Main Project Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spill Size (lbs)</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Very Small &lt; 0.01</th>
<th>Small 0.01-0.9</th>
<th>Medium 1-2.9</th>
<th>Large 3-50</th>
<th>Very Large &gt; 50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Storage Areas</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
Probability of Spill: Very high has a probability approaching one, very low has a probability approaching zero.

### Potential Sources of Spilled Material

#### Mercury Storage Areas

The mercury collected by the mercury abatement systems would be temporarily stored onsite and then transported offsite for long-term management. During the process mercury would be removed from the gases primarily using condensers and through adsorption on activated carbon. All drums containing mercury-loaded spent carbon would be secured on a pallet, and then contained inside of an intermodal shipping container (a Conex) for transport via truck and barge. The Conex would be secured as necessary to the deck of the barge during transport.

The condensers would produce liquid elemental mercury, which would be collected in specialized USDOT-approved, carbon steel 76-pound flasks or metric ton containers. Although the amount collected annually would vary from year to year, approximately 11 tons of liquid elemental mercury would be collected on an annual basis. The mercury containers would be dedicated solely to liquid elemental mercury management to avoid any compatibility issues. The sealed mercury containers are designed to withstand the weight and corrosive properties of mercury and provide a very high level of integrity.

The carbon beds in the mercury abatement systems would be monitored to measure loading and ensure that overloading and/or break through does not occur. The spent carbon would be emptied from the bottom of each column into 55-gallon United Nations (UN) and USDOT approved open head bolt ring closure drums. All containers would meet or exceed HM 181 USDOT requirements, United Nations Hazardous Material Shipping Requirements, and EPA packaging requirements. The drums would be used solely to contain spent carbon from the mercury abatement systems. Although the amount of mercury-loaded spent carbon would vary on a year to year basis, approximately 29 tons of spent carbon would be generated annually. The sealed drums that contain the mercury provide a very high level of integrity (Enos 2015).
Partially-filled flasks and drums may be stored in accumulation areas within the processing facilities. The completely filled flasks and drums would be moved from the process area to the centralized mercury material storage area. The liquid elemental mercury flasks and spent carbon drums would be shipped offsite as hazardous materials for long-term storage by a federally-approved storage facility in accordance with the Mercury Export Ban Act (122 STAT. 4341) once constructed or a permitted RCRA facility.

Accumulation areas - Accumulation areas are temporary collection storage sites for small amounts of mercury up to 55 gallons. Mercury collected at accumulation areas would ultimately be moved to the centralized storage area. In general, the accumulation areas would be secure locations located within the processing facility accessible only by authorized personnel, and designed to handle and contain potential spills. Mercury containers would remain tightly closed at all times except when being filled. The containers would be marked appropriately to identify the content.

Centralized Storage Area - The centralized storage area would be a separate enclosed facility located near the processing facility. It would be designed to handle and contain potential spills, and equipped with adequate monitoring and ventilation systems to limit potential exposure to any mercury vapors. The area would have signage and be secured and accessible only to authorized personnel. At the centralized location, trained personnel would prepare the mercury and required documentation for transport via truck and barge to a permitted storage facility in the U.S. Mercury-filled containers would be transported as soon as practicable, and onsite storage would not exceed legal requirements.

A minimum of weekly inspections would be conducted at the accumulation and centralized storage areas. Inspectors would verify the proper labeling and integrity of each elemental mercury container and activated carbon drum and the overall condition of the areas. Records of inspections would be maintained onsite, including identification of the need for any corrective actions. Specifically, any evidence of damage to or leakage or spills from individual containers or leakage within the areas would be immediately addressed. Access to the accumulation and storage areas would be controlled to limit entry to only authorized employees.

Donlin Gold’s handling and storage of mercury materials would be conducted in accordance with the RCRA regulations at 40 CFR Part 260, including requirements for testing, classification, packaging, labeling, training, tracking/recordkeeping, and ultimate management.

Offsite Transportation

Donlin Gold would transport the elemental mercury and spent carbon containing mercury via barge to an offsite, permitted facility that is permitted to store the materials for an extended period of time. All flasks or 1 metric tonne containers (“pigs”) containing liquid elemental mercury would be placed inside of a plastic-lined 55 gallon UN and USDOT approved open head bolt ring closure drums. These drums would then be strapped, or otherwise secured, on a 4-Drum Spill Containment Pallet, and then containerized inside of a “Conex” intermodal shipping container for transport via truck and barge. Figure 3.24-1 shows a typical elemental mercury 76 pound flask, and a typical 1 tonne elemental mercury pig container.
Figure 3.24-1: Typical Elemental Mercury Containers

Mercury is a USDOT Class 8 hazard class, of which 94 metric tonnes were shipped nationally in 2007 (5.1 percent of all hazard material shipments). For all hazardous materials transported in the years 1990, 2000, 2010, 2011, and 2012, there was only one accident-related incident (in 2010) from water transportation. This shows the unlikelihood of a vessel incident carrying Class 8 hazardous materials for the Donlin Gold project.

The spill risk during truck transportation is minimal due to the safeguards at the Donlin Gold access road (design for industrial traffic, dedicated use and low speed limits, for example), the relatively limited number of truck trips necessary for mercury transport, and the appropriate containment to prevent a spill if an accident occurred. All mercury containers would be secured to prevent slippage in any direction under the full range of travel conditions, and with appropriate separation from other cargo. In the unlikely event of a spill, the transporters and responders would be trained to properly respond to a mercury spill, and minimize the potential for any impacts to the environment. Spill response equipment would be located at the mine site, Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port, and several locations along the access road. At the port site, Donlin Gold would verify that all mercury containers that left the mine site were accounted for and in good condition. The truck transportation of mercury containers would be scheduled to facilitate immediate transfer from the trucks to barges at the Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. Like all hazardous materials, transfers would be made by trained personnel with spill control, containment, and countermeasure equipment in place.

For transport via barge, the containers would be appropriately separated from other materials and similar methods would be used to fully secure the containers and provide for secondary containment for the range of conditions expected during transport. Donlin Gold's handling, transportation, and disposal of mercury materials would be conducted in accordance with the RCRA regulations.
Prior to shipment, Donlin Gold would verify that the container labeling is accurate and in good condition. A manifest would be prepared for each shipment that documents the type and weight of material being transported as well as the generation history. The manifest would formally facilitate tracking of the chain-of-custody from the mine site through the transportation process, to a permitted storage facility.

3.24.3.4.3 OTHER ALTERNATIVES

Under Alternatives 3A, 3B, 4, 5A, and 6A the generation of mercury as a by-product from the gold-bearing ore processing, and the transportation of the mercury-loaded spent carbon and liquid elemental mercury would be the same as in Alternative 2.

3.24.3.5 TAILINGS

3.24.3.5.1 ALTERNATIVE 1 - NO ACTION

Under the No Action alternative, the project would not be developed and none of the materials necessary for the action alternatives would be generated, transported, disposed of, or stored. Therefore, there would be no spill risk under this alternative.

3.24.3.5.2 ALTERNATIVE 2 - DONLIN GOLD'S PROPOSED ACTION

An Early Stage Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Workshop was conducted in December 2014 to evaluate potential failure causes for the Donlin Gold TSF dam design based on a consensus of opinion from geotechnical experts (SRK 2015a). Unlike other substances discussed in this EIS, the likelihood of occurrence for tailings spills cannot be described by spill volume, as the likelihood of a tailings release is largely independent of spill size. Instead, the risk of a failure is generally assessed based on a number of factors such as siting, dam design, construction, QA/QC practices, water management, and inspections. During the Early Stage FMEA Workshop, the definitions of likelihood shown Table 3.24-7 were used as a tool by participants for rating the risk that both the failure mode and consequence would occur. These definitions were incorporated into the evaluations of likelihood for different failure mode scenarios as described in the following paragraphs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Probability of Occurrence over 20 Years</th>
<th>Probability of Occurrence in any one Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost Certain</td>
<td>High frequency (more than once every 5 years)</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Event does occur, has a history, once every 15 years</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Occurs once every 40 years</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Occurs once every 200 years</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely</td>
<td>Occurs once every 1000 years</td>
<td>&lt;2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SRK 2015a.
Based on the results of the Early Stage FMEA Workshop, the following tailings dam release, from workshop Scenarios 1 and 4 (SRK 2015a), was selected to evaluate in the EIS (AECOM 2015c):

An unplanned release of up to two million cubic meters [2.6 million cy] of tailings and contaminated water from the TSF from either a partial breach of the dam and resulting downstream failure or a liner rupture leads to a sinkhole and outflow of tailings through the underdrain.

These two failure modes were selected for further evaluation and modeling after screening of the Early Stage FMEA scenarios based on likelihood and consequence criteria described in AECOM (2015c). These two represent the largest of the low probability-high consequence failure modes identified in the Early Stage FMEA workshop that met these criteria. Both were characterized as moderately high risk and unlikely to occur, but were considered by the participants to be the most likely ways a significant release of tailings could occur.

Several other scenarios examined in the Early Stage FMEA workshop were considered likely to result in some form of seepage, water quality exceedances and/or events that would exceed a regulatory limit. While these would not be desirable, they would also not result in the severe impacts associated with the failure and breach scenarios described above. These lesser scenarios do not need to be analyzed in this EIS because associated impacts would be within the range of the scenario analyzed.

The Early Stage FMEA also identified several modes of catastrophic failure of the TSF dam, all of which were considered very unlikely to occur; that is, conceivable but only in extreme circumstances and given a probability of 1 in 1,000 years (SRK 2015a). These were not carried forward for further analysis in the EIS as they represent “worst-case” spill scenarios. CEQ does not require analysis of such scenarios, instead directing attention to low probability-high consequence events that have a reasonable likelihood of occurrence for detailed analysis (AECOM 2015c). All of these would be mitigated by current design features, as well as additional site investigation and detailed design work prior to construction (Donlin Gold 2015g).

The Early Stage FMEA Workshop ranked Scenarios 1 and 4 as unlikely, with a probability of occurrence once every 200 years, or 0.5 percent in any individual year. Such an event could occur during construction or operations of the TSF. The overall objective of the Early Stage FMEA workshop was to identify and evaluate risks associated with the TSF and the Snow Gulch Reservoir, with a view to ensuring that these risks are addressed in the current and future stages of investigation and design. It is anticipated that additional not yet identified design modifications to mitigate risk will be included in the final tailings dam design, and that the probability of such release scenarios would be reduced. Additionally, Donlin Gold has revised their proposed project following the Early Stage FMEA Workshop to reduce the amount of water stored in the TSF during mine operations. Thus, these scenarios are likely much less probable than presented here.

After closure, the TSF would be closed, covered, and the tailings would gradually lose moisture content and accordingly, internal strength would increase. A significant release after closure is considered very unlikely.

The tailings dam holds back not just fluids, but a slurry of water and tailings (perhaps a 20 to 50 percent solids content). This makes the tailings a viscous fluid resulting in slower flow and
sediment deposition during a release than a water reservoir. As such, a breach of the tailings dam may not result in a full release of the contents behind the dam, but could release a significant portion of the contents depending on the speed of the breach development, amount of ponded water, tailings geotechnical characteristics, flow laminality or turbidity, TSF and downstream topography.

The design of the TSF dam to withstand various causes of dam failure is discussed in Section 3.3.3.2 (Geohazards and Seismic Conditions, Alternative 2). The design was also evaluated in comparison to the Mount Polley Tailings dam which failed in August 2014 (AECOM 2015b). The downstream rockfill dam proposed for the Donlin TSF, with its multiple filter zones, siting in a narrow valley on bedrock, and water drainage control features (Figure 3.3-6 in Section 3.3, Geohazards and Seismic Conditions), is considered a relatively robust dam design. Additionally, the slope of the downstream face (1.7H:1V), geotechnical boring coverage, and target factor of safety used in Donlin TSF engineering studies (1.5), are more conservative than those documented at Mount Polley (AECOM 2015c; IEEIRP 2015).

Downstream tailings dams like that proposed for this project are less likely to fail compared to centerline or upstream designs (Chambers and Higman 2011). Based on International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) statistical data for dam failure, HydroCoop (2013) noted that far fewer failures have occurred worldwide for rockfill dams as compared to earthfill dams. In a benchmarking study of B.C. tailings dam failure frequency, IEEIRP (2015) noted that there were no failures of rockfill dams out of 525 dam-years of active operation for U.S. water dams. Dam height is also known to correlate (inversely) with the frequency of dam failure. Only about 1 percent of 147 tailings dam failures documented worldwide by Rico et al. (2008) have occurred at large dams greater than 300 feet high. Failures of tailings dams with no ponded water after closure, like that proposed for the post-closure TSF, is small compared to dams in active operations with ponded water (IEEIRP 2015).

3.24.3.5.3 OTHER ALTERNATIVES

Alternatives 3A, 3B, 4, and 6A have the same tailings dam and volume of tailings as Alternative 2, therefore release frequency and volume would also be the same as Alternative 2. Alternative 5A would use the dry stack method and would have a lower risk for releases of tailings from the TSF. Alternative 5A would have an operating pond contained by a dam and releases of process affected water are possible. The operating pond dam was not subject to review during the Early Stage FMEA Workshop and possible releases of process affected water under Alternative 5A were not modelled. For the purposes of this EIS, it is assumed that a release from the Alternative 5A operating pond would be similar to the water-only release modelled for the TSF dam for Alternative 2 (see Section 3.24.5.9.2).

3.24.4 FATE AND BEHAVIOR OF SPILLED MATERIALS

This section discusses how materials behave when released into the environment. Fate and behavior of spilled materials do not change as a result of project components; therefore, the information presented is applicable to all action alternatives.
3.24.4.1 DIESEL FUEL AND OTHER OIL

Although petroleum and motor oil would be transported to the mine site, diesel fuel (a light oil) would be transported in the greatest quantity and garnered the most concern from scoping comments. All oil substances would be included in the spill plans (see Section 3.24.1); however, for the purposes of analyzing the spill scenarios laid out below in Section 3.24.5 and 3.24.6, diesel fuel only is discussed in this section and analyzed in scenarios.

3.24.4.1.1 ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE FATE OF SPILLED MATERIALS

The fate and behavior of spilled diesel is affected by many factors, including:

- Weather conditions (e.g. wind, temperature, sunshine, etc.);
- Receiving environment of the spill (e.g. river, pond, tundra, roadbed, etc.); and
- Properties of the spilled diesel (physical and chemical).

The interactions of these factors affect the behavior of spilled diesel and its impact on the receiving environment. Response actions (or lack thereof) as well as the timeliness of the response can further affect the fate and behavior of the spilled diesel.

Weathering

Spreading, evaporation, and dispersion are the primary weathering processes affecting diesel, and have the greatest impact during the initial stages of a spill. Dissolution, photodegradation, and biodegradation processes can also play a part depending on circumstances.

Spreading. As diesel is spilled, it tends to spread quickly. The increased surface area assists weathering processes that are surface-dependent (e.g. evaporation). Spreading reduces the concentration of diesel at the spill site; however, it increases the area which may be adversely affected by the diesel, although possibly less severely.

Evaporation. Diesel evaporates very quickly; evaporation is the primary process for loss of diesel. In general, small and medium-sized spills evaporate and disperse naturally within a day or less, even in cold water (NOAA 2006). As the diesel evaporates it becomes subject to increased rates of photodegradation.

Dispersion. Diesel that is spilled into water is subject to dispersion. This process increases the surface area of the diesel by breaking it up into fine droplets, allowing for greater susceptibility to the processes of dissolution and degradation. Dispersion is more effective when surface turbulence is increased, as by wind, waves, or currents. This is true even in cold water. Often there is little or no substance on the surface for responders to recover (NOAA 2006).

Adsorption. Diesel is lighter than water, and will not sink and accumulate on the bottom of a river or pond as free oil; however, diesel that has been dispersed into fine enough droplets can adhere to suspended fine-grained sediment, which can then settle out and deposit on basal materials. Basal materials consist of any depositional environment inundated with water that is capable of transporting or depositing impacted fine grained sediment. This would include river bed and bank materials; in river features such as point or longitudinal bars; or similar inter-tidal depositional environments depending on the proximity and size of the release. This process will be less of a factor for small and medium spills, or conditions lacking suspended sediment such as marine environments.
**Dissolution.** Dissolving in water is not a primary process for diesel, as it floats on the surface. However, to the extent that dissolution does occur in a contained body of water, such as a pond, it increases the toxic effects.

**Photodegradation.** Photodegradation is the process by which light breaks down a material, and on sunny days can be a major factor in the fate of diesel. Photodegraded petroleum product constituents tend to be more soluble and more toxic than parent compounds and extensive photodegradation, like dissolution, could increase the biological impacts of a spill.

**Biodegradation.** In areas that have not previously been exposed to diesel, biodegradation by indigenous microorganisms is not likely to be a significant factor in the fate of diesel. Indigenous microorganisms take time to adapt to degrade the diesel, as well as grow to a large enough population to make a noticeable effect. Biodegradation can take longer in colder soils. Bioremediation efforts have shown that in some cases fertilization may increase the speed of establishment and growth of microbial populations, thus enhancing the biodegradation of diesel.

Of these processes, dispersion and evaporation would have the greatest short-term effect on the fate of diesel spills in an aquatic environment. For example, almost all (more than 90 percent) of the diesel in a small spill incident from a barge in marine waters would evaporate or naturally disperse into the water column in a matter of hours or days. On land, diesel quickly penetrates porous sediments. Biodegradation and photo oxidation are longer-term processes that would slowly degrade any remaining diesel in the environment over one to two months, longer if the temperatures are cold (NOAA 2006).

**Seasons**

The season during which a diesel spill occurs may influence the behavior and impact of a spill, as well as the potential response activities (and success). For this project, transportation of the diesel by vessel will generally be limited to summer months due to restrictions of river draft; summer and fall will see significant transportation of diesel by truck from Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port to the mine site. Overwinter storage of diesel will occur at the mine site, supported by storage at Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port; in the event of overwinter storage at Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port there would likely be transportation of diesel by tanker truck during the winter.

**Summer (Ice-free).** Summer is the period in which the Kuskokwim River is ice-free, and regional streams and ponds are open water. The tundra is snow-free, and plant and animal activity is highest. Spills to water would be subject to spreading by wind and wave action, and tundra vegetation would be most likely to be impacted by a spill.

**Fall (Freeze-up).** Fall is the period when water bodies may begin to freeze over, but the ice cover might advance and retreat daily depending upon weather conditions and river flow volumes. Snow will begin to cover the tundra and migratory birds are moving through the region. Spills to water would be subject to spreading by wind and wave action; however, spreading may be checked and diesel trapped by forming ice, only to be further dispersed when that ice melts and refreezes. Diesel spilled on top of ice may flow through cracks to water below, where it may collect or disperse out of sight.

**Winter.** In winter, the tundra is snow-covered, and rivers, streams, ponds, and lakes are ice-covered. Snow usually slows the spreading of spilled diesel, although diesel can move underneath the snow to some degree. Depending upon the condition and depth of the snow,
and the temperature and volume of the spilled diesel, diesel may still reach the tundra vegetation beneath the snow. Diesel spilled to ice and snow-covered water bodies will likewise be somewhat limited in its ability to spread, although it is possible for diesel to flow to water depending on cracks in the ice, and the volume and temperature of the spilled diesel. In such cases, the diesel should disperse slowly due to the low water levels and low rates of flow in streams and rivers.

**Spring (Break-up).** Spring is the period in which snow and ice melts and streams and rivers quickly and substantially increase flow volumes. These increased flows cause the Kuskokwim River ice to break up and flow to Kuskokwim Bay. Migratory birds return to the region, and tundra biological activity resumes. Diesel spills to water are likely to become quickly dispersed and difficult to contain or cleanup. The tundra will be wet, and spills to tundra are likely to easily reach open water.

**Weather, Water Level, and Winds**

Flooding of tundra ponds, lakes, and streams can occur quickly due to snowmelt and/ or heavy rains. Increased water levels would result in increased river flow volumes, which may impede response efforts. The increased water levels can facilitate the dispersal of spilled diesel to adjacent areas that might not normally be impacted during drier times. Wind storms may increase the spread of spills, as well as impeding response efforts; however, they would also assist evaporation. High winds would increase wave action in rivers and seas, providing further spreading and weathering of the spilled diesel. Inclement weather in general can be expected to impede response efforts.

### 3.24.4.2 LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS

LNG is natural gas that has been transitioned into a liquefied state by being cooled to minus 259 degrees Fahrenheit through a process known as liquefaction. However, LNG will transition back to a gaseous phase if it is released and comes into contact with warmer air or water (California Energy Commission 2014). Methane, the primary component of LNG, is colorless, odorless, and tasteless. It is non-corrosive and non-toxic but is classified as a simple asphyxiant, possessing a slight inhalation hazard. If breathed in high concentration, oxygen deficiency can result in serious injury or death. Methane has an ignition temperature of 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit and is flammable at concentrations between 5 and 15 percent in air. Unconfined mixtures of methane in air (such as a LNG release that has transitioned back to a gaseous phase) are not explosive. However, a flammable concentration within an enclosed space in the presence of an ignition source can explode.

LNG is less dense than water and will therefore float if a LNG spill comes into contact with water. If a large amount of LNG is spilled on water within a short period of time, the relatively warmer temperature of the water will cause the LNG to rapidly transition to its gaseous phase, a process known as rapid phase transition (RPT). RPT can cause a physical explosion that may be hazardous to nearby people, buildings, or wildlife (California Energy Commission 2014). In addition, if an ignition source is present, the gas-phase natural gas may ignite, leading to a fire or chemical explosion, depending on the concentration of gas present.
3.24.4.3 CYANIDE

Sodium cyanide dilutes quickly in water and thus cannot be cleaned-up using conventional means such as booms, sorbent pads, and skimmers. Because of this, cyanide would be transported in ISO-approved containers designed to minimize the chance of an accidental spill even in the event the container is lost overboard during transportation; the design of these ISO-approved containers effectively provides secondary containment.

Sodium cyanide is generally transported in dry form in individual water tight tank-tainers and it must come in contact with water to pose immediate toxic and acute health dangers. In the event of an accident with release of sodium cyanide into surface waters, all aquatic life in the immediate area would be killed. In flowing streams, the effects would continue downstream until dilution and/or volatilization reduced the cyanide content to nontoxic levels. In a lake, the anticipated impacts would be longer lasting due to the lack of flowing water; however, the overall toxicity would still be relatively short-term.

Although cyanide is highly toxic, the duration of impacts from a release of cyanide would likely be short term. Cyanide is relatively reactive and does not persist in the aquatic environment nor does it bio-accumulate in the food chain.

What is most important environmentally is to prevent cyanide from reaching surface water or ground water. If solid sodium cyanide is spilled on dry ground, it does not present a danger to people or the environment as long as the sodium cyanide remains dry and is swept up and contained for proper disposal.

Hydrogen cyanide in water is subject to the follow processes that will reduce the concentrations in the water.

- Dilution, this is particularly important in moving water.
- Volatilization – This is an important exposure route, the volatilization rate is reduced with high pH water and cool or cold water.
- Complexation – Hydrogen Cyanide forms complexes with 28 different elements.
- Adsorption – Hydrogen cyanide is adsorbed as free or complexed forms onto solid phases of the soil/rock.
- Precipitation – Cyanide complexes from solid metallocyanide precipitates.
- Thiocyanate – Cyanide combines with locally available sulfur to form thiocyanates.
- Oxidation – Cyanide is oxidized to cyanate

Cyanide is very reactive and short lived in the environment. In the interim before it dissipates via the reaction mechanisms noted previously or is diluted, it is dangerous as hydrogen cyanide gas in the air or in water as a cyanide solution by ingestion.

There are a variety of factors that will complex or destroy cyanide in the environment. Even if the local microbial life is killed, the other mechanisms will destroy or dilute cyanide in groundwater.

Cyanide used by Donlin Gold will be managed as described in the previous sections to minimize the environmental impacts.
3.24.4.4 MERCURY

Mercury is present in the environment as a result of both natural and human activities, and persists in the environment. Mercury is an important pollutant at all scales ranging from global to local. Mercury in its elemental form is a heavy, silvery-white liquid metal at typical ambient temperatures and pressures. When spilled, liquid elemental mercury flows and collects in the same way and locations that water would if spilled. However, due to the volatility of the liquid elemental mercury it partitions strongly to atmosphere in the environment.

Mercury can chemically combine with other elements to form organic (carbon-containing) and inorganic (not containing carbon) compounds. The fraction of organic mercury in the atmosphere is extremely small compared to that of inorganic mercury. Typically inorganic mercury is released into the atmosphere in one of three forms:

1. Elemental mercury vapor
2. Gaseous divalent mercury
3. Particulate mercury

Mercury deposition from the atmosphere can be wet or dry. Wet deposition is the dissolution and removal of mercury by rain and snow. Dry deposition refers to the transfer of mercury to the ground during non-precipitating time periods due to molecular diffusion and settling (dust). The three forms of inorganic mercury have very different physical and chemical characteristics, resulting in large differences in their rates of removal by deposition from the atmosphere, and consequently, in their atmospheric lifetimes.

Elemental mercury vapor has a lifetime of several months to more than a year because of its low reactivity, extremely low solubility in water, and slow deposition rate and hence is transported globally over long distances. In contrast, gaseous divalent mercury, dry deposits rapidly and both gaseous divalent mercury and particulate mercury are efficiently wet deposited (due to high solubility in water) near their sources during rain and snow events; thus, their lifetimes range from a few hours to days.

Mercury emissions are transported through ambient air, and deposited to water and land where humans and wildlife can be exposed. Concentrations of mercury in ambient air are usually low and of little direct concern. Once mercury enters water, either through air deposition or soil runoff, microorganisms such as bacteria transform inorganic mercury in the environment to methyl mercury, which can then bio-accumulate in fish and animal tissue. The methylation of mercury is a key step in the entrance of mercury into the food chain.

The volatility of the liquid elemental metal and some of its compounds, in conjunction with its ability to chemically transform under environmental conditions, makes it easily exchangeable across all environmental media including the biosphere where it can bio-accumulate and bio-magnify.

Adverse effects from exposure to mercury differ depending on the form and the route of exposure. The primary route of exposure to elemental mercury is inhalation of its colorless and odorless vapors. The symptoms of acute toxicity following high-level exposure to mercury vapor occur within hours of the exposure. Chronic effects take longer to manifest. Elemental mercury is essentially nontoxic when ingested because virtually none (less than 0.1 percent) is absorbed (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry [ATSDR] 2014). Dermal exposure
or absorption of elemental mercury through the skin is considered a minor exposure route. Methylmercury is commonly found in fresh or salt water fish as a result of bioaccumulation. The most significant exposure pathway for humans and wildlife is considered to be through ingestion of methylmercury. Methylmercury has the highest potential for environmental toxicity relative to inorganic and elemental mercury forms because it is subject to bioaccumulation and biomagnification in higher trophic level organisms. It should also be noted; however, that inhalation of high concentrations of elemental mercury vapor produces toxic effects in humans.

Initially the half-life of ingested elemental mercury is 1-3 days followed by a slower half-life of 2-3 weeks (CDC 2013b).

Liquid mercury pools in soil and water. Care should be taken not to disperse the pools during the cleanup process, as that increases the evaporation rate. Spilled elemental mercury can react in a number of ways as follows; volatilize, oxidize, and move down the soil column. It can also be metabolized into methyl mercury by microorganisms.

Mercury generated as a by-product will be captured and stored off-site to minimize Donlin Gold’s environmental impacts.

3.24.4.5 TAILINGS DAM RELEASE

As described in Section 3.24.5.9, release from the tailings dam could be discharged as either water only, or slurry of water and solids. The potential spill scenario was modeled in these two ways to bracket the range of flow distances, velocities, and depths for the range of possible materials that could spill (BGC 2015n). The behavior of these materials would be different depending on the season of occurrence as follows:

Tailings and Water Release

**Winter:** In the winter months, at least some of the released tailings could be excavated and transported back to the tailings facility thereby limiting the impact of the release during the following spring thaw. There would likely be less possible reduced erosion and transportation of the sediments by Crooked Creek. Water would not necessarily penetrate underlying materials, and there is some potential that a portion of the contaminated fluids could be recovered.

**Summer:** The impacted area would likely be much larger because a significant portion of the deposited tailings would be remobilized by Crooked Creek and transported downstream. Impacts from fluids on the subsurface would be difficult to control or remediate. Access by trucks and other large equipment would be difficult on thawed off-road areas.

Water Only Release

**Winter:** The volume released would be sufficiently high and fast that freezing would not quickly impede the flow. The maximum flow rates of water would be approximately 4.0 percent of flow rates of the Kuskokwim River in the winter months (November to April), resulting in greater potential impacts. Water would not necessarily penetrate underlying materials, and there is some potential that a portion of the contaminated fluids could be recovered.
Summer: The maximum flow rates of water would be approximately 1.8 percent of flow in Kuskokwim River in the summer months (May to October). More water would penetrate the ground surface and infiltrate the subsurface materials, and impacts from fluids on the subsurface would be difficult to control or remediate.

3.24.5 SPILL SCENARIOS

This section summarizes the potential spill or release causes and volume estimates that might result directly or indirectly from the transportation and storage of diesel, LNG, cyanide, mercury, and dam tailings in Alternative 2. This analysis considers a variety of accidental spills, from minor to catastrophic. These scenarios are conceptual views of the future and represent possible sets of potential accidents. The primary purpose of a scenario is to provide a common basis for the analysis of potential environmental impacts, should future accidents occur. BMPs are given, where appropriate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. River Barge Release</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tank Farm Release (Angyaruaq, BTC, Mine Site)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank farm tank rupture</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank farm faulty valve/pipeline leak</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transfer operation line rupture</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transfer operation human error</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Tanker Truck Release</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanker truck rollover</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanker truck collision</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Diesel Pipeline Release</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diesel pipeline pinhole leaks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diesel pipeline rupture</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Liquefied Natural Gas Release</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Storage tank pinhole leaks</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Fueling trucks</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck accident</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rupture of a storage tank</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Cyanide Release</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lost cargo overboard</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank-tainer rupture</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicle collision</td>
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Table 3.24-8: Spill Scenarios and Alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Mercury Release</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lost cargo overboard</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flask, Metric Ton Container, or drum rupture (mine locations)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck accident</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Partial Tailings Dam Failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailings and water release (slurry)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water only release</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. River barge release scenario for Alternative 3B would apply only during construction.

Table 3.24-8 above shows which alternatives are applicable to each scenario. Scenarios 1 through 5 summarize the potential spill or release causes, behavior, and potential impacts that might result directly or indirectly from the transportation and storage of diesel.

In the Project Area, spills could occur from the diesel pipeline, vessels, trucks, storage tanks (including tank farm infrastructure), and transfer operations. Spills that escape from secondary containment areas and roadbeds, or enter water sources directly, could reach one or more of several habitat types. The habitats present in the operational areas for consideration are wet and dry tundra, tundra ponds, lakes, flowing creeks and rivers (especially the Kuskokwim River, as the primary drainage and transportation corridor), bays (including Captains Bay/Iluliuk Bay at Dutch Harbor, and Kuskokwim Bay at the mouth of the Kuskokwim River) and ocean (including the Bering Sea). Spills could occur any time during the year for certain operations. However, all on-river transportation of diesel will be limited to the timeframe of approximately June through October due to the seasonal freezing of the Kuskokwim River in winter.

These scenarios do not include fugitive air emissions, which are discussed in Section 3.8, Air Quality, and Section 3.22, Human Health.

Table 3.24-9 shows which project components are applicable to each scenario.

Table 3.24-9: Spill Scenarios and Project Components

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Project Component</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea</td>
<td>Mine Site</td>
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<td>2. River Barge Release</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
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<td>3. Tank Farm Release (Angyaruaq, BTC, Mine Site)</td>
<td>Pipeline</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Transfer operation human error</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanker truck rollover</td>
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<td>Tanker truck collision</td>
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<td>Diesel pipeline rupture</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. River barge release scenario for Alternative 3B would apply only during construction.

3.24.5.1 SCENARIO 1: OCEAN BARGE RUPTURE AT SEA

A very low probability, very large volume potential spill scenario could result if an ocean-going diesel barge was damaged. The cause of this hypothetical scenario could be loss of tow during stormy weather, mechanical failure of a tug, or human error and result in grounding of the barge with damage that causes the loss of 75 percent of the diesel in two compartments. For a 2.94 million gallon barge with six equal sized compartments, this scenario would result in a release of 735,000 gallons of diesel. This scenario assumes the barge grounds south of the Kuskokwim River entrance. It is assumed for this scenario that approximately 50 percent of the
release would contact the shore. Spills of more than 10,000 gallons involving a barge transporting petroleum products in Alaska did not occur between January 1995 through July 2013 and a spill of this size is not projected to occur during the life of the Donlin Gold Project (ERM 2014).

Dispersal and evaporation would likely take approximately 3 to 5 days; however, heavy winds and waves would reduce that timeframe by speeding up the process. Due to the remoteness of such a spill, response efforts could include overflights to observe the dispersal of the diesel to confirm whether or not shoreline contact is likely and to direct any protection efforts to environmentally sensitive areas.

Potential impacts would include environmental impact to the shoreline and possible contamination of fish, birds, or animals due to contact or ingestion. Also, the possibility of affecting fisheries, which may have immediate economic and subsistence consequences, may also result in potential longer term economic consequences based on loss of fishery reputation.

3.24.5.2 SCENARIO 2: RIVER BARGE RELEASE

A very low probability, large volume, potential spill scenario is a grounding or other accident and release of diesel from a laden river tank barge traveling up the Kuskokwim River carrying 302,535 gallons (90 percent of maximum capacity). (While most fuel shipments would be comprised of a tow of four barges, this scenario assumes only one of the barges would be damaged, as it is extremely unlikely that more than one barge would ground or strike another object with enough force to compromise both layers of the hull.) This scenario would be limited to the summer delivery season, when the river is ice free. A barge could potentially suffer damage that breaches the double hull and impacts the compartment seam, allowing two compartments to release their contents to the river (each compartment holding 37,817 gallons at 90 percent capacity). The tug crew would immediately initiate transfer of diesel from the damaged compartments to other compartments on the same and adjacent barges. Approximately 25 percent of the cargo (18,908 gallons) from the damaged compartments could be transferred to the other compartments (limited by the need to retain void space in those cargo compartments to allow for expansion of the diesel). As diesel leaves the ruptured cargo compartments through release to the environment and transfer to other tanks, it eventually would achieve equilibrium with the outside water pressure, resulting in the retention of approximately 25 percent of the diesel in the ruptured cargo compartments. As a result, approximately 50 percent of the cargo would ultimately be released to the river, accounting for 37,817 gallons.

Response efforts by the tug crew would include the placement of containment booms to encircle the barge tow. While diesel would potentially be entrained under the containment boom by the river current, this would slow the dispersion of diesel into the river enough to allow additional response efforts to get underway. Tactics to employ would include diversion booming downstream, and bringing in a skimming platform to recover diesel by skimming diesel from within the boom. While it would take time for the additional response actions to occur, the release would not be instantaneous; it could take 48 hours or more for the entire volume to be released from the damaged compartments. As a result, it is likely that response efforts would succeed in recovery of at least half of the released diesel, approximately 18,908 gallons.
Diesel that would not be recovered would travel downstream, and so further response efforts would be expended primarily on the protection of pre-identified, environmentally-sensitive areas in Kuskokwim Bay. Rough weather could limit response activities; however, it would also speed up dispersion of the diesel by wave action. Dispersants would not be used. Within 3 days there would be no or very little visible diesel sheen remaining (NOAA 2006).

3.24.5.3 SCENARIO 3: TANK FARM RELEASE

3.24.5.3.1 TANK FARM TANK RUPTURE

A very low probability, large volume (possibly 1 million gallons or more), potential spill scenario is a catastrophic tank failure at a tank farm; this scenario could occur anytime during the year. The entire volume of the tank’s contents would be released to secondary containment; recovery would be 100 percent minus any lost to evaporation. Response efforts would involve recovery of free product to another tank (if available) or a tank barge, and returning the secondary containment to original condition. Recovery of free product should be complete within 2 to 3 days; recovery and cleanup operations should be complete within 7 days.

Impacts include evacuation of nearby homes and businesses due to fumes and potential fire danger. There would be probable economic and legal impacts.

3.24.5.3.2 TANK FARM FAULTY VALVE/PIPELINE LEAK

A high probability, very small volume (less than 10 gallons), potential spill scenario is a mechanical or structural failure at a tank farm (such as a leaky valve seal); this scenario could occur anytime during the year. Any leak would be discovered during the daily visual inspection, and all diesel spilled would be captured within secondary containment. Recovery volume would be 100 percent minus any loss to evaporation; recovery and cleanup operations would be complete within a few hours.

There would be likely little or no impact, including economic.

3.24.5.3.3 TRANSFER OPERATION LINE RUPTURE

A low probability, medium to large volume (100 to 2,000 gallons, depending upon the volume of the hose), potential spill scenario would be failure of a transfer hose during a transfer at a marine facility between a vessel and a tank farm; this scenario would be limited to the summer shipping season, when the river is ice free. Diesel would be released to secondary containment, both on the dock and on the water (barges will be boomed off prior to any transfer operation). On-water recovery may involve sorbents and skimmers; on-shore recovery would involve sorbents and pumping out of secondary containment. On-water recovery would be less than 100 percent due to losses to evaporation and a relatively small quantity of diesel that could escape under the boom if river current causes entrainment. On-shore recovery would be 100 percent minus loss to evaporation, and would be complete within 1 day.

Impacts would include minimal environmental impact to the shoreline with possible contamination of fish or animals due to ingestion. There would be probable economic and legal.
3.24.5.3.4 TRANSFER OPERATION HUMAN ERROR

A low probability, very small volume (less than 10 gallons), potential spill scenario would occur due to human factors during a transfer operation, resulting in the overfilling of a tanker truck; this scenario could occur anytime during the year. A very small amount would be spilled, and recovery would be 100 percent minus loss to evaporation. Recovery would involve the use of sorbents carried on the truck; response efforts would be immediate and complete within the hour.

There would be likely little or no impact, including economic.

3.24.5.4 SCENARIO 4: TANKER TRUCK RELEASE

3.24.5.4.1 TANKER TRUCK ROLLOVER

A low probability, medium to large volume (up to 13,500 gallons), potential spill scenario is an accident resulting from a tanker truck rollover of major collision; this scenario could occur anytime during the year, although more likely during shipping season. The entire contents of the tanker truck could be released to the environment along the roadbed, including potentially to tundra and water. Recovery would be limited by potential dispersal to running water (e.g. a stream), as well as by evaporation, during the time required to get response equipment to the site. During winter, snow and ice may limit the diesel’s ability to initially reach the tundra or water. Response efforts may include (depending on location and receiving environment) sorbent booming, trenching, on-water recovery by boat or shore-based skimmers, snow and ice removal, and in situ burning. Recovery and cleanup should be complete within 7 to 10 days (less in easily accessed locations). Winter responses will require observation during melt and break-up, in case additional recovery and cleanup is required.

Impacts would include damage to tundra vegetation, streams, and possible contamination of animals or fish by ingestion. Also, there are possible impacts to subsistence and fisheries.

3.24.5.4.2 TANKER TRUCK COLLISION

A low probability, very small volume (less than 10 gallons), potential spill scenario may result from a minor vehicle collision involving a loaded tanker truck, if the accident causes the tanker truck to start leaking (e.g. from an affected valve); this scenario could occur anytime during the year. A very small amount of diesel would reach the road (and it would remain on the roadbed, captured by sorbents), and all diesel would be recovered minus any lost to evaporation. Recovery would involve the use of sorbents, carried on the truck; response efforts would be immediate and complete within the hour.

There would be likely little or no impact, including economic.

3.24.5.5 SCENARIO 5: DIESEL PIPELINE RELEASE

3.24.5.5.1 DIESEL PIPELINE PINHOLE LEAKS

A high to very high probability, low volume (less than 99.9 gal) potential spill scenario would result from pinhole leaks from the buried diesel pipeline and related appurtenances that are
detected within days. This scenario could occur anytime during the year. Most of these small spills would not reach non-facility land or waterbodies. However, some of the spills could seep into the soil toward groundwater or into nearby waterbodies outside of the ROW. The spills that could reach terrestrial habitats typically would affect a limited area adjacent to the ROW. Even those spills that do reach waterbodies generally would result in a limited impact because of the small volume of diesel involved. Small spills from pinhole leaks would be restricted in geographic extent and would be unlikely to have measurable impacts on resources. Minimal environmental impact to river and stream shorelines, tundra vegetation, and contamination to fish or animals due to ingestion could occur.

A medium to low probability, medium (100-999.9 gal) or large (1,000-100,000 gal) volume potential spill scenario would result if a pinhole leak remained undetected for weeks or months. If the release volume rate from a pinhole leak was small, the leak might not be detected by the leak detection systems. As stated previously, detection of diesel from pinhole leaks would most likely occur through visual or olfactory identification, either during regular pipeline aerial inspections, ambulatory patrols, or landowner or citizen observation. Because pipeline inspections for indications of leaks would only occur twice a year, a pinhole leak could go undetected for weeks or months. Medium and large volume spills would have a high likelihood of seeping into the soil or into nearby waterbodies. Recovery would be limited by potential dispersal to running water (streams, etc.) and by evaporation during the time required to detect the leak and get response equipment to the site. During winter, snow and ice may limit the diesel’s ability to initially reach the tundra or water; however, it may also disguise cracks in the ice where diesel is able to rapidly reach tundra or water. Snow and ice may also inhibit detection of spills at river and stream crossings. Response efforts may include (depending on location and receiving environment) sorbent booming, trenching, on-water recovery by boat or shore-based skimmers, snow and ice removal, and in situ burning. Recovery and cleanup should be complete within 7-10 days (less in easily accessed locations). Winter responses will require observation during melt and break-up, in case additional recovery and cleanup is required.

Potential impacts would include damage to tundra vegetation, streams, and possible contamination of animals or fish by ingestion. Impacts to subsistence uses could also occur.

3.24.5.5.2 DIESEL PIPELINE RUPTURE

The buried diesel pipeline would traverse a total of 334 miles. The pipeline would hold approximately 42,200 gallons of fuel per mile of line. There are 27 identified stream crossings that would require valves. It is probable that there could be 10-mile or longer stretches without valves. Depending on the nature of the topography, volumes from large ruptures could range from 3,360 to 790,020 gallons (Michael Baker Jr, Inc. 2014). The high range estimates would be considered worst case for spill response planning and very unlikely to occur. Therefore, this scenario evaluates a very low probability, high to very high volume (greater than 100,000 gallons) spill contingency volume of 422,000 gallons or more, resulting from a major rupture or a complete break in the proposed pipeline that releases diesel somewhere along the ROW. This scenario could occur anytime during the year. Causes might include pipeline corrosion or a major earth movement (resulting from slides, an earthquake, or thaw settlement). The actual volumes spilled could vary depending on a number of factors, including:

- Locations, activation methods, and activation delay times for valves;
• The amount of pressure in the line;
• Location of the break; and
• The extent to which the proposed pipeline follows topographic contours, and the location of low spots in the pipeline relative to the break.

A very large spill would be likely to reach both land and adjacent waterbodies, especially if it occurs in the ice-free seasons and near waterbodies. The proximity of the spill to major streams and rivers may be the most important factor in spill scenarios. For those spills that do reach waterbodies, especially flowing streams and rivers, the area of impact generally would be more extensive than for the small spills because of the larger volume of diesel involved. Likewise, the potential for large spills to reach groundwater surfaces is greater than for small spills. Large spills that result from a rupture in a pipeline, for whatever reason, would likely be detected quickly by the SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) system; both automatic and manual responses would be quickly activated to stop and isolate the leak.

In the very unlikely event that a large or very large spill were to occur, it could result in major to catastrophic impacts to water bodies, wetlands and vegetation, birds, fisheries, and marine mammals, depending on the location. Other resources could be impacted to lesser degrees, and subsistence and economic impacts could be magnified by perception.

3.24.5.6 SCENARIO 6: LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) RELEASE

Scenario 6 summarizes the potential spill or release causes, behavior, and potential impacts that might result directly or indirectly from the transportation and storage of LNG. Small LNG spills could result from pinhole leaks from the storage tanks. Fueling the LNG-fueled trucks may also be a source of frequent but very small to small spills.

An accident involving an LNG-fueled truck would have the potential to release up to the full amount of LNG within the truck’s tank. As discussed in Section 3.24.3.2.3, it is assumed that the maximum spill from a LNG-powered truck would be approximately 1,150 gallons.

Rupture of a storage tank at the LNG plant would have the potential to release a maximum of 55,000 gallons of LNG (equivalent to the storage capacity of the tank). This scenario is unlikely.

The LNG operated haul trucks under this alternative would significantly reduce the likelihood of more probabilistic diesel fuel release scenarios (very small to medium releases), since approximately 75 percent of the annual diesel fuel consumed under Alternative 2 is associated with haul truck operation.

3.24.5.7 SCENARIO 7: CYANIDE RELEASE

Scenario 7 summarizes the potential spill or release causes that might result directly or indirectly from the transportation and storage of sodium cyanide.

Sodium cyanide incidents could result from losing the cargo off of a river or ocean barge, transfer operations, tank ruptures, or equipment failure.

It should be noted that if solid sodium cyanide is spilled on dry ground, it does not present a danger to people or the environment as long as the sodium cyanide remains dry and is swept up and contained for proper disposal. Sodium cyanide must come in contact with water to pose immediate toxic and acute health dangers due to the release of hydrogen cyanide gas. Cyanide
should be prevented from reaching surface water or groundwater. Sodium cyanide would be transported as solid briquettes in ISO-approved type 2 watertight sparge tank-tainers, and secured to vessels. Individual tank-tainers would be off-loaded from ocean barges at the Bethel port and stored at the port until transfer to river barges. River barges would transport tank-tainers to the port site, where they would be off-loaded onto tractor-trailers for transport to a secure storage area at the mine site.

3.24.5.7.1 LOST CARGO OVERBOARD

A very low probability potential scenario could result if the container was lost overboard from a barge. Sodium cyanide would be transported in watertight tank-tainers designed to minimize the chance of an accidental spill. The tank-tainers would be equipped with GPS tracking devices that would allow them to be tracked as they are transported, aiding in relocating containers if they were lost from a barge. Lost tank-tainers would be subject to intense relocation and salvage recovery efforts. Rupture of a container and sodium cyanide contact with water would be considered a worst case event and extremely unlikely to occur.

All marine carriers involved in handling sodium cyanide would be trained in safe handling and spill response procedures. Personal protective equipment would be available onboard each barge carrying sodium cyanide. The marine carriers would also be certified under the International Cyanide Management Code. Adherence to this code requires that cyanide transporters implement appropriate security, release prevention, training, and emergency response plans and capabilities, and employ adequate measures for cyanide management. The transportation company would also have a contract with a certified and licensed hazardous materials response and cleanup company within Alaska.

3.24.5.7.2 TANK-TAINER RUPTURE

A very low probability potential spill scenario may result from the tank-tainers while being transported within the port storage or mine site locations. In the unlikely event that the tank-tainer ruptures, the sodium cyanide briquettes could be spilled on dry ground. As long as the sodium cyanide remains dry and is swept up and contained for proper disposal it does not present a danger to people or the environment. If the sodium cyanide briquettes come into contact with water, the sodium cyanide would dissolve and a cyanide spill could result in the release of hydrogen cyanide gas. The resultant spill would be contained as the tank-tainer would be located in an area that includes secondary containment. The dissolved sodium cyanide would be collected and contained for proper disposal. Any undissolved sodium cyanide briquettes would need to be prevented from further potential contact with the water. All marine carriers and Donlin Gold staff involved in handling sodium cyanide would be trained in safe handling and spill response procedures. The storage areas for cyanide would be well ventilated to prevent the build-up of hydrogen cyanide gas and hydrogen cyanide monitoring would be implemented. Personal protective equipment would be available at the port where the sodium cyanide is stored. Spill neutralization and cleanup equipment should also be readily available at storage locations.
3.24.5.7.3 VEHICLE COLLISION

A very low probability potential spill scenario may result from a vehicle collision during transport from Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port to the mine. Potential spills could occur in the unlikely event of an accident that results in the tank-tainer rupturing. If the sodium cyanide came into contact with water it would dissolve, and a cyanide spill could result. Cleanup would be limited to removing and protecting the undissolved sodium cyanide briquettes from further potential contact with the water. To remediate impacted soils, the soil would be tested for WAD cyanide. If the testing indicates a WAD level of less than 10 ppm, the soil would be left in situ. If the WAD level of cyanide is more than 10 ppm, the soil would be excavated. If the WAD level of cyanide is more than 10 ppm and the area cannot be excavated, the soil would be neutralized (detoxified) in place with calcium hypochlorite. The cyanide already dissolved cannot be recovered and would be left to disperse naturally and would likely be completed by the time cleanup could be initiated. If sodium cyanide spills into water, the cyanide would be remediated or allowed to dissipate depending on the spill. A release into water would not be detoxified to avoid adverse impacts to aquatic life. Personal protective equipment would be available onboard each vehicle carrying sodium cyanide and all staff would be trained in safe handling and spill response procedures.

3.24.5.8 SCENARIO 8: MERCURY RELEASE

Scenario 8 summarizes the potential spill or release causes that might result directly or indirectly from the transportation and storage of mercury. An incident or release could occur from a container rupture, transfer operations, or losing cargo overboard from an ocean or river barge. Liquid elemental mercury and spent carbon would be contained in flasks and pigs in a secured area of the mine site, then within shipping containers for transport via truck and barge. All containers would be secured as necessary to the decks of barges during transport.

These scenarios do not include fugitive air emissions, which are discussed in Section 3.8, Air Quality, and Section 3.22, Human Health.

3.24.5.8.1 LOST CARGO OVERBOARD

A very low probability potential spill scenario may result if a container containing mercury is lost overboard from a barge. In the unlikely event that the cargo is lost overboard a mercury spill could only result if the containers ruptured. However, all mercury shipping containers would be secured to the barges to prevent slippage in any direction under the full range of travel conditions, and with appropriate separation from other cargo. Secondary containment of mercury containers would be provided inside the shipping containers that would prevent slippage in any direction under the full range of conditions expected during transport. Shipping containers lost overboard would be relocated and recovered by salvage specialists.

A spill is unlikely as the sealed flasks, pigs and drums provide a very high level of integrity and it is unlikely that these containers could rupture. Prior to shipment, Donlin Gold would verify that the container labeling is accurate and in good condition. A manifest would be prepared for each shipment that documents the type and weight of material being transported as well as the generation history. The manifest would formally facilitate tracking of the chain-of-custody from the mine site through the transportation process, to a permitted storage facility. Complete spill response would be included in a Spill and Emergency Response Plan.
FLASK, METRIC TON CONTAINER, OR DRUM RUPTURE (MINE LOCATIONS)

A very low probability potential spill scenario could result from damage to or spillage from the flasks, metric ton containers, and drums that contain liquid elemental mercury and spent carbon while being stored within the accumulated storage area and the centralized storage areas locations. A container leak is unlikely as the sealed flasks, metric ton containers, and drums would provide a very high level of integrity and it is unlikely that these containers could be damaged enough to cause a leak.

The accumulation areas would be secured locations located within the processing facility accessible only by authorized personnel, and designed to handle and contain potential spills. The mercury containers would remain tightly closed at all times except when being filled. The containers would be marked appropriately to identify the content. The sealed flasks, pigs and drums alone provide a very high level of integrity. The central storage area would be designed to handle and contain potential spills, and would be equipped with adequate monitoring and ventilation systems to limit potential exposure to any mercury vapors. Spill response equipment would be located at the mine site. The area would have signage and be secured and accessible only to authorized personnel.

In the unlikely event that there was a mercury spill from the storage areas either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon would be released from the containers. The liquid elemental mercury could collect in the secondary containment. Spilled mercury would be recovered and managed appropriately.

At a minimum, weekly inspections would be conducted at the accumulation and centralized storage areas. Inspectors would verify the proper labeling and integrity of each elemental mercury container and activated carbon drum and the overall condition of the areas. Aisle space would be maintained to allow inspection of each container/drum. Records of inspections would be maintained onsite, including identification of the need for any corrective actions.

TRUCK ACCIDENT

A low probability potential spill scenario may result from transportation to Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. In the unlikely event that there is an accident and the containers ruptured, a mercury spill (either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon) could result. The liquid elemental mercury and the spent carbon could be released to the land or surface water.

The spill risk during truck transportation is very low due to the safeguards at the Donlin Gold access road (design for industrial traffic, dedicated use and low speed limits, for example), the relatively limited number of truck trips necessary for mercury transport, and the appropriate containment to prevent a spill if an accident occurred. All mercury containers would be secured to prevent slippage in any direction under the full range of travel conditions, and with appropriate separation from other cargo. A spill is unlikely as the containers provide a very high level of integrity and it is unlikely that these containers would rupture. Additionally, the mercury containers would be transported secured to four drum containment pallets. In the event of a spill, the transporters and responders would be trained to properly respond to a mercury spill, and minimize the potential for any impacts to the environment or mine personnel. Specialized equipment (high-efficiency particulate arrestance vacuums) would be used to recover pools of visible mercury. Contaminated soils and water would be remediated. Spill response equipment would be kept at several locations along the access road.
3.24.5.9 SCENARIO 9: PARTIAL TAILINGS DAM FAILURE

An inundation study was conducted for the selected release scenario of up to 2.6 million cy to estimate the potential downstream consequences of a partial dam breach due to piping and a liner rupture leading to a sinkhole and outflow of stored material (BGC 2015n). For both of these potential failures, BGC modelled a release of a mixture of process-affected water and tailings, and a release of process-affected water only, to bracket the range of possible materials that could spill.

Modelling showed that the partial dam breach release from a piping failure (internal erosion) would be more severe than the liner rupture release (BGC 2015n). Thus, the inundation results analyzed in the EIS are for the partial dam breach release from the piping failure; the liner rupture release is dismissed from further analysis. The modelled flow inundation areas are shown in Figure 3.24-2 and Figure 3.24-4 (Scenarios 1 and 2 from BGC 2015n). Figure 3.24-3 (Scenario 1 from BGC 2015n) shows the deposition depth for a tailings and water release. Total duration time, flow front arrival time and maximum flow depth at the confluence of Anaconda Creek with Crooked Creek and the confluence of Crooked Creek with the Kuskokwim River, are summarized in Table 3.24-10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Released</th>
<th>Total Duration (hrs.)</th>
<th>Confluence of Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek (1.6 miles downstream of TSF)</th>
<th>Confluence of Crooked Creek and Kuskokwim River (13 miles downstream of TSF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Front Arrival Time (hrs.)</td>
<td>Maximum Flow Depth (ft.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Tailings</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Only</td>
<td>&gt;48</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BGC 2015n.

3.24.5.9.1 TAILINGS AND WATER RELEASE

For the tailings and water release, the modelled travel distances and deposition of greater than about 1 to 2 feet of tailings extends from the TSF dam toe to the confluence of Anaconda Creek with Crooked Creek, and for about ½-mile both upstream and downstream of the confluence (Figure 3.24-3). If the release were to occur during the summer, Crooked Creek could be temporarily blocked by the deposited tailings, and some of the deposited tailings would then be remobilized by Crooked Creek and transported downstream. Should the release occur in the winter, the cone-shaped deposit of tailings could be excavated and transported back to the tailings facility, thereby limiting the impact during the following spring thaw (BGC 2015n).
Scenario 1, Deposition Depth (Ft)

- 0 - 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10

Village of Crooked Creek

Tailings Storage Facility Dam

DEPOSITION DEPTH, TAILINGS AND WATER RELEASE

NOVEMBER 2015
Scenario 2, Flow Depth (Ft)

- 0 - 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21 - 31

INUNDATION AREA, WATER ONLY RELEASE

NOVEMBER 2015

FIGURE 3.24-4
An Emergency Action Plan required by the State of Alaska Dam Safety Program would be available to direct the appropriate response measures. Response measures would include ensuring the safety of mine employees and downstream residents; stabilizing the TSF breach; and implementing remedial actions to minimize impacts to affected resources. Remedial actions would include removing the tailings from the primary depositional area at the Crooked Creek confluence to the extent practicable. The tailings would be excavated and transported back to the TSF or other designated temporary storage area.

The modelled tailings deposition depths varied from less than 2 feet to 8 feet along Anaconda Creek. The total deposition volumes that may be in Crooked Creek were estimated at approximately 1,300 acre-feet (BGC 2015n). Prediction of tailings deposition thicknesses less than about 1 to 2 feet are limited by the accuracy of the model and existing topographic data.

3.24.5.9.2 WATER ONLY RELEASE

For the water-only release, modelling suggests it would take approximately 24 to 25 hours for the front to arrive at the confluence of Crooked Creek with the Kuskokwim River with a maximum flow rate of approximately 600 cfs. The flow depth was approximately 1 foot or less at the confluence of Crooked Creek with the Kuskokwim River.

Based on the above observations, the flow discharges impact flow depths and flow velocities in Anaconda Creek, but do not have a significant impact on flow depths and velocities in Crooked Creek. This is because the Crooked Creek floodplain is wide (approximately 0.5 miles) and the bed gradient is very gentle (approximately 0.3 percent) from the confluence of Anaconda Creek to the confluence of Kuskokwim River, resulting in flood attenuation along Crooked Creek.

The maximum flow rates of the water only release would be approximately 4.0 percent of flow rates of the Kuskokwim River in the winter (November to April), and approximately 1.8 percent of flow in Kuskokwim River in the summer (May to October) (BGC 2015n).

Depending on the volumetric sediment concentration of the released tailings, the estimates show that the duration of flow could vary from approximately 6 hours for tailings and water flow to longer than 48 hours for water flow only. Recovering released water would be difficult in any season.

3.24.6 SPILL SCENARIO IMPACTS

This section examines potential effects of the nine spill scenarios described in Section 3.24.5 under the action alternatives. These scenarios would be non-routine events, which vary from the analyses in Sections 3.1 to 3.23 that analyzed potential impacts under routine operations. Not all spill scenarios are applicable for each alternative, and this is noted when pertinent.

Under Alternative 1, the No Action Alternative, Donlin Gold would not establish a mine site, develop transportation facilities in the proposed Project Area, or construct a natural gas pipeline. Therefore, no direct or indirect effects to any resource would occur as a result of a project-related substance release and are not discussed (see Table 3.24-8).

3.24.6.1 GEOLOGY

The effects of project-related spills on geological and paleontological resources are considered either not applicable or very similar to impacts described for other resource impacts (e.g., soils);
as such, spill impacts are not evaluated in depth for geological and paleontological resources in the EIS. Two spill scenarios, Scenario 1 (ocean barge rupture at sea), and Scenario 2 (river barge release), are not applicable to upland resources, and impacts to surficial deposits along shorelines under these scenarios are covered under the sediment quality discussion in Section 3.24.6.7.3, Water Quality. Scenario 6 (LNG Release) would not have any effect on geological or paleontological resources. Impacts to surficial deposits under Scenarios 3 through 9 (tank farm, tanker truck, and diesel pipeline releases, and cyanide or mercury releases) would be the same as those described in Section 3.24.6.2, Soils. Impacts to bedrock and paleontological resources would be very similar to those described for soils with the following minor differences:

- While soils and surficial deposits are nearly ubiquitous and would be impacted by almost any release, bedrock (and fossils in the bedrock) is more limited in extent to project areas described under Alternative 2 (Sections 3.1.2.2.1 and 3.1.2.2.2, Geology). Thus, depending on the location of a fuel release, spill impacts to these resources would be the same or less than impacts to soils.

- The presence of shallow bedrock in an area where a spill occurs would impede vertical infiltration into the subsurface. A fuel spill seeping into soils would tend to spread laterally upon reaching a contact between surface geology and unweathered bedrock. Because of this, a large spill of the same volume in an area of shallow bedrock would tend to affect a wider area and shallower depths, than the same size spill in an area of deep soils or surficial deposits where vertical infiltration is rapid.

- If sodium cyanide briquettes come into contact with water, the sodium cyanide would dissolve and a cyanide spill could result.
  - The dissolved sodium cyanide collected in secondary containment and properly disposed of would be considered to have low impact to bedrock, and impact duration would be temporary due to readily available and immediate response measures and secondary containment.
  - Spills of cyanide that get wet on bedrock cannot be excavated; the bedrock would be neutralized (detoxified) in place with calcium hypochlorite. The cyanide already dissolved cannot be recovered and would be left to disperse naturally.

- Mercury would exist either bound to spent carbon or as an elemental liquid in flasks. The spent carbon could be vacuumed from the exposed bedrock and easily cleaned up. Liquid mercury would penetrate the bedrock, and be very difficult to remediate using conventional methods such as excavation. In the event that impacts from medium to large releases reach bedrock and are not readily recovered, impact duration could potentially be long-term (e.g., up to several seasons) until remediation objectives (regulatory limits) are achieved. Mercury is volatile, so such remediation may involve vapor recovery. The geographic extent of impact from this release scenario is local, and would be generally limited to the immediate release area. Soil types and soil quality are considered common to important in context. Overall impacts under Scenario 7 are considered minor to moderate.

- For a release of tailings and water, the tailings could conceivably be excavated and removed reducing impacts. Impacts from contaminated water would presumably seep into bedrock fractures and could impact a wide area, and remediation would be difficult.
3.24.6.2 SOILS

Some spill scenarios are not applicable to any soil impacts; spill scenario impacts to soil that are considered not applicable to any alternatives include the following:

- **Scenario 1 (Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea):** This scenario assumes a release to water, and generally does not involve upland soil since any resulting impacts would be limited to ocean waters or intertidal shoreline sediment. Sediment, for purposes of this evaluation, includes basal or shoreline depositional environments that are potentially influenced by annual variations in sea level fluctuations. This discrete environment and active hydraulic mechanisms are unique with respect to continuous erosion, depositional, and transport processes. Impacts to sediment are discussed in Section 3.24.6.7.3, Sediment Quality.

- **Scenario 2 (River Barge Release):** Similar to Scenario 1, this scenario does not involve upland soil since any resulting impact would be limited to in-stream waters or river shoreline sediment. Sediment, for purposes of this evaluation, encompasses the active river channel area typically ranging from peak high and low annual (seasonal) stage fluctuations. Impacts to sediment are discussed in Section 3.24.6.7.3, Sediment Quality.

- **Scenario 6 (Liquefied Natural Gas Release):** Although a natural gas release can be toxic to atmospheric receptors, impacts to soil are considered non-existent due to the low boiling point of natural gas/methane (-260 degrees Fahrenheit), which means that it dissipates rapidly into the atmosphere.

For all applicable spill scenarios impacting soil, contingency plans are required to mitigate and respond to such circumstances. With the exception of Alternative 1 (No Action), a SPCC plan would be required for all other alternatives where applicable. The SPCC plan would detail measures to prevent, respond, contain, report, and cleanup releases inherent to the final action(s) selected. If necessary, this may include regulatory required post-closure characterization activities or continued mitigation and/or management measures to achieve specific site objectives with regulatory oversight.

3.24.6.2.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 - DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

In addition to the scenarios listed above, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) does not apply to the proposed action, and is not analyzed for soils impacts.

**Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release**

Releases associated with the range of potential spills under this scenario would result in low intensity impacts (e.g., limited quantities of affected soils with concentrations either above or below regulatory levels, requiring minimal remediation/excavation) due to small volume human error transfers. Soil impacts from a large tank farm release are considered unlikely due to a very low probability of occurrence and secondary containment infrastructure designed to be capable of capturing a catastrophic-sized release. Similarly, secondary containment at the tank farms and dock would capture releases from other Scenario 3 sources, with the exception of human error fuel transfers. Releases attributed to human error fuel transfers could result in small release volumes (less than 10 gallons) potentially covering areas of surface soil encompassing several square feet, which would be addressed through immediate response and
recovery efforts. If necessary, appropriate remediation measures would be capable of readily removing limited soil volumes in excess of regulatory limits.

The duration of impacts under this scenario are considered temporary. The geographic extent of impacts from small release areas would be local, as they would be limited to the immediate source area. Soil types associated with scenario-based release areas are common to important in context, in that they are prevalent beyond potentially impacted areas, but soil chemical quality is governed by regulation. Overall impacts under Scenario 3 are considered minor.

**Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release**

The intensity of impacts to soil from these events would range from low intensity (small volume, tanker truck collision) to medium intensity (medium volume, low probability truck rollover). Small spills would be limited to roadbed materials and addressed/recovered immediately per the SPCC plan. Although medium spills could potentially impact soils adjacent to the roadbed, they would be limited in close proximity to the point of release. Limited excavation and removal of shallow impacted soils above regulatory limits would likely be required; however, immediate response and cleanup efforts would minimize further migration of soil impacts through containment and recovery. Post-rehabilitation efforts would likely include limited landscape contouring and revegetation measures.

Impact duration is generally temporary under more probabilistic small spill scenarios due to readily available and immediate response measure alternatives. In the event that impacts from medium to large releases reach soil depths not readily accessible by heavy equipment, impact duration could potentially be long-term (e.g., up to several seasons) until remediation objectives (regulatory limits) are achieved. The geographic extent of impact from this release scenario is local, and would be generally limited to the immediate release area. As described under Scenario 3, soil types and soil quality are considered common to important in context. Overall impacts under Scenario 4 are considered minor to moderate.

**Scenario 7: Cyanide Release**

A very low probability potential scenario could result if the sodium cyanide container was lost overboard from a barge. There would be no potential impact to soils in such scenario, given the sodium cyanide is contained in waterproof containers with GPS tracking devices that would allow them to be tracked as they are transported, aiding in relocating containers. Also, dissolution of the sodium cyanide, should the container rupture, would impact water quality, not soils. These impacts are addressed in Section 3.24.6.7, Water Quality.

If the sodium cyanide briquettes come into contact with water, the sodium cyanide would dissolve and a cyanide spill could result. The dissolved sodium cyanide would be collected and contained in secondary containment and properly disposed. Therefore, spills at the marine terminal or the mine facility would be considered to have low impact to soils, and impact duration would be temporary due to readily available and immediate response measures and secondary containment.

A very low probability potential spill scenario may result from a vehicle accident during transport from Angyaruag (Jungjuk) Port to the mine. Small spills would be limited to roadbed materials and addressed/recovered immediately per the SPCC plan. Limited excavation and removal of shallow impacted soils above regulatory limits would likely be required; however,
immediate response and cleanup efforts would minimize further migration of soil impacts through containment and recovery. Post-rehabilitation efforts would likely include limited landscape contouring and revegetation measures.

Cyanide is highly mobile in soil, and can be converted to hydrogen cyanide and other compounds that evaporate out of soil by microbial processes. However, high concentrations can be toxic to the micro-organisms that convert it into evaporative forms, resulting in persistent concentrations that can find its way to groundwater. If the area cannot be excavated, the soil would be neutralized (detoxified) in place with calcium hypochlorite. If the sodium cyanide came into contact with water it would dissolve; and dissolved cyanide cannot be recovered, and would be left to disperse naturally.

In the event that impacts from medium to large releases reach soil depths not readily accessible by heavy equipment, impact duration could potentially be long-term (e.g., up to several seasons) until remediation objectives (regulatory limits) are achieved. The geographic extent of impact from this release scenario is local, and would be generally limited to the immediate release area. Soil types and soil quality are considered common to important in context. Overall impacts are considered minor to moderate. Soil types and soil quality are considered common to important in context. Overall possible impacts under Scenario 7 are considered minor to moderate.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

In the unlikely event that the cargo is lost overboard, a mercury spill could only result if the containers ruptured. Mercury spilled in water would not impact soils, and the impacts of such a spill are discussed below in Section 3.24.6.7, Water Quality.

In the unlikely event that there was a mercury spill from the storage areas either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon would be released from the containers. The liquid elemental mercury could collect in the secondary containment, be recovered, and managed appropriately.

A low probability potential spill scenario may result from transportation to Anyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. In the unlikely event that there is an accident and the containers ruptured, a mercury spill (either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon) could result. The liquid elemental mercury and the spent carbon could be released to the land or surface water. In the event of a spill, the transporters and responders would be trained to properly respond to a mercury spill, and minimize the potential for any impacts to the environment or mine personnel.

Spent carbon would be very similar to sodium cyanide discussed under Scenario 7, and the response would be similar. Such an event is likely to be low intensity (a small amount of spent carbon with mercury impacting a relatively small area of soil). Contaminated soils and water would be remediated. Spill response equipment would be located at several locations along the access road. Limited excavation and removal of shallow impacted soils above regulatory limits would likely be required. Post-rehabilitation efforts would likely include limited landscape contouring and revegetation measures. Impact duration would be temporary due to readily available and immediate response measure alternatives, and the ease of cleaning up a solid, as opposed to a liquid, spill. The geographic extent of impact from this release scenario would be local, and would be generally limited to the immediate release area. As described under Scenario 3, soil types and soil quality are considered common to important in context.
Elemental mercury is a liquid, much heavier than water. If spilled on the soil it would be expected to migrate downward. However, there may be complicating factors to this scenario. In warm temperatures mercury can vaporize, leaving the spill location. During cold temperatures the ground would be frozen, retarding downward migration or volatilization.

Mercury-contaminated soils would be remediated with the intent of cleaning up to levels that will be protective of human health and the environment and consistent with soil cleanup levels.

The intensity of impacts to soil from such a release would range from low intensity (small volume spill on frozen soils) to medium intensity (medium volume spill on thawed soils). Small spills would be limited to roadbed materials and addressed/recovered immediately per the SPCC plan. Although medium spills could potentially impact soils adjacent to the roadbed, they would be limited in close proximity to the point of release. Limited excavation and removal of shallow impacted soils above regulatory limits would likely be required; however, immediate response and cleanup efforts would minimize further migration of soil impacts through containment and recovery. Post-rehabilitation efforts would likely include limited landscape contouring and revegetation measures.

Impact duration is generally temporary under more probabilistic small spill scenarios due to readily available and immediate response measure alternatives. In the event that impacts from medium to large releases reach soil depths not readily accessible by heavy equipment, impact duration could potentially be long-term (e.g., up to several seasons) until remediation objectives (regulatory limits) are achieved. Mercury is volatile, so such remediation may involve vapor recovery. The geographic extent of impact from this release scenario is local, and would be generally limited to the immediate release area. Soil types and soil quality are considered common to important in context. Overall impacts under Scenario 7 are considered minor to moderate.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

While the two TSF release scenarios discussed in Section 3.24.5.9 would cause significant impacts to undisturbed soils located downstream of the TSF dam toe, physical processes and chemical attributes unique to each scenario would result in different post-release impacts. Types of soil impacts from each release scenario include both physical and chemical. Physical impacts would be derived from a variety of mechanisms resulting in alteration of the pre-existing landscape; however, these would predominantly be associated with erosion (scour) and deposition. Chemical impacts to soil would be derived from either the tailings or water (supernatant or porewater) released from the TSF. Based on a screening review of analyte concentrations for TSF tailings and water and comparison to ADEC 18 AAC 75 Method 2 soil cleanup level guidelines, identified analytes of concern warranting evaluation were limited to antimony, arsenic, and chromium. Mercury was included in this review, but would not be present in tailings at levels exceeding soil cleanup guidelines. Each analyte of concern; their respective media concentrations; and associated ADEC soil cleanup levels are summarized below in Table 3.24-11. All other evaluated analytes and associated concentrations in TSF tailings or water were well below listed ADEC soil cleanup levels.
Table 3.24-11: Media and Analytes of Concern for TSF Release Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Tailings Feasibility Plot (Phase 2) Final Tailings Filtrate 2007</th>
<th>Tailings Pond Water</th>
<th>Tailings Porewater, Buried Tailings - Process DOC</th>
<th>ADEC Soil Cleanup Levels (Direct Contact)</th>
<th>ADEC Soil Cleanup Levels (Migration to Groundwater)</th>
<th>ADEC Groundwater Cleanup Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antimony</td>
<td>120 mg/kg</td>
<td>0.022 mg/L</td>
<td>1.1 mg/L</td>
<td>41 mg/kg</td>
<td>3.6 mg/kg</td>
<td>0.006 mg/L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsenic</td>
<td>910 mg/kg</td>
<td>3.3 mg/L</td>
<td>15 mg/L</td>
<td>4.5 mg/kg</td>
<td>3.9 mg/kg</td>
<td>0.010 mg/L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium</td>
<td>180 mg/kg</td>
<td>0.012 mg/L</td>
<td>0.012 mg/L</td>
<td>300 mg/kg</td>
<td>25 mg/kg</td>
<td>0.10 mg/L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Values from Appendix H – Analysis of Mine Site Geochemistry, Table H-2.
2. Values from Appendix H – Analysis of Mine Site Geochemistry, Table H-1.
3. 18 AAC 75: Method Two, Under 40-inch Zone; direct contact route soil cleanup level.
4. 18 AAC 75: Method Two, Under 40-inch Zone; migration to groundwater soil cleanup level.
5. Total chromium.

Abbreviations:
ADEC = Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
DOC = Dissolved organic carbon
mg/kg = milligrams per kilogram
mg/L = milligrams per liter

As shown in Table 3.24-11, predicted concentrations of arsenic and chromium in TSF tailings exceed direct contact soil cleanup levels; whereas chromium (total) is predicted to be below direct contact soil cleanup levels. All analytes however, exceed soil cleanup levels for the migration to groundwater exposure pathway. The migration to groundwater soil cleanup levels are applicable if the potential exists for migration of the contaminants to groundwater, and the ingestion of that groundwater. Based on maximum (undiluted) chromium concentrations in pre-release tailings water (0.012 mg/L), the migration to groundwater cleanup level for chromium (25 mg/kg) is likely overly conservative, since the predicted concentrations in the surface water are well below the groundwater cleanup levels. Furthermore, chromium would not exceed any of the other exposure pathway cleanup levels for soil.

Predicted antimony and arsenic concentrations in TSF water will exceed the ADEC groundwater cleanup level. Since tailings can impart antimony and arsenic concentrations in TSF water above their respective ADEC groundwater cleanup level, the migration to groundwater soil cleanup levels for these analytes are considered for chemical impact evaluation in an improbable TSF release event.

Tailings and Water Release Scenario

The total release volume of 1,620 acre-feet of slurry would have solids concentration of 50 percent (sediment) in the scenario used for this evaluation. The slower flowing solid-water mixture would be released over a five hour period (Enos 2015). The two-dimensional model (FLO-2D) used to perform the quantitative impact analysis and evaluate the muddy release over complex 3D terrain, resulted in deposition throughout the tailings run (see Figure 3.24-2). The tailings are assumed to deposit at a slope of about 3°, and extend approximately two miles downgradient of the TSF in the Crooked Creek drainage. Maximum flow depths of greater than 20 feet throughout the release are limited to within a half mile of the TSF in the Anaconda Creek drainage, and progressively diminish to two feet in depth at the furthest release extent in
Crooked Creek. Varying depths of tailings deposition would be anticipated throughout the entire flow inundation area which range from 2 to 10 feet in depth. The most prominent area of tailings deposition is the tailings run out terminus at the confluence of Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek which coincides with the largest depositional volume of 1,300 acre-feet, and maximum depositional depth of 10 feet. The total areal extent of soil disturbance by inundation or deposition would be approximately 1,700 acres under this scenario.

Physical impacts to soil primarily include scouring and depositional processes. Erosion and scouring would be most prevalent throughout the Anaconda Creek drainage at locations where channelized flow and corresponding velocities are most significant. Flows would far exceed any historical flow conditions within the drainage, as described in Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology. Although the Anaconda Creek channel is incised and relatively deep, the bed and bank materials are comprised primarily of sand and silt and would be very susceptible to erosion under the release scenario evaluated. With the exception of several discrete areas, tailings deposition in the Anaconda drainage is anticipated to be thin and spatially distributed throughout the inundation area (Figure 3.24-2). Erosional processes would progressively transition to a depositional regime at the confluence of Anaconda and Crooked Creek.

Seasonal conditions at the time of the release could also influence the severity of physical soil impacts. Modeled inputs were based on mean summer flow conditions; a frozen river bed; and roughness value (Manning’s n-value) representative of dense brush. Scouring and depositional impacts (extent) to soil may be appreciably reduced in winter months due to frozen soil; snow cover; and low annual flow conditions in Crooked Creek. Conversely, a release during peak flow conditions would result in a greater inundation area, and distribution of remobilized tailings downstream of the Crooked Creek confluence (Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology).

Chemical impairments to soil would be limited to antimony and arsenic concentrations in TSF sediment released under this scenario. Although elevated concentrations of arsenic and antimony in TSF water will exist, they are considered insignificant in comparison to the concentrations in tailings sediment. In addition, the limited residence time and mobility of antimony and arsenic in released TSF water would have a more acute impact on receiving surface waters in comparison to soils (Section 3.7, Water Quality). Concentrations of antimony and arsenic in deposited tailings would be significantly higher than applicable soil cleanup levels shown in Table 3.24-11. If not removed, the tailings are considered a “source material” from which leachate and prolonged impairment to surrounding soils, surface water, and groundwater would be derived. Soil impairments would largely be limited to the depositional extent of TSF tailings shown on Figure 3.24-1 which covers approximately 1,700 acres. Impairments would include vertical migration of leachate constituents to underlying soils (where present), and transport of tailings (downstream) as sediment from in river processes and/or from erosional run-off into receiving Anaconda and Crooked Creek drainages. The confluence of Anaconda and Crooked Creek is the most significant area where soil impairment would result from 1,300 acre-feet of deposited tailings. This area represents the largest volume and areal extent of source material over pre-existing soils. Soils underlying, and potentially downgradient of deposited TSF sediment would become impaired with antimony and arsenic from tailings leachate or runoff. If left undisturbed, the soil impairments are considered indefinite based largely on the high concentration and fate of antimony and arsenic in the tailings. Tailings mixtures transported as sediment within the Crooked Creek drainage and subsequent impacts are further addressed in Sections 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology, and Section 3.7, Water Quality.
Follow-up restoration work would be performed concurrently with stabilization, recovery and remediation efforts. This would include drainage and channel reconstruction and restoration along Anaconda and Crooked Creek. Erosion and sediment control measures may include seeding of approved vegetation for surface stabilization, in addition to other SWPPP countermeasures. Where appropriate, construction sedimentation ponds within the drainage could also minimize the downstream transport of tailings. In addition to a post release monitoring program, point specific removal and transport of tailings would also be conducted as needed based on preliminary investigation findings.

In summary, both physical and chemical impacts to soil from this scenario would alter pre-existing soil conditions in the release inundation area. Immediate and long-term response efforts and natural processes would facilitate restoration of physical impacts; however, complete removal of antimony and arsenic enriched tailings from the inundation area is unlikely to be possible. Residual source material (tailings) would indefinitely impair some soils above baseline conditions. For these reasons, the intensity of potential soil impacts is considered high, and the duration permanent. The geographic extent of soil impacts are considered regional since they would extend beyond the Project Area. Although impacted soils are considered common throughout the region, physical and chemically impaired soils could indirectly result in impairments to resources protected by legislation. For this reason, soil impacts are considered important in context.

Water Release Only Scenario

For reasons similar to the tailings and water mixture scenario described previously, physical impacts to soil would be most significant in the Anaconda Creek drainage. For evaluation purposes, it is assumed that most of the soils within Anaconda drainage inundation area (Figure 3.24-3) will be subjected to some degree of physical impairment ranging from complete removal to sediment deposition. The extent of impacts is assumed to affect approximately 250 acres of soil and sediment in the Anaconda Creek drainage.

Physical impacts to soil at the confluence of Crooked Creek and Anaconda Creek would likely include both erosional losses and deposition of coarser grained materials beyond the active stream channels, followed by finer materials. Physical impacts downstream of the confluence would likely diminish with distance; however, this would largely be influenced by natural creek flows at the time of the release, and localized channel characteristics along the reach to the Kuskokwim River. Based on historical Crooked Creek discharge measurements in closest proximity to the confluence with Anaconda Creek (upstream of Crevice Creek), long-term average daily discharges seasonally range from approximately 100 cfs to 250 cfs. A maximum average daily discharge of 880 cfs was recorded in late August of 2006. The 2-year and 5-year flood magnitude for the Crooked Creek water shed is 783 cfs, and 1,284 cfs, respectively. With the exception of brief peak flood events, total discharge under this release scenario would likely be well within the range of historical flow conditions.

Although a release under this scenario would have adverse effects to surface water receptors (Section 3.7, Water Quality), chemical impairments to soil are largely considered negligible. Reported maximum concentrations of antimony and arsenic in TSF water (porewater) would be below soil cleanup levels evaluated for comparison purposes. Although the anticipated concentration of arsenic in tailings pond water and porewater ranges from 3.3 mg/L to 15 mg/L, respectively, the concentrations are well below documented baseline soil concentrations
shown in Table 3.2-13 (Section 3.2, Soils). Furthermore, additional factors mitigating TSF water (chemical) impacts to soil include, but are not limited to a release predominantly consisting of tailings pond water with lower arsenic concentrations, and dilution from Crooked Creek at the time of the release.

Similar to the tailings and water release scenario, follow-up restoration work would be performed concurrently with stabilization efforts. This may include drainage and channel reconstruction and restoration along Anaconda Creek, and to a lesser extent Crooked Creek (where identified). A post release monitoring program would be implemented to evaluate both physical and chemical impacts to soil, and guide any additional restoration and remediation activities based on the preliminary investigation findings.

In summary, both physical and chemical impacts to soil from this scenario would be considerably less than a release of tailings and water. Physical impacts resulting from a TSF water release would be more severe than chemical impacts which are considered negligible based on analyte concentrations in TSF water versus existing analyte concentrations in soil. Physical erosional losses would be most prevalent in the Anaconda Creek drainage because it lacks the capacity to convey a sustained release volume of 600 cfs. Since scouring processes in the Anaconda Creek drainage are likely to result in permanent erosional losses, the magnitude of effects is considered high. Depending on the extent of erosional losses and the success of restoration and rehabilitation efforts in the Anaconda drainage and confluence with Crooked Creek, the duration of physical impairments would be long-term to permanent. Since minimal soil disturbances are anticipated downstream of the Crooked Creek confluence due to drainage characteristics and subsequent flood attenuation processes, the extent of impacts are considered local. Although physically impacted soils are considered common throughout the region, impaired soils could indirectly result in impairments to resources protected by legislation. For this reason, soil impacts are considered important in context.

3.24.6.2.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

In addition to the scenarios listed above, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) does not apply to Alternative 3A, and is not analyzed for soils impacts. Impacts under Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenarios 3 and 4: Tank Farm or Tanker Truck Releases

Under Alternative 3A, an uncontrolled release of LNG would not affect soils, since it would dissipate into the atmosphere, provided that no ignition source triggers an explosion before the LNG dissipates. Although the probability of small to medium diesel spills under this alternative is inherently reduced through less diesel usage, impacts to soils under Alternative 3A are generally the same as those described for the proposed action, as some tank farm infrastructure and tanker truck traffic would still be required under this alternative.

3.24.6.2.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, five spill scenarios are applicable to soils, three of which (Scenarios 7, 8 and 9, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts as Alternative 2.
Spill scenarios applicable to riverine sediment and surface water bodies under this alternative are addressed in Sections 3.24.6.5, Surface Water Hydrology, and 3.24.6.7, Water Quality.

Scenarios 3 and 4: Tank Farm and Tanker Truck Releases

Impacts to soils under these resources would be the same as described under Alternative 2, as some tanks and tanker truck traffic at the mine, mine access road, and Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port would still be required under Alternative 3B. In addition, the tank farm at Tyonek Port would add a potential release source under Scenario 3. Although the probability of spills would be inherently reduced at the Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port and mine site through less diesel storage and transfer, the probability of spills would be increased at Tyonek Port; thus, impacts to soils would generally be the same as described for Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

Alternative 3B represents an increased risk of uncontrolled releases from diesel conveyance and handling during pipeline operation and closure compared to natural gas.

Because only half the fuel released from refined product lines would be recovered, the duration and scope of a release to soil would be likely to be much more significant than a natural gas release under Alternative 2. The chronic release of diesel from a pinhole leak could eventually result in a medium to large release to surrounding soils over the service life of the pipeline.

The potential for minor soil quality impacts during closure and termination activities of the diesel pipeline would be higher under Alternative 3B in than for the natural gas pipeline described under Alternative 2. Anticipated pipeline decommissioning activities would include draining and handling of large quantities of residual liquid fuel mixtures in accordance with industry practices using approved state and federal guidance and planning documents. Uncontrolled releases during pipeline closure proceedings would most likely result in very small to small spill volumes due to controlled conditions and standardized industry pipeline abandonment practices.

Although several variables would influence the distribution of soil impacts from small to large diesel pipeline releases (i.e., duration, topography, soil types, seasonal conditions), the intensity of impacts associated with small to large releases are considered to range from low to medium. This is largely based on the availability and success of current petroleum hydrocarbon remediation alternatives (i.e., excavation, thermal treatment, in-situ treatment, etc.) and post-restoration practices (surface stabilization, native species re-vegetation, etc.) in similar environments throughout Alaska.

The duration of small to large spills under this alternative would range from temporary to long-term. Small releases would be addressed immediately, and are therefore considered temporary. Large releases to soil have the potential to be long-term until applicable regulatory limits are achieved through active remediation or natural attenuation. The duration of a diesel release is not considered permanent due to the degradation of hydrocarbons through natural attenuation processes.

The geographic extent of soil contamination from any diesel pipeline release scenario could range from several square feet to several acres, and thus, would be considered local. Refer to Sections 3.24.6.7.1 and 3.24.6.7.2 for analysis of spills that also reach surface water or groundwater. Releases are anticipated to be distributed locally from the point source due to
vertical infiltration of surrounding soils, and would be limited to discrete portions of the pipeline where release sources exist. Frozen soil conditions can be significantly less conducive to subsurface infiltration in comparison to thawed conditions, and are more likely to reduce the extent of impacts and improve overall remediation success.

As described under Alternative 2 Scenario 3, soil types and soil quality are considered common to important in context. Overall impacts under Scenario 4 are considered minor to moderate.

3.24.6.2.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 - BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

In addition to the scenarios listed above, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) does not apply to Alternative 4, and is not analyzed for soils impacts. Impacts under Scenarios 3, 7, 8, and 9 (tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

The BTC Road would be approximately 2.5 times longer than the mine access road proposed under Alternative 2. The increased tanker truck transport distance would inherently increase the probability of a tanker truck release. In addition, equipment usage during operation and construction of the temporary ice road along Crooked Creek valley would also slightly increase the potential for a spill. However, the risk remains generally low, and the scope and type of potential impacts that are likely to occur are the same as those described for Alternative 2.

3.24.6.2.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A - DRY STACK TAILINGS

In addition to the scenarios listed above, under Alternatives 5A spill Scenarios 5 and 9 (diesel pipeline, and water and tailings release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to soils.

Impacts under Scenarios 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 (tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternatives 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.3 GEOHAZARDS AND SEISMIC CONDITIONS

The effects of project-related spills on geohazards are considered not applicable, as spills would not impact geohazards; rather geohazards could cause or exacerbate spills or spill cleanup. The role of geohazards in potentially causing spills (e.g., surface faults causing pipeline rupture, or tsunamis causing tank failure) are incorporated into the analysis of effects of Section 3.3, Geohazards and Seismic Conditions, and the potential impact of these events on other resources are addressed in individual resource sections.

3.24.6.4 CLIMATE AND METEOROLOGY

Climate pertains to long-term weather conditions and is characterized by meteorological parameters listed in Section 3.4.1, Climate and Meterology, such as temperature, solar radiation, barometric pressures, wind speed, relative humidity, or precipitation. A change to these parameters is referred to as global climate change. These parameters are influenced by natural
(e.g., mountains, oceans, solar impacts) and anthropogenic (e.g., land use) features. In the event of a release of diesel, LNG, cyanide, or mercury, no direct or indirect effects to climate or meteorological resources would occur.

3.24.6.5 SURFACE WATER HYDROLOGY

The effects of project-related spills on surface water hydrology are not considered applicable; rather, surface water hydrology could exacerbate spills or spill cleanup efforts. The discussions below examine the potential impacts surface water hydrology could have on uncontrolled releases. This contrasts with Section 3.5 which examines potential effects of project alternatives on surface water hydrology under routine operations.

3.24.6.5.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for surface water hydrology impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

The spread of a large volume (up to 735,000 gallons) spill of diesel fuel from an ocean-going barge during the summer shipping season would be influenced primarily by ocean currents between Dutch Harbor and Bethel. The spreading of diesel fuel over the sea surface would begin as soon as the fuel is spilled. Dispersal and evaporation would take approximately 3 to 5 days; however, the rate of spreading would depend upon the viscosity and composition of the spilled fuel, the ambient temperature, and the environmental conditions (wind, waves, and ocean currents) present at the time and location of the spill.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A river barge release of diesel fuel into the Kuskokwim River would be highly impacted by surface water hydrology. Spreading of diesel fuel over the river surface would begin as soon as the fuel is spilled. The rate of spreading and the area of the sheen would depend upon the viscosity and composition of the spilled fuel, the rate of release, the ambient temperature, and the environmental conditions (wind, waves, and river velocities) at the time and location of the spill.

Diesel fuel that is not recovered from a barge release would travel downstream; the rate of spread would be influenced by wind, wave, and velocities present at the time of the release. Under average flow conditions during the open-water season, the velocity of the Kuskokwim River averages 6 feet/second (4.1 miles/hour). However, evaporation and dilution would limit the extent of water quality impacts resulting from a diesel spill in the main stem of the Kuskokwim River. Physical and chemical properties of diesel fuel are substantially different than those of crude oil insofar as diesel evaporates and disperses faster and more completely. Diesel evaporation rates for a low (32°F) and high (55°F) range of temperatures were estimated for a river barge release in the Kuskokwim River. After 4 days, approximately 39 percent and 59 percent of diesel fuel would be evaporated, respectively (ERM 2014).
Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

In the unlikely event that diesel was released into the environment, factors influencing the impacts of a spill would include the location of the spill and proximity to streams and drainage features, stream velocities, and the volume of diesel released. Diesel spilled into moving water such as a creek or stream could be rapidly transported downstream and distributed over an area of up to several miles in length before the commencement of containment and recovery activities.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

The impacts of a spill from a tanker truck on other resources could be affected by surface water hydrology. Factors influencing the impacts of a spill would include the location of the spill and proximity to streams and drainage features, stream velocities, and the volume of diesel released. Diesel spilled into moving water such as a creek or stream could be rapidly transported downstream and distributed over an area of up to several miles in length before the commencement of containment and recovery activities.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

In the unlikely scenario of a container ruptured and a release occurring in the ocean, river, or tributary stream, attenuation processes including evaporation, dilution, and chemical reaction would limit the effects to a localized area and would make the duration of impacts short. Other factors influencing the impacts of a potential cyanide release would include the location of the release and proximity to streams and drainage features, stream velocities, and the amount of cyanide released. Cyanide that has already dissolved cannot be recovered and would be left to disperse naturally, and would likely be completed by the time cleanup could be initiated.

Cyanide stored and used on site in a liquid form would be contained within primary and secondary spill containment structures and would be cleaned up prior to release to the environment. Thus, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to surface water hydrology as a result of a cyanide release.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

Secondary containment would prevent a mercury release to surface water. In the unlikely scenario of a mercury container ruptured and a release occurring in the ocean, river, or tributary stream, attenuation processes including evaporation, dilution, and chemical reaction would limit the effects to a localized area and would make the duration of impacts short. Other factors influencing the impacts of a potential mercury release would include the location of the release and proximity to streams and drainage features, stream velocities, and the amount of mercury released.

Mercury and mercury-waste stored at the mine site or transported out of state for storage or disposal present a very low potential for contacting surface water as a result of numerous containment and safety system associated with handling the product. Liquid mercury is a viscous fluid, and would not travel far from the spill site, unless the spill occurred directly into a surface water body. Dissolved mercury onto land surface adjacent to surface water bodies would not travel far because of natural attenuation mechanisms, particularly adsorption into surface soil. Cleanup methods, including physical removal of contaminated soils would keep
the duration of impacts short. Thus, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to surface water hydrology as a result of a mercury release.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

Release-induced changes to surface water hydrology and flows would result in varying adverse physical impacts. Surface water chemical impacts are presented in Section 3.24.6.7.1 (Surface Water Quality), and chemical impacts to soil and sediment are presented in Section 3.24.6.2.1 (Soils). Both release scenarios would affect flows in the Anaconda Creek drainage located immediately downgradient of the TSF point of release (toe), followed by the Crooked Creek drainage, and to a lesser extent the Kuskokwim River confluence.

Tailings and Water Release Scenario

The scenario would involve the release of 1,620 acre-ft. of slurry consisting of 50 percent solids (sediment) over a 5-hour period. The release would occur from the toe of the TSF. Modeling of maximum flow and tailings deposition depths are presented in Figure 3.24-2 and Figure 3.24-3 respectively. Maximum flow depths greater than 20 feet are anticipated within the Anaconda Creek drainage in closest proximity to the TSF. Flow depths would progressively decrease as the tailings spread out toward the confluence of Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek, most prominent at the toe of the release. The total volume of deposition at the Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek confluence is estimated to be approximately 1,300 acre-feet. Deposition depths would range from 10 feet at the A/C confluence, and progressively thin to 2 feet at the furthest depositional extents both upstream and downstream.

Changes to surface water flow would be greatest in the Anaconda Creek drainage, where typical flow conditions are significantly less than those resulting from a TSF release. Average monthly discharges from Anaconda Creek between June and September ranges from 2.1 cfs to 21.6 cfs, with a maximum daily discharge of 78 cfs recorded in July of 2003. Significant scouring and erosion would occur in the Anaconda drainage from the Tailings Dam release scenario described above. The post-release stream character would be more linear (less sinuous), with a wider and deeper channel. A TSF release during frozen winter months may result in comparatively less erosion; however, significant changes would still be anticipated.

Intermixed tailings and eroded materials would be deposited in the wide floodplain of Crooked Creek at the confluence with Anaconda Creek. Heavier particles would settle first in close proximity to the drainage confluence, and would progressively gradate to finer materials with distance and reduced flow velocities. Deposition depths of 8 to 10 feet would extend across much of the Crooked Creek floodplain at the Anaconda Creek confluence. The deposit would form a dam that would be likely to temporarily block flow in Crooked Creek.

If a release were to occur during winter months, flow conditions would be more favorable for initial response and recovery efforts. Tailings would be excavated and transported to the TSF, and accumulated water behind the temporary dam could be discharged within historic (seasonal) flow variations. Limited flow data from the month of December indicates discharges ranging from 16 cfs to 32 cfs, which are foreseeably manageable flow volumes given the availability of mine site equipment and resources. Seasonally low flow conditions would also minimize tailings remobilization downstream and allow installation of erosion and sediment control measures. At a minimum, this scenario would result in the temporary loss of flow contribution above this watershed location.
A controlled release of accumulated water behind the temporary dam during summer months would be less manageable during high flow conditions. Long term average daily discharges in Crooked Creek seasonally range from approximately 100 cfs to 250 cfs near the confluence. A maximum average daily discharge of 880 cfs was recorded in late August of 2006, and the 2-year and 5-year flood magnitude for the Crooked Creek water shed is 783 cfs, and 1,284 cfs, respectively. If left undisturbed, flow contribution to Crooked Creek above the temporary dam would be blocked until a new channel was established. Flow would likely resume (skirt) along the north side of the valley where deposits are likely to be thinner and finer grained.

Flow volumes associated with the uncontrolled release of water behind the temporary dam would depend on a variety of conditions which include, but are not limited to, stream channel development through the unconsolidated tailings mixture, Crooked Creek flows at the time of TSF release, and water volume behind the temporary dam. The progressive release of water through a newly established channel could potentially result in flood conditions well above historic seasonal variations. Elevated flows through the tailings mixture would remobilize a significant portion of deposited tailings downstream. Stream channel erosion and migration would continue to mobilize tailings downstream until equilibrium is eventually achieved through stream restoration measures and natural processes.

If a significant portion of the deposited tailings mixture was remobilized downstream (Crooked Creek), alteration of the low gradient, sinuous drainage would be most apparent in proximity to the tailings run out at the Anaconda Creek confluence. Coarser materials would settle first, and finer fractions would reach the confluence with the Kuskokwim River 13 miles downstream. Stream bed aggradation from the influx of tailings mixtures would likely result in appreciable channel instability and subsequent migration. Alteration of the stream channel morphology would diminish downstream; however, the extent would largely depend on a variety of physical conditions controlling the influx of remobilized tailings mixtures. Various physical surface water parameters (e.g., turbidity) and elevated concentrations of chemical constituents (metals) in non-recoverable tailings mixtures would likely result in indefinite impairments to surface water quality (Section 3.7, Water Quality).

In addition to initial response efforts to be specified in an Emergency Action Plan required by the State of Alaska Dam Safety Program, a controlled release of accumulated water minimizing tailings remobilization could be performed to the extent safely practicable. Alternatives may include, but not be limited to, temporary channel reconstruction, flow diversion, tailings excavation, and construction of sedimentation ponds. Initial response efforts would largely depend on the suitability of working surfaces capable of supporting heavy equipment.

In summary, flows in the Anaconda drainage would be far greater than historical flood capacities, likely resulting in scouring and significant erosional losses. A temporary run out at dam at the Crooked Creek confluence would result in the blockage of upstream flow and water accumulation. A controlled release of accumulated water during winter months would be likely; however, an uncontrolled release of accumulated water well above historical seasonal variations could potentially occur during open-water conditions. For these reasons, the magnitude of water quantity change is considered high. The duration of effects is considered temporary since flows would equilibrate to pre-release conditions after a channel is re-established through the unconsolidated tailings mixture via natural processes or initial response measures. Since flows would be disrupted throughout the Crooked Creek drainage below the...
temporary dam and would affect resources protected by legislation, the geographic extent and context of impacts are considered regional and important, respectively.

Water Release Only

A release of 1,620 acre-feet of water at a flow rate of 600 cfs would far exceed any historical flow capacity in the Anaconda drainage extending to the Crooked Creek confluence located 1.6 miles downstream. Scenario-specific distribution modeling of maximum flow depths are presented in Figure 3.24-4. A prolonged release lasting more than 48 hours would result in significant scouring and erosion which would adversely alter the pre-existing drainage character.

Open water flows seasonally range from approximately 100 cfs to 250 cfs near the Crooked Creek confluence, and the 2-year and 5-year flood magnitude for the Crooked Creek water shed is 783 cfs, and 1,284 cfs. Based on these values, it is highly probable that an additional influx of 600 cfs to the Crooked Creek drainage would be within the range of a two to five year flood event. All flow would be limited to the active stream channel and wide, gentle sloping floodplain. A 600 cfs discharge during winter months, however, would be far greater than average seasonal flows which typically range from 16 to 32 cfs during the month of December.

Eventual discharge to the Kuskokwim River would result in an approximate 4 percent flow increase (Kuskokwim River) during winter months, and a flow increase of approximately 1.8 percent during summer months. The induced changes in Kuskokwim River flow are considered negligible based on comparatively substantial year round flow volumes.

In summary, flows in the Crooked Creek drainage during open-water conditions are likely to be within historical range of seasonal variability; however, a winter release would significantly exceed winter flow conditions. Flow within the Anaconda Creek drainage would be well beyond historic variations for all seasonal conditions. For these reasons, the intensity of flow changes to one or more receiving drainages is considered high. The geographic extent of effects would range from local during a winter release (i.e., Anaconda drainage) to regional during a summer release (i.e., Crooked Creek drainage). Depending on resources (e.g., fish) indirectly affected from seasonally dependent outcomes in flow changes, the context of effects could range from important to unique.

3.24.5.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to surface water hydrology impacts. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 and 8 (cyanide, and mercury releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

Under Alternative 3A, an uncontrolled release of LNG would not be affected by surface water hydrology, as the LNG released would dissipate into the atmosphere, provided that no ignition source triggers an explosion before the LNG dissipates.
3.24.6.5.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING/L: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for surface water hydrology impacts. The impacts under Scenarios 1 and 2 (ocean or river barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. The likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts as discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

Alternative 3B represents a major risk of uncontrolled releases from diesel conveyance and handling during pipeline operations and closure. The length of the pipeline, remoteness of the areas traversed by the pipeline, and the number of planned stream crossings would contribute to the risk of spill impacts being influenced by surface water hydrology. Additionally, these factors could encumber response efforts in the event of an unplanned release. The additional 19 miles of diesel pipeline from Tyonek to MP 0 of the pipeline corridor under this alternative would create six more stream/river crossings than under Alternative 2. The duration and scope of a pipeline release into surface water is likely to be greater than Alternative 2 based on the physical and chemical properties of diesel compared to natural gas, the volume and rate of the release, and on the surface water conditions at the release site.

Under Alternative 3B, there are several potential modes of failure that could result in unplanned releases of diesel fuel from the pipeline, each of which could be impacted by surface water hydrology, depending upon the specific location of the release. It is likely that diesel fuel from a medium or large volume spill from the diesel pipeline would reach nearby waterbodies along the pipeline ROW. The geographic extent of impacts resulting from a catastrophic diesel pipeline failure would depend on the location of the rupture relative to isolation valves and surface water resources. For example, in the event of a rupture immediately adjacent to a fast moving river, impacts would be rapidly distributed to downstream locations and could affect hydraulically connected waters if the position of isolation valves is insufficient to control the rate of diesel release to the environment in a timely fashion. Response efforts could also be encumbered by the length of the pipeline and its remote location relative to response facilities. During the winter months, snow and ice may limit the diesel’s ability to initially reach surface water resources; however it could also inhibit detection of spills at river and stream crossings.

The potential for surface water hydrology to influence spill impacts during closure and termination activities of the diesel pipeline is greater under Alternative 3B in comparison to Alternative 2. Anticipated pipeline decommissioning activities would include draining and handling of large quantities of residual liquid fuel mixtures in accordance with industry practices using approved state and federal guidance and planning documents. Uncontrolled releases during pipeline closure would most likely result in small spill volumes due to controlled conditions and standardized industry pipeline abandonment practices. Risks of impacts caused by diesel fuel spills or leaks would be reduced by spill response planning, construction of protective and alerting systems, and operational practices designed to avoid, minimize or identify leaks and spills as early as possible.
3.24.6.5.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to surface water hydrology. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 (ocean barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

The risk of a river barge release would be somewhat lower under Alternative 4 because of the 38 percent reduction in river-barging miles from Alternative 2, and the avoidance of shallow areas between BTC Port and Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port that would not be traveled under Alternative 4. Potential surface water hydrology influences on spill-related impacts would be similar to those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Under Alternative 4, the BTC Road would be 76 miles long, which is about 1.5 times the length of the Alternative 2 mine access road. Preliminary field reconnaissance of the BTC Road indicates that the road would cross 40 streams. Of these, 8 would require bridges and 32 would require culverts. Additional drainage features (such as intermittent or ephemeral drainages) may exist along the route that would require installation of a culvert to convey flow; however, additional reconnaissance during final design would be required to identify these types of features.

Under Alternative 4, the risk of a tanker truck release would be amplified because of the increased one-way haul distance of 76 miles, as compared to 30 miles under Alternative 2. As a result of the increased haul distance on the BTC Road, the surface water resources that could potentially be exposed to risks from a tanker truck release under Equipment usage during construction and operation of the temporary ice road along Crooked Creek valley would also increase the probability of a release. However, snow and ice may limit the ability of fuel to reach surface water resources.

3.24.6.5.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to surface water hydrology.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.5.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to surface water hydrology.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
3.24.6.6 GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY

3.24.6.6.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 - DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for groundwater impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

An ocean barge rupture at sea could affect shallow groundwater resources in shoreline zones if diesel fuel came ashore. The impacts would be limited to areas directly contacted by seawater as a result of high tides, storm surges, or wave action, because dispersed emulsions and dissolved hydrocarbons could infiltrate permeable beach deposits and infiltrate to a shallow near-shore water table. The magnitude and intensity of impacts are expected to be low, of temporary duration, and local in extent.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A river barge release could affect shallow groundwater resources in shoreline areas if diesel fuel came ashore. The impacts would be limited to areas directly contacted by impacted river water as a result of currents, wave action, or fluctuating river levels because dispersed emulsions and dissolved hydrocarbons could infiltrate permeable sand or gravel bar deposits and infiltrate to a shallow water table. The magnitude and intensity of impacts are expected to be low, of temporary duration, and local in extent.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

A tank farm release at Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port or at the mine site would be contained within a lined, impermeable secondary containment structure that would prevent infiltration to groundwater and discharge to surface waters. Spill response would remove the spilled fuel prior to any potential overtopping event caused by precipitation or other event. Thus, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to groundwater resources as a result of a tank farm release.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Tanker truck release scenarios occur on the mine access road, most of which is located on uplands, with varying distances to watercourses. In some areas, especially areas where permafrost is absent, fuel from a release large enough to flow into the road ditch or nearby tundra could infiltrate through porous material and percolate to the water table. Spills that occur during frozen conditions (late fall, winter, and early spring) would be less likely to reach the water table due to the presence of ground ice and frozen soils. As a result of the anticipated fuel spill response and cleanup activities that would take place, the amount of fuel that would infiltrate is likely to be a small fraction of the overall amount of the spill or leak. Fuel that does infiltrate and percolate to the water table, however, could be difficult or impossible to remove completely, resulting in highly localized (unless near a surface water body), but potential long-term impacts.
Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

Cyanide would be transported to the mine site in solid form in sealed containers via barge and truck. Even if one or more containers ruptured, and a spill occurred in a watery environment, little or no cyanide would encounter groundwater. Natural attenuation processes of evaporation, dilution and chemical reaction would limit effects to a localized area and would make the duration of impacts temporary. Potential secondary impacts to the biosphere from groundwater contamination would generally be limited to microorganisms found in the subsurface.

Cyanide stored and used on site in a liquid form would be contained within primary and secondary spill containment structures and would be cleaned up prior to a release to the environment. Thus, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to groundwater resources as a result of a cyanide release.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

Mercury and mercury-wastes stored at the mine site or transported out of state for storage or disposal present a very low potential for contacting groundwater as a result of numerous containment and safety systems associated with handling the product. Liquid mercury is a viscous fluid and would not travel far from the spill site. Dissolved mercury in groundwater would also not travel far because of natural attenuation mechanisms, particularly adsorption onto soil or aquifer materials. Cleanup methods, including physical removal of contaminated soils would keep the duration of impacts temporary.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

A partial release of dam tailings could temporarily affect the physical hydrology of shallow groundwater in the Crooked Creek floodplain and Kuskokwim River shoreline areas, in locations where the flood elevation is substantially higher than normal (Figure 3.24-2 and Figure 3.24-3), causing water to flow into shallow alluvial deposits. Impacts to groundwater flow patterns would be limited to areas directly contacted by the release flood. Effects on groundwater quality from metals leaching from the tailings, infiltrating permeable sand or gravel bar deposits, and reaching shallow water table, are described in Section 3.24.6.7.2 (Groundwater Quality). The magnitude and intensity of most impacts on groundwater hydrology are expected to be of low intensity, local in extent, and of temporary duration, lasting up to a few days longer than the duration of the release event, and subsiding after creek levels return to normal. A small amount of water table mounding could occur within the thicker parts of the tailings deposit in Anaconda and Crooked creeks, with localized groundwater flow directed radially away from the deposit, which could last for the duration of cleanup activities.

3.24.6.6.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to groundwater resources. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4, ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced due to a decrease in barge activity; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would have the same impacts on groundwater hydrology as Alternative 2.
Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

An occurrence of pinhole leaks in LNG storage tanks, an accident involving an LNG-fueled truck, or the rupture of a storage tank at the LNG plant could occur at the mine site. If released, LNG dissipates readily, so it would not infiltrate the soil or the water table. Thus, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to groundwater resources as a result of a LNG release.

3.24.6.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to groundwater resources. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would have the same impacts on groundwater hydrology as Alternative 2.

Scenarios 1 and 2: Ocean and River Barge Releases

The impacts to groundwater resources in the event of an ocean or river barge release under Alternative 3B would be the same as those discussed under an Alternative 2, except for the following:

- The ocean barge route ends at Tyonek during the operations and closure phases of the project, changing the location of potential nearshore shallow groundwater impacts, but not the level of potential effects; and
- River barging would only occur during the construction phase, which would reduce the probability of spill impacts to shallow groundwater along the shoreline.

Scenarios 3 and 4: Tank Farm or Tanker Truck Releases

Impacts under these resources would be the same as described under Alternative 2, as some tanks and tanker truck traffic at the mine, mine access road, and Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port would still be required under Alternative 3B. In addition, the tank farm at Tyonek Port would add a potential release source under Scenario 3. Although the probability of spills would be inherently reduced at the Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port and mine site through less diesel storage and transfer, the probability of spills would be increased at Tyonek Port; thus, impacts would generally be the same as described for Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

The impacts to groundwater resources in the event of a diesel pipeline release would be dependent on the volume and rate of the release and on the groundwater conditions at the release site. In areas where the pipeline is constructed on shallow bedrock or permafrost, the infiltration of diesel fuel to groundwater would be limited by the relatively low permeability of the bedrock or frozen materials. In areas where the pipeline is constructed on unfrozen alluvial gravels and sands, diesel fuel would be expected to flow vertically downward until it reaches the water table and then "pancake" out to form a lens of diesel fuel floating on the water table. Removal and restoration of impacted groundwater is possible, but the deeper that the water table is and the larger the spill, the more difficult the operation is. The natural attenuation of a fuel-impacted groundwater body is normally a very long process because the mechanisms of attenuation, including dissolution, dilution, dispersion, biodegradation, sorption, and vaporization are typically very slow processes.
Because most of the diesel pipeline would be buried, a leak that is too small to trigger a response from the leak detection technology could leak for many months before being detected. A leak of this type could create a pool of floating diesel on the water table that could extend for several tens of feet in each direction from the leak before it accumulated to sufficient thickness or extent to surface and be noticeable by visual or olfactory identification. The diesel could create a pool in a closed depression near the leak, emanate from the land surface as a seep, or discharge to nearby wetlands or surface waters (Fetter 2001). If the leak goes undetected for long enough and occurs in a vegetated area, it could kill or stress vegetation in the vicinity of the leak. Should a pool of diesel form on the water table from a very small to medium-sized leak, it would likely create a long-term impact (i.e. persisting for decades); however, the impact would likely be local in extent and of relatively low intensity.

A large to very large leak or spill would also have the potential to infiltrate to groundwater, especially in areas that are not underlain by shallow bedrock or permafrost, or if the remote location or environmental conditions (e.g. weather, deep snow, flooding, avalanche, landslide, or other conditions) preclude a rapid emergency response. While the immediate flow of diesel could reach surface waters (including wetlands) and potentially be contained and cleaned up in an expedited manner, a large pool of subsurface diesel could be more persistent. However, through source removal, remediation, and use of sorbents and booms (if fuel seeps out into surface water bodies), even a very large spill to groundwater could be substantially contained. Residual dissolved diesel constituents entering surface water bodies would likely be attenuated through natural processes to acceptable levels. Thus, the impacts of a large to very large spill on groundwater could be local in extent, of temporary duration, and of medium intensity. The intensity of impacts to groundwater would not be as high as the direct impacts of a large to very large spill or leak on surface water resources (see Section 3.24.6.5, Surface Water Hydrology); however, it may take longer to cleanup.

Risks of impacts caused by diesel fuel spills or leaks could be reduced by spill response planning, construction of protective and alerting systems, and operational practices designed to avoid, minimize or identify leaks and spills as early as possible. Potential long-term impacts to groundwater from a large or very large spill could be minimized by long-term groundwater monitoring, contaminant source removal, and groundwater remediation, if needed.

3.24.6.6.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to groundwater resources. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Impacts to groundwater resources in the event of a diesel release (Scenarios 1 through 4; ocean or river barge, tank farm or tanker truck releases) under Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2, with the following exceptions:

- The risk of a river barge grounding would be somewhat lower under Alternative 4 because of the 38 percent reduction in river-barging miles from Alternative 2, and the avoidance of shallow areas between BTC Port and Angyaruaq (Jungiuk) Port that would not be traveled under Alternative 4; and
The risk of a tanker truck release would be increased because of the increased one-way haul distance of 75 miles, as compared to 30 miles under Alternative 2. While the expected impacts would still be local and of low intensity, but potentially long-term in duration, the land and water area that could potentially be exposed to risks from a tanker truck release under Alternative 4 would be approximately 2.5 times larger than those exposed under Alternative 2 as a result of the longer BTC Road.

ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to groundwater resources.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to groundwater resources.

Impacts under fuel release Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 and 8 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, and mercury releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

WATER QUALITY

The effects of project-related spills on geochemistry are considered not applicable, as a fuel spill or LNG release would not affect ongoing geochemical processes occurring at the mine site, and geochemical alterations of mine rock would not cause or exacerbate spills or spill cleanup.

SURFACE WATER QUALITY

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for surface water quality impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

A large volume (up to 735,000 gallons) spill of diesel fuel from an ocean-going fuel barge at sea during the summer shipping season would result in high intensity impacts to marine surface water quality over a relatively large area. When spilled on water, diesel oil spreads very quickly forming a thin film of rainbow and silver sheens. Spreading of the diesel fuel over the sea surface would begin as soon as the fuel is spilled. The rate of spreading would depend upon the viscosity and composition of the spilled fuel, the ambient temperature, and the environmental conditions (wind, waves, and ocean currents) present at the time and location of the spill. Diesel
Oil is much lighter than water (specific gravity of diesel is between 0.83 and 0.88, compared to 1.03 for seawater), and it is not possible for diesel to sink and accumulate on the seafloor unless adsorption occurs with sediment (NOAA 2014a). A small fraction of the spilled fuel dispersed in the water column by wave action could adhere to fine-grained suspended sediments, leading to subsequent deposition of contaminated sediment on the seafloor. This process would be more likely to occur near river mouths where high concentrations of fine-grained sediments are carried in by rivers, and would be less likely to occur in open marine settings. Some of the spilled diesel that may be dispersed by wave action would form droplets that are kept in suspension and moved by ocean currents.

Because petroleum-derived diesel is composed of about 75 percent saturated hydrocarbons, and 25 percent aromatic hydrocarbons (ATSDR 1995), during the initial phase of the spill the most relevant applicable water quality standards would likely be those related to concentrations of total aqueous hydrocarbons and visible surface sheen, rather than standards related to total aromatic hydrocarbons. However, the composition of the spilled diesel in the water would change over time as lower molecular weight hydrocarbon compounds would tend to evaporate faster than those with higher molecular weights. Concentrations of total aqueous hydrocarbons in the water column would likely exceed the 15 µg/ L threshold specified by the most stringent Ambient Water Quality Criteria (AWQC) over a relatively large area for a period of several days (ADEC 2012d). Likewise, the sheen resulting from a large diesel spill at sea would be sufficient to exceed water quality regulatory limits for petroleum hydrocarbons in marine waters over a relatively large area (ADEC 2012d). Due to these widespread exceedances of the applicable water quality standards, the impacts to surface water quality would be considered high intensity.

Due to the low density of diesel fuel relative to that of sea water, impacts would be confined to the upper layers of the water column, and the duration of the impacts to surface water quality would be limited by physical (evaporation) and mechanical (natural dispersion and dissolution) processes. The duration of impacts to surface water quality would be limited primarily by the rapid evaporation of diesel fuel, and natural dispersion processes where wave action leads to the formation of micron-sized droplets that are diluted to concentrations below the threshold values (Zervopoulou et al. 2011). Dispersal and evaporation would likely take approximately 3 to 5 days; however, rough weather and wave action would reduce that timeframe.

In summary, a large spill of diesel would affect surface water quality by increasing the concentrations of hydrocarbons in the upper layers of the water column in a large area to levels that greatly exceed background concentrations. The impacts to surface water quality resulting from the release would be considered high in magnitude and extended (widespread) in geographic extent because water quality regulatory limits would be exceeded over a large area. Due to the volume of diesel fuel considered under this scenario, the impacts would likely extend regionally; marine currents and transport processes would likely spread impacts to adjacent waters. The duration of the impacts to surface water quality would be limited to several days due to evaporation and natural dispersion processes, and impacts would be considered temporary. If the spill were to occur in open ocean water (highly unlikely), then the surface water resources impacted would be considered common in context. Due to the high intensity and extent of impacts to surface water quality resulting from the fuel spill, the impacts would be considered moderate to major, depending on the specific location and timing of the spill, and the efficacy of response and cleanup efforts.
Scenario 2: River Barge Release

The release of diesel fuel to the Kuskokwim River as the result of a river barge release would result in high intensity impacts to surface water quality at the site of the release and downstream locations in the Kuskokwim River. Concentrations of total aqueous hydrocarbons in the water column would likely exceed the 15 µg/L threshold specified by the most stringent AWQC over a relatively large area (ADEC 2012d). Likewise, the sheen resulting from a large diesel spill in the Kuskokwim River would be sufficient to exceed water quality regulatory limits for petroleum hydrocarbons in freshwater over a relatively large area (ADEC 2012d).

When spilled on water, diesel oil spreads very quickly forming a thin film of rainbow and silver sheens. Spreading of the diesel fuel over the river surface would begin as soon as the fuel is spilled. Release over time would result in a long narrow sheen, which would extend downstream for distances of up to several miles. The rate of spreading and the area of the sheen would depend upon the viscosity and composition of the spilled fuel, the rate of release, the ambient temperature, and the environmental conditions (wind, waves, and river flow rate) at the time and location of the spill. Evaporation and dilution would ultimately limit the extent of water quality impacts resulting from a diesel spill in the main stem of the Kuskokwim River. It is important to note that the physical and chemical properties of diesel fuel are substantially different than those of crude oil insofar as diesel evaporates and disperses faster and more completely compared to heavier petroleum products such as crude oil.

Response efforts would focus on the protection of sensitive resources along the river banks, and preventing the ingress of spilled diesel to low energy areas of the river, where retarded natural weathering processes could result in accumulation of spilled fuel and longer-term impacts to water quality. In the main stem of the river, rapid evaporation and dilution would limit the duration of impacts to a period of several days.

In summary, a river barge release would result in high intensity impacts to surface water resources because the effects would be sufficient to exceed regulatory limits for hydrocarbons in surface water. The duration of effects would be temporary because impacts would be limited to a period of several days due to naturally occurring evaporation and dissolution processes. The impacts resulting from spilled diesel in the Kuskokwim River would be considered regional in extent because the impacts would extend downstream over distances of up to several miles beyond which natural processes would attenuate the impacts to below regulatory threshold levels. It is worth noting that if a spill were to occur during the salmon fishing season, then the perception of water quality impacts by salmon fishers and other resource users could potentially extend far beyond the area affected by actual water quality impacts resulting from spilled diesel. Due to the cultural and economic importance of the Kuskokwim River as a shared resource, the context for impacts to water quality resulting from a large diesel spill in the Kuskokwim River would be considered important. Overall, the impacts to surface water quality in the Kuskokwim River resulting from a river barge release would be considered moderate to major, depending on the specific location and timing of the spill, and the efficacy of response and cleanup efforts.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

For the scenarios involving accidental releases from the tank farm that are captured in secondary containment, there would be no impact to surface water quality.
There could be impacts to surface water quality from releases as a result of transfer line rupture or human error during diesel fuel transfer operations. Depending on the location of the release relative to the shoreline, some of the diesel could be released directly to the water resulting in high-intensity impacts to surface water quality due to exceedances of the AWQC governing acceptable concentrations of total aqueous hydrocarbons in natural waters. The geographic extent of such impacts would be limited by the presence of secondary containment systems, such as containment booms, which would be deployed prior to any fuel transfer operation over water (SLR 2012a). Some fraction of the spilled diesel would evaporate from the surface of the water and the remainder would be recovered using sorbent materials and skimmers (SLR 2012a). Because the spilled material would be recovered immediately following the release and would be contained within a small area adjacent to the area of release, the duration of the impacts to surface water quality would be considered temporary and the geographic extent of the impacts would be local. The context of the affected resources would be considered common.

In summary, although the impacts to surface water quality would be considered high intensity, the overall impact to surface water quality resulting from an unplanned release of diesel as a result of transfer line rupture or human error during diesel transfer operations would be considered minor because the spilled material would be completely contained and would be recovered within a short period of time (hours to days).

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

An accident resulting in a tanker truck rollover or collision could potentially release up to 13,500 gallons of diesel fuel to the environment. Depending upon the specific location of the accident, proximity to surface water resources, and the volume of diesel released to the environment the impacts to surface water resources could be high intensity because concentrations of total aqueous hydrocarbons in surface water could exceed the applicable water quality regulatory limits. The response to a tanker truck release could be hampered by several factors that would impede recovery of the spilled material. For example, diesel spilled into moving water such as a creek or stream could be rapidly transported downstream and distributed over an area of up to several miles in length before the commencement of containment and recovery activities. However, the geographic extent of impacts associated with such a release would be considered local because effects would not be likely to extend beyond a discrete portion of the Project Area. In addition, a substantial fraction of the spilled diesel would evaporate before it could be recovered from the surface of the water. The duration of the impacts would be considered temporary because concentrations of total aqueous hydrocarbons would return to below threshold levels specified by the most stringent applicable water quality criterion (15µg/ L; ADEC 2012a) within a period of several days following the accidental release. Response efforts associated with a tanker truck release would focus on the protection of sensitive resources, such as fish-bearing streams, wetlands, and waterfowl habitat. Provided that spilled fuel is excluded from such sensitive areas, the impacted resources would be considered common in context.

In summary, the impacts to surface water resources resulting from a tanker truck release would be temporary in duration, local in geographic extent, and would affect resources common in context. Although such impacts would be considered high intensity due to exceedances of the AWQC, the overall level of impacts to surface water resulting from a tanker truck release would be considered moderate. In most cases, smaller volume releases would result in lower levels of
impacts; releases occurring away from surface water resources would be unlikely to have any impacts on surface water quality provided that response and cleanup efforts are successful.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

If waterproof containers were recovered without rupturing, there would be no direct impacts of the cyanide on surface water resources.

In the event that cyanide is released to flowing water, the cyanide would be rapidly diluted and would flow downstream. Cyanide degrades rapidly in surface waters at near neutral pH. Although cyanide is toxic to many living organisms at low concentrations, temporary acute impacts would occur over a relatively small area due to the effects of dilution, dispersion, and natural degradation processes occurring within the river. The most stringent applicable numeric water quality criterion for cyanide in fresh water is the Criterion Chronic Concentration of 5.2 µg/ L (4-day average) measured as WAD cyanide or equivalent for protection of aquatic life (ADEC 2008a).

A very low probability potential spill scenario may result from a vehicle collision during transport from Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port to the mine. If solid sodium cyanide briquettes were spilled from a tank-tainer directly to surface water, then high intensity impacts to surface water resources would occur as the concentrations of cyanide in the water at the location of the spill would exceed the applicable numeric water quality criterion for cyanide. In the case of flowing waters, such as rivers or streams, the effects of a cyanide release would be local and temporary because concentrations of cyanide would rapidly decrease with distance from the spill and the intensity of impacts would decrease as the concentrations of cyanide in the water decrease to levels below the applicable water quality standards. If cyanide is released to non-flowing waters, such as stagnant lakes or wetlands, concentrations of cyanide in excess of the applicable criterion could persist over longer time scales (e.g., months); however, the geographic extent of such impacts would be limited to the area of the non-flowing water body to which the cyanide is released.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

Due to the spill prevention measures and emphasis on safe handling practices considered under Alternative 2, any inadvertent release of mercury to surface water is very unlikely.

In the unlikely event that cargo is lost overboard from a barge, the mercury containers would rapidly sink to the bottom of the river and would become embedded in the riverbed. Due to the high density of mercury (~13.5 g/ cm³) relative to water (~1.0 g/ cm³), mercury-filled containers would be very heavy and unlikely to move very far from the site of the cargo loss, be recovered by salvage specialists, and impacts from mercury to surface water would not occur. It should be noted that due to the high density of liquid mercury, containers would be heavy and special protocols would be needed for retrieving containers dropped in the water.

A very low probability potential spill scenario could result from damage to or spillage from the flasks, metric ton containers, and drums that contain liquid elemental mercury and spent carbon while being stored within the accumulated storage area and the centralized storage areas locations. Any release of mercury from these areas would be managed by secondary containment systems and would not be expected to influence the quality of surface water in the mine facilities area, the pipeline area, or the transportation corridor.
A low probability mercury spill scenario may result from transportation to Angyaruq (Jungjuk) Port. In the unlikely event that there is an accident and the containers ruptured, a mercury spill (either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon) could result. The liquid elemental mercury and the spent carbon could be released to the land or surface water. An unplanned release of concentrated liquid mercury directly to surface water would likely result in concentrations of total mercury in the water in excess of the 12ng/L most stringent applicable water quality standard (ADEC 2008a, 2012a), therefore the intensity of the impact would be considered high. In the extremely unlikely event that liquid elemental mercury is spilled to surface water, it would sink and form a pool on the bottom of the water body. Depending upon the bottom composition, some fraction of the spilled mercury would become embedded in the sediment, where it would interact with organic material in the sediment and it would likely persist in various forms over timescales of years to decades. Depending on local flow velocities and other hydrodynamic factors in the vicinity of the mercury spill, some of the spilled mercury would be transported downstream. In the Kuskokwim River, for example, we would expect a localized persistent ‘hotspot’ in the immediate vicinity of the spilled mercury, and concentrations of mercury in the water and sediment would decrease to below the applicable threshold values over spatial scales of meters due to the diluting and dispersing effects of the flowing water. The situation would be similar in non-flowing water. Mercury concentrations would likely exceed the applicable threshold values over a small area adjacent to the location of the release. The impacts would likely persist for a longer period of time (years to decades) in non-flowing water due to the lack of dilution and dispersion in such situations; however, spill response and clean-up efforts would be simplified and likely more efficient in non-flowing water relative to flowing water. The duration of impacts to surface water resulting from an unplanned release of mercury would be considered long-term because effects on water quality could persist throughout the operational period of the project and concentrations of mercury in the water would return to pre-activity levels at some time after the completion of the project. The effects would be considered local because only discrete portions of the Project Area in close proximity to the spill would be affected. The affected resources would be considered common to important in context.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

In the very unlikely event of a spill resulting from a partial tailings dam failure, the impacts to surface water, groundwater, and sediment resources would be inextricably linked, and the impacts to these resource types would be driven by common impact producing factors. Due to the dependence of impacts to surface water, groundwater, and sediment quality on these common factors, the impacts to these resource types are analyzed together below, in order to preclude redundancy.

Water quality impacts resulting from partial tailings dam failure scenarios are generally limited to chemical evaluation and comparison to water quality standards. Physical impacts resulting in potential changes to surface water hydrology and flow regimes are presented in Section 3.24.6.5.1 (Surface Water Hydrology); and chemical and physical impacts to soil are presented in Section 3.24.6.2.1 (Soils).

Released media would include TSF tailings (solids) and/or water. Water quality impacts would vary based on chemical attributes unique to each media, and would also depend on seasonally-dependent physical and chemical conditions at the time of release. Concentrations of analytes expected to exceed the most stringent Applicable Water Quality Criteria (AWQC) in TSF pond
water and pore-water in buried tailings are summarized in Table 3.24-12 below. It should be noted, however, that water and tailings contained in the TSF would not be considered waters of the State of Alaska or waters of the U.S. for Clean Water Act purposes.

### Table 3.24-12: Tailings Pond Water and Pore-Water Quality in Buried Tailings for Regulated Analytes of Concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>AWQC</th>
<th>Solubility Constrained</th>
<th>Tailings Pond Water</th>
<th>Buried Tailings - Process DOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Constituents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pH</td>
<td>S. U.</td>
<td>6.5-8.5&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluoride</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;2e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulfate</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>250&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimony</td>
<td>µg/L</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;2a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsenic</td>
<td>µg/L</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;2d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadmium</td>
<td>µg/L</td>
<td>0.64&lt;sup&gt;2a,b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>µg/L</td>
<td>1,000&lt;sup&gt;2b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>98,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>µg/L</td>
<td>50&lt;sup&gt;2b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molybdenium</td>
<td>µg/L</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;2e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>230</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selenium</td>
<td>µg/L</td>
<td>4.6&lt;sup&gt;2b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercury</td>
<td>ng/L</td>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;2b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10,000&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- All tailings pond water and pore-water concentrations are “dissolved” and should be used as “average” annual.
- Shaded cells exceed most stringent water quality standard.
- AWQC:
  1. 18 AAC 70, ADEC, Alaska Water Quality Standards. Amended as of April 8, 2012, maximum drinking water levels.
  2. Alaska Water Quality Criteria Manual for Toxic and Other Deleterious Organic and Inorganic Substances. Amended through December 12, 2008. Most stringent criteria used. Criteria are expressed in terms of dissolved metal in the water column, except for aluminum and mercury, which are in terms of total recoverable metal.
  2a Aquatic life for fresh water hardness-dependent criteria. A hardness of >400 mg/L was used for all calculations. For aluminum, if pH>7.0 and hardness≥50, then 750 µg/L.
  2b Aquatic life for fresh water (chronic) criteria.
  2c Aquatic life for fresh water (acute) criteria.
  2d Drinking water primary maximum contaminant levels.
  2e Irrigation water criteria.
  2f Human health criteria for non-carcinogens (for consumption of water + aquatic organisms).
  2g Aquatic life for fresh water (chronic) criteria based on pH and temperature when early life stages of fish are present.
  3. Hatch 2015a; Donlin 2015, personal communication (RE: Hg in TSF pond water email from Gene Weglinski to Nancy Darigo, Aug 26, 2015).

Multiple analytes in TSF water will exceed the concentrations specified by the most stringent water quality criteria. Although any intentional discharge of TSF water under planned mine operations would be sufficiently treated to comply with APDES requirements, an uncontrolled release of untreated TSF water would potentially result in adverse effects to water quality resulting from contribution (loading) of analytes to receiving waters. A total of seven analytes in TSF water exceed the concentrations specified in the most stringent AWQC by an order of magnitude.
magnitude or greater. These include sulfate, antimony, arsenic, iron, manganese, molybdenum, and mercury. Analyte concentrations in TSF water with the greatest water quality standards disparity include mercury, arsenic, and potentially antimony. However, the high mercury levels would be addressed through process plant design that would include a dosage facility to allow chemical addition to precipitate mercury as a stable mercury sulfide compound that would remain with the tailings solids in the TSF (SRK 2012b).

Representative concentrations of analytes in final plant tailings solids are summarized in Appendix H, Table H-2. Values corresponding with the Phase 2 pilot testing in Table H-2 are considered most representative of combined ore types that would be processed through the process facilities.

Analysis of the TSF tailings reported elevated concentrations of multiple constituents, of which arsenic, antimony, and lead are most notable (SRK 2012b). Although the tailings filtrate results provide a relative comparison of analyte concentrations in TSF solids, meteoric water mobility procedure (MWMP) test results are more representative of potential chemical impacts to surface water under the tailings mixture release scenario. The MWMP test results are used to determine the nature and quantities of soluble constituents that may be washed from tailings materials under natural precipitation conditions (e.g., rainfall, snowmelt). In the unlikely event of a partial tailings dam failure, tailings deposited downgradient of the TSF would represent a large quantity of source material that could be capable of releasing chemical constituents to surface water receptors over relatively long timescales (e.g., up to decades). Specific MWMP test results for the 2007 Phase 2 pilot-plant transitional final tailings are summarized in Table 3.24-13 and Table 3.24-14, respectively.

### Table 3.24-13: 2007 Phase 2 Pilot Plant Transitional Tailings Solids MWMP Species Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>AWQS $^1$</th>
<th>Leachate</th>
<th>1st DI Rinse</th>
<th>2nd DI Rinse</th>
<th>3rd DI Rinse</th>
<th>4th DI Rinse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TSS</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDS</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>2,820</td>
<td>2,370</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pH</td>
<td>units</td>
<td>6.5-8.5</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>7.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alkalinity</td>
<td>mg/L as CaCO$_3$</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acidity</td>
<td>mg/L as CaCO$_3$</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conductivity</td>
<td>μS/cm</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,960</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbonate</td>
<td>mg/L as CaCO$_3$</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCO$_3$</td>
<td>mg/L as CaCO$_3$</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>mg/L as CaCO$_3$</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>4.0$^2$</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH$_3$·NH$_4$</td>
<td>as N mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN(T)</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN (F)</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNWAD</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>&lt;0.005</td>
<td>&lt;0.005</td>
<td>&lt;0.005</td>
<td>&lt;0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.24-13: 2007 Phase 2 Pilot Plant Transitional Tailings Solids MWMP Species Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>AWQS(^1)</th>
<th>Leachate</th>
<th>1st DI Rinse</th>
<th>2nd DI Rinse</th>
<th>3rd DI Rinse</th>
<th>4th DI Rinse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cl</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>0.23(^3)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO(_4)</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO(_2)</td>
<td>as N mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO(_3)</td>
<td>as N mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;0.5</td>
<td>&lt;0.5</td>
<td>&lt;0.5</td>
<td>&lt;0.05</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Alaska water quality standards
2. Drinking water primary max. contaminant levels
3. Aquatic life criteria for fresh waters (chronic)
Source: SRK 2012b; Table 4-5.

The standard MWMP result is from the first deionized (DI) water rinse; however, additional rinses were performed to evaluate response to additional rinsing from natural precipitation. Analytes with reported values above drinking and aquatic life standards in the first MWMP rinse include sulfate, chloride, arsenic, manganese, antimony and molybdenum. Concentrations of mercury in the MWWP rinse water were below the numeric criterion specified for protection of human health, and at or below the most stringent AWQC of 12 ng/L for protection of aquatic life in fresh water (chronic). Although reported concentrations of molybdenum are below the AWQC by the third rinse, concentrations of sulfate, arsenic, manganese and antimony persist at levels above their respective AWQC.

The controlled MWMP test results are indicative of chemical conditions and trends that could be induced from a TSF tailings release; however, additional kinetic cell testing profiles for constituents of concern (i.e., sulfate, arsenic, manganese, and antimony) are also available for comparison. Kinetic cell testing profiles of final tailings were performed to evaluate acid generation and metal solubilization (and transport) characteristics. The tests involve subjecting the tailings to periodic leaching and collection of leachate for analysis. Available data indicated no adverse acid generation trends (SRK 2012b). The release of arsenic from 2007 Phase 1 final tailings stabilized in the 0.10 to 0.15 mg/L range after 65 weeks of testing. Antimony release was stable throughout testing at less than 0.05 mg/L. The leachate test results indicate both metals will persist well above their respective AWQC.

Kinetic testing (humidity cell) of leachate for sulfate concentrations in 2007 Phase 1 final tailings (MWMP test material) show a declining trend from 310 mg/L to eventual stabilization at approximately 100 mg/L. Sulfate concentrations in leachate dropped below the AWQC standard of 250 mg/L after week five of testing (SRK 2012b). The results imply that adverse sulfate contribution in leachate from deposited tailings at levels above those specified in AWQC could be comparatively short in duration.
### Table 3.24-14: 2007 Phase 2 Pilot Plant Transitional Tailings Solids MWMP Dissolved Metals Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>AWQS</th>
<th>Leachate</th>
<th>1st DI Rinse</th>
<th>2nd DI Rinse</th>
<th>3rd DI Rinse</th>
<th>4th DI Rinse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ag</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>0.01²</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>2²</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.0736</td>
<td>0.0207</td>
<td>0.0316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>2²</td>
<td>0.0160</td>
<td>0.0185</td>
<td>0.0189</td>
<td>0.0131</td>
<td>0.0428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>0.004²</td>
<td>&lt;0.0002</td>
<td>&lt;0.0002</td>
<td>&lt;0.0002</td>
<td>&lt;0.0002</td>
<td>&lt;0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cd</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>0.005²</td>
<td>0.000083</td>
<td>0.000061</td>
<td>0.000043</td>
<td>0.000017</td>
<td>0.000045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ce</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>&lt;0.00007</td>
<td>&lt;0.00007</td>
<td>&lt;0.00007</td>
<td>&lt;0.00007</td>
<td>&lt;0.00007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>0.050⁶</td>
<td>0.00665</td>
<td>0.00584</td>
<td>0.00362</td>
<td>0.00150</td>
<td>0.00189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cr</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>0.1²</td>
<td>&lt;0.0005</td>
<td>&lt;0.0005</td>
<td>&lt;0.0005</td>
<td>&lt;0.0005</td>
<td>&lt;0.0005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cs</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>0.0003</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>In</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>K</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5.16</td>
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<tr>
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### Table 3.24-14: 2007 Phase 2 Pilot Plant Transitional Tailings Solids MWMP Dissolved Metals Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>AWQS&lt;br&gt;1</th>
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<th>2nd DI Rinse</th>
<th>3rd DI Rinse</th>
<th>4th DI Rinse</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mg</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>Mo</td>
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<td>0.0309</td>
<td>0.0115</td>
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<td>Na</td>
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<td>85.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
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<td>&lt;0.000001</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0122</td>
<td>0.0073</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.004</td>
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<td>&lt;0.001</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.00032</td>
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<td>0.00035</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sr</td>
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<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.86</td>
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<td>0.0941</td>
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<td>Ta</td>
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<td>0.00001</td>
<td>0.00004</td>
<td>0.000001</td>
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<tr>
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<td>&lt;0.0006</td>
<td>&lt;0.0003</td>
<td>&lt;0.0003</td>
<td>&lt;0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.00149</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tl</td>
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<td>0.000046</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
<td>0.000004</td>
<td>0.000001</td>
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<tr>
<td>U</td>
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<tr>
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<td>mg/L</td>
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<td>0.00024</td>
<td>0.00023</td>
<td>0.00011</td>
<td>0.00016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>mg/L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.000010</td>
<td>0.000013</td>
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1. AWQS: Action Level Water Quality Standard
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<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>AWQS</th>
<th>Leachate</th>
<th>1st DI Rinse</th>
<th>2nd DI Rinse</th>
<th>3rd DI Rinse</th>
<th>4th DI Rinse</th>
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<tr>
<td>Zn</td>
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<td>0.010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zr</td>
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<td>0.00014</td>
<td>0.00007</td>
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<td>0.00023</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Alaska water quality criteria
2. Drinking water primary max. contaminant levels
3. Human health criteria for non-carcinogens (for consumption of water + aquatic organisms)
4. Aquatic life criteria for fresh waters (chronic)
5. Aquatic life criteria for free cyanide shall be measured as WAD cyanide or equivalent
6. Stockwater + irrigation water criteria
7. Acute, freshwater ammonia criteria based on pH - criteria not available for pHs <6.5
-- = N/A

Source: SRK 2012b; Table 4-6.
Tailings and Water Release

The 1,620 acre-feet of slurry mixture released from the toe of the TSF under this scenario would have a solids concentration of 50 percent, and would be released over a 5 hour period. Tailings solids would be deposited throughout the entire inundation zone shown in Figure 3.24-2; however, approximately 1,300 acre-feet would be deposited at a terminal run-out located at the Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek confluence. Deposition of tailings solids in the Anaconda Creek drainage would primarily result in depths of two feet or less, but would be as great as eight feet in thickness in localized areas. Deposition depths at the tailings run-out would be as great as 10 feet. The total areal extent of tailings deposition under this scenario is approximately 1,700 acres.

Varying quantities of previously undisturbed native materials (soil and water) would be intermixed with the tailings slurry by erosional processes during the release. Seasonal conditions (frozen) at the time of the release would likely influence the degree of intermixing; however, some appreciable dilution of the tailings mixture would occur. The released solids and water mixture would result in adverse impacts to surface water quality; however, the duration and intensity of impacts associated with dissolved constituents in entrained TSF water would likely be less severe in comparison to the potentially prolonged adverse impacts to water quality associated with leachate from the released tailings solids. The released mixture is assumed to have a constant sediment concentration by volume of approximately 50 percent, which represents fully consolidated tailings at the end of operations (BGC 2015n). For this reason, it is assumed that most of the TSF water would be retained interstitially during tailings deposition.

Some TSF water could be expelled over a relatively short period through dewatering of the tailings mixture during initial deposition and settlement. This would cause an abrupt influx of partially diluted TSF water to the Crooked Creek drainage. The extent of dispersion would be impeded since the tailings deposit at the Anaconda Creek confluence would temporarily dam Crooked Creek flow (Figure 3.24-2). Much of the expelled TSF water would likely remain within the drainage until flow resumed with stream channel re-establishment. Initial post depositional flow in the Crooked Creek drainage would likely result in acute loading of dissolved TSF water constituents in surface water that would progressively diminish to a relative point of stabilization with continued flushing. It is anticipated that certain dissolved constituents in TSF water would temporarily exceed AWQC throughout the entire drainage to the Kuskokwim River. These would include sulfate, antimony, arsenic, iron, manganese, molybdenum, mercury, and potentially selenium pending dilutional processes.

Prolonged chemical impacts to surface water would largely be attributed to dissolution of constituents from tailings solids released in the event of tailings dam failure. Such impacts would be driven by meteoric and surface water leachate from deposited tailings source material, and tailings redistributed within the drainage from erosional processes. A variety of variables would influence chemical impacts derived from tailings leachate, including exposure of meteoric and surface water to tailings mixtures, and dilution from Crooked Creek flows.

Limited Crooked Creek flow data from the month of December indicates discharges range from 16 cfs to 32 cfs. Long term (open water) average daily discharges in Crooked Creek seasonally range from approximately 100 cfs to 250 cfs near the confluence of Anaconda Creek. Although analyte concentrations from tailings dissolution in surface water are anticipated to diminish with distance downstream of the tailings deposit, certain analytes would exist throughout the...
entire Crooked Creek drainage at concentrations above AWQC at any seasonal average flow condition. Concentrations of sulfate, arsenic, antimony, manganese, and potentially molybdenum in surface water all would exceed their respective AWQC based on MWMP test results. With the exception of dissolved manganese, pre-existing analyte concentrations (arithmetic average) in Crooked Creek are in compliance with the most stringent AWQC (Table 3.7-4, Section 3.7, Water Quality).

It is anticipated that dissolved sulfate and molybdenum concentrations would fall below applicable water quality standards within a short period of time (several years or less) based on MWMP and kinetic test results with continued flushing of Crooked Creek flow and meteoric water. Arsenic and antimony would likely persist above AWQC in the Crooked Creek drainage after mine closure for an indefinite period of time. This is based on reported concentrations in tailings source materials, and available kinetic test results. Manganese would also persist above the AWQC; however, dissolved concentrations should progressively diminish over time approaching pre-release conditions above the AWQC.

Seasonal conditions at the time of the release and response measures would significantly influence chemical impacts to surface waters. Low winter flow conditions in Crooked Creek would result in limited redistribution of tailings materials; limited intermixing (exposure) of surface water and deposited tailings mixtures; and negligible meteoric water contribution. Frozen conditions would also be more favorable for recovery and transport of tailings materials to the TSF; installation of erosion and sediment control measures; and implementation of Crooked Creek channel reconstruction and flow redistribution (diversion) controls during initial response activities. Winter flows in Crooked Creek are foreseeably manageable to temporarily by-pass accumulated water behind the deposited tailings dam given the availability of mine site equipment and resources. Winter remediation and restoration success would primarily depend on the amount of time available between shoulder seasons (e.g., freezeup and breakup).

A release during open-water months (summer) would result in greater impacts to surface water quality as initially described. A controlled release of accumulated water behind the temporary dam during summer months would be less manageable during high flow conditions. Significant quantities of tailings material would be re-mobilized and distributed throughout the Crooked Creek drainage from stream channel re-establishment (down cutting, erosion, and channel migration) through the unconsolidated tailings mixture. This process would continue until equilibrium is eventually achieved through stream restoration measures, natural processes, or other mitigation activities.

In the event of a summertime tailings release, initial remediation and restoration efforts would include the removal of deposited tailings to the extent practicable. Restoration and recovery efforts would be prioritized in select areas to minimize tailings re-distribution from channelized flow and erosional run-off. Construction of sedimentation ponds could also minimize the downstream distribution of tailings materials. Initial response efforts would largely depend on the suitability of working surfaces capable for supporting heavy equipment. For this reason the initial tailings recovery would likely span at least one winter season for a summer release scenario.

Since a significant quantity of tailings are expected to be re-distributed downstream within the Crooked Creek drainage during a summer release, fluctuations in water quality are anticipated in response to seasonal changes in flow conditions. Temporally abrupt loading events would be
most severe during post release flood conditions that would re-mobilize tailings materials within the drainage, and erosional run-off. Loading of fine suspended tailings sediment during all seasonal flow conditions would progressively diminish over time as the stream re-establishes equilibrium with continued flow. At a minimum, adverse water quality impacts in the Crooked Creek drainage would meet the criteria for a Category 5 impaired waterbody per Section 303 (d) of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The listing could potentially persist throughout mine closure, but this would largely depend on timing of the release relative to the period of mine operation. Depending on the success of remediation and restoration efforts, adverse physical and chemical impacts to water quality in the Crooked Creek drainage could potentially persist for decades.

In the event of a tailings dam failure as described here, appreciable water quality impacts are anticipated to occur downstream at the Kuskokwim River confluence with Crooked Creek. The magnitude, duration, and extent of such impacts at the Kuskokwim River would depend on whether the release occurred during summer or winter. The magnitude and extent of adverse impacts resulting from a winter release would be less than those associated with a summertime tailings release, despite lower flow conditions in the Kuskokwim River in winter. This is primarily attributed to flow volume disparities between Crooked Creek and the Kuskokwim River, and favorable initial response conditions previously described for a winter release scenario. Comparison of USGS mean monthly discharge measurements from Crooked Creek and the Kuskokwim River (at Crooked Creek) indicates that dilution would be greatest during the month of February, and least during the month of May. The Kuskokwim River mean monthly discharge is approximately 295 times greater than the flow of Crooked Creek in February, to approximately 63 times greater in May (Table 3.24-15).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuskokwim River</td>
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<td>11,800</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>81,800</td>
<td>79,800</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>67,300</td>
<td>46,100</td>
<td>22,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crooked Creek</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relative TSF Water Release Volume (600 cfs) Contribution to Combined Monthly Flow Values

| 4.5% | 5.1% | 5.5% | 3.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.3% | 2.6% | 3.7% |

Notes:
1. Crooked Creek flows approximately 10 miles downstream of Station CCAC.
2. All values shown are in cubic feet per second (cfs)

Greater quantities of tailings sediment and dissolved constituents are anticipated to reach the Kuskokwim River confluence from a summer release relative to a winter release scenario. Analyte specific trends and corresponding water quality exceedances in Crooked Creek are similarly anticipated in the immediate downstream mixing zone at the confluence; however, dilution from Kuskokwim River flow is anticipated to limit the downstream extent of water quality exceedances. The extent of the AWQC exceedances downstream of the confluence...
would progressively diminish over time; but would fluctuate with variations in Crooked Creek sediment transport and chemical loading (flow), and dilution from the Kuskokwim River. Dissolved concentrations of analytes exceeding their respective water quality standard in Crooked Creek are anticipated to be within acceptable or near baseline levels within several hundred feet or less downstream of the Kuskokwim River confluence, as evidenced by the kinetic test results and USGS river discharge data.

In summary, surface water impacts exceeding applicable water quality standards would extend from the Anaconda and Crooked Creek drainages to the Kuskokwim confluence. Mitigation measures are not likely to address the complete removal of all tailings source materials deposited in the Crooked Creek drainage. Since dissolved arsenic and antimony concentrations above AWQC could potentially persist on a seasonal basis after mine site closure, the intensity of impacts is considered high. The duration and extent of impacts would vary dramatically depending on whether the release occurred during summer or winter. Tailings recovery and initial response measures during a winter release could potentially remove a sufficient quantity of the released tailings source material to minimize the duration of impacts to surface water quality. A summer release, however, could potentially result in permanent adverse impacts to surface water quality resulting from deposition of large quantities of non-recoverable tailings. Surface water impairment above AWQC would extend from the Anaconda and Crooked Creek drainages to the Kuskokwim confluence. Since Kuskokwim River flow is anticipated to sufficiently dilute chemical loading from Crooked Creek to below applicable WQS's downstream, the impacts are considered regional. The context of the affected surface water resources could vary from common to unique. The context would largely depend on the non-recoverable volume of tailings (source material) unique to a winter or summer release scenario, and the subsequent spatial distribution of the tailings solids deposited downstream of Crooked Creek and high water areas.

Water Release Only

A total of 1,620 acre-feet of water at a flow rate of 600 cfs would be released for a period of 48 hours or longer under this scenario from the toe of the TSF. The estimated time for the flow front to reach the Kuskokwim River confluence was determined to be 24 to 25 hours at a maximum flow rate of 600 cfs. Dissolved analyte concentrations in released TSF water with corresponding AWQC are summarized in Table 3.24-16. A total of seven analytes in TSF water are anticipated to exceed their respective AWQC by an order of magnitude or greater. These include sulfate, antimony, arsenic, iron, manganese, molybdenum, and mercury. Analyte concentrations in TSF water with the greatest WQS disparity include mercury, arsenic, and potentially antimony. With the exception of dissolved manganese, pre-existing analyte concentrations (arithmetic average) in Crooked Creek are all below their respective AWQC (Table 3.7-4, Section 3.7, Water Quality).
Table 3.24-16: Potential Kuskokwim River Analyte Exceedances

<table>
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<th>Analyte</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Kuskokwim River at Crooked Creek</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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Notes:
1. The evaluation is based on the highest dissolved analyte concentration shown in Table 3.24-XX. Concentrations in tailings pond water is substantially lower than buried tailings process DOC; likely resulting in a final mixed concentration that is well below water quality standards from any seasonal Kuskokwim River dilution.
2. Lower Kuskokwim River flow conditions assume a general 30% increase in total flow from mean monthly discharges reported at Crooked Creek.


Seasonal conditions at the time of the release would influence the severity of impacts to surface water quality under this scenario; flow conditions in Crooked Creek and the Kuskokwim are likely to be the most important variables. Dilution from Anaconda Creek flow is generally considered negligible since year-round flow conditions are comparatively small relative to a peak TSF discharge of 600 cfs. Based on the values shown in Table 3.24-16, dilution from Crooked Creek and Kuskokwim River flows (near Crooked Creek) is greatest during the months of May through October (summer), and least during October through April (winter). Dilution from Kuskokwim River flow would also progressively increase downstream of the Crooked Creek confluence. Based on review and comparison of average daily Kuskokwim River flows from other monitoring sites located downstream of Crooked Creek, flow volumes generally increase an additional 30 percent on the lower Kuskokwim River relative to those measured at the Crooked Creek confluence (Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology).

Since an additional influx of 600 cfs to the Crooked Creek drainage would reasonably be within the range of a two to five year flood event, all flow would be limited to the active stream channel and the wide, gentle sloping floodplain (if any). Negligible dilution of dissolved analyte concentrations in TSF water would exist at a flow rate of 600 cfs in Crooked Creek. Most of the
AWQC exceedances summarized in Table 3.24-16 would exist within the Crooked Creek drainage throughout the release. Exceptions may potentially include pH and cadmium during elevated summer flow conditions in summer months.

The duration of impacts to Crooked Creek water quality would depend on the TSF release period and flow rate, and seasonal flow conditions in Crooked Creek. Since the TSF release period is generally considered temporary based on modeled assumptions (i.e., total release volume and flows), it is not anticipated to persist for greater than 48 hours. A release during the winter could potentially result in comparatively longer impacts than a summer release. This is largely attributed to less flushing and dilution, and potential entrainment of contaminants in ice. Although much of the floodplain would be frozen during a winter release, thawed bed substrate materials would also be capable of TSF water infiltration. Dissolved analyte concentrations in excess of AWQC resulting from a winter release would likely persist throughout some portion of the following open-water season (summer). Water quality exceedances would progressively diminish with continued flushing from summer flow conditions. Gaining stream conditions typically associated with open-water months would also flush impaired porewater and groundwater downstream to the Kuskokwim River. For these reasons, the duration of adverse impacts to water quality are anticipated to drop below AWQC threshold concentrations within one to several years.

Anticipated water quality exceedances at the Kuskokwim River and Crooked Creek confluence, and the lower Kuskokwim River are summarized in Table 3.24-16. This evaluation is based on review and comparison of seasonal mean monthly flows for the Kuskokwim River and Crooked Creek (monthly total) and dilution factors for dissolved analyte concentrations in TSF water at a flow rate of 600 cfs.

Based on the comparative evaluation summarized in Table 3.24-16, a TSF release at any time of the year could potentially result in dissolved concentrations of arsenic and mercury above AWQC beyond the mouth of the Kuskokwim River on a temporary basis. Dissolved concentrations of antimony may similarly exceed AWQC; however, this is considered unlikely since the highest dissolved value was used for evaluation purposes. Antimony concentrations in tailings pond water are expected to be approximately 50 times less than in buried tailings pore water. Mixing of the two water types during a release would further dilute concentrations of antimony dissolved in tailings pore water. The same rationale is applicable to reported iron concentrations in TSF water.

The downstream extent of remaining analytes that could potentially exceed AWQC varies with seasonal flow conditions and subsequent dilution. With the exception of arsenic, mercury, and potentially antimony, no other analytes are anticipated to exceed AWQC from May through September. The least amount of dilution is expected during the months of January through March, coinciding with the largest number of analytes present at concentrations in excess of those specified in AWQC.

The duration of water quality impacts to the Kuskokwim River drainage would largely depend on the TSF release period and flow rate. The release is anticipated to have a peak discharge of 600 cfs. Based on a total release volume of 1,620 acre-feet, a peak rate of discharge could not be sustained over a period lasting more than 48 hours (32.6 hours); therefore flow would be less at times throughout the release period. As the rate of TSF water influx decreases, relative dilution becomes greater. The overall duration of impacts to the Kuskokwim River drainage is considered to be temporary based on the modeled assumptions and continuous flushing and dilution from Kuskokwim River flow.
In summary, chemical impacts to surface water quality from a TSF water only release scenario are comparatively less than those of tailings and water mixture. The intensity of impacts and geographic extent are considered high and regional, respectively. This is attributed to the adverse surface water quality impairments in relation to AWQC that could potentially extend downstream to the mouth of the Kuskokwim River. Depending on seasonal flows (dilution) and subsequent flushing in the Crooked Creek, the duration of impacts would likely range from temporary (summer) to long-term (winter). Regardless of the season, adverse impacts to the Kuskokwim River drainage (downstream) would be considered temporary due to dilutional processes. The context of impacts is considered unique since temporary impairments could potentially impact resources considered important from a socioeconomic perspective, or result in loss of resources protected by legislation.

**Alternative 3A – Reduced Diesel Barging: LNG-Powered Haul Trucks**

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to surface water quality. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced due to a decrease in barge activity; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would have the same impacts on surface water hydrology as Alternative 2.

**Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release**

Under Alternative 3A, an occurrence of pinhole leaks in LNG storage tanks, an accident involving an LNG-fueled truck, or the rupture of a storage tank at the LNG plant could occur at the mine site. If released, LNG dissipates readily, so it would not infiltrate surface water. Thus, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to surface water resources as a result of a LNG release.

**Alternative 3B – Reduced Diesel Barging: Diesel Pipeline**

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to surface water quality. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced due to a decrease in barge activity; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would have the same impacts on surface water quality as Alternative 2.

Scenarios 1 and 2 would have similar water resource impacts as described in Alternative 2, except that under Scenario 1 the ocean barge route ends at Tyonek during the operations and closure phases of the project, and under Scenario 2, river barging would only occur during the construction phase of the project.

**Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release**

The diesel pipeline associated with Alternative 3B poses substantial risks to surface water quality due to the potential for unplanned releases of diesel fuel from the buried pipeline to surface water resources. The 334-mile length of the pipeline, the remoteness of the areas traversed by the pipeline, and the 27 planned stream crossings would contribute to the risk of
impacts to surface water resources and would encumber response efforts in the event of an unplanned release.

Under Alternative 3B, there are several potential modes of failure that could result in unplanned releases of diesel fuel from the pipeline, each of which could impact surface water resources to varying degrees depending upon the specific location of the release, the rates and total volume of the release, and the efficacy of response efforts. A scenario involving pinhole leaks from the pipeline would result in relatively slow rates of release. Pinhole leaks could go undetected for weeks or months resulting in medium and large volume spills that would have a high likelihood of impacting surface water resources. Recovery would be limited by potential inputs of diesel to moving water and by the amount of time required to detect the leak and mobilize response equipment to the site. A pinhole leak in close proximity to a stream or other surface water body would result in high intensity impacts because concentrations of total aqueous hydrocarbons would likely exceed the applicable water quality criterion of $15\mu g/L$ (ADEC 2012d). In most instances, the impacts would be local and confined to a discrete portion of the pipeline corridor; however, undetected leaks in close proximity to moving water could result in distribution of high intensity impacts over a wider geographic area and adverse effects to hydraulically-connected waters could occur outside of the project footprint. In most instances, the impacted surface water resources would be considered common in context; however the context of the impacted resources could potentially be considered important or unique if the leak were to occur in close proximity to less abundant surface water resources such as fish bearing streams or waterfowl habitat. The duration of such impacts would be considered temporary because impacts to surface water quality resulting from a pipeline leak could persist for weeks or months.

A catastrophic failure involving diesel pipeline rupture resulting from slides, an earthquake, or thaw settlement would potentially result in severe consequences to surface water resources. Pipeline rupture resulting in a release of up to 422,000 gallons of diesel fuel would very likely result in high-intensity impacts to surface water resources as applicable water quality standards would be exceeded in water bodies in the vicinity of the spill. The geographic extent of impacts resulting from a catastrophic diesel pipeline failure would depend on the location of the rupture relative to isolation valves and surface water resources. For example, in the event of a rupture immediately adjacent to a fast moving river, impacts would be rapidly distributed to downstream locations and could affect hydraulically connected waters if the rate of diesel release to the environment is not controlled in a timely fashion. The duration of impacts to surface water resources resulting from pipeline rupture would be temporary because concentrations of hydrocarbons in surface water would be expected to return to below the $15\mu g/L$ threshold specified by the most stringent applicable water quality criterion (ADEC 2012d) at some time within the project lifetime as a result of response efforts and relatively rapid natural weathering processes including evaporation. Although some fraction of the released hydrocarbons would initially be expected to partition into sediment and groundwater, and subsequently contribute to hydrocarbon concentrations in surface water, it is assumed that response and cleanup efforts would be sufficient to maintain surface water quality within the specified regulatory limits following the completion of the project.

In summary, unplanned releases of diesel fuel from the pipeline proposed under Alternative 3B could result in major impacts to surface water resources. The magnitude, geographic extent, and the context of impacted resources would depend primarily upon the rates and total volume of diesel released, the specific location of the release, and the efficacy of response efforts. Response
efforts would be encumbered by the length of the pipeline and its remote location relative to response facilities. Low-volume spills resulting from pinhole leaks in the pipeline would result in localized impacts, whereas very large diesel spills would likely result in regional scale impacts. The context of the impacted resources would depend primarily on the specific location of the spill. Relative to the natural gas pipeline described under Alternative 2, the diesel pipeline described under Alternative 3B poses substantial additional risks to surface water resources.

**Alternative 4 – Birch Tree Crossing (BTC) Port**

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to surface water quality. The likelihood of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced, and the likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) would be increased; however, the impacts of either would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 (ocean barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

**Alternative 5A – Dry Stack Alternatives**

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to surface water quality. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

**Alternative 6A – Modified Natural Gas Pipeline Alignment: Dalzell Gorge Route**

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to surface water quality. Impacts under fuel release Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

**3.24.6.7.2 GROUNDWATER QUALITY**

**Alternative 2 – Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action**

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for groundwater quality impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

**Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea**

Grounding of an ocean-going fuel barge could potentially release up to 735,000 gallons of diesel fuel to the sea. Due to the low density of diesel fuel relative to water, the vast majority of the spilled material would spread on the sea surface forming a sheen that would be attenuated by natural weathering processes over timescales of days and would not pose any threat to groundwater resources. The spilled material would not sink or pool on the seafloor to any
appreciable extent. The potential for impacts to groundwater resources would depend on the specific location of the release, the volume of material released, and environmental conditions (e.g., wind, waves, and ocean currents) at the time and location of the incident; if a very large amount of diesel was released in a nearshore area then some potential would exist for limited impacts to surficial (shallow) unconfined groundwater resources along the shoreline (Kuan et al. 2012). Such impacts could occur as a result of diesel contacting the shoreline at high tide, then percolating into porewater and surficial groundwater at low tide. The geographic extent of such impacts to groundwater would be local as only discrete parcels of surficial groundwater would be affected. Due to the high volatility and relatively fast evaporation of diesel fuel, the duration of the impacts would be considered temporary, and the context of the impacted resources would be considered common because of the abundance of surficial groundwater resources in and around potentially affected areas.

In summary, impacts to groundwater quality are unlikely to occur as a result of a diesel spill in the open ocean. Under certain, albeit rare, combinations of conditions the potential would exist for temporary localized impacts to affect unconfined surficial groundwater resources in coastal area (i.e., any water that is present in the pore spaces of sediments or soils at or near the riverbank), such impacts could be considered high intensity because the concentrations of hydrocarbons in the water could exceed the water quality regulatory limits, however, the impacted resources would be considered common in context. Overall, such impacts would be considered minor.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A river barge release could result in impacts to groundwater quality at certain sites along the banks of the Kuskokwim River in close proximity to the site of the diesel release. As a result of the diesel release, a long narrow sheen would extend downstream on the surface of the Kuskokwim River for distances of up to several miles. Response efforts would focus on the protection of sensitive resources along the river banks, and preventing the ingress of spilled diesel to low energy areas of the river, where slower weathering and transport processes would result in accumulation of spilled fuel and greater potential for impacts to groundwater quality. The vast majority of the spilled fuel would either flow downstream with the river water or evaporate to the atmosphere. It is likely that a very small fraction of the spilled diesel fuel would contact the river banks and a subfraction of that fuel could affect unconfined surficial groundwater resources along the riverbanks (any water that is present in the pore spaces of sediments or soils at or near the riverbank). Such impacts would most likely be low intensity, as concentrations of diesel range organics in the groundwater would not approach the 1.5 mg/L groundwater cleanup level specified by ADEC at 18 AAC 75. The effects would be temporary, because they would be unlikely to extend beyond the span of the project, and they would be considered local because they would affect only discrete portions of the transportation corridor, specifically areas along the Kuskokwim River banks. The affected resources would be considered common in context, because groundwater resources are relatively abundant in the areas considered for this analysis.

In summary, the overall level of effects to groundwater quality resulting from a river barge release would be minor.
Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

For the scenarios involving accidental releases from the tank farm that are captured by secondary containment, there would be no impact to groundwater quality.

Failure of a transfer hose during a transfer operation between a vessel and a tank farm would release a medium to large volume of diesel (100 to 2,000 gallons, depending upon the volume of the hose). Depending on the location of the release relative to the shoreline, some of the diesel could be released to soil and then percolate to surficial groundwater near the Angyaruak (Jungjuk) facility resulting in localized impacts to groundwater quality. Because the majority of the spilled fuel would be isolated from groundwater resources by secondary containment, concentrations of diesel range organics in the groundwater would be unlikely to exceed the 1.5 mg/L groundwater cleanup level specified by ADEC at 18 AAC 75; therefore, the intensity of impacts to groundwater resources would be considered low. The geographic extent of such impacts would be limited by the presence of secondary containment systems both at the tank farm and on the dock. On-shore recovery would involve sorbents and pumping out of secondary containment (SLR 2012a). Because the majority of the spilled material would be recovered immediately following the release and would be contained within a small area adjacent to the area of release, the duration of the impacts to groundwater quality would be considered temporary and the geographic extent of the impacts would be local. The context of the affected resources would be considered common.

In summary, the overall impact to groundwater quality resulting from an unplanned release of diesel as a result of transfer line rupture or human error during diesel transfer operations would be considered minor.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Depending upon the specific location of the tanker truck release, proximity to groundwater resources, and the volume of diesel released to the environment, the impacts to groundwater resources could be high intensity because concentrations of diesel range organics in groundwater could exceed the 1.5 mg/L groundwater cleanup level specified by ADEC at 18 AAC 75.

On land, diesel quickly penetrates porous soils, and could contaminate groundwater resources in the vicinity of the release. Diesel fuel does not penetrate permafrost and frozen soils to the same extent as unfrozen matrices, and if the spill were to occur in winter, or in an area where permafrost forms a barrier between the spilled material and groundwater resources, then the spill would be less likely to result in substantial impacts to groundwater resources.

The geographic extent of impacts associated with such a release would be considered local because effects would not be likely to extend beyond a discrete portion of the Project Area. In addition, a substantial fraction of the spilled diesel would be recovered by response and cleanup efforts including sorbents and removal of contaminated soils. The duration of the impacts would be considered temporary because concentrations of total aqueous hydrocarbons would return to below threshold levels specified by the applicable water quality criterion as a result of response and cleanup efforts occurring during the span of the project. Response efforts associated with a tanker truck release would focus on the protection of sensitive resources, such as fish-bearing streams, wetlands, and waterfowl habitat. Provided that spilled fuel is excluded from such sensitive areas, the impacted resources would be considered common in context.
In summary, the impacts to groundwater resources resulting from a tanker truck release would be temporary in duration, local in geographic extent, and would affect resources common in context. Although such impacts would be considered high intensity due to exceedances of the AWQC, the overall level of impacts to groundwater resulting from a tanker truck release would be considered moderate. In most cases, smaller volume releases would result in lower levels of impacts; releases occurring away from groundwater resources would be unlikely to have any impacts on groundwater quality provided that response and cleanup efforts are successful. The available response and cleanup resources would greatly exceed the capacity required to manage any unplanned release of diesel fuel from a tanker truck.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

The release of cyanide from a tank-tainer rupture or vehicle collision would not be expected to have any substantial effects on groundwater quality. The solid phase material poses relatively little risk to groundwater resources, but cyanide that becomes dissolved in water could potentially enter the aquifer in small quantities as a result of infiltration from surface water resources or bank storage effects along rivers. In the event that groundwater is impacted by cyanide as a result of tank-tainer rupture or vehicle accident, the impacts to groundwater resources would potentially be high intensity because concentrations of cyanide in the groundwater could exceed regulatory limits. Such impacts would be local because they would affect only a small area adjacent to the site of the cyanide release and the effects would be temporary because concentrations of cyanide in the groundwater would be attenuated to levels below the threshold regulatory limits as a result of dilution and dispersion processes.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

An unplanned release of liquid mercury to land or water could adversely affect the quality of groundwater in areas near the release. Due to its high density and liquid form at ambient temperatures, spilled mercury could enter the water table where concentrations of total mercury could exceed the applicable water quality criterion for mercury. Under oxidizing conditions some of the mercury would form complexes with dissolved organic matter, and elemental mercury Hg(0) would oxidize to form Hg(II) complexes, with ionic mercury remaining mobile in the groundwater system. Other fractions of the spilled mercury would sorb to surface soils and subsoils and would not be present in the groundwater. Where anoxic conditions are present and sulfate reduction is an important terminal electron accepting process, mercury methylation could occur. Additionally, under reducing conditions, sulfides may precipitate removing mercury from the aqueous phase. The duration of the impacts to groundwater would be considered long-term because concentrations of mercury in the groundwater could remain elevated for the duration of the project and would return to background levels at some point following the completion of the project. In most instances spilled mercury would remain in relatively close proximity to the area where it was released, and the geographic extent of impacts would be considered local. The groundwater resources potentially affected by an unplanned mercury release would be considered common to important in context. Overall, impacts to groundwater quality resulting from an unplanned release of mercury would be considered minor to moderate.
Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

In the very unlikely event of a spill resulting from a partial tailings dam failure, the impacts to surface water, groundwater, and sediment resources would be inextricably linked, and the impacts to these resource types would be driven by common impact producing factors. For that reason, the discussion presented under Section 3.24.6.7.1, Surface Water Quality, is relevant to groundwater quality. Impacts to surface water, groundwater, and sediment quality resulting from released solids would potentially persist over decadal time scales, whereas impacts resulting from the water only scenario would likely diminish over timescales of weeks. The water would naturally drain from the Crooked Creek watershed to the Kuskokwim River, where it would be diluted with river water to the extent that the Kuskokwim River would be compliant with the most stringent applicable water quality criteria. Prolonged chemical impacts to surface water, groundwater, and sediment resources within the Crooked Creek watershed would largely be attributed to dissolution of constituents from tailings solids released in the event of tailings dam failure. The most substantial impacts to surface water quality, groundwater quality, and sediment quality would be primarily driven by the persistence of the released tailings solids in the environment, the efficacy of response and clean-up efforts, and the volume and spatial distribution of the released tailings solids material considered “non-recoverable.” Refer to Section 3.24.6.7.1 for further discussion.

Alternative 3A – Reduced Diesel Barging: LNG-Powered Haul Trucks

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to groundwater quality. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would have the same impacts on groundwater quality as Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

The LNG releases described under Scenario 6 are not expected to result in any impacts to groundwater resources because the LNG would be released to the air and would not dissolve in the water under the ambient conditions. While it is possible for methane to dissolve in groundwater at substantial concentrations under certain conditions, when water containing dissolved methane comes into contact with air, the methane quickly escapes from the water into the atmosphere. Thus the spilled material would be expected to remain in the gas phase, and would not result in any impacts to groundwater resources. With no direct impacts to surface water quality or groundwater quality, the LNG releases described under Scenario 6 are not expected to result in any impacts to groundwater quality.

Alternative 3B – Reduced Diesel Barging: Diesel Pipeline

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to groundwater quality. The likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would have the same impacts on groundwater quality as Alternative 2.
Scenarios 1 and 2 would have similar groundwater resource impacts as described in Alternative 2, except that under Scenario 1 the ocean barge route ends at Tyonek during the operations and closure phases of the project, and under Scenario 2, river barging would only occur during the construction phase of the project.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

The diesel pipeline associated with Alternative 3B poses substantial risks to groundwater quality due to the potential for unplanned releases of diesel fuel from the pipeline to groundwater. The 334-mile length of the pipeline and the remoteness of the areas traversed by the pipeline would contribute to the risk of impacts to groundwater resources and would encumber response efforts in the event of an unplanned release.

Under Alternative 3B, there are several potential modes of failure that could result in unplanned releases of diesel fuel from the pipeline, each of which could impact groundwater resources to varying degrees depending upon the specific location of the release, the rates and total volume of the release, and the efficacy of response efforts. A high-probability scenario involving pinhole leaks from the pipeline would result in relatively slow rates of release. However, because pipeline inspections for indications of leaks would occur only twice a year, pinhole leaks could go undetected for weeks or months resulting in medium and large volume spills that would have a high likelihood of impacting groundwater resources. Pinhole leaks would likely result in high intensity impacts because concentrations of diesel range organics would likely exceed the 1.5 mg/L groundwater cleanup level specified by ADEC at 18 AAC 75; therefore the intensity of impacts to groundwater resources would be considered high. In most instances, the impacts would be local and confined to a discrete portion of the pipeline corridor and the impacted groundwater resources would be considered common in context; however the context of the impacted resources could potentially be considered important if the leak were to occur in close proximity to groundwater used as a source of drinking water. The duration of such impacts could be long-term because impacts to groundwater quality resulting from an undetected pipeline leak could persist beyond the duration of the proposed project.

A catastrophic failure involving diesel pipeline rupture resulting from slides, an earthquake, or thaw settlement would potentially result in severe consequences to groundwater resources. A pipeline rupture resulting in a release of up to 422,000 gallons of diesel fuel would very likely result in high intensity impacts to groundwater resources as concentrations of hydrocarbons specified by the most stringent AWQC would be exceeded. The geographic extent of impacts resulting from a catastrophic diesel pipeline failure would be considered local because impacts would be limited to a discrete portion of the pipeline corridor.

In summary, unplanned releases of diesel fuel from the pipeline proposed under Alternative 3B could result in major impacts to groundwater resources. Response efforts would be encumbered by the length of the pipeline and its remote location relative to response facilities. Relative to the natural gas pipeline described under Alternative 2, the diesel pipeline described under Alternative 3B poses substantial additional risks to groundwater resources which should be carefully considered in any comparison of the alternatives.

Alternative 4 – Birch Tree Crossing (BTC) Port

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG Release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to groundwater quality. The likelihood
of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced due to shorter barge distances, and the likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) would be increased; but the impacts of either would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 (ocean barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Alternative 5A – Dry Stack Tailings

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to groundwater quality.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Alternative 6A – Modified Natural Gas Pipeline Alignment: Dalzell Gorge Route

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to groundwater quality.

Impacts under fuel release Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.7.3 SEDIMENT QUALITY

Alternative 2 – Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for sediment quality impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Impacts to sediment quality resulting from an ocean barge release would depend heavily upon the specific location of the spill. As described in Section 3.24.5.1, the density of diesel fuel is much lower than that of water, and it is not possible for diesel to sink and accumulate on the seafloor unless adsorption occurs with sediment suspended in the water column (NOAA 2014a). This process would be more likely to occur near river mouths where high concentrations of fine-grained sediments are carried in by rivers, and would be less likely to occur in open marine settings. Response efforts would focus on excluding the spilled fuel from river mouths and other sensitive areas; provided these response efforts are effective, the intensity of impacts to sediment quality would be low and the impacted resources would be considered common in context. A small fraction of the spilled fuel dispersed in the marine water column by wave action could adhere to fine-grained suspended sediments, leading to subsequent deposition of contaminated sediment on the seafloor. The duration of effects could be long-term because contaminated sediments could persist for decades on the seafloor environment in low energy areas, and the geographic distribution of impacts could be regional due to spreading of the diesel on the ocean surface and transport of contaminated sediments by ocean currents. However, due to small fraction of the spilled diesel that would partition into marine sediments and the potentially wide area over which those sediments would be dispersed, the overall level
of impacts to sediment quality resulting from a diesel spill in the open ocean would be considered minor.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

Impacts to sediment quality would result from adsorption of the spilled diesel onto suspended sediment particles in the water column and subsequent deposition of contaminated sediment in the main stem of the Kuskokwim River and within the Kuskokwim River delta. Depending on the specific location of the release and the volume of material released, the impacts could be considered high intensity because concentrations of diesel range organics would likely exceed sediment quality guidelines. The extent of impacts would vary spatially according to the concentrations of diesel and suspended sediment in the water and the contaminated sediments would be deposited in low energy areas of the riverbed and delta, thus impacts to sediment quality could potentially extend beyond the immediate Project Area. The intensity of impacts would decrease over time as the contaminated material would be dispersed by natural sediment transport processes, and concentrations of diesel range organics in the sediments would be attenuated by natural processes such as biodegradation and chemical oxidation over timescales of years or decades. High intensity impacts would diminish during the lifespan of the project, but detectable levels of diesel range organics could persist in sediments beyond completion of the project and therefore the duration of impacts would be considered long-term. Due to the importance of the Kuskokwim River and delta for fisheries and other economic and cultural uses, the impacted resources would be considered important in context. Overall, the level of impacts to sediment quality resulting from a river barge release would be considered moderate to major depending on the specific location and timing of the spill, and the efficacy of response and cleanup efforts.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Provided that secondary containment systems are effective then there would be no impacts to sediment quality as a result of a release at a tank farm.

Localized impacts to sediment quality could result from the accidental release of diesel to the Kuskokwim River from the rupture of transfer line while offloading a fuel barge at the Angyaruaq (Jungjuq) Tank Farm. The material released to the water would be contained with sorbent booms and would be immediately recovered using sorbent pads and skimmers. Because the density of diesel fuel is much lower than that of water, most of the spilled diesel would remain on the surface of the water and partitioning into sediments would be minimal over the timeframe required for response and cleanup. The impacts would be concentrated in the area immediately adjacent to the tank farm and would therefore be considered local. However, it is possible that local concentrations of diesel range organics could exceed sediment quality guidelines and therefore the impacts would be considered high intensity. The contaminated sediments would be dispersed by natural sediment transport processes, and concentrations of diesel range organics in the sediments would be attenuated by natural processes such as biodegradation and chemical oxidation over timescales of years or decades. High intensity impacts would diminish during the lifespan of the project, but detectable levels of diesel range organics could persist in sediments beyond completion of the project and therefore the duration of impacts would be considered long-term. The impacted resources would be considered common in context.
Due to the limited geographic distribution of impacts to sediment quality and the potential to control the occurrence of impacts using effective response and cleanup methods, the overall level of impacts to sediment quality resulting from a hose rupture at the tank farm would be considered minor.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Impacts to sediment quality from a tanker truck release would depend entirely on the specific location of the accident and the proximity to sediment resources. Due to the relatively low dipole moment of the organic molecules that comprise diesel fuel, the spilled material would preferentially associate with soils and other organic substances in the terrestrial environment. The physical and chemical impacts of fuel released to the terrestrial environment away from surface water resources are described in Section 3.24.6.2, Soils. Potential impacts to aquatic sediments would occur primarily as a result of spilled material that enters surface water and is subsequently adsorbed onto sediment particles, or as a result of contaminated soils that erode into the water. In the unlikely event that the entire contents of the tanker truck (up to 13,500 gallons) are spilled directly into surface waters, the impacts to sediment quality could be high intensity over a relatively small area. As previously described, the probability of occurrence for such an event is very low at any location. For the case of a release directly to surface water the probability decreases even further because the release would have to occur at or very near surface water. Concentrations of diesel range organics in sediment would likely exceed sediment quality guidelines over a discrete portion of the project area and would be considered local. The impacted sediment resources would be considered common in context, and the duration of impacts would likely be considered long-term because although concentrations of diesel range organics in the sediment would decrease to below threshold levels during the span of the project, detectable concentrations of diesel in the sediment could persist for years or decades.

In summary, the overall impacts to sediment quality resulting from tanker truck release would be considered moderate if 13,500 gallons of diesel are released directly to the water. Smaller volume spills, or spills that occur on land away from aquatic resources would decrease the intensity and extent of the impacts to sediment quality relative to a large volume spill to the water. Response and recovery efforts would also decrease the overall levels of impacts to sediment quality.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

Impacts to sediment quality from an inadvertent cyanide release would depend entirely on the specific location of the accident and the proximity to sediment resources. Cyanide released as solid-phase sodium cyanide briquettes would pose relatively little risk to sediment resources. In the event that cyanide becomes dissolved in water the cyanide would be likely to stay in the dissolved phase and therefore would not impact sediment resources. Concentrations of cyanide in sediments would remain low, and therefore the intensity of impacts to sediment resources would be considered low. Depending upon the specific location of the cyanide release, it is possible that concentrations of cyanide in sediment porewater could exceed the applicable water quality criterion; however, because of their high solubilities in water, most cyanide compounds would not be strongly sorbed onto sediments or suspended solids. Any impacts to sediment quality resulting from spilled sodium cyanide would be limited to the areas immediately adjacent to the site of the spill, and the duration of impacts to sediment would be
considered temporary because concentrations of cyanide in the sediment would be rapidly attenuated as a result of dilution and dispersion processes.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

An unplanned release of liquid mercury to land or water could adversely affect the quality of sediment in areas near the release. Due to its high density and propensity for complexation with organic material, a substantial fraction of the released mercury would collect in sediments where it could be transformed by abiotic redox reactions as well as biologically-mediated mercury methylation reactions driven by sulfate reducing bacteria. The mercury could also be distributed to other areas as a result of sediment transport processes and the ultimate fate of the spilled mercury would depend on the relative rates of the transformation reactions and transport processes. Methylation would potentially increase the bioavailability of the spilled mercury and would also accelerate the rates of mercury transport away from the area of the spill. Although there are no enforceable regulations related to mercury concentrations in sediment, the sediment quality guidelines (SQGs) often serve as benchmark values for making comparisons to the concentrations of contaminant levels in sediments at sites under evaluation for various reasons (Buchman 2008). Preliminary screening levels for mercury contamination in sediment have been suggested by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Although they do not represent sediment quality standards, these guidelines suggest that the Threshold Effects Level for mercury in freshwater sediment is 174 µg/kg (dry weight), the Probable Effects Level is 486 µg/kg (dry weight), and the Upper Effects Threshold is 560 µg/kg (dry weight) (Buchman 2008). If elemental mercury was inadvertently released directly to land or water, it is likely that concentrations of total mercury in the sediments could exceed the thresholds specified in the SQGs. The duration of such impacts would be considered long-term because elevated concentrations could persist beyond the duration of the project. The geographic extent would be considered local because although mercury could be transported away from the location of the initial spill, the intensity of effects would attenuate rapidly over distance from the spill location. The affected sediment resources would be considered common to important in context. Overall, impacts to sediment quality resulting from an unplanned release of mercury would be moderate, and such effects would occur only if a mercury container ruptured and there was a release to water.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

In the very unlikely event of a spill resulting from a partial tailings dam failure, the impacts to surface water, groundwater, and sediment resources would be inextricably linked, and the impacts to these resource types would be driven by common impact producing factors. For that reason, the discussion presented under Section 3.24.6.7.1, Surface Water Quality, is relevant to sediment quality. Impacts to surface water, groundwater, and sediment quality resulting from released solids would potentially persist over decadal time scales, whereas impacts resulting from the water only scenario would likely diminish over timescales of weeks. The water would naturally drain from the Crooked Creek watershed to the Kuskokwim River, where it would be diluted with river water to the extent that the Kuskokwim River would be compliant with the most stringent applicable water quality criteria. Prolonged chemical impacts to surface water, groundwater, and sediment resources within the Crooked Creek watershed would largely be attributed to dissolution of constituents from tailings solids released in the event of tailings dam failure. The most substantial impacts to surface water quality, groundwater quality, and
sediment quality would be primarily driven by the persistence of the released tailings solids in the environment, the efficacy of response and clean-up efforts, and the volume and spatial distribution of the released tailings solids material considered “non-recoverable.” Refer to Section 3.24.6.7.1 for further discussion.

**Alternative 3A – Reduced Diesel Barging: LNG-Powered Haul Trucks**

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to sediment quality. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would have the same impacts on sediment quality as Alternative 2.

**Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release**

Under Alternative 3A, an occurrence of pinhole leaks in LNG storage tanks, an accident involving an LNG-fueled truck, or the rupture of a storage tank at the LNG plant could occur at the mine site. If released, LNG dissipates readily, so it would not infiltrate surface water. Thus, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to sediment quality resources as a result of a LNG release.

**Alternative 3B – Reduced Diesel Barging: Diesel Pipeline**

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to groundwater quality. The likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would have the same impacts on sediment quality as Alternative 2.

Scenarios 1 and 2 would have similar water resource impacts as described in Alternative 2, except that under Scenario 1 the ocean barge route ends at Tyonek during the operations and closure phases of the project, and under Scenario 2, river barging would only occur during the construction phase of the project.

**Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release**

The diesel pipeline associated with Alternative 3B poses substantial risks to water quality due to the potential for unplanned releases of diesel fuel from the pipeline to water resources. Similar risks would also apply to sediment quality. The 334-mile length of the pipeline, the remoteness of the areas traversed by the pipeline, and the 27 planned stream crossings would contribute to the risk of impacts to aquatic sediment resources and would encumber response efforts in the event of an unplanned release.

A catastrophic failure involving diesel pipeline rupture resulting from slides, an earthquake, or thaw settlement would potentially result in severe consequences to sediment quality. Pipeline rupture resulting in a release of up to 422,000 gallons of diesel fuel would very likely result in high intensity impacts to sediments, as sediment quality guidelines for diesel range organics would be exceeded in the vicinity of the spill. The geographic extent of impacts resulting from a diesel pipeline release would depend on the location of the release relative to isolation valves and water resources. A complete list of rivers and streams crossed by the proposed pipeline,
including drainage area and peak-discharge estimates for select recurrence intervals, is included in Table 3, Appendix G. Examples of streams and creeks that could lead to the impacts described in this section include tributaries of Windy Fork and Sheep Creek. For example, in the event of a rupture immediately adjacent to a fast moving river, impacts would be rapidly distributed to downstream locations and could affect hydraulically-connected areas; the geographic distribution of impacts would therefore be considered regional. The duration of impacts to sediment quality resulting from pipeline rupture would potentially be long-term because concentrations of hydrocarbons in sediments could persist for years or decades as a result of slow natural weathering and degradation processes in subarctic sediments. The context of the impacted resources would be considered common.

In summary, unplanned releases of diesel fuel from the pipeline proposed under Alternative 3B could result in major impacts to sediment quality. The magnitude, geographic extent, and the context of impacted resources would depend upon the rate and total volume of diesel released, the specific location of the release, and the efficacy of response efforts. Response efforts would be encumbered by the length of the pipeline and its remote location relative to response facilities. Low-volume spills resulting from pinhole leaks in the pipeline would result in localized impacts, whereas very large diesel spills would likely result in regional scale impacts. Relative to the natural gas pipeline described under Alternative 2, the diesel pipeline described under Alternative 3B poses substantial additional risks to sediment quality which should be carefully considered in any comparison of the alternatives.

Alternative 4 – Birch Tree Crossing (BTC) Port

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to sediment quality. The likelihood of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced due to shorter barging distances, and the likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) would be increased; however, the impacts of either would be the same types as those discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 (ocean barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Alternative 5A – Dry Stack Tailings

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to sediment quality. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Alternative 6A – Modified Natural Gas Pipeline Alignment: Dalzell Gorge Route

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to sediment quality. Impacts under fuel release Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
3.24.6.8 AIR QUALITY

There would be air emissions associated with spills; for example, fugitive volatile organic compound emissions associated with a diesel spill and the tailpipe emissions of criteria pollutants from the response equipment. Many variables associated with unplanned events, such as ambient temperatures and surface characteristics of the spill, would affect the quantity of the emissions. As a result, quantities of air pollutants would be difficult or impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy. In all cases, the magnitude of emissions for spills is estimated to be low, as there are no permit thresholds for fugitive (for the Donlin Gold Project) or mobile emissions that would occur in a spill scenario.

3.24.6.8.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Evaporation of diesel fuel would generate primarily VOCs and HAPs (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management [BOEM] 2012). The quantity of emissions would depend on the amount of fuel spilled and on factors that affect the evaporation rate. For example, the evaporation rate would increase with temperature, amount of exposed surface area, and time of exposure. Exposed surface area would increase if the spill spreads out over a large area or is subject to wind or wave action. Lighter compounds (including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes (BTEX), and hexane, which are both HAPs) may evaporate in a matter of hours depending on the size of the spill and weather, while heavier compounds would take longer. Ambient concentrations eventually return to pre-spill conditions within a relatively short period of time (BOEM 2012).

In situ burning would generate products of combustion (carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, sulfur dioxide, PM, and black smoke). Ambient air quality would return to pre-burn conditions relatively quickly (BOEM 2012). Even when in situ burning is not a proposed cleanup measure, diesel is highly combustible, although it requires a high flash point to ignite. In the unlikely event that a diesel spill ignites, it would result in emissions of criteria pollutants.

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for air quality impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

An ocean barge release could result in a diesel fuel spill of up to 735,000 gallons. Due to the remote location, response efforts would include overflights during the dispersal period. As previously stated, emissions of criteria pollutants and GHGs from the response equipment for this type of action cannot be estimated with certainty.

The duration of air quality impacts would be temporary (infrequent and returning to pre-activity levels). The geographic extent would be regional (outside the project footprint), and the context would be common (would affect only attainment/undesignated areas). Although difficult to predict with complete certainty, the overall impacts to air quality would likely be negligible under Scenario 1.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

After accounting for the effectiveness of booming and skimming operations under this scenario, the remaining fuel would likely evaporate. Increases in emissions of criteria pollutants and
GHGs from the response equipment would be almost nonexistent, as the tugs and vessels are used for normal operations.

Air quality would return to pre-activity levels quickly, so duration would be considered temporary. The geographic extent would be local (occurring within the Project Area), and the context common (would affect only attainment/unclassified areas). Although difficult to predict, the overall impact to air quality would likely be negligible should a spill occur under this scenario.

**Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release**

Recovery under this scenario would range from 1 hour to 3 days, and it is expected that very little of the spilled diesel fuel would evaporate in this time due to the limited surface area of the secondary containment. Except for the transfer operation line rupture (which would occur in summer), the scenarios could occur at any time of year, with colder temperatures reducing the evaporation rate and the rate of VOC emissions.

The duration of air quality impacts would be temporary (infrequent and returning to pre-activity levels), the extent local (within Project Area), and the context common (affecting only attainment/unclassified areas). Although difficult to predict, the overall impact to air quality would likely be negligible.

**Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release**

Recovery of diesel fuel from a tanker truck rollover could be difficult as the fuel could disperse to a stream, tundra, or water. It is possible the entire spill volume would evaporate. In situ burning may be used.

The duration of air quality impacts would be temporary (infrequent and returning to pre-activity levels), the extent local (within the Project Area), and the context common (affecting only attainment/unclassified areas). Although difficult to predict, the overall impact to air quality would likely be negligible under Scenario 4.

**Scenario 7: Cyanide Release**

Because sodium cyanide must come in contact with water to cause environmental impacts, a potential release of dry briquettes would not usually be expected to have any air quality impacts.

If it does come into contact with water or acid, it dissolves and parts will volatilize into hydrogen cyanide gas, which could build up in enclosed areas such as the port storage and mine processing areas. The gas is highly toxic and could be quickly fatal to a human. These areas would be well-ventilated to prevent gas buildup and hydrogen cyanide monitoring would be conducted.

A potential release into the outdoor air could occur as a result of tank rupture. If the tank ruptures and the sodium cyanide combines with water or acid, some of it could volatilize. The gas would dissipate rapidly, and the duration of air quality impacts would be temporary (infrequent and returning to pre-activity levels as the gas dissipates). The geographic extent would be local (affecting local air quality), and the context common affecting attainment/unclassified areas). There are no permit thresholds for cyanide, thus the magnitude
of impacts would be low. Hence, overall impacts to air quality would be negligible under Scenario 7.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

A potential release into the outdoor air could occur as a result of a 76-pound or metric ton container rupture of liquid elemental mercury. Portions of the mercury could volatilize into the atmosphere. Liquid elemental mercury is highly volatile and partitions quickly to the atmosphere.

The mercury can combine chemically with other elements to form organic or inorganic mercury. There is relatively little organic mercury in the environment compared to inorganic mercury. Inorganic mercury can be released to the atmosphere as Hg\text{II}, or Hg\text{P}. These forms have different physical and chemical characteristics, thus have very different atmospheric lifetimes.

Elemental mercury vapor may remain in the atmosphere for more than a year, although it would disperse from the spill area. The Hg\text{II} and Hg\text{P} would typically wet deposit in a matter of days (depending on rain and snow events). Thus air quality impacts would be temporary in duration (infrequent and returning to pre-activity levels as the gas dissipates). The geographic extent would be local (affecting local air quality) to extended (affect air quality beyond the regional scale), and the context common (affecting attainment/unclassified areas) to unique (affecting EPA Class I areas or areas with poor air quality). There are no permit thresholds for mercury, thus the magnitude would be low. Hence, overall impacts to air quality could be negligible to moderate under Scenario 7.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

With the exception of mercury, neither a tailings and water nor water only release would discharge substances that could evaporate and contribute direct or indirect impacts to air quality. The deposited tailings could release mercury in a gaseous phase, however. The extent of this effect would be similar to that described in Environ (2015) for the tailings beach, which is a small portion of overall mercury particulate and gaseous emissions at the mine site, but a large portion of gaseous-only emissions. In the event of the tailings and water release, the amount of tailings exposed to air would expand by 1,300 acres, as there would still be a tailings beach left in the TSF. This is roughly double the size of the maximum tailings beach in late operations. As the tailings beach comprises more than 90 percent of gaseous mercury emissions at the mine site (Environ 2015), this spill scenario could temporarily double the amount of these emissions until remediation is complete. As with the tailings breach, spent mercury in the tailings mixture would include a mercury suppressant that would help prevent the escape of mercury into the air.

Gaseous mercury emissions from the water portion of the slurry release, or from the water-only release, are expected to be negligible due rapid transport and dilution of the initial flood, as compared to the stationary TSF pond during normal operations.

Metals in fugitive dust, including mercury as well as others of concern, such as arsenic and antimony (Section 3.2.3.2.4, Soil), could be mobilized during remediation of the tailings deposit. The extent of mercury in air in both gaseous and particulate forms would be similar to that shown on Figure 3.8-5 (Section 3.8, Air Quality) for the mine site during normal operations, with a slight bulge in contours to the southwest due to the expanded tailings deposit at the
Anaconda-Crooked Creek confluence. It is expected that control of fugitive dust during remediation would include planned mitigation measures similar to those described for normal mine operations, such as water trucks and suppressants when necessary (Section 3.2.3.2.4, Soils).

Impacts to air quality from both gaseous and particulate emissions from the tailings release deposit would be similar to those of the mine site during normal operations (Sections 3.2.3.2.4, Soils, and 3.8.3.3.1, Air Quality), that is of low to medium intensity, local to regional in extent, temporary (lasting a few years until remediation is complete), common in context, and minor overall.

3.24.6.8.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to air quality. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on air quality as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

When LNG is released, it transitions to a gaseous state upon contact with warmer air or water. Air emissions would consist primarily of methane, which is a potent GHG.

Small LNG releases could occur from pinhole leaks from the storage tanks or during fueling of the LNG-fueled trucks. A release of up to 55,000 gallons of LNG could occur from an LNG tank rupture. The duration would be temporary (infrequent and returning to pre-activity levels), the extent would be local (within the Project Area), and the context common (affecting only attainment/unclassified areas). Although difficult to predict, the overall impacts to air quality (aside from GHG emissions which are discussed in Chapter 4, Cumulative Effects) would likely be negligible resulting from an LNG release.

3.24.6.8.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for impacts to air quality. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 3 (ocean or river barge, tank farm releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on air quality as Alternative 2.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Alternative 3B eliminates the need for frequent tanker truck deliveries from Angyaruaq [Jungjuk] Port to the mine site during the operation and maintenance phase. Instead, there would be an occasional tanker truck delivery in the opposite direction (from the mine site to Angyaruaq [Jungjuk] Port) to provide fuel for the generators at the port. Therefore, the occurrence of a spill would be less likely than under Alternative 2. However, should a spill occur, the overall impacts to air quality from a tanker truck release would be similar to the impacts described under Alternative 2.
Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

A pinhole leak in the pipeline could release up to 100,000 gallons of diesel fuel if the leak is undetected for weeks or months. If the leak is undetected for such a long period of time, much of the diesel would evaporate. Upon discovery, response efforts could include in situ burning. Emissions of criteria pollutants and GHGs from the response equipment would likely be low on an annual basis. The duration would be considered temporary (infrequent and returning to pre-activity levels), the extent local (within the Project Area), and the context common (affecting only attainment/unclassified areas). The overall impact to air quality would be anticipated to be negligible.

A pipeline rupture could release 422,000 gallons or more. The duration would also be temporary (infrequent and returning to pre-activity levels), the extent local (within Project Area), and the context common (affecting only attainment/unclassified areas). Although difficult to predict, the overall impact to air quality would likely be negligible should a diesel pipeline release occur.

3.24.6.8.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING PORT

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to air quality. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on air quality as Alternative 2.

Impacts to air quality in the event of a diesel release under Alternative 4 for Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, and tanker truck) would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2, with the following exceptions:

- The risk of a river barge grounding would be somewhat lower under Alternative 4 because of the 38 percent reduction in river-barging miles from Alternative 2, and the avoidance of shallow areas between BTC Port and Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port that would not be traveled under Alternative 4; and

- The risk of a tanker truck release would be increased because of the increased one-way haul distance of 75 miles, as compared to 30 miles under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.8.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to air quality.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7, and 9 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.8.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to air quality.
Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.9 NOISE AND VIBRATION

3.24.6.9.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for noise impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Scenario 1 would be a potential diesel fuel spill resulting from the damage of an ocean-going fuel barge at sea. Under this scenario, dispersal and evaporation would likely take 3 to 5 days. During this time period, an increased number of take-offs and landings of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters would occur around Dutch Harbor and Bethel. Temporary noise impacts generated from these activities would have little or no lasting effect on any noise sensitive receptor. The duration of these impacts would be temporary, lasting only a few days, would be localized at the sensitive receptor, and would impact resources at the sensitive receptor that are common in context. Overall, the noise impacts to the sensitive receptors associated with this scenario would be negligible. However, if a major spill occurred close to the shoreline, overflight observations of the spill could have a higher intensity impact to sensitive receptors in local communities, but would still be temporary and intermittent in duration.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

The grounding and release of diesel from a single laden river tank barge traveling up the Kuskokwim River to the Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port would create temporary noise impacts associated with tug boats used in containing the spill in the river, vehicles transporting the spill response and recovery crew and equipment, and spill cleanup and recovery operations. Sensitive receptors along the Kuskokwim River are shown in Table 3.9-26 (Section 3.9, Noise and Vibration), the nearest being the community of Upper Kalskag, located approximately 475 feet from the river’s edge. The temporary noise impacts generated from response operations equipment would be readily detectable (medium intensity), common in context, and localized at the sensitive receptor. Diesel that would not be recovered within the first few days would travel downstream, so further response efforts would be enlisted. In this case, additional downstream sensitive receptors (Table 3.9-26 in Section 3.9, Noise and Vibration) could also experience some temporary, localized noise impacts associated with response efforts. Overall, the noise impacts to the sensitive receptor associated with this scenario would be minor, primarily due to the medium intensity impacts resulting from the proximity of the sensitive receptor to the location of the spill.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Scenario 3 is a potential diesel spill at a tank farm. The spill and subsequent response effort would be localized to the spill site – either the mine site, a tank farm at Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port, or in Bethel. Noise sources would include vehicles transporting the spill response and recovery crew and equipment, and spill cleanup and recovery operations; under this scenario,
recovery and cleanup operations should be completed within 7 days. The nearest noise sensitive receptor from the Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port site and from the mine site would be Crooked Creek, located 5.94 miles from the Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port site, and 9.15 miles from the mine site. Temporary noise impacts generated from response activities would have little or no lasting effect at these noise sensitive receptors; and noise levels at the receptor locations would be comparable to natural sounds. The duration of these impacts would be temporary, lasting only a few days, would be localized at the sensitive receptor, and would impact resources that are common in context. Overall noise impacts at the sensitive receptor associated with this scenario would be negligible.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release
A small volume potential spill scenario may result from a vehicle collision involving a loaded tanker truck. Response efforts would involve materials that were carried on the tanker truck and the response would be immediate and complete within the hour. Given the relatively short timeframe of this geographically localized and procedure-specific activity, there would be no anticipated noise-related impacts to the surrounding environment as a result of this scenario.

A larger volume potential spill scenario may result from a tanker truck rollover. Recovery efforts should be complete within 7 to 10 days. The nearest sensitive receptor to the mine access road would be the community of Crooked Creek, located 5.93 miles away.

Temporary noise impacts generated from response activities would have little or no lasting effect at the noise sensitive receptor; and noise levels at this receptor location would be comparable to natural sounds. The duration of these impacts would be temporary, lasting only a few days, would be localized at the sensitive receptor, and would impact resources that are common in context. Overall noise impacts at the sensitive receptor associated with this scenario would be negligible.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release
Because spill response and cleanup efforts to address cyanide spills would not involve loud noise generating equipment or vehicles, overall noise impacts would be considered negligible and no vibration impacts would be expected from this activity.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release
Spill response and cleanup efforts to address mercury spills would not involve loud noise generating equipment or vehicles. Therefore, overall noise impacts due to mercury spill would be negligible and no vibration impact would be expected from this activity.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure
Scenario 9 is a potential partial tailings dam spill. The spill and subsequent response effort would be localized to the spill site; the mine site, Anaconda Creek, upper Crooked Creek, and to a lesser extent, the Kuskokwim River for monitoring activities. Noise sources would include increased air traffic, vehicles transporting the spill response and recovery crew and equipment, and spill cleanup and recovery operations. The nearest noise sensitive receptor from Anaconda Creek and from the mine site would be Crooked Creek, located 9.15 miles from the mine site at the mouth of Crooked Creek. Temporary noise impacts generated from response activities would have little or no lasting effect at these noise sensitive receptors. With the exception of
increased air traffic, noise levels at the receptor locations from remediation activities would be comparable to natural sounds. The duration of these impacts would be temporary, lasting only during response, would be localized at the sensitive receptor, and would impact resources that are common in context. Overall noise impacts at the sensitive receptor associated with this scenario would be negligible to low.

3.24.6.9.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to noise. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

Under Alternative 3A, small LNG spills could result from pinhole leaks from storage tanks or fueling the LNG-fueled trucks. Larger spills could result from an accident involving an LNG-fueled truck that could release up to the full amount of LNG within the truck’s tank. Noise sources would mainly come from vehicles transporting the spill response and recovery crew and equipment, and spill cleanup and recovery operations. The nearest sensitive receptor would be the community of Crooked Creek, located 5.93 miles away.

If a spill were to occur, the impacts would be the same as those discussed under Scenario 4 of Alternative 2.

3.24.6.9.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, spill Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to noise. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on noise as Alternative 2.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 and 2 (ocean or river barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

The diesel pipeline release (either a pinhole leak or a pipeline rupture) portrayed under this scenario could occur anytime during the year, and could occur anywhere along the 334-mile buried pipeline route. Noise impacts under this spill scenario would result from vehicles transporting the spill response and recovery crew and equipment, and spill cleanup and recovery operations. Response efforts would use surface (if in the winter) and air transportation to reach the spill site. The nearest sensitive receptor to the pipeline alignment would be the community of Tyonek, located 0.44 miles from the pipeline alignment.

Response efforts for a pinhole leak could range from low to medium intensity, depending on how quickly the leak had been detected. If the pinhole leak had gone undetected for weeks or
months, the recovery effort would be much greater than those contained within the pipeline ROW. Noise levels would range from barely detectable to readily detectable at the sensitive receptor. Noise impacts would be localized at the sensitive receptor (Tyonek), and common in context. Changes to noise levels would be temporary in duration, lasting several days during the cleanup period, and intermittent as response-related equipment is operated (e.g. aircraft overflights). For a larger pipeline rupture, response efforts would create more readily detectible changes to noise levels at the sensitive receptor. Overall, effects related to noise resulting from Scenario 5 would be minor.

3.24.6.9.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to noise. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

The BTC Port road would be approximately 2.5 times longer than the road proposed under Alternative 2. The increased tanker truck transport distance would inherently increase the probability of a tanker truck release. In addition, equipment usage during operation and construction of the temporary ice road along Crooked Creek valley would also increase the probability of a release. However, while the risk of a diesel release increases under this alternative, the anticipated changes in noise levels at the sensitive receptor (Aniak) under the given tanker truck scenarios are generally the same as those described for Alternative 2.

3.24.6.9.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to noise.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.9.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG Release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to noise.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
3.24.6.10 VEGETATION

3.24.6.10.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for vegetation impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release). For all scenarios, a Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point plan and an Invasive Species Management plan would be in effect.

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

A spill at sea under this scenario would affect primarily marine vegetation, but could also impact shoreline vegetation. Light oils such as diesel fuel are moderately volatile and can leave a residue of up to one-third of the amount spilled after several days, and can leave a film on intertidal resources that has the potential to cause long-term contamination (FWS 2004b). While some toxic substances in an oil spill evaporate quickly, meaning that exposure to the most toxic substances are reduced with time and limited to the initial spill area, non-lethal toxic effects can be more subtle and often longer lasting. For example, aquatic life on reefs and shorelines would be at risk of being smothered by oil that washes ashore. Vegetation can also be poisoned slowly by long-term exposure to oil trapped in shallow water or on beaches (EPA 1999b). One impact of oil spills on plants lies with its coating effect. In order to produce food and energy, a plant must be able to carry out gas exchange with the environment. The coating of oil on the leaves of plants prevents the stomata or pores from receiving carbon dioxide from the air. The result would be slow growth and eventual death of plants.

Floating oil can contaminate algae and other marine plants. Marine algae and seaweeds respond variably to oil, and oil spills may result in die-offs for some species. Algae may die or become more abundant in response to oil spills. Although oil can prevent the germination and growth of marine plants, most vegetation, including kelp, appears to recover after cleanup (FWS 2004b). Oil spills can have an indirect effect on plants through water contamination. A spill could potentially kill algae and plankton. Some animals may also perish with direct contact. If plants and animals die, the amount of ammonia and nitrites in the water increases. Conversely, levels of dissolved oxygen and pH levels decrease. Eventually, the changes in water chemistry can create a toxic environment for both plants and animals, becoming ecological dead zones.

It is assumed that due to the remoteness of such a spill, response efforts could be limited. Overflights would likely be conducted to observe the dispersal of the diesel, to confirm whether or not shoreline contact is predicted, and to direct any protection efforts to environmentally sensitive areas. With 50 percent of the spill assumed to impact the shore, this scenario could be expected to have a major impact on shoreline vegetation within the area where the tides and waves carry the diesel onto shoreline vegetation. The extent would be localized to a narrow fringe along the shore where the spill touches the shore.

In summary, the effects of an ocean barge rupture at sea on vegetation could be medium to high intensity, the duration would be temporary – lasting only as long as the oil persists in the environment; the extent would be local – affecting the immediate vicinity of the spill, and the context common.
Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A spill on the Kuskokwim River could affect both aquatic and shoreline vegetation in the vicinity, as well as downstream of the spill. Vegetation could be damaged or killed from the coating effect or through degradation of water quality. Spill response activities could damage adjacent shoreline vegetation by trampling or crushing from increased vehicle and human activity.

In summary, the effects on vegetation from a river barge grounding that spilled diesel fuel could be medium to high intensity, the duration would be temporary – lasting only as long as the fuel persists in the environment; the extent would be local – affecting the immediate vicinity of the spill and potentially downstream, and the context common as no rare or sensitive plants were identified along the shoreline.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

In the event of a release of diesel from a tank farm there would be minimal effect on vegetation because all diesel spilled would be captured within secondary containment. Recovery would be 100 percent minus loss to evaporation, and cleanup would be complete within hours to a few days.

In summary, the effects on vegetation from a release of diesel fuel at a tank farm would be negligible (or there would be no impacts since the spill would be retained in secondary containment).

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

A release of diesel from a tanker truck rollover or collision could occur and would involve a volume of diesel up to 13,500 gallons. At most, the entire contents of the tanker truck could be released to the environment along the roadbed, including potentially to vegetation and any adjacent open water. Recovery would be limited by potential dispersal to running water (e.g. a stream), as well as by evaporation during the time required to get response equipment to the site. During winter, snow and ice may limit the diesel’s ability to initially reach the vegetation or water; however, it may also disguise cracks in the ice where diesel is able to rapidly reach vegetation or water.

Impacts would include damage to adjacent terrestrial vegetation and possible contamination of adjacent aquatic vegetation. Additionally, impacts also could include potential longer term contamination of the growth medium (soils) and therefore longer term impacts to plants.

In summary, the effects on vegetation from a release of diesel fuel from a tanker truck would be medium to high intensity, the duration would be temporary – lasting only as long as the fuel persists in the environment; the extent would be local – affecting the immediate vicinity of the spill, and the context common.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

If there was a tank-tainer spill at a storage site or the mine site, the resultant spill would be contained, as the tank-tainer would be located in an area that includes secondary containment. There would be no effect on vegetation.
If a truck carrying cyanide tank-tainers had an accident on the road, a tank-tainer rupture could result. If the cyanide briquettes spilled on dry ground, there would be no effect on vegetation. If the sodium cyanide came into contact with water, it would dissolve, and a cyanide release would result. If the cyanide came into contact with water, then both aquatic and terrestrial vegetation could be adversely affected. Cyanide can inhibit respiration and affect a plant's ability to absorb nutrients from soil, in some cases causing plant death. In smaller concentrations, cyanide can diminish new growth and can affect germination of seeds (ATSDR 2006). Shifrin et al. (1996) report that the phytotoxicity of cyanide complexes is directly related to the amount of free cyanide evolved.

Cyanide is highly mobile in soil, meaning that it has high potential to affect plants and other organisms in soil rather than being bound up by soil particles. At low concentrations, soil micro-organisms convert cyanide into hydrogen cyanide and other compounds that evaporate out of soil. At high concentrations, however, cyanide is toxic to the micro-organisms that convert it into evaporative forms, meaning that cyanide not only remains in soil where it can damage plants but also can find its way to groundwater.

The effects on vegetation from a release of cyanide would be medium to high intensity, and the duration would be temporary – lasting only as long as the cyanide persists in the environment. The extent would be local – affecting the immediate vicinity of the spill, and the context common to important.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

If mercury containers are lost overboard and recovered, or released in storage areas into secondary containment, no effects on vegetation would occur.

A low probability potential spill scenario may result from transportation to Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. In the unlikely event that there is an accident and the containers ruptured, a mercury spill (either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon) could result. The liquid elemental mercury and the spent carbon could be released to the land or surface water. Under this scenario, mercury could come into contact with plants (terrestrial species if the spill was on land, or aquatic species if the mercury got into a watercourse). Mercury is variably toxic to plants. Exposure to mercury can reduce photosynthesis, transpiration rate, water uptake, chlorophyll synthesis, and seed viability (Azevedo and Rodriguez 2012). The effect could be medium to high in intensity, local in extent, and temporary in duration.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

An analysis of the effects of the tailings spill scenarios on Wetlands is found in Section 3.24.6.11. The effects on Vegetation are drawn from that analysis.

The disturbance processes discussed in the wetland analysis would impact vegetation through:

- Removal or burial of native soils;
- Removal or burial of vegetation and propagules;
- Reduced soil nutrient availability resulting in delayed regrowth; and
- Exposure to soil conditions (pH) or chemical contaminants that may reduce or prevent vegetation growth.
The effects on non-wetland vegetation would be primarily from deposition of tailings and eroded material, although riparian upland vegetation could be removed by the flood of materials as it moved down Anaconda Creek.

The great majority of vegetation affected would be wetland vegetation. The overall vegetation types that would be affected are shown in Table 3.24-17 and Table 3.24-18 for the two scenarios. More than half of the affected vegetation would be forested.

Table 3.24-17: Acres of Vegetation Affected in the Tailings and Water Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vegetation Type</th>
<th>Area (Acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forested - Deciduous/Mixed</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forested - Coniferous</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrub</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbaceous</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Land Cover</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>473</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.24-18: Acres of Vegetation Affected in the Tailings and Water Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vegetation Type</th>
<th>Area (Acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forested – Deciduous/Mixed</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forested – Coniferous</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrub</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbaceous</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Land Cover</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Data</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,780</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared to the effects of the project as a whole, the effects on vegetation of either scenario would be minor.

3.24.6.10.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to vegetation. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7, 8, and 9
(cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

If released, LNG would transition back into a gaseous phase and if unconfined would not be explosive. In that case no impacts to vegetation would be expected. If a large quantity of LNG was spilled on vegetation, the intense cold would kill at least the above-ground parts of plants encountered before the LNG transitioned back to a gaseous state. In the very unlikely event that a large amount of LNG is spilled on water within a short period of time and there was an ignition source, an explosion could occur and nearby vegetation could catch fire. However, the LNG that would be used at the mine site would be stored and used in areas with little vegetation.

In summary, there would be no effects on vegetation from a release of LNG unless it caused surrounding vegetation to freeze, which would be a high, but very localized impact. If an explosion and fire occurred, effects would be medium to high intensity, the duration would be medium to long-term if vegetation was burned, depending on how long it takes the vegetation cover to regrow, the extent would be local – affecting the immediate vicinity of the spill/ fire, and the context common.

3.24.6.10.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, spill Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to vegetation. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on vegetation as Alternative 2.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 and 2 (ocean or river barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

A high to very high probability, low volume (less than 99.9 gal) potential spill scenario would result from pinhole leaks from the buried diesel pipeline that are detected within days. Because most of these small spills would not reach beyond the immediate vicinity of the pipeline or waterbodies they would have little effect on vegetation. Small spills from pinhole leaks would be restricted in geographic extent and would be unlikely to have measurable impacts on vegetation.

A medium to low probability, medium (100 to 999.9 gal) or large (1,000 to 100,000 gal) volume potential spill scenario would result if a pinhole leak remained undetected for weeks or months. Medium and large volume spills would have a high likelihood of seeping into the soil, sitting above permafrost layers, or moving into nearby waterbodies. Recovery would be limited by potential dispersal to running water (streams, etc.) and by evaporation during the time required to detect the leak and get response equipment to the site. Potential impacts would include damage to vegetation, potentially including rare or sensitive plants known to occur along the pipeline route.
A very large spill would be likely to reach both land and adjacent waterbodies, especially if it occurs in the ice-free seasons and near waterbodies. Large areas of both terrestrial and aquatic vegetation could be damaged. For those spills that do reach waterbodies, especially flowing streams and rivers, the area of impact would be more extensive. Large spills from a rupture in a pipeline would likely be detected quickly by the SCADA system; both automatic and manual responses would be quickly activated to stop and isolate the leak. There are several documented occurrences of rare or sensitive plants along the proposed pipeline route that could be affected by such a spill.

3.24.6.10.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING PORT

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to vegetation. The likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) occurring would be greatly reduced due to shorter barge distances, but the impacts would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.10.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to vegetation. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.10.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG Release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to vegetation. Impacts under fuel release Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.11 WETLANDS

3.24.6.11.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for wetland impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

In this scenario a very large volume of diesel fuel (735,000 gallons) could spill from an ocean-going fuel barge. Failures of this type often involve grounding of the barge with spillage. Sensitive shoreline habitats could be affected and would be the focus of shoreline protection.
Diesel fuel reaching shoreline marshes and intertidal wetlands would likely kill vegetation and associated micro and macro fauna, and it could overwhelm or eliminate most wetland functions. The severity of potential impacts to estuarine and marine wetlands would depend on the amount of diesel reaching the wetlands and the sensitivity of the affected shoreline wetlands.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

In this scenario grounding or other accidents could cause a large release; most unrecovered diesel would likely travel downstream with relatively little impact to shorelines and riverine wetlands. Wind and wave action could transport some of the unrecovered diesel into riverine wetlands where it may damage wetland vegetation. Diesel fuel kills vegetation similar to contact herbicides, with the short-chain and aromatic hydrocarbons causing the most damage by penetrating and destroying cell membranes, causing tissues to die (Walker et al. 1978; McKendrick 1999). If the contacted tissues are vital to the plant’s survival, then the entire plant may die; if not, only the affected tissues may die. Long-chain fractions coat the surface of leaves and stems preventing normal gas exchange and, if sufficient area of the plant is covered, the plant may die (McKendrick 1999).

Because diesel floats on water, a band around the stems of shoreline emergent vegetation and any floating leaves may come in contact with diesel, although roots would be unlikely to be contacted. Herbaceous vegetation is most vulnerable to damage from diesel fuel, and contact with the stems may be sufficient to kill the whole plant (Walker et al. 1978). Shrubs have a protective bark layer and perennating buds that are typically elevated above the soil or water surface, protecting the vital cambium and buds from diesel contact (McKendrick 1999). Diesel oil is readily and completely degraded by naturally occurring microbes, in time frames of one to two months; diesel fuels are unlikely to penetrate saturated riverine wetland soils, and most of the unrecovered spill would evaporate or be dispersed downriver (Walker et al. 1978; Kershaw 1990; Bay 1997; McKendrick 1999). Shoreline cleanup efforts in peat shorelines would be difficult and would potentially cause additional damage to shoreline vegetation (NOAA 2007). Diesel oil is readily and completely degraded by naturally occurring microbes, under time frames of one to two months. Mechanized equipment would do more harm than good to shoreline vegetation in the unlikely event of a diesel spill. Diesel oil is not very sticky or viscous, compared to black oils. When small spills do strand on the shoreline, the oil tends to penetrate porous sediments quickly but also tend to be washed off quickly by waves and tidal flushing. Therefore, peat shorelines would likely be allowed to recover naturally, in which case the oil effects would last longer, but the shoreline habitat would recover faster than if cleanup actions were applied.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Potential spills could arise from a tank rupture, faulty valve or pipeline leak, transfer operation line rupture, or transfer human error. In the tank rupture scenario the large potential volume of spilled diesel fuel (1 million gallons or more) would be contained in secondary containment and would be recovered with no discharge to wetlands. Small volume spills (less than 10 gallons) resulting from the failure of a tank valve would also be contained and recovered with no discharge to wetlands. During a transfer operation line rupture, a medium to large volume of diesel fuel (100 to 2,000 gallons) could leak from a transfer hose at the dock in Dutch Harbor, Bethel, or Angyaruak (Jungjuk). The spill would be 100 percent recovered with sorbents with no
discharge to wetlands. A release during a fuel transfer due to operator error could result in a small volume of diesel fuel (less than 10 gallons) spilling from an overfilled tanker truck. The spill would be recovered with sorbents carried on the truck, and there would be 100 percent recovery with no discharge to wetlands.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

In this scenario a medium to large volume of diesel fuel (up to 13,500 gallons) could be released primarily during the summer shipping season along the road between the port and the mine site during a tanker truck rollover. Although much of the road crosses uplands, it also crosses areas with flat, slope, and riverine wetlands including primarily evergreen forested, evergreen scrub shrub and deciduous scrub shrub wetlands that could be damaged by a large diesel spill. Diesel fuel on wetland vegetation would kill the vegetation on contact. Experimental applications of diesel fuel at a rate of 10 and 12 liters/m² on tundra vegetation resulted in reduction in live cover to a few percent or all vegetation died (Walker et al. 1978; Bay 1997). Mosses showed a delayed response to diesel application in heath habitats (Bay 1997). Recovery was generally better in moist and wet habitats than in dry habitats, but effects remained after 10 years with reductions to several percent live cover with the exception to mosses that returned to 53 percent cover in wet fen habitats (Bay 1997). Diesel fuel spray on wetland and upland forest vegetation would kill leaves of deciduous trees and shrubs and ground cover vegetation on contact. The surface contact effects of diesel fuel on evergreen trees, shrubs, and sub-shrubs like Labrador tea may be more moderate as the waxy coatings may delay penetration. While diesel is toxic to wetland flora and fauna in high concentrations, lower concentrations may have little effect. At lower concentrations engineered wetlands have been used successfully to decrease the concentrations of diesel, cyanide, and mercury in aquatic systems (Kadlec and Knight 1996; Palmroth et al. 2002; Weis and Weis 2004; Gessner et al. 2005; Imfeld et al. 2009).

Most spill impact studies in Alaska have addressed effects of North Slope crude oil spills on arctic tundra vegetation and interior black spruce forests (Jenkins et al. 1978; Walker et al. 1978; Kershaw 1990; Collins et al. 1994; McKendrick 1999). Studies that have evaluated both crude and diesel oil spills usually find that diesel is more toxic to vascular plants and mosses and that damage is usually reduced by wetter conditions (Hutchinson and Freedman 1978; Walker et al. 1978; Holt 1987; Bay 1997). Drier soils allow the fuel to penetrate to the root zone; diesel will remain at the soil saturation level. Where diesel fuel penetrates soils it damages root tissues on contact, and it creates hydrophobic soils which limits water availability to plants (McKendrick 1999). Soil water relations remain impaired until microbes degrade the oil, which in turn imbalances carbon:nutrient ratios as microbes increase to decompose the hydrocarbons (McKendrick 1999). The increased microbial activity can deprive vascular and non-vascular plants of vital nutrients (McKendrick 1999). Diesel fuel that reaches the roots of trees would likely kill the trees although it may take several years for death to be apparent (Collins et al. 1994).

Cleanup would be completed within 7 to 10 days and would include sorbent, trenching, on-water recovery, snow and ice removal, and in situ burning. Because diesel fuel causes contact damage to wetland vegetation, limiting the spread of the spill and preventing the diesel from penetrating the soil would limit damages. Burning is generally used after other methods of removal have been applied to remove as much of the spilled product as possible (Cater 2010). An experimental burn of a wet polygon trough after an experimental oil spill in Prudhoe Bay found that all vegetation was dead within the burned area a year after the burn; that vegetation
had not recovered after 5 years, but had recovered completely after 24 years (McKendrick 1999). If diesel pools in wetlands, burning could create sufficient heat to allow the diesel to penetrate the root zones and could cause permafrost melting (Cater 2010). Burning the polygon trough did not cause permafrost melting in the arctic (McKendrick 1999); but oil spills and fires in interior boreal forest habitats with warmer permafrost will likely cause melting and subsidence (Collins et al. 1994; Post 1996).

A very small volume of diesel fuel (less than 10 gallons) could leak from a damaged valve during a minor collision; the spill would be contained on the road and recovered using sorbents with no discharge to wetlands.

**Scenario 7: Cyanide Release**

Potential impacts from cyanide spills in wetlands depend on the concentrations and potential dilution effects. Should a container be punctured and the sodium cyanide contents come in contact with water, hydrogen cyanide gas would be released and pose immediate toxic and acute health dangers. In this case, an area evacuation should be conducted. Only trained emergency responders with the proper personal protective equipment (PPE) should address a sodium cyanide spill.

In wetlands, aerobic and anaerobic microbes can destroy cyanide, which may lessen the effects of cyanide in general in wetland ecosystems. Natural processes may be insufficient to treat cyanide in the event of a spill; flow-through treatment wetlands in temperate regions have been used to reduce total and free cyanide during a 7 day detention by 56 and 88 percent, respectively (Gessner et al. 2005). Certain wetland plants such as willows can ingest and metabolically degrade cyanide (Gessner et al. 2005); however, elevated cyanide can inhibit plant respiration, and at lower concentrations, effects include inhibition of germination and growth (Eisler and Wiemeyer 2004). In general, plants are less sensitive to concentrations of cyanide that are lethal to animals. Adverse effects on aquatic plants are unlikely at concentrations that cause acute effects on most fish and invertebrates (Eisler and Wiemeyer 2004). Cyanide would likely kill wetland fauna. Flow-through treatment wetlands in temperate regions have been used to reduce total and free cyanide during a 7 day detention by 56 and 88 percent, respectively (Gessner et al. 2005).

**Scenario 8: Mercury Release**

Potential impacts from mercury spills in wetlands depend on the concentrations and potential dilution effects. Uptake of mercury is plant specific in bryophytes, lichens, and wetland plants (Patra and Sharma 2000). In freshwater aquatic vascular plants uptake rate depends on the plant species, seasonal growth-rate changes, and the form of the metal ion (Patra and Sharma 2000). Mercury affects photosynthesis by replacing magnesium and breaking down the photosynthesis reaction, and at low concentrations mercury also interferes with microbial degradation reactions (Patra and Sharma 2000). Toxic effects may include reduced seed germination, reduced seedling vigor, chromosomal abnormalities, reduced growth (root, stem, leaf area, and dry-matter production), foliar injury, reduced chlorophyll and phytomass (Patra and Sharma 2000).

Wetlands may act as sources or sinks of metals. Studies of sources of methyl mercury in boreal forest ecosystem wetland catchments determined that these catchments acted as sources. Upland catchments were primarily sinks (St. Louis et al. 1996). Wetland plants may export up
50 percent of mercury within a wetland, with retention level related to mercury sequestration variation within above- or below-ground plant structures by species (Weis and Weis 2004). At non-injurious levels, other studies have reported mercury removal at a rate of about 17 percent within temperate wetlands (Kadlec and Knight 1996). Developing techniques have successfully removed mercury from wetland systems through treatment with metal based salts (Ackerman et al 2015).

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

Burge and Cuervo (2015) identified three categories of physical disturbance that affected vegetation and wetlands after a tailings dam failure that released a slurry of tailings and water:

- Erosion, removal of native vegetation and exposure of native materials;
- Erosion followed by deposition, deposited materials left at the surface with no underlying native soils or vegetation; and
- Deposition, deposited materials overlying intact native vegetation and soils with little or no evidence of prior erosion.

These disturbance processes would impact wetlands through:

- Removal or burial of native wetland soils;
- Removal or burial of wetland vegetation and propagules;
- Reduced soil nutrient availability resulting in delayed regrowth;
- Exposure to soil conditions (pH) or chemical contaminants that may reduce or prevent wetland vegetation growth; and
- Altered hydrologic flow patterns (Andrusiak et al. 2015).

Erosion is expected to be greatest where flow depths are modeled to be highest, near the release point and within the Anaconda Creek valley (Figure 3.24-2 and Figure 3.24-4). Erosion from the water only spill would still occur, although erosion may be reduced compared to the more viscous slurry of water and tailings. Erosion would also be expected to be reduced in winter because of frozen soils, although if the flow also transports large chunks of ice, vegetation damage may not be reduced. Eroded materials would be deposited as water velocity slows, and broken vegetation would be deposited in strand lines as floodwaters recede. Deposition of eroded materials would increase where flow depths are lower or where flow is impeded such as at stream meanders or at the confluence of Anaconda and Crooked Creek for both the tailings and water slurry and for the water only spill.

Interpreting erosion and deposition disturbance as described by Burge and Cuervo (2015) to potential wetland impacts as described by the BGC (2015n) modeled spills based on flow depth: erosion may primarily occur at flow depths of 10 feet or higher; erosion and depositions may primarily occur at flow depths of less than 10 feet to 3 feet; and deposition may primarily occur at flow depths of less than 3 feet. Based on this interpretation and the modeled spills, an estimated 446 acres of wetlands would be disturbed by the slurry of tailings and water, with 64 percent of these wetlands within the spill trajectory affected by the combination of erosion and deposition (Table 3.24-19). For the water only spill an estimated 1,487 acres of wetlands would be disturbed, with 58 percent of these wetlands affected primarily by deposition (Table 3.24-20).
### Table 3.24-19: Piping Failure - Tailings and Water: Preliminary Calculation of Wetland Categories by Maximum Flow Depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wetland Category</th>
<th>Flow Depth (acres)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erosion (≥ 10 ft)</td>
<td>Erosion and Deposition (≥ 3 ft to &lt; 10 ft)</td>
<td>Deposition (&lt; 3 ft)</td>
<td>Impact Area (acres)</td>
<td>Area (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evergreen Forested Wetlands</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciduous Forested Wetlands</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Forested Wetlands</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<td>Evergreen Scrub Shrub Wetlands</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>124.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>221.2</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<td>Deciduous Scrub Shrub Wetlands</td>
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<td>37.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbaceous Wetlands</td>
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<td>21.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent Streams (miles)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perennial Streams (miles)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uplands</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (acre)</td>
<td>116.8</td>
<td>304.1</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>473.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetland Area (%, acre)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>445.4</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Proportion of total study area by wetland category. Note that mosaic classes calculated as 100% wetlands overestimate the wetland area proportion.
2. NA = Not Applicable  0 = None  0.0 = < 0.1

### Table 3.24-20: Piping Failure - Water Only: Preliminary Calculation of Wetland Categories by Maximum Flow Depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wetland Category</th>
<th>Flow Depth (acres)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erosion (≥ 10 ft)</td>
<td>Erosion and Deposition (≥ 3 ft to &lt; 10 ft)</td>
<td>Deposition (&lt; 3 ft)</td>
<td>Area (acres)</td>
<td>Area (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evergreen Forested Wetlands</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>158.8</td>
<td>267.9</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciduous Forested Wetlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Forested Wetlands</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>147.6</td>
<td>263.2</td>
<td>411.0</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evergreen Scrub Shrub Wetlands</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>159.7</td>
<td>180.7</td>
<td>410.2</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciduous Scrub Shrub Wetlands</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>175.9</td>
<td>265.4</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbaceous Wetlands</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.24-20: Piping Failure - Water Only: Preliminary Calculation of Wetland Categories by Maximum Flow Depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wetland Category</th>
<th>Flow Depth (acres)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erosion (≥ 10 ft)</td>
<td>Erosion and Deposition (≥ 3 ft to &lt; 10 ft)</td>
<td>Deposition (&lt; 3 ft)</td>
<td>Area (acres)</td>
<td>Area¹ (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>117.3</td>
<td>166.7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent Streams (miles)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perennial Streams (miles)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uplands</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>104.9</td>
<td>112.2</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (acre)</td>
<td>119.8</td>
<td>563.7</td>
<td>1,093.2</td>
<td>1,776.6</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetland Area (%, acre)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>1,487.2</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1 Proportion of total study area by wetland category. Note that mosaic classes calculated as 100% wetlands overestimate the wetland area proportion.

NA = Not Applicable 0 = None 0.0 = < 0.1

Source: 3PPI et al. 2014, BGC 2015n.

Deposition of tailings and eroded materials would be expected to increase where flow depths are lower or where flow is impeded such as at meander bends or at the confluence of Anaconda and Crooked Creek (Figure 3.24-2). Alluvial forest vegetation, especially cottonwoods and willows are adapted to periodic flooding and deposition of sediments and woody debris. Thick deposits of tailings materials, however, prevent infiltration of water from the surface and limit air exchange in the root zone (Adrusiak et al. 2015). Soil pH may be altered and soil nutrient availability would likely be decreased due to deposition of tailings (Adrusiak et al. 2015). Interpreting potential wetland disturbance from the BGC (2015n) modeled spill based on deposition depth: deposition of less than 0.5 foot was considered light burial; deposition of 0.5 foot to less than 3 feet was considered moderate burial; and deposition of 3 feet or more was considered heavy burial (Table 3.24-21). An estimated 442 acres of wetlands would be covered by tailings, with 52 percent of these wetlands affected by heavy burial with 3 feet or more of tailings (Table 3.24-21).

Cleanup efforts would focus on removal of tailings and return to the TSF. Some impairment of wetland functions would be likely to persist beyond cleanup. Burial or fill of wetlands and waters in the Anaconda Creek, and Crooked Creek watersheds would alter or remove their capacity to provide hydrologic, biogeochemical, and biological functions. Between 1 and 5 percent of the mine site study area wetlands that were modeled as high-functioning for hydrologic functions would be altered by deposition of tailings from the spill (Table 3.24-22; 3PPI 2014b; BGC 2015n). These altered hydrologic functions could extend to the streams connected to or downstream from the affected wetlands. A total of 3.9 miles of streams would be directly affected by tailings deposition, including 3.8 miles of perennial streams and 0.1 mile of intermittent streams (Table 3.24-21; 3PPI et al. 2014). Wetlands affected by tailings deposition...
seem to include 1 to 4 percent, depending on the function, of high functioning wetlands for biogeochemical and biological functions (Table 3.24-22).

Table 3.24-21: Piping Failure – Tailings and Water:
Preliminary Calculation of Wetland Categories by Burial Depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wetland Category</th>
<th>Burial Depth (acres)</th>
<th>Area (acres)</th>
<th>Area¹ (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light (&lt; 0.5 ft)</td>
<td>Moderate (≥ 0.5 ft to &lt; 3 ft)</td>
<td>Heavy (≥ 3 ft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evergreen Forested Wetlands</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciduous Forested Wetlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Forested Wetlands</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evergreen Scrub Shrub Wetlands</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciduous Scrub Shrub Wetlands</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbaceous Wetlands</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponds</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent Streams (miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perennial Streams (miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uplands</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (acre)</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>147.9</td>
<td>251.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetland Area (%, acre)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1 Proportion of impact area by wetland category. Note that mosaic classes calculated as 100% wetlands overestimate the wetland area proportion.

NA = Not Applicable  0 = None  0.0 = < 0.1

Source: 3PPI et al. 2014; BGC 2015n.
### Table 3.24-22: Piping Failure - Tailings and Water: Preliminary Calculation of Wetland HGM Categories by Preliminary Wetland Function Ratings for the Deposition Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wetland Function Models</th>
<th>FCI Model Rating</th>
<th>HGM Class</th>
<th>Study Area (acres)</th>
<th>Area (%)</th>
<th>Impact Criteria (Magnitude)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flat¹</td>
<td>Slope</td>
<td>Riverine</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hydrologic Functions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modification of Groundwater Discharge</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>144.4</td>
<td>161.8</td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td>420.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modification of Groundwater Recharge</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>144.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>148.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110.4</td>
<td>112.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Storm and Floodwater Storage</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>90.9</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>146.5</td>
<td>168.0</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>40.8</td>
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<td>Modification of Water Quality</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
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<td>44.8</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>178.8</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>395.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Export of Detritus</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>143.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>110.4</td>
<td>129.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biological Functions</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Abundance and Diversity of Wetland Flora</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>144.3</td>
<td>169.9</td>
<td>110.4</td>
<td>424.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abundance and Diversity of Wetland Fauna</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>113.9</td>
<td>234.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>205.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. A small area (0.9 acres) of depression HGM class is included under the flat HGM class.
2. Proportion of Impact Area within Mine Site Study Area by Functional Capacity Index (FCI) rating (Low > 0 and < 0.33; Moderate (Mod) ≥ 0.33 and < 0.66; High ≥ 0.66). Note that mosaic classes calculated as 100% wetlands overestimates the wetland area.
3. Source: 3PPI 2014b; BGC 2015n.
3.24.6.11.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to wetlands. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 and 8 (cyanide and mercury releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

Small spills that would be unlikely to reach wetlands could occur from pinhole leaks in storage tanks or during truck fueling. While non-toxic to vegetation, the temperature of LNG would freeze wetland vegetation on contact. The extent of damage from contact with vegetation would be influenced by the extent of the spill and for some plants may depend on the season. Snow cover would likely provide some protection for ground and low-shrub cover, such that spills to vegetation in summer would likely cause more damage to these vegetation layers.

3.24.6.11.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, spill Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to wetlands. Scenarios 7 and 8 (cyanide and mercury releases) would have the same impacts on wetlands as Alternative 2.

During construction, impacts from Scenarios 1, through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) would be the same as Alternative 2, but after the diesel pipeline is in operation much of the risk of diesel and other oil spills from barging and trucking described under Alternative 2 would be shifted from the Kuskokwim River to Cook Inlet and to the diesel pipeline route. Diesel handling spill scenarios would shift from Dutch Harbor, Bethel, and the Kuskokwim River to Tyonek, Cook Inlet, and the diesel pipeline route. However, if a release did occur, impacts to wetlands would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. During construction at the mine and prior to completion of the diesel pipeline some requirements for barge fuel deliveries would remain, however, and spill impact descriptions in Alternative 2 would apply. Because diesel would be primarily delivered by pipeline, the risk of accidents would be reduced, but there would be new risks of spills from the pipeline.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

Most pipeline leaks would be expected to occur in uplands because about 73 percent of the pipeline ROW is upland and 27 percent is wetland. Small spills would be expected to remain within the ROW, but could move along the groundwater surface or collect at the top of the permafrost active layer. Diesel components in the soil may be slow to degrade, and extensive contact with plant roots would cause plant death (Collins et al. 1994). Recovery, cleanup, and repair would likely require excavation of the pipeline, which would require removal of any vegetation cover and would disturb the soil. A diesel pipeline rupture could result in major, long-term impacts to wetlands.
3.24.6.11.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to wetlands. The likelihood of Scenarios 2 and 4 (river barge and tanker truck release) occurring would be higher, but the impacts would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 3, 7, and 8 (ocean barge, tank farm, cyanide, and mercury releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.11.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to wetlands.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.11.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to wetlands.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 and 8 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, and mercury releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.12 WILDLIFE

3.24.6.12.1 TERRESTRIAL MAMMALS

Alternative 2 – Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for terrestrial mammal impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenarios 1 through 4: Ocean or River Barge, Tank Farm, or Tanker Truck Releases

Potential fuel spills on land would likely be limited to roads, workpads, and ROWs during construction and would most likely be very small (less than 10 gallons) or small (10 to 100 gallons) spills of diesel. Such spills would likely be contained and cleaned up relatively quickly and, given their occurrence on gravel areas with high levels of human and vehicle disturbance, would be unlikely to pose a risk of contamination for terrestrial mammals. Scenarios such as fuel truck accidents, where spills could reach terrestrial habitats adjacent to the road, ROW, or pad, are expected to occur rarely but could involve larger volumes of fuel (up to 13,500 gallons) spills. Such accidents could cause injury and mortality for any terrestrial mammals that happened to be in the impact zone, but this would most likely involve small numbers of small
mammals such as voles and shrews. Such serious accidental spills would be addressed immediately by cleanup and safety crews. Contaminated areas could be cordoned off while cleanup operations were completed. It is unlikely that additional terrestrial mammals would be exposed to the spill area due to the high level of disturbance and safety measures taken at the site.

However, such large spills would be more likely to seep into groundwater or escape into nearby water bodies (streams, rivers, and ponds). A similar situation could arise from potential spills that occur directly into water, such as from fuel barges traveling on the Kuskokwim River. As a result of such rare events, if they occurred, terrestrial mammals could be exposed to diesel on the surface of these water bodies, especially those like beavers and moose that spend substantial amounts of time in water and shoreline habitats. The physiological effects of hydrocarbon ingestion or inhalation by terrestrial mammals is rarely studied, except with laboratory animals intentionally exposed to various compounds, and most research in the field has been conducted on marine mammals. Although a number of severe effects have been documented in water birds and marine mammals exposed to crude oil spills, the potential for exposure to more volatile diesel fuel and the abilities of different species to sense contaminated waters and avoid them is not known. Potential effects on terrestrial mammals from eating contaminated fish or other aquatic animals or vegetation are also poorly known and would likely depend on many exposure variables, including the type of contaminant, quantity and duration of the exposure, and physiological condition of the animal. It is possible that a large diesel spill could have serious physiological effects on any terrestrial mammals that are sufficiently exposed to the spill, but the mechanisms for that exposure, the numbers of each species involved, and the resulting effects on the survival or reproductive capacities of those animals cannot be predicted. For terrestrial mammals that might be so exposed, the numbers are expected to be small and too few for population-level effects.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

Tank-tainers lost overboard from an ocean or river barge that were recovered without rupturing would have no effect on terrestrial mammals.

If a release were to occur at a storage site at the mine site, the resultant spill would be contained, as the tank-tainer would be located in an area that includes secondary containment. There would be no effect on terrestrial mammals.

If a truck carrying cyanide tank-tainers had an accident on the road, a tank-tainer rupture could result. If the spilled cyanide briquettes spilled on dry ground, there would be no effect on terrestrial mammals. If the sodium cyanide came into contact with water, it would dissolve; and the resulting hydrogen cyanide would be highly toxic to all wildlife that came into contact with the hydrogen cyanide. The concentrations and extent would depend on the quantity of cyanide spilled into the water and the volume of water. Even a spill in a puddle or rain could release toxic Hydrogen Cyanide gas. Initial isolation of the spill site from unprotected people or animals would be 0.1 mile for a small spill or 0.2 mile for a larger spill, and the downwind protection zone would be 0.1 to 0.2 mile for daytime or 0.2 to 0.9 mile for night. Cleanup would be limited to removing and protecting the undissolved sodium cyanide briquettes from further potential contact with the water. Spill residue would be properly disposed. The cyanide already dissolved cannot be recovered and would be left to disperse naturally, which would likely be completed by the time cleanup could be initiated. If the cyanide came into contact with water,
then both aquatic and terrestrial mammals could be adversely affected. Although cyanide reacts readily in the environment and degrades or forms complexes and salts of varying stabilities, it is toxic to many living organisms at very low concentrations. Fish and aquatic invertebrates are particularly sensitive to cyanide exposure. Cyanide has low persistence in the environment and is not reported to be accumulated or stored in any mammals. There is no reported biomagnification of cyanide in the food chain.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

In the unlikely event that there was a mercury spill in the storage areas either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon would be released from the containers and collected in secondary containment. Spilled mercury would be recovered and managed appropriately. Terrestrial mammals may be affected by sublethal concentrations of mercury that reduce overall fitness or by reduction of food supply if organisms they feed on are affected by the mercury.

A low probability potential spill scenario may result from truck transportation of mercury containers to Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port. In the unlikely event that there is a truck accident and the containers ruptured, a mercury spill (either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon) could result. The liquid elemental mercury and the spent carbon could be released to the land or surface water. If elemental mercury is spilled, some of it would be emitted as gaseous mercury, which could be highly toxic to animals. However, with all the expected activity at the site of an accident and cleanup, few, if any, terrestrial mammals would be expected to be exposed to it. There would be no loss of food supply. If spilled mercury escapes cleanup efforts, it would be subject to natural methylation processes and would add incrementally to the mercury levels in background and air depositions, thus increasing the chronic exposure of aquatic biota and fish and, since it bioaccumulated, it would also increase exposure to fish-eating animals.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

An analysis of the effects of the tailings spill scenarios on Wetlands is found in Section 3.24.6.11, and the effects on Vegetation are found in Section 3.24.6.10. The disturbance processes discussed in the wetland analysis would impact wildlife habitat through:

- Removal or burial of native soils;
- Removal or burial of vegetation;
- Reduced soil nutrient availability resulting in delayed regrowth;
- Alteration of stream morphology and aquatic habitat in Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek; and
- Elimination or burial of aquatic invertebrate communities and other prey species important to the diet of some wildlife species.

More than 360 acres of forested habitat and 60 acres of shrub habitat could be affected by the tailings and water scenario; or about 1,150 acres of forested habitat and 175 acres of shrub habitat could be affected by the water-only scenario. Aquatic habitat effects could range from about 21 acres to about 150 acres, depending on the scenario.

In addition to habitat effects, wildlife that might be in the path of the flood of materials would be subject to drowning, burial or other direct effects. Effects could include exposure to soil
conditions (pH) or chemical contaminants that may be toxic. Based on the Ecological Risk Assessment for the water in the TSF, acute effects are not likely.

Species most affected would be ones that spend most of their time in the aquatic or riparian areas, such as water birds, otters, and voles. The area affected would not contain whole populations of any of the wildlife species, and the overall effects would be minor compared with the Project Area as a whole or to the wildlife in the region.

**Alternative 3A - Reduced Diesel Barging: LNG-Powered Haul Trucks**

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to terrestrial mammals. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailing releases) for Alternative 3A would have the same impacts on terrestrial mammals as Alternative 2.

**Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release**

Under this scenario, an LNG release would occur at the mine site. With the level of human activity at the site, terrestrial mammals would not be expected to come to within a close enough vicinity to be affected by an LNG release.

**Alternative 3B - Reduced Diesel Barging: Diesel Pipeline**

Under Alternative 3B, spill Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to terrestrial mammals. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on terrestrial mammals as Alternative 2.

**Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release**

Under Alternative 3B, a very large spill (greater than 100,000 gallons) would be a very unlikely event that could not be cleaned up quickly and would probably involve some contamination of groundwater and surface waters. Depending on where and when such an event occurred, it could cause injury and mortality for a number of terrestrial mammals, especially small mammals that cannot flee the area quickly. However, after a response was mounted to stabilize and repair the damage, the area would be subject to a great deal of human activity and substantial disturbance that would effectively inhibit terrestrial mammals from entering the area, thus minimizing the potential for exposure. The spill area may take a long time to recover and would represent a loss of habitat. The value and extent of that habitat loss would depend on the extent of the spill, its location, and the success of remediation efforts.

**Alternative 4 - Birch Tree Crossing (BTC) Port**

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to terrestrial mammals. The likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 7
through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

**Alternative 5A – Dry Stack Tailings**

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to terrestrial mammals.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

**Alternative 6A – Modified Natural Gas Pipeline Alignment: Dalzell Gorge Route**

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to terrestrial mammals.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

### 3.24.6.12.2 MARINE MAMMALS

**Alternative 2 – Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action**

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for marine mammal impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

**Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea**

Most studies on the effects of hydrocarbon contamination on marine mammals pertain to crude oil spills (e.g., Garshelis and Johnson 2013; Geraci and St. Aubin 1988; Geraci 1990; Matkin et al. 2008; St. Aubin 1990), although some of the effects of the lighter constituents of crude oil may be comparable to diesel fuel contamination. Direct impacts of fuel spills on marine mammals may include sublethal effects from ingestion, irritation of eyes, mucous membranes, and the respiratory system, neurological disorders and liver damage, and impaired thermoregulation (St. Aubin 1990). Geraci and St. Aubin (1988) note an event that occurred in 1970 that described seals in Alaska as having “a glazed look in their eyes” and appearing disoriented after coming in contact with a light diesel fuel spill. Cetaceans are more likely to experience impacts through inhalation or ingestion, as their epidermis acts as an effective barrier to noxious substances found in petroleum, including gasoline (Geraci 1990). Indirect impacts could include contamination of prey resources and foraging habitat.

The marine mammals along the Bering Sea ocean barge corridor include minke whales, beluga whales, killer whales, harbor porpoises, and Dall’s porpoises. Although gray whales occur in the eastern Bering Sea, they are generally only there during migration prior to and after the proposed shipping season, so they are unlikely to be encountered or impacted by spills occurring along the barge corridor between Dutch Harbor and Bethel. Small and very small spills are unlikely to impact most cetaceans, as they are highly mobile with large ranges relative to the small, localized area that would be affected and short time period over which dispersion
or evaporation would occur. In such a case, the magnitude would be low, duration temporary, and extent local, although the context is important, given legislative protection of all marine mammals under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). In the event of a large or very large spill in the vicinity of cetaceans, injury is more likely to occur such that the magnitude would be medium (detectable injuries), although the duration of the event-causing injury would be discrete and, thus, temporary. The geographic extent would depend on the breadth of the spill and area over which it dispersed, so could range from local to regional. Few pinnipeds would be affected by an ocean barge rupture at sea, since major haulouts in or near Bristol Bay are well beyond the barge corridor. If a rupture were to occur nearer to Kuskokwim Bay and currents and winds dispersed the fuel shoreward prior to evaporation, some seals could encounter fuel and experience short-term, but noticeable physical effects (medium magnitude or intensity) in localized areas of the spill or fuel dispersal range. Potential impacts of an ocean barge rupture on non-threatened or endangered marine mammals would range from negligible to moderate, depending on the size and location of a spill, proximity to marine mammals, and wind and weather conditions.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A diesel fuel spill due either to grounding or collision on the Kuskokwim River could result in the same type of effects on marine mammals as described above for an ocean barge rupture. Small or very small spills are most likely to occur and would likely be contained and/or disperse and evaporate fairly quickly. Pinnipeds, primarily harbor/ spotted seals, would have to be at the spill site at the time of occurrence to incur physical effects derived from breathing or ingesting the fuel. Although of low probability of occurrence, a large or very large spill would have a correspondingly greater footprint, potentially moving downstream from the spill site toward Kuskokwim Bay. In such an instance, the potential for a seal to contact diesel increases, as does the possibility of consuming fish contaminated by the fuel.

The frequency of occurrence of pinnipeds in the lower Kuskokwim River (11-68 sightings of harbor/ spotted seals per year, 2007-2009) is variable and generally low; occurrence further diminishes upriver. Harbor porpoises and belugas are rare in the Kuskokwim River, and killer whales have never been seen in the river. The potential for direct contact with diesel fuel, were a spill to occur in the Kuskokwim River, is low. If such were to occur, the magnitude would range from low to medium (from imperceptible to detectible without population effects), the duration of both the event and the effects would be temporary, the extent local (but ranging from the spill location to some distance down river with a larger spill), and the context important. The overall impact of a river barge diesel release would be negligible to minor for non-threatened and endangered marine mammals in the Kuskokwim River.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Spills at storage tanks at the mine site would have no effect on marine mammals. Storage tanks at Dutch Harbor, Bethel, and Angyaruq (Jungjuk) Port would be used for transferring diesel among forms of transportation (e.g., from ocean barge to river barge and river barge to truck). All storage tanks would have secondary containment equal to a minimum of 110 percent of the total maximum volume of the largest tank. Only in the extremely unlikely event of simultaneous failure of secondary containment of multiple tanks would diesel be released to the surrounding environment. Under such circumstances, and if contamination of the surrounding
environment includes nearby marine or riverine waterways, small numbers of marine mammals could encounter diesel from a tank farm release.

However, since it is assumed that a diesel spill would be contained and recovered, it would not spread to adjacent waters, resulting in little chance for marine mammals to contact the diesel fuel. The impacts of a tank farm release on marine mammals would be of low intensity (effects would not likely be noticeable), of temporary duration (lasting only as long as the recovery and cleanup operations), extent of effects would be local (limited to the immediate area of the spill), and the context for MMPA-protected marine mammals would be important. The summary impact level of a tank farm release on marine mammals would, therefore, be negligible to minor.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Fuel spills resulting from a tanker truck incident are unlikely to affect marine mammals. The on-land release, small to very small volume for most spills, and the on-board spill response kits further minimize potential for impact to waterways. Furthermore, marine mammal sightings are rare as far up the Kuskokwim River as Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. Since a spill emanating from a tanker truck is not likely to affect areas used by marine mammals in the Project Area, there would be no anticipated effects of such a spill on marine mammals.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

None of the transport scenarios for cyanide would release cyanide into the environment where marine mammals may occur. Therefore, no effects from cyanide would be expected. If a cyanide tank-tainer was lost in the water where marine mammals occur, the activity associated with recovering it would have minor effects on them if they were present.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

None of the transport scenarios for mercury would release mercury into the environment where marine mammals may occur. Therefore, no effects from mercury would be expected. If a mercury container was lost in the water where marine mammals occur, the activity associated with recovering it would have minor effects on them if they were present.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

Spills resulting from a partial tailings dam failure are unlikely to affect marine mammals. A water only spill could potentially reach the Kuskokwim River; however, it would rapidly be diluted, and marine mammal sightings are rare as far up the river as Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. Since a spill emanating from a tailings dam is not likely to affect areas used by marine mammals in the Project Area, there would be no anticipated effects.

Alternative 3A – Reduced Diesel Barging: LNG-Powered Haul Trucks

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to marine mammals. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under scenarios and 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

Under this scenario, an LNG release would occur at the mine site and marine mammals would not be affected by an LNG release.

Alternative 3B – Reduced Diesel Barging: Diesel Pipeline

Under Alternative 3B, spill Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to marine mammals. The likelihood of Scenarios 2 through 4 (river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same as Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would have the same impacts on marine mammals as Alternative 2.

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Under this alternative, a diesel pipeline from Tyonek to the mine site would eliminate diesel fuel barge up the Kuskokwim River during the operational and closure phases, but not during the construction phase, which would remain as under Alternative 2. During construction, the potential for an ocean barge rupture and spill along the Western Alaska delivery route from Dutch Harbor to Bethel and resulting effects on marine mammals would be the same as discussed under Alternative 2.

During the operational and closure phases, diesel would be delivered by ocean-going vessel to an expanded fuel dock at Tyonek, resulting in an increased spill risk from ocean barge rupture for the Cook Inlet delivery route under Alternative 3B. In the event of such an occurrence, the impacts would be as described above under Alternative 2. Harbor seals occur in the area, although major haul-outs are south of the proposed barge route. In the event of small or very small spills, the magnitude would be low, duration temporary, and extent local, although the context is important, given legislative protection of all marine mammals under the MMPA. In the event of a large or very large spill in the vicinity of marine mammals, injury is more likely to occur, such that the magnitude would be medium (detectible injuries), although the duration of the event causing injury would be discrete and, thus, temporary. The geographic extent would depend on the breadth of the spill and area over which it dispersed, so could range from local to regional. Potential impacts of an ocean barge rupture on non-threatened or endangered marine mammals would range from negligible to moderate, depending on the size and location of a spill, proximity to marine mammals, and wind and weather conditions.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

The proposed diesel pipeline would begin in Tyonek and connect to Beluga, after which it would cross the Beluga River. Spills occurring along this segment of the pipeline route, particularly where it crosses the river, could impact marine mammals. Pipeline leak detection technology may identify a leak and shut down flow quickly, but containment and cleanup response can vary. The proximity of this segment of the pipeline to Beluga and Tyonek should facilitate intense response efforts once a leak is detected. The magnitude and extent of impact depend on the time of year, size of the spill, and how quickly it disperses. Harbor seals forage at the mouth of the Beluga River during summer months and could either be directly impacted by skin or nasal contact with the spilled diesel or indirectly impacted if prey species are contaminated. Magnitude could range from low to medium, depending on the season, presence of and numbers of seals, duration would likely be temporary (occur during a discrete event),
the extent generally localized to the area near to the spill, although the impact zone depends on
the size of the release, time to detection, season, and weather conditions. The context for marine
mammals is important. Impacts from a pipeline release would range from negligible to minor.

Alternative 4 – Birch Tree Crossing (BTC) Port

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are
not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to marine mammals.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker
truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those
discussed under Alternative 2.

Alternative 5A – Dry Stack Tailings

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings
releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to marine mammals.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker
truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same
as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Alternative 6A – Modified Natural Gas Pipeline Alignment: Dalzell Gorge Route

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not
applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to marine mammals.

Impacts under fuel release Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank
farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the
same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.12.3 Birds

Alternative 2 – Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for bird
impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 2
would be the same as those discussed under terrestrial mammals, except that birds that use
affected wetland areas may also be affected by sublethal concentrations of mercury that reduce
overall fitness or by reduction of food supply if organisms they feed on are affected by the
mercury.

It is important to note that diesel is considered “light” oil, and the effects will differ from
“heavy” oils such as crude oil. Light oils are more acutely toxic than heavy, and also less sticky
with a tendency to be washed off more quickly. Under fuel release Scenarios 1 through 4, the
bulk of research that has been done on birds encompasses all types of oil, and so the discussion
of scenario impacts does as well.
Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Since diesel floats, the animals most affected by oil spills are animals like seabirds that are found on the sea surface or on shorelines if the oil comes ashore. During most oil spills, seabirds are harmed and killed in greater numbers than other kinds of creatures (NOAA 2014b).

The types of birds most affected by an oil spill at sea are those that spend a majority of their time on the surface of the water such as gulls, geese, ducks, auks, grebes, terns, and loons. If the oil reaches shore, shorebirds and songbirds may be affected, as well as any birds that use contaminated habitats. Migratory birds may be affected if critical migration staging, foraging or resting areas are contaminated, especially if the spill occurred during a season of high migratory bird use. Birds that feed in contaminated areas, such as raptors and piscivorous birds, can also be adversely affected.

The assessment of oil spill impacts to migratory birds is based on a combination of risk factors, such as probability of a spill, spill size, spill duration, weather conditions, and effectiveness of oil spill response (Stehn and Platte 2000). Spills of more than 10,000 gallons involving a barge transporting petroleum products in Alaska did not occur between January 1995 through July 2013, and a spill of this size is not projected to occur during the life of the Donlin Gold Project (ERM 2014). If such a spill were to happen, dispersion would depend on the winds, wave action, and currents. The prevailing winds in summer are NE, E, and SE. The strong blows are from the same directions. That means that the spill, if it occurred in Kuskokwim Bay and if uncontained, could disperse in the direction of Kuskokwim Shoals, an area heavily used by eiders and other sea birds. Depending on the winds, the diesel could reach the area within a few hours to a day or two. The wind and waves would also cause the oil to evaporate and disperse in the water more rapidly, and within 3 to 5 days or less the volume of oil at the surface could be reduced by up to two-thirds.

The following description of the short- and long-term effects of oil spills on birds is summarized from FWS (2004b) and EPA (EPA 1999b). Note that it does not differentiate between crude oil and lighter oils such as diesel fuel, and so it is difficult to know which effects would not be relevant.

Oil harms wildlife through physical contact, poisoning through ingestion or inhalation, destruction of food sources or habitat, and can cause long-term reproductive problems. Physical contact with oil destroys the insulation value feathers, causing birds to die of hypothermia or lose buoyancy. In cold climates, a 1-inch diameter oil drop can be enough to kill a bird (NOAA 2014b). Heavily oiled birds can lose their ability to fly and their buoyancy; causing drowning.

In efforts to clean themselves, birds ingest and inhale oil. Ingestion can kill animals immediately, but more often results in lung, liver, and kidney damage and subsequent death. Birds constantly preening to remove oil, or unable to fly due to the oil, would be more vulnerable to predators.

Floating oil and oil dispersed in the water can contaminate algae, fish eggs, and the larvae of various invertebrates. Fish that feed on these organisms can subsequently become contaminated; and then larger animals in the food chain, including birds, may consume contaminated organisms and be sickened or die.

In the long-term, oil ingestion has been shown to suppress the immune system, cause organ damage, skin irritation and ulceration, damage to the adrenal system, and behavioral changes.
Damage to the immune system can lead to secondary infections that cause death, and behavioral changes may affect an individual’s ability to find food or avoid predators. Oil can also affect animals in non-lethal ways such as impairing growth and reproduction, and from the loss of important habitat.

The spill under this scenario (735,000 gallons released and half of it headed toward shore) would take place during the summer shipping season when large numbers of waterbirds (waterfowl, seabirds, shorebirds, etc.) use Kuskokwim Bay for spring staging, and then may nest on adjacent shoreline and upland areas. If birds came into contact with spilled diesel, individuals could be killed, sickened, lose food and habitat, or experience reproductive problems. If the spill spreads to shore, nesting birds may be affected. Eggs coated by diesel would suffocate. If females ingest diesel before laying eggs, the shells may be too thin, or chicks may be malformed. Later in the summer many birds may be molting in the vicinity of the barge route in Kuskokwim Bay and would be more vulnerable to adverse impacts due to their temporary inability to fly.

Numerous foraging areas of regional or global importance for sea ducks, seabirds, breeding seabird colonies, as well as areas important for migratory shorebirds are located in the Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska, although most are far enough away from the barge route that they would not be affected because the diesel would disperse and evaporate or winds and currents would take it elsewhere. The coastal area from the mouth of the Kuskokwim River to the south side of Nelson Island is the most important area for fall staging shorebirds on the west coast of North America. It supports hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of shorebirds, including virtually the entire North American-breeding population of bar-tailed godwits. A spill in one of these areas during the time when large numbers of birds are present could affect a large proportion of certain bird populations.

Many bird populations can recover following a one-time mortality event (e.g., a localized oil spill) if the fraction of the total population killed remains small. However, as the fraction killed becomes higher, the severity of population impact can increase above that expected by a simple proportional change (Stehn and Platte 2000). Disruption of social behavior, loss of mates, competition with other species, or increased predation, may prevent or extend the time before population recovery. Declining populations or populations with a limited capacity for growth would be at greater risk. All loons, eiders, and other seaducks have a relatively low capacity for population growth (Stehn and Platte 2000). The effect of spills on federally-listed Steller’s and spectacled eiders is discussed in Section 3.24.6.14.1.

The impacts of an ocean barge rupture on birds could be moderate to high intensity as it could affect large numbers of birds (species described in Section 3.12.2.3.3, Wildlife, under the heading Marine Waters) and the effects would be noticeable. The duration would be temporary to long-term, depending on what proportion of the population is affected. The extent of effects would generally be local – limited to the immediate area of the spill – but if migratory bird populations were affected, the effects could be extensive. The context for effects is common to important (as unique ESA-listed species are addressed in Section 3.24.6.14.1). The summary impact level of an ocean barge rupture and large diesel release on birds could be major.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A release of diesel from a river barge caused by either grounding on the Kuskokwim River or a collision on the river or at the Angyaruaq Port, would affect any birds that encountered the spill.
in the same ways described above for an ocean spill but would also affect adjacent shoreline birds and habitat. Containment and cleanup activities could also affect birds through the increase in human activity. Diesel would spread downstream, potentially reaching Kuskokwim Bay. The river shoreline habitat in the vicinity of the spill would be adversely affected by vegetation damage both from the spill and subsequent cleanup. The barges would travel through the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge, which was created to protect and maintain internationally significant waterfowl and shorebird populations. As described in Section 3.12.4.1, Wildlife, the Kuskokwim River area provides habitat for 26 Species of Concern; many of which breed there in exceptionally high densities making the habitat along the barge route of regional importance to these species’ populations. In particular, species such as rusty blackbird, solitary sandpiper, dunlin, and short-tailed dowitcher are known to nest near water in the area and feed in shallow water, which increases their risk of exposure to any spills.

The most severe impacts would occur to birds that aren’t able to leave the area immediately, such as juveniles from nearby nests and molting (temporarily flightless) birds. Twenty-one species that were observed in the Project Area are known to nest along shorelines (see Table 3.12-19 in Section 3.12, Wildlife) including tundra swans, ducks, geese, sandpipers, loons, phalaropes, and grebes. Residual contamination that enters the food chain could affect raptors such as bald and golden eagles, osprey, and northern harriers that may eat contaminated fish or small mammals. While a number of birds could be affected by a larger spill, there are no known concentrations of birds along the river that could experience population-level effects from a single spill event.

The impacts of a river barge release on birds could range from moderate to high intensity effects as the effects are likely to be noticeable. The duration could be temporary to long-term, depending on what proportion of the population is affected. The extent of effects would generally be local – limited to the immediate area of the spill – but if migratory bird populations, which are known to migrate along riparian areas, were affected the effects could be extensive, and the context for impacts is common to important. The summary impact level of a large river barge release on birds would be moderate to major.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

A small number of birds in the vicinity of the tank farms located at the Angyaruaq (Jungjuik) Port and the mine site may be affected by a tank farm rupture, leak or operational line rupture. However, because the secondary containment would provide 100 percent recovery, the effects would be limited to temporary disturbance from fumes, potential fire danger, and an increase in human activity in the area. Birds may be temporarily displaced from adjacent habitat. Because it is assumed that the spill would be contained and recovered, there would be no spread to adjacent habitat and therefore little chance for birds to come into contact with the diesel. The number and type of birds present in the affected area depends on the time of year of the spill, but even during migration or breeding season (when more birds are present) the numbers of birds affected would be small.

The impacts of a tank farm release on birds would be low intensity as the effects would not be likely to be noticeable. The duration would be temporary, lasting only as long as the recovery and cleanup operations. The extent of effects would be local – limited to the immediate area of the spill – and the context for impacts is common to important. Therefore, the summary impact level of a tank farm release on birds would be minor.
Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

A release of diesel from a tanker truck rollover or collision may affect a small number of birds in the immediate vicinity of the accident, and small areas of adjacent habitat. If diesel dispersed to a nearby stream, the effects could spread further and affect aquatic birds such as spotted sandpipers, American dippers, and mergansers. Response efforts, including increased human activity, could disturb birds causing them to temporarily avoid the area. If birds were nesting in roadside vegetation that became oiled, nests and/or eggs and young could be killed. Species known to occur in the area and nest close to the ground include fox sparrows, common redpolls, and dark-eyed juncos. Because the area affected would be small, the number of birds to ingest oil or contaminated food would be small.

The number and type of birds present in the affected area depends on the time of year that the spill occurs, but even during migration or breeding season (when more birds are present) the numbers of birds affected would be small. Therefore, the summary impact level of a tanker truck release on birds would be minor.

Alternative 3A – Reduced Diesel Barging: LNG-Powered Haul Trucks

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to birds. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under terrestrial mammals.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

If released, LNG will transition back to a gaseous phase if it comes into contact with warmer air or water (California Energy Commission 2014). The natural gas vapors are initially heavier than air and they form a cloud close to the ground, which is pushed downwind and eventually dissipates. If a viable ignition source is present where a vapor cloud exists at a 5 percent to 15 percent concentration in air, the vapor cloud can ignite and burn, but would not explode unless confined. Methane, the primary component of LNG, is colorless, odorless, and tasteless. It is non-corrosive and non-toxic, but is classified as a simple asphyxiant possessing a slight inhalation hazard. If breathed in high concentration, oxygen deficiency can result in serious injury or death. Unconfined mixtures of metham in air (such as an LNG release that has transitioned back to a gaseous phase) are not explosive. If released LNG comes into contact with water it will float, as it is less dense than water. If a large amount of LNG is spilled on water within a short period of time, the relatively warmer temperature of the water will cause the LNG to rapidly transition to its gaseous phase. If there is an ignition source, a physical explosion can occur, which can be hazardous to nearby people, buildings, or wildlife (California Energy Commission 2014).

The number and type of birds potentially affected depends on the timing and location of the spill; more birds are present in the Project Area during the summer breeding season and the fall and spring migration seasons and fewer during the winter months. However, a spill would be most likely to occur in active mine areas where few birds are likely to be.
Alternative 3B – Reduced Diesel Barging: Diesel Pipeline

Under Alternative 3B, spill Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to birds. The likelihood of Scenarios 2 through 4 (river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would be the same as those discussed under terrestrial mammals.

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Under Alternative 3B there would only be ocean fuel barge trips to Bethel during construction. Therefore, there would be no fuel barges during the operations phase, unlike alternatives 2 and 3A, which would dramatically reduce the risk of spills between Dutch Harbor and the Kuskokwim River. However, if an ocean barge rupture at sea did occur, the impacts to birds would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. During operation, the diesel (12 tankers per year) would be shipped to Tyonek, and the spill scenario would shift to Cook Inlet and waters leading to it. The types of impacts would be the same, but the birds vulnerable to effects would be different. Fewer concentrations of staging and molting birds occur than in the Kuskokwim Bay area, but the area is known to contain large numbers of both breeding and non-breeding glaucous-winged gulls and a colony of black-legged kittiwakes (see Figure 3.12-9 in Section 3.12, Wildlife Audubon Alaska’s Important Bird Areas Nearest the Project Area), as well as a variety of molting and wintering sea ducks in bays throughout lower Cook Inlet. Effects might tend toward moderate, rather than major.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

A diesel fuel spill (large or small) from the pipeline could affect birds in much the same ways as described under Alternative 2 for truck spills or river barge spills, depending on the size of the spill and where it occurred. Many different types of birds could be affected; terrestrial species such as songbirds, raptors, and other inland-nesting or migrating species would be most likely to be affected, although a spill could also affect water birds if it reaches wetlands or waterbodies. Raptors known to nest along the proposed pipeline route and other foraging birds could be affected by contamination of food sources. If the spill reached a river at a pipeline crossing, the effects of the spill would be much like a river barge spill and the extent of effects would be potentially much larger. If the oil spilled on land rather than floating on the surface of the water, oil could sink into soil or groundwater and cause longer-term contamination that may be more difficult to detect or remove. The number and type of birds potentially affected depends on the timing, location, method(s) of dispersion and types of habitats impacted of the spill; more birds are present in the Project Area during the summer breeding season and the fall and spring migration seasons and fewer during the winter months. The geographical extent of impacts could be extensive if the spill occurred during the spring or fall when migrating species could be affected. If the spill occurred during the breeding season, a significant nesting loss could affect several Species of Concern, such as blackpoll warbler, rusty blackbird, olive-sided flycatcher, and solitary sandpiper. A large-scale spill (422,000 gallons) would be larger than a river barge spill (302,535 gallons), but smaller than an ocean barge spill (735,000), and could have a major long-lasting impact on both terrestrial and aquatic birds.
Alternative 4 – Birch Tree Crossing Port

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to birds. The likelihood of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced, and the likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) would be increased; however, the impacts of either would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1 and 3, 7, 8, and 9 (ocean barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under terrestrial mammals.

Alternative 5A – Dry Stack Tailings

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to birds.

Impacts under fuel release Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, and tanker truck, releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under terrestrial mammals.

Alternative 6A – Modified Natural Gas Pipeline Alignment: Dalzell Gorge Route

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to birds.

Impacts under fuel release Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under terrestrial mammals.

3.24.6.13 FISH AND AQUATIC RESOURCES

3.24.6.13.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for impacts to fish and aquatic resources. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Ocean-going cargo barges follow general but consistent routes determined by distance, protected habitat, public safety, water depth, and underwater hazards. The level of impact of a low probability ocean barge rupture would largely depend upon the location of the spill, its proximity to shore, and whether a major fraction of the spill reached intertidal and nearshore habitats. Diesel fuel evaporates, particularly when subject to high-energy ocean waves and wind, and impacts to fish and aquatic resources would be lower if the diesel is blown offshore by the winds than if the spill migrates to shore. If it stays offshore, moderate effects could occur to species within the ichthyoplankton (eggs and larval stages of fish and invertebrates that reside in surface layers offshore). These effects are not likely to be long-term because of the
relatively rapid evaporation rates of diesel fuel. Effects would also be largely localized to the spill footprint.

Spills that reach littoral or intertidal zones could have major effects to fish and aquatic resources that reside in the nearshore spill footprint. Several direct effects could occur within the spill footprint in littoral and intertidal zones:

- Physical effects in the form of localized interference with oxygen dissolution into the water column.
- Toxicological effects, as fuel fractions are absorbed or consumed by organisms within the footprint.
- Habitat alteration as diesel fuel accumulates onto sediment habitats within the intertidal zone, causing toxicity to algae and marine macrovegetation, epibenthic and benthic communities, and avoidance by more mobile macroinvertebrates and fish.
- Local disruption of the foodweb if algae, macrovegetation, and invertebrate communities important to fish and other aquatic species are affected by the spill.

The severity of impacts would be dependent upon the size of the spill within the nearshore/intertidal zone and the size, shape, and aspect of the shore. Diesel fuel is volatile and evaporates relatively quickly when exposed to wind and sun, making effects in open areas relatively short-term. However, areas that are physically protected from these influences have low flushing rates, or small tidal movements and may be more vulnerable. Direct effects may last longer in these areas.

In summary, offshore impacts of an ocean barge rupture at sea would have localized, short-term moderate effects to fish and aquatic resources of the State of Alaska. Spills that occur closer to shore and migrate to the littoral or intertidal zones would have major impacts to species and habitats within the spill footprint. Nearshore impacts, though severe, are likely to be short-term in open coastal regions of the state because of the volatile nature of diesel fuel. Impacts could be longer term in areas that are physically sheltered or protected from wind and waves. Overall, the summary impact to fish and aquatic resources as a result of an ocean release would be moderate to major.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A fuel release, due to a river barge grounding could have major direct impacts to fish and aquatic resources in the Kuskokwim River. Should a low probability river barge grounding occur during the spring/summer shipping season, the severity of any impacts would be influenced by the timing and magnitude of the spill. The diesel would move downstream with the currents, so the speed of movement would vary with the level of flow in the river. ERM (2014) calculated that downstream movement could be as much as 60 miles in 2 days. Floating diesel would be subject to mixing with the river water by currents and wind and other waves as well as evaporation. ERM (2014) estimated that 39 percent of the diesel would evaporate in 4 days at a temperature of 0°C and 59 percent at 13°C. Winds and currents could push part of the floating diesel into river margins and off-channel areas where it could stay longer. Impacts would be considered short-term and localized, attenuating as the spill moves downstream. Impacts would affect waters along the proposed barge route on the mainstem Kuskokwim River between the Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port site and Kuskokwim Bay.
Depending upon the location, a spill that occurs between approximately mid-May and mid-June could have major impacts to the outmigrating juvenile salmon population. This period represents the time when the largest populations of juvenile salmon are present in the mainstem Kuskokwim River, outmigrating from tributary streams to the ocean. Chinook, coho, pink, chum, and sockeye salmon have been documented in the river or tributary streams.

Depending on the duration of direct exposure to a diesel fuel spill, outmigrating salmon could experience acute toxicity. During outmigration, juvenile salmon actively swimming downstream are known to occupy a variety of habitats including areas with the largest currents and water volumes; nearshore margins while feeding or seeking refuge; and off-channel habitats (Quinn 2005). Depending upon the spill location and river configuration, all of these habitats may be vulnerable. Should diesel fuel spills occur, they likely would originate where barges ground on shallow shoals along deeper portions of the main navigation channel (thalweg). Depending on the location and extent of the spill, actively migrating fish occupying such waters could be exposed and adversely affected. If an accidental grounding resulting in a spill occurs, fish residing in the shallow margins of the river downstream would be particularly vulnerable since these areas have low currents and water volumes where fuel can concentrate and maintain a longer residence time. Similarly, off-channel habitats and blind sloughs can have little to no current and can potentially accumulate diesel fuel and trap fish in areas that become isolated from the main channel as water levels recede.

River fuel spills that occur after the juvenile salmon outmigratory period would have minor impacts to this life stage of salmon. Sampling events during July, August, and September of 2014 on the Kuskokwim River between river miles 130 and 240 found very few juvenile salmon along the margins of the mainstem channel. During the same time, sampling within two large tributaries (Aniak and Holokuk Rivers) found numerous juvenile salmon suggesting that the bulk of salmon rearing occurs outside of the mainstem during the ice-free period (Owl Ridge 2014b). Species such as longnose sucker, Arctic grayling, slimy sculpin, and several whitefish species were highly to moderately abundant in the mainstem during the summer months, and, therefore, likely would be vulnerable to fuel spills. Young-of-the-year longnose sucker were particularly abundant in off channel habitats and backwaters. Secondary effects also could occur to predators that consume fish subjected to fuel spills.

Depending upon the location and magnitude, river spills would likely represent a low to moderate risk to the survival of adult salmon, however, their flesh could become tainted making them unsuitable for consumption by the subsistence community. Additionally, fishing nets could become oil laden and unsuitable for use (refer to the Chapter on Subsistence for more detailed information).

Most fish exposed to a spill could avoid it by swimming away from the spill or by moving back downstream, until concentrations attenuate, unless the volume of the spill was substantial enough (or in a narrow area of stream) such that toxic concentrations occurred from bank to bank at a time when adult salmon were in the immediate vicinity and could not avoid it. Mainstem salmon spawning in the Kuskokwim River is uncommon, so only negligible impacts to spawning or very early life stages of salmon would be expected.

Depending upon the timing and location, a river spill could have a major effect on rainbow smelt that spawn in the main river channel. This species quickly migrates upriver for spawning shortly after ice-breakup during early spring. Surveys conducted during late-May 2014, found major spawning areas between 1 and 3 miles upriver of the Village of Upper Kalskag (RMs 181
to 183). These fish were found to spawn primarily on gravel/cobble substrates adjacent to a low gradient gravel bar in waters between 5 and 14 feet deep (Owl Ridge 2014a). In a similar 2015 study, rainbow smelt also were determined to spawn in late May, but at locations downriver from lower Kalskag in a narrower river segment and at a deeper mean depth of 14.5 feet (range 8.7 to 23.4 feet) (Owl Ridge 2015a). During both studies, eggs were found in gravel and sandy textured substrates; but since they were not found in shallow locations, their exposure to fuel oil spills would be limited. In 2014 and 2015, spawning appeared to occur within a one- to two-day period rather than extending over several days. If this spawning behavior is typical, then the timing and location of a spill would be important in determining whether this species would be affected. Anecdotal information obtained from Native Alaskan harvesters, suggests that this rather truncated migratory and spawning period in the Kuskokwim River is typical. Restricting the initiation of seasonal barge traffic until early June could mitigate or eliminate potential impacts of fuel spills on the spawning run of rainbow smelt.

In summary, potential impacts to fish and aquatic resources in the mainstem Kuskokwim River would be moderate to major subject to the timing and location of a low-probability fuel spill event. If such an event occurs during the spring juvenile salmon outmigration, which peaks in May or June depending on species, it could have a major impact potentially affecting an entire year class of multiple stocks of salmon species that migrate and hold in a variety of habitats throughout the river. After mid-June, impacts to juvenile salmon would be negligible, but moderate to major for resident freshwater species such as longnose sucker, grayling, and whitefish. A high magnitude of impact to rainbow smelt would be expected if a potential fuel spill occurred on or upriver of discrete spawning areas during the brief spawning period in late May. Potential impacts to adult salmon would be moderate in areas where spills occur if fish are unable to escape exposure. Since seaward migrations of juvenile salmon typically occur during ascending periods of seasonally higher spring flows on the river, barge groundings at such times would have a lower probability of occurring.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

In the instance of a fuel release due to a tank farm rupture, a faulty valve or pipeline leak, a transfer operation line rupture, or a transfer operation human error, the spill and response would be localized to the spill site (either the mine site or a tank farm at Dutch Harbor, the proposed Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port site or Bethel fuel terminal). Impacts would be considered short-term and localized to the specific release location, attenuating as the spill moves downriver or is contained by spill response activities.

Impacts to fish and aquatic resources would be highly dependent upon the timing, location of the release, and success of the emergency containment response. Fuel storage areas on the mine site are relatively isolated from tributary streams within the Crooked Creek basin. Potential spills would likely be controlled by full secondary containment of the storage tanks that would intercept releases before they could reach fish-bearing waters. Therefore, potential impacts from spill releases on the mine site would be considered low. Similarly, tank farm releases at Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port or the Bethel terminal would be largely controlled by BMPs and full secondary containment of storage tanks. Should a very low probability event occur, fuel could be released into the mainstem Kuskokwim River and represent the same levels of impacts as those discussed in Scenario 2, River Barge Release (moderate to high depending upon timing and fish presence).
Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

In the instance of a fuel release due to a tanker truck rollover or collision, the spill and response would be localized to the spill site on the road, and potentially in a nearby waterbody or stream. Tanker truck spills that occur on or near bridge crossings or on roads proximal to streams could represent major effects to fish and aquatic resources in the stream if direct discharges were to occur. Road crossings over streams between the Angyaraaq (Jungjuk) Port site and the mine would cross Jungjuk Creek, two key tributaries (Getmuna and Crooked creeks) and over 45 other small creeks and drainages several times per hour during the ice-free period. Except for Jungjuk, Getmuna and Crooked creeks, most of the small creeks and drainages are non-salmon-bearing. Small streams, even if they aren’t salmon bearing, could affect fish if potential spills of fuel are conveyed through them to salmon bearing waters located downstream. Where fish populations occur in smaller creeks in the Crooked Creek drainage, they primarily consist of coho salmon and Dolly Varden char. Both species spawn in small creeks and coho juveniles rear for over 1 year before outmigrating, indicating this species is present during the entire ice-free period. As shown in Figure 3.24-4 in Section 3.13, Fish and Aquatic Resources, several species of salmon and resident fishes utilize Jungjuk, Getmuna, and Crooked creeks. Given the potential exposure of these creeks and other drainages along the mine access road, the discharge of fuel from a potential tanker truck spill would result in a high magnitude of impacts, including mortalities to fish and aquatic invertebrate communities downstream of the spill point. Such impacts would be short-term, lasting until concentrations evaporate or attenuate downstream to below toxic concentrations. The extent of impacts also would depend on the timing of the spill relative to the use of these creeks by various life stages of anadromous and resident fishes. Longer-term, indirect, but high intensity impacts also may occur under the low-probability scenario of fuel accidentally being released onto the ground overlying perched aquifers that ultimately discharge into streams.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

If a tank-tainer were to fall overboard from a barge, either in the Kuskokwim River or along the marine portion of the transportation corridor, it would be located and retrieved, resulting in no effects on fish or aquatic biota.

If a release were to occur at a storage site at the mine site, the resultant spill would be contained, as the tank-tainer would be located in an area that includes secondary containment. Thus, there would be no effect on fish or aquatic biota.

If a truck carrying cyanide tank-tainers had an accident on the road, a tank-tainer rupture could result. If the spilled cyanide briquettes spilled on dry ground, there would be no effect on fish or aquatic biota. If the sodium cyanide briquettes came into contact with water, causing them to dissolve, the resulting hydrogen cyanide that would be released would be highly toxic to fish and aquatic wildlife. The concentrations and extent would depend on the quantity of cyanide spilled into the water and the volume of water. Even a spill in a puddle or rain could release toxic Hydrogen Cyanide gas. Initial isolation of the spill site from unprotected people or animals would be 0.1 mile for a small spill or 0.2 mile for a larger spill, and the downwind protection zone would be 0.1 to 0.2 mile for daytime or 0.2 to 0.9 mile for night. If the cyanide came into contact with water, then fish and aquatic organisms could be adversely affected. Although cyanide reacts readily in the environment and degrades or forms complexes and salts of varying stabilities, it is toxic to many living organisms at very low concentrations. Fish and
aquatic invertebrates are particularly sensitive to cyanide exposure. Cyanide has low persistence in the environment and is not reported to be accumulated or stored in fish or aquatic organisms. There is no reported biomagnification of cyanide in the food chain.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

A spill is highly unlikely, as the sealed flasks, pigs and drums provide a very high level of integrity and it is unlikely that these containers could rupture. Without a rupture, there would be no impact on fish or aquatic biota.

In the unlikely event that there was a mercury spill in the storage areas, either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon would be released from the containers, and the liquid elemental mercury would collect in the secondary containment. Spilled mercury would be recovered and managed appropriately. There would be no effects on fish or aquatic biota.

A low probability potential spill scenario may result from truck transportation of mercury containers to Angyaruak (Jungjuk) Port. In the unlikely event that there is a truck accident and the containers ruptured, a mercury spill (either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon) could result. The liquid elemental mercury and the spent carbon could be released to the land or surface water. If spilled mercury escapes cleanup efforts, it would be subject to natural methylation processes and would add incrementally to the background mercury levels in runoff and air depositions, thus increasing the chronic exposure of aquatic biota and fish. Since methylmercury bioaccumulates, it would also increase exposure to certain species of fish and their predators. Only resident fish or aquatic life is likely to be impacted by spills to streams that have consequent methylation.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

An analysis of an unplanned release of up to 2.6 million cubic yards (1,607 acre-feet) of tailings and contaminated water from the TSF was conducted based on either a partial breach of the dam and resulting downstream failure or a liner rupture leading to a sinkhole and outflow of tailings through the underdrain (BGC 2015n). An inundation model predicted the expected migration of tailings and water and the extent of deposition relative to downstream receiving waters in the Anaconda and Crooked Creek drainages. A TSF failure would result in significant damage to these waters, regulated as Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, that support spawning, rearing, and migration of anadromous fish. Inundation maps presented in Figure 3.24-2 and Figure 3.24-4 estimate the extent of downstream flooding and sediment deposition from a dam breach in these drainages.

During a tailings dam failure water, or a viscous slurry of water and tailings, would be released downstream causing sediment deposition where the drainage widens and the gradient flattens. The nature and extent of impacts would vary depending on the type of release and the season in which it occurs as described below:

- **Tailings and Water Release**
  - Winter: At least some of the released tailings could be excavated and transported back to the tailings facility thereby limiting the extent of impacts to fish and aquatic life after the spring thaw. This would reduce erosion and sediment transport in Crooked Creek. A portion of the contaminated fluids may become frozen and recoverable.
- Summer: The extent of impacts would likely be much larger as a significant portion of the deposited tailings would be remobilized by Crooked Creek and transported downstream. Access by trucks and other large equipment would be difficult on thawed off-road areas.

- **Water Only Release:**
  - Winter: The volume and rate of the release likely would be too high to allow freezing to quickly impede the flow. The maximum flow rates of water would be approximately 4.0 percent of flow rates of the Kuskokwim River in the winter months (November to April), resulting in greater potential impacts. Water would not necessarily penetrate underlying materials, and there is some potential that a portion of the contaminated fluids could be recovered.
  
  - Summer: The maximum flow rates of water would be approximately 1.8 percent of flow in Kuskokwim River in the summer months (May to October). More water would penetrate the ground surface and infiltrate the subsurface materials, and impacts from fluids on the subsurface would be difficult to control or remediate.

Depending on the type and season of release, a tailings dam failure could affect fish populations and aquatic habitat in the Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek drainages through several mechanisms. These include:

- Erosion that scours and transports native vegetation and substrates from intermittent and perennial streams;
- Deposition of contaminated sediments resulting in a physical migration barrier that prevents access to fish spawning, rearing, and over-wintering areas upstream and downstream of the blockage;
- Alteration of water quality constituents that could result in acute or chronic toxicity or behavioral disturbance that affects the production of fish and other aquatic biota downstream of the Anaconda Creek confluence;
- Alteration of stream hydrology and morphology in Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek that affects the proper functioning conditions of aquatic habitat that are essential to fish spawning, rearing, and migration in these drainages;
- Elimination or reduction of pool depth and volume downstream of the Anaconda Creek confluence that are important for the survival of over-wintering fish in Crooked Creek;
- Elimination or burial of aquatic invertebrate communities and other prey species important to the diet of fish.

Erosion is expected to be greatest where the flow depths of water/tailings are modeled to be highest, near the release point and within the Anaconda Creek valley (Figure 3.24-2 and Figure 3.24-4). Erosion from the water only spill would still occur, although erosion may be reduced compared to conditions that would result from the movement of a more viscous water and tailings slurry. Erosion would also be less in winter because of frozen soils; although if the flow also transports large chunks of ice, aquatic and riparian habitat damage from ice scour would be expected. Eroded materials would be deposited where and when the water or slurry release reaches wider and flatter segments of the drainage. For both the tailings and water release and water release only scenarios, deposition of eroded materials would increase where flow depths
in the receiving waters are lower such as at stream meanders or at the confluence of Anaconda and Crooked Creek.

The extent of erosion and depositional disturbance was evaluated based on Burge and Cuervo (2015) relative to potential aquatic habitat impacts in response to spill conditions modeled by BGC (2015n). The nature and extent of impacts was categorized based on three levels of flow depths:

- erosion may primarily occur at flow depths of 10 feet or higher;
- erosion and depositions may primarily occur at flow depths of less than 10 feet to 3 feet; and
- deposition may primarily occur at flow depths of less than 3 feet.

Based on this interpretation and the modeled spills, an estimated 21 acres of rivers and ponds would be disturbed under the tailings and water slurry scenario, with 90 percent of these within the spill trajectory affected by the combination of erosion and deposition (Table 3.24-23). For the water only spill scenario a substantially more extensive amount of rivers and ponds, estimated at about 177 acres, would be disturbed with about 70 percent of these affected primarily by deposition (Table 3.24-24).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aquatic Habitat Category</th>
<th>Erosion (≥ 10 ft)</th>
<th>Erosion and Deposition (≥ 3 ft to &lt; 10 ft)</th>
<th>Deposition (&lt; 3 ft)</th>
<th>Impact Area (acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ponds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent Streams (miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perennial Streams (miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquatic Area (acre)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquatic Area (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.24-23: Piping Failure - Tailings and Water Slurry: Preliminary Calculation of Aquatic Habitat Categories by Maximum Flow Depth
Table 3.24-24: Piping Failure – Water Only: Preliminary Calculation of Aquatic Habitat Categories by Maximum Flow Depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aquatic Habitat Category</th>
<th>Flow Depth (acres)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Impact Area (acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erosion (≥ 10 ft)</td>
<td>Erosion and Deposition (≥ 3 ft to &lt; 10 ft)</td>
<td>Deposition (&lt; 3 ft)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>117.3</td>
<td>166.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent Streams</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>123.6</td>
<td>177.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perennial Streams</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquatic Area (acre)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>123.6</td>
<td>177.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquatic Area (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>177.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deposition of tailings and eroded materials would be expected to increase where flow depths are lower or where flow is impeded such as at meander bends or at the confluence of Anaconda and Crooked Creek (Figure 3.24-3). Interpreting potential aquatic habitat disturbance from the BGC (2015n) modeled spill was based on deposition depth: less than 0.5 foot was considered light burial; 0.5 foot to less than 3 feet was considered moderate burial; and 3 feet or more was considered heavy burial (Table 3.24-25). An estimated 21 acres of aquatic habitat would be covered by tailings, with 90 percent of these affected by heavy burial with 3 feet or more of tailings (Table 3.24-25).

Cleanup and reclamation efforts would focus on removal and return of tailings to the TSF and restoration of aquatic habitat. Reduction of certain aquatic habitat functions would likely persist beyond cleanup. Burial or fill of waters and riparian habitats in the Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek drainages would alter or eliminate important hydrologic, biogeochemical, and biological functions that support the aquatic ecosystem in these drainages. A total of 3.9 miles of streams would be directly affected by tailings deposition, including 3.8 miles of perennial streams and 0.1 mile of intermittent streams (Table 3.24-25; 3PPI et al. 2014).

Table 3.24-25: Piping Failure – Tailings and Water: Preliminary Calculation of Aquatic Habitat Categories by Burial Depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aquatic Habitat Category</th>
<th>Burial Depth (acres)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Area (acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light (&lt; 0.5 ft)</td>
<td>Moderate (≥ 0.5 ft to &lt; 3 ft)</td>
<td>Heavy (≥ 3 ft)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponds</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent Streams</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.24-25: Piping Failure - Tailings and Water: Preliminary Calculation of Aquatic Habitat Categories by Burial Depth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aquatic Habitat Category</th>
<th>Burial Depth (acres)</th>
<th>Light (&lt; 0.5 ft)</th>
<th>Moderate (≥ 0.5 ft to &lt; 3 ft)</th>
<th>Heavy (≥ 3 ft)</th>
<th>Area (acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perennial Streams (miles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquatic Area (acre)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquatic Area (%)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the water and tailings release scenario, the front of slurry would arrive at the confluence of Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek within less than an hour, lasting about 5 hours in duration, and resulting in a maximum flow depth of nearly 8 feet. None of the slurry is predicted to reach the confluence of Crooked Creek and the Kuskokwim River 13 miles downstream (Table 3.24-26). Based on the water only release scenario, the front of water would reach Crooked Creek also in less than an hour but the wave of water, at a maximum depth of nearly 7 feet, would persist for over 48 hours. Within 24 hours the water stage at the confluence of Crooked Creek and the Kuskokwim River would be increased by 1 foot.

Table 3.24-26: Flow Inundation Extent and Travel Distance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Released</th>
<th>Total Duration (hrs.)</th>
<th>Confluence of Anaconda Creek and Crooked Creek (1.6 miles downstream of TSF)</th>
<th>Confluence of Crooked Creek and Kuskokwim River (13 miles downstream of TSF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Front Arrival Time (hrs.)</td>
<td>Maximum Flow Depth (ft.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Tailings</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Only</td>
<td>&gt;48</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BGC 2015n.

The water and tailings scenario would have a comparatively greater impact on fish and aquatic life from the burial and elimination of physical habitat, injury or loss of fish and aquatic biota, barriers to fish migration, and isolation of fish populations in the upper Crooked Creek watershed. In addition, water quality impacts downstream of a slurry plume could result in behavioral disturbance, mortality, and acute and chronic levels of stress or toxicity to fish and aquatic life from increased turbidity and suspended solids and release of chemical contaminants from the tailings. Such impacts would tend to attenuate with farther distance downstream.

Based on the water only scenario, the burial and elimination of physical habitat from a tailings plume would not occur. While water quality impacts to fish and aquatic life would be somewhat similar to the water and tailings scenario, the increased maximum flow depth in Crooked Creek would be greater and would extend farther downstream to the Kuskokwim River for a period of over 48 hours. Depending on when this would occur, it could adversely
affect the proper functioning conditions of fish spawning, rearing, and migration habitat in lower Crooked Creek, an area where the greatest proportion of salmon spawning and smolt production occurs in this drainage. An elevated flow regime can create excessive shear stress and other hydraulic forces that can cause bank erosion and degrade the morphological characteristics of a stream that support fish production. Elevated streamflows also can result in increased energy consumption by fish of various life stages as they encounter higher water velocities; rearing and migration habitat that becomes more restricted to backwaters and the margins of stream channels; and elevated turbidity and suspended sediment loads that are adverse to production of fish and their prey species.

Based on aerial surveys of salmon spawning conducted from 2004 to 2010, an annual average of 40 adult salmon (12 percent of the annual total average observed during those years) were observed in the middle and upper reaches of Crooked Creek including areas near Anaconda Creek (OtterTail 2014a). These fish consisted primarily of coho and chum salmon. Ground and aerial surveys conducted in recent years indicate that salmon distribution in the middle reaches of Crooked Creek has been relatively limited. This suggests that relatively few spawning redds likely would be present in the middle reaches of Crooked Creek near the confluence of Anaconda Creek in the event of a tailings dam failure. Incubating eggs, rearing juvenile, or adult fish in Crooked Creek in the vicinity of Anaconda Creek would be directly affected by sediment deposition, however. Fish in the upper reaches of Crooked Creek would become isolated from the lower reaches of Crooked Creek until a passageway becomes eroded through the sediment plume. Fish production in lower Crooked Creek, where the greatest proportion of salmon spawning and rearing occurs, would be subject to higher flows and water quality impacts that could result from a water only release during a tailings dam failure. Depending on the physical and chemical nature of water quality effects from such releases, the intensity of impacts to overall fish production in Crooked Creek could range from medium to high, would be local, and could persist over several years. Such impacts would have an important context since Crooked Creek is regulated as Essential Fish Habitat under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Therefore, anticipated impacts to fish and aquatic habitat from a tailings dam failure would range from moderate to major.

3.24.6.13.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to fish and aquatic resources. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

An occurrence of pinhole leaks in LNG storage tanks, an accident involving an LNG-fueled truck, or the rupture of a storage tank at the LNG plant could occur at the mine site. If released, LNG dissipates readily, so long as no ignition source is present. The spill and response effort would be localized to the spill site. LNG storage areas on the mine site are relatively isolated from tributaries within the Crooked Creek basin, and therefore would likely be contained
before discharges to fish-bearing waters. Impacts to fish and aquatic resources at the mine site would be considered low.

3.24.6.13.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, spill Scenario 6 (LNG Release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to fish and aquatic resources. Impacts under Scenarios 1 and 2 (ocean or river barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on fish and aquatic resources as Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

From the mine footprint, the proposed buried pipeline route traverses east and crosses numerous drainages of the Kuskokwim, Yentna, and Skwentna rivers and streams that discharge directly to Cook Inlet. Many of the streams are salmonid-bearing, with coho salmon and Dolly Varden Char the dominant species. Pipeline crossings are proposed on 32 streams and their tributaries along the pipeline route. The nature of effects caused by accidental fuel releases from the pipeline would be similar to those that would occur from a Scenario 4, Tanker Truck Release under Alternative 2. If a rupture of the pipeline should occur just upslope from a block valve near a river, the spill could be large with major effects of a similar nature to fish, aquatic biota, and related habitats as described under Scenario 2, River Barge Release. The severity of impacts to fish and aquatic resources would depend upon the volume of the spill and proximity to local streams and groundwater sources. Significant discharges of diesel fuel directly into streams could cause major impacts to fish and invertebrate and resulting in an intense level of mortalities. The duration of impacts could be long-term, depending on the timing and extent of discharge and the fish species and life stages affected at the time.

Longer-term, indirect, but major effects may also occur if a spill would contaminate soils and groundwater that, over time, discharges into streams. Fuels bound in soils or groundwater would not evaporate until released into surface waters.

3.24.6.13.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING PORT

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to fish and aquatic resources. The likelihood of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced and the likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) would be increased; however, the impacts of either would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2.

Impacts under Scenarios 1, 3, 7 through 9 (ocean barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
3.24.6.13.5 ALTERNATIVES 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 and 8 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, and mercury releases) for Alternatives 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.13.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to fish and aquatic resources.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 and 8 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, and mercury releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.14 THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES

3.24.6.14.1 ESA PROTECTED, CANDIDATE, AND DELISTED BIRD SPECIES

Alternative 2 – Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for impacts to ESA-protected, candidate, and delisted bird species. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

The discussion of an ocean barge rupture at sea for birds for Alternative 2 in Section 3.24.6.12.3 is relevant to ESA protected, candidate, and delisted bird species.

Steller’s eider

Steller’s eiders may be present in Kuskokwim Bay during the summer shipping season. Large numbers of Steller’s eiders use habitat within Kuskokwim Bay for spring staging and during a 3-week molt period following breeding. During the early spring, it is thought that the entire Alaska overwintering population of Steller’s eiders spend anywhere from days to a few weeks in northern Kuskokwim Bay before leaving for northern nesting areas (Larned 2007).

Figure 3.14-1 and Figure 3.14-2 (Section 3.14, Threatened and Endangered Species) show that the closest critical habitat is approximately 10 miles west of the proposed barge route, and there is a concentration area approximately 10 miles east of the route. Steller’s eiders would be especially vulnerable during their molting season (July–September) when they are temporarily unable to fly, making it more difficult for them to avoid any spilled oil.

The impacts of an ocean barge rupture on Steller’s eider could be moderate to high intensity as the effects of birds encountering spilled oil would be noticeable, and the duration would be temporary to long-term, depending on what proportion of the population is affected. The extent of effects would generally be local – limited to the immediate area of the spill, but if a large part of the population is affected, it would be much broader. The context for effects is unique because the Alaska-breeding population of the Steller’s eider is listed as threatened under the ESA and the population is declining.
Spectacled eider

Spectacled eiders nest in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta National Wildlife Refuge and could be present in Kuskokwim Bay during the summer shipping season. As shown in Figure 3.14-2 (Section 3.14, Threatened and Endangered Species), the closest breeding habitat lies near the mouth of the Kuskokwim River approximately 5 miles from the proposed barge route. Eiders nesting in the area may forage in the bay. The types of effects an oil spill could have on spectacled eiders would be similar to those described above for Steller’s eiders. Populations of both Steller’s and spectacled eiders have been declining in Alaska (FWS 2012b and 2012c).

The impacts of an ocean barge rupture on spectacled eiders could be moderate to high intensity as the effects of birds encountering spilled oil would be noticeable, and the duration would be temporary rather than long-term, assuming that a small proportion of the population is affected. The extent of effects would generally be local – limited to the immediate area of the spill. The context for effects is important because spectacled eiders are listed as threatened under the ESA, but the portion potentially affected is not a large percentage of the population.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A river barge release may or may not affect either eider species, depending on the location of the barge at the time of the release. Both species are found at the mouth of the Kuskokwim River only. The size of the spill under this scenario would be 37,817 gallons, and it is likely that response efforts would succeed in recovery of at least half of the released diesel, approximately 18,908 gallons. With that volume of spill and the distance to where concentrations of either eider species might be, it is very unlikely that unrecovered oil would reach spectacled or Steller’s eiders in Kuskokwim Bay. If it does, they may be adversely affected. They could also be affected if water quality or food resources are degraded by the spill, which are also very unlikely.

The impacts of a river barge release on either spectacled or Steller’s eiders could range from no effect (if oil doesn’t reach them and their prey and habitat is unaffected) to moderate intensity effects if they encounter oil, as the effects may or may not be noticeable. The duration could be temporary rather than long-term, assuming that a small proportion of the population is affected. The extent of effects would generally be local – limited to the immediate area of the spill.

The context of effects for Steller’s eiders would be unique because Steller’s eiders are listed as threatened under the ESA, and the population is declining.

The context of effects for spectacled eiders would be important because spectacled eiders are listed as threatened under the ESA, but the population is currently stable and the portion potentially affected is not a large percentage of the population.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Neither eider species occurs in the vicinity of the tank farms located at the Angyaraqaq (Jungjujuk) Port, or the mine site. Therefore a release of diesel fuel at any of these tank farms would not have any effect on either Steller’s eiders or spectacled eiders. The spill would be contained within the facility and cleaned up before it could spread to adjacent habitat. The same is true of the tank farms at Bethel and Dutch Harbor where eiders may be in the vicinity but would not be affected due to containment.
Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Neither eider species occurs in the vicinity of the project roads; therefore, a release of diesel fuel from a tanker truck would not have any effect on either Steller’s eiders or spectacled eiders.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

None of the transport scenarios for cyanide would release cyanide into the environment where listed birds may occur. Therefore, no effects from cyanide would be expected. If a cyanide tank-tainer was lost in the water where listed eiders occur, the activity associated with recovering it would have minor effects on eiders if they were present.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

None of the transport scenarios for mercury would release mercury into the environment where listed birds may occur. Therefore, no effects from mercury would be expected. If a mercury shipping container was lost in the water where listed eiders occur, the activity associated with recovering it would have minor effects on eiders if they were present.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

Neither eider species occurs more than 56 miles from the coast, thus not in the vicinity of the tailings dam located near the mine site. Therefore, a release of tailings and water or water only would not have any effect on either Steller’s or spectacled eiders. The spill would be contained or diluted before it could spread to the mouth of the Kuskokwim River or other habitat.

Alternative 3A – Reduced Diesel Barging: LNG-Powered Haul Trucks

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to ESA protected, candidate, and delisted bird species. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

Neither eider species is found anywhere near where the LNG would be used, so there would be no effects on eiders.

Alternative 3B – Reduced Diesel Barging: Diesel Pipeline

Under Alternative 3B, spill Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to ESA protected, candidate, and delisted bird species. The likelihood of Scenarios 2 through 4 (river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on ESA protected, candidate, and delisted bird species as Alternative 2.
Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Under Alternative 3B there would only be ocean barge trips to Bethel during the construction phase. Therefore, there would be fewer barge trips than Alternative 2 or Alternative 3A which would reduce the risk of spills. However, if an ocean barge rupture at sea on that route did occur, the impacts to both Steller’s and spectacled eiders would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. During operation, the diesel would be shipped to Tyonek, and the spill scenario would shift to Cook Inlet and waters leading to it. The types of impacts would be the same, but the birds vulnerable to effects would be different. Steller’s eider molting and wintering habitat extends into Cook Inlet, and they would be vulnerable for the part of the molting season that overlaps with shipping, but there is no important habitat for spectacled eiders.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

Neither eider species occurs in the vicinity of the pipeline; therefore, a release of diesel fuel from the pipeline would not have any effect on Steller’s eiders or spectacled eiders. If a pipeline release occurred in the segment of pipeline adjacent to Cook Inlet and the diesel got into the saltwater during the molting or wintering periods for Steller’s eiders, they could potentially be affected.

Alternative 4 - Birch Tree Crossing Port

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to ESA protected, candidate, and delisted bird species.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Alternative 5A - Dry Stack Tailings

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to ESA protected, candidate, and delisted bird species.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Alternative 6A – Modified Natural Gas Pipeline Alignment: Dalzell Gorge Route

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to ESA protected, candidate, and delisted bird species.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
Alternative 2 – Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for impacts to ESA-protected and candidate marine mammals. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

The discussion of an ocean barge rupture at sea for marine mammals for Alternative 2 in Section 3.24.6.12.2 is relevant to ESA protected and candidate marine mammals.

The threatened and endangered marine mammals along the Bering Sea ocean barge corridor include fin whales, humpback whales, and North Pacific right whales. The Southwest stock of northern sea otters occurs near Unalaska Island, so may be present in the nearshore waters adjacent to Dutch Harbor. Small and very small spills are unlikely to impact most of these species. They are highly mobile with large ranges relative to the small, localized area that would be affected by a small spill and short time period over which dispersion or evaporation would occur. In such a case, the magnitude would be low, duration temporary, and extent local, although the context ranges from important to unique, given legislative protection of all threatened and endangered marine mammals under the MMPA and ESA. The threatened and candidate species (bearded and ringed seals, walrus, southwest stock of northern sea otters) are considered important and the endangered species (Steller sea lions, fin, humpback, and right whales) are considered unique as per the criteria in Section 3.14, Threatened and Endangered Species. Additionally, North Pacific right whales have an exceedingly small population size (approximately 30 whales) and the barge corridor traverses one of only two areas designated as critical habitat for this species. In the event of a large or very large spill in the vicinity of cetaceans, injury is more likely to occur. Although injury is likely to be sublethal, as described in Section 3.24.6.12.2, and would not have population level effects for most species, injurious effects to even one individual North Pacific right whale would potentially have deleterious population level effects. In the event of a large or very large spill, the magnitude would be medium (detectible injuries) to high (in the case of population-level effects on right whales), although the duration of the event causing injury would be temporary, based on how quickly a spill disperses, evaporates, or is otherwise contained. The geographic extent would depend on the breadth of the spill and area over which it dispersed, so could range from local to regional. Sea otters could contact fuel if a spill occurred in or spread to nearshore waters. The 2004 grounding of the freighter Selendang Ayu on Unalaska Island released more than 300,000 gallons of non-crude (bunker) oil and caused at least two sea otter mortalities, whereas there is no indication that smaller-scale spills (mean size of about 921 gallons) have an impact on the Southwest stock of northern sea otters (FWS 2014b). The viscosity and volatility of crude or bunker oil and diesel fuel differ, so it may be inappropriate to extrapolate effects of diesel on otters from known oil impacts. Few pinnipeds would be affected by an ocean barge rupture at sea, since major haulouts in or near Bristol Bay are well beyond the barge corridor. If a rupture were to occur nearer to Kuskokwim Bay and currents and winds dispersed the fuel shoreward prior to evaporation, some seals could encounter fuel and experience short-term, but noticeable physical effects (medium magnitude or intensity) in localized areas of the spill or fuel dispersal range. Potential impacts of an ocean barge rupture on threatened and endangered marine mammals would range from negligible to moderate or major, depending on the size and
location of a spill, proximity to marine mammals, species impacted, and wind and weather conditions.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A diesel fuel spill due either to grounding or collision on the Kuskokwim River could result in the same type of effects on marine mammals that occur in the river or Kuskokwim Bay as described above for an ocean barge rupture. Small or very small spills are most likely to occur and would likely be contained and/or disperse and evaporate quickly. Marine mammals would have to be at the spill site at the time of occurrence to incur physical effects derived from breathing or ingesting the fuel. Although of low probability of occurrence, a large or very large spill would have a correspondingly greater footprint, potentially moving downstream from the spill site toward Kuskokwim Bay. In such an instance, the potential for contact with diesel fuel increases.

The frequency of occurrence of threatened or endangered marine mammals in the Kuskokwim River, from the mouth of the river to Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port, is very low. The nearest walrus and sea lion haulouts are in northern Bristol Bay and outside of the Donlin Gold Project Area, bearded seals are rare in the lower Kuskokwim River (1 to 2 per year) and the other species may infrequently occur in Kuskokwim Bay, but are unlikely in the river. There have been no reports of ESA-protected cetaceans in the Kuskokwim River. The potential for direct contact between ESA-protected marine mammals with diesel fuel, were a spill to occur in the Kuskokwim River, is therefore, quite low. If such were to occur, the magnitude would range from low to medium (from imperceptible to detectible without population effects), the duration of both the event and the effects would be temporary, the extent local (but, ranging from the spill location to some distance down river with a larger spill), and the context important, in accordance with criteria in Section 3.14, Threatened and Endangered Species. The overall impact of a river barge diesel release would be negligible to minor for threatened and endangered marine mammals in the Kuskokwim River.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Spills at storage tanks at the mine site would have no effect on marine mammals. All storage tanks would have secondary containment equal to a minimum of 110 percent of the total maximum volume of the largest tank in the secondary containment area.

Since it is assumed that a diesel spill would be contained and recovered, it would not spread to adjacent waters, resulting in little chance for marine mammals to contact the diesel fuel. The impacts of a tank farm release on marine mammals would be of low intensity (effects would not be likely to be noticeable), of temporary duration (lasting only as long as the recovery and cleanup operations), extent of effects would be local (limited to the immediate area of the spill), and the context for MMPA- and ESA-protected marine mammals would be important, in accordance with criteria in Section 3.14, Threatened and Endangered Species. The summary impact level of a tank farm release on threatened and endangered marine mammals would, therefore, be none to negligible.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Fuel spills resulting from a tanker truck incident are unlikely to affect marine mammals. The on-land release, small to very small volume for most spills, and the on-board spill response kits
further minimize potential for impact to waterways. Furthermore, marine mammal sightings are rare as far up the Kuskokwim River as Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. Since a spill emanating from a tanker truck is not likely to affect areas used by marine mammals in the Project Area, there would be no anticipated effects of such a spill on threatened and endangered marine mammals.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

None of the transport scenarios for cyanide would release cyanide into the environment where listed marine mammals may occur. Therefore, no effects from cyanide would be expected. If a cyanide container was lost in the water where listed marine mammals occur, the activity associated with recovering it would have minor effects on them if they were present.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

None of the transport scenarios for mercury would release mercury into the environment where listed marine mammals may occur. Therefore, no effects from mercury would be expected. If a mercury tank-tainer was lost in the water where listed marine mammals occur, the activity associated with recovering it would have minor effects on them if they were present.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

Spills resulting from a partial tailings dam failure are unlikely to affect marine mammals. A water only spill could potentially reach the Kuskokwim River; however, it would rapidly be diluted, and marine mammal sightings are rare as far up the river as Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port. Since a spill emanating from a tailings dam is not likely to affect areas used by marine mammals in the Project Area, there would be no anticipated effects of such a spill on threatened and endangered marine mammals.

Alternative 3A – Reduced Diesel Barging: LNG-Powered Haul Trucks

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to ESA protected and candidate marine mammals. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

A release of LNG would occur only at the mine site and would have no potential to affect marine mammals.

Alternative 3B – Reduced Diesel Barging: Diesel Pipeline

Under Alternative 3B, spill Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to ESA protected and candidate marine mammals. The likelihood of Scenarios 2 through 4 (river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would have the same impacts on marine mammals as Alternative 2.
Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

The discussion of an ocean barge rupture at sea for marine mammals for Alternative 3B in Section 3.24.6.12.2 is relevant to ESA protected and candidate marine mammals. The ESA-protected species of primary concern is the Cook Inlet beluga whale, found only in Cook Inlet and primarily in the upper inlet. The Cook Inlet delivery route traverses designated critical habitat for this species. Potential impacts of an ocean barge rupture on threatened or endangered marine mammals would range from negligible to moderate, depending on the size and location of a spill, proximity to marine mammals, species involved, and wind and weather conditions.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

The proposed diesel pipeline would begin in Tyonek and connect to Beluga, after which it would cross the Beluga River. Spills occurring along this segment of the pipeline route, particularly where it crosses the river, could impact marine mammals. The proximity of this segment of the pipeline to Beluga and Tyonek should facilitate intense response efforts once a leak is detected. The magnitude and extent of impact depend on the time of year, size of the spill, and how quickly it disperses. Beluga whales commonly forage at the mouth of and in the Beluga River during summer through fall and could either be directly impacted by skin or nasal contact with the spilled diesel or indirectly impacted if prey species are contaminated. Magnitude could range from low to medium, depending on the season, presence of and numbers of belugas, duration would likely be temporary (occur during a discrete event), the extent generally localized to the area near to the spill, although the impact zone depends on the size of the release, time to detection, season, and weather conditions. The context for belugas and their potentially impacted designated critical habitat is unique. Impacts from a pipeline release would, therefore, be minor to moderate.

Alternative 4: Birch Tree Crossing (BTC) Port

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to ESA protected and candidate marine mammals.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Alternative 5A: Dry Stack Tailings

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to ESA protected and candidate marine mammals.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
Alternative 6A: Modified Natural Gas Pipeline Alignment: Dalzell Gorge Route

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to ESA protected and candidate marine mammals.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.15 LAND OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND USE

Land ownership would not be affected by any spill scenario; land management and use are discussed for each scenario.

3.24.6.15.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for land use and management impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

If the spill location is away from the coastline and prevailing weather conditions prevent the spill from reaching land, there would be no effect to land use. If the spill were to occur near the coastline, minimal impacts to shorelines may occur. In such an event, there would be no impact to land management. Impacts to land uses of impacted coastlines would be low in intensity (minimal impacts to coastlines anticipated due to rapid dispersal and evaporation of diesel), short-term in duration (diesel lasts three to five days in the marine environment), and local in extent (limited to impacted waters and those coastlines affected).

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

Minor impacts could occur to land management if the spill requires management action. Therefore, land management effects would range from no impact to low intensity, short-term (duration of the spill), and local impacts for the spill site that would require actions by the land manager. These impacts would likely require additional mitigation measures, such as the development of a spill contingency plan in coordination with potential land managers.

Impacts to land uses of impacted shorelines would be low in intensity (minimal impacts to shorelines anticipated due to rapid dispersal and evaporation of diesel), short-term in duration (within a month there would be no or very little visible diesel sheen remaining), and local in extent (limited to impacted shorelines).

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Storage of diesel would occur in tank farms located in Dutch Harbor, Bethel, Angyaruag (Jungjuk) Port, and the mine site. Minor impacts could occur to land management if the spill requires management action. Table 3.24-1 shows the progression for very small and small spills with high and medium probabilities, and large and very large spills both having very low probabilities.
A very low probability, large volume (possibly 1 million gallons or more), potential spill scenario is a catastrophic tank failure at a tank farm, such as the Bethel Port, Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port, or the mine-site tank farm. The entire volume of the tank’s contents would be released to secondary containment; recovery would be 100 percent, minus any loss to evaporation. However, impacts could include evacuation of nearby homes and businesses due to fumes and potential fire danger, as in the case of the Bethel Port tank farm.

Impacts to land management would range from no impact to low intensity, short-term (duration of the spill), and local impacts for the spill site that would require actions by the land manager. These impacts would likely require additional mitigation measures, such as the development of a spill contingency plan in coordination with potential land managers. Impacts to land use from diesel spills at a tank farm would thus range from no impact for small spills to impacts that are high in intensity (evacuation of lands due to fire danger), short-term in duration (cleanup operations should be complete within 7 days), and local in extent (limited to nearby land owners) for large spills.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

In the event of a release from a tanker truck, impacts to land uses would range from low to high in intensity (depending on the size of the spill, current land use, and possible impacts to fisheries), short to medium-term in duration (duration of impacts may increase if subsistence or fisheries are impacted), and local in extent (limited to road or nearby land owners). Minor impacts could occur to land management if the spill requires management action. Therefore, land management would range from no impact to low intensity, short-term (duration of the spill), and local impacts for the spill site that would require actions by the land manager. These impacts would likely require additional mitigation measures, such as the development of a spill contingency plan in coordination with potential land managers.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

In the unlikely event of a sodium cyanide release, direct and indirect effects to land, management and use are expected to be minimal and limited to a short disruption of land uses in the immediate vicinity of the spill during cleanup activities. Limited impacts could occur to land management if the spill requires management action. Therefore, land management would range from no impact to low intensity, short-term (duration of the spill), and local impacts for the spill site that would require actions by the land manager. The intensity and magnitude of negative impacts on land use would likely be low, limited to existing limited land uses and confined to the immediate area of the spill. The environmental effects would be confined to a small area. The effects on land resources are considered negligible, due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

The effects of a mercury release are very similar to that of a cyanide release. In the unlikely event of a mercury release, direct and indirect effects to land management and use are expected to be minimal and limited to a short disruption of land uses in the immediate vicinity of the spill during cleanup activities. Limited impacts could occur to land management if the spill requires management action.
A release of mercury into the environment along the ocean or river corridors, at transfer facilities, or along the road and adjacent water bodies is considered a low probability event, as mercury would have multiple containment levels. Cleanup would occur quickly due to the multiple containment systems. Therefore, land management would range from no impact to low intensity, short-term (duration of the spill), and local impacts for the spill site that would require actions by the land manager. The intensity and magnitude of negative impacts on land resources caused by a disruption of land uses in the immediate area of the spill would likely be low. The environmental effects would be confined to a small area. The effects on land management and use are considered negligible, due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure
The tailings dam, associated facilities, and the spill trajectory resulting from a potential partial tailings dam failure are located on private land (Native Patent or Interim Conveyed—see Figure 3.15-1C, Section 3.15, Land Ownership, Management, and Use). If there were to be a partial tailings dam failure, of either water and tailings or just water, the impacts to land management would range from no impact to high intensity, depending upon the volume of spill and location of spill trajectory. The duration of effects would range from short-term (duration of the spill) to long-term (duration of the cleanup effort), and local impacts for the spill site that would require actions by the land manager owners. These impacts would likely require additional mitigation measures, such as the development of a spill contingency plan in coordination with nearby land managers. Impacts to land use from a partial tailings dam failure would thus range from no impact for small spills to impacts that are high in intensity (evacuation of lands), short-term in duration, and local in extent (limited to nearby land owners) for large spills.

3.24.6.15.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS
Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to land use and management. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release
Impacts to land use from an LNG spill at the mine site would range from low to medium in intensity (depending on the size of the spill), short in duration (LNG would quickly dissipate), and local in extent (most likely limited to the mine site or nearby land owners). No residential or commercial areas are located in the vicinity of the mine site; therefore, an LNG spill would not impact these land uses. An explosion could potentially alter the landform, but not the proposed industrial use within the area. There would be no impact to land management.

3.24.6.15.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE
Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to land use and management. Impacts under Scenarios 1 and 2 (ocean or river barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank
farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on land use and management as Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

Under Alternative 3B, landowners identified along the natural gas pipeline under Alternative 2, as well as the landowners along the additional 19-mile segment from the start of the pipeline to the Tyonek dock could potentially be impacted by a diesel pipeline release. Depending on the size of the spill, there would likely be localized direct impacts to ecological resources both on land as well as river and streams that would continue until cleanup is complete (days to months depending on spill size). Therefore, land management would range from no impact to low intensity, short-term (duration of the spill), and local impacts for the spill site that would require actions by the land manager. These impacts would likely temporarily restrict existing land uses along the ROW such as recreation and subsistence resources (see Section 3.16, Recreation, and Section 3.21, Subsistence, respectively). Cleanup activities would also likely temporarily halt the proposed industrial land use of the land along the pipeline. Overall, impacts to land use would likely be high intensity and localized in extent, but effects would be temporary (extending through cleanup) and affect resources commonly found in the region.

ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to land use and management. The likelihood of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced and the likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) would be increased; however, the impacts of either would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Impacts under Scenarios 1, 3, 7 through 9 (ocean barge, tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to land use and management.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to land use and management.
Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.16 RECREATION

3.24.6.16.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLING GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for recreation impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

A potential rupture of an ocean barge at sea under Alternative 2 would release 735,000 gallons of diesel fuel, and 50 percent of this would reach shore in the Kuskokwim Bay area. This release would likely have a limited effect on existing recreation activities and use patterns, because of limited recreation use in this project spill area. The recreation activities affected could include offshore sport fishing, sea kayaking, and sailing; activities that occur primarily or entirely during ice-free portions of the year. Within the Project Area, these recreation activities largely take place close to shore in areas where there would be minimal interaction with ocean barges and a potential fuel spill. The level of recreation use differs along the length of the ocean barge route, but existing recreation levels are predominantly low. The ocean barges proposed under Alternative 2 generally travel in areas far from shore where little to no recreation activities occur. Those recreation activities that could be affected would likely be clustered around Dutch Harbor and Bethel. In the event of an ocean barge rupture at sea, it is likely that a spill would occur in an area a large distance away from areas of existing recreation use and have no direct or indirect impacts to recreation. If the spill happened near to the shore or during a period of high recreation use (summer) it could displace recreationists in the area, both from the spill directly and from the response effort indirectly. The impact from this spill would be low to moderate depending on the area affected and existing recreation levels.

In the event of a spill near to shore in areas where recreation takes place, the displacement of recreationists would occur immediately after the spill, during the response effort, and possibly afterward if there was a perception of contamination. The response effort, depending on the magnitude of the spill and the amount of shoreline at risk, would likely extend for one week or less, with most intensive cleanup efforts occurring in the days following the spill. Therefore, the duration of impacts to recreation as a result of an ocean barge rupture would be temporary. The likelihood of an ocean barge rupture close to shore in areas of seafaring recreation would be very low. In addition, the levels of recreation use in the areas potentially affected by a spill would be low to moderate. Displacement due to the spill and the response effort would likely not affect a large number of recreationists. Therefore, the intensity of impacts to recreation as a result of an ocean barge rupture would be low to medium, depending on the amount of recreation that took place in the area at the time of a spill.

Given the volume of fuel that could be spilled in the event of an ocean barge rupture and potential for dispersion, a spill could quickly affect a large area. If the spill occurred near the shore, it could have the potential to affect hundreds of miles of shoreline and displace shoreline recreation. For that reason, the extent of a large ocean barge rupture would be regional in scale.
and affect recreationists throughout a large area. The recreation opportunities that would potentially be affected, including near shore recreation, occur frequently within the region and would be considered common to important depending on the location.

Overall, the impacts to recreation as a result of an ocean barge rupture are dependent upon the spill location. If a spill occurred in areas where recreation does not take place, there would be no direct or indirect effects. If the rupture occurred near shore where there are existing low levels of recreation, impacts would be moderate to recreation. Depending on the number of recreationists, this would result from the temporary displacement due to spill and response efforts of medium intensity affecting recreation resources that are common to important in context.

**Scenario 2: River Barge Release**

In the event of a river barge diesel release, impacts to recreation activities would likely be minimal due to the existing low levels of recreation along the Kuskokwim River (see Section 3.16.2.3.1). Under Alternative 2, the transport of fuel by barge up the Kuskokwim River would be limited to the summer delivery season. For this reason, potential impacts would be restricted to recreation activities such as summer sport fishing, kayaking, rafting, and sport hunting along the river. There would be no impact to winter recreation activities such as snowmachining or winter sport hunting in the Project Area. While low in probability, the release of a large volume of diesel from a barge grounding would have the potential to directly impact recreation activities downriver of the spill.

As discussed in Section 3.16.2.3.1, the level of recreation in the Kuskokwim River is low, and the recreation that takes place is primarily related to sport hunting and fishing activities. The contamination of fish and animals from ingestion could disrupt sport fishing and sport hunting along the river and in Kuskokwim Bay. The presence of fuel in the water and subsequent response activities would likely displace other recreation activities. Due to existing low recreation use levels along the river, however, these direct and indirect impacts are expected to be low in intensity. The displacement of recreationists would occur immediately after a spill, continue throughout the response effort, and possibly afterward if there is a perception of contamination. Depending on the magnitude of the spill and the length of river that would be impacted, impacts to recreation would likely be greatest in the days and weeks following the spill and diminish as fuel is dispersed. Efforts would likely continue for one or two weeks following the spill. Therefore, the duration of impacts to recreation as a result of a river barge release would be temporary. Depending on river current, weather, and amount of diesel spilled, the diesel could travel far downriver and possibly to Kuskokwim Bay. Displacement of recreation activities would be greater in areas with focused response efforts. Response efforts could take place at any point from the spill to Kuskokwim Bay, but would remain limited to the Kuskokwim River and Bay. Consequently, the extent of impacts to recreation as a result of a river barge release would be regional to local. There are ample alternative locations for river-based recreation activities throughout the region; many of which exert a larger draw for guided and unguided sport fishing and sport hunting. As a result, a fuel release from the grounding of a river barge would affect recreation resources that are common in the area. Those recreationists displaced by a potential spill would likely seek alternative locations.

Overall, the direct and indirect impacts to recreation resources from a river barge diesel fuel release from a barge grounding would be minor. In the event of a spill, impacts to recreation
activities would be low in intensity due to the existing low levels of recreation along the Kuskokwim River, and the extent of impacts would remain localized to the Kuskokwim River and to a lesser degree Kuskokwim Bay. The number of recreationists displaced as a result of the spill and subsequent response effort would be minimal and affect recreation resources that are common within the Project Area. Those recreationists displaced by a river barge release would likely seek other alternatives within the region to engage in their preferred recreation activities.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

In the instance of a diesel fuel release at a tank farm, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to recreation. The spill and subsequent response effort would be localized to the spill site, either the mine site or a tank farm at Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port or Bethel. In all tank farm release scenarios, potential spills would occur in locations that would be closed to the public and therefore not open to recreation activities. Since the spill and response efforts would remain on-site in an area without public access, and recovery would be 100 percent, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to recreation as a result of a diesel fuel release at a tank farm.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

In the event of a diesel fuel release from a tanker truck rollover or a tanker truck collision, the spill and response effort would have no effect on recreation resources. Under Alternative 2, a tanker truck release would be localized to the spill site on the road, and potentially the land and waters adjacent to the road. In all instances, potential tanker truck spills would occur in locations that would be closed to the public and not be open to recreation activities. Direct and indirect impacts of the release would not extend to areas with the potential for recreation. As a result, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to recreation from a tanker truck diesel fuel release.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

In the event of a container of sodium cyanide being lost overboard from a barge, impacts to recreation activities would likely be minimal due to the existing low levels of recreation along the Kuskokwim River (see Section 3.16.2.2.2). Under Alternative 2, the transport of sodium cyanide by barge up the Kuskokwim River would occur during the summer delivery season. For this reason, potential impacts would be restricted to recreation activities such as summer sport fishing, kayaking, rafting, and sport hunting along the river. There would be no impact to winter recreation activities such as snowmachining or winter sport hunting in the Project Area.

A tank-tainer rupture, including due to vehicle collision during overland transport, is considered a very low probability event. Impacts to recreation from cleanup activities would include a temporary displacement of sport hunting and fishing. Due to existing low recreation use levels along the river, however, these direct and indirect impacts are expected to be low in intensity. The displacement of recreationists would occur immediately after the containers were lost, and continue throughout the response effort. Therefore, the duration of impacts to recreation as a result of lost cargo overboard would be temporary. Displacement of recreation activities would be greater in areas with focused response efforts. Consequently, the extent of impacts to recreation as a result of a lost sodium cyanide container would be local. There are ample alternative locations for recreation activities throughout the region; many of which exert a larger draw for guided and unguided sport fishing and sport hunting. As a result, a lost
container would affect recreation resources that are common in the area. Those recreationists displaced by a potential spill would likely seek alternative locations.

In the event of a sodium cyanide tank-tainer rupture while being transported within the port storage or mine site areas, or from a vehicle collision during transport from Angyaruak (Jungjuk) Port to the mine site, there would be no direct or indirect effects to recreation. These areas are closed to the public for safety reasons, and no recreation would be taking place there.

Overall, the direct and indirect impacts to recreation resources from a sodium cyanide release would be minor. In the event of a lost container, impacts to recreation activities would be low in intensity due to the existing low levels of recreation, and the extent of impacts would remain localized to the spill site. The number of recreationists displaced as a result of the loss and subsequent response effort would be minimal and affect recreation resources that are common within the Project Area. Those recreationists displaced by recovery of a container would likely seek other alternatives within the region to engage in their preferred recreation activities.

**Scenario 8: Mercury Release**

The effects of a mercury release are very similar to that of a cyanide release. In the unlikely event of a mercury release, direct and indirect effects to recreation resources are expected to be minimal and limited to the immediate vicinity of the spill during cleanup activities.

A release of mercury into the environment along the ocean or river corridors, at transfer facilities, or along the road and adjacent water bodies is considered a low probability event, as mercury would have multiple containment levels. Cleanup would occur quickly due to the multiple containment systems. The direct and indirect impacts to recreation resources from a mercury release would be minor. In the event of a lost container, impacts to recreation activities would be low in intensity due to the existing low levels of recreation, and the extent of impacts would remain localized to the spill site. The number of recreationists displaced as a result of the loss and subsequent response effort would be minimal and affect recreation resources that are common within the Project Area. Those recreationists displaced by recovery of a container would likely seek other alternatives within the region to engage in their preferred recreation activities.

**Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure**

In the event of a partial tailings dam failure, impacts to the recreation setting would be high, but the levels of recreation activities downstream from the mine site are estimated to remain very low. The recreation activities that may be affected by a partial tailings dam failure could include sport fishing, river recreation (such as kayaking and rafting), recreational snowmachining, and sport hunting. Sport anglers generally use clear tributary streams as opposed to the turbid waters of the Kuskokwim River, and Crooked Creek and Anaconda Creek are not popular sport fishing or sport hunting locations. While low in probability, a partial tailings dam failure may cause probable loss or damage to anadromous fisheries, which could impact sport anglers. There would be impacts to recreational sightseeing as visual resources would be impacted. Sightseeing and flightseeing are typically secondary recreational activities done in conjunction with travel for sport fishing and sport hunting.

If a release occurred in winter, it could impact recreational snowmachine or dogsled travel on a small portion of the Kuskokwim River and on Crooked and Anaconda creeks. These direct and
indirect impacts are expected to be high in intensity, but would affect very low recreation use levels. Displacement of recreationists would be temporary in duration, with potential long-term displacement of sport anglers and sport hunters if contamination of fish and waterfowl occurred or was perceived. Impacts to recreation would be in a localized area. Resources would be common in context as there are ample alternative locations for recreation, many of which are more popular locations for guided and unguided sport fishing and sport hunting. Displaced recreationists would likely make use of alternative locations for their activities. Overall, the direct and indirect impacts from a partial tailings dam failure would be major to the recreation setting, but would affect a very low number of recreationists in the area.

3.24.6.16.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for impacts to recreation. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

An LNG release, either from pinhole leaks in LNG storage tanks, an accident involving an LNG-fueled truck, or the rupture of a storage tank at the LNG plant, would have no effect on recreation resources. Storage tanks and trucks would be located within the mine site. Thus, potential LNG releases, could occur in the mine site area, which would be closed to the public. Little cleanup response would likely be required because potential LNG releases would vaporize rapidly. Therefore, no direct or indirect impacts to recreation would result.

3.24.6.16.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for impacts to recreation. Impacts under Scenarios 1 and 2 (ocean or river barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on recreation as Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

Under Alternative 3B, the diesel pipeline ROW would follow the same alignment as the proposed natural gas pipeline under alternative 2. (Only one pipeline would be constructed; the diesel pipeline would replace the natural gas pipeline.) The buried diesel pipeline ROW would be within 1,000 feet of or collocated with the Iditarod National Historic Trail (INHT) for approximately 22.9 miles. If a diesel pipeline release were to occur as a result of a pinhole leak or a pipeline rupture in the vicinity of the INHT, it could affect the setting and experience of recreation and result in some displacement of recreation activities. If a diesel pipeline release were to occur away from INHT, which is approximately 292 miles of the pipeline, there would likely be no direct or indirect impacts to recreation resources.
If a diesel pipeline release were to occur in the vicinity of the INHT, it would emit an odor noticeable by recreationists. The spill recovery efforts may require closure of trail sections around the spill site, which could result in displacement of recreation activities. In addition, response efforts would likely use the trail system for access to the spill site, which could either cause more displacement or affect the experience of recreationists. Impacts to recreation would be more likely in the event of a winter pipeline release, as the existing levels of summer recreation on the trail system are very low.

In the event of a diesel pipeline rupture near the INHT in the winter, displacement of recreationists would occur immediately after the spill and during the response effort. The response effort, depending upon the magnitude of the spill, would likely continue until cleanup is complete (days to months depending on spill size). Therefore, the duration of impacts to recreation as a result of a diesel pipeline release would be temporary. The likelihood of a diesel pipeline rupture close to the INHT in the winter would be very unlikely. If this spill scenario were to occur, however, the displacement of recreation due to the spill and the response effort could potentially affect snowmachinists, skiers, and possibly organized race participants and vicarious users. Recreation levels for winter activities along the INHT would be considered moderate to high depending upon the timing of various organized INHT events. The intensity of impacts to recreation as a result of a diesel pipeline rupture would be considered medium, depending on the level of response effort required. If a spill response effort interrupted the Iditarod race, recreation impacts would change to high intensity due to the increases in users, spectator attention, and historic context surrounding the INHT for the Iditarod race. Pinhole leaks would require less response effort, and would have a low intensity impact on recreation. The amount that could potentially be spilled in the event of a diesel pipeline release could be dispersed to a large area, but would not extend beyond the area surrounding the spill site. Therefore, such releases would be local in extent, and effects to recreationists would include displacement in and around the spill response effort. The INHT is a Congressionally-designated trail system that is used primarily in the winter, with several annual organized races. Recreation on the INHT is an important resource in context along the pipeline ROW in that area.

Overall, the impacts to recreation as a result of a diesel pipeline release in the winter would be moderate. There are moderate levels of recreation on the INHT system, and recreation is an important resource in the area. If a pipeline rupture were to occur, the intensity would be medium because of the number of recreationists that may be displaced by the event. The extent would remain localized to the areas around the spill site. Although response efforts may use existing trails for access, the extent would not extend beyond the local area. The response effort would be temporary and displace recreationists during the cleanup period, likely extending for one to two months following the spill.

3.24.6.16.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to recreation. The likelihood of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced, and the likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) would be increased; however, the impacts of either would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 3, 7 through 9 (ocean barge,
tank farm, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.16.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to recreation.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.16.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to recreation.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.17 VISUAL RESOURCES

3.24.6.17.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for visual impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Impacts to visual resources expected to result from very small (less than 10 gallons) and small (10 to 99.9 gallons) diesel spills would be negligible. No change in scenic quality or landscape character attributes would occur. Consequently, potential impacts to visual resources expected to result from very small and small diesel spills are not discussed.

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

In the event of an ocean barge rupture at sea (total release of a very large volume to the water), moderate direct impacts to visual resources could result. Though considered a very low probability event, such an occurrence would be of high intensity, resulting from the strong visual contrast created by the sheen of diesel effluent on the surface of the water compared to unaffected areas. Direct impacts to visual resources would be temporary and localized, as dispersal and evaporation would occur within 3-5 days, thereby limiting the geographic extent to which the spill could spread while still intact. The remote routes followed by ocean barges make it unlikely that diesel fuel would be detected on adjoining shorelines. No indirect impacts to visual resources are expected to result from an ocean barge rupture at sea.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

In the event of a grounding of a river barge and subsequent release of a single fuel laden barge into the riverine environment, major direct impacts to visual resources could result. Though considered a very low probability event, such an occurrence would be of high intensity,
resulting from the strong visual contrast of diesel effluent on the surface of the water compared to unaffected areas. The confined river channel would likely make diesel evident on adjoining shorelines. Though diesel fuel on the surface of the water would be detectable at close proximity, visual contrast between the affected areas and unaffected upriver (or potential down river) areas would be most evident from elevated or aerial locations. Affected area would appear disturbed and unnatural. Geographic extent of direct impacts would be considered regional in scale if the spill was not contained and the discharge was transported by river current to Kuskokwim Bay. The context of direct impacts would be important, affecting villages along the Kuskokwim River, and scenic quality attributes of the Yukon Delta NWR. Direct impacts would be temporary, as diesel would not be detectable on the surface after 3 days, due to dispersal and evaporation. No indirect impacts to visual resources are expected to result from grounding of a river barge and total release of a single fuel laden barge into the riverine environment.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

In the event of a large volume (possibly 1 million gallons or more) spill scenario from a failure of a diesel storage tank, the spill and subsequent response effort would be localized to the spill site - either the mine site or a tank farm at Angyaruag (Jungjuk) Port or Bethel. Under this scenario, moderate direct impacts to visual resources would occur. Direct impacts to visual resources would result from the visual contrast of the diesel effluent in the secondary containment facility against the surrounding environment.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Minor direct impacts to visual resources are expected to result from a potential medium to large volume (up to 13,500 gallons) spill resulting from a tanker truck rollover and release of the entire contents of the tanker truck to the surrounding environment. Released fuel would be visible on the surface of surrounding land and water; however, visual contrast of the spill would be weak and limited to a localized geographic extent to existing topography and vegetation. In the event that in situ burning is required, visual contrast of affected areas could increase to a moderate level; however, direct impacts would remain localized due to topography and intact surrounding vegetation. Because of the extent of burned areas in the Kuskokwim Mountains, such activity would be consistent with larger scale landscape attributes. The context of direct impacts would be common, as no sensitive resources or special management areas are located in the vicinity of mine access or operations-related roadways.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

In the unlikely event of a sodium cyanide release, direct and indirect effects to visual resources are expected to be minimal and likely would be limited to temporary, low intensity impacts from the visual contrast of cleanup activities.

The intensity of negative impacts on visual resources caused by spill cleanup in the immediate area of the spill would likely be low. The direct effects would be confined to a small area would temporarily affect visual resources. The effects on visual resources are considered negligible, due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.
Scenario 8: Mercury Release

In the unlikely event of a mercury release at a cultural resource site, direct and indirect effects to visual resources are expected to be minimal and likely would be limited to temporary, low intensity impacts from the visual contrast of cleanup activities.

The intensity of negative impacts on visual resources caused by spill cleanup in the immediate area of the spill would likely be low. The direct effects would be confined to a small area would temporarily affect visual resources. The effects on visual resources are considered negligible due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

In the event of a liner rupture or tailings dam breach in which a large volume of water or water and tailings is released into the environment, major direct impacts to visual resources could result. While unlikely in probability, impacts would be regional in extent and important in context, potentially affecting visual resources in the vicinity of villages along the Kuskokwim River. A release of tailings and water would have high intensity impacts to visual resources from materials transported downstream and excavated soils as part of cleanup efforts. A water only release would likely have some reduction of impacts over a release of water and tailings, but would still cause a high visual contrast that would appear disturbed and unnatural. Impacts to visual resources would be evident from communities along the Kuskokwim River and from elevated or aerial locations. Indirect impacts to visual resources may result from subsequent cleanup efforts if excavation or earthmoving equipment were used as part of the recovery effort. Impacts would be temporary to long-term in duration, depending upon the extent and location (setting) of the release and cleanup efforts.

3.24.6.17.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to visual resources. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would have the same impacts on visual resource as Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

In the event of an LNG release, moderate long-term direct and indirect impacts to visual resources could result from a large or very large release, if there is a subsequent vapor ignition of LNG at the mine site LNG plant or form a leak on the LNG-powered haul trucks. Direct effects would be of medium intensity, resulting from visual contrast of burned vegetation against the surrounding landscape. Direct impacts would be localized as viewer extent is limited by topography over the majority of the Project Area. Direct impacts would affect common resources.

3.24.6.17.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for impacts to visual resources. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through and 4 (ocean or river barge,
tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would have the same impacts on visual resources as Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

In the event of a large or very large spills occurring due to rupture of the diesel pipeline, direct and indirect impacts to visual resources of the Kuskokwim River as well as other rivers crossed by the pipeline, would be similar to that described under Scenario 2 (River Barge Grounding). In the event of a large or very large spills occurring due to rupture of the diesel pipeline in one of the inland segments, direct impacts to upland areas would be of medium intensity and localized, as shut-off valves would limit the release volume.

ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING PORT

Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to visual resources. Impacts under Scenario 2 (river barge release) would be eliminated upriver, but the same as Alternative 2 for downriver. The likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 3, and 7 through 9 (ocean barge, tank farm cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to visual resources. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to visual resources. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
3.24.6.18 SOCIOECONOMICS

3.24.6.18.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 - DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for socioeconomic impacts. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

It is unlikely that an ocean barge rupture at sea would result in increased employment or income opportunities in the Y-K region. Manpower requirements would be low, as response efforts would be limited to overflights to observe the dispersal of the diesel.

The impacts on employment, income, and sales would be negative if commercial and recreational fishing and/or tourism were to suffer due to the real or perceived impacts of a spill. While these negative employment, income, and sales effects would be temporary, their intensity could be moderate to high if a major spill occurs with shoreline contact and/or contamination of fish.

The State of Alaska has a “Zero Tolerance Policy” with respect to contamination of seafood by an oil spill. If the ADEC finds that a spill threatens to contaminate a body of water or fishery management area, fishing vessels, tenders, and seafood processors must be inspected before, during, and after conducting fishing activities or receiving seafood products (18 AAC 34.600-625).

Moreover, under authority of AS 16.05.060, the ADF&G would close fisheries in areas where there is a likely threat of contamination from a spill. Areas would remain closed to all commercial and recreational fishing, pending monitoring and assessment indicating that the threat of contamination is eliminated. A closed area may be enlarged if the threat of contamination expands to adjacent bays and fishing grounds. The intensity and magnitude of the adverse impacts of a fishery closure on employment, income, and sales would be especially high if the closure coincides with the salmon fishing season in the Y-K region, which occurs during summer months.

The negative employment, income, and sales effects associated with a disruption of commercial or recreational fishing would be regional in extent (within the Y-K region, with negligible effects outside the region), and effects would be unique in context (affecting primarily minority and low-income communities).

Due to the remoteness of a spill resulting from an ocean barge rupture at sea, the effects on public infrastructure and services and fiscal conditions would likely be negligible.

Overall, the direct and indirect effects to socioeconomic resources from an ocean barge rupture at sea would be minor, but moderate if a spill affected local coastal fisheries and communities. The intensity of impacts under this scenario would be medium to high if a major spill occurred close to the shoreline, resulting in commercial fishing closures and a reduction in tourism. Duration of impacts would likely be temporary, affecting socioeconomic resources during the spill and subsequent cleanup efforts. Disruptions of commercial or recreation fishing would likely be regional in extent, given that a large spill could disperse across a large area. Effects would be unique in context (affecting primarily minority and low-income communities).
Scenario 2: River Barge Release

The cleanup and remediation activities following a river barge grounding in which a large volume of diesel is released into the environment would temporarily increase employment opportunities and expenditures in the Y-K region. Manpower requirements would be especially high if labor-intensive response efforts such as mechanical recovery and physical removal are used. Employment associated with cleanup and recovery operations would be of short duration due to the rapid recovery or dispersion of the spilled diesel. No employment opportunities would be created by smaller spills, as cleanup crews would be small and likely consist of Donlin Gold personnel.

Over the longer term, the impacts on employment, income, and sales would be negative if commercial and recreational fishing and/or tourism were to suffer due to the real or perceived impacts of the spill. These negative employment, income, and sales impacts would be similar to those discussed under Scenario 1 (ocean barge rupture at sea), but more focused towards the Kuskokwim River communities. The effects would be important in context (affecting primarily minority and low-income communities).

To the extent that cleanup and remediation activities disrupt local marine and air traffic patterns, by precluding barge traffic in appropriate cleanup areas or by spill cleanup workers taking most of the available seats on local flights, temporary shortages of commodities or services could occur in those communities in the Y-K region in close proximity to the spill. These shortages could have a negative effect on local businesses as well as consumers.

Overall, the direct and indirect effects to socioeconomic resources would be moderate. The intensity of impacts under this scenario could be medium to high if a major spill occurred, resulting in commercial fishing closures and a reduction in tourism. Duration of impacts would likely be temporary, affecting socioeconomic resources during the spill and subsequent cleanup efforts. Disruptions of commercial or recreation fishing would likely be localized in extent (Kuskokwim River). Effects would be unique in context (affecting primarily minority and low-income communities).

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Impacts to socioeconomic resources in the event of a catastrophic tank failure at a tank farm into the secondary containment would be similar to those discussed under Scenario 2. The impact on socioeconomic resources would be negligible to minor because 100 percent of the spill would be captured by secondary containment.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

It is unlikely that cleanup and remediation activities following a tanker truck release would result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region. Cleanup crews would be small and likely consist of Donlin Gold personnel.

A tanker truck accident could result in the release of diesel into the environment along the road, including a water body. However, the intensity and magnitude of the negative impacts on employment, income, and sales caused by a disruption of commercial and recreational fishing and/or tourism would likely be low. The environmental effects would be confined to a small area, and recovery and cleanup should be completed within 7 to 10 days (less in easily accessed locations).
Because a tanker truck release would be highly localized and recovery and cleanup operations would be of short duration, the effects on socioeconomic conditions would likely be negligible.

**Scenario 7: Cyanide Release**

It is unlikely that cleanup and remediation activities following a sodium cyanide release would result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region. Cleanup crews would be small and likely consist of Donlin Gold personnel, trained in safe handling and spill response procedures.

A tank-tainer accident could result in the release of sodium cyanide into the environment along the ocean or river corridors, at transfer facilities, or along the road and adjacent water bodies. The intensity and magnitude of negative impacts on employment, income, and sales caused by a disruption of commercial and recreational fishing and/or tourism would likely be low. The environmental effects would be confined to a small area. The effects on socioeconomic conditions are considered negligible due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.

**Scenario 8: Mercury Release**

The effects of a mercury release are very similar to that of a cyanide release. It is unlikely that cleanup and remediation activities following a mercury release would result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region. Cleanup crews would be small and likely consist of Donlin Gold personnel, trained in safe handling and spill response procedures.

A release of mercury into the environment along the ocean or river corridors, at transfer facilities, or along the road and adjacent water bodies is considered a low probability event, as mercury would have multiple containment levels. The intensity of negative impacts on employment, income, and sales caused by a disruption of commercial and recreational fishing and/or tourism would likely be low. Environmental effects would likely be confined to a small area. The effects on socioeconomic conditions are considered negligible due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.

**Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure**

The cleanup and remediation activities following a partial tailings dam failure in which a large volume of water, or water and tailings, is released into the environment would temporarily increase employment opportunities and expenditures in the Y-K region. Manpower requirements would be especially high if labor-intensive response efforts such as mechanical recovery and physical removal are used, such as in the case of a tailings and water release in winter. Employment increases for cleanup activities would be temporary. No employment opportunities would be created by smaller releases of tailings from the mill or from piping to the TSF, as cleanup crews would be small and likely consist of Donlin Gold personnel.

Over the longer term, the impacts on employment, income, and sales would be negative if commercial and recreational fishing and/or tourism were to suffer due to the real or perceived impacts of the spill. Water contamination could also create drinking water bans, which would also negatively impact local business and consumers. These negative employment, income, and sales impacts would be similar to those discussed under Scenario 1 (ocean barge rupture at sea),
but more focused towards Crooked Creek and the Kuskokwim River communities. The effects would be unique in context (affecting primarily minority and low-income communities).

Overall, the direct and indirect effects to socioeconomic resources would be moderate to major. The intensity of impacts under this scenario could be medium to high if a large spill occurred, resulting in commercial fishing closures, a reduction in tourism, and local drinking water restrictions. The intensity of impacts would depend upon the season, and whether a release was only water, or both water and tailings. Greater magnitude impacts would occur during summer as tailings could be mobilized to a larger area by waterways, and it would be more difficult to move cleanup-up equipment into the area. Duration of impacts would likely be temporary, affecting socioeconomic resources during the spill and subsequent cleanup efforts. Disruptions of commercial or recreation fishing would likely be localized in extent (Crooked Creek, Anaconda Creek, and the Kuskokwim River). Effects would be unique in context (affecting primarily minority and low-income communities).

3.24.6.18.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to socioeconomics. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would have the same impacts on socioeconomics as Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

It is unlikely that cleanup and remediation activities following an LNG release would result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region. In the event of a fire or explosion, responders would be trained fire fighters and other industry professionals. Because released LNG would quickly evaporate leaving no residue when it came into contact with soil or water, there would be no need for workers for environmental cleanup.

In addition, the quick evaporation of released LNG and absence of a residue means that negative impacts to employment, income and sales due to a disruption of commercial or recreational fisheries would be negligible.

Because an LNG release would be highly localized, low intensity, and short in duration, the effects on socioeconomic conditions would likely be negligible.

3.24.6.18.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to socioeconomics. Impacts under Scenario 1 (ocean barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 2 through 4 (river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would have the same impacts on socioeconomics as Alternative 2.
Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

The cleanup and remediation activities following a diesel pipeline break in which a large volume of diesel is released into the environment would temporarily increase employment opportunities and expenditures in communities in close proximity to the section of the pipeline where the break occurred. These positive employment, income, and sales impacts would be similar to those discussed under a river barge grounding under Alternative 2. No employment opportunities would be created by smaller spills, as cleanup crews would be small and would likely consist of Donlin Gold personnel.

If the diesel spilling from a break in the pipeline reached wetlands, freshwater ponds and lakes, streams, or larger rivers, the impacts on employment, income, and sales would be negative to the extent that commercial and recreational fishing and/or tourism suffered due to the real or perceived impacts of the spill. These negative employment, income, and sales impacts would be similar to those discussed under a river barge grounding under Alternative 2, but more localized towards the communities in close proximity to the section of the pipeline where the break occurred. The overall impact could be negligible to minor for small spills, and moderate to major for large spills.

3.24.6.18.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to socioeconomics.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.18.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to socioeconomics.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.18.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to socioeconomics.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
3.24.6.19 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

3.24.6.19.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under Alternative 2, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for effects to minority or low-income communities. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Under Alternative 2, ocean barges would transport diesel fuel from West Coasts ports to Dutch Harbor, and then on to Bethel. Most of the travel area would be far from shore, and would have minimal effects of local commercial or subsistence fisheries. However, there could be adverse impacts from a spill that made contact with the shoreline or created real or perceived contamination of fish, marine mammals, and other subsistence resources. It is unlikely for an ocean barge rupture at sea to result in employment opportunities for low-income or minority communities. There could be temporary adverse impacts to employment, income, and sales if commercial fishing or tourism-related sport fishing declined from real or perceived spill contamination. There may be adverse health impacts from reduced income, community anxiety about an ocean barge rupture at sea, effects to near shore subsistence, and potential exposure to diesel or diesel fumes. Monitoring overflights could increase the risk of injury or accident related to air transportation.

The extent of impacts of an ocean barge spill that reached shorelines would depend upon the size of the spill and cleanup response times. Impact levels would also depend upon the time of the spill.

Overall, the direct and indirect impacts to the minority and low-income communities of the Y-K region from an ocean barge rupture at sea would be minor, but moderate if the spill affected local coastal commercial fisheries and subsistence marine resources. Impact intensity would be negligible or low for an ocean barge rupture away from the coast, but medium to high if the ocean barge spill reached the shoreline. Impacts would likely be temporary. Depending upon the size of the spill, impacts to minority and low-income communities would be local to regional in extent.

Minority and low-income communities would likely not incur disproportionate adverse impacts, and Scenario 1 would not raise an environmental justice concern.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

Potential spills would likely be small or very small, which would not add employment opportunities. However, a large spill would temporarily create additional employment in the Y-K region. Cleanup activities could cause temporary shortages of goods in the Y-K region if cleanup activities disrupt marine and air traffic patterns. Negative employment, income, and sale impacts resulting from commercial and recreation fishing impacts would be similar to those described under Scenario 1 (ocean barge rupture at sea), but would be localized to the Kuskokwim River communities. A large diesel spill could also affect subsistence resources directly with low intensity impacts, but with the potential to have high intensity major impacts of regional perceived contamination of Kuskokwim River salmon and resident species. There may be adverse health impacts from reduced income, community anxiety about a river barge...
release, effects to near shore subsistence, and potential exposure to diesel or diesel fumes. Risk of injury or accident related to air and water transportation would also increase.

If quickly contained or a low volume spill, there would be low or very low intensity effects to minority and low-income communities. If there was a high volume river barge release in the Kuskokwim River, impact intensity would increase to medium or high with an overall moderate impact to minority and low-income communities. If a large volume of diesel was released from a river barge grounding, cleanup activities would temporarily increase employment and expenditures in the Y-K region.

Quickly contained or low volume spills would not disproportionately affect minority or low-income communities and Scenario 2 would not raise an environmental justice concern. While a large spill has a low probability of occurrence, adverse impacts from a large diesel release from a barge on the Kuskokwim River would disproportionately impact minority and low-income communities. Subsistence, recreation, and commercial fisheries would be adversely affected, with interrelated subsistence, health, and socioeconomic impacts to the minority and low-income communities along the Kuskokwim River near the release.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Storage and transfer of diesel fuel would occur in tank farms located in Dutch Harbor, Bethel, Angyaruak (Jungjuk) Port, and at the mine site. Spills would be released into secondary containment structures, and it is unlikely that diesel would be released to the environment. If it did, cleanup response time would determine impacts. A spill quickly contained would have minimal effects to subsistence, health, or socioeconomic resources, but there may be negligible health impacts to communities closest to the tank farms from anxiety over a tank farm release. A tank farm spill would not create additional employment in the Y-K region. The summary impact to low-income and minority communities would be negligible to minor, and limited to localized areas. Minority and low-income communities would not incur disproportionate adverse impacts, and Spill Scenario 3 would not raise an environmental justice concern.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

A tanker truck release would affect a highly localized area and cleanup would be of short duration. A tanker truck release would not create additional employment opportunities in the Y-K region. There may be negligible intensity health impacts to communities closest to the tanker trunk from anxiety over a tanker truck release, although a tanker truck release is unlikely to affect subsistence resources. The summary impact to low-income and minority communities would be negligible to minor, and limited to localized areas. Minority and low-income communities would not incur disproportionate adverse impacts, and Scenario 4 would not raise an environmental justice concern.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

It is likely that natural dispersion would be completed by the time cleanup could be initiated, and small, localized areas would be impacted. If a tank-tainer ruptured and came into contact with water, there would be temporary access restriction for areas of 0.1 to 0.9 radii of the spill. The spill could be toxic to aquatic and terrestrial animals, but sodium cyanide has a low persistence in the environment and does not enter a cycle of food chain bioaccumulation. There could be regional perceptions of contamination of subsistence foods. Cyanide gas is highly toxic to humans, and could build up in the enclosed spaces of the port storage and mine processing
areas; but steps would be taken to ensure there was ventilation in enclosed spaces. Cleanup and remediation activities following a sodium cyanide release would not result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region. There would be low intensity impacts to socioeconomic resources, medium to high intensity impacts to subsistence resources in the localized area of the spill, and medium to high intensity impacts to human health in the localized area of the spill. There would be overall minor to moderate impacts to minority and low-income communities. Minority and low-income communities would not incur disproportionate adverse impacts, and Scenario 7 would not raise an environmental justice concern.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

In the event of a mercury release, some mercury would be emitted as highly toxic gaseous mercury. This could affect terrestrial mammals harvested by subsistence hunters, but there are likely to be few animals in the area with mining activities and human presence. If spilled mercury escapes cleanup efforts, it would be subject to natural methylation processes and would add incrementally to the mercury levels in background and air depositions, and bioaccumulate in fish and fish-eating animals. There could also be regional perceptions of subsistence foods contamination. Bioaccumulation could have human health effects from consumption of fish and animals containing elevated mercury levels and community anxiety over the safety of subsistence foods. Mercury could temporarily impact groundwater and air quality in a localized area. It is unlikely that cleanup and remediation activities following a mercury release would result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region, and declines in employment, income, and sales caused by a disruption of commercial and recreational fishing and/or tourism would likely be low.

There would be low intensity impacts to socioeconomic resources, low to medium intensity impacts to health resources, and medium to high intensity impacts to subsistence resources. There would be an overall moderate impact to minority and low-income communities.

Quickly contained or low volume mercury spills would not disproportionately affect minority or low-income communities, and Scenario 8 would not raise an environmental justice concern. While a large spill has a low probability of occurrence, adverse impacts from a large mercury release would disproportionately impact minority and low-income communities. Subsistence, recreation, and commercial fisheries would be adversely affected, with interrelated subsistence, health, and socioeconomic impacts to the minority and low-income communities along the Kuskokwim River near the release.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

The TSF dam is considered a Hazard Class I by ADNR, implicating a probable loss of one or more lives if a dam breach occurred. There could be local bans on drinking water if contaminated by a tailings dam failure. A tailings release in winter could impede snowmachine travel by subsistence hunters from Crooked Creek. The cleanup and remediation activities following a tailings dam failure in which a large volume of water, or water and tailings, is released into the environment would temporarily increase employment opportunities and expenditures in the Y-K region. Labor requirements would be especially high if mechanical recovery and physical removal were part of the remediation effort, such as in the case of a tailings and water release in winter. There could be declines in employment, income, and sales
from commercial and recreational fishing and/or tourism if impacted by real or perceived impacts of the spill.

There would be overall moderate to major impacts to minority and low-income communities. The intensity of impacts would depend upon the season, and whether a release was only water, or both water and tailings. Greater magnitude impacts would occur during summer as tailings could be mobilized to a larger area by waterways, and it would be more difficult to move remediation equipment into the area. Duration of impacts would likely be temporary. Impacts would be localized to the area of the release, with perceived contamination of subsistence foods being regional in scale.

Quickly contained or very small partial tailings dam failures would not disproportionately affect minority or low-income communities and Scenario 9 would not raise an environmental justice concern. While a large volume tailings dam failure has a low probability of occurrence, adverse impacts from the spill event would disproportionately impact minority and low-income communities. There would be interrelated subsistence, health, and socioeconomic impacts to the minority and low-income communities along the Kuskokwim River near the tailings dam.

3.24.6.19.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to minority or low-income communities. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

If released, LNG would transition back to a gaseous phase when contacting warmer air, soil, or water (California Energy Commission 2014). Air emissions would primarily consist of methane, which would have negligible health impacts. There may be community anxiety from an LNG release that may have health impacts. Methane is a potent GHG, but would not have health-related impacts from climate change. It is unlikely that cleanup and remediation activities following an LNG release would result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region.

Overall impacts to minority or low-income communities would be negligible, and impacts would be highly localized and short in duration. Minority and low-income communities would not incur disproportionate adverse impacts, and Spill Scenario 6 would not raise an environmental justice concern.

3.24.6.19.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to minority or low-income communities. Impacts under Scenarios 1 and 2 (ocean or river barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7, 8, and 9 (cyanide,
mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on minority or low-income communities as Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

Potential spills would create additional employment if a large volume of diesel were released. Subsistence resources would be unlikely to be impacted. Human health impacts would be low intensity, with possible increased impacts if drinking water supplies were impacted. Overall impacts to minority or low-income communities would be negligible, and impacts would be highly localized and short in duration. Minority and low-income communities would not incur disproportionate adverse impacts, and Spill Scenario 5 would not raise an environmental justice concern.

3.24.6.19.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to minority or low-income communities.

Under Alternative 4, the probability for a river barge release would be reduced, and the probability of a tanker truck release would be increased. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.19.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to minority or low-income communities.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.19.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to minority or low-income communities.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.20 CULTURAL RESOURCES

A programmatic agreement is currently under development with consultation among Donlin Gold, the Corps, BLM, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Alaska State Historical Preservation Officer, and tribal representatives and will likely include protection of historic properties during emergency response under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances

3.24.6.20.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under Alternative 2, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for impacts to cultural resources. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Depending on the location of the spill and prevailing weather conditions at the time of the spill, low to high intensity impacts to cultural resources potentially located along shorelines may occur. Impacts to cultural resources from spilled diesel fuel could include contamination of organic cultural materials and site sediments. If ground-disturbing cleanup activities were to occur within the bounds of cultural resource areas, direct impacts would be of high intensity and considered permanent. Direct impacts would be local in extent to resources likely considered important in context. Any clean-up that could impact cultural resources would likely require a mitigation plan to limit those impacts. While the probability of an ocean barge rupture requiring ground disturbance cleanup within the bounds of cultural resource sites is very low, the overall impact could be major. If the spill occurred outside of cultural resource areas, there could be no impacts to cultural resources.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

Although considered a very low probability event, a river barge grounding spill scenario would impact cultural resources if a response effort occurred near culture resources areas. Depending upon the location, release of diesel fuel from up to two barge compartments could potentially result in direct, high intensity impacts to cultural resources. Impacts to cultural resources from spilled diesel fuel could include contamination of organic cultural materials and site sediments. While diesel fuel evaporates and disperses much more quickly than crude oil, there would be impacts from cleanup activities along the shoreline of the Kuskokwim River in close proximity to traditional use areas with potential to contain cultural resources. Because of the confined river channel, diesel would likely be evident on shorelines adjoining known cultural sites. The direct impacts of a diesel spill from the grounding of a river barge would be important in context (affecting sites and villages along the Kuskokwim River) and would be long-term to permanent in duration if intensive ground-disturbing activities occur within the boundaries of cultural resource sites. While the probability of ground-disturbing cleanup activities occurring at cultural resource sites is low due to dispersed geographical distribution of sites along the river, if it were to occur, the overall impact of this scenario on cultural resources could be major due to long-term to permanent, high intensity impacts. If the spill occurred outside of cultural resource areas, there could be no impacts to cultural resources.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

In the event of a large volume spill scenario (possibly one million gallons or more) from a catastrophic tank failure, the entire volume of the tank contents would be released to a secondary containment, with 100 percent recovery, minus any loss to evaporation. No direct or indirect effects to cultural resources would result from this scenario.
Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Direct impacts to cultural resources from a potential medium to large volume spill (up to 13,500 gallons) resulting from a tanker truck rollover or major collision and release of entire contents of the tanker truck to the surrounding environment would impact cultural resources if such a release would occur within the bounds of a cultural resource site. Impacts to cultural resources from spilled diesel fuel could include contamination of organic cultural materials and site sediments. The probability of this occurrence would be very low, however, such an event would likely result in high intensity, direct impacts from cleanup activities. These impacts would likely severely damage the site and be permanent in duration, but limited to a localized geographic extent. While there would be a very low probability of a tanker truck release within the bounds of a cultural resource site, the overall impact of this scenario if it were to occur in a cultural resources area could be major. No impacts would occur to cultural resources in the event of a tanker truck spill outside the area of a cultural resource site.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

In the unlikely event of a sodium cyanide release at a cultural resource site, direct and indirect effects to cultural resources are expected to be minimal and likely would entail limited site disturbance during cleanup activities.

The intensity of negative impacts on cultural resources caused by spill cleanup in the immediate area of the spill would likely be low. The direct effects would likely be confined to a small area and would likely not involve cultural resources. The effects on cultural resources are considered negligible, due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

In the unlikely event of a mercury release at a cultural resource site, direct and indirect effects to cultural resources are expected to be minimal and likely would entail limited site disturbance during cleanup activities.

The intensity of negative impacts on cultural resources caused by spill cleanup in the immediate area of the spill would likely be low. The direct effects would likely be confined to a small area and would likely not involve cultural resources. The effects on cultural resources are considered negligible, due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

A partial tailings dam failure spill scenario would impact cultural resources if water or tailings were carried to a cultural resource site, or response efforts with ground-disturbing activities occurred near cultural resources. The spill scenario could affect sites important in context (sites near the mine site and potentially along the Kuskokwim River), with long-term to permanent duration impacts. While the probability of ground-disturbing cleanup activities occurring at cultural resource sites is low due to the dispersed geographical distribution of sites downstream of the tailings dam; if it were to occur, the overall impact of this scenario on cultural resources could be major due to long-term to permanent, high intensity impacts. Impacts would occur in a localized geographic area, but could affect cultural resources with importance to the region. Clean-up activities would occur in accord with the Programmatic Agreement. (Note: It is not
possible to identify specific cultural resources that could be affected by a potential partial tailings dam failure.)

3.24.6.20.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for impacts to cultural resources. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

The likelihood that an LNG release would occur within the bounds of a cultural resource site would be extremely low. LNG dissipates rapidly into the atmosphere, so there is no liquid spill to clean up. If there were a source to ignite the released LNG before it disperses, then there could be an explosion and fire. This would most likely be confined to the vicinity of the LNG storage tank and truck fueling station. Since these are intensive industrial sites, there is little risk of damage to cultural resources adjacent to or in the vicinity of the mine site. An LNG spill is unlikely, and the risk of impacts to cultural resources is very low.

3.24.6.20.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG Release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to cultural resources. Impacts under Scenarios 1 and 2 (ocean or river barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 3 and 4 (tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts to cultural resources as Alternative 2.

Scenario 5 Diesel Pipeline Release

Under Alternative 3B, impacts from a diesel pipeline release to cultural resources would be dependent upon the location of the release, the proximity of cultural resources, and the extent of cleanup activities. While diesel fuel generally evaporates rapidly, it also quickly penetrates porous soils. In the event that such a release occurred within or adjacent to a cultural resource site, direct and indirect impacts to the site would likely be high in intensity (resulting from the potential for fire, as well as ground disturbance during extensive cleanup activities) and permanent in duration. The extent and context of impacts would be related to the number and significance of affected resources; a release that impacted multiple sites could be regional in extent, while impacts to sites eligible for the National Register of Historic Places would be important to unique in context. In addition, the proposed pipeline corridor is collocated or adjacent (within 1,000 feet) to the INHT for approximately 22.9 miles, between MP 50 and MP 106. For these portions of the pipeline, a diesel fuel release and the subsequent cleanup activities would likely result in direct impacts to the resource. The potential for indirect effects is also present, as subsequent fire and spill response activities would result in long-term visual impacts to the trail’s setting (see Visual Resources in Section 3.24.6.17). While the likelihood of a diesel
release from the pipeline would be low in probability, the overall impacts of a diesel pipeline release on cultural resources could be major.

3.24.6.20.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING PORT

Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to cultural resources. The likelihood of Scenarios 2 and 3 (river barge and tank farm release) occurring would be greatly reduced and the likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) would be increased; however, the impacts of either would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 7, and 8 (ocean barge, cyanide, and mercury releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.20.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A– DRY STACK TAILINGS

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 and 8 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.20.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG Release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to cultural resources. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.21 SUBSISTENCE

A potential spill of fuel or other toxic substances would directly affect subsistence resources and may displace access to those resources. Spills would indirectly affect competition for those resources, since reduced abundance and availability of affected resource might have to serve the needs or a constant-sized user group. Socio-cultural impacts to subsistence would be the same as described for Alternative 2. For this reason, the analysis of spill scenarios will focus on the effects to subsistence resources.

An important indirect effect on subsistence uses due to a spill is highlighted in research conducted after the Exxon Valdez oil spill which showed that people’s perception of risk regarding the contamination of subsistence resources had an effect on whether they trusted that those resources were safe to eat. The perception that resources were unsafe to eat had an effect on overall harvests.

Local people have expertise assessing the safety of subsistence foods if there are observable irregularities in the animal, fish, or plant. Invisible contamination cannot be easily assessed, which creates uncertainty and anxiety. Even a perception of contamination can have an effect on subsistence harvests. During the Exxon Valdez oil spill, local people could see the oil but they had no way of assessing whether the animals, fish, and plants they depended on for subsistence
were safe to eat. Initially, locals assumed they were not safe to eat and the year after the oil spill, subsistence harvests dropped by 77 percent in some communities.

The primary reason that interviewed households gave for reductions in subsistence harvests was concern that resources had been contaminated by the oil. The concern undermined people’s confidence in their own abilities to discern if foods were safe to eat using traditional knowledge... Subsistence harvests and uses rebounded the second and third post spill year... [But]... concerns about the long-term health risks associated with subsistence foods, as well as concerns about spill effects on the resource populations upon which subsistence uses depend, persisted (Fall et al. 2001).

To alleviate people’s concerns about contamination, two things are important: first is quick response and containment of any spill, especially a spill in water; and second, is a system for testing wild foods for contaminants that would provide local people with complete and understandable information in a timely manner.

From the perspective of risk communication, two key themes stand out. The first is the importance of a collaborative, multidisciplinary approach from the earliest stages of response. The second is the necessity of an effective, interactive communication process that develops a credible message and delivers it well and is flexible and reflexive enough to adapt as its audience responds. Crosscutting both of these themes is the importance of sound science, local knowledge, and observations, a public process above suspicion, and sensitivity to the cultural context in which issues are defined and the message is received. These lessons must be applied to each stage of the process, from contingency planning, to spill response, to long-term restoration (Fall et al. 2001).

Overall, the specific behavior and fate of toxic substances potentially released (i.e. diesel fuel and LNG) from the Donlin Gold Project are different from crude oil in the Exxon Valdez example. The impacts to subsistence resources as a result of an ocean barge rupture, river barge release, or tank farm release, would depend upon the extent and duration of the spill, weather conditions, and the speed of the response. In the case of a large scale spill, assessing risks and providing timely information regarding food safety would be of critical importance.

3.24.6.21.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for subsistence impact. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

The ocean barges proposed under Alternative 2 generally travel in areas far from shore where little to no subsistence activities occur. Within the Project Area, subsistence activities largely take place close to shore and in areas where there would be minimal interaction with ocean barges or a potential fuel spill, based on normal transit routes.

In the event of a diesel spill at sea, there would be little to no opportunity to recover the product before dispersal. In this scenario, approximately 367,500 gallons would reach the shore. While dispersal and evaporation would take 3 to 5 days, it could have the potential to affect hundreds of miles of shoreline and could affect near shore subsistence activities. If the cleanup response is rapid and oil does not reach or affect animals or plants, the impact on subsistence uses would
be low and the duration temporary. The extent of the effects would be local, limited to the immediate area of the spill, and the context common. However, as the size of the spill increases and response time lags, the magnitude of impacts would increase and could be medium to high. The indirect effect of perceived contamination would be major, as a spill in the mouth of the Kuskokwim River might be seen as contaminating salmon runs.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

Potential spills would most likely be small or very small and would likely be contained and/or disperse and evaporate fairly quickly. Such an event would also undermine people’s confidence in the safety of the resource. Research shows that concerns persist long after the spill event; for this reason response times are critical.

If a spill were quickly contained, there would be minimal effects on subsistence resources or people’s confidence in the resource. Access to subsistence resources would not be affected in the scenario of a rapid containment. The direct impacts on subsistence resources of a river barge release in the Kuskokwim River would, therefore, be low in intensity. The extent of effects would be local, limited to the immediate area of the spill, and the duration temporary. The impact would affect resources that are common in context, except for migratory waterfowl and Chinook salmon which are important in context due to protections under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act or urgent conservation measures in recent years. The indirect effect of perceived contamination would be major, as a fuel barge spill in the Kuskokwim River would be seen as contaminating salmon and resident species.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

Storage of diesel fuel would occur in tank farms located in Dutch Harbor, Bethel, Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port, and at the mine site. Only in the unlikely event of simultaneous failure of the secondary containment structure and a tank or multiple tanks, would diesel be released to the surrounding environment. Under such circumstances, the same conditions as in previous scenarios apply: if the spill is quickly contained, there would be minimal effect on subsistence resources or people’s confidence in the resource. For the spill scenario, the summary impact level of a tank farm release on subsistence resources would, therefore, be negligible to minor. The extent of effects would be local, and limited to the immediate area of the spill. The context for impacts is common. Access to subsistence resources would not be affected.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

Fuel spills resulting from a tanker truck incident are unlikely to affect subsistence resources. Tanker truck spills would most likely occur on land, would be of small volume, and the on-board spill response kits would be utilized to minimize potential impacts. The magnitude of effect of a tanker truck fuel spill would be low, the duration temporary, the geographical extent local, and the context common.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

If tank-tainers lost overboard were retrieved and were not ruptured, there would be no effect on subsistence resources.
In the event of a tank-tainer spill at a storage site or at the mine site, the resultant spill would be contained, as the tank-tainer would be located in an area that includes secondary containment. There would be no effect on subsistence resources.

If a truck carrying cyanide tank-tainers had an accident on the road, a tank-tainer rupture could result. If the spilled cyanide briquettes spilled on dry ground, there would be no effect on subsistence resources. If the sodium cyanide came into contact with water, it would dissolve and the resulting hydrogen cyanide would be highly toxic to aquatic wildlife or animals drinking it. Even a spill in a puddle or rain could release toxic cyanide gas. Initial isolation of the spill site from unprotected people or animals would be 0.1 mile for a small spill or 0.2 mile for a larger spill, and the downwind protection zone would be 0.1 to 0.2 mile for daytime or 0.2 to 0.9 mile for night. If the cyanide came into contact with water, then both aquatic and terrestrial mammals could be adversely affected. Although cyanide reacts readily in the environment and degrades or forms complexes and salts of varying stabilities, it is toxic to many living organisms used for subsistence at very low concentrations. Cyanide has low persistence in the environment and is not reported to be accumulated or stored in any mammals and therefore there is no reported biomagnification of cyanide in the food chain. The magnitude of effect of a truck-based cyanide release that came into contact with water would be medium to high, the duration temporary, the geographical extent local, and the context common. However, the indirect effect of perceived contamination of the subsistence food resources would be major and regional in extent.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

This scenario summarizes the potential spill or release causes and potential impacts that might result directly or indirectly from the transportation and storage of mercury. In the unlikely event that the cargo is lost overboard a mercury spill could only result if the containers ruptured. Without a rupture, there would be no impact on subsistence resources.

In the unlikely event that there was a mercury spill in the storage areas either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon would be released from the containers. The liquid elemental mercury would collect in the secondary containment. Spilled mercury would be recovered and managed appropriately. There would be no effects on subsistence resources.

A low probability potential spill scenario may result from truck transportation of mercury containers to Angiyaruq (Jungjuk) Port. In the unlikely event that there is a truck accident and the containers ruptured, a mercury spill (either the liquid mercury or the spent carbon) could result. The liquid elemental mercury and the spent carbon could be released to the land or surface water.

If elemental mercury is spilled, some of it would be emitted as gaseous mercury, which could be highly toxic to animals. However, with all the expected activity at the site of an accident and cleanup, few, if any, terrestrial mammals would be expected to be exposed. If spilled mercury escapes cleanup efforts, it would be subject to natural methylation processes and would add incrementally to the mercury levels in background and air depositions, thus increasing the chronic exposure of aquatic biota and fish and, since it bioaccumulated, it would also increase exposure to fish-eating animals. The magnitude of direct effects of a truck-based mercury release would be medium to high, the duration temporary, the geographical extent local, and the context common. The indirect effect of perceived contamination would be high, particularly...
in light of widespread concern in the Kuskokwim River villages about mercury contamination from the historic Red Devil Mine.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

The estimate of impacts to subsistence from a partial tailings dam failure scenario is based on the overlap of subsistence uses areas by EIS Analysis Area villages, by season, and the area affected by the spill scenarios. Specific impacts to subsistence activities would depend upon the spill volume and content (water and tailings versus water only), the season, the time for dispersal before spill response, and the effectiveness of the response and cleanup. In addition to potential direct impacts, in which subsistence activities would be displaced by a spilled materials and spill response activities, the potential perception that subsistence resources are contaminated is also important, as noted in Section 3.24.6.21 above.

In a summer spill event of tailings and contaminated water, the material would transit Anaconda Creek, and deposit an estimated 1,300 acre-feet of tailings in Crooked Creek. In summer, subsistence uses of the Crooked Creek drainage are very limited because the creek is shallow and sinuous, and not conducive to boat access. Most summertime subsistence fishing occurs in the Kuskokwim River rather than in this tributary. Berries are taken in late summer and fall in the lower reaches of the Crooked Creek Drainage, and bear hunting, likely in spring, occurs in the drainage up to about Crevice Creek.

The magnitude of direct displacement in the summer tailings and contaminated water event would be low and local in geographic extent. However, any spill of hazardous materials into Crooked Creek would raise concerns among subsistence users about contamination of fish in Crooked Creek and beyond, including salmon returning to spawn in the drainage, and resident species. The magnitude of this indirect impact to subsistence activities would be high, based on the spill scenario volume.

In a summer spill event of water only, the released material would reach the Kuskokwim River; but the transit of Crooked Creek would be slowed by the wide floodplain, and the release is modeled to be 1 foot or less at the confluence of Crooked Creek and the Kuskokwim River. The spill material would represent approximately 1.8 percent of the flow in the Kuskokwim River during May through October. The greatest effect would be perceived contamination of subsistence fish resources, and this would likely extend to subsistence fishing communities all the way up and down the Kuskokwim River – a high-magnitude impact or regional geographic extent.

The winter spill event scenarios, for both tailings and contaminated water, and for contaminated water only, would directly affect winter subsistence uses in Crooked Creek and in the Kuskokwim River near the confluence with Crooked Creek. Subsistence users from Crooked Creek access the drainage in winter, traveling by snow machine for trapping and for bear in spring. A spill event would impede this access, and hunters would probably go to other areas. The greatest effect would be the indirect impact of perceived contamination of subsistence resources, near the spill event, but also affecting confidence in any subsistence resources that pass through the spill zone. This may include resident fish species used by many communities. As a result, the impacts would be of high intensity and regional extent.

Taken together, the various partial tailings dam failure scenarios have discrete direct effects, but the indirect effects of perceived contamination of subsistence foods would be of high intensity
and regional extent. The duration would generally extend through one to three years, and the context includes resources that are important and unique. Important resources affected include Essential Fish Habitat and the Kuskokwim River Chinook salmon stock, while the subsistence harvest practices of the affected villages are unique in context.

3.24.6.21.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable, and has not been analyzed for effects to subsistence. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be of the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

LNG spills could be small (pinhole leaks from the storage tanks or spills while fueling the LNG-fueled trucks), or larger (LNG-fueled truck accident or unlikely rupture of LNG plant storage tank). If released, LNG would transition back to a gaseous phase (California Energy Commission 2014). If a large amount of LNG is spilled on water within a short period of time, the relatively warmer temperature of the water would cause the LNG to rapidly transition to its gaseous phase.

It is unlikely that subsistence resources would be affected by an accidental release of LNG. The summary impact level of an LNG release on subsistence resources would therefore be negligible. The extent of effects would be local, and limited to the immediate area of the spill. The context for impacts is common. Access to subsistence resources would not be affected.

3.24.6.21.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to subsistence. The likelihood of Scenarios 2 through 4 (river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be of the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on subsistence as Alternative 2.

Once the diesel pipeline is installed, the spill risks associated with ocean barging (Scenario 1) and River Barging (Scenario 2) would be eliminated. Spill risks associated with diesel fuel tank farm storage and tanker trucks would be drastically reduced. However, this alternative introduces additional spill risks associated with the transportation of fuel along the pipeline corridor. Diesel fuel shipments would be routed to Tyonek, and a pipeline segment would run from Tyonek to Beluga. This section discusses the spill risks associated with diesel pipeline transportation.

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Under this alternative, a diesel pipeline from Tyonek to the mine site would eliminate diesel fuel barging up the Kuskokwim River during the operations and closure phases. An initial supply of diesel fuel for the construction period would need to be barged to the mine site; however, during construction, the risk of an ocean barge rupture along the Western Alaska
delivery route from Dutch Harbor to Bethel and to Anyaruaq (Jungjuk) would be very low due to drastically reduced volume. If a spill were to occur, the resulting effects or changes in subsistence resources, uses, and needs would be similar to those discussed under Alternative 2.

During the operations and closure phases, diesel fuel would be delivered by ocean-going vessel to a fuel dock at Tyonek, resulting in an increased spill risk from ocean barge rupture in Cook Inlet. Diesel fuel spills could occur if a tanker ran aground or was otherwise compromised; however, only one or two barge compartments would be expected to fail. This scenario is considered unlikely. In the event of such an occurrence, the direct impacts would be as described above under Alternative 2 and would depend on the size of the spill, wind and weather, the extent of dispersion, cleanup response time, and time of year. If a spill occurred during the summer salmon runs, the magnitude would be medium to high. The duration and geographic extent would depend on the breadth of the spill and the area over which it dispersed, so could range from temporary and local to long-term and regional. In the event of small spills, the magnitude would be low, duration temporary, and extent local, although the context is important given legislative protection of all marine mammals under the MMPA. As with other spill scenarios, the indirect effect of perceived contamination from a diesel fuel barge spill would be of high intensity and regional extent.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release
Spills from the proposed pipeline, associated pump stations, valves, or pigging facilities could occur during project operation. A spill on land would have less of an impact than a spill in water since spills in water could potentially have a wider footprint and affect various fish species that are important subsistence resources for many communities. If the spill reached a river at a pipeline crossing, the effects of the spill would be much like a river barge spill. The pipeline crosses several streams that are habitat for spawning salmon and some non-salmon species. To minimize disturbance during construction and risks during operations, Horizontal Directional Drilling would be used at some of the major anadromous stream crossings, including the Kuskokwim River and the branches of the George River.

A spill of this scale could result in major to catastrophic impacts to waterbodies, wetlands and vegetation, birds, fisheries, and subsistence uses. The indirect impact of perceived contamination would be high in intensity and regional in extent.

3.24.6.21.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT
Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to subsistence. The likelihood of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced due to shorter barge distances; however, the impacts would be of the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 3, 4, 7 through 9 (ocean barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.21.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS
Under Alternative 5A, Scenarios 5, 6, and 9 (diesel pipeline, LNG, and water and tailings releases) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to subsistence.
Direct and indirect impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.21.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A - MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to subsistence.

Direct and indirect impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.22 HUMAN HEALTH

A spill of fuel or other toxic substance could cause stress to community members in close proximity from real or perceived risks of contamination, and potentially impact human health. Invisible contamination cannot be easily determined, which creates anxiety about the safety of subsistence foods and water quality. Quick response and containment of spills (particularly for spills in water) and a system of testing wild foods and drinking water for contaminants to give local people complete and understandable information in a timely manner could help alleviate some anxiety and reduce potential impacts to human health.

3.24.6.22.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

The ocean barges proposed under Alternative 2 generally travel in areas far from shore where little to no subsistence activities occur. However, if a large diesel spill occurred near the shore it could affect hundreds of miles of coastline and impact near shore subsistence activities. If diesel fuel came ashore, an ocean barge rupture at sea has potential to affect shallow groundwater resources in shoreline zones directly contacted by seawater. Although difficult to predict with certainty, air quality impacts would likely be negligible. The impact intensity would depend on the spill volume and spill response times.

It is unlikely that an ocean barge rupture at sea would result in increased employment or income opportunities in the Y-K region as response efforts would be limited to overflights to observe the dispersal of the diesel. There would be temporary adverse impacts on employment, income, and sales if commercial fishing or sport fishing and related tourism were to decline due to the real or perceived impacts of a spill.

There are potential adverse impacts to social determinants of health (Health Effects Criteria [HEC] 1) with psychosocial stress resulting from community anxiety over an ocean barge rupture at sea. An ocean barge rupture release may involve a vessel accident or injury, and monitoring overflights could increase the risk of injury or accident related to air transportation (HEC 2). There could be potential diesel or diesel fume exposure (HEC 3), and impacts to near shore subsistence (HEC 4). Human health impacts would be temporary and localized to the
spill area. Impacts would be minor if little to no diesel reached shoreline, but would increase to moderate or major as volume of diesel spilled and amount reaching the shoreline increased.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A river barge release would likely be small or very small, and if contained quickly, would limit impact to subsistence resources. Although difficult to predict with certainty, air quality impacts would likely be negligible. The cleanup and remediation activities following a river barge grounding in which a large volume of diesel is released into the environment would temporarily increase employment opportunities and expenditures in the Y-K region. Labor requirements would be especially high in the event of mechanical recovery and physical removal efforts. Employment associated with cleanup and recovery operations would be of short duration due to the rapid recovery or dispersion of the spilled diesel. No employment opportunities would be created by smaller spills. There would be temporary adverse impacts on employment, income, and sales if commercial fishing or sport fishing and related tourism were to decline due to the real or perceived impacts of a spill.

There are potential adverse impacts to social determinants of health (HEC 1) with psychosocial stress resulting from community anxiety over a river barge release. A river barge release may involve a vessel accident or injury, and the remediation effort could increase the risk of injury or accident related to air and vessel transportation (HEC 2). There could be potential diesel or diesel fume exposure (HEC 3), and impacts to subsistence (HEC 4). Human health impacts would be temporary and local. Impacts would be minor for small spills and spills that that reach a limited length of river bank, but would increase as volume of released diesel increases and larger stretches of riverbank are impacted. Health impacts would be similar to those discussed under Scenario 1 (ocean barge rupture at sea), but would be focused towards the Kuskokwim River communities.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

A tank farm release from a failure of a diesel storage tank in Dutch Harbor, Bethel, Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) Port, or at the mine site into secondary containment would have very little evaporation release due to the limited surface area. If a tank farm release occurred in cold weather, the lower temperatures would further reduce the evaporation rate and VOC emissions. A tank farm spill would not create additional employment in the Y-K region related to cleanup activities, and there would not be additional transportation to aid the response effort.

There are potential adverse impacts to social determinants of health (HEC 1) with psychosocial stress resulting from community anxiety over a tank farm release. There could be potential diesel or diesel fume exposure (HEC 3), and negligible to minor impacts to subsistence resources (HEC 4). Spills would likely be quickly contained or released to secondary containment, and the duration of impacts would be temporary. Human health impacts would be negligible to minor in the local area of the spill in the event of a tank farm release.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

A tanker truck incident may cause diesel to be released to the mine access road, and possibly to surrounding land or water bodies. Spills may completely evaporate, or may be transported downstream. It is unlikely that cleanup and remediation activities following a tanker truck release would result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region, and there would
be no increase in transportation levels. The mine access road would not be open to commercial or recreational transportation, and a tanker truck release is unlikely to impact travel patterns or be detrimental to local businesses.

There are potential adverse impacts to social determinants of health (HEC 1) with psychosocial stress resulting from community anxiety over a tanker truck release. A tanker truck release may involve a surface transportation accident or injury, but is not likely to create increased risks for transportation-related injury or accident (HEC 2). The duration of impacts would be temporary. There could be potential diesel or diesel fume exposure (HEC 3), and negligible to minor impacts to subsistence resources (HEC 4). Human health impacts would be negligible to minor in the local area of the spill in the event of a tanker truck release.

Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

There would be no impacts to human health if a tank-tainer spill occurred at a storage site or at the mine site as sodium cyanide would be released into secondary containment. There would be no impact to human health if the dry briquettes did not contact water.

If the spilled cyanide contacted water, there would be temporary access restrictions for areas within a radius of 0.1 to 0.9 miles from the spill depending upon the spill volume. Some of the cyanide would volatize into hydrogen cyanide gas, which could build up in enclosed areas. Cyanide gas is highly toxic and could be quickly fatal to a human. Port storage and mine processing areas would be well-ventilated. Cyanide gas released outside of an enclosed space would dissipate quickly.

A cyanide spill that contacted water could be toxic to fish and wildlife, including those used for subsistence. Sodium cyanide would not bioaccumulate as it has a low persistence time in the environment. There would be an indirect effect of perceived contamination of subsistence food resources. There could be potential impacts to groundwater if cyanide dissolved in water infiltrated the ground. A cyanide release would not create additional employment in the Y-K region related to remediation activities.

There are potential adverse impacts to social determinants of health (HEC 1) with psychosocial stress resulting from community anxiety over a cyanide release. A cyanide release may involve a surface or water transportation accident or injury, but is not likely to create increased risks for transportation-related injury or accident (HEC 2). Sodium cyanide dissolves into toxic hydrogen cyanide when in contact with water, and there could be exposures to potentially hazardous materials (HEC 3). There would be medium to high intensity impacts to subsistence resources in the localized area of the spill, with potential regional perceptions of subsistence food contamination (HEC 4). Impacts would be temporary and local in extent. A release of dry cyanide briquettes would have no impacts to human health, and a cyanide release that came into contact with water could have impacts of medium to high intensities to human health.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

If elemental mercury is spilled, some of it would be emitted as gaseous mercury, which could be highly toxic to terrestrial mammals harvested by subsistence hunters. However, there are likely to be few animals in the area of a mercury spill given mining activities and human presence. If spilled mercury escapes cleanup efforts, it would be subject to natural methylation
processes and would add incrementally to the mercury levels in background and air depositions, and bioaccumulate in fish and fish-eating animals.

If there is a mercury release, mercury could enter the water table and potentially impact groundwater in a local area, and could also result in negligible to moderate impacts to local air quality. It is unlikely that cleanup and remediation activities following a mercury release would result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region. Cleanup crews would be small and likely consist of Donlin Gold personnel, trained in safe handling and spill response procedures. The intensity of adverse impacts on employment, income, and sales caused by a disruption of commercial and recreational fishing and/ or tourism would likely be low.

There are potential adverse impacts to social determinants of health (HEC 1) with psychosocial stress resulting from community anxiety over a mercury release. A mercury release may involve an accident or injury, but is not likely to create increased risks for future injury or accident (HEC 2). There could be exposures to potentially hazardous materials (HEC 3). Mercury bioaccumulates, and there would be medium to high intensity impacts to subsistence resources in the localized of the spill (HEC 4). Most health impacts would be temporary and local, but there could be regional perceptions of subsistence food contamination. Human health impacts from a mercury release would overall be minor.

**Scenario 9: Tailings Dam Failure**

If a release occurred in summer, drinking water in Crooked Creek and other communities closest to the mine site could be adversely impacted if a release infiltrated subsurface materials. Perceived contamination of subsistence foods would be high in intensity and extend regionally. A tailings release in winter could impede snowmachine travel by subsistence hunters from Crooked Creek.

The cleanup and remediation activities following a tailings dam failure in which a large volume of water, or water and tailings, is released into the environment would temporarily increase employment opportunities and expenditures in the Y-K region. Labor requirements would be especially high if mechanical recovery and physical removal were part of the remediation effort, such as in the case of a tailings and water release in winter. Employment increases for cleanup activities would be temporary. No employment opportunities would be created by smaller releases of tailings from the mill or from piping to the TSF or other small spills. There would be temporary adverse impacts on employment, income, and sales if commercial fishing or sport fishing and related tourism were to decline due to the real or perceived impacts of a spill. Water contamination could also create drinking water bans, which would also negatively impact local business and consumers.

There are potential adverse impacts to social determinants of health (HEC 1) with psychosocial stress resulting from community anxiety over a tailings dam release. A tailings dam release may involve injury or fatality (HEC 2). There could be exposures to potentially hazardous materials (HEC 3). Subsistence may be impacted, with potential regional perceptions of subsistence food contamination (HEC 4). Impacts would temporary to long-term, local in extent, and moderate to major depending upon the season, volume, and content of a spills release. Effects from contamination perceptions of subsistence resources would be major impacts of a regional extent.
ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to human health. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced, but the impacts would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas Release

In the event of an LNG release to soil or water, the LNG would transition back to a gaseous phase (California Energy Commission 2014). Air emissions would primarily consist of methane, which would have negligible health impacts. Methane is a potent GHG, but is unlikely to directly affect health-related impacts from climate change. It is unlikely that cleanup and remediation activities following an LNG release would result in increased employment opportunities in the Y-K region. In the event of a fire or explosion, responders would be trained fire fighters and other industry professionals. Negative impacts to employment, income and sales due to a disruption of commercial or recreational fisheries would be negligible.

There are potential adverse impacts to social determinants of health (HEC 1) with psychosocial stress resulting from community anxiety over an LNG release. An LNG release may increase risks of accident or injury, particularly if there was a fire or explosion (HEC 2). There could be exposures to potentially hazardous materials (HEC 3). Impacts would be temporary and local in extent. Overall human health impacts would be minor.

ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to human health. Impacts under Scenario 1 (ocean barge releases) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 2 through 4 (river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; but the impacts would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3B would have the same impacts on human health as Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

A diesel pipeline release poses risks to local groundwater quality, which could impact local drinking water quality. Impacts would be confined to a discrete portion of the pipeline corridor and would be long-term. Air quality impacts would likely be negligible. A spill on water would be unlikely to impact subsistence fisheries in most of the EIS Analysis Area, but would have impacts to subsistence similar to those described for a river barge spill, but more localized towards the communities in close proximity to the section of the pipeline where the break occurred.

The cleanup and remediation activities following a diesel pipeline break in which a large volume of diesel is released into the environment would temporarily increase employment opportunities and expenditures in communities in close proximity to the section of the pipeline.
where the break occurred. There may be adverse impacts on employment, income, and sales if the spill reached waterways and impacted commercial or sport fisheries.

There are potential adverse impacts to social determinants of health (HEC 1) with psychosocial stress resulting from community anxiety over a diesel pipeline release. The response effort could include burns and temporary increases in surface and air transportation, which may increase risks of accident or injury (HEC 2). There could be exposures to potentially hazardous materials (HEC 3), with particular potential risk for drinking and groundwater contamination. There could be possible impacts to subsistence fisheries, but these are unlikely for most of the EIS Analysis Area (HEC 4). Impacts would temporary to long-term and local in extent. Overall human health impacts would be minor, but would increase in impact if drinking water supplies were impacted.

3.24.6.22.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING PORT

Under Alternative 4, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to human health. The likelihood of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced, but the impacts would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 3, 4, 7 through 9 (ocean barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.22.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to human health. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.22.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to human health. Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.23 TRANSPORTATION

3.24.6.23.1 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

Under the proposed action, two spill scenarios do not apply and are not analyzed for impacts to transportation. These include Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) and Scenario 6 (LNG release).
Scenario 1: Ocean Barge Rupture at Sea

Ocean-going cargo barges follow general but consistent routes determined by distance, protected habitat, public safety, water depth, and underwater hazards. Although barges normally follow these routes of travel, circumstances occasionally require deviation from the typical routes. Diesel fuel evaporates, particularly when subject to high-energy ocean waves and wind. However, if there were to be an ocean barge diesel spill at sea, water transportation systems could be affected because the spill could disrupt the pattern of shipping routes through that area. Immediately following the spill and during response efforts, barges may be forced to find alternate routes for shipping or travel outside of normal routes depending on the dispersion of the spill. In addition, the response effort would increase the number of vessels using those routes as response teams travel to the spill site. However, the barge travel options to the Port of Bethel are vast, and there are many opportunities for avoiding certain areas or other vessels. Similarly, the cleanup effort would likely increase the number of flights to the region as response staff are mobilized to the nearest transportation hub.

The displacement of barges to alternate routes and increased air transportation would occur immediately after the spill and during response efforts, which would last less than one season and likely only a matter of days or weeks. Therefore, the effect to water and air transportation as a result of an ocean barge rupture would be temporary. Depending on where the spill occurred, there could be a generally low proportion of vessels that would experience route displacement and additional vessel traffic for one or two days. Depending on ocean currents, where the spill was located, the release’s proximity to shore, and the rate of evaporation, the diesel could disperse quickly to a large area. Spill response would cover the extent of the spill, and although would likely be limited to overflights, it is possible that a small increase of vessel traffic could result for response mobilization. Therefore, the extent of the impacts to water transportation as a result of an ocean barge rupture would be regional. The majority of goods in Alaska are delivered by barge. Depending on where the spill occurred, the transportation of goods to some ports could be impacted. For that reason, the shipping transportation system in the state is an important resource.

In summary, depending on where the spill occurred, the impact of an ocean barge rupture at sea would have a minor effect on the water and air transportation system in the state of Alaska. Barges and flights delivering goods are an important resource to Alaska, and the impacts of a response effort could potentially affect a small proportion of total vessel and aircraft traffic, depending on the location of the rupture, for a low intensity impact. Shipping and air traffic volume would be increased during the response effort, and vessels not involved in spill response may be required to temporarily use alternate routes. However, the impacts would be temporary, shipping routes are wide, and alternate routes are plentiful. Therefore, the impacts would be minor to water and air transportation.

Scenario 2: River Barge Release

A fuel release due to a river barge grounding would have no direct or indirect impacts to surface and a limited impact to air transportation systems, which would likely see a slight increase in air traffic. A river barge grounding would occur during the summer shipping season. Winter transportation such as snowmachines would not be affected. Impacts to water transportation systems would occur immediately after a spill and during spill response efforts, which would last a number of days. Depending on the location of the spill, vessels using the
Kuskokwim River for transportation would be forced to either halt operations for the duration of the response effort or use an alternate route to avoid the spill site. If there were a river barge release on the Kuskokwim River, a moderate number of vessels would be either displaced to alternate routes or halted until response was complete. Therefore, the intensity of impacts to water transportation as a result of a river barge release would be medium. Currently, vessel traffic on the Kuskokwim River services villages upriver of Bethel, a roadless area, making the water transportation system in the region an important resource. The vessels would be displaced or halted immediately after the spill and during response, which would be temporary but lasting a number of days. The spill and response would primarily impact the spill site, but could extend as far as Bethel or the Kuskokwim Bay if the spill occurred in the lower river and diesel floated downriver and threatened important shorelines. The impacts would likely remain in the river and bay, however, making the impacts of a river barge release have a local extent.

The impacts to water transportation would be temporary and last for the time of the response effort. Impacts could encompass areas from the spill site to the Kuskokwim Bay, being local in extent. There are a moderate number of vessels that would be affected, and those vessels are an important resource to the region. Impacts would be of medium intensity. Overall, the summary impact to water transportation as a result of a river barge release would be moderate.

Scenario 3: Tank Farm Release

In the instance of a fuel release due to a tank farm rupture, a faulty valve or pipeline leak, a transfer operation line rupture, or a transfer operation human error, the spill and response would be localized to the spill site (either the mine site or a tank farm at Angyaruaq [Jungjuk] Port or Bethel). There would be no need for extra resources to aid the response effort, and the vessel traffic on the Kuskokwim River would not increase as a result of the spill. Potential spills would occur in locations that are closed to commercial or recreational transportation systems (at the mine site or port tank farms). Moreover, each scenario of a tank farm release includes recovery estimates that would capture 100 percent of the loss, minus any loss to evaporation. Since the spill and response efforts would remain on-site in an area without public access and recovery would be 100 percent without additional vessel response, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to water, surface, or air transportation as a result of a tank farm release.

Scenario 4: Tanker Truck Release

In the instance of a fuel release due to a tanker truck rollover, or a tanker truck collision, the spill and response would be localized to the spill site on the road, and potentially in a nearby waterbody or stream. Neither air traffic nor the vessel traffic on the Kuskokwim River would likely increase as a result of the spill. Potential spills would occur in locations that would be closed to commercial or recreational transportation systems. The spill and response efforts would remain on-site in an area without public access, and there would be recovery of a majority of the substance without additional vessel or air traffic response. There would be no direct or indirect impacts to water, surface, or air transportation as a result of a tanker truck fuel release.
Scenario 7: Cyanide Release

In the unlikely event of a sodium cyanide release, direct and indirect effects to transportation resources are expected to be minimal and limited to a short disruption of the immediate transportation network during cleanup activities.

A tank-tainer accident could result in the release of sodium cyanide into the environment along the ocean or river corridors, at transfer facilities, or along the road and adjacent water bodies. The intensity and magnitude of negative impacts on transportation resources caused by a disruption of surface transportation or vessel traffic in the immediate area of the spill would likely be low. The environmental effects would be confined to a small area. The effects on transportation resources are considered negligible, due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.

Scenario 8: Mercury Release

The effects of a mercury release are very similar to that of a cyanide release. In the unlikely event of a mercury release, direct and indirect effects to transportation resources are expected to be minimal and limited to a short disruption of the immediate transportation network during cleanup activities.

A release of mercury into the environment along the ocean or river corridors, at transfer facilities, or along the road and adjacent water bodies is considered a low probability event, as mercury would have multiple containment levels. The intensity and magnitude of negative impacts on transportation resources caused by a disruption of surface transportation or vessel traffic in the immediate area of the spill would likely be low. The environmental effects would be confined to a small area. The effects on transportation resources are considered negligible, due to localized extent of potential releases and short duration cleanup operations.

Scenario 9: Partial Tailings Dam Failure

A partial tailings dam failure would have a limited impact to air transportation, which would likely see a slight increase in air traffic related to spill response and monitoring efforts. There would be minor impacts to surface transportation in the localized area of the tailings dam, and impacts would depend upon sediment deposition and possible flooding of surrounding land. If excavation and earthmoving equipment from the mine site were part of recovery efforts, these vehicles could dominate surface travel in a localized area. The mine site would have restricted access and employees would typically be flown into work; there is a limited level of surface transportation that could potentially be disrupted in communities downstream of the tailings dam.

A partial tailings dam failure would impact water travel on Crooked Creek and Anaconda Creek, and may impact water travel on the Kuskokwim River. Depending upon the volume and trajectory of materials released in the event of a partial tailings dam failure, vessels could be displaced or could have to find alternate routes until the spill response was complete on affected waterways. If a partial tailings dam failure occurred in winter, snowmachine travel along frozen waterways would be impacted. Impacts to water transportation would be medium intensity, with the potential to be high intensity for Crooked Creek. The area in the vicinity of the tailings dam is roadless, and water transportation is thus considered an important resource. Impacts would be to a localized area and temporary in duration. Overall impacts to water
transportation from a partial tailings dam failure would be moderate, and would primarily impact travel along small waterways close to the tailings dam and a segment of the Kuskokwim River.

3.24.6.23.2 ALTERNATIVE 3A - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

Under Alternative 3A, Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to transportation. The likelihood of Scenarios 1 through 4 (ocean or river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 3A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

Scenario 6: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Release

An occurrence of pinhole leaks in LNG storage tanks, an accident involving an LNG-fueled truck, or the rupture of a storage tank at the LNG plant could occur at the mine site. If released, LNG dissipates readily, and there is low risk of fire or explosion in open areas. The spill and response effort would be localized to the spill site, which would be closed for safety. Spill response would not require the use of outside airstrips, trails, or waterways. Since the spill would remain on-site in an area without public access, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to surface, air, or water transportation resources as a result.

3.24.6.23.3 ALTERNATIVE 3B - REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

Under Alternative 3B, Scenario 6 (LNG release) is not applicable and has not been analyzed for effects to transportation. Impacts under Scenario 1 (ocean barge release) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenarios 2 through 4 (river barge, tank farm and tanker truck releases) occurring would be greatly reduced; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Scenarios 7 through 9 (cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) would have the same impacts on transportation as Alternative 2.

Scenario 5: Diesel Pipeline Release

Public access to the diesel pipeline ROW by way of surface transportation would be limited over the majority of the pipeline by remoteness of the route, though there is use of existing trail systems such as the Iditarod National Historic Trail. For spill scenario impacts on recreational users of trails systems see Section 3.24.6.16, Recreation. If a diesel pipeline release were to occur as a result of a pinhole leak or a pipeline rupture, there would be no direct or indirect impacts to water transportation. If such releases were to occur, response efforts would use surface (if in the winter) and air transportation to reach the spill site. Spill response would likely increase flight activity at one or more of the four existing airstrips (Beluga, Rainy Pass, Farewell, and the Donlin Mine Site) that would have been upgraded for the construction of the pipeline. The six airstrips that were built solely for pipeline construction would have been reclaimed and no longer available for use. The increase of air transportation would occur immediately following the release and during the response effort, which could take less than two weeks for a pinhole leak or several weeks for a rupture. If the spill occurred in the winter and it was possible to travel to the site using surface transportation along the ROW, there would be some impact to trail system users, as discussed in Section 3.24.6.16, Recreation.
The volume of air traffic or surface transportation that would be affected by a diesel pipeline release would be small. With only a small number of airstrips and operations being affected, the intensity of the impacts would be low. The response effort, depending on the magnitude of the spill, would likely be one or two seasons long. Consequently, the duration of impacts to transportation resources as a result of a diesel pipeline release would be temporary. The spill and response would remain at a particular spot along the pipeline ROW, and effects would not extend beyond the immediate area. However, response would be staged from the mine site or Anchorage using airstrips and helicopter landing pads closest to the spill, which could be quite far away. Therefore, the extent of impacts to transportation systems as a result of a diesel pipeline release would be regional. A release would affect local airstrips where general aviation is a common resource (there are a large number of float/ski plane accessible lakes in the region).

In summary, effects to transportation resources as a result of a diesel pipeline release would be minor. Transportation resources are a common resource in the area, and would be impacted immediately following the spill and during response efforts, which would be temporary. The extent of impacts could reach as far as Anchorage and therefore would be regional. A low number of airstrips would be involved in response efforts and see an increase in operations. As a result, the intensity of impacts to air transportation would be low.

3.24.6.23.4 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING (BTC) PORT

Under Alternative 4, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to transportation. The likelihood of Scenario 2 (river barge release) occurring would be greatly reduced, but the impacts would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenario 3 (tank farm release) would be shifted relative to Alternative 2, and the likelihood of Scenario 4 (tanker truck release) occurring would be increased; however, the impacts would be the same types as discussed under Alternative 2. Impacts under Scenarios 1, 7 through 9 (ocean barge, cyanide, mercury, and tailings releases) for Alternative 4 would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.23.5 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

Under Alternative 5A, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to transportation.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 through 9 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, mercury, and water only tailings releases) for Alternative 5A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.

3.24.6.23.6 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

Under Alternative 6A, spill Scenario 5 (diesel pipeline release), and Scenario 6 (LNG release) are not applicable and have not been analyzed for impacts to transportation.

Impacts under Scenarios 1 through 4, and 7 and 8 (ocean or river barge, tank farm, tanker truck, cyanide, and mercury releases) for Alternative 6A would be the same as those discussed under Alternative 2.
3.24.7 IMPACT REDUCING MEASURES

The effects determinations presented above in Section 3.24.6 take into account impact reducing design features (Table 5.2-1 in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) proposed by Donlin Gold and also the Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs (Section 5.3, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) that would be implemented. Several examples of these are presented below.

Design features most important for preventing or reducing impacts from potential spills include:

- Donlin would conduct a public outreach program that would include information regarding participation in the “One-Call” program, hazards associated with the unintended release of natural gas, unintended release indicators, and reporting procedures;
- Ocean and river fuel barges would be double hulled and have multiple isolated compartments for transporting fuel to reduce the risk of a spill;
- Using special ISO-approved water tight tank-tainers for the transport of cyanide, equipped with GPS trackers. Design features for cyanide also include cyanide detoxification of the leach tailings and cyanide handling, storage, and transport in compliance with the International Cyanide Management Code (Code) ICMC;
- The project design includes special flasks and metric ton containers for mercury transport; and
- The above-ground fault crossing of the pipeline was designed to resist surface fault rupture hazards, and would be designed to withstand the stress that could occur during a seismic event.

Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for preventing or reducing impacts from potential spills include:

- Development and maintenance of ODPCPs, SPCC Plans, and FRPs;
- Verification that project vessels are equipped with proper emergency towing equipment in accordance with 18 AAC 75.027(f); and
- Verifying pipeline integrity with visual and other non-destructive inspections of welds, hydrostatic testing, use of in-line inspection tools, and aerial inspections.

While the Corps is considering additional mitigation and monitoring to reduce the effects of the project to physical, biological and social resources (Tables 5.5-1 and 5.7-1 in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation), no additional mitigation or monitoring measures have been identified for preventing or reducing impacts from potential spills.

3.24.8 COMPARISON OF IMPACTS BY SCENARIO

Table 3.24-27 below summarizes the impacts from all spill scenarios for each resource. The tables show the impacts from Alternative 2; all other alternatives are presumed to be the same as Alternative 2 unless specified.
Table 3.24-27: Summary of Spill Scenario Impacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Scenario 1- Ocean Barge Rupture</th>
<th>Scenario 2- River Barge Release</th>
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<th>Scenario 9- Partial Tailings Dam Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood</td>
<td>Very low probability, very large volume</td>
<td>Very low probability, large volume</td>
<td>Rupture: Very low probability, large volume</td>
<td>Faulty valve: High probability, very small volume</td>
<td>Transfer operation line rupture: Low probability, medium to large volume</td>
<td>Transfer operation human error: Low probability, very small volume</td>
<td>Pinhole leaks: High to very high probability, low volume</td>
<td>Rupture: Very high probability, low volume</td>
<td>Low probability, low to medium volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geology</td>
<td>Impacts to surficial deposits along shorelines are discussed in Sediment Quality, Section 3.24.6.7.3</td>
<td>Impacts to surficial deposits along shorelines are discussed in Sediment Quality, Section 3.24.6.7.3</td>
<td>Same impacts described for Soils, Section 3.24.6.2 in all alternatives.</td>
<td>Same impacts described for Soils, Section 3.24.6.2 in all alternatives.</td>
<td>Same impacts described for Soils, Section 3.24.6.2 in all alternatives.</td>
<td>No Impacts in all alternatives</td>
<td>Cyanide not captured in secondary containment, cannot be excavated and would be left to disperse naturally</td>
<td>Same impacts described for Soils, Section 3.24.6.2 in all alternatives</td>
<td>Same impacts described for Soils, Section 3.24.6.2 in all alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soils</td>
<td>This scenario is not applicable to soils.</td>
<td>This scenario is not applicable to soils.</td>
<td>Small volumes and immediate response would create minor impacts</td>
<td>Limited soil excavation might be required.</td>
<td>All 3B: Solids could be impacted depending on size of spill.</td>
<td>This scenario is not applicable to soils.</td>
<td>Cyanide not captured in secondary containment, cannot be excavated and would be left to disperse naturally</td>
<td>Impacted soils would be remediated. Limited soil excavation might be required.</td>
<td>Some soils could be indefinitely impacted above baseline conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geohazards and Seismic Conditions</td>
<td>This scenario is not applicable to geohazards.</td>
<td>This scenario is not applicable to geohazards.</td>
<td>This scenario is not applicable to geohazards.</td>
<td>This scenario is not applicable to geohazards.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorology</td>
<td>No effects to meteorology.</td>
<td>No effects to meteorology.</td>
<td>No effects to meteorology.</td>
<td>No effects to meteorology.</td>
<td>No effects to meteorology.</td>
<td>No effects to meteorology.</td>
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<td>No effects to meteorology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Water Hydrology</td>
<td>Ocean currents would influence dispersal of diesel.</td>
<td>River flow would impact dispersal of diesel.</td>
<td>Moving water such as a creek or stream would impact dispersal of diesel.</td>
<td>Moving water such as a creek or stream would impact dispersal of diesel.</td>
<td>Moving water such as a creek or stream would impact dispersal of diesel.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Moving water such as a creek or stream would impact dispersal of diesel.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: A release of LNG would not be impacted by surface water hydrology.</td>
<td>Moving water such as a creek or stream would impact dissolution of cyanide.</td>
<td>Moving water such as a creek or stream would impact attenuation processes of mercury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundwater Hydrology</td>
<td>Shallow groundwater resources at shoreline areas could be impacted.</td>
<td>No effects to groundwater hydrology.</td>
<td>Potential impacts if spills reached the water table.</td>
<td>All 3B: All sizes of spills could infiltrate water table and require remediation.</td>
<td>All 3A: No effects to groundwater hydrology.</td>
<td>No effects to groundwater hydrology.</td>
<td>No effects to groundwater hydrology.</td>
<td>Shallow groundwater in the Crooked Creek floodplain could be minimally impacted.</td>
<td>Shallow groundwater in the Crooked Creek floodplain could be minimally impacted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Quality: Surface Water Quality</td>
<td>Some diesel could contaminate the seafloor, but most contamination would be on upper levels of water column, likely exceeding water quality standards for hydrocarbons for a while.</td>
<td>The river water column would be contaminated, likely exceeding water quality standards for hydrocarbons, if not recovered and contained, for a while.</td>
<td>Releases into water could result in contamination, likely exceeding water quality standards for hydrocarbons, if not recovered and contained, for a while.</td>
<td>Releases into water could result in contamination, likely exceeding water quality standards for hydrocarbons, if not recovered and contained, for a while.</td>
<td>All 3B: All sizes of spills could result in contamination, likely exceeding water quality standards for hydrocarbons, if not recovered and contained, for a while.</td>
<td>All 3A: No effects to surface water quality.</td>
<td>if cyanide released into the Kuskokwim River, concentrations would locally exceed threshold for fresh water for a brief period of time. Cyanide released on land into water would exceed the water quality criterion for cyanide.</td>
<td>A release of mercury directly to surface water would result in concentrations of mercury in excess of applicable water quality standards.</td>
<td>Surface water quality would have impacts exceeding water quality standards from the Anaconda and Crooked Creek drainages to the Kuskokwim confluence.</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water Quality: Groundwater Quality</td>
<td>Diesel would remain on the surface for a short time and would not impact groundwater resources.</td>
<td>Most diesel would not impact groundwater; however, a very small fraction would contact the river banks and a subfraction could affect unconfined surficial groundwater resources.</td>
<td>Released diesel that reaches groundwater would not be in concentrations that exceed water quality standards.</td>
<td>Released diesel that reaches groundwater may be in concentrations that exceed water quality standards.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: All sizes of spills could result in contamination, likely exceeding water quality standards for hydrocarbons and require remediation.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: All sizes of spills could result in contamination, likely exceeding water quality standards for hydrocarbons and require remediation.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to groundwater hydrology.</td>
<td>Mercury could enter the water table and concentrations could exceed water quality criterion.</td>
<td>Groundwater quality would have impacts exceeding water quality standards from the Anacorda and Crooked Creek drainages to the Kuskokwim confluence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Quality: Sediment Quality</td>
<td>A small fraction of diesel could be absorbed at river mouths</td>
<td>Impacts could result from adsorption of diesel in the water column, and could exceed sediment quality guidelines.</td>
<td>Impacts to affected area could exceed sediment quality standards until contained, recovered or attenuated naturally.</td>
<td>Impacts to affected area could exceed sediment quality standards until contained, recovered or attenuated naturally.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: All sizes of spills could result in contamination, likely exceeding water quality standards for hydrocarbons and require remediation.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: All sizes of spills could result in contamination, likely exceeding water quality standards for hydrocarbons and require remediation.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to surface water.</td>
<td>Concentrations of cyanide in sediments would be low.</td>
<td>Sediment quality would have impacts exceeding water quality standards from the Anacorda and Crooked Creek drainages to the Kuskokwim confluence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Quality</td>
<td>Evaporation of diesel fuel would generate minimal VOCs and HAPs. Air quality would return to pre-activity levels quickly.</td>
<td>Evaporation of diesel fuel would generate minimal VOCs and HAPs. Air quality would return to pre-activity levels quickly.</td>
<td>Evaporation of diesel fuel would generate minimal VOCs and HAPs. In situ burning may be used for remediation. Ambient air quality would return to pre-burn conditions relatively quickly.</td>
<td>Evaporation of diesel fuel would generate minimal VOCs and HAPs. In situ burning may be used for remediation. Ambient air quality would return to pre-burn conditions relatively quickly.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Leaks could evaporate before response. In situ burning may be used for remediation.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: LNG air emissions would consist primarily of methane, which is a potent GHG. Air quality would rapidly return to pre-activity levels.</td>
<td>If some volatilizes, it could be toxic to life. However, outdoor the gas would dissipate rapidly.</td>
<td>Portions of the mercury could volatilize into the atmosphere. Elemental mercury vapor may remain in the atmosphere for more than a year, although it would disperse from the spill area.</td>
<td>Gaseous mercury emissions from a release would be minimal from rapid transport and dilution of the tailings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetation</td>
<td>Diesel may leave a residue on intertidal resources, causing the inability to produce food or energy.</td>
<td>Vegetation could be damaged or killed from the cooling effect or through degradation of water quality.</td>
<td>Minimal effect on vegetation.</td>
<td>Damage to adjacent terrestrial vegetation and possible contamination of adjacent aquatic vegetation.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Impacts may include damage to vegetation, potentially including rare or sensitive plants.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: LNG is non-toxic to vegetation, but the temperature of LNG could freeze vegetation on contact.</td>
<td>If the cyanide came into contact with water, it can inhibit respiration and affect a plant's ability to absorb nutrients from soil.</td>
<td>Exposure of plants to mercury can reduce photosynthesis, transpiration rate, water uptake, chlorophyll synthesis, and seed viability.</td>
<td>Impacts in isolated areas from removal, chemical contamination, burial, or reduction in soil nutrients.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetlands</td>
<td>Diesel reaching shoreline marshes and intertidal wetlands could kill vegetation and associated micro and macro fauna, and overwhelm or eliminate most wetland functions.</td>
<td>Wind and wave action could transport some of the unrecovered or recovered with sorbents and booms would not discharge to wetlands.</td>
<td>Spilled diesel that is captured with secondary containment or recovered with sorbents and booms would not discharge to wetlands.</td>
<td>Large concentrations of diesel fuel on wetland vegetation would kill the vegetation on contact, but lower concentrations may have little effect.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Diesel in the soil slow to degrade with extensive contact with plant roots may kill plants. Excavation may be required for recovery.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: LNG is non-toxic to vegetation, but the temperature of LNG could freeze wetland vegetation on contact.</td>
<td>Adverse effects on aquatic plants are unlikely at concentrations that cause acute effects on most fish and invertebrates. Cyanide would likely kill wetland fauna.</td>
<td>Toxic effects may include reduced seed germination, reduced seedling vigor, chromosomal abnormalities, reduced growth, foliar injury, reduced chlorophyll and phytomass. Wetlands may act as sources or sinks of metals.</td>
<td>Impacts in isolated areas from removal, chemical contamination, burial, or reduction in soil nutrients.</td>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife: Terrestrial Mammals</td>
<td>A large spill could affect exposed mammals, but the numbers of each species involved would be too few for population-level effects.</td>
<td>A large spill could have physiological effects to exposed mammals, but the numbers of each species involved would be too few for population-level effects.</td>
<td>Large spills could impact small numbers of small mammals.</td>
<td>Large spills could impact small numbers of small mammals.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Mammals in the vicinity at time of release could be affected, but with human activity at the response site, terrestrial mammals would not be expected to come close enough to be affected.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: With the level of human activity at the site, terrestrial mammals would not be expected to come close enough to be affected by an LNG release.</td>
<td>Cyanide would be highly toxic to terrestrial animals drinking it.</td>
<td>Gaseous mercury could be highly toxic to animals. However, with activity at the site, few, if any, terrestrial mammals would be expected to be exposed to it.</td>
<td>Impacts to small numbers from burial, contaminate exposure, or impacts to habitat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife: Marine Mammals</td>
<td>Direct impacts of fuel spills on marine mammals may include sublethal effects from ingestion.</td>
<td>Direct impacts of fuel spills on marine mammals may include sublethal effects from ingestion.</td>
<td>There is little chance for marine mammals to contact the diesel fuel.</td>
<td>Unlikely to affect marine mammals.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Harbor seals at the mouth of the Beluga River could be directly impacted by skin or nasal contact with the spilled diesel or indirectly impacted if prey species are contaminated.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to marine mammals.</td>
<td>Unlikely to affect marine mammals.</td>
<td>Unlikely to affect marine mammals.</td>
<td>Unlikely to affect marine mammals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife: Birds</td>
<td>Several species of birds could be highly impacted.</td>
<td>Several species of birds could be highly impacted.</td>
<td>The numbers of birds affected would be small.</td>
<td>The numbers of birds affected would be small.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Several species of birds could be highly impacted.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: Birds could be affected by gaseous LNG.</td>
<td>Cyanide would be highly toxic to birds drinking it.</td>
<td>Gaseous mercury could be highly toxic to birds. However, with activity at the site, few, if any, birds would be expected to be exposed to it.</td>
<td>Impacts to small numbers from burial, contaminate exposure, or impacts to habitat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish and Aquatic Resources</td>
<td>Spills that reach littoral or intertidal zones could highly impact fish and aquatic resources that reside in the nearshore spill footprint.</td>
<td>Fish and aquatic resources in the Kuskokwim River could be highly impacted.</td>
<td>Fish and aquatic resources could be highly impacted if diesel reached water bodies.</td>
<td>Fish and aquatic resources could be highly impacted if diesel reached water bodies.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Fish and aquatic resources could be highly impacted if diesel reached water bodies.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: Little to no effects to fish and aquatic resources.</td>
<td>If the sodium cyanide came into contact with water, it could be highly toxic to fish and aquatic wildlife.</td>
<td>Unrecovered mercury would add incrementally to the levels of background and air mercury, increasing the chronic exposure of aquatic biota and fish and fish-eating animals.</td>
<td>Fish and aquatic resources could be highly impacted in the event of a release.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened and Endangered Species: Birds</td>
<td>Some species of listed birds could be highly impacted.</td>
<td>No effects to listed birds.</td>
<td>No effects to listed birds.</td>
<td>No effects to listed birds.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: No effects to listed birds.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to listed birds.</td>
<td>None of the scenarios for cyanide would release cyanide into the environment where listed birds may occur.</td>
<td>None of the scenarios for mercury would release mercury into the environment where listed birds may occur.</td>
<td>A tailings release would not reach into the environment where listed birds may occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened and Endangered Species: Marine Mammals</td>
<td>Direct impacts of fuel spills on listed marine mammals may include sublethal effects from ingestion.</td>
<td>Direct impacts of fuel spills on listed marine mammals may include sublethal effects from ingestion.</td>
<td>There is little chance for listed marine mammals to contact the diesel fuel.</td>
<td>Unlikely to affect listed marine mammals.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Beluga whales at the mouth of and in the Beluga River could either be directly impacted by skin or nasal contact with the spilled diesel or indirectly impacted if prey species are contaminated.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to listed marine mammals.</td>
<td>None of the scenarios for cyanide would release cyanide into the environment where listed marine mammals may occur.</td>
<td>None of the scenarios for mercury would release mercury into the environment where listed marine mammals may occur.</td>
<td>Unlikely to affect listed marine mammals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Transportation

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<th>Scenario 6- LNG Release</th>
<th>Scenario 7- Cyanide Release</th>
<th>Scenario 8- Mercury Release</th>
<th>Scenario 9- Partial Tailings Dam Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Ownership, Management, and Use</td>
<td>Minimal impacts to land use at shoreline and no impact to land management.</td>
<td>Minimal impacts to land management if response requires management action.</td>
<td>Impacts could include evacuation of nearby surfaces and businesses due to fumes and potential fire danger.</td>
<td>Minimal impacts to land use and minimal impacts to land management if response requires management action.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Landowners along pipeline affected by response. Land use would be affected according to the biological effects.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to land use or management.</td>
<td>Minimal effects to land use and management and limited to a short disruption of land uses during cleanup activities.</td>
<td>Minimal effects to land use and management and limited to a short disruption of land uses during cleanup activities.</td>
<td>Minimal impacts to land management if response requires management action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>Some recreational activities near shore could be affected.</td>
<td>Some recreational activities near or near the Kuskokwim River could be affected.</td>
<td>No effects to recreation.</td>
<td>Some recreational activities on or near spill site could be affected.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: If spill occurred in the vicinity of the INHT in the winter, recreation could be highly impacted.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to recreation.</td>
<td>Some recreational activities on or near spill site could be affected.</td>
<td>Some recreational activities on or near spill site could be affected.</td>
<td>Some recreational activities on or near the Kuskokwim River could be affected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual Resources</td>
<td>Strong visual contrast from the sheen of diesel on the surface compared to unaffected areas.</td>
<td>Strong visual contrast from the sheen of diesel on the surface compared to unaffected areas.</td>
<td>Weak visual contrast from the diesel against the surrounding topography.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Strong visual contrast from the sheen of diesel on the surface compared to unaffected areas.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: Some visual impacts, if vegetation in the immediate area were burned.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No employment opportunities from response efforts.</td>
<td>Some visual impacts from response efforts.</td>
<td>Some visual impacts from release and recovery efforts in impacted areas.</td>
<td>Some visual impacts from release and recovery efforts in impacted areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomics</td>
<td>Little to no employment opportunities from response activities. Some commercial fisheries could be impacted.</td>
<td>Some employment opportunities from response activities. Some commercial fisheries could be impacted.</td>
<td>Some employment opportunities from response activities.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No employment opportunities from response effort.</td>
<td>Little or no employment opportunities from response effort.</td>
<td>Little or no employment opportunities from response effort.</td>
<td>Some employment opportunities from response activities.</td>
<td>Some employment opportunities from response activities. Some commercial fisheries could be impacted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Justice</td>
<td>Minority and low-income communities would likely not incur disproportionate adverse impacts.</td>
<td>Minority and low-income communities would likely not incur disproportionate adverse impacts.</td>
<td>Minority and low-income communities would likely not incur disproportionate adverse impacts.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Minority and low-income communities would likely not incur disproportionate adverse impacts.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No employment opportunities from response effort.</td>
<td>Little or no employment opportunities from response effort.</td>
<td>Little or no employment opportunities from response effort.</td>
<td>Little or no employment opportunities from response effort.</td>
<td>Little or no employment opportunities from response effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Resources</td>
<td>Depending on location of the spill, there could be no impacts or high impacts.</td>
<td>Depending on location of the spill, there could be no impacts or high impacts.</td>
<td>Little or no impact to cultural resources.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Depending on location of the spill, there could be no impacts or high impacts.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: Little or no impact to cultural resources.</td>
<td>Little or no impact to cultural resources.</td>
<td>Little or no impact to cultural resources.</td>
<td>Depending on location of the spill, there could be potentially high impacts.</td>
<td>Depending on location of the spill, there could be potentially high impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Potentially high impacts to shoreline subsistence resources and access.</td>
<td>Little or no effect to subsistence resources and access.</td>
<td>Little or no effect to subsistence resources and access.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No impact to subsistence resources.</td>
<td>Potentially some effects to subsistence resources, as effects to birds and terrestrial mammals.</td>
<td>Potentially some effects to subsistence resources, as effects to birds and terrestrial mammals.</td>
<td>Potentially high impacts to subsistence resources and access.</td>
<td>Potentially high impacts to subsistence resources and access.</td>
<td>Potentially high impacts to subsistence resources and access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Health</td>
<td>HECs that may indicate adverse effects are HEC 1, HEC 2, HEC 3, and HEC 4.</td>
<td>HECs that may indicate adverse effects are HEC 1, HEC 2, HEC 3, and HEC 4.</td>
<td>HECs that may indicate adverse effects are HEC 1, HEC 2, HEC 3, and HEC 4.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: HECs that may indicate adverse effects are HEC 1, HEC 2, HEC 3, and HEC 4.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: HECs that may indicate adverse effects are HEC 1, HEC 2, HEC 3, and HEC 4.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: HECs that may indicate adverse effects are HEC 1, HEC 2, HEC 3, and HEC 4.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: HECs that may indicate adverse effects are HEC 1, HEC 2, HEC 3, and HEC 4.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: HECs that may indicate adverse effects are HEC 1, HEC 2, HEC 3, and HEC 4.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: HECs that may indicate adverse effects are HEC 1, HEC 2, HEC 3, and HEC 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Potential disruption of water transportation systems in the ocean.</td>
<td>Likely disruption of water transportation systems on the Kuskokwim River.</td>
<td>No effects to water, surface or air transportation.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to water, surface or air transportation.</td>
<td>Alt 3B: Potential disruptions of air and surface transportation, particularly on airstrips and the INHT</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to water, surface or air transportation.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to water, surface or air transportation.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: No effects to water, surface or air transportation.</td>
<td>Alt 3A: Potential disruption of water transportation systems on Crooked Creek.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.25 PIPELINE RELIABILITY AND SAFETY

This section relates mostly to the natural gas pipeline component. The transportation of natural gas by pipeline involves some risk to the public in the event of an accident and subsequent release of gas. The greatest hazard is a fire or explosion following a major pipeline rupture. This section explains relevant background to natural gas pipeline safety standards, provides relevant industry incident and safety statistics, relates this proposed project to industry-wide statistics, and assesses relevant mitigating measures.

Methane, the primary component of natural gas, is colorless, odorless, and tasteless. While there are differing opinions regarding methane's relative toxicity, for the purpose of this EIS, methane is considered toxic in keeping with its listing on the EPA’s Toxic Substances Control Act inventory and is a simple asphyxiate. If breathed in high concentration, oxygen deficiency can result in serious injury or death. Methane has an autoignition temperature of 1,000°F and is flammable at concentrations between 5 and 15 percent in air. Unconfined mixtures of methane in air are rarely explosive. However, a flammable concentration within an enclosed space in the presence of an ignition source can explode. It is buoyant at atmospheric temperatures and disperses rapidly in air.

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**SYNOPSIS**

This section describes current conditions and evaluates potential impacts to pipeline reliability and safety from the proposed action and alternatives.

**Background:**

The USDOT is mandated to set pipeline safety standards under Title 49, USC Chapter 601. The USDOT’s PHMSA oversees the national regulatory program to ensure the safe transportation of natural gas and other hazardous liquids by pipeline. The USDOT Pipeline Safety Regulations (PSR) are published in 49 CFR Parts 190 to 199.

The pipeline and aboveground facilities associated with the proposed project must be designed, constructed, operated, and maintained in accordance with the Part 192 of the PSR. The regulations prescribe minimum safety requirements for the transportation of natural gas. The transportation of natural gas by pipeline involves some risk to the public in the event of an accident and subsequent release of gas. The greatest hazard is a fire or explosion following a major pipeline rupture. This section explains relevant background to natural gas pipeline safety standards, provides relevant industry incident and safety statistics, relates this proposed project to industry-wide statistics, describes the proposed pipeline design and approach to ensuring pipeline reliability, and assesses relevant mitigating measures.

**Expected Effects:**

**Alternative 1:** No Action – Under this alternative, the proposed pipeline would not be constructed. Therefore, there would be no impacts to public health and safety associated with
the risk of a pipeline accident. (PHMSA’s NEPA regulations have specific requirements, including for the No Action Alternative, that are addressed in Appendix E.)

**Alternative 2:** Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action - The pipeline and related appurtenances would be designed, constructed and operated in accordance with the applicable requirements of 49 CFR Part 192 for subsurface pipelines. Donlin Gold would incorporate pig launching and receiving facilities (receipt, midpoint, and delivery site), 20 main line valves (MLVs), cathodic protection, leak detection, external coating, and supervisory control into the proposed pipeline system. The tie-in facility, compressor station, Farewell launcher/receiver site, above ground fault crossings, and all MLV sites would be fenced and the gates locked. The pipeline terminus facility would not require fencing because it is located at the secure Donlin Gold mine site. Periodic inspections of the pipeline facilities would be conducted to verify site security.

A 14-inch (356 mm) diameter (outside diameter), American Petroleum Institute specification 5L X-52 PSL2 pipe would be used. The pipe would have a baseline wall thickness (WT) of 0.312 inches (7.9 mm), a yield strength of 52,000 pounds per square inch (psi), and a maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of 1,480 psi gauge. If a subsequent increase in population density adjacent to the right-of-way (ROW) indicates a change in class location for the pipeline, Donlin Gold would have to reduce the MAOP or replace the segment with pipe of sufficient grade and wall thickness, if required, to comply with the USDOT code of regulations for the new class location.

While a WT of 0.312 inches (7.9 mm) would comply with the requirements for the designated line class, additional WT would be required in areas where geotechnical hazards are present unless a system-specific Special Permit was granted by PHMSA. Geotechnical hazards include areas prone to thaw settlement, frost heave and fault zones and pipe in these areas would require a WT of 0.344 inches (8.7 mm) or 0.375 inches (9.5 mm). Similarly, a greater WT (0.375 inches) would be required for pipe that would be laid in areas requiring additional strength during pressure testing because of large elevation changes or requiring buoyancy control in wetlands. (Section 2.3.2.3.5, Alternatives, describes the design and construction procedures that would be used at wetland crossings, and impacts to wetlands hydrology resulting from pipeline construction are discussed in detail in Section 3.11.4.2.3, Wetlands.) Finally, for horizontal directional drilling (HDD) installations, above ground fault crossings, and other high hazard areas, a 0.406-inch (10.3 mm) WT is specified.

If the proposed pipeline does not comply with the above described WT requirements, Donlin Gold will apply to PHMSA for a Special Permit under 49 CFR 190.341 for construction of the proposed pipeline due to the use of strain-based design in areas of discontinuous permafrost. If PHMSA elects to grant the Special Permit for the project, the permit would contain conditions specific to the design, construction, and operation and maintenance of the pipeline as well as reporting and certification requirements. These conditions are summarized in this section to demonstrate that, for the purposes of this EIS, any difference in terms of pipeline integrity, potential releases or environmental consequences between operation under a
special permit or standard design would be minimal, because the PHMSA Special Permit approval is conditioned on achieving equal or greater factors of safety than the general design criteria (PHMSA 2013d briefing of Cooperating Agencies). If the Special Permit application complies with 49 CFR 190.341 and PHMSA determines that waiver of the regulation(s) are not inconsistent with pipeline safety, PHMSA may grant the permit with any conditions necessary to assure safety, environmental protection, or otherwise in the public interest. Additional details can be found in Appendix E which includes the draft Strain Based Design Special Permit Conditions and the draft Enclosure B which augments this Draft EIS with information to meet PHMSA NEPA requirements for the Special Permit.

According to 49 CFR 192.317: “The operator must take all practicable steps to protect each transmission line or main from washouts, floods, unstable soil, landslides, or other hazards that may cause the pipeline to move or to sustain abnormal loads.” As described in Section 3.25.1, while a WT of 0.312 inches (7.9 mm) would comply with the requirements for the designated line class, the pipeline would be designed with additional WT in areas where geotechnical hazards are present. In addition, the pipeline would be designed to withstand the stress that could occur during a seismic event. Two active faults, the Castle Mountain Fault and the Denali Fault, cross the proposed pipeline route (Wesson et al., 2007). Large, permanent ground movement at the pipeline crossing and strong ground shaking along the pipeline could occur during a seismic event on either fault. As described in Section 8.6.18 of the Natural Gas Pipeline Plan of Development (POD), a preliminary fault-crossing stress analysis conducted for both crossings produced a recommendation for an above grade design with the pipeline in a “Z” configuration at each end of the potential movement zone to ensure flexibility. Final designs for the aboveground crossings at the Denali-Farewell and Castle Mountain Faults would be developed to allow the pipe to move freely on above ground support beams during seismic shifting of the ground at these crossings without overstressing the pipe.

Other Alternatives: The effects of other alternatives on pipeline reliability and safety would be very similar to the effects of Alternative 2. Differences of note include:

- Alternative 6A (Dalzell Gorge Route) – The pipeline route would be the same for Alternative 6A as for Alternative 2, with the exception of a different alignment between MP 106.5 and MP 152.7.

3.25.1 SAFETY STANDARDS

The USDOT is mandated to provide pipeline safety under Title 49, USC Chapter 601. The USDOT’s PHMSA oversees the national regulatory program to ensure the safe transportation of natural gas and other hazardous materials by pipeline. It develops safety regulations and other approaches to risk management that ensure safety in the design, construction, testing, operation, maintenance, and emergency response of pipeline facilities. Many of the regulations are written as performance standards which set the level of safety to be attained and allow the
pipeline operator to use various technologies to achieve safety. The PHMSA ensures that people and the environment are adequately protected from the risk of pipeline incidents. This work is shared with state agency partners and others at the federal, state, and local level. The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act at 49 U.S.C. 60105 provides for a state agency to assume all aspects of the safety program for intrastate facilities by adopting and enforcing the federal standards, while 49 U.S.C. 60106 permits a state agency that does not qualify under 49 U.S.C. 60105 to perform certain inspection and monitoring functions. A state may also act as the USDOT's agent to inspect interstate facilities within its boundaries; however, the USDOT is responsible for enforcement actions. The majority of the states have either certifications or agreements with USDOT under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, while nine states act as interstate agents.

The State of Alaska does not have either a certification or an agreement with USDOT under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act. If the State of Alaska elects to issue a ROW lease and BLM elects to issue a ROW grant to Donlin Gold for the proposed pipeline, those agreements would contain a comprehensive sequence of stipulations that would direct all aspects of the pipeline design, construction, and operation in conjunction with applicable PHMSA regulations.

The USDOT pipeline standards are published in 49 CFR Parts 190 to 199. Parts 190, 191, 192, and 199 apply to the proposed pipeline, and natural gas pipeline safety issues are specifically addressed in 49 CFR Part 192. The pipeline and aboveground facilities associated with the proposed project must be designed, constructed, operated, and maintained in accordance with the USDOT Minimum Federal Safety Standards in 49 CFR Part 192. The regulations are intended to ensure adequate protection for the public and to prevent natural gas facility incidents and failures. Part 192 of 49 CFR prescribes minimum requirements for: the selection and qualification of pipe and components; design of pipe; design and installation of pipeline components and facilities; welding; constructing; and protection from external, internal, and atmospheric corrosion; the minimum leak-test and strength-test requirements for pipelines; minimum requirements for operation; minimum requirements for maintenance; minimum requirements for operator qualification; and minimum requirements for an integrity management program.

Area classifications based on population density in the vicinity of the pipeline are also defined by 49 CFR Part 192, which also specifies more rigorous safety requirements for populated areas. The class location unit is an area that extends 220 yards (660 feet) on either side of the centerline of any continuous 1 mile length of pipeline. The four area classifications are defined as follows:

- Class 1 – Location with 10 or fewer buildings intended for human occupancy;
- Class 2 – Location with more than 10 but less than 46 buildings intended for human occupancy;
- Class 3 – Location with 46 or more buildings intended for human occupancy or where the pipeline lies within 100 yards of any building, or small well-defined outside area occupied by 20 or more people on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period; and
- Class 4 – Location where buildings with four or more stories aboveground are prevalent.

Class locations representing more populated areas require higher safety factors in pipeline design, testing, and operation. Pipelines constructed on land in Class 1 locations must be installed with a minimum depth cover of 30 inches in normal soil and 18 inches in consolidated
rock. Class 2, 3, and 4 locations, as well as drainage ditches of public roads and railroad crossings, require a minimum cover of 36 inches in normal soil and 24 inches in consolidated rock. All pipelines installed in navigable rivers, streams, and harbors must have a minimum cover of 48 inches in soil and 24 inches in consolidated rock. The rivers and streams that the proposed pipeline would cross, as well as the bankfull width of these crossings (where data are available), are listed in Table 3, Appendix G.

Class locations also specify the maximum distance to a sectionalizing block valve. Pipe wall thickness and pipeline design pressures, hydrostatic test pressures, MAOP, inspection and testing of welds and frequency of pipeline patrols and leak surveys must also conform to higher standards in more populated areas. The preliminary class location for the proposed pipeline has been determined based on the relationship of the pipeline centerline to other nearby structures and manmade features. The entire proposed pipeline route is currently designated as Class 1 (Enos 2013e).

Donlin Gold anticipates the need for a special permit. As discussed in their December 2013 Plan of Development under Pipeline Design Factors: “In areas where the pipeline may cross terrain susceptible to thaw settlement or other geotechnical conditions that subject the pipeline to additional strain, a special permit may be required from PHMSA. In these areas the conditions of the special permit will be the guiding requirements for the design, construction, and operation of the pipeline.”

The Lead and Cooperating Agencies were briefed on November 11, 2013 by PHMSA representatives regarding their role, the special permit process, strain-based design and requirements therefore. The notes of this meeting and PHMSA Power Point presentation are documented in the Administrative Record for this EIS. The Special Permit Conditions and Enclosure B prepared by Donlin Gold are presented in Appendix E to this EIS.

The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 requires operators to develop and follow a written integrity management program that contains all the elements described in 49 CFR 192.911 and addresses the risks on each transmission pipeline segment. Specifically, the law establishes an integrity management program which applies to all high consequence areas (HCAs). The integrity management program is an additional layer of regulatory requirements beyond the operations, maintenance, and other 49 CFR Part 192 requirements for pipelines in HCAs.
The USDOT has published rules that define HCAs as locations where a gas pipeline accident could do considerable harm to people and their property and requires an integrity management program to minimize the potential for an accident. This definition satisfies, in part, the Congressional mandate for the USDOT to prescribe standards that establish criteria for identifying each gas pipeline facility in a high density population area.

The HCAs may be classified in one of two ways. In the first method, an HCA includes:

- Current Class 3 and 4 locations;
- Any area in Class 1 or 2 where the potential impact radius\(^1\) is greater than 660 feet and there are 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy within the potential impact circle\(^2\); or
- Any area in Class 1 or 2 where the potential impact circle includes an identified site.

An identified site is an outside area or open structure that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 50 days in any 12-month period; a building that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for any 10 weeks in any 12-month period; or a facility that is occupied by persons who are confined, are of impaired mobility, or would be difficult to evacuate.

In the second method, an HCA includes any area within a potential impact circle which contains:

- Twenty or more buildings intended for human occupancy; or
- An identified site.

Once a pipeline operator has determined the HCAs along its pipeline, it must apply the elements of its integrity management program to those segments of the pipeline within HCAs. USDOT regulations specify the requirements for the integrity management plan at 49 CFR 192.911.

Donlin Gold has not identified any HCAs along the proposed project route based on the relationship of the pipeline centerline to other nearby structures and identified sites. To maintain compliance with the pipeline classification and pipeline integrity management regulations in 49 CFR Part 192, Donlin Gold would continue to monitor for potential class location changes and HCAs throughout the life of the proposed project. Monitoring would include visual inspections of the pipeline ROW and surrounding area, regular updates to the project’s GIS data, and monitoring for changes to land status (Enos 2013e). Should any HCAs along the proposed project route be identified in the future, the pipeline integrity management rule would require inspection of the HCA segments of the pipeline every 7 years. As further required by the pipeline integrity management rule, inspections of the above ground portions of the pipeline would be required at least once every 3 calendar years (with intervals not to exceed 39 months) regardless of class location. The USDOT prescribes the minimum standards for operating and maintaining pipeline facilities, including the requirement to establish a written plan governing these activities. Each pipeline operator is required to establish an emergency plan that includes procedures to minimize the hazards in a natural gas pipeline emergency. Key elements of the plan include procedures for:

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1 The potential impact radius (in feet) is calculated as the product of 0.69 and the square root of the MAOP of the pipeline in pounds per square inch gauge (psig) multiplied by the square of the pipeline diameter in inches.

2 The potential impact circle is a circle of radius equal to the potential impact radius.
• Receiving, identifying, and classifying emergency events, gas leakage, fires, explosions, and natural disasters;
• Establishing and maintaining communications with local fire, police, and public officials and coordinating emergency response;
• Emergency system shutdown and safe restoration of service;
• Making personnel, equipment, tools, and materials available at the scene of an emergency; and
• Protecting people first and then property and making them safe from actual or potential hazards.

The USDOT requires that each operator establish and maintain liaison with appropriate fire, police, and public officials to learn the resources and responsibilities of each organization that may respond to a natural gas pipeline emergency and to coordinate mutual assistance.

In accordance with 49 CFR Part 192, Donlin Gold would develop an O&M Plan/Manual; Health, Safety, and Environment Plan (including a Safety Plan/Program), Pipeline Surveillance and Monitoring Plan, and other plans that would outline safety measures that would be implemented during normal and abnormal operation. In order to meet ADNR’s ROW lease requirements, Donlin Gold would maintain a surveillance and monitoring program as well as a quality assurance program. Donlin Gold would conduct a public outreach program that would include information regarding participation in the “One-Call” program, hazards associated with the unintended release of natural gas, unintended release indicators, and reporting procedures.

3.25.2 PIPELINE ACCIDENT DATA

The USDOT requires all operators of natural gas transmission pipelines to notify the USDOT of any significant incident and to submit a report within 20 days. Significant incidents are defined as any leaks that:

• Caused a death or personal injury requiring hospitalization;
• Involve property damage of more than $50,000, in 1984 dollars;
• Result in highly volatile liquid releases of 5 barrels or more or other liquid releases of 50 barrels or more; or
• Result in liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion.

During the 20-year period from 1993 through 2012, a total of 1,211 significant incidents were reported to PHMSA on the more than 300,000 total miles of natural gas transmission pipelines nationwide (PHMSA 2013a). Additional insight into the nature of significant incidents may be found by examining the primary factors that caused the failures. Table 3.25-1 provides a distribution of the causal factors as well as the number of each incident by cause.

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3 $50,000 in 1984 dollars was approximately $112,549 as of August 2013 (U.S. Department of Labor 2013).
Table 3.25-1: Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Significant Incidents by Cause 1993-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrosion</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excavation Damage(^1)</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect Operation</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline Material, Weld or Equipment Failure</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Force Damage</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Outside Force Damage(^2)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Causes(^3)</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,211</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Includes third-party damage.
2. Fire, explosion, vehicle damage, previous damage, intentional damage.
3. Miscellaneous causes or unknown causes.
Source: PHMSA 2013a.

The dominant incident cause is corrosion, which constitutes 23.7 percent of all significant incidents. The pipelines included in the data set in Table 3.25-1 vary widely in terms of age, pipe diameter, and level of corrosion control. Each variable influences the incident frequency that may be expected for a specific segment of pipeline.

The frequency of significant incidents is strongly dependent on pipeline age. Older pipelines have a higher frequency of corrosion incidents, since corrosion is a time-dependent process. The use of both an external protective coating and a cathodic protection system\(^4\), required on all pipelines installed after July 1971, significantly reduces the corrosion rate compared to unprotected or partially protected pipe. The proposed pipeline would include an external protective coating and a cathodic protection system, thereby reducing the risk of a corrosion incident.

Outside forces, excavation, or natural force damage is the cause in 33.9 percent of significant pipeline incidents (see Table 3.25-1). These result from the encroachment of mechanical equipment such as bulldozers and backhoes; earth movements due to soil settlement, washouts, or geologic hazards; and weather effects such as winds, heavy rains/ floods, and thermal strains (Table 3.25-2).

Table 3.25-2: Outside Force, Excavation, and Natural Force Incidents by Cause, 1993-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Percent of all Outside Force, Excavation, and Natural Force Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Outside Force Damage(^3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire/Explosion as Primary Cause</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle (not engaged in excavation)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) Cathodic protection is a technique to reduce corrosion of the natural gas pipeline that includes the use of an induced current or a sacrificial anode (like zinc) that corrodes at faster rate. A description of corrosion protection and detection systems proposed to be employed for the proposed pipeline can be found in Section 2.3.2.3.5.
Older pipelines have a higher frequency of outside forces and excavation incidents partly because their location may be less well known and less well marked than newer lines. In addition, older pipelines include a disproportionate number of smaller diameter pipelines, which have a greater rate of outside forces incidents. Smaller diameter pipelines (e.g., local distribution lines) are more easily crushed or broken by mechanical equipment or earth movements than larger diameter pipelines. The remote nature of the pipeline route and extremely low adjacent population lessens the possibility of outside force damage or inadvertent third-party damage through excavation. Natural force damage caused by earth movement is a greater concern given the potential for fault displacement to occur in some areas along the pipeline route. Section 3.25.3.2.2 describes how the proposed pipeline would be designed to withstand the stress that could occur during a seismic event.

Since 1982, operators have been required to participate in “One Call” public utility programs in populated areas to minimize unauthorized excavation activities in the vicinity of pipelines. The “One Call” program is a service used by public utilities and some private sector companies (e.g., oil pipelines and cable television) to provide preconstruction information to contractors or other maintenance workers on the underground location of pipes, cables, and culverts.

Table 3.25-2: Outside Force, Excavation, and Natural Force Incidents by Cause, 1993-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Percent of all Outside Force, Excavation, and Natural Force Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fishing, Maritime Activity, Maritime Equipment, or Vessel Adrift</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Mechanical Damage</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Damage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other or Unspecified Outside Force Damage</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excavation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator/Contractor Excavation Damage</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-party Excavation Damage</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Damage due to Excavation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Excavation Damage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>202</strong></td>
<td><strong>48.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Force Damage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth Movement</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Rains/Floods</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lightning/Temperature/High Winds</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other or Unspecified Natural Force Damage</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>144</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>413</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PHMSA 2013a
Pipeline material, weld, or equipment failure accounted for 23.5 percent of significant incidents involving natural gas transmission pipelines from the period of 1993 through 2012 (Table 3.25-1). While manufacturing-related pipeline failure was the cause for only 12 out of a total of 285 incidences of pipeline material, weld, or equipment failure, the greatest amounts of property damage (58.5 percent), fatalities (100 percent), and injuries (71.8 percent) in this category were attributable to manufacturing-related pipeline failure. Manufacturing-related pipeline failure includes material defects (e.g., impurities in the molten steel) that arise during manufacturing, and welding that results in cracks, pinholes, or incomplete fusion between the weld and the base metal (PHMSA 2011b). Donlin Gold would observe and comply with PHMSA regulations pursuant to 49 CFR Part 192 that provide stringent standards for pipe materials, pipe design, pipe components, pipe welds, pipeline construction, corrosion protection, pipeline pressure testing, and operation and maintenance.

Since this EIS analyzes a new pipeline in compliance with current standards, the probability and severity of incidents should compare favorably to and not likely exceed industry experience.

3.25.3 IMPACT ON PUBLIC SAFETY

The analysis contained in this section does not readily fit the criteria/impact methods used in other sections of the EIS. As a result, tables of impact criteria and summaries of impacts are not presented.

3.25.3.1 ALTERNATIVE 1 - NO ACTION

Under the No Action Alternative, the proposed pipeline would not be constructed. Therefore, there would be no impacts to public health and safety associated with the risk of a pipeline accident.

3.25.3.2 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

The significant incident data summarized in Table 3.25-1 include pipeline failures of all magnitudes with widely varying consequences.

Table 3.25-3 presents the average annual fatalities that occurred on natural gas transmission lines over a 20-year period (1993-2012) and over a 5-year period (2008-2012). Annual fatalities for the period of 1993-2012 averaged two fatalities. Annual fatalities over the period of 2008-2012 likewise averaged two fatalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993-2012</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PHMSA 2013a and 2013b.

During the period of 2008-2012, 10 fatalities associated with natural gas transmission lines occurred. The majority (80 percent) were caused by the 2010 explosion of a Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) 30-inch natural gas transmission line in San Bruno, California. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident included inadequate quality assurance and
quality control during installation of a substandard welded pipe section and an inadequate pipeline integrity management program (NTSB 2011).

The nationwide totals of accidental fatalities from various manmade and natural hazards are listed in Table 3.25-4 in order to provide a relative measure of the industry-wide safety of natural gas transmission pipelines. The data shown are from the year 2007, the most recent year for which the applicable data are available from the U.S. Census Bureau. Direct comparisons between accident categories should be made cautiously, however, because individual exposures to hazards are not uniform among all categories. As shown in the table, the fatality rate from natural gas pipelines is more than 22 times lower than the fatalities from natural hazards such as lightning, tornados, or floods.

From 1993 to 2012, there were an average of 61 significant incidents and two fatalities per year (PHMSA 2013a). The number of significant incidents over the more than 300,000 miles of natural gas transmission lines indicates the risk is low for an incident at any given location. This is particularly the case in the proposed Project Area, due to newer technology, regulatory requirements, and the remoteness of the proposed project. The operation of the proposed pipeline would represent only a slight increase in risk to the nearby public. In addition, the proposed pipeline would be constructed in very remote locations and away from HCAs, further minimizing risk to the public. No risk factors were identified that would support public safety risks higher than current industry experience in terms of anticipated number of severity of incidents. The highly remote location of the pipeline could suggest that the risk to human health is lower than other pipelines.

### Table 3.25-4: Nationwide Accidental Deaths (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Accident</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Accidents</td>
<td>123,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle</td>
<td>43,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poisoning</td>
<td>29,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falls</td>
<td>22,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drowning</td>
<td>3,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire, Smoke Inhalation, Burns</td>
<td>3,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods(^1)</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lightning(^1)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tornado(^1)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines(^2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
2. PHMSA 2013c.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2012 (unless otherwise noted).
3.25.3.2.1 TERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a safety and security concern for energy facilities and is an important consideration for the design, construction, and operation of energy facilities. Both international and domestic terrorism have changed the way pipeline operators as well as regulators must consider pipeline security, both in approving new projects and in operating existing facilities. The likelihood of future attacks of terrorism or sabotage occurring along the proposed project is extremely difficult to estimate, but is expected to be unlikely due to the remoteness of the site, the relative absence of opportunities for collateral or significant environmental damage, and that a break would not impede infrastructure relied upon for national defense or everyday life. However, intentional damage to the pipeline still has the potential to occur.

Design, construction, and operations elements already integrated into the proposed project provide a level of security from such a threat including buried construction of the pipeline; locked security fencing surrounding aboveground facilities; and periodic air and ground inspection of the pipeline route. Additionally, specialized training in pipeline security awareness for pipeline employees is recommended by the Transportation Security Administration (Transportation Security Administration 2011) and will be described in operating manuals prepared prior to operation. Further, specific information including pipeline design and integrity; security risks; and HCA's are frequently kept confidential from the public in order to maintain a higher level of security.

3.25.3.2.2 PROPOSED PIPELINE DESIGN AND APPROACH TO ENSURING PIPELINE RELIABILITY

Donlin Gold would incorporate pig launching and receiving facilities (receipt, midpoint, and delivery site), 20 main line valves (MLVs) (three of which could be operated remotely), cathodic protection, leak detection, and supervisory control into the proposed pipeline system. The pipeline and related appurtenances would be designed, constructed and operated in accordance with the applicable requirements of 49 CFR Part 192 for subsurface pipelines. The proposed pipeline route was selected following an alternatives screening process, as described in Section 2.2.1, Alternatives. The methods that would be used for wetlands and water body crossings are described in Section 2.3.2.3.5, Pipeline Specifications, in Chapter 2, Alternatives.

A 14-inch (356 mm) diameter (outside diameter), American Petroleum Institute specification 5L X-52 PSL2 pipe would be used. The pipe would have a baseline WT of 0.312 inches (7.9 mm), a yield strength of 52,000 psi, and a MAOP of 1,480 psi gauge. If a subsequent increase in population density adjacent to the ROW indicates a change in class location for the pipeline, Donlin Gold would have to reduce the MAOP or replace the segment with pipe of sufficient grade and wall thickness, if required, to comply with the USDOT code of regulations for the new class location.

While a WT of 0.312 inches (7.9 mm) would comply with the requirements for the designated line class, additional WT would be required in areas where geotechnical hazards are present unless a system-specific special permit was granted by PHMSA. Geotechnical hazards include areas prone to thaw settlement, frost heave, and fault zones, and pipe in these areas would require a WT of 0.344 inches (8.7 mm) or 0.375 inches (9.5 mm). Similarly, a greater WT (0.375 inches) would be required for pipe that would be laid in areas requiring additional strength
during pressure testing because of large elevation changes or requiring buoyancy control in wetlands. Finally, for HDD installations, above ground fault crossings, and other high hazard areas, a 0.406-inch (10.3 mm) WT is specified.

Quality Control

Donlin Gold would adhere to its Operations Integrity Management System safeguards and stipulations. To facilitate compliance with the safeguards and stipulations of the ROW authorizations, all contractors would be pre-qualified to verify that they have an Integrity Management System or equivalent in place. In addition, Donlin Gold would implement a Quality Management Program that would:

- Apply to and remain in effect during construction, operation, maintenance and termination;
- Identify the processes needed to be undertaken and the methodologies followed for effective processes;
- Verify resources are dedicated to support the operation and monitoring of the processes; and
- Monitor, measure, and analyze processes and implement corrective actions to processes if necessary.

The Quality Management Program would include a Quality Manual and Quality Control Plan including policies and objectives. Donlin Gold, including its agents, employees, and contractors would comply with the approved Quality Management Program. This program would serve to identify any potential issues and verify that all work is performed in a manner to maintain the quality of the pipeline and related facilities, and to make sure all work is performed in accordance with relevant permit and lease stipulations.

Pipeline Materials and Procedures Control

Materials that would be used in construction of the pipeline would meet the requirements of American Petroleum Institute 5L grade X-52. The material specifications for the pipe are contained in the SBD Special Permit Conditions file in Appendix E. Appropriate quality control would be required of all pipeline material suppliers. Field welds on the pipeline would be inspected using nondestructive testing during construction. Inspectors would be employed to verify compliance with the approved welding procedures and conformance to other construction practices, standards, and requirements.

Pipeline Design in Areas Prone to Fault Displacement

According to 49 CFR 192.317: “The operator must take all practicable steps to protect each transmission line or main from washouts, floods, unstable soil, landslides, or other hazards that may cause the pipeline to move or to sustain abnormal loads.” The pipeline would be designed to withstand the stress that could occur during a seismic event. Two active faults, the Castle Mountain Fault and the Denali Fault, cross the proposed pipeline route (Wesson et al., 2007). Large, permanent ground movement at the pipeline crossing and strong ground shaking along the pipeline could occur during a seismic event on either fault. As described in Section 8.6.18 of the Natural Gas Pipeline POD, a preliminary fault-crossing stress analysis conducted for both
crossings produced a recommendation for an above grade design with the pipeline in a “Z” configuration at each end of the potential movement zone to ensure flexibility. Final designs for the above-ground crossings at the Denali-Farewell and Castle Mountain Faults would be developed to allow the pipe to move freely on above-ground support beams during seismic shifting of the ground at these crossings without overstressing the pipe.

**Welding and Weld Examination**

Sections of 60-foot pipe would be delivered in straight sections. The straight sections of pipe would be temporarily placed or “strung” along the excavated pipeline trench, where they would be bent as necessary to follow the natural grade and direction changes of the ROW. Stringing operations would be coordinated with all other installation activities to ensure that the pipe is available for bending, welding, and lowering-in to minimize the amount of time the trench is open. Following stringing and bending, the ends of the pipeline would be carefully aligned and girth-welded together.

All welds would be visually inspected by an American Welding Society certified inspector who is part of the construction management staff or execution contractor quality control staff. Non-destructive radiographic or ultrasonic inspection methods would be used, in accordance with USDOT requirements. The percentage of welds that are inspected would comply with requirements of 49 CFR 192.243, Welds: Nondestructive Testing. Any defects would be repaired or cut out as required under the specified regulations and standards. Documents that verify the integrity of the pipeline would be kept on file by Donlin Gold for inspection by the USDOT Office of Pipeline Safety.

**Pressure Testing**

The entire pipeline would be pressure tested before it is put into service to verify its integrity and its ability to withstand maximum operating pressures. The test would be conducted in compliance with USDOT regulations (49 CFR Part 192). Before the pressure test, each section of pipe would be cleaned. A detailed Pressure Test Plan would be developed during final design to address all aspects of pressure testing. Donlin Gold has not yet determined whether the pipeline would be pressure tested using water (hydrostatic testing or hydrotesting). Incremental segments of pipe would be filled with water, pressurized, and held for the required duration of the test. The length of each segment tested would depend on topography. Section 2.3.2.3.5, in Chapter 2, Alternatives, contains more information about how the proposed pipeline would be pressure tested.

**Cathodic Protection and Corrosion Control**

To prevent corrosion, the majority of the pipe would be externally coated with a three-layer polyethylene coating before delivery. The pipe intended for HDD installation would use a fusion bonded epoxy corrosion-prevention coating, finished with an abrasion resistant overlay coating. After welding, field joints would be coated with a shrinkable sleeve wrap, or field-applied liquid epoxy. Before the pipe is lowered into the trench, (or pulled back into an HDD) the coating would be visually inspected and tested with an electronic detector for coating defects. Any defects or scratches (holidays) would be repaired and re-inspected before the pipe is lowered into the trench.
In addition to the pipe coating, a current-passive, zinc ribbon cathodic protection system would be used for the length of the pipeline. Zinc ribbon would be installed after pipe lowering-in and before backfill. Following commissioning and startup of the proposed pipeline, the pipeline would be surveyed at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not exceeding 15 months, to determine whether cathodic protection levels are adequate. Cathodic protection test sites would be installed at accessible locations, at intervals of one mile or less, to measure pipe-to-soil potential for the establishment and maintenance of an effective cathodic protection system. Accessibility would be based on the expected cathodic protection survey season. Test stations would be installed where the pipeline parallels, crosses, or passes near other cathodically protected pipelines or structures. The pipeline would be electrically isolated from contact with the compressor station and at the BPL tie-in. The specific location of test stations would be determined during final design. If low pipe-to-soil potentials are found during cathodic protection surveys, remedial measures would be implemented.

Standard Lowering-In

Before the pipe section is lowered into the trench, inspection would be conducted to verify that the trench bottom is free of rocks and other debris that could damage the external pipe coating. Dewatering may be necessary where water has accumulated in the trench. This would occur in accordance with permit requirements. Sideboom tractors would be used to lift the pipe, position it over the trench, and lower it into place. Specialized padding (soil screening equipment) machines may be used to screen previously excavated mineral soils to provide a padding and bedding material free of larger material (>1 inch in size) to line the bottom of the trench before lowering-in pipe, and to provide backfill material next to the sides and the top of the pipe that would not damage the pipe coating. The pipeline coating would be inspected again just before the pipe is placed in the trench.

Operations and Maintenance Inspections

When the pipeline is in operation, the pipeline would be periodically inspected using intelligent inspection pigs, which are in-line inspection (ILI) tools. The O&M Plan/ Manual and Pipeline Surveillance and Monitoring Plan would provide details about inspection pigging, and would define the types and frequency of inspection pigs to be run through the pipeline. The first inspection pig run would establish baseline pipeline conditions. Subsequent pig runs would be scheduled to monitor and detect changes from the baseline conditions. The need for and frequency of the pig runs would be evaluated based on results from previous pig runs and on operating experience and requirements.

3.25.3.2.3 IMPACTS OF A SPECIAL PERMIT FOR STRAIN-BASED DESIGN

If the proposed pipeline does not comply with the above described WT requirements, Donlin Gold will likely apply to PHMSA for a Special Permit under 49 CFR 190.341 for construction of the proposed pipeline due to the use of strain-based design in areas of discontinuous permafrost. If PHMSA elects to grant the Special Permit for the project, the permit would contain conditions specific to the design, construction, and operation and maintenance of the pipeline as well as reporting and certification requirements. These conditions are summarized herein to demonstrate that, for the purposes of this EIS, any difference in terms of pipeline integrity, potential releases or environmental consequences between operation under a special
permit or standard design would be minimal, because the PHMSA Special Permit approval is conditioned on achieving equal or greater factors of safety than the general design criteria (PHMSA 2013d). Additional details can be found in the Donlin Gold LLC Application for Special Permit (Endorsement B) and the SBD Special Permit Conditions file contained in Appendix E.

The SBD Special Permit Conditions specify that Donlin Gold must develop and submit to PHMSA for review an overall SBD Plan that addresses all aspects of the pipeline's life cycle including design, materials, construction, and operations and maintenance. The SBD Plan must be reviewed and validated by a third-party engineering firm. In addition, Donlin Gold must implement a material testing process to determine longitudinal tensile and compressive strain capacity of pipe and girth welds, representing all anticipated operating and environmental conditions the pipeline will be subjected to during its life cycle. Based upon the findings from the material testing program and an engineering critical assessment, Donlin Gold must develop and implement written material, design, construction, and operations and maintenance specifications and procedures in accordance with the SBD Special Permit Conditions to prevent the strain demand for pipe and girth welds from exceeding the defined strain demand limits under operational conditions for the SBD segments. Devices or processes of strain demand monitoring must be installed or implemented during construction or operation (when locations of high strains are discovered after the pipeline is put in service), and Donlin Gold must report and remediate high strain conditions. The SBD Special Permit Conditions additionally specify quality control measures to ensure the reliability of girth welds, the requirements for a ROW construction monitoring program, operations and maintenance procedures, and reporting and certification procedures.

To protect the pipeline from corrosion, the SBD Special Permit Conditions file includes conditions for grounding and cathodic protection of SBD segments. The permit conditions specify that protection from interference current (e.g., from overhead electric transmission lines) and cathodic protection must be provided for all buried SBD segments within one year of installation of the pipeline in the ditch (including backfill) to meet 49 CFR 192.328(e) and 192.620(d)(5) through (8). During the commissioning of the cathodic protection systems and during the annual cathodic protection surveys, Donlin Gold must test for the presence of interference currents and areas with insufficient levels of cathodic protection that could materially impact pipe reliability. Should such conditions be detected, then Donlin Gold must take remedial action within one year of detection, whether through effective cathodic protection, additional grounding, or other technically viable means. The interference current protection and cathodic protection system may be temporary or permanent, but in all cases, one or more of the applicable criteria contained in Appendix D of Part 192 must be achieved and maintained. Both the interference protection and cathodic protection systems must include provisions for testing and monitoring the performance of the systems including provisions for measuring polarized pipe-to-soil potentials and alternating current coupons, as a minimum.

The permit conditions require Donlin Gold to treat the SBD segments as though they are in HCAs and to therefore develop and implement an integrity management program (IMP) that meets the requirements of 49 CFR Part 192, Subpart O, except for the reporting requirements contained in 49 CFR 192.945. Donlin Gold would perform a baseline assessment that includes ILI assessment along the entire length of the SBD segments no later than pipeline

5 Coupons are small pieces of metal used to monitor the level of cathodic protection on buried metal structures such as pipes.
commissioning. ILI must be repeated at intervals not to exceed seven calendar years, and Donlin must monitor the variance between ILI tool measurements and actual field conditions. Depending upon the severity of anomalies detected by ILI tools, Donlin must complete an evaluation or implement remediation measures that would include an immediate response, a response within one year, or a monitored response.

In addition, Donlin Gold’s IMP would include a cathodic protection assessment of the SBD segments after pipe construction backfill and within nine months of placing the cathodic protection system in operation. Donlin Gold would also perform External Corrosion Direct Assessment in accordance with 49 CFR 192.925 on a maximum seven calendar year interval to evaluate and remediate external pipe coating and cathodic protection operational performance.

### 3.25.3.2.4 IMPACT REDUCING MEASURES FOR ALTERNATIVE 2

These effects determinations take into account impact reducing design features (Table 5.2-1 in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) proposed by Donlin Gold and also the Standard Permit Conditions and Best Management Practices (BMPs) (Section 5.3, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) that would be implemented. Several examples of these are presented below, and many are discussed above in Section 3.25.3.2.2.

**Design features most important for reducing impacts to pipeline reliability and safety include:**

- Donlin would develop an Operations and Maintenance Plan/Manual; Health, Safety, and Environment Plan (including a Safety Plan/Program), Pipeline Surveillance and Monitoring Plan, and other plans that would outline safety measures that would be implemented during operations;
- The above-ground fault crossing of the pipeline was designed to resist surface fault rupture hazards, and would be designed to withstand the stress that could occur during a seismic event;
- Appropriate notices, warning signs, and flagging would be used to promote public safety, but barricades may also be used around dangerous areas such as open trenches during construction; and
- The project design includes locked security fencing surrounding pipeline aboveground facilities.

**Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts to pipeline reliability and safety include:**

- Appropriate bonding/financial assurance;
- Verifying pipeline integrity with visual and other non-destructive inspections of welds, hydrostatic testing, use of in-line inspection tools, and aerial inspections, and
- Use of cathodic protection (specific method to be determined in final design) for corrosion protection of the steel pipeline.

### 3.25.3.2.5 ADDITIONAL MITIGATION AND MONITORING FOR ALTERNATIVE 2

While the Corps is considering additional mitigation to reduce the effects presented above (Tables 5.5-1 and 5.7-2 in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation), no
additional mitigation or monitoring measures have been identified to reduce effects to pipeline reliability and safety.

3.25.3.3 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

The natural gas pipeline route and design approach would be the same under Alternative 3A as under Alternative 2. Under Alternative 3A, natural gas usage would increase from 11.2 BSCF/year to a peak of 15.5 BSCF/year. The natural gas pipeline proposed under Alternative 2 has an engineered capacity to accommodate 26 BSCF/year with additional compression (i.e., higher operating pressure) and would not require any modifications to the pipeline design to transport the increased amount. Therefore, the potential impacts on public health and safety from transportation of natural gas by pipeline would be identical to those impacts described for Alternative 2. The effects determinations take into account applicable impact reducing design features and BMPs, as discussed in Alternative 2. No additional mitigation or monitoring measures have been identified to reduce effects to pipeline safety and reliability.

3.25.3.4 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

The natural gas pipeline would not be constructed under Alternative 3B. Therefore, the potential impacts on public health and safety from transportation of natural gas by pipeline would not occur.

A leak or spill from a diesel pipeline would not be likely to cause an immediate impact to public safety because diesel is not likely to explode. Potential impacts to human health from diesel spills are discussed in Section 3.7, Water Quality; Section 3.22, Human Health; and Section 3.24, Spill Risk.

The effects determinations take into account applicable impact reducing design features and BMPs, as discussed in Alternative 2. No additional mitigation or monitoring measures have been identified to reduce effects to pipeline safety and reliability.

3.25.3.5 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING PORT

The natural gas pipeline route and design approach would be the same under Alternative 4 as under Alternative 2. Therefore, the potential impacts on public health and safety from transportation of natural gas by pipeline would be identical to those impacts described for Alternative 2. The effects determinations take into account applicable impact reducing design features and BMPs, as discussed in Alternative 2. No additional mitigation or monitoring measures have been identified to reduce effects to pipeline safety and reliability.

3.25.3.6 ALTERNATIVE 5A – DRY STACK TAILINGS

The natural gas pipeline route and design approach would be the same under Alternative 5A as under Alternative 2. Therefore, the potential impacts on public health and safety from transportation of natural gas by pipeline would be identical to those impacts described for Alternative 2. The effects determinations take into account applicable impact reducing design features and BMPs, as discussed in Alternative 2. No additional mitigation or monitoring measures have been identified to reduce effects to pipeline safety and reliability.
3.25.3.7 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

The pipeline design approach would be the same under Alternative 6A as described for Alternative 2. The pipeline route would be the same for Alternative 6A as for Alternative 2, with the exception of a different alignment between MP 106.5 and MP 152.7 (see Chapter 2, Alternatives). However, the entire route variation is designated Class 1, as is the rest of the pipeline route, and Donlin Gold has not identified any HCAs along the route variation. Therefore, the potential impacts on public health and safety from transportation of natural gas by pipeline would be identical to those impacts described for Alternative 2. The effects determinations take into account applicable impact reducing design features and BMPs, as discussed in Alternative 2. No additional mitigation or monitoring measures have been identified to reduce effects to pipeline safety and reliability.
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3.26 CLIMATE CHANGE

SYNOPSIS

Summary of Existing Conditions:

Atmosphere: Climate change is increasingly understood to be linked to the accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. While Alaska has a high per capita rate of GHG emissions, the state accounts for only about one percent of U.S. GHG emissions and Alaska’s contribution to global GHGs is minimal. Most of Alaska’s GHG emissions are from the petroleum and natural gas industry, and about one percent Alaska’s GHG emissions are from the mining industry.

Water Resources: Although the effects of climate change on surface water resources are complex and difficult to quantify, predicted increases in average precipitation may cause changes in stream flow. Combined with warmer winters and less snow cover, large-scale stream flow changes may impact barge schedules as well as other resources within the Project Area.

Permafrost: Permafrost is predicted to thaw within the Project Area. As permafrost soils warm, organic carbon reservoirs trapped in the ice are mobilized, causing carbon dioxide and methane to be released into the atmosphere. Permafrost stability or anticipated changes to existing permafrost conditions can significantly influence design and construction considerations associated with settlement and ground stability issues. Predicted changes affecting permafrost conditions over the lifespan of a project can affect engineering and construction design.

Biological Resources and Subsistence: Climate change will impact vegetation, and subsequently wetlands, wildlife, fish, and subsistence resources. Climate modeling predicts shifts in vegetation community types to a drier landscape with a higher proportion of shrubs and trees. Some areas may subside with permafrost loss, fill with water, and drain adjacent wetlands. Fire regime shifts may also contribute to landscape-level vegetation pattern change. Vegetation shifts may cause a small net loss of carbon and nitrogen. Species distributions and abundances are likely to change, resulting in changes to ecosystem functions, habitat range, and interconnected food webs.

Expected Effects:

Alternative 1: No Action – Climate change would continue to have effects as predicted within the Project Area. This alternative would not further contribute to climate change in the Project Area, other than climate change inputs already resulting from exploration work and baseline studies.
Alternative 2: Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action

Atmosphere

- **Mine Site**: The intensity of direct GHG emissions from project activities at the mine site would be medium (between 1 percent and 10 percent of Alaska annual GHG emissions). The duration of GHG emissions would range from temporary (construction) to long-term (operations and closure). GHG emissions at the mine site would be local in extent (within immediate Project Area). Indirect GHG emissions associated with construction and operations of the mine site would result from emissions associated with transporting supplies and construction materials to the mine site. Overall, project impacts on climate change would range from minor to moderate for the mine site.

- **Transportation Facilities and Pipeline**: The intensity of direct GHG emissions from project activities for the transportation facilities and pipeline would be low, with maximum annual GHG emissions being less than 1 percent of Alaska’s GHGs. The duration of GHG emissions would range from temporary (construction) to long-term (operations and closure). Direct GHG emissions at the transportation facilities and pipeline would be local in extent. Indirect GHG emissions associated with construction and operations would result from cruise operations of air traffic between Anchorage (or other point of origin) and the mine site airstrip, and ocean traffic. Overall, GHG impacts on climate change associated with the transportation facilities and pipeline under Alternative 2 would be considered negligible to minor.

- In summary, the Donlin Gold Project would overall cause minor impacts to climate change under Alternative 2.

Water and Permafrost

Hydrologic effects due to climate change under Alternative 2 would range from low intensity (e.g., sufficient barge days would be available under a low water climate change scenario to meet proposed shipping needs) to medium intensity (e.g., a faster pit lake filling rate could require changes in water management/treatment strategies in post-closure). The duration of climate change effects would be long-term to permanent, with potential impacts lasting through the life of the project (transportation and pipeline components) and in post-closure (mine site). The extent of project effects would be considered local to regional. The context of climate change effects on water as pertains to the project is considered common to important. Overall effects are considered minor to moderate.

Impacts to and from permafrost due to climate change under Alternative 2 would range from low intensity (e.g., little noticeable additional ground settlement due to climate change) to medium intensity (e.g., design and BMPs at major mine structures and along pipeline are effective in controlling permafrost hazards, differential settlement, and thermal erosion), although specific low probability conditions may exist that could cause medium to high intensity effects (e.g., additional permafrost excavation at toe of WRF). Project-related impacts to climate-altered permafrost would be limited to intermittent areas of permafrost and would
be localized beneath facility footprints and cleared areas. Permafrost thaw effects would range from long-term (e.g., settlement and revegetation reach equilibrium within several years) to permanent (i.e., restoration of permafrost not expected). Discontinuous permafrost and climate change are considered common in context based on their regional to global distribution. Overall effects would range from minor to moderate.

Biological Resources and Subsistence

The effects of predicted climate change on vegetation and wetlands under Alternative 2 may increase in later project years due to warming temperatures and altered precipitation patterns, resulting in permafrost loss, vegetation type changes, a general drying trend, and changed fire regime. Fire severity is predicted to increase over time in a warming climate, and the vegetated areas along active roads or other operations areas would be most vulnerable to accidental fire. Shifts in wildlife, fish, or threatened and endangered species (TES) populations may occur due to subsequent habitat and precipitation or temperature changes, affecting subsistence resources as well. Because the effects would be incremental, the intensity of impacts for biological resources and subsistence would be low. The extent would be considered local to regional, and the context would be considered common. Given the expected long range trends of biome shifts, overall effects of climate change on biological resources and subsistence during the life of the project would be minor.

Other Alternatives: The effects of the other alternatives would be very similar to the effects of Alternative 2. Differences for other action alternatives include:

- Alternative 3A (Reduced Diesel Barging: LNG-Powered Haul Trucks) would reduce consumption of diesel, reduce barge trips, and reduce tanker trucks compared to Alternative 2. There would be less potential for low water barge impacts (fewer trips needed), but a slight increase in the effects of climate change on permafrost thaw at the Bethel Dock. Overall impacts from GHGs and for biological resources and subsistence would remain minor, and impacts for water and permafrost would be minor to moderate.

- Alternative 3B (Reduced Diesel Barging: Diesel Pipeline) would replace the natural gas pipeline proposed under Alternative 2 with a diesel pipeline. GHG emissions and the resulting impacts to climate change under Alternative 3B would be similar to those discussed under Alternative 2 for construction and closure of all project components, as well as for pipeline operations. There would be slightly less climate effects on project use of water resources along the transportation corridor due to fewer barge trips, but slightly more effects along the pipeline (more stream crossings subject to climate-change impacts). Overall impacts from GHGs and for biological resources and subsistence would remain minor, and impacts for water and permafrost would remain minor to moderate.

- Alternative 4 (Birch Tree Crossing Port) would have slightly higher GHG emissions during the construction of the longer access road under Alternative 4. During operations,
project-related activities for the transportation facilities would have reduced GHG emissions due to less barging, but increased GHG emissions from the increased travel distance for trucks. There would be less potential for climate-caused low water barge effects, but slightly more climate-caused effects along Crooked Creek ice road. Overall impacts from GHGs and for biological resources and subsistence would remain minor, and overall impacts for water and permafrost would remain minor to moderate.

- Alternative 5A (Dry Stack Tailings) would include variations in tailings methods within the mine site that would not cause a substantial change in GHG emissions or impacts to climate change from those identified under Alternative 2. Flexible mine water management and design of operating pond would be able to accommodate climate-caused precipitation effects. Overall impacts from GHGs and for biological resources and subsistence would remain minor, and overall impacts for water and permafrost would remain minor to moderate.

- Alternative 6A (Modified Natural Gas Pipeline Alignment: Dalzell Gorge Route) would include an alternative route for part of the natural gas pipeline that would not cause a substantial change in GHG emissions or impacts to climate change from those identified under Alternative 2. With 21 more stream crossings and 10.5 more miles co-located with INHT than Alternative 2, the potential exists for slightly higher climate-caused precipitation and aufeis effects. Overall impacts from GHGs and for biological resources and subsistence would remain minor, and overall impacts for water and permafrost would remain minor to moderate.

3.26.1 DEFINITION

Climate change, for the purposes of this EIS, is defined as “any systematic change in the long-term statistics of climate elements (such as temperature, pressure, or winds) sustained over several decades or longer,” occurring due to human causes as well as natural external forces, such as changes in solar emission, slow changes in the Earth’s orbit, or natural internal processes of the climate system (AMS 2013).

Many lines of evidence suggest that recent global warming of the past half-century is due primarily to human activities (USGCRP 2014). The likelihood that observed warming since the middle of the twentieth century is a result of human influence has increased from very likely to extremely likely, with the level of confidence having increased from very low to very high (IPCC 2013).

Climate change can therefore also be defined as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods” (UNFCCC 1992).

Anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are likely the dominant cause of observed climate warming since the mid-twentieth century (IPCC 2013). Continued emissions of GHGs are predicted to cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate
system (IPCC 2013). The GHG most often emitted through anthropogenic activities is carbon dioxide. In 2012, carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) accounted for about 82 percent of all U.S. anthropogenic GHG emissions (EPA 2014d).

Naturally occurring GHGs (including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, ozone, and water vapor) are produced by volcanoes, forest fires, and biological processes. Anthropogenic GHGs include these gases as well as sulfur hexafluoride, perfluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and chlorofluorocarbons produced by burning fossil fuels, industrial and agricultural processes, waste management, and land use changes. Concentrations in the atmosphere of GHGs from both natural and anthropogenic sources have increased as a result of the industrial revolution (NOAA 2013a). EPA found that these GHG emissions – specifically six key well-mixed GHGs (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride) may reasonably be anticipated to adversely affect public health and welfare (EPA 2009a).

3.26.2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

EPA has taken several actions to track and develop standards for GHG emissions from mobile and stationary sources under the Clean Air Act. Listed below are promulgated federal regulations on GHGs relevant to the proposed project, and U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) guidance on special permits that is pertinent to climate change predictions of permafrost thaw.

3.26.2.1 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA)

Increasingly, the consideration of GHG emission and the potential effects of climate change have been incorporated into NEPA reviews of proposed federal actions. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has issued a draft guidance memorandum on when and how to address GHG emissions and climate change in the NEPA process (2014). The guidance indicates that 25,000 metrics tons (MT) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO$_2$-e) per year is the reference point above which a quantitative analysis is warranted. All federal agency actions are covered by this guidance (CEQ 2014). As noted in this guidance, the nature of the proposed action and its relationship to climate change must be considered to determine if a detailed analysis is warranted in the EIS. As the proposed Donlin Gold Project would cause an increase of GHG emissions greater than 25,000 MT per year, an analysis in this EIS is warranted.

CEQ also issued guidance on addressing climate change in NEPA analyses.¹

3.26.2.2 MOBILE SOURCE REGULATIONS

The EPA has implemented regulations for GHG emission standards for light- and heavy-duty vehicles, for heavy-duty engines, and for renewable fuel standards for the purpose of reducing GHG emissions. These regulations and their applicability to the proposed project are discussed in more detail in Section 3.8, Air Quality.

3.26.2.3 GHG REPORTING

The EPA requires large emitters of GHGs to report GHG emissions annually in order to inform policy makers. Calculations of the six greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride) identified in the Kyoto protocol are needed to determine total project GHG emissions. Because CO$_2$ is the reference gas for climate change, measures of non-CO$_2$ GHGs are converted into CO$_2$ equivalent (CO$_2$-e) based on their global warming potential (GWP) (potential to absorb heat in the atmosphere). GWP’s for these covered gases are shown in Section 3.8, Air Quality, Table 3.8-4. These mandatory reporting requirements and their applicability to the proposed project are described in more detail in Section 3.8, Air Quality.

3.26.2.4 GHG PERMITTING

The EPA has incorporated GHG permitting requirements into its New Source Review (NSR) and Title V permitting programs. The ADEC has adopted EPA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration NSR, Nonattainment NSR, and Title V GHG permitting provisions into 18 AAC 50. The ADEC has not incorporated GHG permitting into its minor NSR permit program. Permitting requirements for GHG emissions, and their applicability to the proposed project, are discussed in more detail in Section 3.8, Air Quality.

3.26.2.5 PHMSA SPECIAL PERMITS

PHMSA issues special permits, an order that waives or modifies compliance with a regulatory requirement if the pipeline operator requesting it demonstrates the need and PHMSA determines that granting a special permit would be consistent with pipeline safety. Special permits are authorized by statute in 49 USC § 60118(c), and the application process is set forth in 49 CFR 190.341. PHMSA performs extensive technical analysis on special permit applications and typically conditions a grant of a special permit on the performance of alternative measures that will provide an equal or greater level of safety. Climate change may cause thaw of permafrost in sections of the proposed natural gas pipeline, presenting a challenge for all proposed project phases (construction, operations and maintenance, and closure, reclamation, and monitoring). Alternative pipeline designs to accommodate permafrost thaw effects would be evaluated by PHMSA prior to issuance of a special permit.

3.26.3 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

Examples of climate change directly affecting Alaska include increases in temperature and precipitation, extreme weather events, increased permafrost thawing, shrinking glaciers, and coastal erosion from sea level rise (USGCRP 2014; Chapin III et al. 2014). Complex interactions in natural systems presents challenges to quantified analysis of climate change; the following sections discuss interpretation of the best available data, models, and information regarding atmosphere, water resources, permafrost, biological resources, and subsistence to evaluate climate change effects per resource. Models contain inherent uncertainty and limitation, which are discussed in the applicable sections.
3.26.3.1 ATMOSPHERE

Baseline climate conditions (e.g., temperature, rainfall, etc.) are described in Section 3.4, Climate and Meteorology. According to EPA, there is strong evidence (such as warmer air and ocean temperatures, more high-intensity rainfall events, and more frequent heat waves) that climate change is linked to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere (EPA 2012).

Alaska accounts for less than one percent of the total GHG (CO$_2$-e) emissions in the U.S. annually (Table 3.26-1). GHG emissions from the U.S. represent approximately 18 percent of the worldwide GHG emissions (Environment Canada 2011). Therefore, Alaska’s contribution to global GHGs is minimal.

### Table 3.26-1: Estimated Annual GHG Emissions (CO$_2$-e)$^1$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary Year</th>
<th>GHG Emissions - ALASKA (MMT)$^1$</th>
<th>GHG Emissions - U.S. (MMT)</th>
<th>Alaska vs U.S. GHG Emissions (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>6,233</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>7,107</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>7,254</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>55.2$^2$</td>
<td>6,875</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. MMT = Million Metric Tons
2. Projected emissions.
Source: ADEC 2008b; EPA 2014d.

On a per capita basis, Alaska activities emit about 77 MT of CO$_2$-e annually, significantly higher than the national average of 25 MT per year CO$_2$-e (ADEC 2008b). Alaska’s high per capita rate, compared to the rest of the country, is influenced by its low population, cold climate, long winters with low light, and greater distances for transport of goods and people. In addition, Alaska is a major producer of oil and gas for export; activities related to oil and gas exploration and production generate GHG emissions (MAG 2009).

Actual GHG emissions are reported to EPA in Alaska under the greenhouse gas reporting program by sector (Table 3.26-2). For calendar year 2013, approximately 64 percent of reported GHG emissions came from the petroleum and natural gas industry, and approximately 1 percent from the mining industry. In the mining category, Red Dog Operations Mine, Coeur Alaska, Kensington Gold Mine, and Hedla Greens Creek Mine emit 152,985 MT per year, 32,469 MT per year, and 24,846 MT per year, respectively.
Table 3.26-2: Annual Reported GHG Emissions by Sector in Alaska

| Sector                          | Metric Tons CO$_2$-e | Percent of Alaska GHG Emissions |
|                                |                     |                                  |
| Power Plants                   | 3,451,787           | 18.8                             |
| Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems | 11,791,276         | 64.4                             |
| Refineries                     | 1,285,775           | 7.0                              |
| Other                          | 878,119             | 4.8                              |
| Waste                          | 599,667             | 3.3                              |
| Chemicals                      | 103,874             | 0.6                              |
| Mining                         | 24,846              | 0.6                              |
| **Total**                      | **18,320,798**      | **100.0**                        |

Notes:
1. Calendar year 2013 emissions reported to EPA under the GHG reporting program reflect actual (rather than potential) emissions from large facilities (over 25,000 MT per year) only. Mobile sources of emissions are not required to be reported, thus are not included in the estimates shown in this table.
2. Calculated using actual Alaska GHG emissions reported for calendar year 2013.
Source: EPA 2014h.

3.26.3.2 WATER RESOURCES

The effect of climate change on surface water characteristics, such as stream flow, within the affected environment of the proposed project is complex and difficult to quantify. BGC Engineering Inc. (BGC) (2011a) reviewed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (2007) to develop an understanding of climate change predictions for the project. In terms of water resources, precipitation changes may impact stream flow most directly.

The IPCC provides regional climate change predictions of temperature and precipitation for multiple regions in the world, including Alaska. Based on 21 Global Climate Models (GCMs), IPCC (2007) projected that the average precipitation in Alaska could increase by 21 percent by the end of the 21st century. Additionally, the report suggested that significant warming would likely occur, especially during winter months, in the northern portions of Alaska and Canada primarily due to shorter periods of snow cover (Christensen et al. 2007). Average warming by the end of the 21st century in southwest Alaska in the region of the proposed project is projected to range from an increase of 5 to 8 degrees Fahrenheit ($^\circ$F) depending on the GCMs used (Figure 3.26-1) (Chapin III et al. 2014; Markon 2012).

While the Scenarios Network for Alaska + Arctic Planning (SNAP) predictions for precipitation provide an indication of future changes due to climate change that can be compared among different parts of Alaska, potential inconsistencies in historical precipitation records used to make these predictions should be noted. The SNAP (2012) datasets partially narrow the uncertainties of applying a wide range of GCMs to Alaska by using only those GCMs selected based on historical trends (Walsh et al. 2008). Numerous studies evaluation precipitation trends in Alaska differ in analysis period and methodology, and have come to different conclusions, while not addressing the issue of temporal inconsistencies in their datasets (McAfee et al. 2013).
Multi-model mean annual differences in temperature (°F) between the three future periods and 1971–2000, from 15 CMIP3 model simulations. Areas with hatching indicate that more than 50 percent of the models show a statistically significant change in temperature. CMIP3: Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 3; A2: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change emissions scenario that assumes a continuation of recent trends in fossil fuel use; B1: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change emissions scenario that assumes a vigorous global effort to reduce fossil fuel use.
The IPCC predictions for temperature and precipitation are based on relatively large-scale grid cells, as smaller scale grids for climate change predictions are not currently available from the IPCC. In Alaska, however, a collaborative group at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) known as Scenarios Network for Alaska + Arctic Planning (SNAP) has created down-scaled climate change predictions for the state using five GCMs for Alaska. The five GCMs were selected from a performance evaluation conducted on 15 GCMs by Walsh et al. (2008). This study utilized outputs for an intermediate climate change scenario, where carbon dioxide increases from present day concentrations to 720 parts per million by the year 2100 (known as scenario A1B). The study then determined how each of the 15 GCMs outputs concurred with actual climate data for years 1958-2000 for three climate variables: surface air temperature, air pressure at sea level, and precipitation.

SNAP used the five GCMs for Alaska selected from the Walsh et al. (2008) study to narrow potential uncertainty by generating independent, as well as combined, climate change predictions. SNAP then linked outputs from the five GCMs with historical climate data for Alaska at a 2-kilometer (km) resolution from Parameter Elevation Regressions on Independent Slope Models (PRISM). The predicted results from the GCMs linked with the average monthly PRISM data were used by SNAP to generate pixelated 2-km grids throughout Alaska for average monthly temperature and precipitation for every year out to 2099. From these datasets, SNAP created statewide maps of average monthly temperature and precipitation as well as climate change predictions for 353 communities, including Crooked Creek, located 10 miles south of the proposed mine site, and several additional communities up and down the Kuskokwim River (SNAP 2012) (Figure 3.26-2), as described in the following subsections.

3.26.3.2.1 MINE SITE

BGC (2011a, b) compiled SNAP climate change data for the proposed mine site using Crooked Creek community data as an analog, with the goal of identifying ranges in precipitation that could have an effect on the adequacy of mine infrastructure design. Using a similar approach, Table 3.26-3 presents updated SNAP data from 2012, showing predicted changes in average monthly precipitation at Crooked Creek based on the intermediate climate change scenario A1B for four periods: 2010-2019, 2040-2049, 2060-2069, and 2090-2099. Average monthly precipitation at the mine site is provided alongside Crooked Creek historical data and modeled Crooked Creek SNAP data for the current decade to show the differences in datasets that represent current conditions in the mine area.

Based on the SNAP (2012) modeled data for Crooked Creek, precipitation during winter months (October to March) is projected to increase from current conditions over these decades. Summer months show an increase in precipitation through 2069, then a slight decline in mid-summer through 2099, but a net overall increase for summer months combined. The SNAP data predict a minor increase in precipitation at Crooked Creek (about 2 percent) for the 2040-2049 period, which is less than local historical differences between the mine site and Crooked Creek. More significantly, a 17- to 25-percent increase in precipitation is predicted for the 2060-2099 decades, which represent the post-closure period at the mine.
PROJECT LOCATION

DONLIN GOLD PROJECT EIS

COMMUNITIES WITH SNAP CLIMATE CHANGE DATA

NOVEMBER 2015  FIGURE 3.26-2

UAF SNAP = University of Alaska Fairbanks, Scenarios Network for Alaska and Arctic Planning

Data Sources: USGS 2012, UAF 2013

UAF SNAP Community Data

Proposed Port Road

Proposed Donlin Gold Site Layout

Proposed Natural Gas Pipeline

Kuskokwim River Watershed Above and Below Crooked Creek

Glaciers
## Table 3.26-3: Predicted Precipitation Changes in Mine Area from Climate Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Crooked Creek Historical Avg. Monthly Precipitation</th>
<th>Avg. Monthly Precipitation for Mine Site</th>
<th>Predicted Average Monthly Precipitation(^1) (inches)</th>
<th>2010-2019 (Construction)(^4)</th>
<th>2040-2049 (Operations)(^4)</th>
<th>2060-2069</th>
<th>2090-2099 (Closure/ Post-Closure)(^4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010-2019</td>
<td>2040-2049</td>
<td>2060-2069</td>
<td>2090-2099</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>19.63</td>
<td>16.25</td>
<td>16.64</td>
<td>18.94</td>
<td>20.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Increase</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
2. Synthetic dataset for total precipitation (snowfall plus rainfall) based on data from Crooked Creek, scaled to the proposed Project Area (BGC 2011f) (Also shown in Table 3.4-1, Section 3.4, Climate Change and Meteorology).
3. SNAP (2012) data for the community of Crooked Creek.
4. Approximate phase of the proposed project.
Source: BGC 2011a; SNAP 2012.

An increase in precipitation does not necessarily correlate with an equivalent increase in runoff and stream flow.

### 3.26.3.2 TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

Water levels on the Kuskokwim River during the construction and operations of the proposed project are of particular interest as the use of the river for barging materials and fuel to the mine is part of the proposed action. Precipitation in the Kuskokwim River watershed represents a significant input for stream flow in the river; therefore, precipitation predictions at several locations along the river were compared. Table 3.26-4 presents the predicted change in average monthly precipitation at five river communities (Bethel, Aniak, Crooked Creek, Sleetmute and McGrath) for two decadal periods (2010-2019 and 2040-2049) based on SNAP (2012) data. These two periods represent construction and later operations of the proposed project, requiring transportation of material and fuel on the Kuskokwim River. Based on the SNAP modeled data,
each location is projected to experience an average increase in annual precipitation by approximately 2 to 3 percent from current levels through 2049. On a month-to-month basis, precipitation during winter months (October to March) would generally increase from current conditions, and it appears that most summer months would have a decrease in precipitation at each location.

Aniak and McGrath are projected to have the greatest increase in precipitation during winter months, with changes of 24.1 and 24.6 percent, respectively, which may also indicate an increase in spring breakup flow (Table 3.26-4). The greatest decrease in precipitation during the open water season is predicted to occur in July at Aniak, Crooked Creek, and Sleetmute, with changes of -11.9, -12.1, and -13.1 percent, respectively. Although the predicted change in precipitation during summer months appears to be more negative than positive, the changes are relatively small (all less than -13.1 percent) compared to the winter month increases. Summer low flows are affected by both monthly and seasonal changes in precipitation; therefore, the impacts to stream flow due to decreased precipitation during summer months are likely to be balanced to some degree by possible increases in subsurface flow from increased precipitation during fall and winter. Additionally, a -13 percent change in precipitation does not necessarily suggest that there will be a -13 percent change in stream flow or water depth in the Kuskokwim River.

Local observations of Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK), including precipitation-related phenomena, are catalogued by the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium (ANTHC 2015) in a statewide Local Environmental Observer (LEO) Network database. For the Kuskokwim River area, these include anecdotal observations of recent low snow years, early breakup, thin river ice, and open water in winter, which may be related to climate warming. For example, observations in Bethel in 2014 document a mild winter, very low snow conditions, and thin river ice in the months of January through April. The LEO Network, which is just getting underway, is intended to become a long-term database that will be used to help track or model climate change effects.
### Table 3.26-4: Predicted Precipitation Changes along Kuskokwim River from Climate Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Precip. Average Monthly Precipitation (inches)</th>
<th>Bethel</th>
<th>Aniak</th>
<th>Crooked Creek</th>
<th>Sleetmute</th>
<th>McGrath</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td><strong>19.0</strong></td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td><strong>24.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td><strong>10.3</strong></td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td><strong>-11.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td><strong>20.1</strong></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td><strong>20.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td><strong>18.9</strong></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td><strong>18.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td><strong>10.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. 2010-2019 represents construction of proposed project, and 2040-2049 late operations.
2. **Bold** data represent changes > 10%.
Source: SNAP 2012.
3.26.3.2.3  NATURAL GAS PIPELINE

Monthly SNAP precipitation data are available for several communities near the pipeline in the Cook Inlet basin, and as mapped decadal averages at a 2-km resolution throughout the less populated parts of the route in the Alaska Range and Kuskokwim Basin (SNAP 2012).

Average annual precipitation in the Cook Inlet basin communities is anticipated to increase about 3 to 4 percent over the life of the project as a result of climate change (Table 3.26-4). In the Alaska Range, Kuskokwim basin drainages, and Kuskokwim Hills, average annual precipitation is predicted to increase on the order of 2 to 15 percent, with the higher increases mapped in the Alaska Range and lower increases in the Kuskokwim Hills and villages along the Kuskokwim River (Table 3.26-4). Most of the increased precipitation at the Cook Inlet locations is predicted to occur as snowfall in winter months (November and January) and during breakup in May. These increases would be balanced in part by drier weather in early summer (e.g., June precipitation decreases). The combined greater winter snowfall and precipitation increases in May suggest that greater discharge could occur during breakup than would be anticipated in the absence of climate change.

Other studies in the Cook Inlet basin that focus on climate modeling later in the century (e.g., Prucha et al. 2011) suggest that much of the expected increased precipitation in winter could occur as rain, and that a reduced snowpack could occur with smaller intermittent melting episodes throughout the winter, rather than a large breakup. As shown in Table 3.26-3 and Table 3.26-4, precipitation changes are expected to be unevenly distributed across different seasons.

Thus, while climate change predictions suggest that an overall increase in precipitation may occur in the vicinity of the mine and along the Kuskokwim River, it is difficult to quantify changes to stream flow given the uncertainties inherent in the predicted precipitation trends and the complex watershed mechanisms influencing runoff. Given the uncertainties and watershed complexities described above, predicted changes in the SNAP data of less than 20 percent, such as summer decreases in precipitation in Kuskokwim River communities, may not be statistically significant or reliable enough to use for stream flow predictions; and further modeling of the data in an attempt to glean implications for water levels would compound these uncertainties.
### Table 3.26-5: Predicted Precipitation Changes near Pipeline in Cook Inlet Basin from Climate Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Tyonek (Alternative 6A)</th>
<th>Beluga (Alt. 2, near MP 0)</th>
<th>Susitna (Alt. 2, near MP 20)</th>
<th>Skwentna (Alt. 2, near MP 50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>+14.0</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>+2.7</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>+3.3</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>+3.1</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>+16.4</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>+4.4</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
<td>4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>+7.5</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>+9.1</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>+3.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. 2010-2019 represents construction of proposed project, and 2040-2049 late operations.
2. **Bold** data represent changes > 10%.
3.26.3.3 PERMAFROST

The presence of permafrost is associated with many components of the proposed project. Permafrost stability or anticipated changes to existing permafrost conditions can significantly influence design and construction considerations associated with settlement and ground stability issues. For these reasons, climatic changes affecting permafrost conditions over the lifespan of a project can affect engineering and construction design.

Permafrost susceptibility to thaw can vary considerably within a narrow range of temperatures referred to as “warm” and “cold” permafrost conditions. Permafrost conditions that are considered “warm” remain just below freezing (32 °F), and cold permafrost conditions remain below 30°F (-1 degree Celsius [°C]) (Markon et al. 2012). Warm permafrost often exists in a fragile thermal equilibrium, and is more susceptible to potential thaw. Permafrost conditions associated with the Project Area are considered warm. This includes the proposed mine site, select segments of transportation facility components (i.e., roads), and localized segments of the proposed pipeline alignment (BGC 2006; CH2M Hill 2011b). Sporadic, discontinuous permafrost in the proposed mine site area is typically less than 31.6°F (BGC 2006). Similarly, discontinuous segments of warm permafrost along the proposed pipeline alignment are typically between 31°F and 32°F (CH2M Hill 2011b).

Mean annual air temperature (MAAT) generally coincides with permafrost distribution, but does not necessarily correspond with linear warming (temperature) of permafrost (Smith et al. 2010; Markon et al. 2012). Topography, surface water, groundwater movement, soil properties, vegetation, and snow can also affect permafrost in addition to anthropogenic disturbances. Snow depth insulative properties can be as influential as warming temperatures (Jorgenson 2011). Zones of permafrost distribution in the northern hemisphere generally correlate with mean annual air temperatures (Jorgenson 2011) as shown in Table 3.26-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permafrost Zone</th>
<th>% Area</th>
<th>MAAT Range</th>
<th>% Land Surface by Region of Alaska</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>&gt;90%</td>
<td>21.2°F</td>
<td>32% of northern reaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinuous</td>
<td>50-90%</td>
<td>21.2 to 28.4°F</td>
<td>31% of south-central and interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sporadic</td>
<td>10-50%</td>
<td>28.4 to 32°F</td>
<td>8% of southern portions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolated</td>
<td>0-10%</td>
<td>32 to 35.6°F</td>
<td>10% of southern portions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
°F - degrees Fahrenheit
MAAT - Mean Annual Air Temperature
Source: Jorgenson 2011; Markon et al. 2012.

Review of Alaska's climate records indicates a seasonally inconsistent 4°F average-annual extended (air) temperature increase from 1949 to 2005. However, southwestern Alaska has seen smallest average-annual temperature increase of 1.8° to 2.5°F (Markon et al. 2012). Regional climate forecasts and projected mean annual temperature range estimates have been modeled for future time periods using two emission-based scenarios (Figure 3.26-1). The A2 scenario assumes a continuation in the recent trend of fossil fuel use, and B1 assumes a vigorous global
effort to reduce fossil fuel use (Markon et al. 2012). The projected time period temperature increases for each of the scenarios are listed in Table 3.26-7.

### Table 3.26-7: Projected Air Temperature Increases in Alaska for Two Climate Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Scenario B1 MAAT Range</th>
<th>Scenario A2 MAAT Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021 to 2050</td>
<td>0 to 4°F</td>
<td>0 to 6°F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2041 to 2070</td>
<td>2 to 6°F</td>
<td>2 to 8°F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2070 to 2099</td>
<td>2 to 8°F</td>
<td>4 to 9.5°F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- °F - degrees Fahrenheit
- MAAT - Mean Annual Air Temperature

Permafrost temperature increases of 2 to 5°F have been documented in northern Alaska since the 1980s (Markon et al. 2012). Local observations of permafrost conditions in the Kuskokwim River area note increased permafrost degradation and settlement along traditional use trails associated with the mild winter of early 2014 (ANThC 2015).

A permafrost degradation model developed by the Geophysical Institute Permafrost Laboratory at UAF, which is driven by climate model outputs (emission scenario projections), predicts a northward expansion of permafrost thaw (Figure 3.26-3). The results from two simulation outputs (temperature and snowfall, based on emission scenarios) and five coupled model intercomparisons (downscaling) (Walsh et al. 2005) project an increase in mean annual ground temperatures at a 3-foot depth in permafrost. Since the proposed project has an estimated lifespan of approximately 37.5 years from construction to reclamation, the projected permafrost model simulations for the 2040–2049 period are temporally applicable to operations, and the 2090-2099 period applicable to about 40 years post-closure. Ground temperature increases projected by the models are on the order of 2°F for the mine area, roughly 2-4°F for the Bethel area, and range from about 0 to 4°F over the length of the pipeline corridor. Increases projected for the 2090-2099 period are in the range of 2-7°F for the mine site and Bethel area, and 0-7°F for the pipeline corridor depending on location and model. Although predictions beyond 2099 are speculative, if warming trends continue, permafrost would continue to degrade beyond the twenty-first century.

Near-future (decadal scale) permafrost considered most vulnerable to surface thaw in a warming environment include warm permafrost (sub-arctic and boreal) and permafrost with high ground ice content in the near-surface (>20 percent excess ice by volume). Thaw effects are generally most pronounced in the upper 33 feet of high-ice-content permafrost, resulting in settlement and thermokarst terrain. Accelerated thawing from future warming could include as much as the top 10 to 30 feet of discontinuous permafrost by 2100 (Markon 2012).
Mean annual ground temperatures at 3-ft depth in permafrost model simulations driven by output from climate models run under B1 (upper panels) and A2 (lower panels) emissions scenarios. As indicated by color bars, blue shades represent temperatures below 32ºF; red shades represent temperatures above 32ºF.
Melting permafrost can also introduce carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere. Currently, the earth’s atmosphere contains about 850 gigatons of carbon. Almost twice that amount (about 1,400 gigatons) is estimated to be frozen in the earth’s permafrost. As permafrost soils warm, organic carbon reservoirs trapped in the ice are mobilized, causing carbon dioxide and methane to be released. Methane is predominantly released from melting permafrost in wetland habitats such as ponds, lakes, and swamps. Thus, models predict that if climate change results in the region becoming warmer and drier, more carbon dioxide will be released. If the region gets warmer and wetter, more methane will be released. Methane is 25 times more potent at trapping energy as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, resulting in a much larger impact on climate change. The rate, location, and method of how the carbon in the permafrost decays will impact how much carbon is released into the atmosphere.

3.26.3.4 BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES

Expected climate change impacts affecting biological resources within the Project Area include altered hydrology, new fire regimes, ocean acidification, and changing species distributions, abundances, and phenologies. Improved local (downscaled) climate models are increasingly available (SNAP 2015) to assist in planning for change in biological resources with inclusion of more specific variables.

Interpretation of studies on biological responses to climate change should be considered carefully, as many climate change impacts may be masked by species interactions, meaning that responses could be overlooked or misinterpreted as evidence that climate change has no effect on a particular species (Post et al. 2009). Long-term trends post-closure may change as new information, better models, and greater understanding of climate trends is investigated.

3.26.3.4.1 VEGETATION AND WETLANDS

Studies have shown that warming temperatures affect the distributions and growth rates of vegetation, resulting in changes in vegetation community composition, structure, and function. Changes may include a northward expansion of the range of shrubs; increased growth rates of shrubs and graminoids; and decreased cover of mosses and lichens (McGuire 2015; BLM 2012a; Chapin III et al. 2003, 2006, 2008, 2014).

Predictive models, such as SNAP’s Integrated Ecosystem Model, forecast large scale biome shifts in Alaska and Northwest Canada in the next 100 years due to warming temperatures, less available water (precipitation and evapotranspiration changes), and changing fire regime. The predicted warmer temperatures in Alaska would likely decrease the duration of snow cover, causing earlier snowmelt and a longer growing season (Euskirchen et al. 2009). The shorter period of snow cover and longer duration of warmer summer months could serve to change the seasonal distribution of river flow and to decrease the size of ponds and wetlands (Jones and Rinehart 2010).

Climate change may not have profound effects on vegetation community type composition during the project life (30 years) or during closure, but changes such as shrub encroachment or wetland shifts may be evident. The time frame of large-scale shifts is expected to be beyond the analysis time of the project life, as most scenarios give a range of outcomes per emissions scenario in decadal increments for vegetation (McGuire 2015; SNAP 2012).
Phenological shifts have been noted in studies and in observations in the LEO Network (ANTHC 2015), such as earlier timing of bud burst in the spring and altered berry production. Warming trends may also increase potential suitable habitat for invasive species (FWS 2009b). Donlin Gold’s Invasive Species Management Plan will include adaptive strategies to plan for change.

Vegetation communities with a higher proportion of shrubs and trees will have higher biomass and a greater capacity for transpiration compared to tundra vegetation types. Southcentral Alaska vegetation communities have experienced drying trends in recent decades, resulting in fewer wetlands and a corresponding increase in upland species (Berg et al. 2009; Klein et al. 2005). Higher transpiration, less available water, and a lower albedo caused by woody vegetation increase contributes to a drier landscape with fewer or smaller waterbodies compared to current conditions. Large scale hydrological changes may occur throughout the landscape.

Fire regime changes may be more immediate than vegetation changes during the project life; increased fire frequency and intensity is already evident throughout much of Alaska (Schuur et al. 2014). The Alaska Frame-based Ecosystem Code (ALFRESCO) model focuses on system interaction and feedbacks to predict landscape level change by varying fire intensity and frequency. Results from interior Alaska models indicate that fire frequency changes strongly influence landscape-level vegetation patterns through feedbacks that increase future fire frequency and intensity (SNAP 2012). Landscape models indicate that the mine site area may be subject to more extreme changes than either the pipeline corridor or the transportation corridor because of geography in relation to the area’s weather patterns (Rupp and Springsteen 2009).

Permafrost loss is expected due to thawing from positive feedbacks between warming temperatures, increased woody vegetation, and lower-snow winters. Permafrost thaw may cause ground subsidence leading to water-filled depressions. Adjacent areas may then drain, causing a shift from a wetland type or mosaic to an upland type. Most of the Project Area has discontinuous permafrost (with some sporadic or isolated zones), so vegetation community type changes would be variable and difficult to predict.

Permafrost loss, overall drying trends, and vegetation community type shifts may require adapting the project’s reclamation and revegetation strategies. Donlin Gold’s Stabilization, Rehabilitation and Reclamation Plan would include regular inspection and monitoring of reclaimed or restored sites through the life of the project and after closure to ensure adequate success levels. The Plan will build in adaptive management capacity for alternate approaches due to climate change effects.

Carbon sequestration and loss is another complex aspect of potential vegetation community type changes within the Project Area. Expected effects are low during project life and after closure. Increases in above-ground plant biomass may increase carbon and nitrogen storage, especially with shifts to higher proportions of woody vegetation; however, the subsequent loss of both elements from deep soil layers may offset the gains (Genet et al. 2013). Overall, most tundra carbon storage experiments indicate a small net loss of carbon and nitrogen from vegetation changes, resulting in a net carbon loss within non-forested ecosystems in Alaska (Mack et al. 2004). Reclamation and restoration activities may offset loss by adding fertilizer or other strategies discussed in detail in the Stabilization, Rehabilitation and Reclamation Plan.
3.26.3.4.2 WILDLIFE AND THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES

Studies in Alaska and the region have begun examining the complex factors in potential climate change impacts to wildlife and birds, but results are limited. Changes to fish and wildlife resources are anticipated by the State of Alaska, and addressed in a climate change strategy to assess likely effects and develop adaptation strategies (ADF&G 2010b). A revised Alaska Wildlife Action Plan contains details of threats and impacts to wildlife populations in Alaska, with provisions for the potential of policy and regulation changes, and adaptive strategies to meet climate change impacts to wildlife and birds (ADF&G 2015m).

Species distributions and abundances are likely to change, resulting in changes to ecosystem functions, habitat range, and interconnected food webs (Liebezeit et al. 2012; Ims and Fuglei 2005). Impacts may be positive or negative. Interior river basins may experience increases in woody vegetation cover and reduction in wetlands, negatively affecting moose and waterfowl habitat. Changing fire regimes may affect wildlife differently; moose may benefit from earlier successional stages, but woodpeckers dependent on old growth forest may be negatively impacted (ADF&G 2010b). Wildfire may also create more potential habitat for invasive species, some of which are toxic or unpalatable to moose or other wildlife species (Chapin III et al. 2014).

Warming conditions may lead to increases in infectious disease in wildlife, or conditions that favor the release of persistent environmental pollutants that can affect the immune system and favor an increased disease rate (Bradley et al. 2005). Increased disease may negatively affect wildlife populations and conditions.

Specific to birds, altered hydrological conditions may affect wetland productivity for migratory birds seasonally dependent on them (ADF&G 2010b). Asynchrony between breeding phenology of migratory bird species and their invertebrate food sources is possible (ADF&G 2010b). Drying of wetlands would result in negative impacts to species that rely on shallow water and wet meadows, and shrub expansion may reduce the quality and availability of some types of habitats. A positive impact is that productivity of some species may increase due to a longer open water season, which may also increase food productivity in aquatic systems.

Coastal dependent bird species such as spectacled eider, identified as a threatened species, may lose habitat if sea levels change (ADF&G 2010b). Changes in marine productivity could negatively affect food webs important to bird species, such as reduction in clam beds used in winter by spectacled eiders. Impacts of climate change to other threatened and endangered species (TES) species (marine mammals) are extremely complex and poorly understood at this time.

3.26.3.4.3 FISH AND AQUATIC RESOURCES

The complex factors contributing to fisheries trends due to climate change are currently being studied in Alaska. Expected changes include species range shifts to fish tolerant of warmer waters; temporal shifts in prey and predators; food web alterations due to temperature and acidification changes; habitat changes such as turbidity increase; or shifts in run timing (ADF&G 2010b; IUCN 2009). Higher water temperatures increasing metabolic stress for fish species could result in lower tolerance thresholds to land-use impacts. A positive effect may be that a moderate increase in water temperature could contribute to a more productive feeding season and enable fish to better survive the winter and additional stress.
For Pacific salmon, the overall trend is that conditions in a few cold-water locations may improve for certain life stages, but the overall impacts of a warming climate are negative (Crozier et al. 2014; IUCN 2009; Tolimieri and Levin 2004). Ocean acidification may affect zooplankton production, affecting species such as sockeye salmon that feed on zooplankton (ADF&G 2010b). In the Pacific Northwest, new literature generally supports previous concerns that climate change will cause moderate to severe declines in salmon, especially with interacting factors such as water diversion, accelerated mobilization of contaminants, hypoxia, and invasive species (Crozier et al. 2014). Warmer temperatures will reduce incubation and cause earlier hatching times, leading to phase mismatch between juveniles and food source (AYK SSI 2006).

Changes in lake stratification due to warmed temperatures may affect freshwater fish species reproduction and distribution patterns. Increased or altered precipitation may enhance nutrient loading in lakes and wetlands, increasing connectivity and potential for cross-lake fish colonization and aquatic system food web changes (Post et al. 2009).

Marine assemblages may also shift northward, or may include increases in predatory fish presence or invasive species habitat more favorable to species such as green crab (ADF&G 2010b).

3.26.3.5 SUBSISTENCE

Limited studies examine the combination of indigenous observations and understanding of climate in the context of climate change. Understanding the multi-scaled interaction of climate with subsistence livelihoods will help anticipate vulnerability and adaptive capacity potential in rural Alaskan communities (McNeely 2009). The small number of jobs, high cost of living, and rapid social change make rural communities highly vulnerable to climate change through impacts on traditional hunting and fishing and cultural connection to the land and waters (Chapin III et al. 2006, 2014). The LEO network partnership provides a broad, expanding network of local observations to help synthesize this understanding over time (ANTHC 2015).

Subsistence harvest opportunities may be affected by potential shifts in hunting seasons. In other cases, shifts in distribution or abundance of favored species may affect harvest opportunity (ADF&G 2010b). Economic losses to coastal and riverine communities may occur as traditional harvest species change their relative location and abundance. Climate change is likely a contributing factor to recent declines in moose populations in unit 19A and Kuskokwim River chinook runs. Landscape changes may alter access by subsistence users, including changes to wetlands or winter access conditions. However, with the current state of knowledge, it is not possible to definitively identify the degree to which climate change, among many other factors, is causing the declines.

One of the most important recent and ongoing effects on subsistence uses due to climate change is less predictable ice thickness and more widespread and frequent instance of open water in the winter. For the Kuskokwim River area, the ANTHC Local Observer Network includes observations for the Kuskokwim River of recent low snow years, early breakup, thin river ice, and open water in winter, which may be related to climate warming. For example, observations in Bethel in 2014 document a mild winter, very low snow conditions, and thin river ice in the months of January through April. These changes and uncertainties make for very dangerous winter ice-travel conditions.
3.26.3.6 SPILL RESPONSE

The effects of project-related spills (described in Section 3.24, Spill Risk) on climate change are considered not applicable. The analyses of spill scenarios are provided within each resource area.

3.26.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

This section addresses direct and indirect impacts on climate change during construction, operations and maintenance, and closure, reclamation, and monitoring from the Donlin Gold Project. Climate change may also affect project impacts on many different resources.

The impact criteria table for climate change and GHG emissions is presented in Table 3.26-8. Impact criteria ratings for other resources affected by climate change follow the criteria tables in Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology, and Section 3.2, Soils. Aside from GHG analysis affecting atmosphere, water, and permafrost, this section briefly considers the effects on vegetation and wetlands, which in turn impacts wildlife and TES, and fish and aquatic resources. Subsistence, due to the complex, multi-scaled interaction of climate with subsistence livelihoods, is also briefly considered.

Since an analysis of broad cumulative changes is inherent in the determination of project effects on climate change, discussions of cumulative effects related to climate change are included in this section, summarized for each alternative.

Table 3.26-8: GHG Impact Assessment Criteria for the Donlin Gold Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact Category</th>
<th>Effects Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Magnitude or Intensity</strong></td>
<td>Low: GHG project-related emissions are &lt; 1% of the total annual GHG emissions for the State of Alaska (i.e., &lt; 0.521 MMT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>Temporary: GHG project-related emissions would be intermittent and not longer than span of project construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic Extent</strong></td>
<td>Local: GHG project-related emissions occur in the immediate Project Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context</strong></td>
<td>Common: Affects usual or ordinary resources; not depleted or protected by legislation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

a Total CO₂-e emissions were 52.1 MMT for the State of Alaska in 2005.
Source: ADEC 2008b; EPA 2014d.
3.26.4.1 ALTERNATIVE 1 – NO ACTION

Under the No Action Alternative, the proposed Donlin Gold Project would not be developed, and Donlin Gold would not establish a mine site, develop transportation facilities, or construct a natural gas pipeline in the proposed Project Area. While this alternative would introduce no new GHG emissions, the effects of climate change would still occur based on existing projections. Existing GHG emissions and related climate change effects on various resources would be the same as described in Affected Environment (above Section 3.26.2).

Over the past 60 years, Alaska has warmed more than twice as fast as the rest of the U.S., with state-wide average annual air temperature increasing by 3°F and average winter temperature by 6°F (Chapin III et al. 2014). Recent climate change effects are having major impacts on Alaska including increased temperatures, reduced sea ice, glacier retreat, thawing permafrost, coastal storms, ocean acidification, floods and drought (NOAA 2013a; Chapin III et al. 2014).

Recent climate model simulations for Alaska used both high and low future global GHG emissions scenarios with sources of climate information considered and approved by the National Climate Assessment Development and Advisory Committee (SNAP 2013). Climate change effects predicted from these scenarios that would most likely affect the Project Area include:

- Predicted increases in the frequency and intensity of storm severity, which may increase flooding and erosion in the Project Area;
- Increased winter and springtime temperatures with increased winter precipitation, which may cause flooding due to increased snowpack or rapid springtime temperature increases;
- Thawing permafrost, which may cause infrastructure damage to roads, utility infrastructure, pipelines and buildings;
- Increased chance of drought during predicted warmer, drier summers, which may limit river transportation and increase the chance or intensity of wildfires.

Within the Project Area, climate change could impact existing barging in the Kuskokwim River that would continue under the No Action Alternative. Predicted air temperature increases due to climate change could result in permafrost degradation where present in the Project Area. Thawing permafrost could cause damage to existing infrastructure, introduce increased carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere, and contribute to changes to vegetation and wetlands.

3.26.4.2 ALTERNATIVE 2 – DONLIN GOLD’S PROPOSED ACTION

3.26.4.2.1 ATMOSPHERE

Methodology

As climate change is a global issue, no standard methodology currently exists to assess how a proposed project’s GHG emissions would translate into physical effects on the global environment. However, because GHG emissions contribute to impacts on climate change, it is appropriate to analyze GHG emissions when assessing the impacts of a project on climate change (CEQ 2014). In Section 3.8, Air Quality, Table 3.8-18 (Annual Mine Site Operations Phase
Emissions), the Donlin Gold Project mine site could cause direct emissions of up to 1,760,469 tons per year of CO$_2$-e during operations, which converts to 1,597,070 MT per year. This is above the CEQ guidance threshold of 25,000 MT per year, thus the project warrants a discussion of climate change in the NEPA process (CEQ 2014).

In comparison, the oil and gas industry in Alaska emits a total of about 11,800,000 MT per year; and three large operating mines in Alaska (Greens Creek, Kensington, and Red Dog) each have reported annual GHG emissions in the range of roughly 25,000 to 150,000 MT (Section 3.26.3.1). Direct comparisons between Donlin Gold and other mines is difficult, because existing mines are reporting actual emissions while the Donlin Gold estimates represent worst-case scenario emissions. Regardless, the Donlin Gold mine would emit substantially more GHGs than existing mines, in part because the extraction of gold from the refractory ore at the Donlin deposit is more highly energy intensive than the other mine processes.

There are no precedents or guidelines established for determining the relative magnitude or intensity of GHG emissions; to assess intensity, project GHG emissions are compared to total Alaska GHG emissions (Table 3.26-8). The most recent year of CO$_2$-e emissions data that is available for the State of Alaska is 2005, when CO$_2$-e emissions were 52.1 million MT (MMT) (ADEC 2008b). The high level impact level (10 percent of Alaska GHG emissions) is triggered at about 5.2 MMT per year, which is less than 0.1 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions (6,525.6 MMT in 2012), and even less on a global scale, so the impact level is reasonable. (Note: tabulated emission estimates for GHG emissions from the various project phases and components for the Donlin Gold Project were provided in Section 3.8, Air Quality, as tons per year. These are converted to metric tons (MT) per year in this section.)

There is no legislation for GHG emissions at this time. Therefore, the atmosphere is considered common in context due to its global distribution and the global distribution of GHGs for all project components, phases, and alternatives.

Mine Site

Construction

Direct GHG emissions from the heavy equipment required for construction and permafrost destruction would occur during the entirety of construction (3 to 4 years), thus the duration of impacts would be temporary. The intensity of the impact would be considered low because impacts would be less than 1 percent of annual GHG emissions for the state of Alaska. All direct emissions would occur at the mine site; therefore, the geographic extent would be local.

Indirect GHG emissions associated with construction of the mine site would result from activities associated with transporting supplies and construction materials to the mine site. These impacts are discussed under the transportation facilities section below.

Operations and Maintenance

Operations for the mine site would last approximately 27.5 years. Direct GHG emissions would be generated by a dual-fueled (natural gas and diesel) multi-engine power plant, as well as from mobile machinery and the mining equipment necessary for extraction and processing gold throughout the life of the project. Therefore, impacts would be long-term in duration. All activities and impacts would occur at the mine site; the geographic extent would be local for
direct emissions of GHGs. The intensity of direct GHG emissions would be considered medium because impacts would be greater than 1 percent of annual GHG emissions for the State of Alaska, but less than 10 percent of annual GHG emissions for the State of Alaska (Table 3.26-9).

Table 3.26-9 shows annual GHG emission from selected other mines in Alaska as reported to EPA under the GHG reporting program, which excludes mobile source emissions; however, GHG emissions from other mine sites are not directly comparable to the Donlin Gold Project as other mines are smaller.

Indirect GHG emissions associated with operations of the mine site would result from emissions associated with transporting supplies and construction materials to the mine site. These impacts are discussed under the transportation facilities section below.

Closure, Reclamation, and Monitoring

To minimize the time needed for reclamation, closure activities would take place in areas that are no longer required for active mining whenever possible during operations. GHG emissions would be generated by the equipment necessary to conduct reclamation activities within the mine site including pit backfilling; stabilizing pit highwalls; regrading, slope contouring and restoration; pumping TSF water to the ACMA pit; covering the tailings impoundment; and building removal. Post-reclamation monitoring activities would continue beyond the 5 year closure timeframe. For example, one small generator would remain at the mine site to operate the post-reclamation water treatment plant until such time the discharge meets water quality standards, and the airstrip would remain permanently. Reclamation and post-reclamation impacts would be long-term in duration, and local in extent. The intensity of direct GHG emissions would be considered low because impacts would be less than 1 percent of annual GHG emissions for the state of Alaska (Table 3.26-9).

Indirect GHG emissions from project-related activities during the closure and reclamation of the mine site may occur due to transportation of supplies and employees to and from the site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.26-9: Annual Mine Site GHG Emissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Phase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
<sup>a</sup> The project-related CO₂-e emissions in tons per year are average annual emissions assuming a 3.5 year construction phase.
<sup>b</sup> Total CO₂-e emissions were 52.1 MMT for the State of Alaska in 2005.
Source: EPA 2014d; Air Sciences 2015b; ADEC 2008b, Cardno 2015b.

Summary of Mine Site Impacts

The intensity of direct GHG emissions from project activities at the mine site would be medium (between 1 percent and 10 percent of Alaska annual GHG emissions). The duration of GHG
emissions would range from temporary (construction) to long-term (operations and closure). GHG emissions at the mine site would be local in extent (within immediate Project Area).

Indirect GHG emissions associated with construction and operations of the mine site would result from emissions associated with transporting supplies and construction materials to the mine site. These impacts are discussed under the transportation facilities section below.

Overall, project impacts on climate change would range from minor to moderate for the mine site. The highest GHG emissions represent 0.024 percent of the total U.S. GHG emissions in 2012.

Transportation Facilities

Construction
GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion would occur from construction equipment, and aircraft, land vehicles and vessels associated with transporting supplies and construction materials to the mine site. Direct emissions would occur at the transportation facilities; therefore, the geographic extent would be local. Direct GHG emissions would occur during the entirety of construction, thus the duration of impacts would be temporary. The intensity of direct GHG emissions would be considered low because impacts would be less than 1 percent of annual GHG emissions for the state of Alaska (Table 3.26-10).

Indirect GHG emissions associated with the transportation facilities construction would result from operations of air traffic between Anchorage (or other points of origin) and the mine site airstrip, and ocean traffic.

Operations and Maintenance
GHG emissions associated with operations of the transportation facilities would result from the combustion of fossil fuels in aircraft, ocean barges, tugs associated with river barges, and tanker trucks delivering diesel. Emissions would occur at the transportation facilities themselves; therefore, the geographic extent would be local. Direct GHG emissions would occur throughout the life of the project, thus impacts would be long-term in duration. The intensity of direct GHG emissions would be considered low because impacts would be less than 1 percent of annual GHG emissions for the state of Alaska (Table 3.26-10).

Indirect GHG emissions associated with operations would result from cruise operations of air traffic between Anchorage (or other points of origin) and the mine site airstrip, and ocean traffic.

Closure, Reclamation, and Monitoring
The mine access road would remain for long-term monitoring of the mine site. Reclamation activities for other transportation facilities would occur during the 5 year period following final mine closure. GHG emissions generated by the equipment necessary to conduct closure, reclamation, and post-reclamation activities would last up to 50 years, so impacts would be long-term in duration. Direct emissions would occur at the transportation facilities; therefore, the geographic extent would be local. Direct GHG emissions were not calculated for this phase, but are expected to be less than operations due to minimal activities and fuel combustion during closure. Therefore, intensity of impacts would be considered low with less than 1 percent of annual GHG emissions for the State of Alaska, as displayed in Table 3.26-10.
No indirect GHG emissions from transportation facilities-related activities are anticipated to occur during closure and reclamation.

Summary of Transportation Facilities Impacts
The intensity of direct GHG emissions from project activities for the transportation facilities would be low, with maximum annual GHG emissions being less than 1 percent of Alaska’s GHGs. The duration of GHG emissions would range from temporary (construction) to long-term (operations and closure). Direct GHG emissions at the transportation facilities would be local in extent (within immediate Project Area) (Table 3.26-10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Phase</th>
<th>Project-related CO₂-e Emissions (tpy)</th>
<th>Project-related CO₂-e Emissions (MMT/yr)</th>
<th>Percentage of CO₂-e Emissions for the State of Alaska in 2005 (%)</th>
<th>Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>312,056</td>
<td>0.2831</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>72,982</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure</td>
<td>nc</td>
<td>nc</td>
<td>nc</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
a Emissions from third party-operated Dutch Harbor Port site are not included. Emissions from the Bethel Port site are considered direct emissions, but they are not included because information is not available.
b GHG emissions during closure were not calculated but are expected to be less than operations.
c Total CO₂-e emissions were 52.1 MMT for the State of Alaska in 2005.
nc = not calculated
Sources: EPA 2014d; Air Sciences 2015b; ADEC 2008b, Cardno 2015c.

Indirect GHG emissions associated with construction and operations would result from cruise operations of air traffic between Anchorage (or other point of origin) and the mine site airstrip, and ocean traffic.

Overall, project impacts on climate change associated with the transportation facilities under Alternative 2 would be considered minor.

Natural Gas Pipeline

Construction
Direct GHG emissions would occur during the 3- to 4-year construction phase and would be temporary in duration. During the first year, activities include ROW clearing and grading of access roads and shoofly roads, preparation of the compressor station site and campsites, camp construction, pipeline storage yards construction, airstrip construction and upgrades, and development of barge landings and material sites. (The Bethel and Angyaruaq [Jungjuk] ports would be used during pipeline construction as well. Impacts from these activities are included under the transportation facilities component.) During Years 2 through 3 or 4, the primary activity would be pipeline installation. Construction-related GHG emissions would be generated by helicopter traffic, diesel-powered mobile equipment, and pipe installation equipment, equipment operating at material sites. GHG emissions would vary depending on the construction stage, and would be localized and transitory as construction activity proceeds at various locations along the length of the pipeline. The intensity of direct GHG emissions
would be considered low because impacts would be less than 1 percent of annual GHG emissions for the State of Alaska (Table 3.26-11).

Indirect GHG emissions from project-related activities are anticipated to result from vessels associated with transporting construction equipment and material to the pipeline area.

Operations and Maintenance

The compressor station at MP 5 would be powered by electricity; therefore, it would not have combustion causing GHG emissions. The pipeline components (e.g., compressor station, metering stations, mainline block valves, pipeline) would emit fugitive GHG emissions due to leaks from pipeline segments, valves, and fittings; and from permafrost melting. In addition, there would be project-related maintenance activities that would occur along the pipeline ROW, such as vehicle and helicopter traffic (SRK 2013b). These emissions would be considered local in extent. There would be no vented GHG emissions due to pipeline blowdown for planned maintenance (Rieser 2014a).

The intensity of direct GHG emissions would be considered low because impacts would be less than 1 percent of annual GHG emissions for the State of Alaska (Table 3.26-11).

Indirect emissions would occur at the Beluga Power Plant that would be used to supply power for the compressor station at MP 5.

Closure, Reclamation, and Monitoring

Direct GHG emissions during closure and reclamation of the pipeline would result from small hand tools used to cut aboveground sections of the pipeline, would last less than 4 years, and are considered temporary in duration and local in extent. Maximum direct GHG emissions are expected to be much lower than during construction and operations.

No indirect GHG emissions from project-related activities are anticipated to occur along the pipeline during closure.

Summary of Natural Gas Pipeline Impacts

The intensity of direct GHG emissions from the pipeline would be low, with maximum annual GHG emission being less than 1 percent of Alaska’s GHGs. The duration of GHG emissions would range from temporary (construction) to long-term (operations and closure) (Table 3.26-11).
### Table 3.26-11: Annual Pipeline GHG Emissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Phase</th>
<th>Project-related CO₂-e Emissions (tpy)</th>
<th>Project-related CO₂-e Emissions (MMT/Yr)</th>
<th>Percentage of CO₂-e Emissions for the State of Alaska in 2005</th>
<th>Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>258,746</td>
<td>0.2347</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>10,036</td>
<td>0.0091</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure</td>
<td>nc</td>
<td>nc</td>
<td>nc</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

a Does not include indirect emissions associated with electrical demand of the compressor station at MP 5 during operation and maintenance activities.
b GHG emissions during closure were not calculated but would be expected to be less than operations.
c Total CO₂-e emissions were 52.1 MMT for the State of Alaska in 2005.

nc = not calculated

Source: EPA 2014d; Air Sciences 2015b; ADEC 2008b, Cardno 2015e.

Overall, impacts of GHG emissions from the pipeline on climate change under Alternative 2 would be considered negligible to minor.

**Summary of Impacts for Alternative 2 – Atmosphere**

The magnitude of GHG emissions during construction, operations, and closure of all components of this project would be considered low to medium, representing at most 0.024 percent of U.S. total GHG emissions in 2012 (EPA 2014d). The maximum duration of impacts would be long-term, with GHG emissions occurring throughout the duration of the project. Direct GHG emissions would be local in extent (occurring in Project Area) and context is common. Therefore, the Donlin Gold Project would cause minor impacts to climate change under Alternative 2.

#### 3.26.4.2.2 WATER

This section analyzes how climate change could affect project impacts on water flow, including incremental effects that climate change would have on base case impacts identified in Sections 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology, and Section 3.6, Groundwater Hydrology. Key indicators include predicted precipitation changes due to climate trends and consequent changes in project impacts to streamflow and groundwater recharge, and the implications of these changes on project plans, facility designs, and related risks to the environment.

The criteria for evaluating the levels of effects in this section are generally the same as those presented in Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology, Table 3.5-24, as applied to the incremental effects of climate change on project impacts to water flow. For example, low magnitude effects could include climate-caused changes in water flow that are within historical seasonal variation and that require no change in water management strategies at the mine or operational rules for barging on the Kuskokwim River. Medium magnitude effects could include changes in water flow outside of historic variation that would require changes in operational rules, although hydraulic designs of major structures would still be adequate for conditions.
The context of climate change effects on water resources for all project components is considered common to important. While climate change is a wide-ranging global phenomenon, and water is an abundant resource, water is shared with other resources, and its use and related structure design is governed by regulation.

**Mine Site**

Construction, and Operations and Maintenance

The effect of climate change on precipitation and hydrology at the mine site has implications for infrastructure design and the capacity of major mine facilities to handle different water regimes under future climate change scenarios. The approach taken at the mine site with respect to hydrologic design is generally consistent with the U.S. Global Change Research Program (Bierbaum et al. 2014) and NOAA (2015b) guidance for adaptation based on identification of climate change vulnerabilities, risks, and options.

Effects on TSF. A 25 percent increase in annual precipitation was selected to represent the effects of climate change on the TSF during operations in sensitivity runs on the mine site water balance model (BGC 2011g, 2014b; Weglinski 2015b). The 25 percent increase case is considered conservative in that the SNAP data predicts much less than this (2 percent increase) for the life of the mine, and the TSF would be closed and capped by the time of the predicted 25 percent climate change increase. A stochastic model was used for the sensitivity analysis, which allows calculation of the probability of a particular outcome to quantify risk. The results indicated that, prior to development of the advanced water treatment (AWT) scenario, a 25 percent precipitation increase would result in an average annual water storage requirement in the TSF impoundment roughly three times that of the base case (71,000 acre-feet vs. 24,000 acre-feet, respectively) or as much as 91,000 acre-feet for the 95th percentile probability value. These volumes are well within the ultimate design capacity of the TSF impoundment of 357,000 acre-feet, which accounts for the combined volume of tailings, pond, and flood storage (BGC 2014b). With AWT, the effects of a 25 percent increase in precipitation would be within the range of effects for the original Alternative 2 analysis (Weglinski 2015b), as the TSF would be designed to the same capacity but contain less process water. Based on ratings criteria in Table 3.5-24 (Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology), the estimated magnitude of climate change effects are expected to be low, in that adverse impacts from the added effects of climate change are unlikely because the TSF design would be adequate for predicted conditions, and mine site water management would be flexible enough to accommodate the extra dewatering water from potential climate change precipitation increases.

Effects on Pit Dewatering and Freshwater Requirements. The AWT proposed under Alternative 2 for treating and discharging pit dewatering water and other contact water is expected to provide maximum flexibility in overall water management, which would be useful in the event of increased precipitation due to climate change over the life of the mine. The 25 percent precipitation increase described above for the TSF was also used in water balance sensitivity runs to estimate the effect of climate change on the volume of pit dewatering water under Alternative 2. The results indicate that total dewatering volume during operations would increase by approximately 5,000 acre-feet (an average increase of about 200 acre-feet annually) in the event of a 25 percent precipitation increase (BGC 2014b). The 25 percent precipitation increase case also results in a reduction in total freshwater requirements from Snow Gulch reservoir from about 3,400 to 400 acre-feet (a decrease of about 120 acre-feet annually), because
there would be more dewatering and mine contact water available to meet process water needs. The AWT water treatment plant would be designed for an average flow of about 2,900 acre-feet/year, and a maximum of 4,400 acre-feet/year, which is about 50 percent or 1,500 acre-feet/year above the average and could be expanded if necessary (Hatch 2015). Thus, mine site water management under the AWT scenario would be able to accommodate extra dewatering water from potential climate change precipitation increases through flexibility in WTP design and less freshwater use.

Extreme Events. Uncertainties inherent in applying climate change trends to the effects analysis of the proposed action are discussed in the above Section 3.26.3.2, Climate Change, Water Resources. An important modeling objective is to determine the potential impact of extreme events on engineered structures, as these events tend to drive facility designs more than monthly or annual average changes that are derived from climate models. There are conflicting results from different research with regard to the impact of climate change on rare events such as are used to design spillways. A recent NOAA study in Alaska (Perica et al. 2012) indicated no statistically significant trends in the 1-hour and 1-day annual maximum series. Although there is evidence that average annual precipitation would increase as a result of climate change in the next 30 years, Perica et al. (2012) found no evidence that the magnitude and frequency of rare events is changing. Other studies suggest that the number of very heavy precipitation events (i.e., defined as those that comprise 1 percent of all daily events) have increased about 5 to 11 percent since 1980, and that their frequency will continue to increase in the future (Walsh et al. 2014).

The effects of extreme precipitation events and both wetter and drier climates on facilities at the mine site have been evaluated through application of low probability events based on local historic records from the 1950s to present. As described in Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology, major water containment structures at the mine site have been designed in accordance with ADNR (2005) Dam Safety Guidelines that prescribe the use of certain maximum runoff events for the inflow design flood (IDF) depending on dam hazard rating. For example, these include the 24-hour probable maximum precipitation plus 200-year snowmelt for Class I facilities like the TSF dam, and the 24-hr probable maximum precipitation including snowmelt for Class II structures like some water dams at the mine site; and 3 days of underdrain flow plus the 200-year, 24-hour rainfall event for the SRS pond and wells (BGC 2011a). In addition, a mitigation recommendation is provided in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation), to incorporate a potentially longer-term event (time of concentration) into final design of major structures at the mine. This would ensure that the maximum rainfall event used for the IDF design is adequate, and reduce the likelihood that an extreme event lasting longer than 24 hours could cause overtopping, erosion, and/or a release of impaired water quality to the environment.

In addition to the design of major structures, BGC (2014b, 2015f) assessed precipitation and runoff effects, based on 30-year historical trends, for the 10th and 90th percentiles of the precipitation distribution to evaluate significantly drier and wetter than average conditions for the purpose of determining overall water management strategies at the mine site. Individual years within the historic datasets can exhibit annual precipitation that fluctuates 40 percent above and below the average. These ranges are significantly greater than the trends in average annual precipitation predicted by SNAP data over the life of the mine (2 percent increase).
Water balance models were developed for the mine site based on these trends for both above-average and below-average conditions, and for different phases (operations and closure). The results were used to develop a set of operational rules or strategies for the mine site to handle the large range of expected conditions (see Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology). As mine operations proceed, water balance models and sensitivity analyses are typically updated based on a longer period of record, and facility designs or operational strategies are modified to handle changes in precipitation predictions. For example, additional capacity could be added to the SRS or the schedule for tailings dam raises altered if wetter years are predicted, or more Snow Gulch reservoir water or dewatering water could be reserved for processing if drier trends are predicted.

Thus, impacts are anticipated to be of low magnitude during mine construction and operations, in that incremental effects due to climate change are unlikely because current designs and water balance planning account for wide historic ranges that are greater than predicted precipitation trends during the life of the mine.

Closure, Reclamation, and Monitoring

As described in Section 3.6 (Groundwater Hydrology), the effect of a wet climate scenario was evaluated in sensitivity runs on the mine groundwater model for the purpose of analyzing effects on pit lake filling rates (BGC 2014c). By increasing groundwater recharge and streamflows by a factor of two, the pit lake was calculated to fill in 30 years, as compared to the base case of 60 years. As the pit lake fills, the water level would be monitored and the pit lake model would be recalibrated as data become available (SRK 2012d). The effect of fill rate on water management of freeboard at the pit lake in post-closure is discussed in Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology. The managed maximum lake stage would be approximately 33 feet below the lowest point on the pit rim. In the event of pump failure, a faster fill rate could mean that the lake would reach the spill point in 2 to 3 years, as compared to 5 to 7 years for the base case. Because 2 to 3 years is adequate time to fix potential equipment problems, the likelihood of potential overflow of contaminated pit lake water to Crooked Creek is considered low to medium, in that the freeboard (the difference between the managed stage and the spill point) is adequate for expected conditions, even under a wet climate scenario, although water treatment strategies may need to be reassessed to accommodate a potentially faster fill rate. Additional mitigation recommendations are provided in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) for reassessing the effect of climate change on water balance and groundwater models in post-closure approximately every 10 years in order to adequately anticipate effects on pit filling and other project structures.

Summary of Mine Site Impacts

Climate change effects on the impacts that major structures and water management at the mine site have on water flow are expected to be of low intensity during the mine life and of low to medium intensity during post-closure; in that climate effects may or may not be discernable beyond extremes predicted by the historical record, hydrologic designs meet or exceed state guidelines and would be adequate to accommodate climate change effects, and water management and treatment strategies are flexible enough to accommodate potential long-term precipitation trends. This analysis is based partly on state and global studies that do not exhibit confident trends in rare events, and on infrastructure designs that appear robust enough to accommodate modest increments in rare events that may be caused by climate change outside
of extremes already predicted by the historical data. The duration of climate change effects would be long-term to permanent, as these effects are not expected to cease within the life of the mine or post-closure. The geographic extent of effects would range from local to regional, in that some hydrologic effects would be limited to within mine site boundaries (e.g., small water diversion structures) and some could affect Crooked Creek beyond the mine site (e.g., pit dewatering reducing winter flow) with or without climate change effects. Overall effects of climate change on water impacts at the mine site are considered minor to moderate.

Transportation Facilities

Barging

The effect of climate change on precipitation could impact barging in the Kuskokwim River during construction and operations. Predicted precipitation changes along the river are based on SNAP precipitation data from several river communities (Figure 3.26-1, Table 3.26-12). The relationship between precipitation and change in discharge is a complex issue, and a difficult one to translate to effects on barging. A simplistic model was developed to predict the order of magnitude of the effect that climate change is likely to have on proposed barging activities.

Methodology for Estimating Available Barging Days. Based on assuming a direct and proportional response between precipitation and discharge, SNAP precipitation predictions were applied to Kuskokwim River discharge data in order to evaluate the effect of potential summer month decreases on water flow and available barging days in the Kuskokwim River (URS 2014). A series of computations were conducted on 60 years of Kuskokwim River discharge data collected at the USGS Crooked Creek gauge (USGS 2014b) to evaluate the likelihood that the proposed number of barging days (110) under Alternative 2 would be available (AMEC 2014). The computations initially counted available barge days and their probability of occurrence over the period of record under three base case scenarios: 1) the total number of days in each of the 60 years of record that exceeded a minimum discharge of 39,000 cfs needed to operate between Nelson Island and the Angyaruag (Jungjuk) Port (AMEC 2014; Enos 2014); 2) the number of days greater than 39,000 cfs within the proposed 110-day shipping season between June 1 and September 18 (AMEC 2014); and 3) the number of days constrained by estimated dates of breakup and freezeup available from the National Weather Service (2014).

The discharge record was then reduced based on the monthly SNAP data to represent a possible future climate change discharge record (Table 3.26-13). The average of the monthly precipitation changes for the communities of Crooked Creek, Sleetmute, and McGrath for the decade 2040-2049 were selected to represent the effects of climate change on future flow conditions in the Kuskokwim River transportation corridor, as precipitation happening in these communities and the surrounding hills is considered most likely to contribute to discharge conditions below Crooked Creek. For months in which the mean monthly precipitation at the villages is predicted to increase, no change was made to the daily discharge record. However, it was assumed that the daily discharge associated with each year of record would decrease by the same percentage as the mean monthly precipitation at the village.
Table 3.26-12: Average Monthly Precipitation Change Applied to Kuskokwim River Discharge Record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Predicted Average Monthly Precipitation Change for Crooked Creek, Sleetmute, and McGrath(^1) (%)</th>
<th>Average Monthly Precipitation Change Applied to Kuskokwim River Daily Discharge Record (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>+10.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>+15.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Average of 3 communities' predicted change in precipitation for decade 2040-2049.
Source: SNAP 2012.

Results of Available Barge Days Analysis. The results of the discharge computations for both the base case scenarios and the scenario with reductions due to climate change are shown in Table 3.26-13. The climate change case indicates that the median number of days a barge could operate is 140 per year. In 9 out of 10 years, barges could operate for at least 113 days, and in none of the 60 years of record would the available days be less than 95.

Table 3.26-13: Available Barge Days on Kuskokwim River under Base Case and Climate Change Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of Occurrence(^1) (%)</th>
<th>Base Case Scenarios(^2)</th>
<th>Climate Change Scenario(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#1: All Available Days ≥39,000 cfs(^3) (Jan. 1-Dec. 31)</td>
<td>#2: Available Days ≥39,000 cfs within June 1-Sept. 18 Shipping Season(^4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.26-13: Available Barge Days on Kuskokwim River under Base Case and Climate Change Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of Occurrence¹ (%)</th>
<th>Base Case Scenarios²</th>
<th>Climate Change Scenario²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#1: All Available Days ≥39,000 cfs³ (Jan. 1-Dec. 31)</td>
<td>#2: Available Days ≥39,000 cfs within June 1-Sept. 18 Shipping Season⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum No. of Days</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. of Days</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum No. of Days</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1 Percentage of years in which number of days is equal to or greater than value presented.
2 Based on 60-year discharge record at Kuskokwim River-Crooked Creek gage (USGS 2014b). The years 1951, 1994, and 1995 have only partial records with some data missing for potential barging months; thus, they have not been used in the analyses.
3 Conservative minimum discharge reading at Kuskokwim River-Crooked Creek gage needed to operate between Nelson Island and the Angaryuak (Jungjuk) Port (AMEC 2014; Enos 2014).
4 Proposed by Donlin Gold (AMEC 2014).
5 Estimated based on NWS (2014) dates for breakup, first boat, last boat, and freezeup.
6 Based on average monthly precipitation reductions shown in Table 3.26-12 (SNAP 2012), and applying same monthly reduction to each day of record within month.
cfs = cubic feet per second
Source: URS 2014c.

The results suggest that even with a change in precipitation similar to what the SNAP estimates suggest, the number of days available for barging would not be outside the range considered by Donlin Gold in developing the barge plan for the proposed project. Though measureable, the change in number of days available as a result of climate change appears to be minor compared to the year-to-year variability. In addition, the analysis conservatively does not account for increases in flow predicted for certain months by the SNAP data (e.g., May and August).

Because the results of the climate change scenario are based on potential use of all days between breakup and freezeup, low water years could require an adjustment in the dates of operation to earlier in spring or later in the fall than assumed under base case Scenario #2 (June 1 to Sept. 18 shipping season). This is considered part of the proposed action as one possible method of increasing the amount of supplies that can be barged in a year (AMEC 2014). Additional proposed mitigations and contingencies for low water conditions are described in Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology, and are included in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation). These include collection of daily and real-time barge draft data for forecasting river depths, storage of sufficient inventory at the mine and Bethel as backup for reduced barging days, chartering a third tow, operating with reduced under keel clearance, and implementation of a stranded barge plan if needed (AMEC 2014; Donlin Gold 2013e). These measures are expected to be effective in minimizing the potential effect of low water years on barge stranding risk and mine shipping needs.
Mine Access Road

The effect of climate change on precipitation has potential implications for the capacity of culverts and bridges along the mine access road to handle breakup flow and high precipitation events during the life of the mine as well as the post-closure period. Donlin Gold is considering replacing some culverts along the Jungjuk Road at closure with low water crossings, due to the anticipated low level of use and monitoring in post-closure (Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) (Midnight Sun Court Reporters 2015). Predicted climate change effects on precipitation in the vicinity of the mine access road are similar to those predicted for the mine site and the other Kuskokwim River drainages described above (Table 3.26-4); these include an overall increase in annual precipitation, with lower summer precipitation balanced by higher precipitation in fall and winter months, which could result in greater snowmelt during breakup. However, as described above under Mine Site, recent studies are conflicting as to the prediction of statistically significant trends in rare precipitation events in Alaska due to climate change (e.g., Perica et al. 2012; Walsh et al. 2014). Because rare events are typically used to design culverts and bridges, and because the culverts may be replaced with low water crossings, the effect of climate change on their design is expected to be low, in that the added effects of climate change may or may not be noticeable, and the design is anticipated to be adequate for the conditions.

Summary of Transportation Facilities Impacts

Potential climate change effects on transportation facilities with respect to water flow are expected to be of low intensity during mine life, in that effects may or may not be noticeable. Sufficient barge days would be available even under a climate change scenario to meet proposed shipping needs without increased risk of barge stranding, and the barge plan and proposed contingencies are expected to be adequate to accommodate predicted climate change trends during operations. In addition, effects would be of low intensity in post-closure for the mine access road where culverts are replaced with low water crossings. Effects may be of low to medium magnitude for facilities that remain in post-closure such as culverts and bridges that could experience the longer-term trends of increased precipitation. The duration of climate change effects would be long-term to permanent, with potential impacts lasting throughout barging operations and use of the road throughout post-closure. While the extent of climate change effects is global, the extent of project effects would be considered local to regional, as they could be limited to critical sections of the Kuskokwim River or certain road drainages, but may involve potential contingencies that could extend from Bethel to the mine site. The context of climate change effects on transportation water resources is considered common to important; while climate change is a wide-ranging global phenomenon and water in the Kuskokwim River is an abundant resource, the river flow is shared with other users and other river traffic is important to the welfare of river communities. Overall effects of climate change on the transportation facilities associated with Alternative 2 are considered minor.

Natural Gas Pipeline

Climate change effects on precipitation during pipeline operations could cause changes in erosion patterns along the cleared ROW and scour potential at waterbody crossings. Average annual precipitation in Cook Inlet basin, Alaska Range, and Kuskokwim Hills is anticipated to increase on the order of 2 to 15 percent over the life of the project as a result of climate change (SNAP 2012), with the higher increases in the Alaska Range and lower increases in the
Kuskokwim Hills. Most of the increased precipitation in Cook Inlet basin is predicted to occur in winter months and during breakup, although the winter increases could occur as rain, resulting in a reduced snowpack with smaller intermittent melting episodes, rather than a large breakup. Effects from increased snowmelt and precipitation at breakup represent potentially worse effects on the pipeline (such as scour) than intermittent snowmelt.

Greater discharge at breakup could cause increased risk of bank erosion and scour along major river crossings, e.g., in areas of known river erosion along the Jones and South Fork Kuskokwim rivers (Figure 3.3-4, Section 3.3, Geohazards and Seismic Conditions) and at other major rivers draining the Alaska Range and Kuskokwim Hills (Figure 3.5-15, Section 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology). While the duration of scour effects on the integrity of the pipeline would be long-term, lasting through the life of the project, the abandoned-in-place pipeline in post-closure could also cause increased bed or bank erosion locally if exposed.

At HDD river crossings, the pipeline would be installed well below (typically 10s or 100s of feet below) any river scour hazard, and the ends of the HDD segments would be set back from the riverbanks at distances ranging from 400 to 3,900 feet (Section 3.2, Soils). Typical burial depths at other stream crossings would be 4 feet, except at river crossings with high scour potential, where the pipeline would be buried up to 10 feet below the thalweg (SRK 2013b). Thalweg depths have been determined based on site-specific calculations of the 100-year event scour depth at each crossing (CH2M Hill 2011c). In addition, the length of increased cover depth along river crossings assumes that active channels could move anywhere within historic floodplains.

Additional geotechnical investigation would be conducted prior to final design (e.g., Section 3.2, Soils) to evaluate site-specific conditions for PHMSA permitting. The magnitude of the effects from climate change potentially causing increased scour at breakup is anticipated to be mostly low, in that the depth of cover designed for the 100-year event would be within the limits of historical variation, although these conditions could plausibly be exceeded in post-closure in the event of precipitation increases due to climate change, leading to occasional medium intensity effects. Additional mitigation recommendations are provided in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) to address monitoring and rehabilitation in post-closure that could reduce effects to low intensity levels.

Potential increased precipitation and discharge at breakup could also cause erosion along the cleared ROW. The magnitude of these effects is anticipated to be low in late operations, as revegetation during reclamation immediately following construction is expected to stabilize early in the operations period.

Increased precipitation and breakup discharge could cause an increase in the occurrence of glaciation or aufeis effects at co-located ROW and Iditarod National Historic Trail (INHT) segments between MP 84 and MP 97. As described in Section 3.2, Soils, localized glaciation (usually extending less than 1/4 mile along the trail) is known to occur along the trail in the Alaska Range in winter, and can accumulate about 1 to 10 feet thickness of solid ice (BLM 2015d), a situation which could be exacerbated by the co-located pipeline ROW and be hazardous for trail users due to slippery cross slopes associated with the flowage. Best management practices (BMPs) and erosion and sedimentation control (ESC) measures emplaced to promote non-erosive drainage from existing and new water sources and pathways, and regular monitoring and maintenance during operations (Section 3.2, Soils), are expected to minimize these effects along the ROW and co-located INHT sections and crossings.
Summary of Natural Gas Pipeline Impacts

The magnitude of potential climate change effects on pipeline impacts to water would range from low during the mine life, to a range of low to medium during post-closure, in that the effect of climate change on ROW erosion in operations would be mitigated by revegetation and stabilization early in operations, and most scour hazards at river crossings would be mitigated by designing for the 100-year flood. The duration of climate change effects on the pipeline would be long-term to permanent, with potential impacts on the integrity of the pipeline lasting through the life of the project, and local erosion effects from a potentially exposed pipeline continuing into post-closure. While the extent of climate change effects is regional to global, the extent of project effects would be considered local, as erosion and scour impacts would be limited to the immediate vicinity of the pipeline corridor. The context of climate change effects on water is considered common to important: while climate change is a wide-ranging global phenomenon and water in the pipeline region is an abundant resource, the effects of erosion and scour hazards are governed by regulation. Overall, direct and indirect effects of climate change on water impacts along the pipeline are considered minor to moderate overall.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 2 – Water

Hydrologic effects due to climate change at the mine site, transportation facilities, and natural gas pipeline under Alternative 2 would range from low intensity (e.g., sufficient barge days would be available under a low water climate change scenario to meet proposed shipping needs) to medium intensity (e.g., a faster pit lake filling rate could require changes in water management/treatment strategies in post-closure). The duration of climate change effects would be long-term to permanent, with potential impacts lasting through the life of the project (transportation and pipeline components) and in post-closure (mine site). The extent of project effects would be considered local to regional. The context of climate change effects on water as pertains to the project is considered common to important. Overall effects for water resources are considered minor to moderate.

3.26.4.2.3 PERMAFROST

Mine Site

Mine site permafrost is discussed extensively in Section 3.2, Soils. Mine site effects on permafrost in the absence of climate change, and the types of permafrost-related hazards that could impact the project in the absence of climate change and the proposed design features that could mitigate these hazards, are described in Section 3.2, Soils. These include thaw settlement where soils are removed to construct roads and mine site infrastructure; excavation of most permafrost soils at dams and the toe of the WRF to improve foundation conditions; excavation of upper permafrost soils beneath the tailings impoundment to reduce differential thaw settlement; and berms and collection ponds at overburden stockpiles to capture sediment flow from melting permafrost soils. In addition, permafrost degradation at the mine site could cause a release of trapped carbon into the atmosphere. Estimates of GHG emissions from both permafrost degradation and drying of wetlands soils from pit dewatering are discussed in Section 3.8, Air Quality.

Regional climate change trends suggest that northward expansion of permafrost thaw would occur, and that ground temperatures in the mine site area could increase by roughly 1.5°F to 2°F
over the life of the mine (Markon et al. 2012), potentially thawing already warm permafrost in the mine region to more than 32°F. However, changes in soil cover at the mine site would have a comparably greater effect on permafrost thaw than climate change, as removal or disturbance of soils in most areas of the mine site are expected to accelerate thaw much faster than climate change would on undisturbed soils. Small areas of the mine site where soils are left in place, or compacted but not removed, could experience some additional thaw degradation and settlement during mine operations due to climate change, but these areas comprise a small percentage of the total area where soils are completely removed or covered. In areas where permafrost soils are not removed but are covered by project facilities (e.g., overburden piles), climate change is expected to have little effect on increasing the rate of permafrost thaw, due to the insulating effect of the added ground cover material. Areas of the mine site with coarse-grained surficial deposits (e.g., Crooked Creek terrace gravels) would not experience much thaw settlement regardless of whether thaw is caused by soil removal or climate change. Thus, the incremental effect of climate change on permafrost at the mine site would be small, and impact ratings would be similar to those of Alternative 2 in the absence of climate change, as described below.

Summary of Mine Site Impacts

Climate change effects on permafrost impacts would range from low intensity (e.g., little noticeable additional ground settlement from climate change in areas of coarse-grained deposits) to medium intensity (e.g., design and excavation of permafrost soils beneath major structures is adequate to mitigate potential thaw hazards). As in the base case (i.e., no contribution from climate change), specific low probability permafrost conditions may exist that could cause medium to high intensity effects (e.g., at the toe of the WRF) that could be reduced through additional mitigation (e.g., Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation). In post-closure, effects would be of lower intensity due to reclamation preserving remaining permafrost, although climate change would result in less permafrost preservation than the base case. While climate change effects on permafrost would be extended, with effects reaching beyond the Project Area, Project–related effects on climate-altered permafrost would be localized beneath facility footprints and cleared areas. Permafrost thaw effects would range from long-term (e.g., unstable foundations reach equilibrium within life of mine) to permanent (i.e., restoration of permafrost not expected). Discontinuous permafrost and climate change are considered common in context based on their regional to global distribution. Overall direct and indirect effects would range from minor to moderate.

Transportation Facilities

The occurrence of discontinuous permafrost along the mine access road and Angyaruaq (Jungjuk) and Bethel ports is discussed in Section 3.2 (Soils). The types of effects that the transportation facilities could have on permafrost in the absence of climate change, and the types of permafrost-related hazards that could impact these project facilities in the absence of climate change and the proposed design features that could mitigate the hazards, are also described in Section 3.2 (Soils). These effects include differential thaw settlement along the road and at the ports, use of geotextile material to mitigate permafrost road sections, and thawing of permafrost soils in the Jungjuk waste soil stockpile.

Regional climate change trends predict that ground temperatures in the area from Bethel to the mine site could increase by roughly 1.5°F to 3.5°F over the life of the mine (Markon et al. 2012),
potentially thawing already warm permafrost in the area. However, removal of soils during construction at these facilities, and possible excavation of permafrost to mitigate the effects of differential settlement on structures (e.g., docks, tanks), would have a comparably greater effect on permafrost thaw than climate change, as disturbance of soils in most areas of the road and ports are expected to accelerate thaw much faster than climate change would on undisturbed soils, and excavation would permanently remove permafrost soils to depths that would probably be beyond the effects of accelerated thawing from future warming. In areas where permafrost soils are not removed but are covered by project facilities (e.g., geotextile and fill along road), climate change is expected to have little effect on increasing the rate of permafrost thaw or causing increased differential settlement, due to the insulating and strength effects of the added material.

Summary of Transportation Facilities Impacts

Permafrost impacts at transportation facilities due to climate change would range from low intensity (e.g., little noticeable additional ground settlement from climate change) to medium intensity (e.g., erosion/sedimentation of thawing soils in port stockpile with or without climate change). Like the base case (i.e., no contribution from climate change), these effects would likely be reduced to low intensity through planned special design and additional mitigation. While climate change effects on permafrost would be extended, with effects reaching beyond the Project Area, project–related effects on climate-altered permafrost would be localized beneath facility footprints and cleared areas. Regardless of climate change, most permafrost thaw effects would range from long-term (e.g., road conditions reach equilibrium within several years) to permanent (i.e., restoration of permafrost not expected). Discontinuous permafrost and climate change are considered common in context based on their regional to global distribution. Overall direct and indirect effects would range from minor to moderate.

Natural Gas Pipeline

The occurrence of discontinuous permafrost along the pipeline is discussed in Section 3.2, Soils. The types of effects that the pipeline could have on permafrost in the absence of climate change, and the types of permafrost-related hazards that could impact these project facilities in the absence of climate change and proposed design features that could mitigate the hazards, are also described Section 3.2, Soils. These include differential thaw settlement along the trench at transition points between thaw unstable permafrost and either thaw stable permafrost or soils with no permafrost; strain-based design of the pipe to allow for flexibility, pipe construction features, and strain monitoring methods to mitigate differential settlement; thermal erosion of the cleared ROW or cuts in thaw unstable soils; and BMPs and ESC measures to mitigate thermal erosion.

Regional climate change trends predict that ground temperatures along the pipeline corridor could increase by 0°F to 3.5°F over the life of the mine (Markon et al. 2012), potentially thawing already warm permafrost in the pipeline region. Pipeline thermal modeling was performed by CH2M Hill (2011a, b) and Zarling (2011), and updated by Fueg (2014), to evaluate thaw settlement effects in response to the buried thermal regime. Methodology, models, and assumptions are described in Section 3.2, Soils. The models were run as (1) a base case using historical annual temperatures from Farewell Lake and (2) as climate change cases for both a 30-year mine operations period and a 75-year post-closure period. The modeled climate change cases assume a mean annual temperature increase over time of 0.04°F/ year (or 4°F/ 100 years).
due to global climate change, which is consistent with temperature trends in McGrath over the past 36 years and the lower range of predicted statewide air temperature increases from climate change models.

Clearing of ROW vegetation during construction and maintenance, which initiates permafrost degradation and continues to contribute to thawing over time, would be the same in both the base case and climate change cases. Likewise, the lateral extent of permafrost degradation would be the same in both cases, coinciding with the extent of permafrost covering about 60 miles of the pipeline route and occurring intermittently between about MP 100 and MP 215, but the amount of degradation and vertical thaw settlement would be more for the climate change case. Initial analyses (CH2M Hill 2011a, b; Zarling 2011) yielded predicted thaw depths beneath the disturbed ROW and trench of 8 to 33 feet for the 30-year climate warming case, which represents a 4-foot increase in thaw depth due to climate change over the mine life. Based on the updated modeling results (Fueg 2014), thaw depth predictions in the climate change case were 30 feet for the operations period and 50 feet for the ROW after 75 years (roughly 45 years into post-closure), which represent increases of 3 to 13 feet of thaw depth over that of the base case (i.e., no contribution from climate change).

Permafrost soils can act as a source of carbon dioxide and methane emitted to the atmosphere when thawed. The total amount of soils along the pipeline that are predicted to thaw during operations and closure assuming no contribution from climate change is roughly 37 million tons. Based on the incremental depths of thaw predicted for the climate change case and the same soil density and ROW width assumptions used in the base case, an additional 9 million tons of permafrost soil are predicted to thaw during operations and closure.

The amount of ground settlement associated with the above thaw depth predictions ranges from 0 to 23.5 feet during operations and up to 43 feet in post-closure, which represent increases in the range of 0 to 13 feet above the base case due to climate change. As described in Section 3.2, Soils, boreholes with the highest predicted settlements due to climate change are located in the Alaska Range along the Threemile Creek / Jones River portion of the alignment near MPs 115 to 120. This is an area with additional geohazards such as landslides where specialized construction techniques (e.g., HDD or deep bedrock trenching) are proposed that would also address concerns about thaw settlement by drilling beneath or removing permafrost-bearing overburden (Fueg 2014). Thus, the primary area of concern for thaw settlement would be on the north side of the Alaska Range between the North Fork Kuskokwim River (MP 147) and the main stem Kuskokwim River (MP 240). About 37 percent of geoprobe holes in this area contain permafrost, with thaw settlement estimates ranging from 0.2 to 7.3 feet at ground surface during operations, and 0.2 to 8.6 feet in post-closure, which represent increases in the range of 0 to 2 feet above the base case due to climate change. Thus, the effect of climate change on permafrost along the pipeline is expected to be measurable (medium intensity) but small compared to thaw settlement caused by ROW clearing in the absence of climate change, as vegetation removal during construction and ROW maintenance contributes the most to permafrost degradation.

These percentages and settlement estimates are considered conservative. The geoprobes specifically targeted areas of suspected ice-rich permafrost. Probes which were unable to penetrate material at depths shallower than the estimated thaw depth were assumed in the model to continue with the final soil layer logged, even though a probe unable to penetrate
something other than frozen soils (such as boulders or bedrock) would be less likely to contain deep permafrost.

As described in Section 3.2, Soils, the effects of differential settlement on pipeline integrity would be addressed through PHMSA Special Permit conditions. Conditions specific to the operations period could include, for example, in-line tool inspections, strain gauges in problematic segments, and frequency of PHMSA permit reviews.

The unmitigated effects of ground settlement and thermal erosion during operations could lead to adverse changes in drainage patterns and erosion. Mitigation for these effects would be addressed primarily during construction by placing a mound of fill over the trench to allow for settlement, and by employing BMPs and an Erosion Sediment Control plan measures in permafrost areas of the ROW as described in Section 3.2, Soils. In addition, some erosion stabilization would occur over time due to revegetation regardless of ground settlement, although scattered locations along the north side of the Alaska Range could experience settlement-related drainage channeling and erosion. These areas would be addressed through routine monitoring and ROW maintenance during operations. Additional fill may be required in some areas on an ongoing basis through proactive monitoring and maintenance. These actions are expected to reduce the effects to a low to medium intensity.

The magnitude of climate change effects on thermal erosion in post-closure is expected to be mostly of low to medium intensity for similar reasons. The amount of additional ground settlement that is predicted to occur along the north side of the Alaska Range in post-closure due to climate change is predicted to be in the range of 0 to 3.4 feet beyond that of the operations period (Fueg 2014), which could lead to occasional high intensity erosion effects if unmitigated. These effects are expected to be partly mitigated through a revised SRR Plan compiled specifically for termination and reclamation, which may include visual overflight monitoring and placement of additional fill and/or other erosion control measures as needed (SRK 2013b). The SRR Plan would not necessarily cover the post-closure period, however, and mitigation recommendations are provided in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation, for consideration of additional bonding that would allow continuation of monitoring and stabilization activities that would reduce localized persistent thaw settlement to temporary medium intensity effects.

Summary of Natural Gas Pipeline Impacts

Climate change effects on pipeline permafrost impacts would mostly range from low intensity (e.g., little noticeable additional ground settlement or thermal erosion due to climate change) to medium intensity (e.g., pipeline design and monitoring/ maintenance expected to be effective at controlling measurable increases in thaw settlement and thermal erosion due to climate change), although localized conditions could exist that cause high intensity drainage or thaw erosion effects, which could be reduced through additional mitigation (e.g., bonding to cover ROW monitoring and stabilization in post-closure). While climate change effects on permafrost would reach beyond the Project Area, pipeline effects on and from climate-altered permafrost would be localized along intermittent ice-rich areas of the ROW (mostly along the north flank of the Alaska Range between MPs 150 and 215) and within the immediate vicinity of the cleared ROW. Most permafrost thaw effects would range from long-term (e.g., settlement reaches equilibrium within several years) to permanent (i.e., restoration of permafrost not expected).
Discontinuous permafrost and climate change are considered common in context based on their regional to global distribution. Therefore, overall effects would range from minor to moderate.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 2 - Permafrost

Impacts to and from permafrost due to climate change at the mine site, transportation facilities, and natural gas pipeline under Alternative 2 would range from low intensity (e.g., little noticeable additional ground settlement due to climate change) to medium intensity (e.g., design and BMPs at major mine structures and along pipeline are effective in controlling permafrost hazards, differential settlement, and thermal erosion), although specific low probability conditions may exist that could cause medium to high intensity effects and which could be reduced through additional mitigation (e.g., additional permafrost excavation at toe of WRF). Low intensity beneficial effects (preservation of remaining permafrost) could also occur in some areas following reclamation. While climate change effects on permafrost would be extended, with effects reaching beyond the Project Area, project-related impacts on climate-altered permafrost would be limited to intermittent areas of permafrost and localized beneath facility footprints and cleared areas. Permafrost thaw effects would range from long-term (e.g., settlement and revegetation reach equilibrium within several years) to permanent (i.e., restoration of permafrost not expected). Discontinuous permafrost and climate change are considered common in context based on their regional to global distribution. Effects would range from minor to moderate.

3.26.4.2.4 BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND SUBSISTENCE

Vegetation and Wetlands

Climate change effects for biological resources are difficult to quantify, and are presented for all three project components (mine site, transportation facilities, and natural gas pipeline) together. Impacts of Alternative 2 to vegetation and wetlands are described in Section 3.10, Vegetation, and Section 3.11, Wetlands.

Predicted overall increases in temperatures with precipitation shifts (McGuire 2014; Chapin III et al. 2006, 2010; Walsh et al. 2005) have the potential to influence the projected effects of the Donlin Gold Project on vegetation and wetlands, and by extension, on wildlife and fish resources, and on subsistence. Especially important would be the influences on indirect effects and on the success of reclamation and mitigation efforts. Changes may be positive, neutral, or negative.

Large scale vegetation types community shifts, such as woody vegetation encroachment into tundra and wetland conversion to upland, is expected are anticipated for much of Alaska in the next 100 years (McGuire 2014; SNAP 2012). During the project life (30 years), a substantial increase in woody vegetation that would require more frequent brushing is unlikely (McGuire 2014). Vegetation shifts may be beneficial to reclamation impacts through increased temperatures, resulting in a higher number of growing degree days and longer growing seasons.

Decreased available water may have a negative effect on regrowth. Overall, a drying trend is expected in the region due to large-scale climate shifts, with subsequent vegetation community type shifts from wetland to upland characteristics (Berg et al. 2009; Klein et al. 2005). Wetland
reclamation areas may become too dry to qualify as wetlands, requiring adjustment to reclamation plans to meet project goals. Potentially rerouting water courses or adding erosion and sedimentation control measures would add complexity to planned measures.

Construction activities that remove or displace soil and vegetation will disrupt insulting layers, resulting in greater potential permafrost thaw rates. In some locations, permafrost thawing could cause subsidence of the surface, creating wet depressions with subsequent upland conversion in adjacent areas. Reclamation or mitigation goals may be more difficult or challenging in areas where permafrost loss causes more open water due to depressions, particularly along the pipeline corridor. Planned permafrost protective measures may be less effective in a warmed or drier climate.

Potential habitat for invasive species is expected to increase with a warming climate (FWS 2009b). Donlin Gold’s Invasive Species Management Plan (detailed in Section 3.10, Vegetation) will build in adaptive management capacity for detection, monitoring, and control approaches to address potential climate change effects.

Increases in fire frequency, extent, and burn severity are predicted within the EIS Analysis Area (Rupp and Springsteen 2009), along with increased insect outbreaks of native insect species such as the spruce bark beetle (Chapin III et al. 2010). Fire prevention measures during all phases of the project would remain important under projected fire regime changes.

Wildlife and Threatened and Endangered Species
Impacts of Alternative 2 to wildlife and TES are described in Section 3.12, Wildlife and Section 3.14, Threatened and Endangered Species.

Vegetation community type changes may impact wildlife habitat positively or negatively. An increase in open water areas may increase habitat diversity and add value for wildlife. An increase in wildfire frequency and intensity may create more early successional vegetation communities favorable to moose. Decreases in coastal winter habitat may reduce food availability for shorebirds. Shifts in populations due to habitat changes combined with construction and operations impacts may require revisions or adaptations to the Donlin Gold Wildlife Avoidance and Human Encounter/Interaction Plan.

Fish and Aquatic
Impacts of Alternative 2 to fish and aquatic resources are described in Section 3.13, Fish and Aquatic.

Impacts to fish and aquatic resources may be positive or negative. Potential food web alterations caused by temperature changes or ocean acidification may have profound impacts to fish populations which are only poorly understood at this time. Warming temperatures may increase habitat potential for some species. Generally, warming is expected to have negative impacts on most salmon species life cycles (Crozier et al. 2014). Potential habitat for non-native species may increase with warmed temperatures. Combined with increased marine and aquatic traffic from construction and operations, potential for aquatic habitat changes exists.

Subsistence
Impacts of Alternative 2 to subsistence resources are described in Section 3.21, Subsistence.
The effects of climate change in Alaska strongly affect Alaska Native communities, which are highly vulnerable to these rapid changes but have a deep cultural history of adapting to change (Chapin III et al. 2014). Subsistence practices may have to be flexible in time, season, and harvest volume to accommodate both habitat and climate shifts and mine construction and operations. For example, a later or earlier run time for certain fish species combined with mine construction and operations may affect individual’s ability to access or have time to harvest the species.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 2 – Biological Resources and Subsistence

The effects of predicted climate change on vegetation and wetlands under Alternative 2 may increase in later project years due to warming temperatures and altered precipitation patterns, resulting in permafrost loss, vegetation type changes, a general drying trend, and changed fire regime. In the pipeline corridor, vegetation removal during construction and operations may accelerate permafrost loss in a warming climate, although construction practices and mitigation measures will be incorporated to prevent unnecessary permafrost loss. In the mine site, construction activities would remove the permafrost, so it would not be further modified by climate change. Fire severity is predicted to increase over time in a warming climate, and the vegetated areas along active roads or other operations areas would be most vulnerable to accidental fire. Shifts in wildlife, fish, or TES populations may occur due to subsequent habitat and precipitation or temperature changes, affecting subsistence resources as well.

Because the effects would be incremental, the intensity of impacts for biological resources and subsistence would be low. The extent would be considered local to regional, and the context would be considered common. Given the expected long range trends of biome shifts, overall effects of climate change on biological resources and subsistence during the life of the project would be minor.

3.26.4.2.5 IMPACT REDUCING MEASURES

These effects determinations take into account impact reducing design features (Table 5.2-1 in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) proposed by Donlin Gold and also the Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs (Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) that would be implemented. Several examples of these are presented below.

Design features most important for reducing impacts from climate change include:

- The project design includes the use of natural gas to fuel the power plant and the other dual-fuel fired units at the mine site, which would result in lowering GHG emissions by 9.6031 MMT during the mine life of 27.5 years compared to diesel fuel.
- There is flexibility built into the design of mine site water-containment structures, the WTP, and water management strategies that would accommodate potential precipitation increases or decreases, freshwater requirements, or increased storage or treatment needs caused by climate change.
- The barge plan includes several elements that would allow flexibility in managing shipping requirements in low-water years, such as extension of the barge season into shoulder seasons, collection of daily draft data for forecasting river depth, and storage of sufficient inventory for backup supply.
• Strain-based design of the pipeline would accommodate increased differential thaw settlement from permafrost melting.

Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts from climate change include:

• Preparation and implementation of a Stabilization, Rehabilitation, and Reclamation Plan;
• Appropriate bonding/financial assurance; and
• Monitoring of water withdrawals to ensure permitted limits are not exceeded.

Additional Mitigation and Monitoring for Alternative 2

The Corps is considering additional mitigation (Table 5.5-1 in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) to reduce the effects presented above. These additional mitigation measures include:

• Donlin should consider replacing culverts along the mine access road with low water crossings at closure to minimize long-term effects of extreme precipitation events and climate change.

The Corps is considering additional monitoring (Table 5.7-1 in Chapter 5, Impact Avoidance, Minimization, and Mitigation) to reduce the effects presented above. These additional monitoring measures include:

• To minimize the effects of climate change, reexamine the continuing applicability of key portions of the water balance model on approximate 10-year intervals as determined by the data collected and operational or closure conditions and experiences. For example, current mine plans for the pit lake during closure indicate that the water level would be monitored and pit lake model recalibrated as data become available. It is recommended that climate change precipitation predictions also be reevaluated periodically in post-closure, and incorporated into water balance and groundwater model updates, in order to adequately anticipate climate change effects on pit filling and other project structures such as reclaim components; and

• As described in Sections 3.2, Soils and 3.5, Surface Water Hydrology, the Stabilization, Rehabilitation and Reclamation (SRR) Plan would cover pipeline termination activities (SRK 2013a), but not necessarily post-closure monitoring by Donlin Gold, which may be required to mitigate long-term effects from climate change such as thaw settlement on the ROW or scour effects in drainages if the abandoned pipeline is uncovered. The need for monitoring and rehabilitation in post-closure should be addressed in the revised SRR Plan prior to closure, and additional financial assurance considered to cover these activities.

If these mitigation and monitoring measures were adopted and required, impacts of climate change to the atmosphere would be negligibly reduced and therefore remain minor. Impacts to water could be somewhat reduced, but would likely remain minor to moderate. Impacts to permafrost could also be reduced somewhat although would remain minor.
3.26.4.3 ALTERNATIVE 3A – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: LNG-POWERED HAUL TRUCKS

3.26.4.3.1 ATMOSPHERE

Under Alternative 3A, the project would use liquefied natural gas (LNG) instead of diesel to power the large haul trucks to move waste rock and ore from the open pits during operations. These large trucks would account for approximately 75 percent of the total annual diesel consumption in Alternative 2. During operations, Alternative 3A would reduce consumption of diesel, reduce barge trips, and reduce tanker trucks compared to Alternative 2.

No change in diesel consumption would occur at any component of the Donlin Gold Project during construction and closure under Alternative 3A, and thus no change in GHG emissions or climate change impacts for those phases from the levels discussed under Alternative 2 would occur. During operations, GHG emissions would be reduced by about 64,000 tpy of CO₂-e due to reduced diesel consumption at the mine site and corresponding reduced river diesel barging, as compared to Alternative 2 (Cardno 2014b). This is about 0.1 percent of extended CO₂-e emissions of 52.1 MMT in 2005 (ADEC 2008).

LNG burns cleaner than diesel due to its lower carbon content (DOE 2013). Because LNG is a low-carbon, clean-burning fuel, a switch to LNG, especially when considering life cycle emissions, can result in substantial reductions of GHGs compared to diesel (DOE 2013). The reduced diesel consumption under Alternative 3A would not affect GHG emissions associated with the pipeline component.

GHG emissions during operations of the mine site and transportation facilities would be reduced compared to Alternative 2; thus, emissions would remain low in magnitude. For the mine site and transportation facilities, GHG emissions would remain long-term in duration (occurring throughout operations), local in extent (emission sources would occur within the Project Area), and common in context.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 3A – Atmosphere

GHG emissions would remain low in intensity for the mine site, transportation facilities, and pipeline components under Alternative 3A. GHG emissions would be long-term in duration (occurring throughout operations), and considered local in extent (emission sources would occur only within the Project Area). While GHG emissions would be reduced compared to Alternative 2, the reduction would only be about 0.1 percent of extended CO₂-e emissions. Thus, the overall assessment of climate change impacts from GHG emissions under Alternative 3A would still be minor, similar to Alternative 2.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would remain similar to Alternative 2.
3.26.4.3.2 WATER

Mine Site and Natural Gas Pipeline

The effects of climate change on hydrology impacts for the mine and pipeline components would be the same under Alternative 3A as Alternative 2. Adding an LNG facility at the mine site and reducing tank storage capacity would not change hydrologic effects discussed under Alternative 2, and there would be no changes to the pipeline component under this alternative.

Transportation Facilities

Because the number of barge trips would be reduced under Alternative 3A by more than half, the effects of climate change on Kuskokwim River flow would cause less impact on the project than Alternative 2. With fewer barge trips, there would be almost no need to operate barges on the Kuskokwim River in low water conditions to meet resupply requirements, and there would be less risk of barge stranding or need for other shipping contingencies. Thus, the magnitude of potential climate change effects is expected to be low, in that these effects may or may not be noticeable.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 3A – Water

While the magnitude of effects on the transportation component under Alternative 3A would be less than that of Alternative 2, the range of effects for the mine and pipeline would remain unchanged, i.e., low to medium (e.g., hydrologic design of major facilities is expected to be adequate to accommodate climate change effects of increased precipitation). Thus, the rating for the project as a whole would be the same as Alternative 2; i.e., minor to moderate.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

3.26.4.3.3 PERMAFROST

Mine Site

The effect of climate change on permafrost impacts depends on the amount of disturbed versus undisturbed soils that would occur under Alternative 3A, as soil removal or other ground disturbances would have a comparatively greater effect on permafrost than climate change, which would cause increased thawing only in areas of undisturbed soils. Because facility footprints and the extent of disturbed soils would be about the same under Alternative 3A as Alternative 2, the effect of climate change on permafrost would be the same.

Transportation Facilities

The reduction in fuel storage expansion at the Bethel dock under this alternative would decrease the extent of permafrost effects. However, because climate change would only cause increased thawing in areas of undisturbed soils, there would be a slight increase in the effects of climate change on permafrost for those soils (approximately 5 acres) that remain undisturbed.
under this alternative as compared to Alternative 2. This increase would likely result in measurable permafrost thaw (medium intensity) due to climate change for these 5 acres under Alternative 3A; whereas under Alternative 2, the soils would be disturbed and the effects of climate change would not be noticeable (i.e., permafrost thaw would occur regardless of climate change effects). This slight increase in effects under Alternative 3A, however, would not change the range of impact criteria (e.g., low to medium intensity) for Alternative 3A compared to Alternative 2.

Natural Gas Pipeline

The effect of climate change on permafrost impacts associated with the pipeline component of Alternative 3A would be the same as Alternative 2, as there would be no difference in soil disturbance between the two alternatives for the pipeline component.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 3A – Permafrost

While there could be a slight increase in the effects of climate change on permafrost thaw under Alternative 3A at the Bethel Dock, the increase would be relatively small compared to the project as a whole. Thus, the level of effects would be the same as Alternative 2, i.e., minor to moderate overall.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

3.26.4.3.4 BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND SUBSISTENCE

The effects of climate change on impacts of the project on biological resources and subsistence under Alternative 3A would be similar to those described under Alternative 2. Overall impacts from climate change would be minor.

3.26.4.4 ALTERNATIVE 3B – REDUCED DIESEL BARGING: DIESEL PIPELINE

3.26.4.4.1 ATMOSPHERE

Alternative 3B would replace the natural gas pipeline proposed under Alternative 2 with a diesel pipeline. GHG emissions and the resulting impacts to climate change under Alternative 3B would be similar to those discussed under Alternative 2 for construction and closure of all project components, as well as for pipeline operations.

Alternative 3B would result in lower GHG emissions during operations due to reduced barging, and elimination of fugitive GHGs from the natural gas pipeline and compressor station. However, this reduction would be more than offset by increased GHGs from combustion of diesel in the mine site combustion equipment. The magnitude would not be expected to change from Alternative 2 levels for any of the components. The duration, extent, and context of GHG emissions would be similar to those described under Alternative 2.
Summary of Impacts for Alternative 3B - Atmosphere

The intensity, duration, extent, and context of GHG emissions would be similar to those described under Alternative 2. Overall impacts under Alternative 3B would be considered minor.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

3.26.4.4.2 WATER

Mine Site

Hydrologic effects at the mine site due to climate change are expected to be the same under Alternative 3B as Alternative 2. Effects of increased precipitation on the design of major structures would not change under this alternative.

Transportation Facilities

The number of barge trips on the Kuskokwim River would be reduced by about half under Alternative 3B. As a result, the effects of climate change on Kuskokwim River flow are expected to cause less impacts on the project than Alternative 2. With fewer barge trips, there would be almost no need to operate barges in low water conditions to meet resupply requirements, and there would be less risk of barge strandings or need for other shipping contingencies. Thus, the magnitude of potential climate change effects is expected to be low, in that these effects may or may not be noticeable.

Diesel Pipeline

The additional section of pipeline between Tyonek and Beluga under this alternative would cross an additional 5 streams using open cut methods. Predicted climate change effects on precipitation along this section of the pipeline are similar to other sections of the pipeline in the Cook Inlet basin. There could be a slight increase in potential erosion and scour under this alternative due to the additional stream crossings; however, the magnitude of effects for all stream crossings would be the same as described under Alternative 2, i.e., low to medium (e.g., design burial depths anticipated to be adequate for conditions).

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 3B – Water

The magnitude of effects on the transportation component under Alternative 3B would be less than that of Alternative 2, but would be balanced somewhat by slightly greater effects along the pipeline. The range in magnitude of the effects for all project components would be the same as Alternative 2, i.e., ranging from low (e.g., climate change effects on Kuskokwim River barging may or may not be noticeable) to medium (e.g., hydrologic design of major facilities adequate to accommodate climate change effects of increased precipitation). Thus, the rating for the project as a whole would be the same as Alternative 2; i.e., minor to moderate.
Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

### 3.26.4.4.3 PERMAFROST

#### Mine Site

The slight reduction in footprint of the fuel storage area at the mine site under Alternative 3B is likely to be offset by use of the same area for other purposes (e.g., laydown). Because there would be almost no difference in soil disturbance between Alternatives 2 and 3B, the effects of climate change on permafrost impacts would be considered the same.

#### Transportation Facilities

The area of soil disturbance at the Angyaruak (Jungjuk) and Bethel ports is expected to be approximately the same under this alternative as Alternative 2; thus, the effect of climate change on permafrost would be the same. There would be no change in effects due to the addition of the Tyonek dock and tank farm under this alternative, as no permafrost is expected in this area.

#### Diesel Pipeline

There would be no change in effects due to the addition of the Tyonek to Beluga section of the pipeline under this alternative, as no permafrost is expected in this area. Permafrost-related ground deformation associated with this alternative in the absence of climate change is expected to be similar to Alternative 2, as the diesel would be within a few degrees of ambient ground conditions and ROW clearing-related effects would be the same. The effects of climate change on permafrost impacts under this alternative are also expected to be the same as Alternative 2, as the amount of soil disturbance in permafrost areas would be about the same between the two alternatives.

#### Summary of Impacts for Alternative 3B – Permafrost

While there would be differences in soil disturbance between Alternatives 3B and 2, most of these are located in areas with no permafrost. Thus, the level of effects would be the same as Alternative 2, i.e., minor to moderate overall. Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

### 3.26.4.4.4 BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND SUBSISTENCE

The elimination of diesel bargeing on the Kuskokwim River would reduce but not eliminate the risk of introducing aquatic and terrestrial invasive species. The addition of a diesel fuel barge from either northwest marine terminals or Nikiski to Tyonek would impact vegetation in the
vicinity of Tyonek through direct vegetation removal for a new dock and tanks, or by increasing
the potential for introduction of new invasive species or spread of existing known invasive
plant species in Tyonek. Invasion prevention and management practices would not change;
design features, Early Detection and Rapid Response principles, BMPs, and an adaptive
Invasive Species Management Plan (ISMP) would remain the same as in Alternative 2.

The effects of climate change on impacts of the project on biological resources and subsistence
under Alternative 3B would be similar to those described under Alternative 2, but would cover
a slightly larger area during operations. Overall impacts from climate change would be minor.

3.26.4.5 ALTERNATIVE 4 – BIRCH TREE CROSSING PORT

3.26.4.5.1 ATMOSPHERE

Alternative 4 would move the location of the Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port and mine access road in
Alternative 2 to BTC. This would result in reduced distance of river barging and longer road
trips between the BTC Port and the mine site. Project-related activities for the transportation
facilities would have slightly higher GHG emissions during the construction and reclamtion
and closure of the longer access road under Alternative 4. During operations, project-related
activities for the transportation facilities would have reduced GHG emissions from barging, but
increased GHG emissions from the increased distance trucks would have to travel on the mine
access road when compared to Alternative 2. No changes in GHG emissions would occur under
Alternative 4 for any phases of the mine site or pipeline components.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 4 – Atmosphere

Overall, Alternative 4 would have a slight increase in GHG emissions during operations of the
transportation facilities when compared to Alternative 2. At most, impacts to climate change
would be minor under Alternative 4, similar to Alternative 2.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts
are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be
implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation
measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to
Alternative 2.

3.26.4.5.2 WATER

Mine Site and Natural Gas Pipeline

The effects of climate change on hydrology impacts for the mine site and pipeline would be the
same under Alternative 4 as Alternative 2, as there would be no change in proposed facilities
for these two components.
Transportation Facilities

Barging

Under Alternative 4, the number of barge trips on the Kuskokwim River would be the same, but the round trip travel distance would be reduced by about 40 percent. In addition, several critical (shallow) sections of the river upstream of the BTC Port would be avoided under this alternative. However, there would still be two critical sections of the river downstream of the BTC Port under Alternative 4 (Figure 3.5-29, Surface Water Hydrology).

The flow cutoff for operating on the lower section of the river is the same as that of the upper river (greater than 39,000 cfs at the Crooked Creek gauge), because Nelson Island below BTC is the controlling case. That is, the flow needed to get through Nelson Island under Alternative 4 is the same as the flow needed to get to Angyaraq (Jungjuk) Port under Alternative 2 (Enos 2014). With a shorter barge travel time, fewer barge days would be required under this alternative to meet fuel and cargo shipping requirements, and the need for seasonal changes or other contingencies would be reduced.

As a result, the effects of climate change on Kuskokwim River flow are expected to cause less impact on the project under Alternative 4 than Alternative 2. With shorter barge trips and fewer barge days, there would be almost no need to operate barges in low water conditions to meet resupply requirements, and there would be less risk of barge strandings or need for other shipping contingencies. Thus, the magnitude of potential climate change effects is expected to be of low intensity, in that climate change potentially reducing summer flows on the river is not likely to have a noticeable effect on the project.

BTC Road

Predicted climate change effects on precipitation in the vicinity of the BTC Road (e.g., see Aniak, Table 3.26-4) are similar to those predicted for the mine access road under Alternative 2. While there would be an increased number of bridges and culverts along the BTC Road as compared to the mine access road, the range of magnitude associated with these effects would be the same for both alternatives; i.e., the effect of climate change on their design is expected to be low to medium, in that the effects may or may not be noticeable and designs based on extreme events are expected to be adequate for conditions.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 4 – Water

While the magnitude of effects on the transportation component ( barging) under Alternative 4 would be less than that of Alternative 2, the range of effects for the mine site, transportation facilities (BTC Road), and pipeline would remain unchanged, i.e., low to medium (e.g., hydrologic design of major facilities expected to be adequate to accommodate climate change effects of increased precipitation). Thus, the ratings for the project as a whole under Alternative 4 would be the same as Alternative 2; i.e., minor to moderate.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.
3.26.4.5.3 PERMAFROST

Mine Site and Natural Gas Pipeline

The areas of soil disturbance for the mine site and pipeline components under Alternative 4 would be the same as Alternative 2. Thus, the effects of climate change with respect to permafrost would be the same.

Transportation Facilities

Impacts to and from permafrost under this alternative in the absence of climate change are expected to be greater than those of Alternative 2, due to the increased length of the BTC Road and Crooked Creek temporary ice road crossing permafrost areas. However, because the permafrost areas along the BTC Road would be covered by geotextile and fill, climate change is expected to have little effect on increasing the rate of thaw or differential settlement, due to the insulating and strength effects of the added material.

Climate change could increase permafrost degradation effects along the Crooked Creek ice road, depending on the degree of vegetation and soil compaction beneath the ice. Effects in the absence of climate change may or may not be noticeable and would be temporary to long-term; effects with climate change are more likely to be noticeable and long-term, depending on the rate of vegetation recovery. This increase in effects for the Crooked Creek ice road, however, would not change the range of impact criteria (e.g., low to medium intensity) for the transportation facilities combined under Alternative 4 as compared to Alternative 2.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 4 – Permafrost

While there could be an increase in the effects of climate change on permafrost thaw under Alternative 4 along the Crooked Creek ice road, the increase would be relatively small compared to the project as a whole. Thus, the level of effects would be the same as Alternative 2; i.e., minor to moderate overall.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions, and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

3.26.4.5.4 BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND SUBSISTENCE

The longer port road and ice road would cause an additional 918.4 acres of direct vegetation removal, resulting in a higher risk of invasive species introduction or spread. Invasion prevention and management practices would not change; design features, Early Detection and Rapid Response principles, BMPs, and an adaptive ISMP would remain the same as in Alternative 2.

The effects of climate change on impacts of the project on biological resources and subsistence under Alternative 4 would be similar to those described under Alternative 2, but would cover a slightly larger area during operations. Overall impacts to from climate change would be minor.
3.26.4.6 ALTERNATIVE 5A - DRY STACK TAILINGS

3.26.4.6.1 ATMOSPHERE

Alternative 5A includes variations in tailings methods within the mine site. This action would not cause a substantial change in GHG emissions or impacts to climate change in any of the phases or project components from those identified under Alternative 2. Overall direct and indirect impacts related to climate change would be minor under Alternative 5A, similar to Alternative 2.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

3.26.4.6.2 WATER

Mine Site Construction, and Operations and Maintenance

Alternative 5A (both Options 1 and 2) would involve slightly different major water-retaining structures than Alternative 2, that could be affected by the predicted increase in precipitation caused by climate change. Under Alternative 5A, a dry stack tailings pile would be constructed behind an upper dam in the Anaconda Creek drainage, and the main TSF dam would be used to hold an operating pond. The dam design criteria with respect to IDF would be the same as the TSF dam under Alternative 2 (BGC 2014a). Thus, the effects of extreme hydrologic events on Alternative 5A would be considered the same as Alternative 2. The upper operating pond dam would limit seepage of infiltrated water (under both options) and groundwater (under Option 1) through the dam that accumulates in the dry stack. The dry stack would either be unlined (Option 1) or have a rock overdrain (Option 2) to provide drainage and enhance stability of the stack in the event of higher precipitation conditions due to climate change.

Stochastic water balance models (WBMs) have been developed for Alternative 5A, which take into account the same wet and dry climate scenarios as under Alternative 2 (that is, WBM runs based on 10th to 99th percentile precipitation conditions) (BGC 2015j). These provide results over a greater range of conditions than the predicted average annual climate change increase over the operations period of 2 to 3 percent. For example, WBMs for Alternative 5A predict that, if 99th percentile precipitation conditions occur continuously over the mine life, the ultimate cumulative TSF operating pond volume would be about 20 percent higher than the 50th percentile or average condition (99,000 vs. 82,000 acre-feet, respectively). Both of these are well within the total storage capacity of the pond, about 125,000 acre-feet, as it is designed to store an extra year of contingency water production (BGC 2014a). The total storage capacity of pond under Alternative 5A is about 50 percent higher than the average precipitation condition.

The effects of a 25 percent climate-caused precipitation increase on pit dewatering volume, and on the amount of freshwater needed from Snow Gulch reservoir, would be the same under Alternative 5A (both options) as for Alternative 2. In addition, the flexibility provided by the
AWT WTP design under Alternative 2 would be the same under Alternative 5A. Flexible mine site water management under Alternative 5A means that major water containment structures would be able to accommodate extra runoff and dewatering water from potential climate change precipitation increases. Thus, the magnitude of potential climate change effects on major mine structures in operations under Alternative 5A is considered medium (likely to be adequate for conditions).

Closure, Reclamation, and Monitoring

Because the operating pond and other water dams would be removed in closure, the effects of climate change on pond volumes and related water management activities would be considered long-term and would not occur in post-closure. There would be an increased rate of seepage flow to the SRS in post-closure under Option 1 (unlined dry stack), which would be pumped to the pit lake. Under Option 2 (lined dry stack), the same increased seepage flow (compared to Alternative 2) would report directly to the pit lake in post-closure. Because the increased volume of seepage flow through the dry stack under both options of Alternative 5A compared to Alternative 2 (about 30 to 80 gpm more) represents a relatively small amount of the total water filling in the pit lake from other sources (about 4,000 gpm), the effect of increased precipitation from climate change during post-closure would be about the same as Alternative 2; i.e. the management of water levels to maintain freeboard would be similar and, like Alternative 2, would be conducted in perpetuity.

Summary of Mine Site Impacts

The magnitude of climate change effects on major structures and water management at the mine site is expected to be low to medium (e.g., effects may or may not be discernable beyond extremes predicted by the historical record, and hydrologic designs adequate to accommodate most climate change effects). The duration, geographic extent, and context of climate change effects would be the same as Alternative 2. Overall effects of climate change on hydrology impacts are considered mostly minor to moderate.

Transportation Facilities and Natural Gas Pipeline

The effects of climate change on hydrology for transportation facilities and the pipeline would be the same under Alternative 5A as Alternative 2, as there would be no change in proposed facilities for these two components of the project.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 5A – Water

The magnitude of hydrologic effects due to climate change under Alternative 5A (including effects on transportation and pipeline components which do not change under this alternative from Alternative 2) would mostly range from low (e.g., effects may or may not be discernable beyond extremes predicted by the historical record) to medium (e.g., sufficient barging days available to meet shipping needs). The duration, geographic extent, and context of climate change effects would be the same as Alternative 2. Overall effects of climate change on hydrology are considered mostly minor to moderate, with a low probability of major effects that could be reduced to moderate through additional mitigation.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be
implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

3.26.4.6.3 PERMAFROST

Mine Site

Soil and permafrost disturbances beneath the dry stack tailings and operating pond under Alternative 5A would be slightly greater than those for Alternative 2, but not significantly different. Permafrost excavation beneath the dam footprints would be higher under Alternative 5A, increasing the amount of this material stored in the TSF overburden stockpile and the amount of permafrost melting in the pile; however, this effect is expected to occur in the absence of climate change. Thus, the effects of climate change on permafrost impacts under this alternative are expected to be the same as Alternative 2.

Transportation Facilities and Natural Gas Pipeline

The areas of soil disturbance for the transportation and pipeline components under Alternative 5A would be the same as Alternative 2. Thus, the effect of climate change on permafrost impacts would be the same.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 5A – Permafrost

While there could be a minor increase in permafrost impacts under Alternative 5A associated with the mine site, the effects of climate change would be the same as Alternative 2. Thus, the level of effects would be the same as Alternative 2, i.e., minor to moderate overall. Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

3.26.4.6.4 BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND SUBSISTENCE

The change in tailing disposal method would directly affect biological resources by reducing the amount of vegetation disturbance at the mine site slightly. The effects of climate change on impacts of the project on biological resources and subsistence under Alternative 5 would be similar to those described under Alternative 2. Overall impacts from climate change would be minor.

3.26.4.7 ALTERNATIVE 6A – MODIFIED NATURAL GAS PIPELINE ALIGNMENT: DALZELL GORGE ROUTE

3.26.4.7.1 ATMOSPHERE

Alternative 6A would not cause a substantial change in GHG emissions or impacts to climate change in any of the phases or project components from those identified under Alternative 2.
Overall direct and indirect impacts to climate change would be considered minor under Alternative 6A, similar to Alternative 2.

Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

3.26.4.7.2 WATER

Mine Site and Transportation Facilities

The effects of climate change on water impacts for the mine and transportation facilities would be the same under Alternative 6A as Alternative 2, as there would be no change in proposed facilities for these two components of the project.

Natural Gas Pipeline

The alternate pipeline route through the Alaska Range under Alternative 6A would traverse high mountain terrain that is expected to have similar climate change impacts to hydrology as that of the Alaska Range section of Alternative 2. Based on mapped SNAP (2012) data, precipitation is predicted to increase as much as 15 percent in the Alaska Range over the life of the mine. The monthly distribution of precipitation changes at lower elevations along the alternative route are expected to be similar to that of Skwentna (Table 3.26-5)).

Increased precipitation and breakup discharge due to climate change could cause an increase in the occurrence of glaciation or aufeis effects at co-located ROW and INHT segments between MP 84 and MP 142 of Alternative 6A. Localized glaciation is known to occur along the trail in the Alaska Range in winter, a situation which could be exacerbated by the co-located pipeline ROW near stream crossings and be hazardous for trail users. While BMPs and regular operations activities would minimize these effects, incremental glaciation effects from climate change could be greater underAlternative 6A than Alternative 2, due to the greater number of trail crossings and co-located segments under Alternative 6A (21 more crossings and 10.5 more co-located miles).

The predicted magnitude of hydrologic climate change effects would be similar between the Alternative 2 and 6A routes, although the extent of potential increased glaciation effects could be greater under Alternative 6A. However, the range of overall effects under this alternative would be the same as Alternative 2, i.e. minor to moderate.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 6A - Water

The hydrologic effects of climate change for the mine site, transportation facilities, and natural gas pipeline under Alternative 6A would be the same as Alternative 2, i.e., minor to moderate overall. Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.
3.26.4.7.3 PERMAFROST

Mine Site and Transportation Facilities

The areas of soil disturbance for the mine and transportation components under Alternative 6A would be the same as Alternative 2. Thus, the effect of climate change on permafrost impacts would be the same.

Natural Gas Pipeline

As described in Section 3.2, Soils, there appears to be less permafrost occurrence and related impacts along the Alaska Range section of Alternative 6A than that of Alternative 2. However, this is based on data of varying quantities and confidence between the two routes, and ground conditions are more likely to be similar with regard to permafrost between the two alternatives. Thus, the effect of climate change on permafrost impacts along Alternative 6A is expected to be roughly the same as Alternative 2.

Summary of Impacts for Alternative 6A – Permafrost

While there could be minor differences in permafrost impacts between Alternatives 6A and 2, these differences and the effects of climate change would likely be small compared to those of the project as a whole. Thus, the level of effects would be the same as Alternative 2, i.e., minor to moderate overall. Design features, Standard Permit Conditions and BMPs most important for reducing impacts are described in Alternative 2. Additional mitigation and monitoring measures that could be implemented to further reduce impacts are also described in Alternative 2. If these mitigation measures were adopted and required, the summary impact rating would be similar to Alternative 2.

3.26.4.7.4 BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND SUBSISTENCE

The effects of climate change on impacts of the project on biological resources and subsistence under Alternative 6 would be similar to those described under Alternative 2. Overall impacts from climate change would be minor.

3.26.4.8 IMPACT COMPARISON – ALL ALTERNATIVES

A comparison of the impacts to climate change by alternative is presented in Table 3.26-14.
### Table 3.26-14: Climate Change Effects Summary Comparison*

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Atmosphere</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Impacts intensity of GHG emissions would be considered low to medium, representing at most 0.023 percent of U.S. total GHG emissions in 2012. Duration of impacts would be long-term, with GHG emissions occurring throughout the duration of the project, local in extent (occurring in Project Area), and common in context. <strong>Overall effects would be minor.</strong></td>
<td>GHG emissions would be low in intensity for all project components, long-term in duration (occurring throughout operations), and local in extent (emission sources would occur only within the Project Area). GHG emissions reduction would only be about 0.1 percent of extended CO(_2)-e emissions. <strong>Overall effects would be minor.</strong></td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Water</strong></td>
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<td>Hydrologic effects would range from low intensity to medium intensity with the duration of climate change effects being long-term to permanent, with potential impacts lasting through the project life (transportation and pipeline components) and in post-closure (mine site). The extent would be local to regional, and the context of climate change effects on water is considered common to important. <strong>Overall effects would be minor to moderate.</strong></td>
<td>Less potential for low water barge impacts (fewer trips needed). Overall same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Slightly less effects along transportation corridor (fewer barge trips); slightly more effects along pipeline (more stream crossings subject to climate effects). Overall same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Less potential for low water barge effects. Overall same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Flexible mine water management and design of operating pond would be able to accommodate climate-caused precipitation changes. Overall same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Potential for slightly higher climate-caused precipitation and aufeis effects: 21 more stream crossings and 10.5 more miles co-located with INHT. Overall same as Alternative 2.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Table 3.26-14: Climate Change Effects Summary Comparison*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative 2 - Donlin Gold’s Proposed Action</th>
<th>Alternative 3A - LNG-Powered Haul Trucks</th>
<th>Alternative 3B - Diesel Pipeline</th>
<th>Alternative 4 - BTC Port</th>
<th>Alternative 5A - Dry Stack Tailings</th>
<th>Alternative 6A - Dalzell Gorge Route</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permafrost</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impacts to and from permafrost for all components would range from low to medium intensity, although specific low probability conditions may cause medium to high intensity effects which could be reduced through additional mitigation. Low intensity beneficial effects (preservation of remaining permafrost) could also occur in some areas following reclamation. While climate change effects on permafrost would be extended in extent, project-related impacts on climate-altered permafrost would be limited to intermittent areas of permafrost and localized beneath facility footprints and cleared areas. Permafrost thaw effects would range from long-term to permanent. Discontinuous permafrost and climate change are considered common in context. <strong>Overall effects would be minor to moderate.</strong></td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2. While there could be a slight increase in the effects of climate change on permafrost thaw at the Bethel Dock, the increase would be relatively small compared to the project as a whole. <strong>Overall effects would be minor to moderate.</strong></td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Slightly more climate-caused effects along Crooked Creek ice road. Overall same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biological Resources</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Because effects on biological resources (primarily vegetation and wetlands) would be incremental, the intensity would be low. The extent would be local to regional, and the context would be common. <strong>Overall effects would be minor.</strong></td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
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</tbody>
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<th>Alternative 6A - Dalzell Gorge Route</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Because effects on subsistence resources (primarily flexibility in time season, and harvest volume) would be incremental, the intensity would be low. The extent would be local to regional, and the context would be common. <strong>Overall effects would be minor.</strong></td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
<td>Same as Alternative 2.</td>
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**Notes:**
* The No Action Alternative would have no impacts.
3.27 OTHER IMPACT CONSIDERATIONS

3.27.1 UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE EFFECTS

The CEQ guidelines require agencies to evaluate “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented” (40 CFR 1502.16). Unavoidable adverse effects are those remaining after the project has complied with applicable stipulations and mitigation measures. This section summarizes unavoidable adverse effects of the proposed action and alternatives. A detailed discussion of beneficial and adverse effects is presented for each resource in Sections 3.1 through 3.26. Unavoidable adverse impacts to resources in the EIS Analysis Area are described below.

Geology and Soils – changes in landforms and reduction in mineral, soil, fossil-bearing bedrock, and aggregate resources. Surface and intrusive activities during construction and operations would affect the mechanical and thermal properties of the soil and would modify permafrost distribution.

Surface and Groundwater Hydrology – lowered water table in the vicinity of the mine site, average annual flow reduction in Crooked Creek, alteration of groundwater flow and elevation, and alteration of stream flow including the damming of Crooked Creek tributaries.

Water Quality – surficial pit lake water and drainages from the WRF, TSF, Lower CWD, and SOB are predicted to exceed AWQC for some constituents; however, the water from these mine facilities would be treated to meet the most stringent applicable water quality standards before discharge. Atmospheric deposition of mercury could create high intensity impacts to surface water quality depending on watershed location.

Vegetation and Wetlands – changes in vegetation and wetlands, potential introduction of non-native and invasive species, and removal of vegetation (including rare/sensitive plants) and wetlands.

Wildlife and Threatened and Endangered Species – changes in habitat, direct habitat removal, disturbance, and risk of injury or mortality from collisions.

Fish – changes in habitat (including effects of wetland removal), direct habitat removal, stream flow and temperature changes, and sedimentation.

Visual Resources – facilities, infrastructure, equipment, and vegetation clearing would introduce contrast to the natural landscape. Impacts would persist following project closure.

Cultural Resources – changes to cultural landscape of INHT at a scale that would not reduce the scenic quality rating class, impact to sites not eligible for the NRHP, and loss of integrity or destruction of sites eligible for the NHRP.

Subsistence – disturbance and displacement from subsistence use areas, potential for increased competition for resources, disturbance to subsistence fishing in narrow reaches of the Kuskokwim River, and potential or perceived contamination of waterfowl due to the tailings pond and pit lake.

Hazardous Materials and Spills – petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, cyanide, mercury, and mine tailings are hazardous substances that could be spilled as a result of the proposed project. The probability of spills of a magnitude that could adversely affect resources is low.
Resources that could be adversely affected by spills include vegetation, fish, wildlife, water resources, subsistence harvest and uses, recreation, cultural resources, and the economy.

**Climate Change** - the proposed action and alternatives would contribute to global climate change, primarily through the release of greenhouse gases from the burning of fossil fuels. Climate change in turn will impact many aspects of the physical, biological, and social environment including precipitation patterns, permafrost distribution, vegetation, wildlife, fire regimes, and subsistence.

### 3.27.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USES OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT OF LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY

The CEQ guidelines require an evaluation of environmental sustainability considering the relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity (40 CFR 1502.16). This section provides a brief overview of the short-term effects of the proposed action and alternatives versus the maintenance and enhancement of potential long-term productivity of the environmental resources in the area. Generally, short-term is considered the life of the project and long-term refers to an indefinite period beyond the termination of the project.

This evaluation considers whether the proposed development options reduce the ability of the land and water to be used for other purposes. The proposed project and alternatives are consistent with the goals of the landowner to maximize economic benefits by producing gold to meet worldwide demand and provide local economic development. The land was selected under the terms of ANCSA due to the potential mineral development of the area. After project closure and reclamation, many elements of lost productivity may be restored for the long-term. Annual revenues and taxes resulting from the mining activity would cease upon the conclusion of project operations. The loss of these economic benefits could have long-term impacts to the local and regional economy if they are not replaced with other resource development revenues.

### 3.27.3 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES

The CEQ guidelines require an evaluation of “any irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposal should it be implemented” (40 CFR 1502.16). A commitment of resources is irreversible when the impacts of the proposed action or alternatives would limit the future options for use of the resource. This applies primarily to non-renewable resources or to processes or resources that are renewable over long periods of time. Irretrievable commitments apply to loss of production or use of renewable resources. These opportunities are foregone for the period of the proposed action, during which the resource cannot be used. These decisions are reversible, but the utilization opportunities foregone are irretrievable. This section summarizes the irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources for the alternatives analyzed in this EIS.

Ground disturbance, particularly due to project construction and operations, would cause irreversible impacts including land to be permanently altered, soils and bedrock to be permanently displaced, vegetation to be permanently removed, and wetlands to be permanently altered or filled. Any inadvertent effects to cultural or paleontological resources would also result in an irreversible commitment of resources.
Incidental or induced mortality of fish and wildlife resulting from project construction and operations, as well as any reduction in habitat value, could result in localized irretrievable commitment of these resources during the life of the project. Subsistence harvesting and recreational activity in areas occupied by facilities would not be possible during the life of the project, resulting in an irretrievable commitment of related resources.

Funds and labor would be irretrievably committed for project permitting and development.

Consumption of renewable and non-renewable resources would be required for infrastructure development, including metals, aggregate, cement, wood, and other materials.

Non-renewable resources (including gasoline, diesel, natural gas, and electrical power generated from these fuels) would be irreversibly committed for project construction, operations, and closure. Fuels would be required to operate aircraft, motor vehicles, barges, machinery, and mining equipment.

Water would be irretrievably committed for milling and processing.
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